Statement by the Delegation of the Russian Federation at the First Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 11th Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Cluster 1: nuclear disarmament), Vienna, August 3, 2023
Mr. Chair,
In its main statement during the general debate the Russian delegation tried to highlight some problematic aspects, which at this stage significantly hamper the fruitful work within the NPT review process. The foregoing is also fully applied to the discussions in recent years on the review of the disarmament pillar of the Treaty. Today, we would like to elaborate, in particular, on insufficient consideration of geopolitical and strategic realities when discussing the state of affairs on the nuclear disarmament track.
We note that many participants have shown their unwillingness to adequately and pragmatically take into account, in the disarmament context, the state of the security environment, which is not limited to nuclear aspects alone. Meanwhile, the link between progress towards nuclear disarmament and the overall international security situation was evident for the authors of the NPT and was explicitly incorporated by them into the context of the Treaty. It is worth recalling that its preamble refers to the desire of States "to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control".
Fundamental understandings regarding the conditions necessary to ensure the consistency and sustainability of nuclear disarmament have been developed and supplemented throughout the NPT duration. The 2000 "13 steps" underlined the need to implement the steps leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all. The 2010 Action Plan further elaborates on this formula and envisages that the steps should promote international stability, peace and security, and be based on the principle of increased and undiminished security for all. There is no denying the fact that these understandings are part of the consensus agreements of all NPT States parties.
Russia remains strongly committed to this approach, which was originally enshrined in the NPT. We believe that schemes involving a "shortcut" to "nuclear zero", including by simply outlawing nuclear weapons, are completely unfeasible. Guided by these considerations, we have consistently stated that such endeavors as the TPNW are counterproductive. While sharing the idea of a nuclear-weapon-free world as the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament, we are at the same time convinced that the hasty drafting and conclusion of the TPNW have not brought this goal closer. They have only deepened the divisions among the parties to the NPT and thereby have weakened its viability.
We find it is possible to achieve further practical results in reducing nuclear weapons and, ultimately, their complete elimination only on the basis of a realistic step-by-step approach. Advancing on this path requires not setting artificial time frames, but meticulous work on the part of all members of the international community to create a climate conducive to disarmament with due regard for security interests of all parties. In this effort, of importance is the role of both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States, which should effectively contribute to the overall de-escalation of international tensions, the strengthening of stability and the establishment of a feasible global disarmament agenda in the context of the implementation of Article VI. At the same time, nuclear disarmament should be seen as part of the process of general and complete disarmament in strict accordance with the provisions of the NPT preamble, as well as Article VI in its entirety and without singling out individual elements.
Fulfilling its obligations under the NPT, Russia has made a significant contribution to the process of real nuclear weapons reductions and has consistently diminished the place and role of nuclear weapons in its Military Doctrine over decades. Our State policy in the field of nuclear deterrence is exclusively defensive in nature, aimed at maintaining a minimum nuclear force capability to prevent aggression against Russia and its allies.
At this stage the continued possession of nuclear weapons is for our country the only possible response to certain external threats. The Ukrainian crisis provoked and fueled by the West has confirmed the validity of our concerns. Having flagrantly violated the principle of equal and indivisible security, the NATO bloc has staked on malicious expansion aimed at weakening our country. The West used our forced response to protect our external security contour as a pretext to move to an open power game against Russia, dangerously teetering on the brink of direct military confrontation. Under these circumstances, further reductions in our country's nuclear weapons would not only dramatically decrease its security, but would actually turn the idea of large-scale aggression against Russia into a very realistic option for NATO countries, which have a significant advantage in conventional weapons.
Thus, further progress on the nuclear disarmament track will require the West to abandon its destructive policy of undermining Russia's security. At the same time, it will be necessary for all the States with military nuclear capabilities to join the disarmament process. First of all, in this context we have to take into account the combined arsenal of the United States, United Kingdom and France, which are NATO allies and are capable of jointly using nuclear forces against our country. This factor takes on special significance given the fact that the North Atlantic bloc, positioning itself as a "nuclear alliance," is being increasingly involved in the confrontation with Russia and declares its intention to inflict a "strategic defeat" on Russia. Moreover, the nuclear arsenals of London and Paris are not only unlimited, but in the case of the United Kingdom, they are being significantly increased.
Nuclear arms control, as well as nuclear disarmament process cannot be isolated from the general geopolitical and military-strategic context. The potential for progress in this area depends directly on the international security and strategic stability situation, which under current conditions is affected by a number of factors. They include the total hybrid war unleashed against Russia by Western countries, which is on the verge of slipping into a direct armed conflict; the U.S. aspiration to achieve decisive military superiority for the purposes of undivided global dominance; the unrestricted development of a destabilizing U.S. global missile defense system combined with the build-up of high-precision non-nuclear weapons for "global", "decapitating" and "disarming" strikes; lowered threshold for the use of nuclear weapons in the U.S. military doctrine; the self-proclaimed "nuclear status" of NATO, the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe and their active modernization; Washington's progress towards placing weapons in outer space; growing quantitative and qualitative imbalances in conventional weapons; the West's illegitimate use of restrictive measures that prejudice the security of other countries, bypassing the UN.
Prior to the current crisis, Russia initiated a dialogue with the U.S. to find ways to comprehensively resolve the unsatisfactory military and political situation in the Euro-Atlantic region, as well as to ensure strategic stability by means of risk reduction and arms control. We sought substantive work to minimize conflict potential and formulate a new "security equation." However, the dialogue that had barely begun was devalued by the United States' refusal to respect our fundamental interests and its general anti-Russian policy, and then interrupted by Washington under the pretext of the developments around Ukraine, which it itself had provoked.
The destructive actions of the United States continued to have a devastating effect on the arms control architecture, which it had already largely destroyed. This led, in particular, to the suspension of the New START Treaty. Russia's forced decision was a justified, legitimate and practically inevitable reaction to Washington's undermining of the fundamental principles and understandings on which the New START Treaty was based and to the following fundamental change of circumstances. The American side's failure to observe the central quantitative limits under the New START Treaty and its assistance to the Kiev regime in attacking our strategic facilities subject to the Treaty also dealt a severe blow to its viability.
Given the "freezing" of the New START Treaty and the earlier collapse of the INF Treaty caused by the United States, Russia is taking a number of measures to maintain predictability and stability in the nuclear missile sphere. We continue to adhere to the central quantitative limits stipulated in the New START Treaty, inform the United States of launches of ICBMs and SLBMs through an exchange of relevant notifications, and observe a unilateral moratorium on the deployment of ground launched intermediate- and shorter-range missiles until similar U.S.-made weapons emerge in relevant regions. At the same time, this moratorium is under serious pressure in view of the Pentagon's active preparations for the deployment of ground-launched intermediate- and shorter-range missiles in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region.
In the context of the overall growth of threats from the West, the retention of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, which are designed to promptly hit a wide range of targets in the Russian territory, is of major concern to us, inciting compensatory countermeasures. These weapons must be completely withdrawn to the U.S. territory and the relevant infrastructure in Europe must be dismantled.
Washington's steps toward extending such schemes to other parts of the world, where the United States already practices so-called "extended deterrence," also have pronounced negative implications for regional and global security. In particular, the arrangements between the United States and the Republic of Korea on joint "nuclear planning" lead to heightened tensions in the Asia-Pacific region and spur an arms race. We note with concern the official calls to expand this format to include Japan.
Today, restrained and responsible behavior by the nuclear powers towards each other is more important than ever. Our principled approach has always been based on the postulate that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. In January 2022, it was jointly affirmed by the leaders of the five nuclear-weapon States and has gained additional relevance in the current circumstances. According to the logic of the Joint Statement, it is necessary to minimize the risk of any military confrontation between nuclear powers. However, as has already been noted, in the context of the crisis that has erupted in Europe, we see actions on the part of the Western nuclear-weapon States that lead in the opposite direction. This is extremely dangerous.
As a matter of principle, we believe that nuclear risk reduction should be considered in the broader context of minimizing strategic risks and on the basis of a comprehensive approach that takes into account the combination of relevant factors in their interrelationship. New steps in this area should be seamlessly integrated into the process of repairing the undermined international security architecture and minimizing the potential for conflict between nuclear-weapon States by addressing the root causes of the contradictions that arise between them through equitable dialogue.
The issue of nuclear disarmament verification (NDV) has been gaining popularity in recent years. However, we strongly believe that the potential benefits of its in-depth discussion at the present stage have been greatly overestimated. Discussions in the specialized UN Group of Governmental Experts confirmed the lack of unity in relation to approaches to NDV and its scope. Most importantly, there is no agreement on the advisability of the "early" development of verification procedures in isolation from comprehensive negotiation work that will be required in the future to conclude nuclear disarmament agreements. All of this range of views is presented in the final report of the Group, which also contains a number of important consensus statements on the fundamental principles on which the NDV should be based. It is unlikely that in the foreseeable future the NPT community will have much to add on this topic for the purposes of the Treaty review process.
In our view, the discussions at the 10th Review Conference clearly demonstrated that a professional and committed conversation among States parties to the Treaty is needed on the NPT platform. This approach should also be followed when discussing the issues inducing the most heated debates. This is the only acceptable means of overcoming differences and finding common ground that would allow us to build further work on the basis of consensus.
Russia is open to any constructive ideas on encouraging multilateral discussion of nuclear disarmament issues in the context of strengthening international security and stability.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
