Statement by the Deputy Head of the Delegation of the Russian Federation M.Kondratenkov at the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 11th Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (General debate), New York, 29 April 2025

Mr. Chair,

We congratulate you on your election to this high office and assure you that we stand ready to constructively engage with you on all issues that arise in the course of the review process. We commend the United Nations Secretariat and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs for organizing the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 11th Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

The NPT has been and remains a cornerstone of the international security architecture. Over fifty years of the successful functioning of this Treaty demonstrate both its relevance for all its States parties and its utility.

The main value of the NPT, which has become a nearly universal international legal instrument, is the inherent calibrated balance between its three pillars: nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Should this balance be artificially tilted in favour of any of the pillars, the realization of the goals and objectives of the NPT would be seriously hampered.

Mr. Chair,

Another NPT review cycle is drawing to a close. We have to state that the problems facing the NPT-based nuclear non-proliferation regime are far from receding; rather, they continue to multiply.

The international security situation is getting increasingly complex. Western countries had once embarked on a course towards securing themselves global dominance and overwhelming military and strategic superiority, which led them to blatantly violate the principle of equal and indivisible security and to renounce the search for mutually acceptable solutions in the spirit of genuine multilateralism and taking into account each other's concerns. In particular, this has brought about a dangerous increase in conflicts between the countries possessing both major military capabilities and nuclear weapons. As the West abused other countries' core interests, there emerged serious strategic risks, including the potentially disastrous threat of a direct armed confrontation between nuclear-weapon States.

Such situation has had a most negative effect on almost all aspects of international relations, including arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. The system of treaties and arrangements, which served as pillars of the international security architecture, which it took decades to build, has been partially destroyed. Despite this, at the international arena there is still an abysmal lack of political will to work together, based on the respect of each other's security interests, towards eliminating the root causes of crises and fundamental contradictions between States. Individual States and their alliances continue to push their priorities disregarding the opinion of the rest. That is why disarmament initiatives fail to command consensual support. The problem is that such initiatives offer countries no answer to the essential question of how they can help them strengthen their security in the current turbulent environment. Furthermore, the initiatives fail to take into account the objective difference in the States' strategic situation and their economic, political, military and demographic potential. This prevents us from laying a solid groundwork for upgrading the regional security and global stability architecture and creating favourable environment for progressing in arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. Any disarmament initiative and practical measures to implement it should be consistent with the politico-military and strategic context. There is an equally important matter of the extent to which a certain approach to arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation efforts can ensure the equality of the parties of the dialogue and the balance of their interests.

We support the implementation of a comprehensive approach that could enable the achievement of the ultimate goal of the disarmament process — a nuclear-weapon-free and safer world for all. The NPT provisions unequivocally put the efforts in this field within the context of general and complete disarmament. It totally escapes us how anyone can call for accelerated nuclear disarmament without taking into account the political reality, especially if the ones who call are the States that allow forward deployment of foreign nuclear weapons in their territory, provide military infrastructure for the use of such weapons and take part in 'nuclear sharing' and joint nuclear planning. It is these countries' irresponsible policy that has become a major obstacle to the nuclear disarmament.

Mr. Chair,

The NPT nuclear-weapon States' compliance with their non-proliferation obligations is pivotal for ensuring international peace and security. The IAEA safeguards system plays the central role in verifying such compliance. Its objectivity, political impartiality and technical soundness, as well as the States' and the IAEA Secretariat's strict adherence to their rights and obligations under the Safeguards Agreements and their Additional Protocols in force are the main criteria ensuring the States parties' trust in the IAEA verification mechanism. Failure to abide by them, as well as any attempts to politicize the implementation of the safeguards are detrimental to both the Agency and the cause of the nuclear non-proliferation in general.

The reform of the safeguards system carried out by the IAEA Secretariat requires close attention of the Agency's member States, as it affects, to varying degrees, the sovereignty and security of all countries. We are still expecting the IAEA leadership to present a comprehensive report on the State-level concept clearly stating all the parameters of the reform. It should be presented to the Agency's Board of Governors for consideration and approval.

We note the importance of Additional Protocols to IAEA Safeguards Agreements. At the same time, we would like to emphasize that concluding such Additional Protocols remains a voluntary step.

The establishment and functioning of nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) envisaged by Article VII of the NPT is an important element of strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Nuclear-weapon States' accession to the relevant protocols to the treaties establishing such zones is the best way to provide the members of the NWFZs with legally binding assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against them. Russia has ratified all the protocols to treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones that is signed and has thus provided negative security assurances to over one hundred countries. Russia's reservations to such instruments serve the purposes of clarity and do not affect the interests of States abiding by NWFZ arrangements in good faith. It should be understood that the members of the NWFZs are not merely expected not to deploy nuclear weapons in their territories, they are not to establish infrastructure for the use of such weapons.

We reaffirm the significance and relevance of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East adopted at the NPT Review and Extension Conference. As one of its co-sponsors, we support the efforts to establish a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD-free zone) in the region. We welcome the process of annual sessions of the Conference on a Middle East WMD-Free zone, which was launched in 2018 and in which Russia takes part as an observer. It is important that all the countries of the region and all nuclear-weapon States engaged in its work.

Mr. Chair,

The development of peaceful nuclear technologies is essential for the maintenance of peace and human well-being. More and more States include nuclear energy in their energy mix, make increasing use of peaceful atom in their industry, agriculture, healthcare and other key economic sectors.

Russia has consistently supported a broad access to the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy for the States parties to the NPT and the development of international cooperation in this area. All countries compliant with their obligations under the Treaty should have the right to freely develop peaceful nuclear technologies. Imposing unilateral restrictions, creating artificial barriers to bilateral and international cooperation, and undermining the principle of equal access to nuclear materials, equipment ant technical information to be used for peaceful purposes, violate Article IV of the NPT. Politicization of this area and creating artificial dividing lines are unacceptable.

We expect that we manage to agree on adopting outcome documents of the 11th NPT Review Conference. To do that, we need to act in the spirit of consensus and duly take into account the political priorities and limitations of each of the participants in the review process.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.