A Survey of Russian Federation Foreign Policy
Unofficial translation from Russian
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION |
MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY |
Russia's Participation in UN Activities |
Russia's Participation in the Group of Eight |
International Cooperation in the Struggle against New Challenges and Threats |
Disarmament, Arms Control and Nonproliferation |
Conflict Settlement and Crisis Response |
Dialogue Among Civilizations |
THE GEOGRPAHICAL DIRECTIONS OF FOREIGN POLICY |
The CIS Space |
Europe |
The United States and Canada |
The Asia-Pacific Region |
The Middle East and North Africa |
Africa |
Latin America and the Caribbean Basin |
ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY |
THE HUMANITARIAN DIRECTION OF FOREIGN POLICY |
Human Rights Problems |
Protecting the Interests of Compatriots Abroad |
Consular Work |
Cooperation in Culture and Science |
RESOURCE SUPPORT FOR FOREIGN POLICY |
The Diversification of Foreign Policy Instruments |
Interregional and Transfrontier Cooperation |
Information Support for Foreign Policy |
Foreign Policy Coordination |
ADDENDA |
1. List of Activities Carried Out as Part of the Survey's Preparation 2. List of Organizations That Sent Materials for the Survey |
INTRODUCTION
Substantial changes have taken place on the world scene in recent years. The growing processes of globalization, despite their contradictory consequences, lead to a more even distribution of resources of influence and economic growth, thus laying the objective basis for a multipolar construct of international relations. There continues the consolidation of collective and legal principles in international relations on the basis of the recognition of the indivisibility of security in the contemporary world. In world politics there has risen the significance of the energy factor and access to resources as a whole. Russia's international standing has firmed markedly. Strong, more self-confident Russia has become an important component part of the positive changes in the world.
As a result the equilibrium and competitive environment that were lost with the end of the Cold War are gradually being restored. The object of competition, which is acquiring a civilizational dimension, now consists of value orientations and development models. With the universal acknowledgement of the importance of democracy and market as the foundations of a public system and economic life their realization takes on a variety of forms depending on the history, national peculiarities and the level of social and economic development of states.
Along with the positive changes negative trends also persist: an expanding conflict space in world politics, and disarmament and arms control problems fallen out from the global agenda. Under the flag of the struggle against new challenges and threats attempts continue to establish a "unipolar world," to impose on other countries one's own political systems and development models while ignoring the historical, cultural, religious and other specificities of the rest of the world, and to arbitrarily apply and construe the rules and principles of international law.
Recent events also show a bid to impose on the world – contrary to the objective tendency of contemporary world development – a hypertrophied significance of the factor of force in international relations for dealing with this or that problem by proceeding from political expediency, in circumvention of all legal norms. It is evident now that certain states have no interest in tying themselves by new international legal commitments in the area of security and disarmament (this impeding the disarmament process) while countries that feel militarily vulnerable are increasingly eager for possession of weapons of mass destruction as a guarantee of their own security.
By and large the inertia of unilateral response makes itself felt, as it is conceptually predicated on the "victory in the Cold War syndrome." Tied to this approach is the course towards preserving dividing lines in world politics through the gradual expansion – by co-opting new members – of the sphere of western influence. The choice in favor of re-ideologizing and militarizing international relations creates the threat of a new split of the world, now on civilizational grounds. The situation is further complicated by the fact that this occurs against the background of the fight against international terrorism, a fight requiring a broad dialogue among cultures, religious confessions and civilizations, their counteraction against extremism within their own environment, and resolute advancement in tackling the problems, including regional conflicts, that form the breeding ground of terrorism.
At the same time it is becoming increasingly obvious that the existing international problems have no force-based solutions. Unilateral illegitimate responding, especially the one predicated on force, is proving its invalidity, and even more so – counterproductiveness. The upshot of this is that a comprehensive politico-diplomatic settlement of chronic conflicts is becoming impossible, as some problems are accumulating on others.
The myth of a unipolar world has been definitively busted in Iraq. The model itself has turned out to be unworking, because at its core there is no moral base of modern civilization, nor can there be. The impossibility of providing the claims to single-state leadership with adequate military-political and economic resources also attests to this. Under these conditions, there grows the need for a collective leadership of key states, objectively bearing special responsibility for the state of affairs in the world.
Based on the experience of the last 15 years, an understanding takes root that there is no alternative to multilateral diplomacy as the principal method of governing international relations at the global and regional level. In addition to objective the subjective conditions are being created for the formation by the international community of a common vision of the contemporary era with its requirement of global solidarity, which could constitute the philosophical basis for an emerging multipolar world, from the reality of which the overwhelming majority of states already proceeds. It is evident that we have approached the landmark moment, when it is necessary to think about a new global security architecture based on a reasonable balance of interests of all the participants in international intercourse.
Under these conditions, the role and responsibility of Russia in international affairs have qualitatively grown. The chief achievement of recent years is the newly acquired foreign policy independence of Russia. The time is ripe for conceptualization of the new situation, particularly at the doctrinal level.
In a globalizing world there can be no islets of stability. The national security of Russia cannot be ensured outside the global and regional context. In the conditions of globalization the success of internal transformation to an ever greater extent depends on the influence of factors lying beyond our boundaries. Moreover, it is obvious that Russia can exist within its present boundaries only as an active world power pursuing a resourceful policy across the entire spectrum of pressing international problems on the basis of a realistic assessment of its own capabilities.
On the other hand, the firmness of the international positions of Russia directly hinges on the situation within the country. The internal strengthening of Russia makes our foreign policy more purposeful and productive, and Russian diplomacy increasingly relevant in world affairs. Russia strong again has already become a major positive factor in the development of worldwide processes. We are creating favorable external conditions for internal reforms, but outside we also seek promptings for our constructive work. We are in a position to influence world development, particularly by what we do primarily for ourselves.
In foreign policy work under the new conditions it is important as never before to proceed from the vital requirements of the country and the interests of the Russian citizens and take into account the real factors which make up the national security and prosperity of Russia. For this purpose it is necessary to fully realize the competitive advantages of our country, which are not a few.
At issue is also the need to improve foreign policy work in the spirit of the times and with due regard for the increased capabilities of the country. In today's circumstances the significance of forecasting and analytical work increases fundamentally as they make it possible to act ahead of, and forestalling events.
Russia is firmly entering the mainstream of international life, and therefore the supertask of the Survey is intellectually and psychologically to get accustomed to this new position for us. The qualitatively new situation in international relations creates favorable opportunities for our intellectual leadership in a number of areas of world politics. In other words, it is about Russia's active participation not only in carrying out the international agenda, but also in shaping it.
Conducting foreign policy surveys in diverse forms is widespread in international practice. The employment of this instrument in the foreign policy process of Russia has long since become imminent. The Survey enables giving a comprehensive appraisal of the international situation and the current international position of the country and formulating well-grounded recommendations about further steps in concrete foreign policy areas having regard to the realities of international life, forecasts of global developments and the strengthened position of Russia.
The Survey is also designed to reflect, as far as possible, the maximally broad spectrum of views existing in Russian public opinion, make a contribution to a nationwide discussion on foreign policy issues and help preserve in society a broad consensus in this field.
MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY
Russia's Participation in UN Activities
1. The UN remains a universal forum endowed with a unique legitimacy, the load-carrying structure of the international system of collective security and the chief element of contemporary multilateral diplomacy. Our principled choice in favor of a collective mode of action by the world community presupposes reinforcing the central role of the World Organization in every sphere of international life.
The UN is a platform for discussing and working out decisions on a broad spectrum of issues on the socioeconomic, humanitarian and environmental agenda, particularly the surmounting of poverty, financing for development, economic cooperation and integration, trade, the promotion of industry, transport and communications, education, public health, the averting of natural and man-made disasters, and so on.
It is now, with the end of the Cold War, that the Organization's potential can be completely unfolded. Of course, its comprehensive adaptation to the present day conditions will be required, which is the aim of the provisions of the unanimously adopted 2005 World Summit Outcome Document. There is a good basis available, including the fundamental principles of the Charter of the United Nations. And if the United Nations was able to serve the interests of the world community in the worst of times, then the Organization is all the more in a position to do it now – given the good will of all states.
The active participation in UN activities, inter alia as a permanent member of the Security Council, enables us to effectively influence world processes for the purpose of creating a stable, equitable and democratic world order and to realize our national interests through the broadest international cooperation.
2. Presently the UN is undergoing a complicated moment in its development, connected with the largest reform of the Organization in all its history. Russia understands the necessity of UN reforms which would enable the Organization to continue playing its role as the chief international mechanism in collectively countering the challenges and threats to security and sustainable development. The most important thing in this process is to enhance the effectiveness of the UN and reaffirm its central role in world affairs while preserving the interstate nature of the Organization. This is possible only on lines of the maximally broad consensus of member countries on all the reform options. Schemes will not be workable which would, contrary to the Charter of the United Nations, remove individual states or groups of countries from active participation in the Organization's affairs, or introduce a single system of values into its Secretariat's work.
In the reform area there are already some concrete achievements: the Peacebuilding Commission has been formed, the Human Rights Council established, the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy approved, and decisions adopted to step up the work of the United Nations General Assembly.
Recommendations. By using the active participation of Russia in UN activities, continue effective influence on the world processes in order to form a stable, equitable and democratic world order.
- Proceeding from the collective security mechanisms enshrined in the United Nations Charter, use our activities in the UN Security Council for direct participation in international efforts towards political settlement of crises and conflicts and towards the maintenance of stability in different regions of the world as well as for the struggle against the new threats and challenges.
- In examining the question of the Security Council enlargement, proceed from our principled approaches: keep a maximally compact and work-capable SC membership, increase its representativeness, particularly through inclusion of influential developing countries, and, most importantly, prevent infliction of harm upon the present status of Russia as a permanent Council member, confirmed in the United Nations Charter.
3. Russia from the outset backed up the idea of creating a Peacebuilding Commission. We took an active part in the elaboration of the principal provisions setting the terms of reference of the PBC, its composition, and relations with the other UN bodies. We managed to uphold a provision by which the Commission's activities must develop with the active participation of the Security Council, on whose agenda conflict settlement issues had stood for a long time. Russia as a permanent Security Council member became a part of the guiding nucleus of the PBC, its Organizing Committee.
4. The newly created United Nations Human Rights Council should be undeviatingly guided by the principles of universality, constructive international dialogue, and the promotion of fundamental freedoms for everyone, without distinction of any kind and on a just and equal basis. It is important that the Council should overcome the negative moments which had hindered the UN rights sector from realizing its full potential – confrontation and "double standards" in assessment of the human rights situation in the world. The Council's work should not bear a politicized character. Russia continues to actively participate in the search for compromise solutions, points of contact and mutually acceptable decisions on international human rights problems, as it presumes that interaction among states in the field of human rights is capable of becoming a unifying factor in international relations.
5. Russia is an active participant in UN peacekeeping efforts. Russians are working and serving in 13 out of the 19 current UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs). At the same time the 40th place we currently hold in number of peacekeepers involved in the PKOs under the aegis of the UN, as well as the share in the peacekeeping operations budget (1.4%) do not match the role of Russia in the contemporary world.
Recommendation. Build on efforts in the UN peacekeeping sphere, as also in cooperation with such regional organizations as the OSCE, CSTO, CIS and SCO. Politically a step-up of our activity in maintaining international peace and security under the aegis of the UN would strengthen the case for demands, corresponding to Russian interests as well, that use of force in international relations should be possible only when authorized by the UN Security Council.
6. To influence situations that carry with them a threat to international peace and security, the world community can resort to a complex of restrictive measures in the politico-diplomatic, trade-and-economic and other fields.
Recommendations. In questions of the use of UN sanctions there should continue to be presumed that diverse restrictive measures can be imposed solely by resolutions of the Security Council. Such decisions should remain a last resort, when all other means of influence have been exhausted. Decisions to impose sanctions should be strictly adequate to the threat, envisage clear-cut limitations on their duration, a possibility of review, the procedure for revoking such measures, and contain humanitarian exemptions. Carry out work in favor of consideration for assessment by the relevant expert specialized institutions and units of the UN Secretariat of likely humanitarian implications of the use of sanctions against this or that country at the stage of examination of the question of the advisability of their being imposed by the Security Council.
7. Russian participation is developing in an ongoing way in the mainstream areas of UN humanitarian activity. With our consistent support the United Nations has firmly established itself as the global center of international humanitarian efforts.
The experience of Russia's participation in multilateral efforts to eliminate the consequences of large-scale natural disasters, primarily the tsunami in the Indian Ocean at the end of 2004, beginning of 2005 (Russia's total donor contribution amounted to about 30 million dollars) demonstrates the considerable potential available in our country and acknowledged by partners for involvement in such operations, including capabilities to build up supplies of Russian humanitarian goods and services, both under the auspices of international organizations and on a bilateral basis.
Promoting Russian humanitarian donorship calls for transfer of our pinpoint efforts under the auspices of UN international organizations onto a more systematic basis, as also for closer involvement in the coordination of donor activities in this sector.
8. An important task of Russian diplomacy in the United Nations sector is to ensure our weighty representation in the bodies determining UN policies in questions of management, budgetary planning, financing, procurement activities and so on.
Recommendations. In examining questions of financing for international organizations seek a fair distribution of the expense burden among their members, based on the ability to pay principle.
- Regard activating the participation of government entities and the Russian business community in the services market of the United Nations as a growth area.
Russia's Participation in the Group of Eight
1. Participation in the Group of Eight is an important thrust in implementing the strategic course of Russia towards the promotion of multilateral principles in international relations, its speedier integration into the world economy and the creation of favorable external conditions for the economic and social development of the country and reinforcement of its statehood and democratic institutions. The work in this format in recent years has become transformed into a major separate foreign policy sector and is an ever more important component of the international activity of a broad range of federal ministries and departments.
2. The St. Petersburg summit enabled Russia to realize to the fullest extent the opportunities provided by the participation of our country in this multilateral mechanism both for the advancement of Russian interests and approaches to a number of priority global problems and for a more energetic turn of the G8 itself towards their solution.
Our G8 Presidency enabled us to include in the St. Petersburg summit agenda truly important problems for the entire world community, urgently requiring their solution, such as international energy security, developing education and combating infectious diseases. Progress in these areas meets the fundamental goals of internal development of Russia itself.
During our Presidency, big strides were made in ensuring greater openness and more democratic work of the G8, including the format of dialogue with the traditional partners, China, India, Brazil, Mexico and South Africa, as well as with a number of major international organizations and interstate associations, in particular – for the first time in G8 history – the Commonwealth of Independent States. Their representatives actively participated in the elaboration of a number of summit documents in the specialized meetings at the ministerial and expert level.
The summit was held with due regard to two major forums – the World Summit of Religious Leaders and the International Forum of Non-governmental Organizations ‘Civil G8 2006,' which enabled the Russian Presidency to take the G8's dialogue with civil society to a higher level and facilitate and promote dialogue among civilizations.
3. The character of the Group of Eight with Russia's entry into it has qualitatively changed: it is turning from an exclusive "club of Western powers" into a more representative mechanism. Objectively the nature of the G8's work will become transformed as the significance of the globalization factor grows, which, in its turn, will call for its greater openness and further democratization. There are all grounds to regard the G8 as an important element of the informal mechanism of collective and constructive leadership of key states now emerging in the world, which is designed to be representative geographically and civilizationally.
In this case, of course, the G8 will not duplicate or substitute the UN, through which, as through other multilateral entities, concerted decisions will be implemented. It is called upon to function in support of the UN and its central role in international life, in support of multilateral diplomacy and for the purpose of the collective mode of action by the world community at the regional and global level.
Recommendations. The success of the Russian Presidency and the need for increased engagement with the partners, in particular, to carry out the accords reached in St. Petersburg, require coordinated action by all federal executive bodies.
- The viability of Russia's G8 priorities largely depends on our ability to provide intellectual, organizational and financial follow-up for them in further work. This will call for a joint action strategy, including measures to ensure our curatorship of the Russian themes in subsequent activities of the G8. The task that comes to the fore is to forge effective interaction with the partners, primarily Germany, presiding over the G8 in 2007, as well as secure the necessary resource replenishment of our efforts.
International Cooperation in the Struggle Against New Challenges and Threats
1. The Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, adopted by the UN in September 2006 with Russia's active participation, contains a detailed urgent action plan to reduce the global terrorist threat. Russia was the first nuclear state to ratify the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT).
Recommendation. Accelerate ratification of the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection – the only one of the 13 international antiterrorist conventions, to which Russia so far is not a party.
- Continue elaborating the United Nations Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism. Give particular attention to filling the gaps in international criminal law, including the creation of a legal basis for combating the manifestations of terrorism in cyberspace and countering the spread of counterfeit medical products.
2. It is necessary to continue paying special attention to antiterrorist efforts under the aegis of the UN Security Council. Within the Council's 1267 Committee (the Al-Qaida/Taliban Sanctions Committee), we participate in decision making on the inclusion of specific individuals and entities in the sanctions list, as also in the work of the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) of the UNSC. Russia is among the limited circle of states which have submitted a report on the measures taken to prevent the incitement to terrorism pursuant to UNSCR 1624.
A fundamentally new type of cooperation has been institutionalized between the CTC and the G8 Counter-Terrorism Action Group (CTAG). Russia as the CTAG Chairman in 2006 carried out with support from its members a survey of counteraction against terrorist ideology and propaganda on a regional basis throughout the world. The CTC was thoroughly informed about the results of this work.
3. Under the Russian G8 Presidency the St. Petersburg summit approved the Declaration on Counter-Terrorism defining as a new area of the G8 nations' engagement their "cooperation with regard to countering terrorist and other criminal attacks on critical energy infrastructure facilities." An important element of the G8's work was the adoption of the Statement on Strengthening the UN's Counter-Terrorism Program reaffirming the central coordinating role of the Organization in this activity.
Unprecedented for the G8 was the initiative of the Russian Presidency to launch the mechanism of an antiterrorist partnership between governments and businesses, in development of which a Global Forum for Partnerships between Governments and Businesses to Counter Terrorism took place in Moscow in November 2006. Another major direction is to counter the illicit Afghan drug trafficking. The relevant Paris II-Moscow I Ministerial Conference was held in Moscow in June 2006.
Recommendation. Continue implementing the decisions of the St. Petersburg Summit on antiterror, including developing the partnership between governments and businesses in the struggle against terrorism, and also on the development of the antidrug Paris-Moscow Process.
4. Within the CIS it is important to continue implementing the Concept of Cooperation among the CIS Member States in Combating Terrorism and Other Violent Manifestations of Extremism under the relevant Program of Cooperation for the years 2005-2007.
Meriting positive appraisal are the activities of the Antiterrorist Center of the CIS and of the CSTO, including the preparation and conduct of antiterrorist training exercises (Caspian Antiterror, Antiterrorist Center-Antiterror, South-Antiterror in the CIS format, and Zaslon (Shield) and Rubezh (Frontier) in the CSTO framework) and preventive Operations Kanal (under CSTO auspices).
5. The SCO summit in Shanghai in June 2006 adopted the Declaration on the Fifth Anniversary of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization with a substantive antiterrorist part; Agreement on the Procedure of Organizing and Holding Joint Anti-Terrorism Measures Within the Territories of the SCO Member States; the Agreement on Cooperation in Identifying and Cutting Off the Channels of Infiltration into the Territories of the SCO Member States by Persons Involved in Terrorist, Separatist or Extremist Activities; the Agreement on the Technical Protection of Information in the SCO Regional Antiterrorist Structure (RATS), and the Cooperation Program of the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in the Fight Against Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism from 2007 to 2009.
6. Having joined in 2003 the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Russia has been actively facilitating the creation of a Eurasian Group to combat the legalization of criminal proceeds and terrorist financing, patterned after FATF (EAG).
7. Russia was the first among the member states of the Council of Europe to ratify the Council's Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (2005). This agreement establishes such types of action as public provocation to commit terrorist offences and recruitment and training for terrorism as criminal offences.
8. In the Russia-ASEAN dialogue format, it remains a priority to launch the mechanism of a Working Group on Combating Terrorism and Transnational Crime, agree a Working Plan to Combat Transnational Crime as well as continue the annual practice of holding Russia-ASEAN Senior Officials Meetings on Transnational Crime. Possibilities exist for the further strengthening of our positions in the antiterrorist sector of activities of the ASEAN Regional Forum on security issues.
Multilateral cooperation under the auspices of the Counter-Terrorism Task Force of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum appears to be promising in terms of the advancement of Russian interests.
9. Meetings of heads of special services, security agencies and law enforcement bodies are becoming an important mechanism of international antiterrorist engagement.
10. As part of antidrug cooperation, the Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Center (CARICC) being established under the aegis of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and designed to accumulate information from participating states on narco-crime has good prospects.
There has begun the practical realization of the Agreement Among the SCO Member States on Cooperation in the Fight against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs, Psychotropic Substances and Their Precursors.
A Russia-NATO Council pilot project has been agreed for personnel training at Russian centers for law enforcement agencies in Afghanistan and the Central Asian countries.
11. Russia actively participates in international anti-corruption cooperation. In July 2006 our country ratified the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption of 1999, which allows it to be part of the Council of Europe's Group of States against Corruption (GRECO). In August 2006 Russia took part in the first anti-corruption forum of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (Kuala Lumpur), and in October 2006 in the first annual Conference of the International Association of Anti-Corruption Authorities (Beijing).
12. Cooperation in questions of extradition and mutual legal assistance in criminal matters takes on special significance. Unfortunately, not all of our requests for extradition and legal assistance are accepted for proper consideration by competent authorities of foreign states. In many cases refusals to extradite criminals have a political motivation. We can give as examples of "double standards" the position of the United States and Britain, from whom the Russian Federation continues to seek the extradition of Ilyas Akhmadov, Akhmed Zakayev and Boris Berezovsky.
Recommendations. Complete the process of the preparation for ratification of the European Convention on the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters (1972). Continue in cooperation with concerned Russian agencies to seek the extradition to Russia of persons who have committed criminal offenses against its citizens or interests.
- Apart from employing current international legal mechanisms (the European Convention on Extradition, European Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance, etc.), continue the work on concluding appropriate bilateral agreements with our main partners.
Disarmament, Arms Control and Nonproliferation
1. The new security threats and challenges, the unsettledness of regional conflicts and the apparent tendency for the factor of force to grow in world affairs over recent years have exerted an unfavorable impact upon the dynamics of disarmament, arms control and nonproliferation. The shortage of predictability in the area of international security has grown and the danger of outside interference in domestic affairs of sovereign states under the pretext of tackling WMD nonproliferation tasks has increased. Prerequisites are being created for the justification of lowering the "threshold" for using nuclear weapons.
These adverse tendencies, along with the negative attitude of the United States to multilateral legally binding instruments in the sphere of disarmament, have led to the disarmament process being pushed into background in recent years. The Conference on Disarmament has now been inactive for almost a decade, and stagnation is obvious in the work of the United Nations Disarmament Commission.
The consequences of the US's withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty) are beginning to manifest themselves in real military building. It has embarked on deploying a global missile defense system. Two interceptor missile bases have been built in Alaska and California. There are plans to set up a third such base in Eastern Europe. The Americans are drawing some of its European NATO partners into deploying missile defense in depth in Europe as an integrated part of its global MD system.
The appearance of a European antimissile base of the United States would mean a substantial reconfiguration of the American military presence in Europe, and the imparting to US armed forces in this region of a strategic component capable of adversely affecting the nuclear deterrence capability of the Russian Federation.
By its new space strategy, the US has secured a possibility to place weapons in outer space, which may provoke a space arms race. China has already tested an anti-satellite weapon, demonstrating the capability of fighting space vehicles. An international agreement on nonplacement of weapons in outer space has proved elusive so far.
The prospects still remain undefined of future Russian-American agreements in the field of strategic offensive arms (SOA). The current Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty expires on December 5, 2009. The US's position against new legal commitments in this field still delays work on this theme.
Worrying is the situation evolving around the Treaty Between the USSR and the USA on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF). The missiles of these two classes were destroyed pursuant to the Treaty back in 1991, but this international legal act has never been given a universal character since then. Moreover, an ever larger number of states, including those located near our borders, are developing and adopting such missiles. Under these conditions, it is necessary to begin thinking about ensuring our own security.
The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) "has got hung," primarily because of the United States' refusal to ratify it.
Shelved is the entry into force of the Adapted Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty owing to the NATO members' unwillingness to ratify it under the farfetched pretext of Russia's "noncompliance" with the so called Istanbul Commitments regarding Georgia and Moldova.
2. Although the nuclear arms race of the Cold War period is over, the development of the nuclear potentials of world powers is continuing. The existing disarmament and nonproliferation mechanisms are not adapted for an effective response to the new challenges to international security, including a possible link between weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. There takes place the spread of technologies sensitive from the viewpoint of the development of nuclear weapons.
The Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) regime is undergoing serious tests. The DPRK has withdrawn from this agreement and carried out a nuclear test. Questions remain about Iran's compliance with its obligations. India and Pakistan still remain outside the NPT, having proclaimed their "nuclear status." Israel neither confirms nor denies that it possesses nuclear weapons.
Other countries are also beginning to think about nuclear capability as a factor of increasing their international and regional status. Already, in the opinion of IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei, there exist about 30 countries possessing the potential to create nuclear weapons today.
Universalizing the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) fails to be achieved, and the same holds for the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). A large group of countries make their joining them contingent upon Israel joining the NPT as a nonnuclear state.
Only the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation continue to remain in force in the missile domain. Because of their limited range of participants and an insufficient legal base, these political arrangements so far cannot serve as the foundation for solving the problem of missile proliferation.
At the same time the overwhelming majority of the international community favors buttressing the multilateral principles of disarmament, arms control and WMD nonproliferation. We suggest countering the new challenges and threats on the basis of existing treaties, despite their drawbacks. Russia's initiatives for averting the deployment of weapons in outer space and with respect to international information security and the elaboration of a legally binding agreement in the field of missile nonproliferation are receiving ever greater support. The overwhelming majority of states vote for our resolutions at the UNGA on these issues, and only the United States stands alone against them.
Recommendations. In these circumstances collective action is necessary to strengthen the nonproliferation regime, prevent the undermining of the international legal disarmament base, ensure a continuity in the reduction of (primarily nuclear) arms, and avert the origination of a "legal vacuum" and new spheres of the arms race. That work has to be conducted at all levels – at international fora, primarily in the UN and at the Conference on Disarmament, in contacts with regional political and economic alliances of countries as well as on a bilateral basis.
- It is necessary to seek agreements with the US on further effective limitations on SOA, as also regarding strategic security issues, where there are substantive differences with it, including questions of developing low-yield nuclear explosive devices, putting non-nuclear warheads on intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine launched ballistic missiles, and building a global MD system, especially deployment of its elements in Europe.
- It appears expedient to continue advancing the widely supported international initiatives of Russia to conclude a treaty on the prevention of the deployment of weapons in outer space, the threat or use of force against outer space objects, as well as to promote transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities.
- Simultaneously as a separate subject it is expedient to advance further the themes related to confidence-building measures in the space field that have already been approved at the UN General Assembly and it is important to resume the Russian-US dialogue on a broad range of space cooperation issues.
3. Russia and the US, despite shortcomings in the current administration's policy, are united by a shared concern about strengthening the nonproliferation regime. We are jointly dealing with the danger of WMD falling into terrorist hands. There are the first positive results on this front – United Nations Security Council resolution 1540, and the Russian-American Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, which received support at the G8 summit in St. Petersburg and at the meeting of the states original participants of this Initiative in Rabat, Morocco, on October 30-31, 2006. Such interaction needs to be expanded by developing specific new projects.
A promising measure to bolster the nonproliferation regime is the initiative of President Putin for establishing an international network of uranium enrichment centers under IAEA control. In this regard we can also act together with the US, which has put forward an idea close in spirit and focus to our initiative, and also with the support of other leading countries of the world, in the first place the G8 nations and China, and in cooperation with the CIS partners, primarily Kazakhstan.
Recommendations. The principal orientation of our foreign policy activities should remain counteraction against the spread of WMD and the prevention of their falling into terrorist hands. Russia's leading positions should be consolidated in the struggle to preserve, strengthen and fully comply with the fundamental nonproliferation treaties – the NPT, CWC, BTWC – as well as to bring the CTBT into force. Special attention is required for the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, upon which the functions are laid of verifying compliance by states with their commitments in the field of the nonproliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons. It is advisable to continue consolidating the key role of the UN and its Security Council in the field of nonproliferation. The priority: a complete implementation by all countries of UNSCR 1540.
- It is a challenge to devise a legally binding agreement to establish a global missile nonproliferation regime and the universality of the Hague Code of Conduct should be sought, along with the fulfillment of the obligations by all states.
- It is advisable to go on working for the establishment and consolidation of nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) in the world. Agreements on such zones strengthen the NPT, juridically providing their participants with security guarantees.
- In bolstering the NPT regime, the focus should be on the creation of a system of political levers and economic incentives for states not to be interested in creating their own nuclear fuel cycle capacities, but to have the possibility to develop atomic energy, thus building up their energy potential.
4. Participation in all the export control regimes is an essential precondition of the successful integration of Russia into international economic relations. In this connection Russia continues to be interested in entering the Australia Group, an informal association of nations for control over the export of dual-use chemical and biological goods and technologies. But of course – on nondiscriminatory terms for our country. The consistent dissemination in the world of the advanced experience of multilateral export control mechanisms, including the Nuclear Suppliers Group, MTCR and the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, meets Russian interests.
5. Russia regards military technological cooperation (MTC) as an important component part of its foreign policy, especially in the light of attempts to impose on the world a hypertrophied significance of military power in international relations.
We shall facilitate efforts by states to strengthen their defense capability, realizing their right to self-defense in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.
In so doing we shall observe a responsible approach, evaluating the situation in concrete regions with a view to preventing destabilizing arms stockpiles, and facilitate maintaining global and regional stability and raising the threshold for using force in relations between states.
6. New threats to international security arise on account of the processes of the global scientific and technological revolution and the appearance of radically new technological possibilities and resources, primarily in the field of information and communications. In this context it is necessary to pursue further a line on facilitating multilateral consideration of threats to international information security (IIS) of a military-political, criminal and terrorist character and on searching for joint ways to counter them.
Recommendation. An effective international instrument directed at reducing threats in the information sphere and minimizing the consequences of their realization could, for example, be an international treaty, a kind of code of conduct of states, governing relations in the MTC field. It is advisable to continue leading matters towards the elaboration of an appropriate international legal base.
Conflict Settlement and Crisis Response
1. A politico-diplomatic settlement of crisis situations, particularly in the Near and Middle East, has no reasonable alternative. Of course, any compromises should be within the legal field, without prejudice to international security and with due respect for obligations under international agreements, including WMD nonproliferation regimes. Russia cannot joint ultimatums which drive everyone into deadlock, create new crises in an already seriously destabilized region and strike a blow at the authority of the United Nations Security Council. Using force to coerce peace should be a last resort, on which the international community may fall back in strict accordance with the Charter of the United Nations if all the other options for conflict settlement have been exhausted.
Taking into consideration the close interconnection of problems in the vast expanse of the Middle East and North Africa, Russia stands for a comprehensive approach to solving them. In particular, in development of our concept for a system of collective security in the Persian Gulf zone it would be expedient to join it with a future model of post-crisis reconstruction on the scale of the entire region.
On the basis of cooperation among regional and other concerned parties, it is necessary to ensure advancement towards the unblocking of conflict situations as well as towards agreements on confidence-building and verification measures, international guarantees and, ultimately, the creation of a collective security system, of which agreements to convert the Middle East and North Africa into a zone free of weapons of mass destruction should be a part.
The involvement, not isolation of "problem states" leads to settlement. Any conflicts, whether in Kosovo, Cyprus, Transcaucasia or Transnistria, must be resolved by agreement between the parties, which alone can be an enduring settlement. Attempts to impose the terms of settlement from the outside undermine the foundations of international law and are fraught with destabilization of the entire system of international relations.
Any escalation, as a rule, leads to the use of force. The dangers of such a mode of action, which makes hostages of those who have taken this slippery path, are inherent in its very nature: "The exact point to which a bluff may succeed is difficult to determine; if one party goes too far, the other which has previously yielded, advances in its turn; ...until the moment when neither can draw back any longer" (Marcel Proust).
Experience shows that, in resolving conflict situations, their genesis should be fully considered. In particular, considering the interconnection between the state of affairs in the field of disarmament and the situation in the area of nonproliferation is at issue: the lack of progress in the former, accompanied by a policy of force, stimulates a tendency to lean towards proliferation. Another point – the absence of normal relations between states, including the reluctance of certain states to "waive principles" and build their relations with "inconvenient" partners on a basis of peaceful coexistence. By and large there is a need for analysis of the possibilities to turn, in today's circumstances, to the positive elements of the Cold War experience, such as the possibilities of containment by deterrence and the pursuit of a policy of peaceful coexistence.
2. The root of the problems the Middle East countries encounter is the unsettledness of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The situation is aggravated by the continuing tension around Syria and Lebanon; there is a danger that Iraq might disintegrate. A threat of destabilization stems from the Kurdish problem. We're witnessing the positions of Iran grow stronger in the region, resulting, inter alia, from a short-sighted line on containing and isolating Teheran instead of drawing it into the settlement of the entire spectrum of regional problems. Overall instability is fed by local conflicts in Sudan, in the Horn of Africa and in Western Sahara.
Efforts directed at unblocking the Palestinian-Israeli conflict remain among the priorities of Russian Mideast policy. Russia perceives its task as helping the leaderships of Israel, the PNA and Arab states take correct decisions geared to end confrontation and to shift conflict situations onto the track of political settlement. So far there is no realistic alternative to the Quartet as a vehicle for exerting collective external influence on the situation in Middle East settlement and it is necessary to facilitate enhancing its effectiveness and efficiency.
A just, comprehensive and lasting settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict is realizable on the basis of the comprehensive approach enshrined in UN Security Council resolutions 242, 338, 1397 and 1515 and the 2002 Arab peace initiative. There is a need for a serious new impulse to a resumption of the peace process on all tracks. The idea of convening an international conference on the Middle East appears promising in this connection. A comprehensive approach is needed, with the drawing of all the parties concerned, including Syria and Iran, into international efforts for settlement.
Recommendations. As applied to Arab-Israeli settlement, advance the idea of resuming negotiations on all tracks. Lead matters to convening a broad-format international conference on the Middle East, with the initiative to hold which Russian President Vladimir Putin came up in April 2005. An important part of the preparation of that forum could be a Moscow meeting at the expert level.
- Plead strongly in favor of a system of regional security in the Middle East with the participation of all countries of the region, involving equal military security guarantees, the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone and carrying out of effective confidence-building measures in the field of security. The realization of that approach could help raise the level of mutual trust among the countries of the region and add greatly to efforts for conflict settlement.
- In case the Palestinians and Israelis begin to fulfill their obligations under the Road Map and make good faith efforts, explore the possibility of realizing the idea of speeded-up advance in terms of the Road Map stages and movement from one stage to another. In this regard, concentrate on Israeli-Palestinian negotiations aimed at reaching the permanent status agreement (the third stage of the Road Map).
After consultations within the Quartet, an international Middle East conference could be convened to approve, in particular, the agreements on the creation of a Palestinian state.
3. The situation in Iraq is critical, balancing on the brink of a full-scale civil war. Terrorist activity is on the rise, and contradictions on ethnic and faith grounds grow sharper. The momentum-gathering disintegration processes may lead to a final breakup of the Iraqi state. The Government of Iraq and the Multinational Force (MNF) are unable to control effectively the situation on a considerable part of the territory of the country. Attempts to launch a process of national reconciliation have not yielded any tangible results, particularly as a consequence of the unwillingness of the Iraqi leadership to accept the opposition's chief demand – for a time schedule to pull out the foreign troops from Iraq.
The progressing degradation of the situation in Iraq bears out the well-groundedness of our warnings about the inevitability of serious adverse consequences of strong arm action against Saddam's regime. The military adventure of the US and its allies in Iraq has brought about the appearance of new factors whose destructive influence may extend far beyond the Middle East. We highlight the following two aspects.
The first – as a result of the overthrow of a secular authoritarian regime that had no links with Al-Qaida, Iraq has turned into a "base" of terrorists using it for the recruitment of jihadists, their training and (particularly ideological) steeling. Later on, when the Iraqis have sorted things out among themselves without any outside interference, Iraq, most likely, will have no place left for terrorists. So it has to be expected that, as after end of the war in Afghanistan, terrorist elements will start egressing to other countries, including their countries of origin, this constituting a grave factor of destabilization of some nations and the growth of the terrorist menace as a whole.
The second – objectively the war in Iraq has strengthened the positions of the Shiite majority there. Many Arab capitals have taken this as a violation in Iran's favor of the established balance of forces in the Persian Gulf zone, with fears of a possible further "Shiite expansion" in the region.
On the other hand, Iran can play a substantial positive role in the Iraqi field. It is precisely with Washington and Teheran operating in Iraq on parallel courses, supporting the government of Nouri al-Maliki, that the security situation has been kept from collapse, a number of experts believe.
Against the increasingly fierce Sunni-Shiite confrontation, the Kurdish problem has temporarily receded into the background. But the lingering contradictions between Iraq's Arabs, Kurds and Turkomen, primarily on the issues of a change of administrative boundaries and the delimitation of powers between the central and regional authorities, may at any moment transfer this conflict into an active phase. In this case it is not inconceivable that neighboring states (primarily Turkey, but also Iran and Syria) may directly intervene in it, as "Kurdish separatism" is a sensitive internal political problem for them.
An uncontrolled run of events in Iraq ending up in a full-scale civil war, in which neighbor countries might be involved, would not meet Russia's interests. At the same time it is obvious that the earlier the internal Iraqi situation begins to develop without the distorting influence of the factor of a foreign military presence, the sooner its resolution will occur. The role of the external factor – the international community and Iraq's neighbors – should be reduced to assistance in reaching a consensus in Iraqi society on the main issues of the country's future. Goal: the formation of a broad national consensus with the participation of all leading Iraqi forces and the ensuring of the real involvement of the international community, primarily all of Iraq's neighbors without exception, in the process of settlement.
Strictly speaking, this is the meaning of the Russian initiative put forward as early as 2003 to convene a representative international conference on Iraq with the participation of leaders of all the major ethnic and faith groups and leading sociopolitical organizations of the country, including those in opposition. This proposal remains valid. It can become urgently relevant if an awareness of the dead endedness of the current US policy in Iraq comes, along with the prevalence of realistic approaches to Iraqi settlement.
It is in this vein that the recommendations of the two-party expert group of James Baker and Lee Hamilton are formulated, in particular, about the expediency of devising a schedule for speeded-up withdrawal of the MNF, drawing Syria and Iran into the settlement process and ensuring advance in Arab-Israeli settlement.
The Iraq situation shows the interconnection of many international problems. In this case it is about Iraq and the nuclear program of Iran. An important practical consequence from this link: Iran's participation in Iraqi settlement in a multilateral format will create conditions for the shift to solving the problem of its nuclear program as well, likewise in the spirit of moderateness and compromise, including the normalization of bilateral relations between Washington and Teheran.
Recommendation. In the work with international partners, advance the Russian approaches to a political settlement of the Iraq problem. Its demonopolization would give a realistic alternative to the present dead-end situation in the conditions, when after the midterm congressional elections the debate about an "exit strategy" from Iraq has intensified in the US. The ideas of setting up a Contact Group made up of the United Nations Security Council permanent members, all of Iraq's neighbors and a number of key regional powers and of holding in this composition an international conference on Iraq with the participation of leading Iraqi politicians appear to be productive. That collective format is in a position to devise a viable strategy for settlement, meeting the interests of all the ethnoconfessional groups of Iraqi society and all of Iraq's neighbors.
4. Russia's well-considered approach to the situation around the nuclear program of Iran enjoys wide understanding in the world and is shared by many international experts. It is acknowledged that this problem has no force-based solution; that is, there is no reasonable alternative to its politico-diplomatic settlement. The ultimatum policy is doomed to failure.
The unconstructive position of Iran led to the adoption by the UN Security Council of resolution 1737 in December 2006 demanding of Iran the suspension of all its activities involving uranium enrichment, chemical reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel and heavy water reactors. We regard it as a serious signal to Teheran urging it to be more actively and openly cooperative with the IAEA in order to remove the outstanding issues and concerns related to its nuclear program.
The Iranian nuclear problem can be solved only in the overall context of the international and regional situation, bearing in mind that to toughen up the nonproliferation regime will be possible only in the conditions of the rule of international law in international affairs and the creation of a system of international security guarantees for all states without exception as well as of providing all states with equal, nondiscriminatory access to the newest technologies, including nuclear. Anyway the problem should not be stalemated, and the reaction of the international community must be adequate to the degree of threat to nonproliferation, which duly authorized professionals alone can determine. The proposals to set up in the Near and Middle East region a system of regional security, of which mutual security guarantees with the participation of the UNSC permanent members, Iran, Israel and Syria could be a part, also merit attention.
An important factor in this situation, as in a number of others, is the absence of normal relations between Iran and the United States. The situation is aggravated by attempts to put on Teheran the label of a country which is part of the "axis of evil," as well as by statements about the need for regime change in Teheran as the only means for ensuring a reliable solution to the problem.
Neither can we disregard the opinion of independent experts that the real aim of Teheran is not so much the development of nuclear weapons as the achievement of a capability for their quick production using nonmilitary nuclear sector facilities (the so called "threshold potential," which a number of countries, including the FRG and Japan, already possess). In this context the most productive line of the international community would be a complex of measures to involve Teheran, be it in regional affairs, including settlement in Iraq and the stabilization of Afghanistan, or the normalization of bilateral relations with it.
Maintaining normal relations with each other is the duty of all states, and no considerations, especially those of an ideological nature, can absolve states of this responsibility. What makes us cautious is the admissions by a number of US officials that the real aim of their Iran policy is a change of regime.
Recommendation. In any case the international community should not take the common risks for all that are involved with the escalation of the situation around Iran until the United States undertakes sincere, conscientious efforts to normalize its relations with Teheran. In this matter, as with the situation in the Palestinian territories, the reluctance of the US to use the "window of opportunity" created by the pro-reform government of Mohammad Hatami has had as its direct consequence the radicalization of the situation within Iran and the further exacerbation around its nuclear program.
Another, more fundamental question arises: Why go for a force option that threatens a collapse of the situation in Iraq, if the United States by its plans to deploy elements of its national MD in Europe actually recognizes the effectiveness of a strategy of containment by deterrence with respect to a presumed nuclear-missile threat from Iran?
Recommendations. If there is where to start cooperation with the US "from the very beginning," that is from a joint threat assessment, then it is precisely here until the American tactic of creeping involvement of the international community in a full-scale crisis around Iran is crowned with success. In this case the entire array of existing expert judgements should be brought into play.
- Among other things, it will require considering the implications of the Iran crisis for intercivilizational relations. The United States will have to prove that it is not getting ready for a "war of civilizations," by creating conditions for its "frontline" existence (a la Israel) – as "Fortress America," shut off from the rest of the world by oceans and Soviet-style border control, including "fences." The August trip by former Iranian president Hatami to the US shows that intercivilizational dialogue could become a useful channel of establishing contacts with Teheran for the Americans.
As to the interests of Russia, of significance to us along with nonproliferation is the important regional role of Iran, including the problem of stabilizing Afghanistan and the states of Central Asia. Washington's obsession with confrontation with Iran at all costs determines the contradictoriness of American policy as a whole. For example, the US in the light of its present policy in Transcaucasia just cannot but have a keen interest in Iranian gas supplies not only for Armenia, but for Georgia as well. The unsettledness of relations with Iran is a weak point of other American geopolitical projects in this vast region, including the plans to transport Caspian resources bypassing Russian territory and create a "Greater Central Asia."
5. The six-party talks are the optimal format of ensuring a comprehensive solution to the Korean Peninsula nuclear problem, including the provision of firm and convincing security guarantees to all countries of the region, normalization of relations between the DPRK and the United States, and creation of conditions for the development of the DPRK and the region as a whole. Of key significance is the implementation of the Joint Statement of September 19, 2005, adopted at the end of the fourth round of six-party negotiations. Subsequently it is important to start developing a realistic Road Map clearly reflecting the sequence of steps to settle the Korean Peninsula nuclear problem. Of course, the six-party negotiations have a prospect only counting on the normalization of bilateral relations between the DPRK and the United States.
Recommendation. The preferableness of having the KPNP settled in the framework of six-party negotiations should be proceeded from.
6. With reference to the situation in Afghanistan there are no grounds yet to share the pessimism of the experts who believe that the MNF's pullback from Iraq will necessarily entail a coalition force withdrawal, and the cessation of the activities of the ISAF in Afghanistan. For, we have an entirely different format of settlement there, along with objectively high stakes for the international community as a whole, NATO, Russia, and other powers of the region and, of course, all of Afghanistan's neighbors. This provides for an objective basis for arriving at an agreed option of demonopolization of the political settlement in the country, and at the enlistment of all of Afghanistan's neighbors without exception in it.
Recommendation. It is important to continue assisting postwar reconstruction in Afghanistan, the solution of its economic and social problems and the formation of a national army. Regional organizations, including the CSTO and SCO, can play a positive role in stabilizing the situation around Afghanistan, in combating the terrorist and narcotic threats and in forging real cooperation with that country. It is useful to forge their interaction with other international organizations, especially those already engaged in the Afghan sector.
7. Russia participates in resolving the Kosovo problem in the framework of the United Nations Security Council and the Contact Group (Russia, Britain, Germany, Italy, the US and France), and plays an important role in devising the line of the international community on the basis of the parameters agreed upon in UNSCR 1244. But a number of our partners regard the granting of independence to Kosovo as an unalternative scheme for dealing with the problem, indulging the Kosovo Albanians' needs and favoring imposition of a status decision on Belgrade. This kind of situation creates an element of tension in the efforts of the international community. The establishment of an independent Kosovo state is going to entail serious complications for stability in Europe. It is also doubted that, in the conditions of Kosovo independence, without all countries' consent, it will be easier to seek to achieve the fundamental aims of the settlement – such as the creation of multiethnic society and implementation of the other Kosovo standards. The experience of the international community associated with the creation of Israel gives some food for thought. For well-known reasons the process of the territorial and political disposition of Palestine has gone out of control vis-a-vis the international community, which is one of the key factors of the continuing unsettledness of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Recommendation. In the event of attempts being made to impose a unilateral Kosovo decision, we will not support an option in the United Nations Security Council which is fraught with serious adverse implications for regional and international stability.
Dialogue Among Civilizations
1. One determinant tendency of the contemporary stage of international relations is the coming to the fore of the questions tied to the maintenance of intercivilizational harmony in the world. This is due largely to globalization creating a threat to national distinctiveness, the cultural-civilizational diversity of the world and personal freedom. Terrorists and those preaching rigidly ideologized approaches to international affairs provoke tension in intercivilizational relations. The threat of a split of the world on civilizational grounds is becoming one of the chief challenges of our time.
Scholars emphasize two principal evolutionary scenarios for intercivilizational relations in the world. The first option is associated with continued all-round internationalization while preserving the specific cultures that have taken shape in individual countries and regions. The second one envisages convergence, in which the civilizational values of different cultures will merge into global civilization as its component parts. In any case the eastern civilizations as an important part of the cultural heritage of mankind have yet to play a positive role in the formation of global development trends.
2. The promotion of the dialogue among civilizations in these circumstances is becoming one of the most important elements of our foreign policy strategy. There are grounds to make this theme the thread running through our international contacts and secure it as the "big idea" of Russian diplomacy for the foreseeable future. This is already becoming an effective means for asserting the intellectual leadership of Russia in world politics, upholding our foreign policy independence and advancing national interests in particular situations and questions of international life.
The theme of intercivilizational harmony enables us, in an unconfrontational vein, to take up a whole series of principled issues reflecting our vision of a new world pattern. This question reveals with particular clarity the inseparable link between foreign and domestic policies and affects the national security interests of Russia with its multinational and multiconfessional society. The intercivilizational theme provides a unifying positive agenda both at home and internationally, and establishes the necessary conditions for drawing religious and other civil society institutions into the foreign policy process. Objective civilizational multivectorness thus constitutes an important advantage of our diplomacy.
Key Russian religious organizations and, in particular, the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) make a great contribution to promoting the dialogue among civilizations. In 2006 the Interreligious Council of Russia and ROC sponsored a number of international interreligious events, the largest being the World Summit of Religious Leaders (Moscow, July 3-5). Its participants spoke for building a world order which would combine democratic norms with respect for moral principles, the way of life, diverse legal and political systems, and national and religious traditions.
Recommendations. Regard intercivilizational dialogue and partnership, and opposition to a split of the world on civilizational grounds as a top-priority issue in pursuing the foreign policy course and tackling the practical tasks of the further strengthening of the international position of Russia.
- In the work on the intercivilizational front, cooperate vigorously with our natural allies, such as Turkey, Spain, Malaysia and other Asian countries. Seek on a wider scale joint actions with the Islamic world, particularly in the framework of our participation in the activities of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and by involving our partners from among Islamic states in the work within different multilateral formats.
- Carry on the purposeful work on advancing our approaches to problems relating to the G8 BMENA, particularly under the auspices of the Forum for the Future.
- Support energetically the work of the Russia-Islamic World Strategic Vision Group, and advance its recommendation for setting up a consultative Council of Civilizations under the UN Secretary General. Conduct this work in close cooperation with civil society and with religious, scientific and cultural workers, using the Public Chamber's potential.
- As part of the advancement of the Turkish-Spanish initiative for an Alliance of Civilizations, work towards establishment of a United Nations platform for interconfessional and intercivilizational dialogue involving members of civil society and the media.
THE GEOGRAPHICAL DIRECTIONS OF FOREIGN POLICY
The CIS Space
1. Relations with the CIS countries is the chief priority of Russian foreign policy. Our security interests are concentrated here, and that is where serious challenges emanate from, illegal immigration and organized crime among them.
2. Russia is interested in having friendly, prosperous, democratic and stable states along the perimeter of its borders. A guarantee of Russia's leadership in the CIS space could be the design of an attractive realistic model of evolutionary transition to a full-fledged market and democracy for partners. We have every reason to presume that the "European choice" of Russia is shared by society and the political elite in the other Commonwealth states. The path to achieving this objective ought to be prompted with our own example. In particular, our practice of public-private partnerships could be of interest.
As the accumulated experience shows and our foreign partners in the CIS are well aware, trade-and-economic cooperation with Russia is an indispensable condition of sustainable development of the Commonwealth countries. In this regard, we are talking about the important common resources of national development, resulting from the complementary economies and the long-standing joint existence within one state. In the foreseeable future no external partners or alternative integration formats will be able to replace the role of Russia, bilaterally and in the CIS as a whole and in the formats of various-level integration. The desirable end result is the establishment of an economic system which would ensure the effective development of each of its participants.
Attempts to ignore the natural interrelationships and long-established traditions turn into a threat of the appearance of not self-supporting, weak states. We want to base our relations with the CIS countries on sober economic calculation. Such relations are more viable than the outdated, politicized schemes. Taking real economic interests out of the shadow will also benefit our relations with extraregional powers in the Commonwealth space. It is the clarity, openness and intelligibility that we are being exhorted to show and which we, in our turn, expect in the policy of our partners with respect to the countries of this vitally important region for us.
2. The CIS ensured the "civilized divorce" of the former Soviet republics after the USSR's breakup and now still remains an indispensable platform to discuss common problems. The reform that has been launched within the Commonwealth aims to find an optimal balance between modernization and the retention of the positive potential accumulated over the last fifteen years. Of key significance within the CIS is the problem of consolidating the common humanitarian space. It is about preserving and strengthening diverse human ties, inter alia through civil society. Herein is the important additional resource of national development for each country of the Commonwealth.
A shift to a free-market basis in economic relations with the CIS countries is long overdue. "Favoritism" in relations between individual partners not only runs counter to universally accepted world practice, but also distorts the processes of their internal development, lowers the incentives for restructuring of the economies and does not fit into our common striving to enter the WTO. In this case Russia is ready to consider a variety of schemes for a gradual transition to new energy prices. The task is to overcome the politicization of economic cooperation that distorts the nature of our relations. This, as polls show, meets the sentiments in Russian society. It was politics that used to dictate previous prices, and this led to nothing good for either supplier countries or for consumer countries. We are dealing with a major element of reciprocal emancipation that helps remove the rudiments of the past and build pragmatic forward-looking relations predicated on mutual respect and mutual benefit.
Russia should be striving towards an economically liberalized post-Soviet space, including the investment sphere. The past fifteen years have shown that for Russia this space is a vast promising sales market, inter alia for high value added products. Engineering products form 5 percent of total Russian exports. They accounted for about 21 percent of exports to the CIS countries in 2005. Thus Russia can make its contribution to economic modernization within the CIS.
3. The need for integration in the post-Soviet space will sooner or later arise among most former republics of the USSR. At this stage, real integration in the CIS space is proceeding in small formats. The Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) is the nucleus of these integration processes. Its near-term goal is to establish a full-fledged customs union, by which to move to a higher-level integration stage: creating a single economic space (common market) within the EurAsEC.
Work is under way to form a package of documents for a customs union of the Three (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia) in the format of the six EurAsEC countries using the ideas and suggestions from the negotiation process under the Agreement on the Single Economic Space (SES). It is envisaged that accession to the customs union of the Three by other member states of the EurAsEC will proceed consecutively having regard to their degree of readiness.
A special role in implementing large investment projects in the CIS space is allotted to a new international financial organization, the Eurasian Development Bank (authorized capital 1.5 billion dollars).
Recommendation. Explore the following approach: work towards a customs union with "ready" countries; prepare the rest through special regimes and bring them in as the necessary conditions become ripe. In terms of resource support of EurAsEC activities the Eurasian Development Bank has a key role to play.
4. The interests of bolstering the integration processes between the four economically most developed countries of the CIS, Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus, which account for about 90 percent of the CIS states' gross domestic product, would be met by Ukraine's full-format participation in creating the Single Economic Space. This would correspond to the present-day realities of the world economy, and blend into the context of the process of the globalization of world economic ties.
5. The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) plays a key role in ensuring regional security and stability, including combating the new challenges and threats. Uzbekistan's resumed membership in it helps raise its role in tackling these tasks, particularly with reference to the Central Asian Region. Russia will continue promoting consolidation of the CSTO as a military-political alliance, the strengthening of the peacekeeping capabilities of the Organization, improvement in military technological cooperation among member states and the enhancement of the coordination of their actions in the international arena. An urgent challenge is to build on the international prestige of the CSTO and develop its contacts with other regional analogously specialized organizations, including NATO. Increasing coordination between the CSTO and the EurAsEC takes on growing practical significance.
6. Russia has been consistently pursuing a line on deepening its relations with Belarus, with which the highest level of political and economic integration in the CIS has been achieved and close cooperation ensured in foreign policy, in the fields of defense and security and in the humanitarian sphere.
The creation of the single economic space acquires priority significance in further deepening the integration processes. In this context the gradual transition being effected in bilateral relations to universal market principles, despite all the complexities, creates conditions for taking Russian-Belarusian cooperation to a qualitatively new level and will help find an optimal model to build the Union State.
7. Relations with Ukraine are one of the key thrusts of Russian foreign policy. Russia and Ukraine were and will be major, strategic partners for each other. The prerequisites for this are the cultural and historic kinship, the complementary economies, the extensive humanitarian ties, and the intertwining of destinies of the citizens of our countries. All the accretions in them, resulting from the action of the various geopolitical factors in the complicated period of transition to a new world order, have a transient significance and will be surmounted with the establishment of a modern sustainable architecture of international relations.
The state of Russian-Ukrainian relations is projected onto the processes across the CIS space and on the European continent as a whole. Russia is striving towards deepening links with Ukraine on the basis of the principles of good-neighborliness, pragmatism and mutual benefit. A unique mechanism for realizing this purpose is the Russian-Ukrainian Interstate Commission led by the two countries' presidents.
8. Russia, while remaining committed to a political settlement of the Transnistrian conflict with the observance of the territorial integrity of Moldova and on the basis of elaborating a special, reliably guaranteed status of Transnistria, stands in the negotiation process for the preservation of the mechanisms for ensuring stability in the region, including the existing peacekeeping operation as well as due care of the entire stock of ideas for settlement. A major element of a long-term settlement is the consolidation of Moldova's constitutional status as a neutral state.
9. The Transcaucasian region has a key significance in terms of Russia's territorial integrity and national security. The situation in the region remains tense, and as applied to Georgia – explosive. The "frozen conflicts" existing there are exploited by extraregional forces for the purpose of enhancing their influence in the region to the detriment of our positions.
10. The policy of Georgia's leadership with Mikhail Saakashvili at the head is based on ethnic nationalism and enjoys support from a number of western countries, primarily the United States. Tbilisi is pursuing a line on breaking the existing peacekeeping and negotiation formats, with the result that it has aggravated the situation around Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Georgia counts on attracting heightened international attention to these problems; it wants to get Euro-Atlantic entities involved in the "frozen conflicts" theme and thus accelerate settlement on its own terms, bearing in mind to ensure the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as component parts of a unitary Georgian state. In so doing the Georgian side has been waging an incessant anti-Russian media campaign, although with slightly reduced intensity of late; it has been trying to exploit for its purposes the potential of the OSCE, CoE, EU and NATO, and seeking to shift the blame to Russia for all its problems internal and external, which supposedly would justify screw tightening inside the country and the growing authoritarian tendencies in political life.
The assessment is also supported by the findings of the July 2006 report on Russia to the Trilateral Commission, which notes, in particular, that Georgia "is very far from a beacon of democracy and the rule of law," and that it "is in a weak and unstable condition and under highly erratic leadership." In the authors' opinion, "the West should not encourage the delusion that the solution to Georgia's problems lies through NATO or EU membership."
Recommendations. A consistent further pursuit of the principled line in relations with Tbilisi appears to meet our interests. The chief thing here is to prevent actions which could prejudice the long-term national interests of the people of Georgia.
- Our line regarding the Abkhazia and South Ossetia conflicts involves the necessity to search for a viable solution exclusively by peaceful means outside a time or status framework. It means the voluntary consent of the parties in conflict to a settlement model they have themselves devised within the existing negotiation formats; that is, essentially, the realization of the parties' will.
It is important to avert erosion of the prevailing formats of Georgian-Ossetian and Georgian-Abkhaz settlement (including the presence of the Russian peacekeepers) and to consistently uphold the thesis that Kosovo's eventual acquisition of independence will have a precedent character.
11. Against the background of the conflicts involving Georgia, Nagorno-Karabakh settlement looks a less acute question. The present line – joint actions with Washington and Paris in the framework of the mechanism of the OSCE Minsk Group cochairmanship in support of direct negotiations between Baku and Yerevan – appears optimal.
12. Azerbaijan is a strategically important partner for the near and long term. The respectful tone and the atmosphere of trust and equality that have become established in our relations have acquitted themselves. The Azerbaijani leadership is striving to continue its line on rapprochement with Russia.
13. Relations with Armenia bear a stable allied character. It is our strategic partner in Transcaucasia and a part of the integration nucleus of the Commonwealth. We shall be striving to weaken the transportation blockade of Armenia, to build up cooperation in the energy sector, to seek a higher degree of coordination of the two countries' foreign policies in the region and to strengthen humanitarian cooperation.
14. In the region of Central Asia the US has been persistently advancing plans to create a new entity incorporating the five Central Asian republics, Afghanistan and Pakistan, and in the long term India as well. Many in the Central Asian political circles see in the penetration into the region by the US and other Western countries an important resource for modernization, financial aid and the inflow of advanced technologies. A big factor of uncertainty, though: the degrading situation in Afghanistan. But if the Afghan campaign ends in failure and the US and NATO leave, the Central Asian countries and Russia will be left one on one facing the consequences of the aggravated Afghan problem, primarily the narco-terrorist threat, a burst of fundamentalist sentiment and the destabilization of the region. Under these conditions, Russia has no choice but to build up its multipronged involvement in Central Asian affairs.
Recommendations. Presume that our work in the Central Asian sector can be successful only in the case of a comprehensive approach, including the activation of the potentialities of the CSTO, EurAsEC and SCO. The question must be one of creating in the person of Russia an attractive competitive and realistic perspective for the political elites as well as for the broad sections of the population. Our neighbors should associate with Russia their future, the possibility of an evolutionary, without upheavals, transformation, and the prospects for stabilizing their social and economic position.
- The elaboration of serious economic and investment projects will have a great significance from the viewpoint of assistance in the stabilization of the socioeconomic position in the countries of the region and in their sustainable development. In this case it is necessary to make wider use of the capabilities of the Russian corporate sector, including major energy companies. Such work could be carried out both in the framework of the SCO and through the EurAsEC. In particular, this could involve the creation of a common energy market, including the unique possibility of the EurAsEC to cooperate in nuclear energy by establishing international uranium enrichment centers, as well as participation in the effective use of the hydroenergy resources of the region.
15. Kazakhstan is Russia's key strategic partner and ally in the Central Asian region. This assessment is based on its role as a key engine in the integration processes in the post-Soviet space as well as on the geostrategic importance of Kazakhstan for Russia and of its potential in the energy, transportation/transit, military and other fields, dynamically, but not yet fully activated in the interests of our bilateral relations.
Recommendation. On a symmetrically-pragmatic basis, it is necessary to work for the allied understanding and strategic partnership to be preserved and developed as the optimal model for our relations. At the base of that model lie the historically predetermined economic, military-political and humanitarian interests of the sides, and the mutual striving to counter the threats and challenges to regional and international security. The intensive political dialogue should be accompanied by a more coordinated approach of Russia's ministries and departments to building up cooperation with the Republic of Kazakhstan, in a bilateral format as well as within the integration organizations – the CIS, CSTO, EurAsEC and SES. It should be borne in mind that maintaining and developing allied and partner relations with Kazakhstan will require of Russia significantly greater effort than before, owing to the emerging geopolitical situation in Central Asia.
16. Relations and cooperation with Uzbekistan, based on the principles of strategic allied understanding, are dynamically evolving along an ascending line in the political, economic, military-technological, humanitarian and other fields. The entry of the Republic of Uzbekistan into the EurAsEC at the end of 2005 and the restoration of its membership in the CSTO in 2006 have given a good impulse in this direction.
17. Relations with Kyrgyzstan are developing in a traditionally friendly, constructive vein and bear a multifaceted character. Military and military-technological cooperation proceeds on a bilateral basis and in the CSTO framework. Systematic work is under way to equip and develop the Russian military base at Kant, which is the air component of the CSTO Collective Rapid Deployment Force in the Central Asian sector.
18. Russia and Tajikistan cooperate in the framework of the CSTO, EurAsEC and SCO and coordinate their approaches toward key topical issues, internationally and regionally. The Russian 201st military base in Tajikistan functions in normal mode. Definite progress has been made in the field of hydroenergy: the river Vakhsh was dammed for the Sangtudin HPP-1 being build with Russian aid. An important stride has thus been made in erecting an electric station which must solve the problem of supplying the Republic with electricity.
19. Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov, Turkmenistan's newly elected President, at a meeting with Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov in February 2007, reaffirmed continuity in his country's policy aimed at developing close cooperation with Russia in diverse fields.
Europe
1. Work in the European sector calls for renewed approaches, oriented towards molding a new quality of relations. This is due to both the strengthened positions of Russia and the fact that the main European and Euro-Atlantic associations, the EU, CoE, OSCE and NATO, are going through a period of transformation, as they search for their respective niches in a changed international setting. In these conditions the fulcrum of Russian policy on the European continent is bilateral relations, where the economy, politics, the social sphere, cultural issues, and contacts between people are present. The realization of the potential of bilateral links must help us decide on the scale of priorities regarding the multilateral organizations.
2. The European Union is our chief partner in Europe, with whom the main array of Russia's European interests are associated. In spite of the slowdown in the pace of eurointegration, it remains a powerful geopolitical factor which has to be considered as we build our line in Europe and in international affairs as a whole. Overall, the strategic partnership with the EU is developing constructively, and the dialogue on the broadest spectrum of cooperation is becoming ever more saturated and substantive.
At the same time, attempts by a number of countries having joined the European Union in 2004 to "avail themselves" of the advantages of their membership for the realization of their political tasks vis-a-vis Russia, turning the Russia-EU relationship into a "hostage" of their own narrow national interests, have been observed.
A priority issue on the agenda is the launching of negotiations on the elaboration of a basic Russia-EU treaty which would lay a new legal basis for cooperation with the European Union replacing the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), whose initial ten-year period expires on December 1, 2007. But a legal vacuum does not threaten our relations: the sides can extend the existing PCA. Anyway this is above all the problem of the European Union itself.
Work with the European Union focuses mainly on the realization of the roadmaps that were adopted at the Russia-EU summit in Moscow on May 10, 2005 for four common spaces: common economic space; space for freedom, security and justice; space for co-operation on external security; and space for research, education and culture.
Intensive work is under way to create horizontal ties under the common economic space roadmap. Twelve Russia-EU sectoral dialogues have been launched, paying special attention to energy and transport problems.
A complicated aspect of the relationship continues to be the European Union's demand that Russia should ratify the Energy Charter Treaty and sign the Transit Protocol, which as currently worded do not meet our national interests. The partners were clearly told so during the Russia-EU summits in Sochi on May 25, 2006 and in Helsinki on November 24, 2006, as well as in the course of President Putin's informal meeting with the heads of the 25 EU member countries in Lahti on October 20, 2006. At the same time the Russian side reaffirmed its readiness to work out uniform rules for energy cooperation on the basis of the principles contained in the Energy Charter.
Problems related to Kaliningrad cargo transit are gradually being solved. Yet differences persist over transportation tariffs and transit fees and veterinary and phytosanitary checks. The upcoming entry of Lithuania into the Schengen space ought not to narrow Kaliningraders' freedom of movement.
As part of cooperation on the roadmap for freedom, security and justice, the signing of the visa facilitation and readmission agreements, due to enter into force soon, constituted an important landmark. It remains our strategic objective to have a visa-free regime introduced for trips of citizens of Russia and the EU.
Still urgently relevant is the implementation by the European Union of the part of its commitments under the Joint Statement on EU Enlargement and Russia-EU Relations, adopted in Luxembourg on April 27, 2004, concerning the due observance of national minority rights in Latvia and Estonia.
Under the roadmap for the common space of external security, a constructive dialogue on international problems has been arranged at all levels, and regular consultations are being held on such topical issues as Middle East settlement, the Iranian nuclear program, and the situation in Iraq.
The continuing presence and anti-Russian activities on the territory of a number of EU member states of Chechen separatists' "emissaries" doing not only propaganda, but also fundraising for terrorist activities against Russia and Russian citizens is in sharp contrast to the overall positive tonality of the Russia-EU antiterrorist dialogue.
Under the framework of the common space of research and education, a mechanism for cooperation in the scientific domain has been set up – the Joint Science and Technology Cooperation Committee. We also have a Russian-EU joint educational project in place, the European Studies Institute at the Russian Foreign Ministry's Moscow State Institute for International Relations (MGIMO).
In order to minimize the adverse consequences of the admission of Romania and Bulgaria into the European Union in 2007, the Russian side through the negotiation process with the CEC begun in October 2006 is bringing to the partners an awareness of the necessity to hold negotiations with Bulgaria and Romania which would precede the extension of the PCA to these countries.
Recommendation. In contacts with the EU, primarily in the framework of the upcoming negotiations on a strategic partnership treaty, it is advisable to concentrate on the tasks in comprehensive and long-term governance of our relations, in the combination of common values and reciprocal interests and in the construction of Europe without dividing lines.
3. Russia's Chairmanship of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe (CMCE) in May-November 2006 greatly strengthened our influence on the pan-European agenda formation and helped take action to neutralize the intentions of the European Union to withdraw from the pan-European human rights space by creating a European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights which would not fall within the remit of the European Convention on Human Rights.
The following thrusts of the Council of Europe's activity meet the interests of Russia in the first place: antiterrorist engagement, interfaith and intercultural dialogue; ensuring freedom of movement in Europe through the creation of a single visa-free space; cooperation in the social sphere as well as in the fields of culture, youth and sport.
Recommendation. It is important to continue to uphold vigorously the line on enhancing the independence of the Council of Europe and its role in the most significant European projects (freedom of movement; a pan-European legal space; defense of human rights in the context of new threats; the social and cultural protectedness of individuals and others).
4. Originally set into the concept of the OSCE, its function as a forum for equal political dialogue and collective decision making on the issues of European security common to all the participating states in all of its three dimensions (military-political, economic and humanitarian) is becoming increasingly atrophied. The US and a number of other western countries are trying to reduce OSCE activities to the role of a unilateral instrument for ensuring their foreign policy interests in respect of other member states. This concerns, first and foremost, influence on the CIS processes, attempts to reconstruct the "European periphery" according to externally imposed patterns, to pressure states which are not members of NATO and the EU to alter their vector of political orientation, even as far as a change of ruling regimes, and to oust Russia from negotiation and peacekeeping formats for settlement of "frozen conflicts."
For these purposes a line on preserving the institutional "looseness" of the OSCE inherited from its "conference-type" (when it was the CSCE) past and expressed in the "wilfullness" of its Chairman-in-Office and its institutions and field presences, many questions of whose activity simply are not submitted for consideration by the collective intergovernmental bodies (the Permanent Council and the Ministerial Council), is being pursued. Some of these institutions, especially the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), openly claim autonomy from the OSCE member states, meaning to retain the possibility for politically biased "monitoring" of processes, including electoral, in the countries located "east of Vienna."
So far Russia and allies have succeeded in keeping OSCE reform on the agenda and pinpointedly saturating its work with issues related to combating the new challenges and threats. The appropriate instructions are included in the decisions of the OSCE Ministerial Council held in Brussels in December 2006.
Recommendations. Our line in these conditions should be directed at advancing an institutional reform of the OSCE which would eventually put its entire work on a sound normative footing, by which to ensure supremacy of prerogatives of the collective intergovernmental bodies taking decisions by consensus; as well as at rectifying the geographical and functional-thematic distortions in the Organization's work and at shifting emphasis to dealing with matters linked to the new challenges and threats, relevant for all or most of the member states.
- The question of the monitoring activities of ODIHR, which has shown itself to be an instrument of shamelessly applying "double standards" for purposes of political pressure, merits special attention. Should the ODIHR reform efforts fail, our further cooperation with this entity will turn out to be in question.
5. In relations with NATO, which occupy a special position in Russian foreign policy, we proceed from the realities – the alliance remains a geopolitical and power factor influencing the security situation near our borders.
For all the differences in tactical and geopolitical priorities, Russia and NATO have a significant field of coincidence of interests in responding to common security threats and challenges – terrorism, regional crises, natural and man-made disasters. In the documents of the alliance, it has been repeatedly stated that the Russia-NATO partnership is a strategic element in bolstering security in the Euro-Atlantic space.
Cooperative activities with the North Atlantic Alliance are arranged via the Russia-NATO Council (RNC) mechanism, established in accordance with the Rome Declaration of May 28, 2002. The Council's member states work as equal partners, on the basis of the principles of consensus and the strict observance of international law.
The activities of the RNC have become an important factor of stability and predictability in relations with the alliance. Substantial progress has been achieved in forming the chief mainstays of the RNC – political dialogue and practical cooperation.
In the framework of political dialogue, Russia raises before the partners questions concerning plans for further enlargement and transformation of NATO, a reconfiguration of the military presence in Europe and the establishment of bases on the territories of new members. Of considerable significance in the work to strengthen mutual trust is practical cooperation under RNC auspices between the military for the purpose of enhancing the operational compatibility of forces, particularly for ensuring interaction between peacekeeping troops. Among other priority projects: cooperation in air traffic control; creation of the capabilities for response to terrorist acts and other emergency situations; forging military technological ties; personnel training for the antidrug entities of Afghanistan and the countries of Central Asia.
The enlargement plans of NATO (including accelerated admission of Georgia and Ukraine), moving its military infrastructure closer to Russian borders (setting up bases in Romania and Bulgaria), and its nonratification of the Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE Treaty inevitably complicate our relations.
Of basic importance will be the content of the political transformation of the alliance, which, everyone agrees, has stalled. NATO's real adaptation to the new security conditions can occur only in case it is ready for equal partnership with other countries and regional organizations. One of the indicators of such readiness can be the reaction of NATO to the repeated proposals from the Russian side to forge engagement with the CSTO in the fight against the narco-terrorist threat emanating from Afghanistan. Our attitude to NATO's transformation will depend on the direction in which this process will go after the Riga summit of the alliance, held in November 2006, and to what extent the principles of international law, including the prerogatives of the UN Security Council, will be observed, and the security interests of Russia will actually be recognized, not in a merely declarative way. The conversion of NATO from an exclusive military bloc into a more contemporary organization, concerning itself with real, not imaginary security threats, would contribute to the promotion of international and European stability.
Recommendations. As of now there is not a single site (with the exception of Operation Active Endeavor in the Mediterranean) where Russia and NATO would participate in joint operations. At the same time work is being carried out to create common capabilities that can lead to positive results. In case of the necessity of joint actions on the ground it is important that Russia be ready for this. It is therefore advisable to consistently enhance operational compatibility via the elaboration of a mechanism of equal partnership and streamline the system of organizing training exercises, which would enable our armed forces to participate in operations abroad under a United Nations mandate.
- It would meet Russia's interests, forging many-sided mutually advantageous cooperation with the alliance in Afghanistan, primarily with a view to countering the narco-terrorist threat emanating from its territory and generally stabilizing that country in accordance with the declared aims of the international community.
It could specifically be about jointly guarding the Tajik-Afghan border: by the forces of Tajikistan and Russia (possibly, in cooperation with CSTO partners and with the enlistment of Iran) "from the outside" and by the forces of NATO and other ISAF participants "from within." Russia's considerable resources of interest to NATO are our political vision of a settlement in Afghanistan based on a traditional balance of ethnoreligious forces and groups, influence on our allies of the days of the Northern Alliance and the capabilities of our special services.
6. Of key significance for the construction of a European architecture corresponding to our interests are relations with leading states of Europe – Germany, France, Spain and Italy. The principles of European life are being formed in cooperation with these states on an equal basis. Further initiative steps are needed to build effective engagement and cooperation with them. In the long term, there will be an even greater demand for the mechanism of the Russia-Germany-France trilateral political dialogue, and the "variable geometry" of other formats of relations with European countries that regard the role of Russia in the Eurasian space as an important stabilizing factor.
Recommendation. Use the developing pattern of strategic partnership relations with the FRG and France, predicated on a ramified system of permanent instruments, the most weighty of which are summit-level interstate consultations, as a model for shaping up systemic ties with major partners in Europe and other regions.
7. Britain remains an important, though complicated partner for us. The chief resource for the further development of Russian-British ties is economic, commercial and investment cooperation, as also joint antiterror schemes, having though constraints in the form of the well-known stand of London on the problem of so called "new political emigrants." Despite the extensiveness of our cooperation, bilateral relations and engagement on the international scene are held back by the avowedly messianic disposition of a considerable part of the British political elite, inter alia regarding the internal political processes in Russia.
8. The states of Central and Eastern Europe remain a substantial reserve of our European policy.
Recommendation. With those of them who are disposed toward pragmatic cooperation with Russia, a line on regular political dialogue should be continued, along with developing trade-and-economic ties, including their investment component, and humanitarian exchanges.
9. Russia is interested in forging good-neighborly relations with the Baltic states where real progress will depend primarily on a cardinal improvement in their political background as well as on the partners' readiness to consider Russia's interests and concerns. It remains a principled task for Russia to defend the rights of Russian speakers in Latvia and Estonia. Invariable is our position on the juridical formalization of the borders with Latvia and Estonia: signing of the appropriate bilateral treaties is only possible on terms excluding any likely territorial claims to our country. Outbursts of the "occupation" rhetoric, manifestations of neonazism in these countries and plans of Estonian national radicals to dismantle Soviet soldiers' monuments should further be consistently opposed.
10. Recent actions, inter alia to develop a ferry line, will bring a weakening of Russia's "transit dependence" on the countries bordering the Kaliningrad Region. This substantially bolsters our negotiation position on the issues of passenger, freight and military transit.
11. Russian relations with the countries of Northern Europe are stable in overall character, even though they evolve with a varying degree of intensity. Particularly dynamic is cooperation with Finland, with which an in-depth political dialogue proceeds and economic and commercial interaction is actively developed. The results of Russian-Finnish cooperation vividly demonstrate the advantages, including those of a purely economic nature, of maintaining good-neighborly relations with Russia.
12. A continuing priority for Russian foreign policy in the North is to further strengthen international regional cooperation in the framework of the Arctic Council (AC), the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) for the purpose of tackling the economic, social and environmental problems of the northern and northwestern regions of the Russian Federation.
Recommendations. It is necessary to consolidate the positive outcomes of Russia's two-year chairmanship of the AC, during which headway was made in a number of key areas of sustainable Arctic development. Continue implementing multilateral projects to eliminate persistent pollutants and carrying out the National Plan of Action for the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment from Anthropogenic Pollution, and seek even closer cooperation in the fields of technogenic disaster prevention and cleanup and radiation monitoring.
- In the framework of the BEAC, it appears expedient to concentrate primarily on projects aimed at eliminating environmental hot spots in the Russian part of the region, help deepen in every way a new format of cooperation, the Barents Industrial Partnership, and bolster interaction between rescue services.
- In the CBSS, proceed from the principled importance of arranging joint work of the Baltic sea states on a maximally substantive basis. It remains the chief task to further deepen economic interaction, with emphasis on energy security and environmental cooperation.
- Develop cooperation with the European Union, Norway and Iceland in the framework of the renewed Northern Dimension on an equal and mutually advantageous basis.
13. The Balkans require special attention, considering our traditional ties with this region, as well as its role in the matter of ensuring European security, including its energy aspect.
14. The significance of the Black Sea Region grows, where the processes of many-sided regional cooperation evolve on a qualitatively new basis of the awareness of the commonality of the problems facing the Black Sea states, which no one else will solve for them.
Recommendation. Strengthen the role of regional institutions that have acquitted themselves well, primarily BSEC and Blackseafor, while giving no support to any regional initiatives aimed at duplicating the existing cooperation mechanisms.
The United States and Canada
1. The priority of relations with the United States of America is objectively determined by the fact that the situation in the field of international security and strategic stability and the effectiveness of the efforts of the world community in the struggle against the new challenges and threats depend on their state. In addition, considering the weight of the US in world economic affairs, the quality of Russian-American relations is a factor for establishing favorable external conditions for tackling the tasks of socioeconomic development in Russia.
At the same time the character of Russian-American relations at this stage remains ambiguous, combining both important common interests and serious differences.
2. Complexities in relations with the US arise, as a rule, when on the American part a striving appears to arrange them according to the leader and led scheme. We're also witnessing a substantial difference in the vision of a future world pattern: the American unipolar and the Russian predicated on multipolarity – the primacy of international interaction in dealing with global problems, and reliance upon international law and multilateral institutions, the UN above all. These differences, of course, do not doom us to confrontation. For world history, the rivalry between ideas is a normal condition. The chief thing is that competition with Russia should be honest at the level of practical politics, across the full range of international problems and everywhere in the world, including the post-Soviet space.
Naturally, we seek to develop partner relations with the US on the understanding that they will rest on the principles of equality and mutual benefit. The determination of Russia to uphold its own point of view in world affairs is an absolutely normal thing. Unfortunately, far from everybody in the US has turned out to be psychologically ready for the swift regaining by Russia of its foreign policy independence.
We presume, however, that the Bush Administration has made a principled choice in favor of cooperation with Russia, perceiving it as an indispensable component in the search for effective answers to the new threats and with respect to settlement of regional crisis situations. When Russia and the United States manage to work together, then, as a rule, viable decisions are successfully agreed upon. We want that exactly this practice would become established in our relations with the American partners.
The high level of mutual trust at the highest level is the paramount political resource for our relations. The July meeting between Presidents Putin and Bush on the eve of the G8 St. Petersburg summit bore out that our relations are self-valuable. Antiterror remains one of the factors ensuring their stability.
3. The military action in Iraq and its consequences have shown the need for the US to build up interaction with other countries, Russia among them, on many regional and international problems.
A shift by the Administration to sober assessments of its capabilities offers a potential for new, wider engagement with the US within multilateral entities, primarily the UN.
4. Despite the problems and differences, including those of a principled character, relations with the United States have in recent years been evolving preeminently with positive dynamics. The dialogue structure and mechanisms are well-organized, and skills of joint or parallel action in areas of common interest developed. Cooperation has been launched and generally proceeds in an ongoing way for implementing the continuously renewed concrete directions from the two presidents to agencies of both countries (the so called Control List). There is greater predictability than in the past, although it is still a long way to go for the partners to actually take into account Russia's interests.
5. One cooperation area where the American approaches need to be adjusted is disarmament. In particular, this concerns the task of ensuring strategic stability and predictability after the expiration of the Russian-American Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the START Treaty). We stand for continuation of the reliable and well-developed political and legal arrangements for further arms limitation and reduction.
6. A promising area is interregional cooperation: its decentralized format conduces to developing economic ties and overcoming the survivals of mutual distrust. The Russian diaspora represents a significant reserve in terms of the establishment of a favorable climate in Russian-American relations. Its consolidation could lead to the formation of a constructive and influential "Russian lobby" in America.
7. Objectively the situation opens up new opportunities for building relations with the United States on an equal basis. There remains a need for our "twofold" policy to firmly, unconfrontationally uphold our interests while simultaneously advancing a constructive agenda.
It is necessary to impart greater dynamics to the process of the modernization of Russian-American relations and strike up a partnership not only across the entire spectrum of security challenges and threats, but also in the sphere of creating the conditions for joint prosperity. This will help strengthen trust and ensure the preservation and development of partner relations also for the period after presidential elections in Russia and the US in 2008.
Although the scope of economic ties has been steadily growing, it is insufficient for the scale of the economies of the two countries. The task of intensifying cooperation in the field of high technologies should be particularly highlighted. In its time it was practical cooperation in such fields as space exploration that provided the ground for improvement in relations between our countries. Peaceful atomic energy cooperation could serve this aim today. Joint work on the realization of the Russian and US Presidents' initiatives for the safe development of world nuclear energy opens up great possibilities. A potential obstacle, though, is the American practice of tying prospects for long-term bilateral cooperation to other issues, in particular, in the context of US internal legislation on Iran.
A special area of cooperation is efforts to prevent nuclear materials from falling into terrorist hands. The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, put forward by the Russian and US Presidents at the July 2006 summit in St. Petersburg, is called upon to play an important role in this regard.
8. Relations with Canada bear a stable character and are little susceptible to influence of internal political factors. This is an important element of building our well-balanced North America policy construct.
9. A special element in relations with Canada is the promotion of cooperation in developing natural resources in the Arctic, protecting its environment and preserving the culture and lifestyle of the Northern indigenous peoples. It is in our interests to direct this cooperation towards tackling the national tasks in Russian northern development. Understanding with the Canadians is also relevant in view of the increasingly acute problem of delimiting the continental shelf in the Arctic.
The Asia-Pacific Region
1. The strategic importance of the Asia-Pacific Region (APR) is determined by its role as the engine of the world economy and as one of the main driving forces of global development, whose real weight will steadily grow in the foreseeable future. Of great significance in this case is China and India's economic upturn, as also the dynamic growth of a number of East Asian and Latin American countries.
Responding to the challenge of the resulting correction of the prevailing regional architecture in the APR, the US has been actively pursuing a line on preserving its influence in the region through the consolidation of its bilateral strategic alliances with Japan, the Republic of Korea and Australia in combination with the advancement of its own positions in existing and emerging integration entities of the APR.
Serious consideration needs to be given to the totality of these circumstances in shaping our policy in the region with a maximally effective conjugation of internal and foreign policy interests in ensuring the national security of Russia, inter alia by accelerated development of the areas of Siberia and our Far East. Our strategic objective is to form in-depth and well-balanced relations with the countries of the region guaranteeing its long-term stability.
Russia has a strong potential to help solve the practical problems of the region on the basis of acknowledging and respecting the lawful interests, national specificities and traditions of the partners. The specifics of the APR, reflected in its cultural and civilizational diversity, make it possible to devise here a comprehensive strategy model for the maintenance of intercivilizational harmony in the world.
2. A distinctive feature of the region is the rapid development of its integration processes. The growing activity of the associations operating here reflects a general tendency towards consolidation of the principles of multilaterality and collective decision making. Against this background, attempts to create groups of countries of an exclusive composition with the participation of extraregional forces in order to solve narrow tasks cannot but evoke concern.
The establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was a strategic choice made by Russia jointly with the other five states of the Eurasian continent in the face of 21st-century challenges and threats for the purpose of achieving a lasting peace and sustainable development in the region. Today the SCO, while retaining its openness, has established itself as an effective means for combining the interests of member states, including Russia and China, and as an efficient instrument for ensuring stability in Central Asia.
The course towards building up the participation of Russia in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, a unique integration mechanism in the APR which effectively contributes to the development of multilateral diplomacy, has completely justified itself.
The development of our dialogue partnership with the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), active participation in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) on security and in the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), the consistent building-up of our involvement in the Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD) and the ensuring of our full-fledged representation in East Asia Summits acquire ever greater significance. An important platform for multilateral engagement in the transport, environmental and other fields is the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific Ocean (ESCAP). The strong positions of Russia in these entities constitute an effective element in influencing the regional situation and countering the establishment of any new multilateral mechanisms in the APR without Russia's participation.
Recommendations. Seek to strengthen further the role of Russia in the integration processes and increase Russian participation in the multilateral associations within the APR.
- Endeavor to ensure that the SCO can effectively serve its declared goals and objectives and make a weighty contribution to the strengthening of peace, interaction and development in the region.
3. Our relations with China have reached an unprecedentedly high level of mutual trust and become an important factor in world politics. At the base of our cooperation with the PRC lie the long-term national interests of Russia and the similarity of the approaches of our two states to the fundamental issues of the contemporary world pattern. While continuing our line on the comprehensive strengthening and expansion of areas of full-fledged trustful partnership and strategic interaction with China, it is necessary to put practical returns on relations with that country at the head of the list in our current China policy.
4. One of Russia's foreign policy priorities remains the development and deepening of our strategic partnership with India across the board – in the political, economic, commercial, scientific, technological, cultural fields and in the MTC sphere, with special emphasis on the advancement of the areas of cooperation where the long-term interests of our countries are close or coincide and cooperation is mutually advantageous. Toward this end, it is necessary to ensure a consistent, timely and maximally complete implementation of the priority tasks agreed upon at the highest level. At this stage the most urgent of them is to substantially augment the scope of trade-and-economic ties between Russia and India to 10 billion US dollars by the year 2010.
Recommendation. Carry on the line on developing dialogue and expanding interaction within the Russia-India-China trilateral format.
5. We are open for a comprehensive partnership with Japan based on mutual respect for interests. The creation of a solid economic basis and deepening of ties in practical areas of cooperation should contribute to shaping an atmosphere for forward-looking solutions of the political problems in bilateral relations.
6. Significant prospects are opening up in relations with Vietnam, which is on the upturn (second place in economic growth rates in the region after China). In addition, there is an important historical resource of our interaction here.
7. The unsettledness of the Korean Peninsula nuclear problem continues to be a serious challenge to security and stability in the APR. Progress in the course of the six-party negotiations on its resolution (Russia, the US, China, Japan, the DPRK and ROK) could open the way for the creation of a permanent dialogue mechanism on security and cooperation in Northeast Asia.
8. Expanding many-sided relations with Iran, particularly in the economic and commercial sphere, including transport, telecommunications, the fuel and energy sector and cooperation in regional affairs, meets Russia's long-term interests. Prospects for bilateral cooperation in the most diverse fields will largely depend on how the situation develops regarding Iran's nuclear program. It is important to pursue a well-balanced course toward Iran to ensure our national interests in it on one hand, and to prevent a violation of the nuclear nonproliferation regime on the other.
Recommendations. Go on trying to induce Iran to take measures to reinforce trust in its nuclear program.
- Develop MTC with Iran based on strict observance by Russia of its international commitments and taking into account how the situation develops regarding the Iranian nuclear program.
- Deepen collaboration with Iran in the transport sphere, concerning, inter alia, the creation of the North-South International Transport Corridor and restoration of a direct rail link between our countries.
- Facilitate participation by Russian companies in carrying out infrastructure projects on the territory of Iran, including building the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline.
9. The situation in the Caspian area is determined to a significant extent by the keenness of large international players on establishing optimal conditions for the development of hydrocarbon resources in the region and their transportation to external markets.
It is Russia's belief that the Caspian states possess sufficient potential to tackle problems in the area of security and other fields on their own, without outside interference. The issues of laying trunk pipelines across the sea floor, regardless of their routes, should be decided with the participation of all Caspian states.
At the base of our approach to the delimitation of the water area of the Caspian Sea lies an understanding that the tasks of protecting the natural environment and preserving biological resources can be effectively solved if a considerable part of the sea remains in the common use of the Caspian states. In this case each Caspian state must, of course, have a national sea belt for security and economic activity purposes.
In the interests of ensuring regional stability and neutralizing the challenges and threats to the security of the Caspian states the formation of a unified naval task force in the regional format is fundamentally important. We hold that setting up a Caspian Sea Naval Cooperation Task Force (Casfor), based on the principles of the exclusive responsibility of the coastal states for ensuring security in the Caspian, is a matching solution to this task.
Recommendations. As the negotiations on the sea's legal status drag on and, as a consequence, elaboration of agreements, to regulate individual types of activity in the Caspian (navigation, fishing, etc.), is delayed, additional political impulses need to be given to the negotiation process. Obvious is the need for a regular character of meetings between the heads of state of the Caspian Five.
- Offer the coastal states methods and forms of Casfor activity which would enable the task force to effectively perform the missions assigned to it in the conditions of the unsettledness of the problem of Caspian status.
The Middle East and North Africa
1. The Middle East and North Africa region lies within Russia's sphere of strategic interests by virtue of the geopolitical, economic, religious and other factors. Our principal task in this sector is to develop and strengthen mutually beneficial ties with all countries of the region. The military-political and economic situation in the Middle East influences to a significant extent the world energy and arms market and the state of affairs in intercivilizational relations. The region possesses a considerable potential for the import of Russian-made goods and technologies, as also for military technological cooperation.
For these reasons our close involvement in Middle East affairs appears to be an indispensable component and an important tool for ensuring the national interests of Russia.
2. Recent years have seen an increase in negative trends in the Middle East; the overall situation in the region has become extremely aggravated and zone of destabilization has widened (Iraq, Lebanon, the Palestinian territories, the situation around Iran). In the conditions of the unsettledness of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the continuing strong-arm interference in the affairs of the region by external forces the answer to the challenge of modernization takes on the form of the spread of ideas of Islamic fundamentalism here. These ideas have been brought to life by, among other things, an awareness of the new possibilities that have appeared for Muslim countries and communities as a consequence of globalization. They are associated with the rapid increase in the total number and influence of Islam adherents and with the growth of the aggregate wealth and power of Islamic civilization.
An exacerbation of relations between Sunnis and Shiites is in evidence. After the open involvement in the conflict with Israel of the radical Shiite movement Hezbollah, Sunni elites of the Arab world have begun speculating about the appearance of an Iran-Syria-Hezbollah-Hamas linkage threatening destabilization in the Persian Gulf region.
Against this background, the consolidation of radical forces continues in the countries of the Middle East and North Africa, which leads to a growth of extremism and the mounting threat of terrorism and WMD proliferation risks. In its essence contemporary Islamic radicalism is a deformed and dangerous, but predictable reaction to the unilateral response of the United States, which actually encounters no systemic counteraction in the conditions of an out-of-balance, post-Cold War international system.
At the same time these tendencies must not be exaggerated. One ought not to play into the hands of fundamentalists who pretend to represent the interests of all Muslims. It is all the more dangerous to give a "mirror response" to this challenge. One cannot rule out that forming the enemy image of Islam aims at buttressing the consolidation the West lacks for global subjectness. However complicated the process of the growth of Muslims states' influence and role in the modern world may be, an emergent collective Islamic factor on a global scale is hardly feasible in the foreseeable future.
3. The "Achilles' heel" of our ties with the countries of the region is the comparatively small extent and the relative narrowness of economic and commercial cooperation. The volume of trade with the Arab countries stands at only 6 billion dollars. It is necessary to build up the positive dynamics that were imparted by the recent visit to the region of President Putin and make maximum use of those states' keenness to develop business ties with Russia.
Recommendation. Step up economic and energy diplomacy in the Middle East sector. Use effectively the possibilities of the Russian-Arab Business Council. Explore the possibility of creating a financial and industrial structure for developing economic collaboration on the basis of the RABC, including involving the Islamic Development Bank. Promote the development of partner ties between the business communities of Russia and the region's countries.
Africa
1. Africa is one of the most problem regions of the world. The overall unfavorable situation on the continent is characterized by the persistence of a significant number of armed conflicts. Essentially in African countries there still continue the processes of the rise of statehood and national building, complicated by old interethnic contradictions, by the struggle for power and resources, by a chronic crisis in the socioeconomic sphere, by the extreme poverty of the bulk of the population, and not infrequently – by external interference.
It is obvious that Africa should not be left one on one with the problems confronting it. Russia advocates an effective combination of international aid to the continent with efficient measures of the Africans themselves. Efforts to settle the conflicts should be accompanied by moves to ensure the sustainable development of Africa and the soonest full-fledged inclusion of the continent in the global economy. Without the active participation of African countries in world affairs and international economic life, there is no way to arrange fruitful cooperation and create a coherent and stable system of global security based on the primacy of universally recognized legal norms.
Despite the scale and complexity of the challenges with which Africa is confronted, this continent has a great significance for international political and economic processes. The countries of the region constitute more than a quarter of the entire world community and play a noticeable role in the formation of coordinated approaches to global issues within the UN and other international fora. Africa has large reserves of strategic raw materials and rich forest, fish and other resources.
All of this predetermines unremitting attention to the continent from its traditional partners (Western Europe and North America). "New players": China, India, a number of Latin American states and ASEAN countries work actively with Africa. It also meets Russia's interests to expand our many-sided ties with African states.
2. The policy for developing traditional friendly relations and mutually advantageous cooperation with Africa allows us to employ the African factor for advancing Russian interests in the international arena and tackling our own economic tasks. The strengthening of Russia and the growth of its influence in world politics creates favorable conditions for building up Russian-African ties. President Vladimir Putin's visit, the first by a Russian head of state, to African countries south of the Sahara in September 2006 gave a strong impulse to the development of the whole range relations with the region.
Important prerequisites for expanding multifaceted interaction between Russia and the continent are the cooperation potential that was amassed in previous decades, including traditional ties with leading elites of African states, the experience of interaction in the economic, commercial, scientific, technological, investment and other fields, and the similar approaches to shaping a new world pattern resting on the principles of equality of all states, multilateral diplomacy and respect for international law. With due consideration for this, it is necessary to persistently search further for ways to streamline dialogue with the countries of Africa and their regional and sub-regional organizations, primarily the African Union.
3. A weighty component of Russian-African relations is the participation of our country in international efforts to provide overall assistance to Africa, particularly under G8 auspices. The priorities of the Russian G8 Presidency in 2006 (energy security, education development and combating infectious diseases) correspond to the basic interests of African peoples. Carrying out the St. Petersburg summit decisions on these and other issues will facilitate marshaling Africans' own efforts to achieve the long-term goals of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) program as well as attract additional foreign assistance to the countries of the region.
Recommendation. It is important to continue ensuring active participation by Russia in concerted moves in support of Africa with emphasis laid on peacekeeping, the alleviation of the debt burden of African states, assistance with personnel training, and the provision of humanitarian aid. This will contribute to buttressing the status of our country as a responsible member of the world community and enhancing its prestige on the continent and in the international arena as a whole.
4. Along with strengthening political engagement with the continent, a priority task is the intensification of economic and commercial ties, the present level of which so far does not match the considerable potential available. The need for bringing the Russian-African partnership to a new level is dictated by the raw material requirements of the momentum-gaining Russian economy. In addition, Africa is a promising sales market for Russian goods and attractive from the viewpoint of developing investment cooperation and involving Russian entrepreneurial entities in the implementation of various projects and programs on the continent.
Among the principal tasks: providing consistent incentives for economic, commercial, scientific and technological cooperation, ensuring the politico-diplomatic follow-up of the projects being carried out in Africa by Russian organizations, and forging partnerships between regions and direct ties between Russian and African business circles.
Latin America and the Caribbean Basin
1. The role of Latin America in the world economy and politics is continuously increasing. In terms of GDP, the biggest Latin American countries – Brazil and Mexico – hold places near the top ten developed states of the world. Integration entities are gathering strength, primarily the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR). The foreign policy activity of the Latin American countries is increasing. The positions of most of them, on the formation of a new world order, the primacy of international law, negotiated settlement to conflicts and noninterference in domestic affairs, are close to the Russian approaches. Latin America as a whole is becoming one of the centers of economic growth and political influence in an emerging multipolar structure of international relations.
Complicated social and political processes are under way on the continent, with the search proceeding for an adequate socioeconomic development model to local conditions. All of this has an important civilizational dimension, as it reflects and enriches the cultural and civilizational diversity of the contemporary world.
2. The countries of Latin America and the Caribbean Basin consider relations with Russia to be an important area of diversification of their external ties and perceive our country as a key partner in the international arena. Interaction with key states of the region in the UN and other international organizations is often more fruitful than with the US and European states, considering the strong commitment of Latin Americans to the principles of multilaterality and collective problem solving with maximum consideration for the positions and interests of all countries. This provides favorable conditions for building up political and economic cooperation with the continent. Of fundamental importance in this regard were President Putin's visits to Cuba, Mexico, Brazil and Chile, and his meetings with Latin American leaders at international fora (the UN, APEC).
A record trade turnover level of 9 billion dollars for our relations with Latin America has been achieved. On the other hand, with a steady tendency for trade to grow, we have not yet reached a matching level of economic cooperation to the potential available.
Recommendations. In further work with Latin America the political component should further be increased, cooperation with Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Venezuela and other key countries strengthened and expanded and contacts on a multilateral level developed – in the first place with MERCOSUR, the Organization of American States, the Rio Group, the Central American Integration System, the Caribbean Community and the Ibero-American Community.
- It is important to undertake additional steps for developing economic and commercial ties. Give priority attention to the export of high technologies, and buttress industrial cooperation. Seek a heightening of attention to the region from big Russian business, whose interests should lay a firm basis for the sustainable development of our relations.
3. The visit of Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov to Havana in September 2006 established conditions for strengthening our economic positions in Cuba, which remains one of Russia's most promising partners in Latin America.
Recommendation. Use the agreements that were signed during the visit on the settlement of the Cuban debt under previous Russian credits and the extension of a 355 million dollar loan to Cuba for assisting the development of the Cuban economy through supplies of Russian goods and services for its most promising industries.
ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY
1. The present state of the world economy is characterized by the fact that along with the traditional centers of economic life – the US, EU, Japan – new ones have now appeared, such as China, India, Brazil, Mexico, South Africa and other APR, Latin American and African countries. The external expansion of the new industrial countries against the background of the economic problems being experienced by the US, EU and Japan leads to the creation of a more competitive environment in the world economy. The appearance of a new player in this arena, Russia, meets with predictable opposition.
Under these conditions, the process of full-fledged integration of Russia into world economic ties on terms meeting our national interests will not be easy even in the conditions of further accumulation of positive moments in the national economy. Countries which regard Russia as a potentially dangerous competitor on the world economic scene will strive (and are already doing so) to form such conditions of Russia's integration into world economic ties which would to a maximum degree limit the competitive advantages of our country. It can be anticipated that, with the strengthening of the Russian economy and diversification of the structure of Russian exports as Russian competitive products with a high degree of processing enter external markets, opposition to the full-fledged participation of Russia in the advantages of the international division of labor will only grow.
Recommendation. It is by and large necessary to more single-mindedly project in foreign policy, particularly in the European sector, our advantage as a large reserve of global economic growth, of which the factors are internal political stability and the high development level of human resources.
2. Assistance to Russian business abroad is becoming an ever more noticeable direction of our foreign policy efforts. Practical work in this field proceeds both through support of specific projects and by international climate improvement for our business and investment activity.
Recent years have seen active penetration by domestic companies into external markets – in 2006 Russia placed third among developing economies in level of direct investment abroad.
Russian investment in foreign countries is a positive factor for the development of the Russian economy as it helps gain access to new sales markets, reduce production costs, expand the raw materials base as well as facilitating overcoming tariff and nontariff restrictions and getting additional competitive advantages.
3. Russia with its production-technological, scientific and educational potential cannot stay aloof from global economic processes. That's what dictates our striving to join the WTO and take part in the elaboration of the rules governing international trade. In the conditions of the incompleteness of reforms and restructuring of the economy, we insist in the negotiations that we need to retain economically justified protection of some of its key industries. Without such measures, permitted by WTO rules, not a single country can manage, no matter how developed it is. But the chief vector of our efforts is the liberalization of the commercial and political regime of the country.
The WTO is the leading international institution laying down the rules for international trade, directed toward the liberalization of goods and service markets. Despite the setbacks of the present round of multilateral trade negotiations being conducted under the aegis of the WTO, the role of this organization in the conditions of a deepening globalization of world economic ties will continuously grow.
The effectiveness of Russia's participation in the WTO will depend on the terms on which Russia joins this organization and the degree of readiness of Russian government entities to make full use of the mechanisms and procedures operating in the WTO in the interests of the Russian economy. In this case our principled position should consist in upholding commitments which would maximally assist the economic development of the country.
4. The importance of energy diplomacy increases qualitatively. This is determined by the leading role of the Russian fuel and energy sector in the national economy's development at this stage and by the tasks of advancing our interests in the conditions of a sharpening competition in the world arena for attractive energy assets and sales markets. It was no coincidence that we chose as a priority of the Russian presidency of the Group of Eight in 2006 the theme of ensuring global energy security, on which the declaration was adopted in St. Petersburg predicated upon a balance of interests of all world energy market participants. Thus, the measures guaranteeing reliable supplies must consistently be buttressed by steps to ensure the stability of demand. By and large, in the energy sphere Russia focuses on the creation of uniform market principles and transparent conditions for all.
In this case we, like other countries, are not going to give up our natural competitive advantages or act to the prejudice of our own national interests. We will continue building up our energy potential, we will maintain our reputation as a solid and responsible partner in markets of energy resources, and we will diversify energy resource transportation routes, ensuring sustainable development of our fuel and energy sector and helping to keep world energy markets in a well-balanced state.
The growing significance of the energy factor in Russian foreign policy makes ever more obvious the necessity to develop a Russian foreign energy policy concept and a mechanism for its implementation, both in the medium- and in the long-term. Action to this end has already been taken in conjunction with the Security Council and the Ministry of Industry and Energy of Russia.
Russia attaches great importance to developing an energy dialogue with the EU and also with individual European Union countries, the US, China, India, Japan, and other consumer countries and to strengthening the strategic partnership with leading producers of energy resources (Algeria, Venezuela, Norway, Saudi Arabia and others).
We expect to use financial proceeds from energy exports to accelerate the diversification of the Russian economy and channel it into innovative development.
Diplomatic follow-up continues for such large-scale energy investment projects as the Baltic Pipeline System, the integration of the Druzhba and Adria pipeline systems, the Blue Stream gas pipeline, and projects for the Nord Stream gas pipeline and the oil pipelines between eastern Siberia and the Pacific Ocean and between Burgas and Alexandroupolis.
5. By the full-fledged integration of Russia into world economic ties should be meant not only improvement in the structure of Russian exports, but also the geographical diversification of trade exchanges. Today Russia's chief partner continues to be the EU, which, after its enlargement, accounts for 52.1 percent of the trade turnover of the country. China, India, Japan and the Republic of Korea, which cumulatively produce about 30 percent of the world's GDP, account for only 16 percent of Russian foreign trade, and the geographically remote countries of North and Latin America and also of Southeast Asia, seven percent. On the other hand, Russia's share of imports by China, India, Japan and the Republic of Korea stands at less than 2 percent, and those of the countries of the American continent and Southeast Asia, less than 0.4 percent. This does not allow us to speak of our country as a global trade power. That position does not match the role and weight of Russia on the world political scene. So the importance of bilateral relations for the advancement of our economic interests grows accordingly.
By and large our efforts in the field of regulation of the world economy are directed towards building a more democratic and more equitable system of economic relations. Russia is ready to honestly compete, but in the interest of ensuring international economic security, which as a result of globalization has become indivisible and requires that the partners adhere to the uniform rules existing in this sphere.
We are not indifferent to the terms on which leading economic powers give aid to poor countries. Assistance to international development ought to really help the elimination of regional and country disbalances and eradication of poverty, not conserve economic backwardness.
Recommendation. Considering that Russia is one of the four most dynamically developing economies of the world (including China, India and Brazil – BRIC), it is necessary to continue developing cooperation in this format, expanding its scope by the inclusion of themes of mutual interest (energy, counter-terrorism). In combined GDP, according to latest Goldman Sachs estimates, the Four may overtake the G8 states in 2035.
6. In the field of transportation, priority attention should be given to realizing the potential of Russia as a "transit bridge" between Europe and Asia, elaborating the questions of connecting Russia's transport infrastructure to Europe's, developing the transport corridors running through Russian territory and having them linked to the Trans-Siberian Railway, and carrying out the multilateral intergovernmental Agreement on the North-South International Transport Corridor.
7. One of the Russian Federation's priorities in the field of multilateral economic diplomacy continues to be work on ensuring our entry into the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), a leading forum for industrial states to coordinate their socioeconomic policies.
Overall, favorable conditions have presently arisen for imparting a new impulse to efforts for launching a negotiation process for our entry. Nearing completion is the process of an internal reform of the OECD, after which in May 2007 a number of countries may be invited to start negotiations to join the Organization as part of the "first wave" of enlargement.
Under these conditions, it is important not to slow down the pace of activity for building up interaction with the OECD, to continue the line on expanding the participation of Russian agencies in its committees and working bodies and to intensify the bilateral dialogue in support of our entry with the member countries of the Organization.
8. With the improvement of the financial position of Russia our relations with the Bretton Woods Institutions acquire a new quality. In the IMF we have already turned from an aid recipient into a donor and creditor. In cooperation with the World Bank the emphasis has also changed: for Russia the Bank is not a source of cheap credits anymore, but first and foremost an instrument for the transfer of expertise and knowledge, and an additional help in carrying out reforms. Of considerable interest to us is cooperation with the World Bank, primarily the International Finance Corporation and Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency which are part of it, in third country markets.
9. Russia's joining the activities of the Asian Development Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank has quite good prospects in terms of strengthening the political and economic positions of Russia in the Asia-Pacific and Latin American Regions. This move would be helpful in further increasing our cooperation with these dynamically developing regions and ensuring Russia's deeper integration into their financial and economic system. Besides, participation in these banks can potentially bring economic benefit by opening access for Russian business to projects being financed under loans from these banks.
10. On the international community's list of global priorities, environmental protection and sustainable development problems have moved into one of the first places. It is in this field that the multilateral approach to tackling the problems facing mankind has become firmly established. The United Nations plays the main role in this area of activity as a universal mechanism for elaborating concerted decisions and as a major source of international environmental law.
On this basis, Russia strives to use most effectively the unique opportunities provided by this universal organization to advance its approaches, uphold its national environmental priorities and enhance its international influence and image as a key world player in the environmental sector.
We take an active part in the promotion of international cooperation in this field through work in the Boards of Governors of the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and the United Nations Human Settlements Program (UN-HABITAT).
Russia actively uses the activities of the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD), the main body of the UN system for implementing the comprehensive Agenda for the 21st Century decisions, to advance its interests and strengthen global cooperation in the fields of energy, transportation and agriculture with a view to reducing their impact on the environment.
Our country is a party to most of the main multilateral environmental conventions. At the present time work is being carried out for accession to the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, which aims at eliminating or restricting the production and use of 12 particularly toxic chemicals, and to the Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade, designed to help regularize the world circulation of these substances in order to protect human health and the environment.
Recommendation. It is necessary to accelerate the process of the interdepartmental approval of the drafts of the appropriate documents, because a further delay in this matter can already in the near future deprive us of the possibility to effectively compete with other countries actively using environmental levers in the arsenal of their economic policy.
11. Russia played a decisive role in the process of the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, an important international instrument for countering global changes in the climate. On the condition of the adoption at the national level of efficient measures for legislative and normative regulation, control and accounting, the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol will be economically beneficial to Russia as it conduces to the inflow of foreign investment into the modernization of the Russian economy and to the adoption of environmentally clean technologies.
Recommendations. Provide support via diplomatic channels of the international recognition of Russia as a state which is in the regimen of observance of the Kyoto Protocol, which is the prerequisite for the start of realization of Joint Implementation (JI) projects in our country. Ensure participation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia and Russian agencies abroad in the preparation of agreements with foreign states interested in carrying out JI projects in Russia, seeking the best terms for the attraction of foreign financial resources into the modernization, and upgrading the energy efficiency, of Russian enterprises.
- In respect of the future Kyoto process for the period after 2012 – proceed from the assumption that efforts to prevent the adverse consequences of the global problem of climate change should be undertaken by all countries of the world community.
With this aim in mind, a wide-ranging dialogue on the question of the elaboration of procedures for the approval of voluntary commitments by states to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions has been started at Russia's initiative.
For its part, Russia is open for broad cooperation and constructive dialogue with all interested parties to the Convention and Kyoto Protocol on the question of devising future approaches to the limitation of global GHG emissions with a view to reducing the anthropogenic impact on the environment and improving the ecological situation on the planet.
THE HUMANITARIAN DIRECTION OF FOREIGN POLICY
The humanitarian dimension of foreign policy, public and cultural diplomacy are an important factor of international life in today's global world. A special role in Russia's foreign policy strategy belongs to our cultural/civilizational resource. Historically the role and prestige of the Russian state in the world were determined not only by its political weight and economic strength, but also by the cultural heritage of the peoples of the Russian Federation and their spiritual and intellectual potential.
Human Rights Problems
1. Recent years have witnessed the growth of the significance of human rights and humanitarian problems, and more broadly – personal security in the overall structure of international relations. This finds reflection in the fact that human rights have now securely occupied a position as one of the three priorities of the UN, along with security and development issues. And all three issues are correctly being viewed in their interconnection. In particular, this means that any progress of democracy is only possible on a sound economic footing. There can be no sustainable democracy coupled with poverty, destitution and the lack of elementary possibilities for individual self-realization. A truly democratic form of government rests on a developed civil society, which in turn constitutes the product of a definite level of economic and social development.
Against this background, international human rights cooperation entities undergo transformation. In particular, the Human Rights Council (HRC) has been established within the United Nations. There is a clearly evident tendency for human rights standards to be enhanced at the regional level (Council of Europe, European Union, OSCE). This is accompanied by the strengthening of international monitoring functions in the human rights field. The participation of civil society institutions and parliamentary entities in the international dialogue on human rights is becoming wider.
Attitude to human rights has become one of the facets of intercivilizational relations. An artificial democratization, speeded up and externally imposed, not supported by the ripening of internal prerequisites in the social processes, and conducted unrelatedly with the solution of other global problems, frequently turns into a rise in extremism, interethnic and interfaith contradictions and leads to the growth of instability and anarchy in international relations.
The migrationary processes, primarily in Europe, exert a serious influence on the state of human rights in the world. In this connection social tension resulting from the migrationary processes in the CIS space fits into the Europe-wide picture, requiring concerted approaches and uniform standards in tackling the relevant problems.
Recommendations. Our reaction to the criticism leveled at Russia over human rights should remain calm and well-considered, in the spirit of dialogue and openness for cooperation. The continuation of the profound democratic change in Russian society, the construction and streamlining of the mechanisms for ensuring civil rights, inter alia with the use of international mechanisms, and openness for monitoring, in particular, under the auspices of the Council of Europe should ultimately serve the enhancement of internal human rights standards and the increase of attractiveness of the image of Russia in the world.
- We should continue to take an aggressive stand on specifically important issues for us, such as the defense of the rights of compatriots and the struggle against the manifestations of neofascism in certain countries of Europe (including attempts at the heroization of former SS men), as well as purposefully build up our own vigor in international human rights activities, involving Russian NGOs and parliamentary diplomacy in them. Insist on overcoming double standards in this sphere and universalizing the relevant approaches of the international community.
- From the viewpoint of the interests of our country and prospects for Greater Europe without dividing lines it is important to prevent discussions on human rights problems leading to confrontation and poisoning the atmosphere of cooperation: it is essential to channel them into quiet and systemic work to assist particular countries, arriving eventually at comparable human rights defense standards in the European region, and on this basis, creating a common human rights space under the aegis of the Council of Europe.
Protecting the Interests of Compatriots Abroad
1. For the new Russia, especially as tens of millions of our people as a result of the breakup of the USSR have found themselves outside of the country, defending compatriots' interests is a natural foreign policy priority, whose significance will only grow. There is a need for continuous all-round assistance to the strengthening of the compatriots' links with the historical Homeland and the creation of a "Russian world" as a unique element of human civilization. In the work with the compatriots we are shifting from paternalism to interaction on a partner basis. The strategic objective is to ensure that our compatriots, while strengthening their ethnocultural distinctiveness, act in the capacity of an authoritative intellectual, economic and cultural-spiritual partner of Russia in world politics.
The following three basic documents, adopted in 2006, form the basis of the practical work with compatriots: the Program of Work with Compatriots Abroad 2006-2008; the Russian Language (2006-2010) Federal Target Program; and the National Assistance Program for the Voluntary Resettlement to the Russian Federation of Compatriots Living Abroad.
The World Congress of Compatriots, held in St. Petersburg in October 2006, played a fundamentally important role in this regard by imparting a serious impulse to bringing cooperation with compatriots to a qualitatively new level. The course towards facilitating consolidation of compatriots' organizations, strengthening the positions of the Russian diaspora and enhancing its links with Russia was buttressed by the establishment at the congress of the Coordination Council of Russian Compatriots, designed to become a partner of the Government Commission on the Affairs of Compatriots Abroad.
2. The National Assistance Program for the Voluntary Resettlement to the Russian Federation of Compatriots aims to provide favorable conditions for accommodation and life in the Motherland to those of our compatriots who have already decided to return having regard, of course, to their needs as well as the development interests of Russian territories. As part of the Program implementation, the Foreign Ministry is carrying out the systematic preparation of Russian consular agencies for the fulfillment of the tasks laid upon them; in particular, it ensures distribution of the basic documents of the Program and information about it, and is working out drafts of relevant legal and regulatory acts. In addition, the implementation of the Program will create a competitive environment on the labor market and enhance the demand for compatriots and their labor and intellectual potential in the countries where they now live. This additional effect of the Program would constitute an important element of support for our co-citizens who feel their unsettledness.
Recommendation. Streamline the consular aspects of the work with compatriots, particularly under the National Assistance Program for the Voluntary Resettlement to the Russian Federation of Compatriots Living Abroad.
3. A major resource for the protection of compatriots' interests is the preservation of the Russian-language space in foreign countries, primarily the enhancement of the status of the Russian language – inter alia through the support of Russian theaters and Russian or Slavic universities, augmentation of the quotas and scholarships for compatriots to train in Russian educational institutions, and expansion of the network of Russian centers for science and culture and of "Russian Houses." The holding of the Year of the Russian Language in the World in 2007 is designed to make a great contribution to solving this task.
Consular Work
1. All-round assistance to Russians living outside of the Russian Federation has assumed a new resonance in recent years. This is an element of improvement in our foreign policy work turning face to the interests of people and of the new quality of national development as a whole.
2. The number of Russian citizens leaving to live abroad has steeply increased: presently our consular agencies abroad have on their registers more than 1.5 million Russian citizens permanently or temporarily resident abroad, and their total number constitutes several million; there steadily grows the number of Russians going abroad on business, private or tourist short-term trips (over 6.7 million Russians were abroad for tourist purposes in 2005). Accordingly, the number of applications to Russian overseas agencies for legal assistance has sharply increased; many of them causing public resonance.
Of special importance is assistance to our co-citizens in emergency situations in foreign states, brought on by an aggravation of the internal political situation, hostilities, terrorist acts or natural disasters.
Recommendation. Consider the possibility of allocating a special item of expenditure in the Russian overseas agencies' budget to provide emergency material assistance to Russian citizens who have found themselves in a difficult situation.
3. The expanding geography of foreign trips of Russian citizens and the growth of economic and commercial relations with foreign states determine the necessity to expand the network of Russian consular agencies abroad and to strengthen existing overseas representations.
4. It is necessary to continue the line on regularizing juridical relations in the migration and related fields. A visa-free regime of trips to the Russian Federation should not be viewed as an unconditional right, but as a reciprocal measure, buttressed by a responsible policy of the partner states in the field of combating illegal migration, including readiness for the creation and use of readmission mechanisms.
5. Coupled with globalization and the intensification of world economic ties, forging constructive relations in the migration field should be an important instrument of ensuring Russian economic and commercial interests. Of great significance in this context is the soonest entry into force of the Agreement between the Russian Federation and the European Community on the Facilitation of the Issuance of Visas to the Citizens of the Russian Federation and the European Union, signed in May 2006, which is a landmark event in the course of the transition to a regime of visa-free trips with the EU.
6. In close cooperation with other agencies the Ministry of Foreign Affairs makes a contribution to the struggle against illegal migration and undertakes efforts to prevent the entry into the Russian Federation of persons involved in extremist or terrorist activities. We have toughened up the rules for the issuance of visas to citizens of foreign states who present a migration danger for Russia. Negotiations are being conducted with those countries to conclude readmission agreements.
7. In relation to the upcoming introduction in the Russian Federation of passport and visa documents of a new generation the Consular Department, the Foreign Ministry Representation in Kaliningrad and the Russian overseas agencies in Germany and Lithuania as a pilot zone on January 1, 2006, began the issuance of new-generation foreign passports containing electronic information about the bearer.
Cooperation in Culture and Science
1. In the era of globalization the significance of international cultural cooperation as an effective vehicle for intercivilizational communication, understanding among peoples and overcoming confrontation in the world has increased. Russia, as a great power making a huge contribution to world culture and having a considerable scientific and educational potential, can hold leading positions in the matter of promoting such cooperation on a global scale.
Culture must be an efficient tool for ensuring the foreign policy and economic interests of our country and shaping its positive image in the world. The experience of leading world powers, which regard this direction as one of the elements of "soft power," and to achieve their goals, employ considerable personnel, financial and informational resources, is testimony to this.
In this domain, the Russian diplomatic service devotes considerable attention to activities in both the framework of bilateral and multilateral ties, including cooperation with UNESCO, the European Union, and participation in the Council of Europe and other international organizations.
Recommendations. Considering the increasing role of the cultural, scientific, educational and sporting aspects of international cooperation, it is necessary to more vigorously assimilate the world space in this field, and augment the fabric of bilateral and multilateral ties. Of great significance is the search for new forms and methods of work, particularly in the context of interaction with NGOs. It is likewise important to strengthen this area of the diplomatic service both from the viewpoint of providing it with highly qualified staff and in terms of tackling the questions of financing.
- It is advisable to consider the possibility of creating a "corps of Russian cultural ambassadors" within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- Actively facilitate, at the level of federal bodies and in cooperation with city authorities, strengthening the potential of Moscow and St. Petersburg as cultural/educational centers of the CIS, Europe and the world.
2. The humanitarian diplomacy of Russia, of which the coordinator is the Russian Center for International Scientific and Cultural Cooperation under the auspices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in today's circumstances performs a very important and much-required mission of creating a new form of international partner ties and involving the NGO community resource in the foreign policy process.
The key task in this sector is not only to supplement the traditional political mechanisms and institutions in the area of international relations, but also to shape a creative humanitarian sphere in them. While emphasizing the humanitarian component of globalization, the growing desire to promote a culture-civilization dialogue and humanitarian integration should be noted.
Recommendations. A top priority is to restore and develop our informational and cultural presence abroad. It is about accelerating the opening of new cultural centers, primarily in CIS countries; and based on existing representations of Roszarubezhtsentr (an organization involved with the promotion of the Russian language and culture abroad), organizing regional Russian centers for science and culture (RCSCs) ensuring work in adjacent countries.
- With a view to perfecting our information policy, assist the implementation of the UNESCO program ‘Information for All,' under which it is intended to provide the RSCSs with the electronic systems ‘The Legislation of Russia' and ‘Official Periodical Publications of Legal Information.' Thanks to their databases containing information on state legal and regulatory acts, environmental culture and the protection of intellectual property in cyberspace, Russian NGOs will receive access to the resources they require in their day-to-day public and professional activities.
RESOURCE SUPPORT FOR FOREIGN POLICY
The Diversification of Foreign Policy Instruments
1. The increased capabilities and responsibility of Russia in the world arena dictate the necessity to build up resource support for foreign policy and to diversify foreign policy instruments according to the changing realities of international life. As world experience shows, the diplomatic service can keep abreast of the times only by acting in unison with the other government entities, parliament, political parties, business circles and the political science community of its country. Neither can we dispense with renewing the tools of diplomatic work. All this together with the measures to enhance the prestige of diplomats' profession must ensure the competitiveness of the Russian foreign policy service, without which there can be no competitiveness of the country in a globalizing world.
In the contemporary world we witness the growing role of parliamentary diplomacy and the international activity of civil society institutions, which become self-valuable channels of international communication, work for enhancing understanding among peoples and strengthening the common legal principles of international life, and integrally supplement the engagement between states. They are important resources for our entire foreign policy endeavor, particularly in the area of public diplomacy.
2. At the base of interaction between the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Federal Assembly lies the national consensus on major foreign policy issues that reflects the prevailing sentiment in society. Russian parliamentarians actively participate in international inter-parliamentary entities, particularly under auspices of the CIS and the Group of Eight. A good potential exists for collaboration with the European Parliament, Parliamentary Assembly of the Western Union, PACE, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, the Inter-Parliamentary Union and regional parliamentary entities.
Recommendations. Build up cooperation with the European Union on the parliamentary track for the sake of forming a common legal space, protecting Russian economic interests and streamlining regional policy, including transfrontier cooperation.
- Concentrate on the elaboration of an efficient system of monitoring electoral processes and the human rights situation, including within EU member states.
- Inter-parliamentary ties on a bilateral basis require further development, particularly with such strategic partners as the US, China and India.
- A promising area of inter-parliamentary cooperation in Asia is the strengthening of the parliamentary component in SCO activities. Inter-parliamentary engagement in APEC and with ASEAN should be deepened. The Russian Society for Solidarity with the Peoples of Asia and Africa should become a significant instrument of Russian foreign policy.
A more active foreign policy calls for honing its legal tools and giving adequate legislative backing to the initiative steps of Russia. The Foreign Ministry maintains an intensive dialogue with both chambers of the Federal Assembly in the interest of explaining our approaches on key problems of international life, adopting the laws and ratifying the international legal acts necessary for ensuring the effectiveness of our foreign policy course.
3. Involving non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the foreign policy process is the calling of our time. It is an integral part of the statewide work to develop civil society institutions.
Factors play a considerable role in present-day diplomacy that are most often described in terms of "soft power," including an ability to influence the behavior of other states with the help of the cultural-civilizational, humanitarian-scientific, foreign policy and other attractiveness of one's country, the so called network system of public diplomacy which has become one of the most dynamically evolving and influential spheres of world politics.
Across the world, NGOs become actively involved in tackling internal and international tasks. In the conditions of globalization non-governmental organizations and diverse scientific and public foundations often assume the initiative of generating ideas to help resolve crisis situations and form new approaches to tackling particular international problems. Interaction with Russian civil society institutions and the facilitation of their accommodation in the international NGO community open up new opportunities in terms of ensuring the foreign policy interests of Russia in such priority areas as humanitarian, educational and interregional cooperation, the enhancement of Russian language status, promotion of Russian culture and the defense of compatriots' rights abroad.
Of great significance was the implementation of the Russian initiative for holding the Civil G8 2006 forum, which enabled forming a useful channel for the exchange of information with international NGOs. Joint events with key foreign civil society entities give us the possibility to conduct dialogue with them on a parity basis.
The Foreign Ministry intends to advance proposals on buttressing the resource base of Russian NGOs active in the foreign policy sector, inter alia by drawing on the budget. Good prospects are opening up in cooperation with the Public Chamber, primarily its Commission on International Cooperation and Public Diplomacy.
Recommendations. Promote cooperation with leading global NGOs in development of the outcomes of the Russian President's meeting with their leaders in July 2006.
- Continue elaborating the question of setting up under the aegis of the Foreign Ministry a public grant-giving entity under the provisional name of the A. M. Gorchakov Fund, through which it would be possible to render support to Russian NGOs in the interest of advancing the foreign policy priorities of Russia.
- In the context of the Presidential Decree on the formation of public councils within federal ministries, study the question of creating such an institution under Foreign Ministry auspices in the form of a pool of domestic NGOs of international specialization with the enlistment of relevant Public Chamber entities, which can become an important mechanism of further development of interaction between the Ministry and Russian civil society.
4. A promising area is the step-up of interaction with religious organizations and associations. Cooperation by the Foreign Ministry with the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), having become stronger in recent years, conduces to realizing a number of ROC proposals concerning its participation in the work of international organizations, in particular, the establishment of consultative religious bodies at the UN, UNESCO and the Council of Europe.
Interaction with Russian Muslim organizations is evolving fruitfully. It aims to develop the tradition of tolerant Islam and limit the influence upon Russian Muslims by international Islamic extremist circles. Our observer status in the Organization of the Islamic Conference enables us to advance our foreign policy initiatives in the countries of the Islamic world in cooperation with Russian Muslim communities.
Cooperation with Jewish and Buddhist communities is becoming stronger.
5. It is important to ensure the weighty participation of Russian political science centers specializing in international affairs in the formation of the country's public opinion on international issues – otherwise judgements will be issued for it by experts from well-funded Russian branches of foreign political science centers. The role of the Russian political science community in shaping world public opinion on pressing international problems can hardly be overestimated. For this purpose a whole array of questions of a financial/organizational nature have to be solved in order to buttress the specialized institutes of RAN and forge links and cooperation with them and other authoritative political science centers in accordance with established international practice.
An important role in this endeavor is to be played by the Ministry's Scientific Council, incorporating leaders of major Russian specialized research organizations.
Recommendations. A comprehensive and systemic interpretation of the situation with respect to the news and analysis follow-up of foreign policy is needed so as to create a mechanism for continuous mutually advantageous and keen cooperation between government entities and the scientific and expert community.
- Facilitate activities of Russian NGOs abroad, primarily within the CIS space and in developing countries, and under auspices of international organizations, including the UN, the Group of Eight and the Council of Europe, developing and streamlining the areas of work that were laid down during the Russian presidency of these last two entities in 2006.
6. An effective foreign policy requires support from business circles. The contribution by Russian business, in particular OAO Rosneft Oil Company and ZAO Interros, to developing the educational institutions under the auspices of the Foreign Ministry in terms of the preparation of professional staff at the junction between business and diplomacy merits positive appraisal.
Recommendation. Consider the possibility of a shift in the long term to the universally accepted international practice of a personnel flow between the diplomatic service on one hand and the various elements of civil society (NGOs, political science centers and the corporate sector) on the other. This would solve cadre problems of the diplomatic service in the appropriate sectors and contribute to raising the effectiveness of our work and growth of the integrality of the entire foreign policy process, bearing in mind the necessity to reflect the full spectrum of opinions and interests existing in Russian society.
Interregional and Transfrontier Cooperation
1. One of the growth areas of foreign policy work, in the mainstream of general international tendencies, is links between regions and transfrontier cooperation. The effective use of these foreign policy instruments is called upon to assist the economic development of Russia's regions, the attraction of foreign investment and advanced technologies into their economy, a more even distribution of economic growth across the country and the creation of a favorable atmosphere for humanitarian exchanges.
The enormous border perimeter, the large number of land and sea neighbors, and the diversity of the potentialities of Russia's regions in terms of international cooperation form a considerable resource for the development of the country. Over the last 15 years tangible progress has been achieved in this field. The mechanisms of foreign economic activity of the regions, including transfrontier cooperation, have been arranged practically from scratch. At the same time negative moments have become evident that require the earliest possible solution. Among them: illegal migration, contraband trade, drug traffic, and other manifestations of the criminalization of border areas. It is obvious that a comprehensive approach is necessary here with the enlistment of all concerned entities of the state apparatus, private sector and non-governmental organizations.
2. The work on structuring of the system of institutions operating in the interest of promoting interregional and transfrontier cooperation should be continued. As before, the Ministry's Council of Heads of Subjects of the Russian Federation and its working body, the Consultative Council of Subjects of the Russian Federation on International and Foreign Economic Ties, should play the coordinating role. The territorial representations of the Ministry render effective assistance to the regions in forging and developing their international ties. Other important channels of interaction with federal and regional bodies of authority are the Interagency Commission on Transfrontier Cooperation and the Working Group of the Federation Council.
3. Our priority partners in interregional cooperation are CIS neighbors, the European Union countries and China. Expanding links with them at the subjects of the Federation level will substantially supplement interstate relations, and conduce to deepening Russia's integration into the world economy.
Recommendations. Continue working on the project for an Association of CIS Border Regions which could be a partner of the Association of European Border Regions. Take additional action to simplify the border crossing procedure for border area residents. Based on the experience of the functioning of the Russian-Ukrainian Euroregion ‘Yaroslavna' (made up of the Kursk and Sumy Regions), study the question of extending this form of cooperation to other sectors of regional links.
- In the European sector, facilitate expanding the regional format of cooperation with the Council of Europe and the Committee of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe.
- A new impulse to further related work must come with the normative base of interregional and transfrontier cooperation brought into conformity with international standards. The norms established by the Council of Europe legal instruments lying at the base of the functioning of the Euroregions can serve as an important guideline.
- Based on the CIS and Europe interaction experience, adopt the most effective ways to develop transfrontier and interregional cooperation in the Asian sector.
- Expand the practice of holding regional economic forums involving foreign participants, as patterned after the St. Petersburg, Sochi, Baikal and Far Eastern Economic Forums.
Information Support for Foreign Policy
1. The image of Russia has substantially changed in recent years in connection with its democratic revival. To convey the meaning and dynamics of the change to the world public at large and give our foreign partners objective and precise information about our position on key international problems and about the foreign policy initiatives and steps of the Russian Federation is the major objective of our informational work abroad.
The role of the informational component in foreign policy activities is becoming ever more substantial. The tonality of a perception of the outcome of talks or particular facts, events or tendencies in international relations is largely shaped not so much by the documents adopted as by their informational background – comments of the political science community, expert statements and media publications. This holds true for the information follow-up of both Russian foreign and domestic policy. The border line between these areas of informational work is conditional. And our chief task is to arrange effective informational campaigns in every place where the real challenge to Russian interests may appear, while maintaining a broad public consensus around the foreign policy course of Russia.
Building up efforts to counter the stereotyped anti-Russian thinking in the United States and a number of European countries acquires particular urgency and relevance. In this case it is important to remember that the talk is about a single-minded official propaganda designed to secure implementation of the foreign policy course of the appropriate capitals, including their Russian policy. This line already exhibits failures: not everyone, including in Europe, is ready to tow behind it, and buttressing, from the informational viewpoint, a policy that every now and then proves that it is untenable and inadequate to the present-day realities is becoming ever harder. We therefore face the broader goal of facilitating an objective perception of Russia everywhere in the world, which calls for systemic action both at the interstate and the non-governmental level, including parliamentary exchanges, and ties between regions, between businesspeople, between scholars and between publics.
We are striving to greatly broaden the course of the information flow being shaped through the creation of a network of overseas information platforms and by the expansion of the range of interaction with the Russian media and the media of our compatriots.
A major task is to develop world information platforms. In this regard, definite achievements already exist: the English language television channel Russia Today has been launched (with its Arabic and Spanish-language versions to be added soon), and Russian national channels are striving to expand their telecasting abroad. That striving ought to be supported.
With the active cooperation of the Ministry, the newspaper Rossiiskaya Gazeta initiated an extensive project for the publication of supplements with materials about Russia in leading foreign periodicals, those of the G8 in the first place. The first editions have already appeared in The Daily Telegraph. The Russian State Broadcasting Company ‘The Voice of Russia' and the news agency RIA Novosti also have some creative successes.
It is now important to add up individual achievements to create a well-oiled system, patterned after those of our principal partners. Taking into account the challenges with which Russia is confronted in this sphere, a coordinating center for informational work is necessary. Our international partners also point out that we give insufficient attention to this aspect of activity. We therefore have every reason to count on the keenness of Russian business to participate, as its interests depend to no small extent on the image of Russia.
Separate attention to the style of our informational work abroad. Its aggressive character does not at all mean a return to confrontation and an ideological standoff. But it is time we stopped trying to justify ourselves every now and then: Russia and western countries have much in common, but there are also many things that make us different – that's why we're interesting to each other. With the growth of elements of similarity the elements will also persist that determine the uniqueness of each country, including Russia and the US, and are rooted in the distinctions at the level of attitude, stemming from the cultural and civilizational characteristics of society. A discussion on this theme appears to be long overdue, and by launching it, we can well count on support from influential circles within the western community, for example, the conservative Christian-democratic spectrum, and beyond (in the Islamic world), thus making our contribution to the dialogue of civilizations.
Recommendations. In order to impart to our informational work an aggressive character it is necessary to pay greater attention to restoring the proper level of foreign broadcasting of our state news agencies, and to buttressing and expanding the network of their offices abroad. A positive example: the English-language channel Russia Today, in whose work more attention should be paid to the showing internal Russian life.
- An important resource for this work – foreign companies having business interests in Russia, which suffer from the politicization of the information about Russia in world media.
2. A substantial potential for shaping an objective image of Russia resides in the work with compatriots in the near and far abroad countries. We have nothing to hide; there's simply the need to transmit information efficiently and in an easy-to-understand language, as well as promptly.
Recommendation. In the conditions of the increased politicization in recent years of history and the use of historical events in the interests of certain political circles in a number of Eastern European and Baltic countries, as well as in some CIS states, it is an important task to develop retrospective information on the basis of the array of documents kept in the stocks of the Ministry Archives.
3. The momentum-gaining aggressive campaign of the politicization of historical themes requires an overall step-up of the elaboration of documentary sources. Toward this end, closer interaction is necessary with members of the Russian scholarly and public circles, with state-run media and those enjoying state support, that would rest on a privileged partnership, primarily through expanding their preferential access to documentary sources for the preparation of well-considered and well-argued publications and for use in discussions and statements at international conferences.
Recommendation. Work towards the formation of joint groups of historians on difficult questions of bilateral relations with individual countries. Themes of such investigations could consist of the joint study of key historical questions, including the origins of the Cold War, having a significance for the present stage of development in international relations.
Foreign Policy Coordination
1. Ensuring the unity of foreign policy is a major task of the state. Failures in coordination in this sphere are fraught with serious political costs. This question becomes particularly acute in the conditions when an ever larger number of diverse players join international activity. They all, including the Federal Assembly, the subjects of the Federation, NGOs, business, and the media, have their own lawful interests, can and should make an important contribution to securing an objective perception of Russia abroad and providing adequate information to the foreign partners about the judgements and sentiments of Russian public opinion.
It is the task of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to ensure that the overall vector of foreign policy actions of government entities and civil society corresponds to national interests and helps to promote the security and development of Russia. The legal framework for such work in the part of ensuring the concerted interaction of the executive with the legislative and judicial bodies as well as implementing the international commitments of Russia has been created by the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 375 of March 12, 1996, on the Coordinating Role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation in Carrying Out the Unified Foreign Policy Line of the Russian Federation.
In all other respects such coordination can be ensured through the close cooperation of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs with all the above players, including possibilities of targeted financing for their international activity in accordance with generally accepted international practice.
Addendum 1
List
of
Major Politico-Diplomatic, Theoretical-and-Practical and Sociopolitical Activities Carried Out by or with the Participation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Materials of Which Were Used in the Preparation of the Russian Foreign Policy Survey
1. The Conference of Ambassadors and Permanent Representatives of the Russian Federation, June 27, 2006, with the President of the Russian Federation in attendance
2. The Meeting of the Scientific Council under the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, November 10, 2006, held on the theme of "The Preparation of a Russian Foreign Policy Survey," with heads of academic institutes, leading scholars and political scientists, and representatives of civil society in attendance
3. The May 19, 2006, Round Table on the Russian Federation President's Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, organized by the Analytical Council, ‘Unity in the Name of Russia' Fund, All-Russia Political Party ‘United Russia,' with the participation of the Russian MFA
4. The Round Table on the Theme of "Space and Time in World Politics and International Relations" held on September 22-23, 2006, by the Commission of the Public Chamber on International Cooperation and Public Diplomacy
5. The World Summit of Religious Leaders, July 3, 2006
6. The Tenth World Russian People's Council
7. The Seventh Congress of the All-Russian Political Party ‘United Russia,' December 2, 2006
8. The World Newspaper Congress, June 5-6, 2006
9. The World Congress of Compatriots, St. Petersburg, October 24-25, 2006
10. The Big Eight Summit, St. Petersburg, July 15-17, 2006
11. The events held under the auspices of the International Forum of Non-Governmental Organizations ‘Civil G8 2006':
a) The Round Tables as Part of the Work of the Forum, Moscow, July 3-4:
- ‘The Formation of Global Social and Economic Policy for Sustainable Development';
- ‘Global Security and the Interests of Society';
- ‘Global Energy Security: A Look Into the Future';
- ‘Professional Education: Partnership and Opportunities';
- ‘Ecology: The Problems and Priorities of International Cooperation in the Field of the Protection of Biodiversity and the Prevention of the Spread of GMO';
- ‘Combating the Spread of HIV/AIDS: From Money to Action';
- ‘Business and Society: The Mechanisms of Interaction';
b) The ‘Youth G8' Summit, Pushkin near St. Petersburg, July 10-18, 2006;
c) The International NGO Round Table ‘The African Partnership Forum and the Agenda for Africa's Development,' Moscow, October 24-25, Civil G8 2006 Project;
d) The Final ‘Civil G8' Conference, Moscow, December 2, 2006
12. Together for the future - Forum on civil society cooperation of European Union and Russia, organized in Lahti, Finland, on November 17-20, 2006, by the Finnish-Russian Society, Alexander Institute at the University of Helsinki, and Roszarubezhtsentr, Russian MFA
13. The Third Meeting of the Forum for the Future, Amman, Jordan, December 1, 2006, at the Foreign Ministers level, as part of G8 Broader Middle East and North Africa (BMENA) Initiative, involving Russian NGOs, the Russian-Arab Business Council, and representatives of academic and expert circles
14. The round tables and international conferences held during the year by the Russian MFA in conjunction with Roszarubezhtsentr under the ‘Newsmakers About Russia' program:
- ‘Russian Diplomacy and UN Activities' (Addis Ababa);
- ‘The Role of Russia in International Affairs' (Cairo, Alexandria);
- ‘The Outcomes of the Russian Presidency of the Big Eight' (two round tables, Rome);
- ‘The Problems of Ensuring Energy Security on the European Continent' (Athens, Belgrade, Vienna);
- ‘The Strategy for Russia's Development' (Sofia, Bratislava);
- ‘The Questions of Integration in the Post-Soviet Space' (Warsaw, Beijing);
- ‘The Challenges of Globalization: A Regional Aspect' (Ulan-Bator, Krakow);
- ‘Russia in the Fight Against Terrorism' (Hanoi, Lusaka);
- ‘The Issues of Combating Terrorism in the SCO Framework' (Delhi);
- ‘The Informational Aspects of International Security' (Berlin)
15. The Conference organized in conjunction with the CoE Secretariat in Syktyvkar on June 8-9, 2006, on the theme of "Russia's Regions: Problems of Interregional and Transfrontier Cooperation," in which representatives of Russian federal and regional bodies of authority and CoE scientific experts took part
16. The world public forum ‘Dialogue of Civilizations,' held in Rhodos Island, Greece, in September-October 2006 by Russian NGOs, the Center of National Glory and the Andrew the First-Called Foundation, with the cooperation of the Russian MFA
17. The Expert Meeting on Intercivilizational Cooperation held at MGIMO University on November 14, 2006, in the context of advancing the Spanish-Turkish Alliance of Civilizations Initiative, developing the G8-BMENA Forum for the Future dialogue entity, and discussing Russian cooperation with the OIC and the work of the Russia-Islamic World Strategic Vision Group
18. The Russia-Islamic World Conference, organized by the Strategic Vision Group (Russian cochairman Yevgeny Primakov) in Kazan in June 2006
19. The round tables on Middle East settlement held in July and November 2006 at RIA Novosti Press Center and attended by Russian and foreign diplomats, scholars, political scientists and journalists
20. On Russia-ASEAN cooperation there were held with the cooperation of the Russian MFA:
- the round table in Irkutsk on September 21, 2006, as part of the Fourth Baikal Economic Forum;
- the seminar organized in Moscow on October 3-4, 2006, by the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences, in conjunction with Singapore's Institute of Southeast Asian Studies
21. With the cooperation of the Russian MFA, a round table was held at the Institute of Africa RAN in May 2006 to discuss economic and commercial relations with the continent's countries. Conceptual proposals for developing possibilities for building up our cooperation with African states were prepared at its end.
22. The following situational analyses were held at the Russian MFA:
- on the situation in and around Iran in the context of Teheran's nuclear program, July 3, 2006
- on the promotion of multilateral cooperation in the CIS space, September 29, 2006
23. The interagency meeting on the theme of "The Influence of Internal Political Processes in Latin America on Russia's Positions in the Region," held at the Russian MFA in conjunction with the Institute of Latin America RAN on May 17, 2006
Addendum 2
List of Organizations That Sent Materials for the Survey of
Russian Federation Foreign Policy
1. | International Affairs Committee of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation |
2. | International Affairs Committee of the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation |
3. | Commonwealth of Independent States and Relations with Compatriots Committee of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation |
4. | Public Chamber (Commission on International Cooperation and Public Diplomacy) |
5. | Apparatus of the Commissioner for Human Rights in the Russian Federation |
6. | Civil Society Institutions and Human Rights Council under the President of the Russian Federation |
7. | Chamber of Commerce and Industry |
8. | Institute for African Studies RAN |
9. | Institute of Oriental Studies RAN |
10. | Institute of Far Eastern Studies RAN |
11. | Institute of Europe RAN |
12. | Institute of World Economy and International Relations RAN (Center of International Security) |
13. | Institute of the USA and Canada RAN |
14. | Institute of Economy RAN |
15. | Diplomatic Academy, Russian MFA |
16. | MGIMO (U), Russian MFA |
17. | Russian Institute for Strategic Studies (RISI) |
18. | Institute for Globalization Studies (IPROG) |