Statement by the Head of the Delegation of the Russian Federation at the First Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 11th Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (General debate)
Mr. Chair,
The NPT remains a central element of the international security system. The Treaty is still effective and has proven its sustainability and usefulness for all its parties, both nuclear and non-nuclear. The successful functioning of the non-proliferation regime based on the NPT relies on a calibrated balance between its three pillars: cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.
At the same time, in the last two cycles of the Treaty, the parties did not manage to adopt an outcome document. In general, we do not intend to overdramatize the situation. We believe that the outcome document is an important element of the review cycle, but in principle not necessary, since its absence does not affect the stability of the NPT. However, the very fact that we have been unable to reach consensus for more than 12 years shows that the NPT community has accumulated certain negative trends, which we need to analyze and try to overcome, not only for the sake of the success of the review processes, but also in order to strengthen the Treaty.
The excessive politicization of work within the NPT should be noted. In recent decades, a certain group of countries - more precisely, the member States of the NATO nuclear bloc and their allies - have usurped the right to interpret States' compliance with their obligations under the Treaty and have used its provisions to pressure undesired States and justify interference in their internal affairs. This approach has also had a negative impact on the review process: during the 2015 Conference, some NPT parties deemed passages on a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone inappropriate for an outcome document; and in 2022, a group of States found it possible to promote controversial and obviously unacceptable language in the outcome document, deliberately sacrificing non-proliferation interests.
Another destructive trend is the use of the NPT as a pretext for restricting States' access to nuclear technology. Those who do so forget about Article IV of the NPT, which guarantees the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. This approach is also dangerous because it creates the false impression that the Treaty is unfair, when in fact it only concerns the abuse of the NPT provisions by some NPT parties who thus try to deal with their short-term political challenges.
One of the stumbling blocks in the NPT discussions has been the fact that in a number of cases the parties refuse to take into account geopolitical and strategic realities.
The nuclear disarmament process, as well as nuclear arms control cannot be isolated from the international security situation and the military-strategic context. Progress on these tracks is impossible without creating favourable conditions that would ensure the maintenance of peace and stability during the reduction of both nuclear and conventional weapons, and without respecting the principle of undiminished security.
At the same time, the military and political situation in the world continues to deteriorate rapidly. The accumulated conflict potential between nuclear powers, which was not curbed in time, has already led to an acute crisis in Euro-Atlantic and threatens to escalate into a military confrontation in Asia-Pacific. Having violated the principle of equal and indivisible security, the NATO bloc has staked on expansion and assertive involvement of more and more members. Besides, NATO has officially become a nuclear bloc, which means that all its States pursue shared strategic goals, which are ensured, inter alia, by nuclear weapons. In this case, nuclear weapons of the United Kingdom and France become as much of a threat to Russia as nuclear weapons of the United States. Moreover, against the backdrop of the international community's demand to reduce nuclear weapons, London has announced a build-up of its nuclear arsenal.
The presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in the territory of a number of non-nuclear NATO member States should also be emphasized. There is talk about U.S. tactical nuclear weapons emerging in Eastern European States, while these countries themselves are vigorously fighting for the right to become territories for the deployment of such weapons.
All this destabilizes the situation in Europe.
I would like to draw attention to another negative aspect: increased expenditures on conventional weapons. The NPT places nuclear disarmament in the context of general and complete disarmament. But at present, military spending is growing in most States. In particular, the U.S. accounts for 40% of all military expenditures in the world. And if we add up the budgets of the armies of the NATO countries and their closest allies, we will get about two-thirds of global military expenses. And this cannot be ignored when speaking of renouncing nuclear weapons.
Against this gloomy backdrop, the world community's concern over increasing strategic risks and uncertain prospects for nuclear disarmament is more than justified. Especially since the state of affairs is characterized by the ongoing undermining of the existing international security architecture, including its important pillars - arms control agreements. In the nuclear missile sphere, in particular, potential negative scenarios after the termination of the INF Treaty following the withdrawal of the United States, which is now actively preparing to deploy missile systems previously prohibited under the Treaty, are deeply disturbing. The situation that led to the suspension of the START Treaty as a result of the destructive policy of the United States and its substantial violation of this Treaty cannot but cause concern.
In this context, Russia was forced to take necessary measures to ensure its security. However, the West used our retaliatory actions to protect our external security contour as a pretext for resorting to an open power game against Russia, dangerously teetering on the brink of a direct armed conflict involving nuclear powers. Moreover, the current crisis is far from being resolved and carries the gravest risks of further escalation.
Russia remains unwaveringly committed to seeking ways towards a world free of nuclear threat, in full compliance with Article VI of the NPT in its entirety. For decades, our country has made a significant practical contribution to the reduction of nuclear weapons. We are convinced that further progress in this field can be achieved only on the basis of a step-by-step and consensual approach, persistent work to improve the politico-military climate and respect for the security interests of all parties.
In the current circumstances, the validity of the argument we have consistently advocated about the counter-productivity of those approaches to nuclear disarmament that imply an immediate and complete ban on nuclear weapons or the establishment of both tight and artificial deadlines for reaching "nuclear zero" becomes doubly evident. It is important to understand that a sustainable and secure nuclear-weapon-free world is not equal to the world in its current deplorable state minus nuclear weapons. Radicalism contradicts the NPT logic and will not lead to the ultimate goal of enhanced security for all.
Joint efforts should be made to ensure the coexistence of major military powers at a lower level of conflict potential through a concerted update of the international security architecture. Such work should be carried out in a comprehensive manner, take into account the combination of factors in this field and include not only individual measures to reduce strategic risks, but also all-out efforts to eliminate the root causes of the contradictions that destabilize relations between nuclear-weapon States.
Mr. Chair,
Speaking about the state of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, one cannot fail to mention such an irritant as the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue. For many years it has been common to accuse the DPRK of violating the NPT. The UN Security Council has adopted a number of resolutions on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
Recently, however, the tide has turned. In April, the Presidents of the United States and the Republic of Korea issued a joint statement, which, inter alia, referred to joint nuclear planning. On 18 July, a U.S. nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarine visited the port of Busan. Such actions undermine not only efforts to resolve the situation on the Korean Peninsula, but also the entire system of UN Security Council resolutions aimed at its denuclearization. The responsibility for this falls on Washington and Seoul.
Mr. Chair,
We note the unacceptable situation around the Comprehensive Nuclear- Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). This document is essentially a link between non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. It has been over a quarter of a century since the Treaty was opened for signature, however, it has yet to become an effective international legal instrument.
The fate of this most important international agreement remains uncertain and depends on the political will of the leadership of the eight States on the "List of 44" in Annex 2 to the CTBT that have not yet acceded to the Treaty. In this context, we should mention the destructive position of the United States, which, having officially refused to ratify the CTBT in 2018, has not taken any real steps to remedy the situation, despite the declarative statements by the current Washington administration about its desire to reconsider this stance.
It is particularly unacceptable when a State that has not ratified the CTBT allows itself to make accusations related to the Treaty against States that have ratified it and are complying with it in good faith.
Mr. Chair,
The Russian Federation expresses its full support for the IAEA safeguards system, which is the NPT verification mechanism. A priority is to ensure its impartial, depoliticized and technically sound application.
We underline that the safeguards should not be a pretext for discrimination against certain countries with regard to the exercise of the right to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.
We note that any changes to the existing safeguards system may be introduced only with the approval of the IAEA Member States. Russia supports the universalization of the Additional Protocol, but stresses the voluntary nature and inadmissibility of imposing it as a mandatory measure.
Mr. Chair,
The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) under Article VII of the NPT is also a crucial element of the non-proliferation regime.
Russia has fully acceded to all protocols to the existing treaties on NWFZs – the Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Pelindaba and Semipalatinsk Treaties - thus providing over a hundred NWFZ States with guarantees against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
We hope for an early resolution of all outstanding issues arising from the signing of the relevant protocol to the Bangkok Treaty. We are ready for that.
In this regard, I would like to note once again that Russia, like most other nuclear powers, traditionally makes a number of reservations when signing such documents. But it should be clearly understood that our reservations in no way affect the interests of States that intend to strictly adhere to their obligations under a relevant treaty establishing a NWFZ. They are merely a tool to ensure that NWFZ States comply with the provisions of the agreements they concluded.
Mr. Chair,
The issue of establishing a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone occupies a special place in the NPT framework. The key to successful progress on this track is the involvement of Israel and the United States, which, as co-sponsors of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, bear special responsibility for the implementation of its provisions. We view this resolution as an integral element of the agreements reached in 1995 to strengthen the non-proliferation regime.
We welcome the 2018-launched process of annual sessions of the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons, in which Russia takes an active part as an observer. It is important that an open and inclusive dialogue has been initiated and that States of the Middle East have a full opportunity to discuss ways towards establishing the zone.
Mr. Chair,
We disapprove of the AUKUS trilateral partnership. It creates a fundamentally new geopolitical situation in the Asia-Pacific region. Within the partnership, an infrastructure of nuclear-weapon States, which can later be used to deploy nuclear weapons, is being established in a non-nuclear-weapon State that is also a NWFZ country. This produces an additional factor of instability that undermines nuclear disarmament efforts.
In addition, this partnership involving the transfer of material that is not likely to be under comprehensive IAEA safeguards, while not violating the Safeguards Agreement, sets a precedent that could be used by other States in the future. This leads to weakening the NPT regime.
Mr. Chair,
The Russian Federation is one of the world leaders in nuclear industry. Russia currently operates 12 nuclear power plants with 43 power units, including the floating power unit of the Akademik Lomonosov nuclear thermal power plant and two advanced fast neutron nuclear reactors. A land-based low-capacity nuclear power plant with the RITM-200 reactor unit and new floating power plants are under construction.
In addition, the first ever construction of the BREST-300 lead-cooled power unit was launched. First time in the world practice, a power plant with a fast neutron reactor and on-site closed nuclear fuel cycle facilities will be built on the same site.
Russia is the only country using civil nuclear-powered vessels. Currently, there are seven nuclear icebreakers and one nuclear transport vessel in operation. Three nuclear icebreakers are under construction. The Russian Federation assists other countries in building nuclear power plants. They include China, Turkey, Egypt, India and Bangladesh. We help in the application of peaceful nuclear technologies for non-energy purposes. In a number of States, with Russia's assistance, nuclear science and technology centers are being established. We actively participate in the training and retraining of personnel for the nuclear power industry. Over 2,000 students from 65 countries study at Russian universities specializing in nuclear and related disciplines.
Russia considers the efforts to promote the nuclear energy development central to the IAEA work. We cooperate with the Agency in implementing the initiative launched in 2017 to develop the nuclear energy infrastructure of newcomer countries. Russia is the initiator and leading donor of the IAEA International Project on Innovative Reactors and Fuel Cycles, in which 43 countries and the European Commission participate. Together with the Agency, we are working on the development of the concept of assured supplies and multilateral approaches to nuclear fuel cycle. In 2016, Russia joined the IAEA's Programme of Action for Cancer Treatment and subsequently the Rays of Hope initiative.
We note that all NPT-compliant countries should have access to peaceful nuclear energy without any additional conditions. We know that the overwhelming majority of States parties share this approach. Russia is ready to further impart its experience in nuclear energy with its partners and to enhance mutually beneficial cooperation.
Mr. Chair,
In conclusion, I would like to express our hope that the Preparatory Committee session will enable us to make progress in addressing the challenges facing the NPT and will also provide a good basis for the Review Conference. I would like to warn against repeating the mistakes of previous cycles, and to emphasize that, if we want to conduct the review process in a constructive manner, the parties to the Treaty should treat each other with respect and avoid imposing obviously unacceptable provisions in the outcome document. The only way to ensure the adoption of such a document is to prepare it according to the principle of the lowest common denominator. I would like to emphasize that it is an important, but optional, element of the NPT review.
