SOR TREATY - A NEW STAGE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TREATY BASE WITH RESPECT TO NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTIONS (FACTSHEET)
Unofficial translation from Russian
SOR Treaty - a New Stage in the Development of the Treaty Base with Respect to Nuclear Arms Reductions
(Factsheet)
The Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions will ensure continuity and consistency in the development of the bilateral Russian-American treaty base in the field of nuclear disarmament and the promotion of strategic stability, whose formation began in the seventies of the last century.
By now the Soviet Union, and then Russia has concluded more than ten treaties and agreements with the USA in this field, to the most important of which one may assign the following:
Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War
Signed and entered into force on September 30, 1971. Of unlimited duration. The Parties undertook to notify each other in the event of various incidents and other situations which could create a risk of outbreak of nuclear war.
Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War
Signed and entered into force on June 22, 1973. Of unlimited duration. Under this Agreement, the Parties undertook: to remove the danger of nuclear war and of the use of nuclear weapons; and to refrain from the threat of force in circumstances which may endanger international peace and security.
Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles
Signed on May 26, 1972, entered into force on October 3, 1972. Of unlimited duration. For more than 30 years served as the basis for strategic stability, restraining and strictly limiting the development of the defensive component of the strategic forces of the two sides.
On December 13, 2001, the USA announced that it was withdrawing from the ABM Treaty.
Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT 1)
Signed on May 26, 1972, entered into force on October 3, 1972. Of 5 years duration. Under this Agreement, the Parties undertook not to start construction of additional fixed land-based ICBM launchers after July 1, 1972, as well as to limit SLBM launchers and modern ballistic missile submarines
Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT 2)
Signed on June 18, 1979. In particular, each Party undertook to limit, from January 1, 1981, ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, and ASBMs to an aggregate number not to exceed 2,250, and to initiate reductions of those arms which as of that date would be in excess of this aggregate number.
Treaty Between the USSR and the USA on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (ISRMs)
Signed on December 8, 1987, entered into force on June 1, 1988.
By May 31, 1991, in accordance with the Treaty-prescribed dates and procedures the process was fully completed of eliminating more than 2,500 Soviet and US land-based missiles of two classes - intermediate-range (from 1,000 to 5,500 km) and shorter-range (from 500 to 1,000 km), as well as their launchers, support structures and support equipment, deployment areas, missile operating bases and missile support facilities.
Treaty on Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I)
Signed on July 31, 1991, entered into force on December 5, 1994. Expiration date: December 5, 2009 (may be renewed).
December 5, 2001, marked the end of a 7-year period envisaging the reduction of delivery vehicles of strategic offensive arms (ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers) to 1,600 and of the associated warheads to 6,000.
According to Article II of the new START Treaty this Treaty "shall remain in force in accordance with its provisions."
The parties to the START Treaty are Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and the USA. The elimination of strategic offensive arms on the territory of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, which have become members of the NPT, is over.
Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II)
Signed by Russia and the USA on January 3, 1993. Ratified by the Russian Federation on May 6, 2000. Not in force because it has not been ratified by the American side.
If START II had become an operative treaty, Russia and the USA should have reduced their strategic offensive arms to a level of 3,000-3,500 warheads. MRVed ICBMs would have been prohibited, and heavy ICBMs among them would have been completely eliminated.
Glossary
SOR - strategic offensive reductions;
ICBM - intercontinental ballistic missile;
MRV - multiple reentry vehicle;
SLBM - submarine-launched ballistic missile;
ASBM - air-to-surface ballistic missile;
ISRMs - intermediate- and shorter-range missiles;
NPT - Nonproliferation Treaty
Format of the SOR Treaty, Ratification Procedure
1. The Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions bears a legally binding character. The chief undertaking of the Parties under the Treaty is to reduce and limit their strategic nuclear warhead to 1,700-2,200 by a fixed date - December 31, 2012.
The Treaty is subject to ratification in accordance with constitutional procedures of each of the Parties. For Russia this means: a law on ratification is passed by the State Duma, approved by the Federation Council, and signed by the President. It will enter into force the day the instruments of ratification are exchanged.
The Treaty will remain in force until December 31, 2012. It contains a provision for its renewal and possible replacement earlier than this date by a subsequent agreement.
Each Party, according to the Treaty, has the right to withdraw from it - by way of the exercise of state sovereignty upon three months written notice to the other Party.
The Treaty will be registered in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
(This Article reads in part:
"Every treaty and every international agreement entered into by any Member of the United Nations after the present Charter comes into force shall as soon as possible be registered with the Secretariat and published by it.")
Principles Set Forth in the SOR Treaty
The Treaty Between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Strategic Offensive Reductions proceeds from the recognition of their commitment to the goal of strengthening mutual relations by cooperation. It states that new global challenges and threats demand the establishment of a new strategic relationship between Russia and the USA, based on genuine partnership.
The Preamble to the Treaty specifies the principles on which such partnership will be built in the military-strategic field: mutual security, cooperation, trust, openness and predictability.
Of special importance is the mention of the principle of mutual security, for the first time appearing in Russian-American treaties. This is a reflection of the qualitatively new stage in the positive development of relations between the two countries.
Thus, the new Treaty places emphasis above all on a more developed base of the strategic relationship between Russia and the USA, in which the principles of partnership and cooperation, and a mutual recognition of the demands arising from new global challenges and threats figure much more prominently.
The Treaty by referring to the Joint Statement of the Russian and US Presidents in Genoa on July 22, 2001, reconfirms the principle of the interconnection of strategic offensive and defensive arms.
The Treaty reaffirms the obligations which both Parties bear in accordance with Article VI of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). This Article establishes the interconnection between the task of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and the task of nuclear disarmament with consistent advancement towards general and complete disarmament.
The Treaty-envisaged strategic offensive arms reductions are an important contribution to the current NPT review process with the objective of preparing for the 2005 NPT Review Conference.
Main Content of the SOR Treaty
The Treaty envisages a considerable reduction of strategic offensive arms. In accordance with its provisions each of the Parties must reduce the levels of its strategic nuclear warheads to 1,700-2,200 by December 31, 2012; ie by about three times compared to the ceiling established by the now operative START I Treaty (6,000 weapons). Furthermore-, each of the Parties will itself determine the composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms, proceeding from the established aggregate limit for the number of such warheads.
The Treaty envisages no stages (schedule) of reductions. This lets each Party plan at its own discretion the lowering of the levels of strategic nuclear warheads in its possession. As the experience of the implementation of the START I Treaty shows, reducing strategic offensive arms is a complex, labor-consuming process requiring a lot of effort, time and expenditure. So both Parties will be able to draw up such schedules even in the absence of relevant treaty provisions. There is mutual understanding that it will take certain transparency with respect to such reduction plans and their implementation to enhance the verifiability of the Treaty.
Set into the Treaty itself are the conditions for its further enrichment, strengthening and development. It is borne in mind that a special Bilateral Implementation Commission will deal with this matter. It will meet at least twice a year. Regulations for this commission will have to be worked out, determining its functional powers, objectives and tasks.
On the Interrelationship Between the SOR Treaty and the START I Treaty
Article II of the new Treaty records the consent of the Parties that the START I Treaty shall remain in force. Special reference is also made to their obligations under this Treaty.
The START I Treaty shall remain in force until December 5, 2009 and with the consent of both Parties may be renewed. This means that the strategic offensive capabilities of Russia and the USA will at least until this date be under the double complementary restriction of these Treaties.
This is important from, among other things, the viewpoint of ensuring proper verification. The START I Treaty verification mechanism, which continues to function, will enable the Parties to trace the state of affairs in the strategic arsenals of each other, including in the interests of the new Treaty. In addition, as envisaged by the Declaration on a New Strategic Relationship Between the Russian Federation and the United States of America, the provisions of the START I Treaty will serve as the basis for ensuring trust, openness and predictability in the further reduction of strategic offensive arms along with other supplementary measures to be agreed upon, including measures of openness.
An important role in implementing the new Treaty is also called upon to play by the START I-prescribed quantitative and qualitative restrictions on delivery vehicles of strategic offensive arms and the provisions concerning re-equipment of such delivery vehicles. They contain a serious restraining element for back deployment of warheads.
Questions of the START-ABM Link in the SOR Treaty and the Declaration on a New Strategic Relationship Between Russia and the USA
Russia continues to regard the unilateral US decision to quit the ABM Treaty as erroneous. Nevertheless, to prevent the creation of a legal vacuum in the area of strategic stability, the Russian side chose the constructive path of preparing a new agreement with the USA on strategic offensive arms. Moreover, it has been possible to ensure in the new Treaty the confirmation by both sides of the objectively existing link between strategic offensive and defensive arms.
Thus, the Preamble to the Treaty cites the Genoa Joint Statement of the Russian and US Presidents on Strategic Issues of July 22, 2001, in which "we agreed that major changes in the world require concrete discussions of both offensive and defensive systems" and spoke in favor of holding "intensive consultations on the interrelated subjects of offensive and defensive systems."
The Preamble to the Treaty also refers to the Joint Statement of the two Presidents on a new relationship between Russia and the USA of November 13, 2001, which speaks of both a shared commitment to implement substantial reductions in strategic offensive weapons and an agreement to continue consultations on strategic defense in the "broad framework of the new strategic relationship."
The Declaration on a New Strategic Relationship develops the provisions on interconnection. It directly points out that Russia and the USA proceed from the Joint Statements adopted in Genoa and Washington. Besides, in order to ensure the predictability of the Parties' actions Russia and the USA, in accordance with the Declaration, have consented to carry out a number of measures aimed at confidence building and the expansion of openness in the field of antimissile defense, and agreed to study possible areas of cooperation with respect to antimissile defense.
Those provisions provide politico-legal conditions for the further discussion of the question of interrelationship between strategic offensive and defensive arms, as well as for the elaboration of appropriate supplementary agreements.
Excerpts from the Treaty-mentioned Joint Statements and from the Speeches of the President of Russia
Joint Statement by President of Russia Vladimir Putin and US President George Bush on the Results of Their Meeting in Genoa on July 22, 2001:
"We agreed that major changes in the world require concrete discussions of both offensive and defensive systems. We already have some strong and tangible points of agreement. We will shortly begin intensive consultations on the interrelated subjects of offensive and defensive systems."
From the Joint Statement by President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia and President George W. Bush of the United States of America on a New Relationship Between Russia and the USA, Washington, November 13, 2001:
"We have agreed that the current levels of our nuclear forces do not reflect the strategic realities of today. Therefore, we have confirmed our respective commitments to implement substantial reductions in strategic offensive weapons. "
From the Speech by Vladimir Putin before the Representatives of the American Public and US Political Figures, Russian Embassy in Washington, November 13, 2001:
"...Russia declares that it is ready to make deep cuts of strategic armaments. That is why we are proposing today a radical program of further strategic offensive arms cuts, at least by three times, to a minimum level required to maintain the strategic balance in the world. We no longer need to scare each other in order to come to terms. Security arises not from weapons and mountains of hardware, it is created by the political will of states and the leaders of these states.
"Yes, the world has still a long way to go before international relations are built solely on trust. This is regrettable. But this is why it is so important today to rely on the existing foundation of treaties and agreements in the sphere of disarmament and arms control."
From Vladimir Putin's Remarks at Joint Press Conference with George Bush, Washington, November 13, 2001:
"We also thoroughly discussed how our dialogue is going on the interrelated questions of strategic offensive and defensive arms. Definite progress has been made in this field. Above all, it concerns the prospects for the elaboration of a reliable and verifiable accord on further drastic cuts in the nuclear potentials of Russia and the United States.
"In this regard, I must say that we highly appreciate the decision of the US President to reduce strategic offensive arms to the designated threshold and will for our part strive for an adequate response."
From the December 13, 2001, Statement by President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin Regarding the Decision of the Administration of the United States of America to Withdraw from the Antiballistic Missile Treaty of 1972:
"Along with the problem of anti-missile defense a particularly important task under these conditions is putting a legal seal on the achieved agreements on further radical, irreversible and verifiable cuts of strategic offensive weapons, in our opinion to the level of 1,500-2,200 nuclear warheads for each side."