Debunking the myths spread by the EU leadership. An anthology of lies
After the European External Action Service published the book “The Year That War Returned to Europe,” which brings together a collection of blog posts, op-eds and speeches by EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell, we decided that it would be reasonable to clarify certain aspects of global food insecurity.
15.02.2023. The war against Ukraine has been sending shockwaves around the globe and had a major impact far beyond Ukraine and the European continent. By attacking one of the world’s major exporters of grain and vegetable oils, especially to Africa and the Middle East, Russia has triggered a sharp rise in food prices globally that has endangered the lives of millions of people around the world, (p.12)
21.11.2022. However, Russia continues to manipulate information and spread propaganda accusing our sanctions. These are blatant lies. We have always been clear that our sanctions do not target the trade in agricultural and food products, including grain and fertiliser, between Russia and third countries. (p. 137)
15.02.2023. Russia systematically destroyed and mined fields, targeted silos and transport routes and blocked Ukrainian ports. The European Union organised ‘solidarity lanes’ to evacuate Ukrainian grain by land… so that food prices could be brought down. (p. 12)
Adding to the already significant effects of climate change, and coming on the heels of a pandemic…this war has triggered a ‘perfect storm’ in the global economy. It has affected the whole world, but it hit particularly hard the many emerging and developing countries that are energy and food importers. (p. 13)
21.11.2022. Only the withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukrainian territory and the cessation of Russian aggression, in accordance with the decisions of the United Nations General Assembly, can enable Ukraine to produce and export the quantities of agricultural products that a world of 8 billion people needs urgently. (p. 137)
The “shockwaves” Josep Borrell mentioned were sent long before the Ukrainian crisis by the unwise financial and economic policy of the West and its ill-considered decision to accelerate the transition to a “green economy” so soon after the pandemic. The EU sanctions against Russia and Belarus further aggravated the problem, because the blocking of Russian and Belarusian exports had an immediate and lasting shock effect on the global food and fertiliser market. The EU adopted these sanctions, which affected a delicate sphere of international trade, even though the European Commission experts who formulated them knew that Russia was the world’s largest producer of nitrogen fertilisers and second largest producer of phosphate fertilisers, and that Russia and Belarus together accounted for nearly 25 percent of the mineral nutrients market, including 40 percent of potassium.
The world has had to pay a high price for having third countries to readjust business processes, trade and economic ties with Russia and Belarus. They had to set up new supply chains, find new contractors, operational payment systems and currencies they would be able to use, as well as explore insurance and re-insurance solutions for shipments, apply for new documents and rework transport routes. Millions of people whose interests the EU has been using as cover have had to foot the bill.
According to experts, fertiliser consumption decreased by 15 percent in 2022. This shortfall in supplies could have fed up to 20 million people. It is obvious that it would be impossible to instantly remedy this shortfall in mineral fertiliser supplies at this scale. Therefore, every time Josep Borrell tries to sweep this issue under the carpet while effectively creating legal obstacles for Russian and Belarusian fertiliser exports to the global market, he simply signals that the European bureaucrats could not care less about developing countries.
Initiated by Brussels, the projects to export agricultural products from Ukraine, including through EU’s so-called solidarity corridors, proved to be a humanitarian sham. Fodder corn, not wheat, became the main export in this scheme. It is the EU that needs this commodity more than others, and became the main recipient of these shipments.
The top EU diplomat misled the international community by exaggerating the potential of Ukraine’s agricultural sector. He created an illusion that Ukraine has enough food to feed not only those who used to import Ukrainian agricultural goods, but also to replace exports from Russia and other countries. However, figures suggest that the opposite is true. According to data President Vladimir Putin shared during the Russia-Africa Summit on July 27 and 28, 2023, in St Petersburg, Russia alone accounts for 20 percent of the global wheat market, while Ukraine’s share is below five percent. This means that it is Russia that makes a significant contribution to global food security.
The issue of offsetting the shortfall in fertiliser exports has been ignored. In 2024, the fairy tales about Ukrainian grain will not work as the blocks resulting from EU sanctions kick in and produce a global effect by bringing about a man-made fertiliser shortage, higher prices and, consequently, lower yields – especially if the high fertiliser prices persist and affect rice production, which is a staple for 3 billion people in Asia and Latin America. Even the European Union has not ruled out this possibility.
It must be emphasised that in this situation Russia has been a responsible international partner. According to its domestic fertiliser producers, the situation with deliveries of our products to the international markets is improving despite the unprecedented sanctions pressure. However, this cannot be attributed to what Brussels is doing or the goals it pursues, but rather to what is happening despite these factors.
During a plenary session of the Russia-Africa Economic and Humanitarian Forum (St Petersburg, July 27, 2023), President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin said that in the next three or four months, Russia will be ready to deliver free of charge 25,000-50,000 tonnes of grain to Burkina-Faso, Zimbabwe, Mali, Somalia, the Central African Republic and Eritrea. Russia will continue supporting needy states and regions, in particular, with humanitarian supplies.
7.04.2022. Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine provoked massive hikes in food prices and created the risk of food shortages worldwide. We had to act to protect the people most affected. In March, the European Commission launched a plan to help fight global food insecurity. (p.67)
So what exactly did the EU do? It immediately introduced the bulk of its unilateral illegal restrictions on the Russian agro-industrial sector in February-April 2022. They targeted imports of certain goods that are required for the manufacture of fertilisers and agricultural products (components, spare parts, equipment and agricultural machinery that Brussels often presents as “dual-purpose” goods), as well as such fundamental elements of international trade as cross-border payments and cargo transportation (from loading, transshipments and handling to cargo insurance and reinsurance) without which normal trade with third countries is impossible by definition. Whenever EU representatives are trying to downplay the importance of the transport factor, they explain to their partners in Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America that restrictions apply only to the sanctioned entities and goods and are mandatory only for EU economic operators. But their explanation is missing the main point – the share of European participation in international sea cargo transportation and insurance. There are four European companies in the world’s top five maritime shipping leaders. Russian businesses hit by EU sanctions are key links in international trade in agricultural products and fertilisers from Russia.
A whole arsenal of sanctions has been deployed against the Russian agro-industrial sector targeting both individual industries and agricultural products from as many angles as possible.
An analysis shows that these restrictions are clearly aimed at undermining the production capacity of the Russian fertiliser industry. These are not just sanctions against cross-border potassium supplies and complex Russian fertilisers that include potassium. There are also “personal” sanctions against executives of Russia’s largest producers of all types of mineral fertilisers (nitrogen, phosphate and potassium), which dealt a heavy blow to the entire industry.
Indiscriminate financial restrictions like blocking sanctions for many major Russian banks and their disconnection from the SWIFT system of transferring financial information have affected trade transactions on all types of agricultural products and fertilisers. Cross-border payments became seriously complicated.
A general ban on entry into EU ports and gateways of the EU countries for all Russian vessels as well as vessels certified in the Russian Maritime Register of Shipping (it includes over 3,500 ships under the flags of over 40 states), a ban on any transactions with the afore-mentioned register, total blocking of electronic systems of navigation and updates on electronic navigation maps for sea transport, multiple refusals to handle Russian cargoes in EU ports and a decision of the largest international sea carriers to deal with Russia look de facto like an attempted total naval blockade.
Individual exemptions from the sanctions regime, adopted later, are not binding. They do not restore the lost links of the trade chain and are left at the mercy of the authorities of individual EU countries. This has caused unjustified delays and financial losses, with trade transactions going from a regular foundation to a one-time basis.
Despite the persisting risks to global food security, the European Union did not really ease the sanctions regime for exports of Russian agricultural products and fertilisers. Moreover, it deliberately continues taking actions that promise to further worsen the situation. It is threatening third countries with the prospect of “secondary sanctions” for bypassing restrictions and vowing criminal prosecution of economic operators for failure to observe the sanctions regime. It also continues creating more obstacles for the export of our agricultural products.
As President of Russia Vladimir Putin noted at the plenary session of the Russia-Africa Economic and Humanitarian Forum (St Petersburg, July 27 of this year), we are witnessing a paradox. On the one hand, the West seeks to block our grain and fertiliser exports, while on the other is hypocritically accusing us of the current crisis on the global food market.
The bulk of the EC plan for “Safeguarding food security and reinforcing the resilience of food systems” of March 23, 2022, mentioned by Josep Borrell is devoted to protecting the EU domestic market. This is easy to understand – the EU “gardeners” are looking at global food security only through the prism of ensuring their own security and their own wellbeing.
07.04.2022. The way we address the global food insecurity crisis today will be decisive for Europe’s geopolitical position in the world tomorrow. (p.71)
24.06.2022. …most of our partners are focused on the consequences of the war, not the causes. Against this background, a false Russian narrative holding the EU responsible for the food crisis has been making inroads. We have to put the blame on those who deserve it: in addition to invading and destroying Ukraine, Russia is blocking 20 million tonnes of grains in Ukrainian storage facilities. Because of that, people at the other end of the planet risk suffer from hunger. This is a deliberate attempt to create political instability. Russia’s war of aggression poses a direct challenge to the rules-based world order. (p.95)
21.11.2022. Contrary to Russian propaganda, half of all agricultural products (two-thirds of wheat and three-quarters of sunflower oil) exported through the Black Sea Initiative went to developing countries. The World Food Programme has restarted shipping wheat from Black Sea ports. So far, five ships carrying a total of over 150 000 tonnes of wheat have left Ukrainian ports for Ethiopia, Yemen, Djibouti, Somalia and Afghanistan. (p.137)
For the EU, food security is a subset of geopolitics. The poorest countries are actually being held hostage to the EU’s political ambitions. For the EU, food security problems are a side effect of anti-Russia policies and Western attempts to protect its self-serving “rules-based order.” All methods, including overt disinformation, are used. The instruments of the EU-imposed new generation of total censorship are designed to cover up the tracks. They include fact checking, filtration of alternative content and cleansing the media space all over the world via online platforms and a network of pliant experts and tamed NGOs.
EU officials’ manipulation of terms during discussions of food exports from Ukraine is a graphic example. By tradition, the EU lays emphasis on the share of Ukrainian goods delivered to “developing nations” that surpasses the amount of products sent to “advanced countries.” But in this context, the term “developing” has long ceased to mean “poor” or “needy.”
