Statement by the Deputy Head of the Delegation of the Russian Federation at the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 11th Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Cluster I: Nuclear disarmament), Geneva, 25 July, 2024

Mr. Chairman,

Last year in our statements, we paid much attention to the close interrelation between the politico-military and strategic realities, on the one hand, and the situation on the track of nuclear disarmament, on the other hand. We specifically emphasised that this interrelation had been not duly taken into account at the NPT forum despite the fact that the state of regional and global security environment was unanimously acknowledged to be dire.

A year later, we have to recognize that general situation has not improved, and, in fact, remains prone to further deterioration. While the international security and strategic stability situation continues to degrade, many delegations persist in their unwillingness to adequately measure their disarmament initiatives against today's realities of the world.

Russia, for its part, has consistently maintained that it is necessary to rely on the approaches that have no alternative and that have been enshrined in the provisions of the NPT and the consensus documents of the NPT review process. Their key clauses stipulate that nuclear disarmament should be considered as an integral part of the process of general and complete disarmament and that steps leading to nuclear disarmament should promote international peace and stability and be based on the principle of increased and undiminished security for all.

In the current extremely adverse international security environment, we believe it to be twice as obvious that any concepts involving "shortcuts" to a nuclear-weapon-free world, including immediately outlawing nuclear weapons as a means of ensuring security, are unworkable. We continue to consider such initiatives, including the TPNW, counter-productive, as they cannot bring us any closer to reaching nuclear zero, but rather deepen the divide between the parties to the NPT, shaking the foundations of its regime.

Any ideas involving "compartmentalized" development of some "universal" measures of nuclear arsenals transparency and nuclear disarmament verification, appear to be equally inadequate. What we have here at hand is highly sensitive national security aspects that should not be addressed without due regard for strategic situation and outside any substantive negotiations on specific future arms control and disarmament agreements.

Any further practical results in the reduction of nuclear weapons and ultimately their complete, transparent and verifiable elimination can only be achieved on the basis of a consensus, realistic sequence of actions and carefully calibrated step-by-step approach. Furthermore, this collaboration will need to involve all the States possessing military nuclear capabilities.

This is an objective reality that in the current situation, Russia has to retain nuclear deterrence as an integral component of its efforts to address specific external threats, which continue to increase, affecting our country's vital interests. As a consequence, while the provisions of Russia's doctrines evolve, the factor of nuclear deterrence keeps playing an important role. Nevertheless, we strictly outline the extreme circumstances of self-defence in which Russia reserves the right to nuclear response.

We remain consistently committed to the principle that a nuclear war cannot be won, and must never be fought, which the N5 States reaffirmed in January 2022 in their joint statement. It is essential that the actions of the three Western States are consistent with this statement in all its entirety, including with the obligation to avoid military confrontations among the nuclear powers and to acknowledge each other’s security interests. However, that is what the Western States have failed to do.

What is more, in pursuit of overwhelming military superiority and with full support of its allies, the United States continues to undermine the remains of the international security architecture, which it has already destroyed to a large extent. Washington has opted for bloc politics and keeps forming more and more military coalitions, implementing a variety of actions and technical military programmes that undermine strategic stability. These negative factors have been listed in detail in the earlier joint statement by the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation as States Parties to the Treaty on the Establishment of the Union State.

Particular emphasis should be put on the destabilizing practice of the NATO's so-called "nuclear sharing" involving forward-based U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in Europe, that is, thousands miles away from the U.S., and capable of promptly hitting critical targets in the territory of Russia and its allies. Given the general increase in threats posed by the West and active modernization of the mentioned nuclear capabilities, this practice increases strategic risks and prompts one to take compensating counter-measures. This factor has considerably complicated the dialogue at the NPT forum for decades, and has long been a major obstacle to further steps in the field of nuclear disarmament. We reiterate that the United States' nuclear weapons must be completely withdrawn to their national territory and the relevant infrastructure in Europe must be dismantled.

Washington's steps to replicate such schemes in other parts of the world where the United States already practices its so-called "extended nuclear deterrence," also have extremely negative implications for regional and global security. In particular, the United States' and Republic of Korea's joint "nuclear planning" activities accompanied by calls to involve Japan in the process, create considerable tension in the Asia-Pacific and spur arms race. These tensions are fuelled by Washington's active steps to deploy its strategic platforms in the region, including nuclear delivery vehicles, and plans to transfer systems that could carry nuclear weapons, to their allies. In particular, the United States intends to transfer to Australia submarines designed, among other things, to carry nuclear cruise missiles that are under development. This poses a number of serious questions in the context of both the NPT and the Treaty of Rarotonga.

One should also mention Washington's long-term policy of shaking and re-formatting the arms control architecture to suit its selfish purposes. The system of relevant mutually reinforcing agreements has already been largely destroyed by the United States, who, on the one hand, has cynically dismantled all the international instruments that restrained it, and, on the other hand, took destructive steps that rendered the implementation of a number of treaties counter-productive for other parties. All this highlights the hypocrisy of the United States' attempts to impose on its opponents unfair arms control and strategic risk reduction schemes that do not correspond to the realities and benefit no one but Washington. Until Washington and the U.S.-led NATO, who renounce the principle of equality and show no readiness to respect our security interests, abandon their profoundly hostile anti-Russian policy, strategic dialogue with the West remains pointless to Russia.

While the conditions for such dialogue are missing, Russia continues to take a number of relevant measures to reduce nuclear danger and maintain acceptable level of predictability and stability in the nuclear and missile sphere. Those include voluntary observance of quantitative restrictions on strategic offensive arms stipulated in the suspended New START Treaty, throughout its duration.

However, even such efforts may be undermined by Washington's destabilizing policy. In particular, as the United States advances its plans to deploy its ground-launched intermediate and shorter-range missiles in different parts of the world, Russia's unilateral moratorium on the deployment of similar systems is hanging by a thread. There are some other countries that will have to respond to Washington's steps in this area. As a result, the chain of actions and reactions initiated by the United States will inevitably cause a new and extremely dangerous surge in negative dynamics.

In view of the above, Russia continues to insist that the disarmament issues, including the matters of nuclear disarmament, should be discussed exclusively within the general context of comprehensive strengthening of international security and stability.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.