Remarks by the Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation Sergey Ryabkov at the Regional seminar "Strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime", Bishkek, September 7, 2023
Dear Colleagues,
I am pleased to speak here, at this regional seminar co-organized by the Center for Energy and Security Studies and the Evgeniy Primakov Center for International Cooperation together with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kyrgyzstan.
Russia has always proceeded from the fact that the effectiveness of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, which is based on the NPT, arrives from maintaining a balance between the three pillars of this Treaty: cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy, nuclear non-proliferation and negotiations on nuclear disarmament. However, we see that this unique poise has been seriously tested in recent times. This is due to a number of external (in relation to the non-proliferation regime) and internal reasons. NPT meetings that took place one year apart – the 10th Review Conference (RevCon) that concluded the previous review cycle and the first session of the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) which launched the new one for the 11th RevCon – clearly demonstrated this.
According to their results, it can be stated that the nature of the discussion is still determined by high expectations and demands by some of the State Parties and the general radicalization of positions. Often there is just a systematic promotion of national or group guidelines, delegations neither listen to each other nor try to reach compromise. There are also attempts to bring into the review process external issues, which provokes the emergence of new dividing lines. This was most evident during the debates on strengthening the review process of the Treaty.
Another stumbling block is the deliberate politicization of discussions. Some States just initially lack a focus on finding a mutually acceptable solution to problems.
It cannot but cause concern that in recent decades a certain group of countries, or to be precise, the States which are the NATO members and their partners, have been trying to usurp the right to interpret the issue of compliance by other State Parties with their obligations under the NPT. They also have been trying to use the provisions of the Treaty to put pressure on objectionable countries and justify the interference in their internal affairs.
Similarly, the NPT is being seen as a pretext for restricting states' access to nuclear technology. Those who do this are forgetting Article IV of the Treaty, which guarantees the right to peaceful uses of atomic energy. This is also dangerous as it creates a false impression that the Treaty is unfair, although in reality it is only about the abuse of the provisions of the NPT by some Parties, who are trying to solve their own opportunistic political tasks this way.
These factors do not contribute to maintaining the spirit of constructive interaction and the advance of an interested dialogue among States. All this makes the task of developing meaningful practical steps for the further implementation of the Treaty, not mentioning collective consensus decisions, twice as difficult. It’s not surprising that since the 2010 RevCon, the State Parties, for various reasons, have not been able to agree on final documents. The last PrepCom session was no exception as well.
Under such circumstances, ensuring the sustainability of the NPT is one of the priorities for maintaining stability on a global scale.
Among negative points, I would like to highlight the fact that many State Parties, when considering the nuclear disarmament issues, unreasonably evade taking into account political and strategic realities. This is happening contrary to the logic of the comprehensive approach embodied in the NPT and the consensus decisions of the review conferences. At the same time, unrealistic demands are put forward, simply driving the situation into a deadlock. Meanwhile, it is clear that progress towards nuclear disarmament and nuclear arms control cannot be carried out in isolation from the international security situation as well as the military and strategic context. These are interrelated processes and moving forward on the mentioned tracks is impossible without the creation of favorable conditions that would ensure the maintenance of peace and stability during the reduction of nuclear weapons, as well as without respecting the principle of undiminished security for all.
The military and political situation in the world continues to rapidly degrade. The accumulated conflict potential between the nuclear powers that had not been settled timely has already led to an acute crisis in the Euro-Atlantic region and threatens to develop into a military confrontation in the Asia-Pacific region. Having violated the principle of equal and indivisible security, the NATO alliance relied on harmful expansion and assertive military squatting of territories in the zone of Russia's vital interests. The West used the responsive actions we were compelled to make to protect our external security as a pretext for switching to an open forceful pressure on Russia, dangerously balancing on the verge of a direct armed conflict of nuclear powers. At the same time, the current crisis is far from being resolved and fraught with the most serious risks of further escalation.
Against this gloomy background, the concerns of the world community in connection with the increase in strategic risks and the uncertain prospects for nuclear disarmament are more than justified. Moreover, the situation is characterized by the ongoing erosion of the existing international security architecture, including its important pillars – arms control agreements.
In the nuclear missile sphere, in particular, potential negative scenarios are deeply alarming after the United States withdrew from the INF Treaty and actively preparing to deploy previously banned missile systems. The situation that led to the suspension of the START due to the destructive policy of the United States and its significant violation of this agreement cannot but cause concern.
Nuclear disarmament in the NPT is incorporated in the context of general and complete disarmament, but now we are witnessing an increase in spending on conventional weapons in most States. The US accounts for 40% of all military spending in the world and if we add up the budgets of the armies of NATO countries and their closest allies, we get about two-thirds of global military spending. And this cannot be ignored when talking about the renunciation of nuclear weapons.
Bearing that in mind, there has been no reduction in the nuclear potential of NATO. On the contrary, the so-called non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW) of the United States are located on the territory of the alliance States, and vital Russian facilities are within their reach. Thus, such weapons have all the properties of strategic nuclear forces. According to recent reports, the possibilities for stationing of US NSNW in Europe are expanding. Moreover, another NATO member – the UK – decided to increase its nuclear arsenal by almost a third.
Under such circumstances, the validity of our consistently defended thesis about the counterproductiveness of those approaches to nuclear disarmament that imply an immediate and complete ban on nuclear weapons or the establishment of both harsh and artificial deadlines for reaching "nuclear zero" becomes very obvious.
Russia remains unfailingly committed to finding ways to move towards a world free of the nuclear threat, in full compliance with Article VI of the NPT in its entirety. For decades, our country has been making a significant practical contribution to the reduction of nuclear weapons. We are convinced that further progress along this path can be achieved only on the basis of a phased and consensus approach, with consistent work to improve the military and political climate and respecting the interests of all States.
Joint efforts are needed to ensure the coexistence of major military powers at a reduced level of conflict potential through a coordinated renewal of the international security architecture. Such work should be carried out comprehensively, taking into account all the factors defining the juncture of things in the area and include not only individual steps to reduce strategic risks, but, first of all, effective measures to eliminate the root causes of those contradictions that destabilize the relations among nuclear-weapon States.
Dear Colleagues,
One of the central components of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and an important factor for the stability and viability of the NPT is the Treaty’s verification mechanism - the IAEA safeguards system.
Russia has always supported it. We are convinced that its effectiveness is based on ensuring the objective, depoliticized and technically justified application of such a mechanism strictly according to the safeguards agreements and protocols concluded between the Member States and the Agency. Any possible changes to the current functioning of the IAEA safeguards system can only be made with the approval of the policy-making organs of the Agency and its Member States. We recognize the importance of universalization of the Additional Protocol to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, but at the same time we proceed from the voluntary nature of such obligations and from the inadmissibility of imposing them as a mandatory measure.
Misuse of safeguard cases as a pretext for discriminating individual countries in terms of exercising their right to use nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes is unacceptable. Often, however, we see how biased accusations against the State Parties to the NPT appear and forged “country dossiers” are composed. They comprise a big part of discussions at NPT and IAEA meetings. An example of this is the coordinated campaign of Western countries against Syria and Iran.
As regards Iran and the fate of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), we have always been in favor of preserving this mechanism and do not see any reasonable alternative to it. These fundamental agreements proved to be an effective solution to a long-standing problem and made it possible to ensure the necessary level of transparency of the Iranian nuclear program.
Unfortunately, the US withdrawal from the “nuclear deal” and Washington’s illegal actions undermining the UN Security Council Resolution 2231 worsened proliferation risks. Sweeping criticism of Tehran’s actions only intensifies confrontation and poisons the atmosphere of trust, the existence of which is extremely important for the proper fulfillment of obligations by all concerned parties.
Other regional non-proliferation challenges also form an important part of the NPT debate.
In this context, one of the main such irritants - the nuclear issue of the Korean Peninsula – cannot be ignored. The successful resolution of the problem largely depends on progress on the political track, in particular, on agreements in bilateral (USA-DPRK) and multilateral formats. Unfortunately, the process in this direction has stalled for the time being due to Washington's unwillingness to take practical constructive steps towards Pyongyang.
Moreover, we have recently seen actions that further distance us from the solution. These are the agreements between the United States and the Republic of Korea on joint nuclear and strategic planning, and provocative military exercises with the calls at the South Korean port of American nuclear submarines capable to carry strategic nuclear weapons. Such actions are clearly destabilizing in nature and are going to bring nothing but escalation of tension in the Asia-Pacific region, spurring crisis manifestations in the field of security and provoking an arms race. In fact, these steps undermine the goals of the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, for the sake of which a number of UN Security Council resolutions have been adopted.
Of course, when discussing regional challenges, one cannot fail to mention another problem – the establishment of the Middle East WMD-free zone (MEWMDFZ). Russia is a consistent supporter of this process and a co-sponsor of the corresponding resolution at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference.
In 2018, we also voted in favor of the UN General Assembly resolution, in accordance with which three sessions of the MEWMDFZ Conference were convened. Russia took part in them as an observer. In this regard, it is important that the States of the region have taken the process over. At the same time, we regret that Israel does not take part in the Conference. The event made it clear that it is not conceived as a forum for criticizing and casting out the Israelis, and thanks to the agreed condition that any decision can only be taken by consensus, Tel Aviv has every opportunity to defend its interests. We hope for a change in the position of the US, which, being also a co-sponsor of the 1995 resolution, will finally start contributing to its implementation.
The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world is an important element of strengthening the non-proliferation regime. By acceding to the relevant protocols to treaties on nuclear-weapon-free zones, Russia provides the parties to such treaties with security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. This is an example that our country takes its obligations responsibly and intends to comply with them in the future. At the same time the signing of such documents is accompanied on our part by the declaration of traditional reservations, which are a tool to guarantee compliance by the States forming a nuclear-weapon-free zone with the provisions of the agreements they have concluded.
Dear Colleagues,
The Executive Secretary of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission, Mr. Robert Floyd, is also participating in our seminar and I would like to say a few words about the destiny of this extremely important international agreement.
This document, in fact, is a link between non-proliferation and nuclear arms control. More than 25 years have passed since the Treaty was opened for signing, but it unfortunately still has not become a valid international legal instrument. The reasons are well known: eight of the States listed in Annex 2 to the CTBT (countries with significant nuclear potential) have not yet signed and/or ratified it, which prevents the Treaty from becoming a full-fledged international legal agreement.
Obviously, most of the countries on this list are guided by the position of the United States, which can only be called destructive. Washington, having officially refused to ratify the CTBT in 2018, has not yet taken any real steps to rectify the situation, despite the current administration's declarative statements about the desire to reconsider this approach. I would like to take the opportunity to once again call on the countries concerned to officially accede to the CTBT in full and thereby contribute to strengthening the non-proliferation regime and arms control.
Dear colleagues,
Taking into account the tense international situation, the recently started NPT review cycle is unlikely to be simple in terms of developing and agreeing on decisions that will help strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The differences between the State Parties are too strong and the demands of some of them are too high.
On the contrary, a calm and mutually respectful expert dialogue is in demand today. Only on its basis it is possible to negotiate and move forward. It is necessary to exclude the politicization of non-proliferation platforms, moderate ambitions and act primarily in the interests of the NPT, and ultimately the entire world community.
As you know, our Kazakhstani colleagues have taken over the chairmanship in the current NPT review cycle. We congratulate them on this and hope that our neighbors, given their traditional deep involvement in the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament issues, will be able to reestablish the atmosphere of trust and constructiveness within the framework of the NPT. For our part, we intend to contribute to this in every possible way.
Thank you for your attention.