Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov answers media questions at a Working Breakfast organised by Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Moscow, May 18, 2015

Question: Everybody is interested in the Ukraine situation and how the Minsk-format dialogue is unfolding. Everyone has heard about the difficult negotiations with US Secretary of State John Kerry, but nobody knows what was discussed exactly. Could you give us some details? What can you say about the possibility of the United States’ involvement in the peace process in Ukraine? What steps can we expect from Russia and the United States to normalise bilateral relations? Is a meeting between the US and Russian presidentspossible in the foreseeable future? Can you tell us about the current visit to Moscow by US Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland?

We saw you driving a Pobeda car in Sochi. Who gave it to you? Did the car impress John Kerry?

Sergey Lavrov: When we arrived in Sochi to prepare for John Kerry’s visit, a Foreign Ministry representative introduced me to Sochi residentVartanYeremyan, a descendant of a Great Patriotic War veteran (a street in Sochi is named after the Yeremyan brothers), who runs a carservice business. Among other things, he repairs and restores vintage cars. The Pobedayou mentioned was presented as a gift to one of the veterans who lived in Sochi in 1960, and who was a friend of Yeremyan. Before his death, the owner of the car left it toYeremyan, saying,you know how to keep a car well, and I really want you to have this car so it can serveas long as possible to anyone who remembers what Pobeda (Victory)means.

After telling this story, Yeremyanasked me to drive it to the Eternal Flame, a memorial of Sochi residents who were killed or died in hospitals where they were brought from the front,wounded. I thought it made sense, especially in view of a wreath laying ceremony at the monument at the start of John Kerry's visit to Sochi. I was expecting him there, and the Secretary of State arrived with his motorcade. We attended the ceremony which left him profoundly moved. There were dozens, maybe hundreds, of young people who were holding candles. He was really touched. I asked him if he wanted to drive the Pobeda with me to the negotiation venue. He said, I would love to, but we have to follow the rules;we have our security service here, and this ideashould have been arranged in advance. That’s the end of the Pobeda story.

Now about Ukraine. During our talks (in Sochi), we discussed other things too, but we did focus on Ukraine most of the time. The issue also took up a lot of time during President Vladimir Putin’smeeting with John Kerry. Essentially, we talked about finding common ground. I have to say it went quickly because Russia and the United States both support full and comprehensive implementation of the Minsk Agreements. But, as the saying goes, the devil is in the details– namely, the specific provisions of the Minsk Agreements of February12, the specific tasks facing the working subgroups established in Minsk on May 6, as well as the varying understanding of specific problems. Spending so much time on this during the meeting of four heads of state in Minsk on February 12, we derivedfrom the need for strict compliance not only with the problem-resolution steps stipulated in the Minsk package, but also with the agreements’content.

The Americans take a slightly different interpretation, although, in our opinion, the right things are spelled out in the documents in black and white, agreed with Ukrainian President Petr Poroshenko and his representative in the Contact Group. There is nothing to argue about. For example, it says that local elections should be held in the areas controlled by the self-defence forces of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions, based on Ukrainian laws and approved by representatives of these two self-proclaimed republics. The Americans said, "There is a Ukrainian law for that, so they need to hold elections based on that law." The law on the special status of these territories was agreed with Lugansk and Donetsk in September 2014 and was waiting to come into force. However, introducing it this spring, the Ukrainian government distorted the content by making amendments, which, essentially, mean that these territories are to be considered occupied, therefore it is unclear who the Lugansk and Donetsk representatives are actually representing in these occupied territories, and the elections there can only take place after these areas come under the control of Kiev. It is a completely distorted, I would say, perverse interpretation and entirely opposite to what the Minsk document was about.

We were the ones who initiated the creation of the working subgroups immediately after the Minsk summit on February 12. By working with these subgroups - economic, political, humanitarian and security ones - we will ensure that people representing each of the sides in the subgroups look at the appropriate section of the Minsk package and be guided by it. Yes, it will require a change in the current position of the Kiev authorities. Right now, while declaring their full commitment to the Minsk Agreements, they actually reject the underlying principle spelled out in the Package of Measures, namely, direct dialogue with Lugansk and Donetsk. A direct dialogue is key to resolving, temporarily at least, the special status issue, to holding municipal elections there and to carrying out constitutional reform, which should fully take into account the position of Donetsk and Lugansk in regard to these territories. The constitutional reform is largely aimed at transforming the temporary special status into a permanent one. It was all written down.

It is very difficult to engage in dialogue with people who say the right things like we do, agreeing with us that all the agreements need to be fulfilled, but saying that we are the ones who need to do so, who need to force them to surrender, to give up their status as being elected by the people, and who have to ensure the restoration of Kiev’s full control on the border of these territories before anything else is done. The Minsk Agreements state that control along the Ukrainian-Russian border (the part now controlled by the self-defence forces), will be established once all the steps I mentioned (the temporary special status, local elections, lifting the economic embargo and constitutional reform) are taken. Our partners have nothing to argue about here. I’ll say it again: they show commitment to the Minsk Agreements only in speeches, while, in fact, they are trying to twist things. I hope that what we have agreed (which would be, as I said at the news conference following Vladimir Putin’s meeting with -John Kerry, on the need to influence both sides, because Lugansk and Donetsk have to observe the ceasefire more carefully, although most incidents are provoked by the Ukrainian authorities), will be carried out: the United States will use its influence on Kiev to persuade the officials there to abide by the Minsk Agreements. Given what I said about trying to interpret the Minsk Agreements in a perverse manner, the process will not be easy. And we will continue working with the representatives of the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Lugansk republics.

Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland’s visit was a follow-up to the May 12 Sochi meetings. My colleagues, primarily, State Secretary and Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin, who is in charge of the Ukrainian issue, will certainly talk to her about the need for Washington to influence Kiev so as to, firstly, prevent them from sliding into any force-based scenarios and, secondly, help launch a political process through direct dialogue with Donetsk and Lugansk.

Question: The current state and the future of Russian-US relations. What has the recent visit by US Secretary of State John Kerry shown?

Sergey Lavrov: I believe that Rossiyskaya Gazeta and online media have analysed that visit in detail. It has shown primarily that the attempts to isolate Russia have failed. The questions which Mr Kerry raised in Sochi concerned not only Ukraine, but also Syria, Yemen and many other issues. These questions show that it’s very difficult to deal with them without Russia.

I’m grateful to my American colleague, and I believe that he acted very responsibly. We discussed all regional conflicts, which have brought trouble to millions of people and have killed very many people, honestly and openly.

Of course, we also talked about Russian-US relations. Ours is an absolutely fair position: we are willing to honour all of our commitments to our American partners, including as regards the mechanisms of bilateral cooperation. We once had a presidential commission that comprised 21 working groups on the current issues of economic, cultural and international security cooperation. It’s obvious that when such countries as the United States and Russia suddenly stop talking about these issues, their solution objectively runs into an increasing amount of obstacles. We saw that our partners are interested in renewing our cooperation in the fight against terrorism, organised crime and various forms of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. I hope that our American partners will take steps towards resuming our cooperation after they analyse the talks which Mr Kerry has held. We are ready for this. But it wasn’t us who stopped this cooperation. Those who did it should review their stance.

Question: The majority of the P5+1 talks with Iran are held behind closed doors, and their essence is kept confidential. The latest foreign policy breakthrough at the global level was a major shift at these talks. What helped achieve it?

Russia’s decision to supply the S-300 air defence systems to Iran has alarmed many partners, in addition to Israel and the United States. Was it an objective decision? How important is it to Russia? Or maybe it was a foreign policy mistake?

Is the issue being discussed of the possible admitting of Iran to the SCO at the organisation’s summit this year if sanctions are lifted from Iran?

Sergey Lavrov: Iran’s nuclear programme has been discussed especially actively in the past 18 months. There have been obvious positive changes, and all sides are focused on reaching an agreement. The breakthrough event was the meeting in Lausanne on April 2, when the sides coordinated a political framework for future agreements, which covers all the key aspects of the related package. Experts are now working on the specific legal and technical elements of these agreements. This was made possible because our Western partners and Iran have seen that it is not in their interests to continue the tug of war. It is satisfying that the Russian participants proposed a formula that helped all sides to join forces to coordinate the paradigm of their future work: phasing and reciprocity, when each step taken by one side is followed by a step taken by the other side. This principle has proved effective.

The second thing that was proposed by our experts – primarily Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov –who managed to consolidate the negotiating process based on our ideas, were specific proposals pertaining to what Tehran should do with uranium enrichment after the nuclear programme has been regulated and after a number of other technical solutions related to, among other things, the need to ensure a balance of interests from the point of view of removing nuclear technology proliferation risk. In our current work we are particularly concerned that the resultant final solutions create no precedents for the IAEA, for the system of guarantees that it provides for all its member-countries, and for methods whereby the non-proliferation and export control systems are maintained. Hinging on these agreements are opportunities for promoting legitimate economic ties with foreign countries. In this context, it is very important to refrain from creating artificial obstacles or trying to use this process as a pretext for unfair competition.

We hope that the desirable deadline, which has been identified by the Six and Iran – June 30 of this year – can be met and the agreement coordinated. This will require subsequent work at the UN Security Council, because there is an understanding that this agreement should be approved by a UNSC resolution that can provide for an entire package of agreed-upon steps, including, of course, the lifting of the sanctions. We would like the UN Security Council to quickly remove its sanctions, particularly those unrelated to the need to influence Iran and convince it to comply with the IAEA rules. There are sanctions, particularly unilateral economic sanctions, which were imposed outside of this framework. So, I am cautiously optimistic in this regard, with an emphasis on the word “optimistic.”

Regarding the S-300 systems, sending them to Iran has never been banned by the UN Security Council. Nor have they been covered by unilateral sanctions introduced by the Americans and Europeans, who in some way or other have referred to the S-300 problem. Suspending the contract was Russia’s initiative in response to our Western partners’ wishes. Our partners said that this would induce Iran to be more constructive at the talks. We heeded this argument and explained it to our Iranian partners. But much time has passed since then. As we see it, the fundamental and qualitative shift towards a positive solution and the breakthrough agreements reached in Lausanne deserve that we encourage Iran to continue cooperation by renouncing our own unilateral restrictive methods and transitioning to the implementation of the contract rather than by suspending the contract.

Let me note that the agreement reached in autumn 2013 was referred to as an interim agreement and was implemented within a year. Iran took the steps, which it was due to take, and the Western countries, primarily the US, responded by relaxing their unilateral sanctions. If the Americans reward Iran for its constructive participation in the talks by reducing their unilateral restrictions, why should Russia do otherwise on a political and substantive plane? We were convinced that this needed to be done.

In terms of regional security, S-300 systems pose no threat to anybody and create no problems for anybody, unless, of course, somebody wants to bomb Iran. That such excesses are possible we saw recently in Yemen, among other places. So, defense systems, which prevent risks and diminish the temptation to conduct strikes, fit into our position, which has for years consisted of promoting the idea of creating a regional security system in the Persian Gulf with the participation of all Arab countries and Iran. Countries that, in our opinion, should potentially start cooperating, have different positions toward this. There are those among the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf that are prepared to discuss this, while others believe that, first, they should make sure that Iran is not harbouring any aggressive plans. Iran has not attacked anyone in decades. Iran has been attacked, including by Iraq under Saddam Hussein, with the use of chemical weapons.

Here, it is of course important to take into account the entire range of historical feelings on the part of states that cannot but be concerned about their own security. I disagree entirely with those who say that it was a political mistake. I will cite US President Barack Obama. When, soon after we announced our decision to resume the contract to supply S-300 systems, he was asked whether the US was concerned by this. He said that he was not concerned, and was even surprised that the Russians had dragged their feet for five years when it came to resuming the procedure. The reaction that followed our decision to resume the contract’s implementation was not alarmist but was basically balanced, objective and reflected the understanding among serious analysts that this step is justified and inevitable.

Iran applied for SCO membership a long time ago. Because the criteria for the Organisation’s membership provide that a candidate cannot be under UN Security Council sanctions, the application has not been formally considered yet. However, as soon as the agreement on Iran’s nuclear programme is finalised, there will be no impediments to Iran’s admission to the SCO. Anyway, Russia believes that the SCO summit in Ufa, where (a general understanding has already been reached) the procedure of India and Pakistan’s admission to the SCO will be officially launched, we will be able to make a decision that will emphasise our readiness to promote Iran’s membership as progress in resolving Iran’s nuclear programme is made and, therefore, as the grounds for UN Security Council sanctions disappear. It is too soon to speak about this now, as a lot can happen in the two months before the opening. Nevertheless, I have every reason to believe that there will be sufficient progress for the heads of state to receive a recommendation from the ministers who are preparing the Ufa summit to make a political decision that will point to a clear prospect for Iran’s membership.

Question: On May 8, 9 and 10 there were many foreign delegations in Moscow. The president had many talks, most of which you attended. Could you share some non-confidential details of those meetings?

Sergey Lavrov: Basically, there were no big secrets. There are matters that are at the stage of coordination with our partners. The official visit by Chinese President Xi Jinping, which took place on May 8, on the eve of Victory Day, and the greater part of which was devoted to official events, was absolutely transparent. The agreements that were reached are open, and there is nothing to hide there. We are not engaged in any intrigue against anybody. I will mention the joint statement on the further deepening of our strategic cooperation with China; a very important joint statement that the leaders of our two countries signed on linking Eurasian economic integration and China’s Silk Road Economic Belt project; and an important intergovernmental agreement on cooperation in international information security. Russia, China and our SCO, CSTO and BRICS partners are actively promoting this topic at the UN to ensure that the achievements reached in information and communication technology in the last few decades are not used to the detriment of any one country, so that there are no abuses on the part of those who control various segments of the Internet, with all states equal in this sphere of human activity, as stipulated by the UN Charter, which does not limit equality to any particular spheres of activity but proclaims and enshrines it in international law as a fundamental principle.

In addition to the Russian-Chinese summit, there were meetings between Russian President Vladimir Putin and the leaders of India and South Africa. As with the Chinese president, we discussed with them the strengthening of BRICS, including in the context of preparations for its summit, which will take place at the same time as the SCO summit in Ufa, in the first decade of July.

There was an informal meeting of CIS leaders: those who came for this event. The entire scope of our joint work in connection with the 70^th anniversary of Victory and the Year of CIS Veterans this year was discussed, as were specific lines of integration processes in the CIS space.

For the first time since the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) was established, a meeting of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council was held, where the membership of the fifth participant in this association – Kyrgyzstan – was finalised. Now, alongside Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus and Armenia, Kyrgyzstan has become a full member of the EAEU. The Council also considered the organisation’s further consolidation, as well as practical and concrete goals in the short and medium term in light of the global economic situation.

We appreciated the visit of German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who came to Moscow on May 10, and her desire to pay tribute to the memory of the Soviet people and all those who were killed during World War II. She had a meeting with President Putin. The discussion focused on Ukraine in the manner I mentioned earlier. We have a common understanding with Germany about the need to implement the Minsk Agreements in good faith. Chancellor Merkel, who personally participated in harmonising the February 12 document, knows very well what the agreements are and understands the counterproductive nature of the attempts to distort the essence of this document.

During their meeting, the Russian president and the German chancellor discussed the status of relations between Russia and the European Union. Today, in Brussels (where we will go to participate in tomorrow’s meeting of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe), I will continue this conversation with EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini.

Question: Presumably, this conversation is not going to be easy?

Sergey Lavrov: We don’t shout at each other, but talk.