STATEMENT by the Deputy Head of the delegation of the Russian Federation at the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 11th Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (General debate), Geneva, July 23, 2024
Mr. Chair,
Let me congratulate you on your election to this high office and assure you that we stand ready to constructively engage with you on all issues that arise in the course of the review process.
Russian delegation takes this opportunity to commend the United Nations Secretariat and the United Nations Office at Geneva for organizing the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 11th Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).
We appreciate the efforts made by the Chairmanship in cooperation with the UN Secretariat in order to bring the work of the review process back within its usual schedule. We hope that the issue of holding the 2026 Review Conference in April and May will be resolved as successfully, as was that of the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee.
Mr. Chair,
The NPT remains a central element of the international security system. The Treaty is still effective and has proven its resilience and usefulness to all its parties. The successful functioning of the NPT-based international nuclear non-proliferation regime relies on a calibrated balance between the Treaty's three pillars: cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.
We have to note with regret that international security and strategic stability situation continues to deteriorate, as the number of conflicts is growing, their escalation is spiralling, and there is an obvious lack of readiness to engage in comprehensive work to ease tensions and build collective security on mutually acceptable terms. Most dangerously, the confrontation involving States possessing military nuclear capabilities is increasing.
Contradictions across the world have built up, bringing a number of brewing conflicts to active phase and creating new hotbeds of tension. The United States and its allies continue to aggravate the Ukrainian crisis, which was brought about by NATO's unchecked expansion and the West's nurturing the anti-Russian Kiev regime relying on ultra-nationalist actors. Desperate attempts to inflict "strategic defeat" on Russia and remove our country from the international arena as a sovereign stronghold of those who struggle for a just, multi-polar world order, are fraught with a direct clash between nuclear powers. The Middle East conflict is expanding, which has already led to the use of "nuclear rhetoric". In the Asia-Pacific, the turbulence has intensified manifold, with rifts growing along various dividing lines and the nuclear factor gaining increasing role.
In addition to that, NATO's combined military budget has sky-rocketed and exceeded half of the combined global military budget, and it continues to grow. The obvious purpose of this is to gain unchallenged military advantage in order to retain global dominance relying on force.
In this explosive environment, concerns over sharp global increase of strategic risks are completely justified. However, it appears absolutely unrealistic to call for remedying situation primarily through measures focusing on disarmament. Unfortunately, the competent international fora persist in their unwillingness to duly take into account the current political, military and strategic context while considering disarmament initiatives. As a result, their focus is shifted away from the tasks which should logically be treated as an absolute priority. This trend is also visible at the NPT forum, where for many participants promotion of nuclear disarmament totally substitutes for the addressing of a more urgent and inevitable issue of creating the necessary prerequisites. What is more, the disarmament demands have apparently become far more radical.
For our part, we remain convinced that no idea on achieving progress in nuclear disarmament formulated without regard to the international security situation, can be either pragmatic, or workable. Without taking collective efforts to remedy the grave situation in global affairs and creating favourable climate for disarmament first, no tangible progress towards nuclear zero can be attained.
All members of the international community, both possessing nuclear weapons and not, should contribute to such efforts. What we need is urgent steps to extinguish the existing conflicts, and systemic measures to prevent the new hotbeds of confrontation from escalation. Emphasis should be made on tackling the root causes of fundamental controversies relying on the principles of equality, indivisible security and mutual respect of each other's core interests. Practical adherence to these principles is especially important for minimizing strategic risks in relations of nuclear powers on a comprehensive and lasting basis. Without this, no nuclear threat reduction model can be viable.
Mr. Chair,
The NPT nuclear-weapon States' compliance with their non-proliferation obligations is pivotal for ensuring international peace and security. IAEA Safeguards System plays the key role in verifying such compliance. Credibility of the Agency's control mechanism is a key factor of its resilience. Such credibility is only possible if this mechanism is objective, technically sound and politically unbiased.
Russia closely follows the situation around the reform of the IAEA Safeguards System, which continues to cause our serious concerns. We expect the Agency's leadership to present a comprehensive report on the State-level concept clearly stating all the parameters of the reform, the procedure for applying the new approach, the rights and obligations of the IAEA Secretariat and Member States. Until the Secretariat has presented such report and it has been approved by the Agency's policy-making bodies, all Secretariat's State-level approaches to safeguards remain purely experimental, leaving the States the right not to recognize any conclusions prepared using such approaches.
We recognize the significance of the Additional Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards Agreements for confirming that all nuclear material in the country and the country's nuclear activities are of peaceful nature. At the same time, we would like to remind that concluding such Additional Protocols remains a voluntary step.
Russia has contributed money and expertise to ensuring reliability of the IAEA control mechanism, including through its national programme of safeguards support. It includes analysing environmental samples collected by the Agency as part of its inspection activities, in Russian laboratories, the training of IAEA inspectors, and assistance in the development of verification approaches for new types of nuclear plants, including mobile nuclear reactors.
Mr. Chair,
Nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) are a pivotal component of the non-proliferation regime. Establishing such zones is envisaged by Article VII of the NPT. We consider establishing such zones and nuclear-weapons States' signing legally binding protocols on security assurances to the parties to such zones as a meaningful factor strengthening international security and stability. Russia has signed and ratified the protocols to the existing treaties establishing NWFZs in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the South Pacific (Treaty of Rarotonga), Africa (Treaty of Pelindaba), Central Asia (Semipalatinsk Treaty), thus providing security assurances against the threat or use of nuclear weapons to over one hundred States parties to such zones.
The issue of establishing a zone free from nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD-free zone) in the Middle East as envisaged by the resolution of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, has always played special role in the NPT context. We view this resolution as an integral element of the 1995 NPT agreements. Russia welcomes the process of annual sessions of the Conference on a Middle East WMD-Free zone, which was launched by the UN General Assembly in 2018 and in which our country takes part as an observer. A series of substantive discussions has already taken place, and a number of specific decisions has been made. Certainly, this process can only be meaningful if it involves all Middle East countries excepting no one. We once again call on Israel and the United States not to disregard the Conference and take this opportunity to express their opinion and engage in an open discussion on strengthening security in the Middle East.
Mr. Chair,
We would like to highlight the situation around the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). As far back as 1999, the United States Congress denied to ratify the Treaty under an invented pretext. Since then, Washington has made no practical steps in this regard. We view the allegations that the Treaty cannot be passed through the Congress as a poor excuse. Consequently, we have concluded that the American establishment is not interested in ratifying the CTBT.
Russia's withdrawal of its ratification of the Treaty has become a natural response to the disparity in obligations with the United States, which had ensued and lasted for a certain period of time. Nevertheless, we continue to take full part in the CTBT process and have recently completed our segment of the International Monitoring System, the largest certified segment to date. We stand ready to return to the issue of the CTBT ratification as soon as the United States ratifies it.
Mr. Chair,
This year marks the 70th anniversary of the industrial use of the energy released from the nucleus of an atom. In 1954, the world's first nuclear power plant was launched in the town of Obninsk in the USSR. Today, nuclear power accounts for 10 percent of the world total energy production, and nuclear technologies have become an integral part of the life of people across the world. Nuclear energy promotes the sustainable development goals and supplies economy with sustainable and clean energy with the lowest levels of СО2 emissions during the life cycle.
At the moment, Russia operates 42 power units at 12 nuclear power plants with a total installed capacity of 35 GW. Our country has engaged in extensive work on cutting-edge technologies. We run two fast-neutron nuclear reactors; the construction of a lead-cooled fast reactor is under way, which is part of the nuclear power facility intended to close nuclear fuel cycle within a single site; we operate the world's first floating nuclear thermal power plant with two small reactors; a land-based NPP with small reactor is currently under construction, and the programme of construction of small reactors is to be further expanded. Besides, Russia is the only country using civilian nuclear-powered vessels, with seven nuclear icebreakers in operation, and five more being constructed.
Russia actively promotes the development of nuclear energy across the world, and champions broad access of States to the benefits of the peaceful atom. Russian-designed power units are currently build in China, India, Egypt, Turkey, Bangladesh and Hungary. Late last year, a nuclear power plant in Belarus started commercial operation.
Russia is a leader in uranium enrichment and nuclear fuel production. Its priorities include scientific research into and development of radiation technologies and peaceful uses of nuclear energy in medicine, agriculture, industry and other key economic sectors. We attach special importance to training professionals in nuclear sphere: over two thousand students from 65 foreign countries are currently studying in Russian universities.
We provide continuous political, financial and expert support to the IAEA in its activities in the field of energy and non-energy applications of nuclear technology. Russia is a donor of the Technical Cooperation Fund.
We would like to note the reinforcement of negative tendencies in the development of nuclear energy. Those are related to the fact that a group of States, first and foremost, the U.S.-led Western countries, use political methods against their competitors with considerably more advanced nuclear technologies. Such steps run counter to the principles of free trade, Article IV of the NPT and the purposes and objectives of the IAEA.
Russia finds unacceptable any attempts to limit the access to the benefits of peaceful atom for any State compliant with its non-proliferation obligations. Consequently, we do everything we can to counteract the use of the NPT to pursue political and economic tasks that are not directly related to the non-proliferation issues, and will continue to provide all possible assistance in using nuclear technology to all interested States.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.