17:35

Statement by the Deputy Head of the Delegation of the Russian Federation, Deputy Director of the Department for Non-proliferation and Arms Control of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Konstantin Vorontsov at the Ninth Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Review Conference on item 10  of the agenda Review of the Convention Provisions, Article 5 of the BTWC, Geneva, 1 December, 2022

2478-02-12-2022

Unofficial translation

 

Madam Chair,

In a comprehensive review of the Convention articles, we would like to state briefly the key ideas related to the use of Article 5 this year.

As we have reiterated, the Russian Federation received the evidence which shed light on the genuine nature of interaction between Pentagon and its contractors and the Ukrainian side in the field of military and biological activity in violation of Articles 1 and 4 of the BTWC. We have already detailed the nature of our concerns.

In view of the facts proving that Washington and Kiev conduct improper military and biological activity, in June 2022, Russia, through the BTWC Implementation Support Unit (ISU), attempted to obtain exhaustive answers to the questions it had posed in relation to the implementation by the United States and Ukraine of Articles I and IV of the BTWC through a bilateral consultative process with these countries (documents prepared by the Russian Federation containing a detailed description of the said questions and the relevant supporting materials are available on the BTWC Web portal:

However, Washington and Kiev have not provided necessary explanations, nor have they taken immediate measures to remedy the situation. On August 26 and September 5-9, 2022 the Formal Consultative Meeting of the BTWC States Parties under BTWC Article V concerning the questions regarding compliance of the United States and Ukraine with the BTWC

in the context of the activities of biological laboratories in Ukrainian territory was convened upon the Russian initiative. The Russian Federation assumed that the Consultative Meeting would let the delegations concerned, with the support of their experts, gain a thorough understanding of the situation, exchange assessments, ask professional questions and receive detailed answers. During the consultations, we made all the necessary efforts to provide detailed materials and arguments to enable the Consultative Meeting to achieve its objectives and resolve the situation related to the military and biological activities in the territory of Ukraine.

However, based on the results of the exchange of views among States Parties, the Russian Federation notes that the overwhelming majority of the claims put forward by Russia have gone unanswered. As stated in the final report of the Consultative Meeting, it was not possible to reach consensus on the questions we raised, they remain open and require resolution. They remain unanswered and require solution.

In this regard, we need to take further steps within the framework of the Convention to settle this situation, at least hold additional consultations to address the remaining claims and questions in the context of the activities of biolaboratories on Ukrainian territory. We also need to undertake further measures to establish all facts of violation of obligations under the Convention by the United States and Ukrainian. As long as the issues we have raised are not answered, they will remain here and undermine implementation of the Convention.

The Russian Federation attaches significant importance to confidence-building measures under the BTWC. Since the introduction of confidence-building measures in 1987, our country has participated in the exchange of such information on an annual basis. Moreover, Russia's statements include additional information, provided upon our own initiative, which goes beyond confidence-building initiatives.

Due to the absence of the verification mechanism, the development of which we support, confidence-building measures are the only coherent tool for increasing confidence in implementation and ensuring transparency of the Convention-related activity. At the same time, we reiterate that they can not be considered as replacing the verification mechanism under the BTWC, or representing a tool to assess the BTWC implementation by any State.

Therefore, the Russian Federation proposes supplementing the format of confidence-building measures (Form A, part 2 ii) with a new form, "Military medical and biological activities carried out by a State Party on the territory of other States Parties". In addition, we believe it is necessary to improve Form "Declaration of Vaccine Production Facilities" (Form G) by providing data on vaccine production facilities for animal protection. The relevant working papers have already been submitted for your consideration. You can find them at the BTWC web-site.

Thank you.

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