Regarding the Situation with the Glorification of Nazism and the Spread of Neo-Nazism and Other Practices That Contribute to Fuelling Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance (Report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation)
Unofficial translation
Regarding the Situation with the Glorification of Nazism and the Spread of Neo-Nazismand Other Practices
That Contribute to Fuelling Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia
and Related Intolerance
Report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of the Russian Federation
Moscow
2024
Contents
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Countries are listed in accordance with the alphabet of the Russian language
* After the NATO aggression against Serbia in 1999, the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija does not fall under control of Belgrade. At the same time, the UN SC resolution 1244 confirms the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Serbia as regards Kosovo.
This report continues the efforts of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation to draw attention to the manifestations of various forms of glorification of the Nazi movement, neo-Nazism, racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance in foreign countries.
As in previous reports on this subject, the document reflects the line of Western countries aimed at fomenting rabid Russophobia, which has become one of the "manifestations" of their support for Ukraine against the background of the special military operation to demilitarize and denazify that country. Considerable attention is also paid to the actions of certain States, primarily the Baltic States, Poland and Ukraine, which, using the Special military operation conducted by Russia as a pretext, actively continue to destroy on their territory the entire array of Soviet and Russian, and often their own, memorial heritage and step up their activities to falsify the history of World War II in order to justify Nazism and its current supporters in Kiev.
This topic was also included in the first Joint Report by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus on Human Rights Situation in Certain Countries published this June.
Today, there is a growing trend in a number of States to publicly justify and glorify Nazism and Nazi figures, and to support neo-Nazism in order to serve the biased political ambitions of external curators. The earlier campaigns to distort history and falsify the role of the USSR in ensuring the Victory over Nazism in the Great Patriotic War and World War II and creating the modern system of international relations have received a strong impetus.
The cynicism, historical revisionism and revanchism inherent in the leadership of a number of Western countries are aimed at the complete substitution of notions and the swapping of places between the authors of racial purity ideologies who unleashed the war and nations that opposed them.
The tension in the sphere of "historical wars" does not ease either. Here, the bias and complete unprofessionalism of "rewriters" of history in working with real events of bygone days, their primitivisation, as well as the "tabloid" approach to the presentation of pseudohistorical materials are obvious. As a result, the final "product" created by them has nothing in common with scientific approaches to the presentation and analysis of historical facts.
The West is openly and unceremoniously changing historical concepts – from equating the Nazi regime with the "totalitarian" Soviet one to attempting to place all responsibility for the war on the Soviet Union and declare it "a criminal worse than the Third Reich". The meaning and, most importantly, the essence of the verdict of the International Military Tribunal for the trial and punishment of major war criminals of the European Axis countries (the Nuremberg Tribunal) is being deliberately blurred. This verdict outlawed war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by the Nazis and their henchmen, and condemned the leaders of the Nazi regime, thus putting everything in its place.
It should be noted that this became possible largely due to the joint decision of the members of the Anti-Hitler Coalition to hold an open, public trial of the main Nazis and its implementation. It was during the Nuremberg trial that the world learned in detail about the horrors of National Socialism and the atrocities committed by the followers of this ideology. Back then the world community was horrified by what it saw. The very fact that the Nuremberg Tribunal verdict exists is very disturbing to the current adherents of the "rule-based order" who support the modern Nazis.
As analysts correctly point out, history repeats itself, and the templates developed in Nazi Germany and militaristic Japan are now being applied in a number of States whose authorities not only glorify the ideas of Nazism but also implement them with particular zeal. This is evident from their attempts to reshape public consciousness, erase historical memory and spread neo-Nazi ideology among the younger generations, support and legalise neo-pagan and Satanist movements, oppose canonical Orthodoxy, etc.
Thus, collaborators who cooperated with the Nazis and committed war crimes and crimes against humanity are declared members of national liberation movements who allegedly fought for the "independence" of their States. Curricula and cultural projects glorify the "feat" of volunteer members of national SS legions who fought for Hitler's Germany and were involved in numerous massacres of civilians. The authorities' encouragement has unleashed the activities of radical nationalists and right-wing extremists who often become the main perpetrators of the cynical "war" against monuments to Soviet liberator soldiers.
For their fight with the "Russian world" and Soviet memorial heritage, nationalists are privileged to preach the "correct patriotism" idea to the entire society. In most cases, national authorities take no measures to suppress such bacchanalia; rather, on the contrary, they stimulate it. There has been virtually no response to protests from Russian diplomatic missions in connection with such incidents. Civil society members are simply ignored, or even subjected to repressive measures.
Apart from Ukraine, the most threatening situation in this area has developed in the Baltic States, Poland and the Czech Republic. Over the past few years, unimaginable hysteria with Russophobic motives has unfolded in these countries around 9 May celebrations. As part of the hastily launched campaigns to "liquidate the legacy of the totalitarian regime", not only the main monuments in honour of Red Army soldiers were barbarously destroyed but also many other such monuments, almost all of them. The public was forbidden to pay tribute to the fighters against Nazism in any form. Activists and ordinary citizens are arrested and criminally prosecuted for participating in such actions and even for defending the right to honour the memory of the Red Army heroes. Examples of such criminal prosecutions are cited in this report.
Demonstrating the cynical use of double standards, the political elites of the overwhelming majority of European and North American "democratic" states are trying their best to conceal from the international community, including their own citizens, the Nazi essence of the policy of the Kiev and similar regimes.
It has even come to open whitewashing of the supporters of neo-Nazism, the fighters of the radical nationalist battalion Azov and other similar Ukrainian extremist groups that openly demonstrate their racist ideological nature. In particular, any mention of the numerous brutal crimes committed by members of Ukrainian extremist groups in Donbass is carefully excluded from the information space. In the same way, they are trying to prevent the broadcasting of information about the adherence to Nazism of the Ukrainian military, as evidenced by their wearing of Nazi symbols. Yet, such cases do reach the public. So far, pro-Western journalists have apologised for showing such things on air.
In terms of content, this report is traditionally based on the provisions of the profile resolution "Combating glorification of Nazism, neo-Nazism and other practices that contribute to fuelling contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance" annually submitted for consideration of the UN General Assembly by Russia together with a wide range of co-sponsors from all regions of the world. The text of the resolution and the table reflecting the results of the voting at the 78th session of the General Assembly are included in the document as annexes.
We believe it is important to recall in connection with this resolution that the absolute majority of members of the international community share Russia's approaches to the glorification of Nazism and the justification of racism. Unprecedented pressure from the Washington-led "collective West" failed to change this trend. In 2023, the Russian resolution was supported by the majority of the world's countries – 118. 49 delegations voted against it, including the United States and Ukraine (which traditionally opposed the initiative), as well as EU member states (which previously abstained from voting, but now, under external pressure, are publicly demonstrating support for neo-Nazism).
With regard to the voting, the odious position of the Western countries, which, following the United States, voted against the document condemning the glorification of Nazism and manifestations of neo-Nazism, is striking. Serious concern is still caused by the cohesion of the former Axis member states, which casts doubt on the sincerity of the repentance of Germany, Italy and Japan for the war crimes and crimes against humanity committed during World War II. Through their actions, those States have demonstrated a blasphemous attitude towards the memory of the victims of German Nazism, Italian fascism and Japanese militarism.
Let us also recall the thematic focus of the resolution: it condemns the glorification of the Nazi movement and former members of the Waffen‑SS, including through the unveiling of monuments and memorials, as well as public demonstrations to glorify the Nazi past, the Nazi movement and neo-Nazism. It has been particularly stressed that the erection of monuments in honour of the SS, the organisation of their processions and other similar actions desecrate the memory of countless victims of fascism, have a negative impact on the younger generation, and are absolutely incompatible with the obligations of UN Member States. The co-sponsors of the resolution cannot ignore the fact that some countries are persistently trying to elevate those who fought against the Anti-Hitler Coalition or collaborated with the Nazis to the rank of national heroes and heroes of national liberation movements. The Russian Federation and its associates are convinced that this is not a question of political correctness, as its ideologues are trying to convince us, but of the most blatant cynicism and blasphemy towards those who liberated the world from the horrors of National Socialism.
The most important regulatory framework for combating these adverse phenomena and the basis for the development of multilateral cooperation come from the provisions of international human rights treaties, and first of all, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. The overwhelming majority of UN Member States, including countries that vote against the Russian initiative or abstain from voting are parties thereto.
In accordance with Article 4, the States Parties to the Convention particularly undertake to:
- condemn all propaganda and all organisations which are based on ideas of superiority of one race or which attempt to justify or promote racial hatred and discrimination in any form;
- declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred;
- declare illegal and prohibit organisations, and also organised and all other propaganda activities, which promote and incite racial discrimination, and recognise participation in such organisations or activities as an offence punishable by law.
Article 4 is one of the key provisions of the Convention. Its importance lies first and foremost in the fact that it establishes a clear line between acts punishable by law and the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and association and to freedom of opinion and its expression. That is why references by certain States that marches of Waffen‑SS veterans and various types of collaborationists, the erection of monuments to Nazis or other such manifestations are allegedly merely the implementation of the above-mentioned freedoms and are completely groundless. In this regard, we are convinced of the need for the States to withdraw their reservations to this treaty, including those to Article 4, as soon as possible.
Based on data from international and national sources the report summarizes the factual information on new manifestations in any form of the glorification of the Nazi movement, neo-Nazism, racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance in focal countries. It also takes into account the recommendations of international universal and regional human rights mechanisms, in particular treaty bodies (committees) and regional (especially European) law enforcement institutions to the States under review. The report also draws on the relevant research by civil society organisations. Therefore, thorough work to identify former members of Nazi units and collaborationist structures remains a major asset. The world is still witnessing some trials of such "figures", although they are probably among the last of their kind, in particular due to the inexorable passage of time.
As part of efforts to establish the Victory as a common heritage of UN Member States and prevent, in line with the provisions of the UN GA resolution on combatting the glorification of Nazism, the destruction or desecration of monuments and memorials to fighters against Nazism, this report traditionally focuses on the treatment by Western countries of monuments and memorial complexes dedicated to the Red Army soldiers who liberated Europe from the Brown Plague, antifascist warriors and members of the Resistance Movement, as well as their preservation. Increased attention to this issue has also been caused by the sharp rise in attempts by the current leadership of a number of States, first of all Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Estonia, to settle a historical score with Russia, and in a broader sense, with their historical past, by blasphemously destroying monuments to Soviet liberator soldiers.
The report also traditionally highlights the problem of discrimination against national minorities, as well as Russian and Russian-speaking population, especially in the Baltic States and Ukraine (including the authorities' efforts to deport Russian-speaking residents, including the elderly, from the Baltics).
Russia will always cherish the memory that all peoples of the Soviet Union played a decisive role together in the Victory over Nazism. The significance of this epochal event for all mankind cannot be overemphasized. There is no need to explain its significance in our country. For us, that war will remain the Great Patriotic War. Its horrors and deprivations affected every Russian family.
The above-mentioned trends and facts only confirm the thesis defended by Russia and its supporters that such manifestations of racial discrimination and glorification of Nazism pose a direct threat to the fundamental values of true democracy and human rights and a serious challenge to international and regional security and stability. However, so far, there are no prospects for some States to unite and cooperate constructively for sustainable development and equal partnership. The events of recent years remind us more and more insistently of the "values" of superiority of one race or nation over other peoples and cultures, which prevailed more than half a century ago. Naturally, Russia, together with like-minded countries, does not intend to tolerate such racist and neo-colonial approaches and will oppose them in every possible way.
No intensified attempts to falsify the history of World War II and glorify the Nazis have been registered at the federal level in Australia. At the same time, neo-Nazi ideas have been spreading in the country for some years. The authorities work towards eradicating this phenomenon.
Canberra persists in ignoring the Kiev regime's reliance on neo-Nazi groups and continues to increase its military support to Kiev. In June 2024, it announced the largest package of such assistance amounting to almost USD 250 million. It includes various types of weapons, which are used by the Kiev junta to carry out terrorist attacks against civilians.[1] What is more, Australian authorities have sent at least 70 personnel to train Ukrainian military in the United Kingdom.[2] In January 2024, their number was increased to approximately 90.[3]
In these circumstances, it can hardly be surprising that Australia voted against[4] the annual draft resolution co-sponsored by Russia and a number of other States and titled "Combating glorification of Nazism, neo-Nazism and other practices that contribute to fuelling contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance" at the UN General Assembly meetings in 2022 and 2023.
Despite Australian authorities' efforts to curb the number of Australian mercenaries directly involved in the hostilities in Donbass, Australian extremists increasingly often head to Ukraine in pursuit of "combat experience". Australian Department of Home Affairs and Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) have launched a special operation code-named Project Backencourt to prevent neo-Nazis from leaving the country and gaining combat experience abroad.[5]
According to The Sydney Morning Herald,[6] in 2023 Daniel Newman, a Nazi and a member of the Combat18 international ultra-right extremist group went to Ukraine to take part in the hostilities. He had previously been jailed for violent offenses in Victoria,[7] helped Australia's neo-Nazis forge connections with prison gangs and set up a cell in Tasmania.[8]
Another neo-Nazi, ex-soldier Conor Sretenovic failed to fly to Ukraine, because his passport was cancelled in 2020 on ASIO's order due to his ties with the racist organization Antipodean Resistance.[9]
There have been other Australian mercenaries in Ukraine, whose names have become public. In 2023, Caleb Matthews flew to Ukraine. There he joined a unit called the Chosen Company attached to the 59th Motorized Brigade of the AFU and led by Ryan O'Leary, former US Army officer and a veteran of the US wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, as soon as after the first combat he took a flight back to his native Kalgoorlie. One should also mention Brad Kendall from AFU's International Legion.[10] There is another Australian mercenary who headed back home from Ukraine, Henrik Bo Kenneth Parsgaard, a Nazi and a Hitler fan who had reportedly taken part in an attempted terrorist attack on the Belgorod Oblast.[11]
Australian mercenary Sage O'Donnell was killed in the Lugansk People's Republic. He had come to Ukraine to join the International Legion Defence of Ukraine, which gathered nationalists' supporters from across the world. He was the fourth Australian mercenary to be killed in fighting in Ukraine.[12]
The Daily Mail reported that in November 2022, an Australian man from Brisbane Trevor Kjeldal was killed in a battle in Donbass. He served in the 49th "Select Carpathian" battalion of the Ukrainian army.[13]
The ABC newspaper (Australia) says the exact number of Australian mercenaries in Ukraine cannot be established. It estimates that Brock Greenwood from Queensland from Ukraine's Foreign Legion killed in July 2024 was at least the seventh Australian to be killed in Ukraine.[14]
The support of neo-Nazi ideas is not unusual in the Australian Army. It transpired in 2023 that some members of Australian defence forces and police officers had had links with neo-Nazi groups, after which an inquiry was initiated in the Australian Army. It established that at least three men had joined the military after being members or liaising closely with racist groups (for example, the one called Operation Werewolf).[15]
Australian public was outraged by a 2007 photograph depicting Australian soldiers flying a Nazi flag with swastika from their vehicle during a military operation in Afghanistan.[16] Australian Department of Defence conducted an investigation and established the name of the soldier who raised the flag on the military vehicle. The country's Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull condemned this act.[17]
Crimes committed by the Australian servicemen with the connivance of supreme commanders remain a sensitive issue for the country's society. In 2020, the so-called Brereton Report was issued by the Australian Department of Defence; it described the killing of 39 civilians and prisoners committed by 25 Australian servicemen in Afghanistan (with most cases dating back to 2012 – 2013) and revealed a cult of violence and impunity in the country's special forces, to which the commanders had connived for many years. However, the names of the perpetrators and many other details were deleted from the public version of the report. Today the people know the name of at least one of them, Ben Roberts-Smith, because he is "the most decorated Australian soldier living" (he was awarded, inter alia, Victoria Cross, Australia's supreme award). What is more, a series of exposing media publications and the Brereton Report did not prevent the British Royal Family from inviting the former serviceman to attend the funeral of Elizabeth II.
It is highly unlikely that this war criminal will ever face punishment, even after the court judgement. This will require a new – criminal – proceeding to be opened. Its outcome is in no way predetermined, as stricter sufficiency criteria are applied to the evidence of guilt in such proceedings.
In addition to that, Ben Roberts-Smith is a suspect in a closed criminal investigation initiated by the government on the basis of the Brereton Report. Out of the 25 persons mentioned in the report, only one (Oliver Schulz) has faced charges. In February 2023, during the budgetary hearings in the Australian Parliament's Senate, the members of the investigative bodies promised to present preliminary conclusions on criminal episodes 40‑50 "by the middle of the year." The promise, which has not been fulfilled up until now, was accompanied by complaints that it was difficult to collect the materials "on site" up to a point that the witness testimonies of Afghans obtained in the on-line format were of "dubious legal force." It is clear that the authorities want to let the case slide.
June 2023 saw an end of a top-profile suit between Ben Roberts-Smith, a special operation forces veteran and participant in the military action in Afghanistan, and Fairfax Media, which had been taking place since 2019. The "defamation" case brought by the former soldier against journalists was dismissed. The publications characterizing Ben Roberts-Smith as a war criminal guilty of executions of unarmed Afghans and mocking the victims (for example, he used as a kind of beer mug the killed disabled man's prosthetic leg[18] taken by the soldiers as a "trophy") were found to be accurate by the Federal Court.
Realizing it is hopeless to investigate the involvement of the Australian Armed Forces command in war crimes in Afghanistan, in June 2023 Jacqui Lambie, an independent senator from Tasmania, had to take this story to the International Criminal Court,[19] despite the unsavoury reputation of this body in the eyes of the international community.
In August 2024, a group of the independent UN experts called on Australia to immediately fulfil its commitment to compensate the families of 39 murdered victims of war crimes committed by the Australian military in Afghanistan. "Australia has a duty to compensate victims of summary executions and torture under international human rights law and international humanitarian law," the experts said. At the same time, the experts acknowledged that the Australian Government was making genuine, albeit slow, efforts to criminally investigate and prosecute the perpetrators. In addition to compensation, Australia is required to provide measures of rehabilitation including medical and psychological care, legal assistance and educational or other support to the victims' families.[20]
The matters pertaining to countering Nazism, neo-Nazism, racism and xenophobia in Australia are governed by the 1995 Racial Hatred Act.[21] Australia's 1995 Criminal Code Act has no articles on manifestations of racism and xenophobia.[22] Criminal prosecution for racial discrimination is only provided for by the regional legislation of the Western Australia.[23]
Intentional public demonstration of Nazi symbols (swastika) has been criminalized at the level of some states, including New South Wales (since June 2022), Victoria (since December 2022), Tasmania (since June 2023), Queensland (since October 2023),[24] South Australia (since June 2024).[25] January 2024 saw the adoption of a federal law criminalizing public display of Nazi salute and symbols to supplement pertinent legislation enacted in a number of states.[26]
Australia has a record of far-right sentiments since the early 20th century, when the federal State was established. At that time, a set of legislative measures was adopted to restrict non-Caucasian migration to the country. Such immigration selectivity was based on Australian society's mostly hostile attitude towards Asians and Pacific Islanders, as well as the strong influence of local labour unions, which sought to prevent the emergence of a competitive workforce.
About 70 far-right organizations, political parties, or registered protest movements operate in the country. Many of them are striving to get access to policy-making at the supreme level.
Australia's right-wing and far-right socio-political groups can be roughly subdivided into patriots, nationalists and racists.
Civic patriots adhere to ideas and concepts shared by most Australians. For example, they support the sustainable development of a secular society, its civil institutions, moral and social values, with citizenship (rather than race, ethnicity or religion) remaining a fundamental element and identity marker. Civic patriots tolerate non-Europeans and non-Christians immigration to Australia provided that the immigrants are assimilated into the Australian system of social values. At the same time, civic patriots share the belief that Islamic fundamentalists, being unable to integrate into a secular society due to their traditional religious affiliation, are a "fifth column" seeking the Islamization of Australia. Some supporters of the movement take a firmer stance condemning Islam in general as an imperialist and totalitarian ideology that infringes the rights of non-Muslims. At the same time, civic patriots are not anti‑Semites, on the contrary, they call Israel the "lone bastion of Western civilization" in the Middle East.
The following groups and organisations consider themselves civic patriots: Party for Freedom, Rise Up Australia Party, protest movement Reclaim Australia, European Australian Civil Rights League, Love Australia or Leave, Restore Australia, Nationalist Republican Guard.
More radical right-wing group is represented by the nationalist movement, which is both Islamophobic and anti-Semitic. Nationalists prioritize race and ethnicity over citizenship. Although nationalists' main activity is to confront Muslims, their ideology is also aimed against other national and religious minorities, even though it is not expressed publicly and openly for fear of losing popularity and supporters.
The main actors of the nationalist movement in Australia are Nationalist Alternative, the National Democratic Party of Australia, Christian Identity and Patriot Blue.
Organisations that maintain international relations of any kind include United Patriots Front and Australian Defence League.
United Patriots Front expressed solidarity with the Greek far-right nationalist Golden Dawn Party. According to the organization's website, in 2017, it was restructured and renamed Lads Society, with no information on international ties.
Australian Defence League was founded in Sydney in 2009 and is a branch of English Defence League operating in the United Kingdom.
The most radical Australian right is represented by the racist movement, which believes that it is the Caucasian race that determines identity. Australian racists share the ideas of social Darwinism, a theory that places different races and ethnic groups on different levels of a hierarchical chain based on their moral, physical and psychological compatibility. Australian racists are hostile to all non-European immigrants, but consider the Jewish community as the main threat. At the same time, unlike the two groups mentioned above, they are not always negative towards Muslims, which reflects the historical fact that Nazi Germany collaborated with some Islamic State leaders during World War II. This political group in Australia includes mostly neo-Nazis who share the ideas of anti-Semitism and white supremacy, as well as the concept of "the white genocide."
Battalion 88, Club Nation, Expel the Parasites, Australians Resistance Network, National Socialist Network represent this movement.
The following racist groups maintain international relations of varying intensity: Blood&Honour, Soldiers of Odin, Women for Aryan Unity, Right Wing Resistance.
Blood&Honour is a low-activity Australian branch of the namesake British organization.
Soldiers of Odin was registered as an NGO in the state of Victoria in 2016 and is an Australian branch of a similar structure established in northern Finland in 2015; it also operates in Belgium, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Estonia, the United States, the United Kingdom, Portugal, and Spain. Open sources claim that the Australian Soldiers of Odin have been inactive since 2016.
Women for Aryan Unity is a group founded in the USA in 1990 with branches in Australia, Argentina, Italy, and Spain.
Right Wing Resistance is a New Zealand-based organization operating in Australia.
Recently, Antipodean Resistance has been the key racist group in Australia. It has openly used Nazi symbols and called to the legalization of the killing of ethnic Jews residing in the country. The group was established in 2016 and has used the well-known right-wing radical groups as an inspiration, including the UK's National Action, the Scandinavian Nordic Resistance Movement, and the U.S. Atomwaffen Division. It is unclear whether it maintains any direct ties with them.
The far-right movement in Australia is neither large, nor consolidated. The vast majority of organisations that identify themselves as patriots, nationalists or racists include at most a few hundred supporters. Besides, these groups do not have sufficient administrative and financial resources. Therefore, their activity is mostly confined to sporadic protests of predominantly verbal nature. In most cases, right-wing extremist manifestations can be observed in the media, on social platforms and specialized nationalist forums where right-wing views and ideas are actively disseminated.
The Australian Security Intelligence Service (ASIO) has also reported an increase in extremist sentiments motivated by racial and religious hatred. According to ASIO, the number of cases of ideologically motivated violent extremism under investigation increased by more than a third in 2021.
In February 2020, the media reported a rally of the National Socialist Network in a park near Melbourne on the Australia Day. About 40 people in paramilitary uniform displayed Third Reich symbols and greeted passers-by with the Nazi salute.
These activities have been a matter of concern for the country's authorities. In February 2020, ASIO Director-General Michael Burgess said that far-right extremism is a growing threat to Australia's security. The agency said, in about a half of cases, its counter-terrorist efforts were targeting right-wing radicals (in 2016, such measures accounted for only 10 to 15 per cent). This position was supported by Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police Reece Kirshaw in July 2020.
In March 2021, Australian Minister of Home Affairs Peter Dutton announced that the British neo-Nazi group, "Sonnenkrieg Division," was included in the national list of terrorist organizations becoming the first radical right-wing group to be put on the list. The Australian Home Affairs Department website specifies that Australians have not been directly involved in its activities and it does not pose a direct threat to the country. However, its ideology, which is hostile to multicultural societies, can incite local extremists, and terrorist attacks are potentially dangerous for Australian citizens abroad. Becoming its member, affiliating with it or providing it with financial support would constitute a criminal offense punishable by up to 25 years in prison. The expert community and the opposition Australian Labor Party welcomed this step, but pointed to the need to add to the list of banned organisations those groups that are active in Australia.
The following terrorist organisation to be put on the list was the U.S. Base group, which was recruiting followers among the members of local nationalist associations between 2019 and 2020. In 2022, the National Socialist Order group (former Atomwaffen Division) was included in the list.
Neo-Nazi manifestations (such as the hanging of a banner saying "Hitler was right" over a highway in a Gold Coast suburb in November 2022) trigger public protests and force regional authorities to take appropriate measures.
In 2024, the ultra-right radical nationalist rallies have become increasingly often, yet the law enforcement agencies tend to suppress these groups' illegal activities. There has also been an increase in the number of the so-called "Active Clubs", sport clubs uniting neo-Nazi supporters.[27]
Another neo-Nazi rally was to take place in Sydney on 26 January 2024. A group of 60 men clad in black balaclavas boarded a subway train but soon was held by the police. Six of them were arrested and taken to the police station, while the remaining 55 were fined for offensive behaviour. Thomas Sewell, the leader of the National Socialist Network, was among these people. Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese condemned the neo-Nazi action[28] In April 2023, Thomas Sewell was seen together with other 30 neo‑Nazis celebrating Hitler's birthday in the Bavarian restaurant in a shopping centre in Melbourne.[29]
On 28 January 2024, 30 neo-Nazi supporters gathered in the Artamon Reserve in Sydney, but the police promptly broke up the radicals' rally.[30]
In July 2024 at least 30 black balaclava clad neo-Nazis, most of them members of the National Socialist Network, held an unplanned demonstration at Melbourne main railway station chanting offensive phrases. One of them was Jacob Hersant, a notorious Australian neo-Nazi who in 2023 became the first Victorian charged with allegedly performing a Nazi salute in public in violation of the state law.[31]
Top officials of various states were also noticed as expressing ultra-right views. In June 2023, the media reported Danielle Elizabeth Auctions from Gold Coast, Queensland, organizing an online auction of Nazi artefacts.[32] The buyers of portraits of Adolph Hitler, anti-Semitic posters and photographs of executions included Australian politicians and MPs.
Right-wing nationalist associations of the Ukrainian community are engaged in justifying the crimes of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) committed during World War II. As an example of such association one can cite the Australian Federation of Ukrainian Organisations (AFUO) headed by Stefan Romaniw who also leads the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (Banderites) and NGO Ukrainian Democracy Initiative (UDI).
A memorial honouring Nazi soldiers "fallen for Ukraine" depicting Galician lion, the symbol of the 14th Waffen Grenadier Division of the SS (1st Galician), has been installed on the premises of the Ukrainian Catholic Church Our Lady of Protection in Wayville (South Australia).
Nazi accomplices are celebrated in a number of Australian place names. A street in South Penrith,[33] a suburb in the state of New South Wales, was named after Stefan Bandera. According to archive records, the initiative was sponsored by Ukrainian-born businessman George Borec (UPA veteran) who made considerable investments in the development of the suburb.
Australian Croatian community also fondly remembers Nazis. The Sydney Morning Herald states in its article that in Croatian community's most important institutions the support of Nazi-backed Ustasha regime, which is notorious for its executions of Serbs, Jewa and Roma in 1941-1945, has become mainstream. The numerous Croatian community's sports clubs and cultural centres openly celebrate Nazi anniversaries and demonstrate the symbols of the atrocious Ustasha regime. Croatian Club (aka Croatian House, Melbourne Croatian community headquarters) has a stone bust of Ante Pavelic, a founder of Croatian Ustasha organization and head of Croatian pro-Nazi government in 1941‑1945.[34]
In 2023 "a Croatian social club in Canberra (where the majority of the country's Croatian community is concentrated) was back in the spotlight after the O'Connor Knights soccer team (one of the two Croatian soccer clubs in the ACT National Premier League) it sponsored posted photographs of players posing underneath a portrait of Ante Pavelic. Later the photograph was removed. The Australian Croatian Club was also noted as selling merchandise with the Ustasha slogan "Za dom spremni!" (For home – ready!) outlawed in Croatia. Earlier in 2016, the ACT Administrative Appeal Tribunal ordered the Australian Croatian Club to pay AUD 63,000 in compensation to a man who was banned from full membership for his political views and his opposing the display of nationalist portraits, flags, emblems, and symbols.[35]
At the same time, it has been noted that Ustasha symbols are also used by soccer clubs of other cities, including Melbourne, Sydney, North Geelong and Adelaide.[36]
Three Croatians Nikola Marko Gasparovic, Dominik Sieben and Marijan Lisica (all of them Sydney United 58 supporters) were captured performing Nazi salute during the Australia Cup final between Sydney United 58 and Macarthur on 1 October 2022.[37] In July 2024, all the three were found guilty of displaying by public act a Nazi symbol and faced a fine of AUD 500.[38]
Australia became home for a number of escaped Nazis. One of them was Hungarian Nazi Charles Zentai. Zentai was allegedly one of the three Hungarian soldiers who killed an 18‑year‑old Jewish youth Péter Balázs in Budapest in November 1944. They heavily bat him and then threw him in the Danube. In 2005 Hungary requested his extradition as a war criminal. In late 2009, Australian government consented to the extradition, however after Mr. Zentai appealed against this decision, Australian High Court overturned the extradition order. The Department of Home Affairs' Spokesperson said that Mr. Zentai could not be extradited because at the time of the alleged offence the concept of a war crime did not exist in Hungarian law.[39] In 2017, Mr. Zentai died without facing punishment.[40]
In July 2006, Lajos Polgar died in a Melbourne suburb.[41] A year earlier Hungarian authorities opened investigation against him. Lajos Polgar reportedly fled war crimes prosecutors under an assumed name in 1949 and lived in Melbourne for more than 50 years. He admitted in an interview that he had been a youth leader of the Arrow Cross notorious for its atrocities against civilians, and worked as secretary to Jozsef Gera, a Hungarian Nazi, war criminal and supporter of Ferenc Szálasi, the leader of the Arrow Cross party.[42]
In March 2022, a Guardian[43] article, exposing resident of a small Australian town Bob Sredersas, a Nazi collaborationist from Lithuania who had served in Sicherheitsdienst (SD), evoked a wide response among the public. In 1950, he settled in Wollongong (New South Wales). Over the years, Sredersas built up an impressive art collection, which he donated to the city of Wollongong in 1976. This step was warmly welcomed – a plaque honouring the Nazi collaborationist was put up in the gallery, and a gallery room was named after him. In June 2022, following an investigation in cooperation with the Sydney Jewish Museum, the name of the room was changed and the plaque was taken down.[44]
Despite the official policy of multiculturalism, racist and xenophobic sentiments are widespread in Australia. Increased incidents of racial discrimination and xenophobia in both everyday life and the public domain were reported by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) in November 2017[45] and by the Human Rights Committee (HRCttee) in October 2017[46]. Migrants, especially Arabs, Muslims, people of African descent, and people from indigenous communities are the most frequent targets of intolerant attitudes.
In September 2023, the report containing the findings of the HRC Working Group of Experts on People of African Descent on its visit to Australia (from 12 to 20 December 2022) was published. The experts stress the prevalence of racial discrimination; the delegation noted that, throughout Australia, people of African descent reported racial profiling, abuse of authority, over policing, targeting, and violence by the police. Although in some States, like Victoria, racial profiling is prohibited, yet no monitoring exists in practice. There is information that pedestrians, cyclists, and drivers of African descent are more frequently subject to police stops that escalate to questioning, searches, threats of force.[47]
Children of African descent are subject to racial discrimination as well. Children reported to the delegation experiences of bias and discrimination in schools, on public transport, and in other public spaces. In 2017, a study across two Australian States found 40 per cent of students reported experiencing racial discrimination.
Health facilities are no exception for racial discrimination. This manifests itself in medical personnel's dismissive approach toward people of African descent, including mistrusting patients of African descent and underrating their complaints.
Experts also expressed concern about the rise of suicide among refugee of African descent, particularly among South Sudanese youth who faced a constant barrage of racialization and racial bias in everyday life.[48]
With the escalation of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, in the second half of 2023, manifestations of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia have dramatically increased. A total of 662 anti-Semitic incidents were recorded by the Executive Council of Australia Jewry between October and November 2023 alone, a 738 per cent increase on the number of incidents recorded in the previous year.[49] From 7 October to 6 November 2023, 133 Islamophobic incidents were reported. Before the escalation of the Middle East conflict, the average number of weekly incidents was 2.5. The executive director of Islamophobia Register Australia, Sharara Attai, said she believed the real number of Islamophobic incidents in the past month was "much higher" and that Islamophobia, and hate crimes in general, historically went under-reported.[50]
Manifestations of anti-Semitism were recorded in all spheres of life, with Jewish children and students being particularly affected by xenophobia. One of Melbourne's largest Jewish day schools has been the target of anti-Semitic graffiti saying "Jew die"[51], which has sparked a public reaction.
In early March 2023, a final Federal court hearing was held in Melbourne on a complaint against Brighton secondary school and the Victorian Department of Education for inciting the bullying of five Jewish students. In September 2023, a federal court judge found the State of Victoria and the principal of Brighton Secondary College breached the Racial Discrimination Act, as they failed to properly address anti-Semitism against students between 2015 and 2020, and ordered a personal apology and compensation to the victims totalling USD 435,000.[52]
There have been desecrations of Jewish cemeteries. Neo-Nazis vandalized Jewish graves in Tasmania in November 2021, at the 83rd anniversary of Kristallnacht, "the Night of Broken Glass." The white supremacists reportedly placed "white force" stickers on tombstones at the Jewish section of the cemetery.[53] In February 2023, swastikas were found painted on gravestones in a Jewish cemetery near Maitland (New South Wales.) The incident came a month after a synagogue in the same area was found graffitied.[54]
The authorities are making efforts to counter an unprecedented upsurge in anti-Semitism in the country. In July 2024, the Australian government appointed the country's first envoys to fight antisemitism. Jewish lawyer Jillian Segal had been appointed to consult Jewish Australians, experts and the wider community about ways to best address antisemitism. Albanese said a "special envoy for Islamophobia" would be appointed "shortly."[55]
In June 2024, the Liberal-National Coalition introduced a Commission of Inquiry into Antisemitism at Australian Universities Bill 2024.[56] The bill is to be considered by the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee, which will report back by 4 October 2024.[57]
There has also been an increase in attacks against mosques in recent years. In September 2019, a Brisbane mosque was vandalised with spray-painted swastika, Islamophobic language, and a reference to a shooter who committed terrorist attacks against mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand, in 2019.[58] In June 2022, a group of individuals vandalized a mosque in a Melbourne suburb. This mosque has already been attacked in 2015.[59] In October 2023, unknown persons set fires in the vicinity of mosques in Adelaide. In this regard, the police have increased patrols near places of worship.[60] In July 2024, a mosque in Gwynneville was vandalized multiple times.[61]
Russophobia fuelled by the Australian authorities and the Ukrainian community (including the Australian Federation of Ukrainian Organizations) has certainly added to the burden on Russian citizens and compatriots living in the country.
The country's major media issue anti-Russian content on a regular basis. Expressing any alternative views has become virtually impossible. In March 2022, Stan Grant, the host of a popular Q+A talk show expelled a young audience of Russian descent from the studio for his attempt to voice an opinion in support of Russia's actions.
In 2023, the Shooters, Fishers and Farmers Party (SFF) expelled Sean Ambrose, an ADF veteran, who was going to run in the upcoming New South Wales state elections, because of his pro-Russian stance and statements about the spread of neo-Nazism in Ukraine, in particular within the armed forces.[62]
Member of the Town of Port Hedland Council Adrian McRae, who was an independent observer for the Russian presidential election in March 2024, was harassed and threatened for commending the Russian election saying that they were highly transparent and free.[63]
In March 2023, SBS Russian,[64] a Russian branch of Australian public broadcaster SBS, issued an article about a Russian young man called Ruslan, whose application to Deakin University, one of the country's leading universities, was rejected. The University cited as a reason the discriminatory decision it adopted in March 2022 to cease cooperation with new students from Russia (including those with a residence permit in Australia) and foreign citizens residing in the territory of Russia.
In November 2023, according to the Australian media, the University of Tasmania accused its employee, a Russian-born academic, Vadim Kamenetsky, of allegedly exposing the University to "high risk" of foreign "interference" by receiving funds from Russian institutions and conducting research with the Russian Science Foundation and the Russian Academy of Sciences.
In October 2023, Minister for Tourism and Multicultural Affairs of South Australia Zoe Bettison cancelled the Kalinka Russian Ensemble composed of local children and young people of Russian heritage from the line-up of an annual Multicultural Festival in Adelaide in November. The Minister was open about the "difficult" but "necessary" decision that was made at the request of the Ukrainian community out of respect for Ukrainian refugees who would also be in attendance.
For two consecutive years the Australia Day Council of South Australia has banned the members of the Russian Cultural Centre and the athletes of the local sambo federation from taking part in the traditional 26 January parade. In 2024, the notice of the ban was sent as late as four days before the event.
It is worth noting that the authorities do not prevent the Victory Day celebrations. On 4 May 2024, an Immortal Regiment march took place in Sydney CBD. On 9 May, in Sydney's Waverley Park, the Russian Ambassador to Australia and citizens honouring the heroic deeds of the Soviet army laid wreaths at the memorial plaque to the Soviet soldiers-liberators.
A failure to respect the rights of Indigenous peoples is one of the country's recurring human rights issues. This population group is still not recognized in the country's Constitution and has no special legal protection.
One cannot but note a failed constitutional referendum held on 14 October 2023 (more than 60 per cent voted "no") to establish an advisory body within the Australian parliament – the so-called "Indigenous Voice to Parliament" referred to in the 2017 Uluru Statement from the Heart. In addition to the government's failure to address the entrenched problems of native Australians, its outcome has demonstrated that much of Australian society, about 90 per cent of which was formed by several "waves" of immigrants from Europe, retains colonial mindset.
The results of the referendum were criticized by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. The High Commissioner was "deeply disappointed at the missed opportunity to officially recognize Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples in Australia's Constitution and give them a greater voice alongside the country's Parliament."[65] The Special Rapporteurs of the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) on the right to development and the rights of Indigenous Peoples had also previously urged support for this legislative initiative.[66]
After years of discrimination, today, the indigenous population remains the poorest and most vulnerable part of Australia's society. Most of them live in remote and rural areas, that also affects their incomes and limits their access to healthcare and education services. Poor living standards not only fuel criminality, but also affect both physical and mental health of the indigenous population.
According to the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, a significant number of persons with disabilities express suicidal ideation, particularly within Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities, due to, inter alia, lack of support, poverty and isolation.[67]
Persons with disabilities, women and minors are the most vulnerable group in indigenous communities. In November 2019, the Committee on the Rights of the Child criticized the Australian government noting "that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children continue to be disproportionally affected by family and domestic violence, including sexual violence, both as victims and witnesses."[68]
In April 2024, the EMRIP notes that many of the concerns and recommendations contained in the concluding observations to Australia of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child in November 2019 are still of relevance today in the State of Western Australia, including the concerns over the continuing overrepresentation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children in alternative care.[69]
According to the November 2023 Family Matters annual report,[70] as of June 2022 there were 22,328 Indigenous children in out-of-home care – the highest number on record ever monitored. Moreover, less than half of Indigenous children in care live within the community and maintain their identity. Ten years ago, the figure was over 65 per cent. SNAICC chairperson Muriel Bamblett said it was concerning to see little traction in improving outcomes across all states and territories. She described current child protection systems as "racist" and urged authorities to work more closely with Indigenous communities to better understand the sector's complexities.[71]
Law enforcement officers continue to treat the indigenous population in a biased way. The information provided by The Guardian reveals the true scope of the problem. With reference to the Australian Institute of Criminology and several other line agencies, "The Guardian" reports 500 indigenous deaths over the last 30 years (1991 – 2021) at police stations and in similar circumstances.[72]
In 2023, indigenous Australians (3.8 per cent of the country's population) accounted for almost 32 per cent of Australia's total prison population a quarter of all prison deaths. Legal assistance centres have documented numerous cases of biased and cruel treatment of Aborigines in penitentiary facilities.
Many indigenous peoples live in remote and hard-to-reach areas, that severely limits their access to medical, educational, legal and other services and reduces their financial opportunities. So far, some progress has been made in education only. In other aspects, the gap remains, with the Aboriginal population still severely disadvantaged, in employment, mortality, and imprisonment rates.
In November 2017, the CERD[73] also noted the plight of indigenous people in Australia, including in terms of political participation, the lack of protection of their land rights, socio-economic discrimination, disproportionate rate of violence against indigenous women, as well as extremely high imprisonment rate among Aboriginal people, especially children.[74]
In September 2022, the HRC found that Australia had failed to adequately protect Torres Strait Islanders against "the effects of climate change." The Committee arrived at this conclusion upon examination of a complaint filed by representatives of eight Australian islands. The plaintiffs claimed that the state's failure to adequately protect their territories against extreme weather conditions had resulted in the indigenous peoples' inability to engage in farming, traditional crafts, and many ceremonies inherent in their culture. The Committee called on the Australian government to compensate the indigenous Islanders for the harm suffered and engage in meaningful consultations with communities to develop measures to secure their safe existence on the islands.[75]
Australian laws governing Aboriginal cultural heritage need to be reformed because mining companies still manage to find loopholes to obtain consent for the destruction of indigenous artefacts when conducting extractive activities. Causing destruction or alterations to Aboriginal territories is a crime under Australian law.[76]
In May 2017,[77] experts of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) expressed concern over Australia's non-compliance with the principle of free, prior and informed consent of indigenous peoples while developing policies with regard to extractive activities on the lands traditionally used by them.
In April 2024, the CERD strongly criticized the fact that, following the repeal of the Aboriginal Cultural Heritage Act of 2021 (WA) on 15 November 2023, the state government, without consultation with, or consent by, Aboriginal Peoples, decided to reinstate, with some amendments, the former Aboriginal Heritage Act of 1972.[78] The Committee is concerned that this may amount to a breach of the State party's obligations enshrined in the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) and in this regard recalls its previous concluding observations in which it recommended the State party to ensure that the principle of free, prior and informed consent is incorporated into pertinent legislation and fully implemented in practice. The Committee calls upon the State party to ensure that no decisions directly relating to the rights and interests of Indigenous Peoples are taken without their informed consent. On that basis the Committee insists that the landowners cease and desist all operations that have negative implications for the cultural heritage rights of Indigenous peoples. Moreover, all consents to landowners given under the post 15 November 2023 legislative framework are duly reviewed or revoked in light of the State party's obligations under ICERD and other international human rights obligations and standards.[79]
Canberra's tightening migration policy has been increasingly criticized by the human rights community. Thus, Australia refuses to grant asylum to irregular refugees and holds them indefinitely at detention centres, including on Nauru and earlier on Manus Island (Papua New Guinea) without adequate access to medical and legal services. The harsh conditions in such facilities, including inadequate mental health services, the serious safety issues and instances of violence, sexual abuse and self-harm, as well as the fact that the harsh conditions compel some asylum seekers to return to their countries of origin were pointed out by the Human Rights Committee.[80]
On 13 May 2021, Australian parliament endorsed amendments ruling out the possibility to expel foreigners who stay illegally in the country if they have applied for asylum. According to the government, the measure aims to ensure that the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees prohibiting forcible return of refugees to a country where their life or freedom would be threatened is reflected in national legislation. This step was followed by a joint statement of 30 human rights entities. They pointed out that even the amended version of the law lacks provisions on the periods of detention of persons in migration centres and in fact authorizes indefinite detention.[81] According to the Australian Department of Home Affairs, as of December 2022, more than 872 irregular migrants were kept in Australian detention centres, including on the continent.[82]
The Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (SPT) has also referred to the unsatisfactory state of the country's migration agenda. In October 2022, the Subcommittee delegation had to suspend its visit to Australia because of the obstacles it encountered in that country in carrying out its mandate under the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.
Head of the SPT Delegation Aisha Shujune Muhammad reported lack of cooperation from the regional authorities of the States of Queensland and New South Wales. In February 2023, the delegation eventually paid a visit to the country with a follow-up report published in December 2023.[83]
In this documents the SPT experts point out that Australia's policy of mandatory immigration detention may have deleterious effects on the mental health of migrants and their eventual ability to assimilate into Australian society. As immigration detention centres are largely devoid of language and cultural education programmes, migrants are placed in situations of deprivation.
Migrants detained in immigration detention facilities do not have sufficient access to State-provided free legal aid. The Subcommittee highlights that lack of clarity on the duration of detention is likely to have adverse effects on migrants' physical and mental health, in particular for those who cannot be returned to their countries owing to risk of torture or irreparable harm. The same is true of stateless persons. The Subcommittee received frequent testimony during interviews that migrants were often transferred between facilities without prior notice or reason for their transfer. This is also a contributing factor in adverse health outcomes and has harmful effects on their ability to retain family ties.[84]
Human rights activists are concerned over the fate of the Migration Amendment (Removal and Other Measures) approved by the lower house of the Parliament of Australia on 26 March 2024,[85] requiring non-citizens to "cooperate with steps to arrange their lawful removal" and establishing penalties for those who fail to "cooperate". Non-compliance with removal pathway direction without a reasonable excuse is considered an offense and is penalized with obligatory imprisonment of one to five years, an AUD 93,900 fine or both.[86]
Furthermore, the bill also empowers the government to designate "removal concern countries". Such designation would imply a bar on visa applications from persons who are citizens of the countries that fail to accept those removed from Australia.
However, on 27 March 2024, the upper house failed to pass this controversial bill proposed by the Labour Party. The adoption was moved at least six months in order to subject it to further examination.[87]
For historical reasons, Austria has been paying particular attention to countering manifestations of neo-Nazism and attempts to rehabilitate Nazism.
Vienna's international legal obligations to combat Nazism stem from the provisions of the State Treaty for the Re-establishment of an Independent and Democratic Austria of 15 May 1955, Articles 9 and 10 of which obliged the State to eliminate from Austrian political, economic and cultural life all traces of Nazism, to ensure that such organisations are not revived in any form, and to prevent all Nazi and militarist activities and propaganda on Austrian territory.
The question of establishing effective legal mechanisms to prevent the resurgence of fascism in Austria, liberated from Hitler's occupation, arose immediately after the end of World War II. The primary goal was to prevent the resurgence of fascist, Nazi or neo-Nazi associations and parties or other forms of fascism in the country.
At the legislative level, the issues of countering the manifestations of neo‑Nazism and attempts to rehabilitate Nazism are regulated by special laws.
The Provisional Government of the Republic of Austria, in its first statement upon its establishment in April 1945, introduced the criminal prosecution of the crimes of the Nazi regime.
To this end, the Law on the Prohibition of the National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP) (the Prohibition Act – Verbotsgesetz) was passed as early as on 8 May 1945, followed by the Law on War Crimes and Other Atrocities of the National Socialists (the War Crimes Act) of 26 June 1945. These laws remain in force, with some amendments introduced as the post-war national legislation evolved.
The Prohibition Act, which has the highest rank (constitutional law), provides for the alienation of the property of National Socialist organisations in favour of the State and other measures to denazify Austrian social, political and everyday life. This includes the prosecution of Nazi criminals and collaborators and the removal from public space of manifestations that in any way whitewash Nazism and its adherents. The law prohibits National Socialist ideology, the establishment of parties, the use of fascist symbols and any statements that justify the criminal activities of the NSDAP or deny the Holocaust.
Thus, paragraph 3 of the aforementioned law specifies that all activities in the name of the NSDAP are prohibited, even if they are actually carried out outside the organisation. Anyone who continues to be a member of the party or supports its aims is declared guilty of a crime punishable by death and confiscation of all property. If there are serious mitigating circumstances, the death penalty may be commuted to 10 to 20 years' imprisonment and confiscation of all property.
In 1992, the Prohibition Act was amended to increase criminal liability for any attempt to revive or support the activities of banned Nazi organisations. The threshold for punishment was lowered. The amendments increased the penalties for propagating Nazi ideology through the distribution of publications or works of art and criminalised a new offence – denying Nazi genocide and crimes against humanity or adhering to the ideas of National Socialism.
It is the applicability of the Prohibition Act provisions which is at the centre of public and political debates that arise from time to time regarding the removal or reuse of monuments and architectural structures, and the interpretation of certain historical events.
Among the most resonant examples of this kind are the disputes over the format of "commemorative events" organised by the Croatian and Slovenian diasporas on the anniversary of the so-called Bleiburg massacre of 1945 (mass executions of the Croatian Ustashas and Slovenian collaborators who had fled to Austria by Yugoslav partisans, led by Josip Broz Tito), the debate on the permissibility of preserving a monument on a Viennese square to Bürgermeister Karl Lüger (1844-1910) known for his anti-Semitic views, and the issue of nationalising of the so-called Hitler house in Braunau am Inn (federal state of Upper Austria), which is nearing its final resolution.
Thus, in 2016, by passing a special law, the Republic of Austria nationalised the building where Adolf Hitler was born in order to prevent it from becoming a "place of worship" for neo-Nazis (before that, the Austrian Ministry of the Interior had rented it since 1972). The woman who had owned the building was awarded compensation of 812,000 euro. In 2020, after a long public debate involving politicians, civil society, historians and building experts, it was decided to reconstruct the building to house a police station. The work with an estimated cost of 20 million euro is expected to be completed in 2025.
Socio-political disputes also regularly arise over the renaming of toponyms of Austrian cities as well as over the appropriateness of street and square names in Austrian cities with Nazi references. The work on erecting explanatory signs in such streets in Graz (federal state of Styria) which was started in 2019 by a special commission headed by Professor Stefan Carner (co-chairman of the Russia-Austria Commission of Historians which has suspended its work at Vienna's initiative) continues.
The provisions of the War Crimes Act can also be applied to Nazi criminals. According to Austrian sources, there have been 13,607 convictions under the Act in the post-war period, 43 of which provided for the death penalty and 29 for life imprisonment. However, Jewish associations in Austria criticise the law claiming that it is ineffective as not a single Nazi criminal has been punished in the country in the past 30 years.
Right-wing extremism, racism and neo-Nazi manifestations are still a significant topic in Austria discussed by the media and public.
Despite this, Austrian legislation does not contain specific regulations to combat extremist manifestations. National legal practice also lacks a clear definition of the term "extremism". Therefore, offences that could fall under this definition are regulated by the aforementioned Prohibition Act, as well as by the Insignia Act, the Penal Code and the Administrative Penal Code.
The 1960 Insignia Act is aimed at combating the most widespread acts of right-wing extremism in Austria. This law prohibits the public use of symbols (badges, emblems, uniforms, etc.) of banned fascist and Nazi organisations, including similar symbols that can be used as substitutes. This is a misdemeanour punishable by a fine of up to 4,000 euro or imprisonment for up to one month with the exception of theatrical performances and works of art, as well as exhibits and printed matter, provided that the use of such symbols is not an essential element thereof and is not intended to propagate or encourage Nazism.
Since 7 May 2024, the symbols of 15 organisations recognised by Vienna as extremist have been banned in Austria, including the Croatian fascists, the Ustasha, the Muslim Brotherhood, the Hezbollah organisation and political party, Hamas, the Kurdistan Workers' Party and the Grey Wolves, a Turkish nationalist organisation. The offence is punishable by a fine of 10,000 euro, and up to 20,000 euro[88] in case of a repeat offence. The symbols used by Hamas and Hezbollah are also equated as Nazi ones.[89]
Article 283 of the Austrian Penal Code criminalises extremist acts (incitement to violence, causing injury, threatening life or health, etc.) and other acts (e.g. damage to property) against persons, a group of persons, a religious or ecclesiastical association on the grounds of race, language, nationality, religion, ideology, state affiliation, ethnicity, age or gender identity.
Under Article 33 of the Austrian Penal Code, racist manifestations (mainly those referred to in Article 283) are considered an aggravating circumstance in the commission of unlawful acts.
If certain extremist acts are not criminalised due to the lack of serious negative consequences for society or the insignificance of the damage caused, the provisions of the Administrative Penal Code apply. In particular, paragraph 4 of Article 1 (Section III) provides for a fine for the dissemination of National Socialist ideas.
The complexity and fragmented nature of anti-discrimination legislation remains a particular problem for the Austrian legal system. The reason for this lies in the division of competences between the federal government and federal states. The differences between the Equal Treatment Act and the laws of each of the federal states in providing a differentiated degree of protection depending on the grounds of discrimination lead to legal uncertainty and confusion in the application of the regulations.
The Austrian authorities have made considerable efforts to monitor, prevent and suppress the activities of destructive right-wing forces. Austria has been implementing the National Action Plan to Combat Right Wing Extremism, which provides for a comprehensive approach to countering various right-wing extremist and neo-Nazi manifestations.
Islamophobic and anti-Semitic excesses, as well as attempts to rehabilitate the use of symbols from the National Socialist era and to misinterpret events, tend to resonate most strongly. A key role in monitoring the situation in this area is played by NGOs, such as "Civil Courage and Work Against Racism" (ZARA), the Dokustelle Österreich advice centre (which focuses on anti-Islamic incidents), the Antisemitismus Meldestelle reporting office under the Jewish Community of Vienna, etc., which publish annual reports on the number and nature of recorded incidents.
According to the report by the Antisemitismus Meldestelle, the number of anti-Semitic manifestations in 2023 increased by 59.5 per cent to a record 1147 cases compared to 2022. The main reason is the escalation of the Israeli‑Palestinian conflict. The Jewish community is particularly sensitive to the increasing instrumentalisation of Holocaust facts and symbols by certain political forces in the country aimed at pursuing their line on unrelated issues (the so-called Holocaust relativisation). The most striking example is the use of the Jewish star and the phrase "Vaccination sets you free" (Impfung macht frei) during demonstrations against anti-Covid measures in various Austrian cities in 2020‑2022 (historical references to the discriminatory stamps on the clothing of Jews during National Socialism and the cynical "Arbeit macht frei" (Work sets you free) inscriptions at the entrances to Nazi concentration camps).
The 2023 Report on the Defence of the Constitution[90] published in May 2024 notes that Austria's legal system restricts the ability of right-wing radicals and neo-Nazis to communicate, disseminate their ideology and recruit new supporters. Encrypted Internet platforms, such as chat rooms and channels on Telegram messenger, are used for communication. Analyses of groups and correspondence of suspects often become important evidence for the prosecution. There has been a lack of willingness on the part of the messenger administration to cooperate with Austrian authorities in some cases.
The Documentation Centre of Austrian Resistance and the Austrian Mauthausen Committee (MKÖ) NGO make an important contribution to the monitoring of neo-Nazi activities in Austria through their research and awareness-raising work and the publication of relevant thematic material on their online resources. The MKÖ publishes and regularly updates its brochure "Right Wing Extremism", which primarily informs publishers about banned Nazi symbols and insignia. The Commission's official website offers the possibility to report cases of right-wing extremism anonymously.
The Mauthausen Memorial Federal Institution established in January 2017 on the territory of the former Mauthausen concentration camp, plays an important role in educational activities, especially among young people, on the prevention of neo-Nazism.
The Mauthausen Memorial, the International Mauthausen Committee (IMC) NGO and the MKÖ jointly organise annual commemorative events (in May) to mark the anniversary of the liberation of the camp, with the participation of Austrian authorities, representatives of the public, foreign guests and the Vienna diplomatic corps – the so-called Festival of Joy in Vienna, as well as processions of national delegations to lay wreaths at Mauthausen itself.
In general, incidents and trends of a neo-Nazi nature recorded in the Republic of Austria, including at the domestic level, are thoroughly analysed, discussed and, in the vast majority of cases, condemned by Austrian law enforcement officials, political circles, the public and the media.
A recent example is the case when a member of the government of the municipality of Korneuburg, a representative of the Social Democratic Party of Austria, posted a series of anti-Israeli messages on a social network in November 2023, labelling Israel, among other things, a "neo-Nazi state". Following the ensuing public condemnation by the public and officials, he resigned from his post and was expelled from the party.[91]
In early July 2022, a non-commissioned officer of the Austrian army was given a suspended sentence for 10 months for distributing Nazi symbols in his unit (a search of the military officer's apartment also revealed numerous household items with swastikas and other Nazi paraphernalia).
Yet, neo-Nazism and racial intolerance persist in some areas. Thus, despite protests from Austrian anti-fascist organisations, annual "commemorative events" are organised in Austria by church institutions or local NGOs linked to right-wing radicals.
The already mentioned Bleiburg massacre of 1945 is still a matter of public debate. In March 2022, after the Internal Affairs Committee of the Austrian National Council (the lower house of parliament) had reviewed the Ministry of the Interior's expert opinion on these commemorative events, the authorities publicly declared their intention not to allow this event to take place in the future. From the 1950s until 2019, the event was held annually (in May) at the Loibach field in Bleiburg (federal state of Carinthia); it was not held in 2020 and 2021 due to the coronavirus pandemic. Previously, it was attended by high-ranking Croatian politicians, clergymen and prominent public figures (e.g. Prime Minister Ivica Račan in 2002 and his successor Ivo Sanader in 2004).
There were repeated instances of organised groups arriving in Bleiburg, wearing Ustasha insignia and shouting fascist greetings. After decisive police action, the number of radicalised participants decreased dramatically and such excesses became rare.
In the spring of 2022, after the publication of the above-mentioned expert report, the event was reduced to a memorial service in a local church and the laying of individual wreaths at the main monument, and the organisers (church institutions and local NGOs) were forced to remove the Croatian Ustasha coat of arms with the symbols of the 13th Waffen-SS Division from the memorial stone on the Loibach field.
Beyond the context of the special military operation, the topic of the so‑called Lienz tragedy remains the bottleneck in dealing with the issue of whitewashing of World War II Nazi collaborators in Austria. Every year (end of May – beginning of June), in Lienz (federal state of Tyrol) are held actions dedicated to the events of 1 June 1945, when the British occupation authorities extradited to the Soviet Union Cossacks from the Russian Empire who served in the 15th SS Cavalry Cossack Corps. Participants in the events include representatives of the city authorities, the Austrian Black Cross NGO and clergy from the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia (ROCOR).
In 2020, the memorial service was cancelled due to the pandemic, but an online commemorative exhibition organised by two professors from the University of Innsbruck was displayed at www.dolomitenbank.at, describing the "dire plight of those who strived for freedom."
Various manifestations of the right-wing extremism in everyday life remain one of the most significant social problems in Austria. According to a report by the Austrian ZARA human rights NGO, 1,302 racially motivated human rights violations were registered in 2023 (1,479 in 2022). Of these, 58 per cent were committed using the Internet (including 8.4 per cent by public officials and 4.5 per cent by law enforcement officials) and 42 per cent were committed outside the Internet.[92] In 78 per cent of cases, the offences (including online) were reported by eyewitnesses or witnesses, and only 22 per cent by the victims themselves.
The right-wing extremist environment in the country is very heterogeneous and varies in terms of number of participants, composition, resource base and ideological focus (anti-democratic, racist, Islamophobic, anti-Semitic and revisionist movements). The 2022 Report of the Directorate of State Security and Intelligence of the Austrian Ministry of the Interior, which is responsible, among other things, for combating manifestations of extremism and neo-Nazism, states that the activities of right-wing radical groups pose a potential threat to public order and national security.
In terms of organisational structure, right-wing forces are usually grouped into so-called "ideological" parties, unions, "clubs of like-minded people" or "fellowships", and may include individual revisionist activists who deny Germany's responsibility for the outbreak of World War II and the Holocaust, and seek to play down other crimes of the Nazi regime. To this end, the "works" of pseudo-historical revisionists from Germany, the United States, Canada and Great Britain are used as an "ideological basis". Since such campaigns are prohibited by the national legislation, they are carried out from abroad, including through the active use of the Internet.
The other segment of the right-wing extremist spectrum is represented by (mainly regional) youth "subcultural" groups, neo-Nazi "associations" (including virtual ones), the skinhead movement, individual activists from marginal social groups and well-organised associations of sports fans. The ideological component plays a secondary role in these structures, but they have a high mobilisation potential and a pronounced propensity to violence.
Right-wing extremist associations in Austria include the Austrian Identitarian Movement (Identitäre Bewegung Österreich), part of the European movement that originated in France and opposes the unification of traditional 'indigenous' cultures, multicultural policies and globalisation processes, as well as capitalism and American dominance. The Austrian branch, which is close to the right-wing populist Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), has been organising annual anti-migration campaigns since 2014, including protests and internet propaganda, calling for the abandonment of integration policies, the repatriation of migrants and refugees, the enshrinement of Austria's "dominant culture" notion. It has close links with 'partner' organisations in Germany, France and Italy.
After it was discovered in 2019 that Brenton Tarrant, the terrorist responsible for the shootings at the Christchurch mosques in New Zealand, had channelled donations to this Austrian movement, the then Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz authorised to study legal grounds for its ban. In 2020, Identitarians faced the refusal of major social networks to post their content. The Identitarians' symbols were banned as part of tougher measures against terrorism and religious extremism following the terrorist attack in Vienna in November 2020. Against this background, an attempt was made to transform the movement in early 2021: its leader Martin Sellner founded a conservative patriotic civic platform "Die Österreicher – DO5" (a reference to the Austrian resistance movement against Nazism called O5), whose agenda mirrors that of the Identitarians.
Another far-right association, the "Working Community for Democratic Politics" (Arbeitsgemeinschaft für demokratische Politik/AFP), is registered as a political party, although it does not participate in elections. It consists of a small number of activists and is seen as a platform for establishing contacts between activists on the Austrian far-right scene and their supporters abroad.
Right-wing student unions (Olympia, Arminia Chernivits, etc.), which are considered to be far-right by local NGOs, enjoy certain influence in Austria. Their membership includes federal and regional political figures from the FPÖ. There also exist a few regional right-wing radical cells: the German-Austrian Blood Brotherhood (Kameradschaft Deutsch-Österreichische Blutsbrüder), Braunau Resistance (Widerstand Braunau), Object 21 (Objekt 21, illegal since 2013), and Free Fellowships (Freie Kameradschaften). Members of these associations hold 20 out of the 51 FPÖ seats in the National Council. According to the Austrian Resistance Documentary Archive, this is "a record figure in the history of the Second Austrian Republic."[93]
To propagate their ideas, right-wing extremists hold rallies, protests and street marches, often not sanctioned by the authorities. They use print media outlets, such as Freilich, Abendland, Heute, Der Eckart, etc., as a media platform for disseminating their right-wing radical narratives. Internet and social networks are increasingly utilised by right-wing extremist groups to promote their "ideas." Local NGOs consider such "alternative" Internet portals as "unzensuriert.at" and "alles roger?" to be right-wing radical. Neo-Nazi musical records available for purchase on the Internet are actively used to attract the target audience, especially the youth.
Experts note the increasing aggressiveness and "paramilitary" nature of extremist groups in recent years. In June 2023, Austrian police seized 35 rifles, 25 submachine guns, 100 pistols, armour-piercing weapons and 10,000 pieces of ammunition during searches at 13 facilities in the federal states of Lower Austria and Upper Austria belonging to the right-wing extremist rocker group MC Bandidos. In addition, 600 items with Nazi paraphernalia and more than 1.5 kg of narcotic substances were found.[94]
In December 2020, Austrian law enforcement agencies, during a joint special operation with their German colleagues, discovered a warehouse with weapons belonging to local neo-Nazi groups and intended for the creation of illegal armed formations in Germany.
This problem also has an international component. It is known that the Austrian right-wing extremist community maintains links with the far-right forces in Germany, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Norway, Sweden and Belgium. Organised groups and individual activists regularly participate in demonstrations and marches in other countries, primarily in Germany.
It should be noted that a significant number of right-wing radical groups is the result of the country's Nazi past, but their real influence on Austria's domestic political agenda is insignificant. The number of their active supporters is small, and the opposition Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) traditionally represents the bulk of the problems they raise ("migrant domination", "Islamisation", etc.).
At the same time, such forms of intolerance as racism, anti-Semitism, Islamophobia and migrantophobia continue to occur in the State. There has been no progress in resolving these problems in recent years, despite the repeated observations and recommendations of international monitoring bodies in this regard.
Combating anti-Semitism remains a priority for the Austrian authorities, as the number of offences motivated by anti-Semitism has increased dramatically in recent years. This is confirmed by a joint study by the Forum Against Anti‑Semitism NGO and the Jewish Community of Vienna.
According to the Ministry of Interior's[95] data for 2021, the offences are mainly committed on the Internet and at "anti-COVID" demonstrations. It is noted that anti-Semitism on ethnic grounds is less common than its "side" manifestations, such as Holocaust denial or anti-Israeli actions.
A notable increase in incidents was recorded at the beginning of the coronavirus pandemic when the Jewish people faced allegations of COVID-19 dissemination. As already noted, a spike in anti-Semitic manifestations has been recorded since the start of the Israeli ground operation in the Gaza Strip in October 2023.
According to the Jewish Community of Vienna, between 7 and 29 October 2023, 165 relevant offences were committed in the capital (which is 5 times more than in the previous 9 months), dozens of cases are being investigated, and measures taken by the authorities to strengthen the security of Jewish institutions are insufficient and need further elaboration[96].
The most defiant delicts include the burning of the Jewish section of Vienna's Central Cemetery[97], anti-Israel graffiti on the campus of the Institute of Jewish Studies at the University of Vienna[98], the tearing down of the Israeli flag from administrative buildings in Linz and Salzburg and Jewish cultural and religious institutions (including the main synagogue in Vienna)[99].
In May 2024, anti-Semitic slogans were sprayed on the walls of Jewish‑owned shops in Vienna's Leopoldstadt district by unknown persons. According to the President of the Austrian Jewish Community, Oskar Deutsch, on 1 May 2024, stones were thrown at Jewish teenagers during a demonstration in Vienna under the slogans "Freedom for Palestine"[100].
In this respect, few people remember that in August 2020, the President of the Jewish Community of Graz, Elie Rosen, was attacked by unknown assailants a few days apart.
Against the backdrop of criminal trials against radical Islamists, anonymous bomb threat calls to educational institutions, courts and Jewish cultural centres became more frequent. At the end of June 2022, a series of such provocations were organised by so-called jihadists in Vienna, Graz and St. Pölten with slogans "Death to Jews and infidels" (under investigation).
Human rights defenders are particularly concerned about the young age of the perpetrators, which is primarily related to the spread of misinformation about anti-Semitic conspiracy theories on the streets, in schools and on the Internet.
According to a survey by the EU Agency for Fundamental Human Rights (FRA), 24 per cent of Jewish respondents consider anti-Semitism a very big problem in Austria, while 49 per cent of them perceive it as a fairly big one[101].
In May 2023, the leadership of the Jewish Community of Vienna presented its annual report on incidents of anti-Semitism in Austria. Although the total number of incidents in 2022 (719) decreased compared to the "anti‑record" of 2021 (965, +65 per cent compared to 2020)[102], it remained significantly higher than in previous years (585 in 2020; 550 in 2019). Hooliganism (422), online mass spamming (140), property damage (122), threats (21) and assaults (14) prevailed. Most of them occurred in person (284), through social media (212) and by mail (90). They were committed mainly by right-wing radicals (395 cases), ultra-left forces (146) and the Islamic world (63)[103].
At the same time, there was a decrease in the number of atrocities (‑14.3 per cent, from 461 to 395) with a right-wing ideological background.
Far-right and neo-Nazi movements are trying to adapt anti-Semitic concepts to modern realities in order to attract new supporters.
According to the president of the Jewish Community of Vienna, O.Deutsch, who is known for his critical attitude towards the right-wing populist Freedom Party of Austria (FPO), the danger of such manifestations, in addition to right-wing extremists and radical Islamists, also comes from the "libertarians" (Kellernazi; "underground Nazis") in the Lower Austrian government, who openly share anti-Semitic and racist views.
According to the 2022 report of the Institute for Empirical Social Research (IFES) on anti-Semitism in Austria, the country is experiencing an increase in anti-Semitic manifestations in both overt and latent forms. The main triggers are the pandemic and the Ukrainian conflict, which have often been linked to conspiracy theories (including Jewish ones)[104]. Anti-Semitism is more prevalent among Turkish and Arabic speakers[105].
According to social surveys, 36 per cent of Austrians are convinced that Jews "run the international business community," 30 per cent are convinced that their power in world politics and the media is growing, 19 per cent are convinced that they have "undue influence" in Austria, and 18 per cent believe they are responsible for the current price increases and economic crisis[106].
Classification of the respondents by education level, age and background brings a conclusion that well-educated people with a basic knowledge of Jewish history and culture are noticeably less likely to make anti-Semitic statements.
With regard to historical memory, 36 per cent of respondents agreed that Jews "try to profit from the fact that their people were victims of Nazi crimes," 19 per cent agreed that they themselves "are guilty of being persecuted in the course of history," 34 per cent opposed the constant manipulations of the Holocaust by Jews, and 11 per cent refused to recognize it at all. The least inclined to manifestations of anti-Semitism were those under the age of 25.
In order to obtain an objective and comprehensive picture, the research involved a focus group of Arab Austrian residents (about 1,000 people). They were more anti-Semitic toward the policies of the State of Israel than the native Austrian population: 57 per cent (with 30 per cent of the other respondents) agreed with the statement that the Israelis "treat the Palestinians like the Germans treated the Jews during World War II," and 47 per cent (14 per cent) are convinced that "peace will come to the Middle East with the end of the state of Israel." Tellingly, 53 per cent of the "Arab" respondents grew up and were educated in Austria.
The authors of the report, having divided the study participants into those who showed overt (15 per cent), covert (32 per cent) anti-Semitism and those who did not manifest it (54 per cent), concluded that unbiased attitudes towards Jews prevail over hateful attitudes in society.
The report was presented as part of the Second European Conference on Anti-Semitism, held on 18-19 April, 2023 in Vienna with the participation of the leadership of the World Jewish Congress, the Israel Religious Society, human rights structures of the EU, the Council of Europe, and the OSCE.
At the opening of the forum, the President of the National Council (lower house of parliament) of Austria, W.Sobotka, noted that anti-Semitism as a direct threat to democracy covers all layers of society, not only marginalized groups. The task of parliamentarians is to fight this "evil" and thus strengthen the democratic foundations of the state. He cited numerous commemorative events, thematic meetings and seminars on parliamentary democracy, as well as the establishment of the S.Wiesenthal Prize for civil society representatives for their services in countering anti-Semitism and Holocaust education. He called for a "new way of thinking" and the expansion of practical tools to prevent anti‑Semitic manifestations, as well as the creation of a unified database to record such statements in the online environment.
Austrian Minister for EU Affairs and Constitution K.Edtstadler supported the importance of coordinated efforts to improve the exchange and collection of relevant information within the EU. She called on EU member states to join the Vienna Declaration on Combating Anti-Semitism and Supporting Jews in Europe (signed by 13 states, including Austria).
In June 2023, at the opening of the American Jewish Committee's Global Forum on the occasion of the 75th anniversary of the founding of the State of Israel, K.Edtstadler spoke of Austria's historical responsibility: "supporting Israel and Jews is part of our political DNA, our duty and obligation".
The national strategy to combat anti-Semitism, presented in January 2022, contains a set of measures in the educational, integration and legal spheres aimed at strengthening the security of Jewish associations in the country, effective monitoring of anti-Semitic crimes, and increasing the level of socialization of representatives of the Jewish diaspora.
In order to improve coordination, it is planned to create a pan-European register of offenses. The Ministry of Education, together with the Austrian Integration Fund, is developing educational projects for schoolchildren and students to raise awareness of the specifics of Judaism and the Jewish world.
In June 2023, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry for EU Affairs and the Austrian Constitution, with the expert assistance of the Jewish Community of Vienna and the Austrian Resistance Documentation Archive, submitted amendments to the above-mentioned National Socialism Prohibition Act of 1947 (currently under consideration by the government) in order to improve the fight against anti-Semitism.
It is envisaged that a number of "gaps" will be eliminated by expanding national jurisdiction: the publication of anti-Semitic content on the Internet from abroad will be investigated under Austrian law. Nazi symbols and cult objects, such as the so-called "SS honour rings" (of the former Nazi organization Schutzstaffel), are to be confiscated even in the absence of illegal actions with their use (until now, only in the case of their deliberate use). There are plans to criminalize the trivialization of the Holocaust.
The current term "gross trivialization" leaves room for interpretation of the gravity of such crimes. Henceforth, mentioning Holocaust themes and symbols outside the historical context will be punishable. Examples include comparing opponents of vaccination with Jews persecuted under National Socialism and wearing a modified "Jewish star" at "anti-COVID" demonstrations.
The Austrian government supported the initiative of the president of the Jewish Community of Vienna, O.Deutsch, to create a Holocaust museum in Vienna, following the example of similar centres in Israel and the United States. According to the idea of the authorities, it should become a place of remembrance for the victims and promote awareness of the consequences of manifestations of hatred and intolerance. The land plot where the Gestapo headquarters was located from 1938 to 1945 is considered a possible location for the future museum complex.
According to the decision of the Austrian government, from 1 September 2020, Jews deported from the territory of Austria during World War II (more than 100,000 people) and their descendants can apply for Austrian citizenship without having to renounce their existing citizenship (in the Republic of Austria, dual citizenship is granted only in exceptional cases). The head of the Jewish community of Austria, O.Deutsch, called this decision "not a gift, but a formal elimination of injustice." In 2022, 20,606 people exercised this right (27 per cent more than in 2021).
The official authorities have also been criticized by human rights NGOs for insufficient efforts to counter the racism that is becoming systemic. In particular, in the area of migration, the need for equal treatment of all refugees, regardless of their nationality, has been emphasized.
According to statistics from the SORA Institute, people with a migration background or Islamic religious affiliation experience discrimination twice as often (62 per cent and 78 per cent) as people without a migration background (37 per cent) or of Christian faith (39 per cent).
An important factor in Austria's religious life is the need to counter various forms of radicalism, including against the backdrop of a marked increase in the country's Muslim population (doubling in the last 20 years) and the migration crisis.
According to the local Documentation Center for Islamophobia and Antisemitic Rassismus (Dokustelle Islamfeindlichkeit und antisemitischer Rassismus)[107] and the Austrian Advisory Society Dokustelle Österreich, the number of incidents of religiously motivated intolerance against Muslims (dissemination of hate messages in media space, religious insults, damage to property, unequal treatment) in 2022 amounted to 1,324 (1,061 in 2021 and 1,402 in 2020). Of these, 81.6 per cent occurred using the online environment, in 1/3 of the cases political figures (usually representatives or followers of the right-populist Austrian Freedom Party) "distinguished" themselves. In terms of gender, Muslim women were more often harassed (70 per cent of cases), 3/4 of the perpetrators were men.
In November 2023, the Documentation Center for Islamophobia and Anti-Semitic Racism also noted an increase in hostile attitudes against Muslims after the escalation of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in October 2023. According to the organization's data for October-November 2023, the number of incidents of racism against Muslims was higher than in the period from January to September 2023. There were cases of both verbal insults and physical attacks against Muslims, as well as discrimination in educational institutions and attempts to limit public displays of solidarity with Islamic community[108].
In addition to domestic Islamophobia, human rights NGOs point to systemic legislative discrimination against members of the Muslim community by the authorities, as well as a politically motivated anti-Islamic bias in the area of security.
The results of a sociological survey cited in the AOHR's 2020 report are very illustrative in this regard: 45 per cent of the respondents believe that Muslims should not enjoy the same rights as "all other Austrians"[109].
The purchase of a house in March 2019 by a Palestinian family with many children in the municipality of Weikendorf (Lower Austria) caused a widespread resonance. The local residents and the city administration disagreed with the purchase and tried to prevent the family from moving into the new housing. An appeal was filed by the local authorities with the Administrative Court of Lower Austria against the purchase of the said property; after several months of proceedings, the legality of the transaction was confirmed by the Austrian Federal Register.
In order to consolidate the primacy of public law in relation to religious teachings and to limit foreign influence, in 2015 amendments to the Law on Recognition of Followers of Islam as a Religious Community were adopted which do not allow funding of Muslim religious organizations and imams from abroad (there is no such ban on other confessions).
According to human rights activists, the new version of the law de facto "erases" Islam from the public educational space. Restrictions are in place on a number of religious practices: the wearing of burkas is prohibited (since 2017), and the slaughter of livestock is limited. In the federal states of Carinthia and Vorarlberg, a special procedure for the construction of minarets and mosques has been introduced as part of the construction legislation, severely limiting the possibility of building them.
The activities of the Directorate State Protection and Intelligence Service (DSN) under the Austrian Ministry of the Interior, which contributes to intimidation and turning the public against representatives of the Muslim community, cause the dissatisfaction of human rights defenders. The essence of their claims is an inherently biased attitude towards this religious group, groundless accusations of its representatives of involvement in terrorist/criminal circles.
Attention to the local Muslim diaspora has increased significantly after the resonant terrorist attack in the centre of Vienna in November 2020. More than 30 alleged adherents of radical Islam were arrested as a result of the Counter-Terrorist Operation Luxor organized after the attack, but the proceedings against them were terminated due to lack of evidence.
Experts note that such actions of law enforcers contributed to a noticeable deepening of interethnic contradictions and aggravation of the already generally negative public mood towards Muslims living in Austria. Against this background, human rights activists insistently urge the government to develop a comprehensive national strategy, similar to the "anti-Semitic" one, against racism that would include measures to combat its Islamophobic manifestations (in 2022 there were 1324 cases, 1061 in 2021, 1402 in 2020).
The authorities of the country have carried out a comprehensive revision of anti-terrorist legislation with a focus on countering the spread of terrorist ideology and preventing religious extremism.
In July 2021, a package of measures was introduced to intensify the fight against the spread of radical movements.
Within the framework of anti-terrorist legislation, the powers of the judiciary and law enforcement agencies with respect to extremist religious associations have been expanded, control has been strengthened and the procedure for closing radical mosques simplified, mandatory registration of imams and restrictions on foreign funding of Muslim (non-religious) NGOs have been introduced. Penalties for crimes on religious and political grounds have been toughened, and Islamist symbols have been banned.
As shows the 2022 report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus on the most high-profile cases of human rights violations in certain countries of the world, with the amendments to the Federal Act on Islam (German Islamgesetz) in Austria of July 2021, the control powers of the Office of Worship in the Federal Chancellor's Office with regard to Islamic structures are significantly expanded and the process of liquidation of Islamic communities in case of violations is simplified. One of the goals of the "anti‑terrorism package" was to combat "political Islam." The Islamic religious community of Austria IGGÖ – the largest public association of Austrian Muslims – condemned the adoption of the new version of the law. Representatives of the community point to the discriminatory nature of the innovations. Austrian Muslims also consider it unacceptable to link the issues of combating terrorism and relations between the state and religious institutions.
According to the NGO Amnesty International, the package of anti‑terrorist measures is "threatening respect for the rights of Muslims". Experts believe that these steps can lead to stigmatization of the Muslim population and create a negative background around the Islamic world as a whole.
Against the backdrop of the worsening situation with systemic discrimination against representatives of the Muslim community and the increase of the terrorist threat level (taking into account the escalation of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict – up to the fourth level out of five), the law enforcement officers have intensified surveillance over the Islamic diaspora, in particular, in order to apprehend active supporters of ISIS and Hamas, as well as members of groups friendly to them, including the Muslim Brotherhood. Mosques and the content of sermons delivered by imams are being closely monitored[110]. It even comes down to innocent Muslims being detained. Pro‑Palestinian rallies[111] are banned, and their participants are subject to administrative proceedings on a large scale[112].
Critics of the authorities' religious policy are under pressure. In 2022, Farid Hafez, editor of the yearbook Islamophobia Research and author of the Austrian section of the European Report on Islamophobia and the anthology Islamophobia in Austria, was prosecuted for alleged contacts with the Muslim Brotherhood. Following a trial in January 2023, he was acquitted.
According to the Austrian Ministry of the Interior, the number of hate speech incidents against Muslims by right-wing radicals has increased. Due to the lack of a legal mechanism for the protection of Islamic religious and educational institutions, appeals on the facts of attacks on them often do not meet the due attention of law enforcement agencies.
In May 2021, the state-funded organization Documentation Center for Political Islam (established to combat anti-Semitism, especially among migrants), together with the Ministry of Integration and the University of Vienna, compiled an interactive "Map of Islam"[113], which contains information on the location of 623 mosques and other Muslim religious associations in Austria. It contains information on the location of 623 mosques and other Muslim religious organizations in the territory Austria. This fact caused discontent among representatives of the Muslim diaspora, who regarded it as a threat to disclose personal data. Local heads of Catholic and Protestant churches have characterized this initiative as contributing to social stratification and the growth of ethnic tensions.
The Austrian Map of Islam also caused a negative reaction from the Council of Europe's Special Representative of the Secretary General for Combating Anti-Semitism, Hatred against Muslims and Hate Crimes, who stated that it was perceived by many Muslim believers as a manifestation of a general bias against Islam, could foster anti-Muslim sentiment and put the security of Muslims under threat. According to a statement issued by the Council of Europe on 31 May 2021, the map is counterproductive, exacerbates discrimination against a religious group, and should be withdrawn.
Muslim human rights activists saw the Map of Islam as a demonstration of the government's open intention to stigmatize all Muslims as a potential threat[114].
The authorities insist on the purely informational nature of the source. Based on this approach, the authorized Austrian agency (Datenschutzbehörde) rejected the complaint of the NGO "Muslim Youth of Austria".
According to the "integration barometer" of the Austrian Integration Foundation, the attitude of Austrian citizens towards the Muslim part of the population is deteriorating every year. According to 62 per cent of 1,000 respondents, living together with Muslims can be characterized as "bad". The last time this indicator was as high was during the dawn of the migration crisis in 2015. This attitude is confirmed by the conclusions of the latest report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) operating within the framework of the Council of Europe on Austria, according to which there is "a high degree of Islamophobia in the state and the public discourse is becoming increasingly xenophobic, especially against Muslims and refugees".
The issue of the spread of radical Islam is the second most important issue for Austrian citizens after global warming. At the same time, the situation with the integration of refugees in schools and workplaces worries 58 per cent of respondents.
In order to counter radicalization of certain categories of citizens, especially young people, special attention is paid to the early warning system.
A wide public resonance was caused by the ban imposed by the authorities on Muslim girls wearing hijabs in schools. However, the ban was significantly mitigated by the Constitutional Court's decision. On 11 December 2020, the ban on hijabs for female pupils in elementary school was recognized as illegal and abolished.
According to the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the decision of the authorities to ban face-covering clothing in public places has a discriminatory effect on Muslim women and migrant women and girls living in Austria. According to experts, this legal provision limits the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion of the women belonging to this population group, who wear such clothing because of their religious beliefs, and contributes to their social isolation[115].
The reason for the criticism was a series of incidents that took place since the beginning of the 2019/2020 school year in schools in Vienna. Since the ban on the wearing of Muslim headscarves-niqabs in elementary schools came into force in May 2019, 8 cases of violations were recorded until the end of November 2019. In all cases, parents had to accept the decision of the authorities after receiving legal advice (their refusal would have entailed a fine of up to 440 euros). In January 2020, the Islamic Community of Austria filed a complaint to the Austrian Constitutional Court against this restrictive measure, considering that it violates basic human rights such as freedom of religion and the right to be raised by parents.
It is noteworthy that the ban itself, included in the Law on School Education, is formulated in general terms: pupils under the age of 10 must not wear head-covering clothing that reflects religious or ideological beliefs. However, a parliamentary subcommittee on education subsequently issued a commentary on the issue, clarifying that only head coverings that conceal either all or most of the hair are subject to the restriction. Thus, the wearing of yarmulkas and patkas – Sikh children's headwear – was exempted from the law. This makes the targeting of Muslim girls even more obvious, which, according to ECRI experts, could marginalize this group of students and negatively affect their enjoyment of the right to education[116].
In addition to criticism from human rights activists, the Federal Office for Immigration and Asylum also points to the deteriorating situation in the migration area.
According to a report by the Austrian Integration Fund, the number of people with migrant backgrounds in the country has increased significantly. According to statistics, almost a quarter of the population (around 2 million people) are from other countries (a 24 per cent increase since 2015[117]).
According to the Austrian Ministry of Interior, 2022 saw a sharp increase in the number of applications for refugee status, which is associated with the lifting of strict anti-COVID restrictive measures, including entry restrictions: 112 thousand applications, which is a record, were filed (compared to 39.9 thousand in 2021[118]; +280 per cent by 2021; +170 per cent by 2020). 19 thousand requests were satisfied (in 2021, 12 thousand asylum applications were satisfied (the share of Syrians equals 57 per cent), 13.5 thousand were rejected). The most active resettlement is from Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria.
As the June 2024 summary of the European Union Asylum Agency's (EUAA) Annual Report on the Asylum Situation in the European Union 2024, published in June 2024, shows, Austria was under significant pressure from the influx of asylum applications in 2023 (6,500 per 1 million inhabitants) along with Greece (6,200), Germany (4,000), Luxembourg (3,800), Bulgaria (3,500), Slovenia and Switzerland (3,400 each)[119].
In the first quarter of 2023, 10.15 thousand applications were registered (‑11 per cent compared to the same period of 2022: over 56 thousand (+195 per cent compared to the same period of 2021) applications were filed in January-August 2022[120]). Austria ranks 4th among EU countries in terms of the absolute number of applications, and 2nd in terms of "migration" burden per capita (1250, 216 in Europe). 89 thousand refugees are on social security, for the maintenance of which in 2022 was allocated 435 million euros (100 million for Ukrainian migrants).
In total, Austria has sheltered more than 90 thousand refugees from Ukraine (57 thousand are on social welfare)[121] and 276 Russian citizens (within the framework of the EU directive on granting temporary protection (2001/55 EC).
Of particular concern to human rights defenders are the unfavourable situation in the primary reception centres, the lack of coordination between the authorized federal and state authorities, poor treatment of migrants, as well as unbearable conditions of detention of asylum seekers: overcrowding of centres, accommodation in unheated, outdated premises, unsanitary conditions, settlement without taking into account the differences in gender and age.
The NGO Together for Children's Rights is dissatisfied with the absence of the practice of establishing guardianship over refugee minors (the unaccompanied ones) from the moment of arrival in the country, as well as with the long periods of their detention in primary accommodation centres[122].
According to the Austrian Interior Ministry, in 2022, about 11,000 underage refugees who arrived in the country unaccompanied by adults went missing. This only takes into account children for whom the refugee status process has been officially launched.
The consequences of the 2015 migration crisis and the continuing mass influx of new refugees, including from Ukraine, in addition to the critical load on the social sphere leads to cases of discrimination on ethnic grounds on the part of civil servants, social services and medical workers.
The Ministry of Interior of Austria pursues a markedly strict policy of deporting foreigners whose stay has been recognized as illegal by the court (on the basis of a refusal to grant asylum) or who have lost their refugee status as a result of an offense committed in the territory of Austria.
The actions of the authorities are often criticized by the opposition and human rights defenders.
For instance, the hard-line stance of then Chancellor Sebastian Kurz, who held the post of Chancellor of Austria from 2017 to 2021, in favour of "consistent deportation of foreigners who have committed crimes in the country and whose refugee status has been revoked," was another matter of concern raised by specialized NGOs.
Human rights defenders also pointed to the problem of migrant smuggling into Austria (in January-February 2020, a number of such cases took place when at least 50 refugees were brought into the country).
According to the Amnesty International report on Austria, deportation centres regularly record cases of "disproportionate use of force and unjustified disciplinary measures".[123]
The head of the Ministry of the Interior, Gerhard Karner, is pushing for a legislation to ensure that the initial "screening" of refugees takes place in third countries prior to their entry into Austria. At a conference on refugees (Vienna, 21‑22 February 2022), he suggested that applicants with a clearly low chance of obtaining refugee status should be sent back home at the EU's doorstep, that is at the borders of the Western Balkan countries.[124] In return, Gerhard Karner promised to help these countries with border control activities and deportation of refugees to their countries of origin.
Following the trilateral summit (Austria, Hungary and Serbia) on migration held in Budapest on 3 October 2022, Austrian Chancellor Karl Nehammer called on EU countries to take concerted action to combat illegal migration and the entry of refugees, to ensure their "fair" distribution among European countries, and to strengthen cross-border cooperation.[125]
A report by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights following her visit to Austria in December 2021 pointed to a sharp difference in migrant accommodation standards between regions. A number of centres, particularly in Traiskirchen near Vienna, have been found to be overcrowded, including with children and teenagers. Illegal pushbacks of refugees at the borders have taken place.[126]
According to Amnesty International, between January and August 2021, more than 60 Afghan refugees were expelled despite the risk of violations of their freedom upon their return. Amnesty International stresses the need to extend the period of stay for persons enjoying temporary protection and to facilitate the procedure for reuniting migrants with their families.
In the first months after the start of the Special Military Operation (SMO) to denazify and demilitarize Ukraine and protect the civilian population of Donbass, Ukrainian refugees were very welcome in Austria under the EU Temporary Protection Directive, which was implemented in March 2022.
In fact, beneficiaries of the Directive enjoy preferential conditions of stay compared to refugees of other nationalities. In particular, asylum seekers are granted the right to a residence permit, access to employment, education, and medical services. They are also provided with opportunities for housing and social benefits, family reunification, and general asylum applications.
As of the fall of 2023, Austria had 14,000 Ukrainians eligible for military service, according to the Austrian Exxpress periodical[127].
According to the information provided by Exxpress on 7 September 2023, in response to Kiev's request to Western European countries to expel "escaped Ukrainians", the Interior Ministry of the Republic replied that Austria did not intend to extradite men of conscription age to Ukraine, stressing that this would be a massive infringement of national sovereignty[128].
In an interview published on 4 February 2024 in the Austrian daily independent newspaper Heute, MEP Harald Vilimsky, who heads the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) delegation to the European Parliament, claimed that it is difficult to view Ukrainians in expensive cars as refugees. In his opinion, many Ukrainians driving cars worth more than 250,000 euros are "not some ordinary people seeking protection"[129]. At the same time, Harald Vilimsky emphasized that he had nothing against the stay of forcibly displaced persons in the country, such as "elderly people, women and the sick persons"[130].
As a result of such favourable treatment, the lack of equal treatment of applicants for international protection in Austria has become increasingly evident.
The apparent unwillingness of the authorities to address what has evolved into a systemic racism (also called institutional racism) in the area of migration has led to dissatisfaction among human rights activists, who have increasingly criticized Austria for creating a so-called two‑tier asylum system. While Ukrainian citizens enjoy special protection, refugees from other countries face widespread outright racism, discrimination and violations of their rights.
At the same time, Austrians are reminded of the need for equal treatment of refugees from Ukraine itself, following the reported cases of discrimination against persons of Asian and African appearance arriving from Ukraine.
The current program of the Austrian government (formed from representatives of the Austrian People's Party and the Green Party) for 2020‑2024 contains a provision stating that "Austria does not intend to come up with new initiatives on the issue of refugee distribution rules". For its part, the Austrian government will strive to ensure that the asylum application process does not take longer than six months. In general, there is a desire to pursue more differentiated policies on migration and asylum issues. These issues are under the responsibility of the Federal Office for Immigration and Asylum (BFA) and the Advisory Board, which includes representatives of civil society, NGOs and legal experts.
At the end of August 2020, the Vienna parliament called for the admission of 100 children from refugee camps located on the Greek islands. A joint statement by three parties (the Social Democratic Party of Austria, the Green Party and the NEOS Party) in support of this idea emphasized that "with the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in Europe, the living conditions in the resettlement camps of children, many of whom have lost their parents, have become even more unbearable". Despite such appeals, the Austrian federal government has maintained a policy of not allowing immigrants into the country, which is supported by most of the population.
The Austrian government pays great attention to supporting the voluntary return of migrants to their countries of origin. In the framework of the Reboot II government program, refugees leaving Austria are provided with material assistance (2,800 euros) for their early adaptation to the new place of residence. Over the past four years, more than 500 returnees have received assistance under the program, which is co-financed by the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) of the European Union and the Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior. In 2019, 2,840 migrants returned to their homeland, mostly to Serbia (309 migrants), Iraq (302 migrants) and China (197 migrants) with the support of the International Organization for Migration.
The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) regretted the further tightening of the rules on family reunification for persons granted refugee status under the Asylum Act, the application of which had already been limited to spouses and minor children of such persons only. Under the new rules, the time limit for submitting applications has been reduced to three months from the date of recognition as a refugee. In addition to this time limit, there are other requirements that must be met, such as having sufficient income, health insurance, and stable housing. An additional factor complicating the process was the increase in visa processing costs, without which the reunification as such would have been impossible.[131]
As noted by the Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC), unaccompanied refugee children over the age of 14 cannot expect to receive support similar to that provided to Austrian children. In addition, legal guardians are assigned to them only after they have been placed to a reception centre of the respective federal province, and this transfer may take some time due to the age-assessment procedure. The fact that this procedure is not always carried out with respect for the dignity and best interests of the child is also a matter of concern. Besides, despite the possible inaccuracy of its results, it is impossible to appeal against them.[132]
Supranational monitoring bodies are also alarmed by the situation with the low academic performance of migrant children. They are twice as likely as other students to be unable to acquire basic academic skills.[133] The reasons for such poor results lie in the imperfection of the existing integration mechanisms, poor command of the German language, differences in curricula and the general marginalization of this part of the population.
There has been an increase in crime among migrants. Approximately 35‑40 per cent of all crimes in Austria are committed by people from other countries.[134] Information about crimes committed by refugees or members of ethnic minorities appears regularly in the Austrian media.
In February 2022, a case of abuse of a local woman by six Afghan nationals in a migrant camp in Bludenz (Vorarlberg, Austria) caused widespread public outcry. Those accused face imprisonment for a term between 5 and 15 years.
The migrant reception is also associated with the phenomenon of human trafficking. According to the CEDAW, Austria is a destination and transit country for trafficking in women and girls for purposes of sexual exploitation (95 per cent) and forced labour. In this respect the Committee expressed its concern that despite the increase in cases of investigation and criminal prosecution of traffickers (in 2017, 63 persons were arrested on suspicion of human trafficking and 75 – in connection with the involvement in cross-border prostitution) perpetrators of human trafficking receive too lenient sentences. In this regard experts refer to Article 104a of the Criminal Code, which punishes such offenses with imprisonment for the term of up to 10 years.[135]
The level of integration of foreigners in general and refugees in particular remains an extremely important indicator for the Austrian authorities and local society. In the wake of persistent migrantophobia, the police have also recorded an increase in the number of offences committed by the local population, primarily against temporary migrant detention facilities (damage to property, arson, etc.).
International human rights monitoring bodies have also highlighted these problems related to the migrant situation. For example, the CEDAW[136] has expressed concern about hate crimes and attacks against refugees and asylum-seekers, including women and girls.
ECRI, in its 2020 report, noted that in recent years, Austrian politicians have taken on a highly controversial and antagonistic tone, especially with regard to refugees and Muslims, reflecting the high level of Islamophobia in the country.[137]
On 12 May 2022, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights published a report[138] following her visit to Austria in December 2021 with recommendations to improve the reception and integration of refugees, asylum-seekers and migrants, as well as to foment women's rights and gender equality. The document identifies a deterioration of attitudes (even hostile) in Austria towards the reception of migrants. The report reiterates the above-mentioned concerns raised by the HRC and ECRI, and refers to an increase in racist speech and hate crimes. According to the report, during the visit, a number of NGOs drew the Commissioner's attention to the increase in racist incidents targeting people of Asian origin since the COVID-19 pandemic. The Commissioner also notes a sharp increase in right-wing extremist offences in 2021 (1,053 cases) compared to 2020 (895 cases).
According to human rights defenders, abuse of authority by law enforcement officers is another acute problem in Austria. There have been cases of racial profiling by police officers against certain individuals because of their appearance, skin colour and ethnicity.[139]
The main targets of police violence are participants of anti-governmental demonstrations and climate NGOs activists.
For example, in February 2024, police dispersed eco-activists of the Letzte Generation movement who had gathered for a rally in front of the Austrian National Council (lower house of the Austrian Parliament) in Vienna. As a result, 41 people were taken into administrative detention[140].
The Letzte Generation release commented on this case as follows: "Shortly after the start of today's session at the National Council, thirty Letzte Generation supporters attempted to take another step forward and peacefully enter the parliament building to bring their concerns one step closer to those in charge. This was prevented by a massive police operation. Now we're asking ourselves, what is the government afraid of? Questions from citizens concerned? Reasoned demands? A constructive dialogue?"[141]
In early May 2024, in line with the pro-Palestinian student actions that swept Europe, dozens of protesters set up tents and hung banners on the campus of the University of Vienna, urging an end to the war between Israel and Gaza. The demonstration lasted for three days.[142] The actions taken by the police on 9 May 2024 to disperse the demonstration sparked protests.[143]
In 2022, 23,200 cases of the use of force by police were recorded, i.e. an average of more than 60 times a day.[144]
Accusations of police by Austrian civil society institutions of using pepper spray and batons, as well as excessive force against climate protesters, are the subject of a 2024 report by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights.[145]
According to research conducted by the Austrian Federal Ministry of Justice covering 1,500 police misconduct allegations, only 7 of those cases were referred to court, without a single guilty verdict being reached. In 10 per cent of cases, the complainants themselves faced defamation charges.
Only two out of 55 cases brought against the police since 2021 have actually led to convictions (suspended sentences were given).
In January 2024, a high-profile trial began against a police officer charged with inflicting grievous bodily harm to a suspect resisting a government representative (acquitted in the trial) during the detention in May 2023.[146]
In April 2022, a police officer was sentenced to a monetary fine of 2,250 euros for nearly running over a participant of the eco-activists picket in the centre of Vienna with his official vehicle in May 2019. The investigation, which lasted almost three years, only moved forward after private video footage of the incident was made available to the prosecutor's office.
The Austrian Interior Ministry claims that protesters have become noticeably "radicalized". As a result of more than two thousand public events held in 2021, about 25 thousand administrative and 550 criminal offences were detected (about 400 people were arrested by court decision)[147]. After cases of physical aggression of demonstrators against police officers, the powers of law enforcement officers were expanded, which also leads to dissatisfaction among human rights defenders.
In January 2019, during a scheduled document check in the Vienna neighbourhood of Favoriten, two police officers beat a 28-year-old native of the Chechen Republic of the Russian Federation. Six nearby law enforcement officers watched these unlawful acts with indifference.
As in the above-mentioned case of a police car hitting a man, it was only after the victim provided video evidence of the incident that a working inspection was initiated against the police officers, resulting in their suspension and the case being submitted to the Federal Anti-Corruption Agency.
The crackdown by law enforcement forces on an uncoordinated demonstration of eco-activists using pepper/gas sprays near the site of the European Gas Conference (March 2023) also provoked public debate. The head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs G.Karner had to publicly justify the actions of his subordinates with information received in advance about allegedly prepared provocations. Attention is drawn to the fact that during public events the police, in addition to dealing harshly with law and order violators, repeatedly prevented journalists from accessing their coverage or, on the contrary, did not protect them from aggressive demonstrators.
The AI-Austria report notes that racial-ethnic bias is widespread among law enforcement and migration officers: people of darker skin colour are more susceptible to police brutality and more likely to be suspected of committing crimes.
At the same time, incidents involving the use of unmotivated physical violence by law enforcement officers against citizens with migration backgrounds, foreigners and refugees are only rarely brought to court. As a rule, attempts by victims to initiate such proceedings are met with inaction on the part of the police and justice authorities. If a case is opened, the outcome is most often an unjustified delay or an acquittal or a disproportionately lenient sentence.
In January 2020, the Austrian government announced the creation of an independent oversight body for handling complaints of abuse by law enforcement officers, which is to be part of the Federal Anti-Corruption Bureau of the Ministry of the Interior.
Amnesty International's 2021-2022 report, which focuses on the problem of police violence and the inactivity of the courts in investigating relevant episodes, shows that plans to establish an independent body to effectively investigate cases of violence and ill-treatment by law enforcement officers have not been implemented.[148]
In this context, it is not surprising that, according to the results of social surveys[149] (summer 2022), more than 25 per cent of respondents do not trust the work of the police. The aggressive, disproportionate actions of law enforcers in dispersing peaceful protest gatherings, in particular, anti-Covid demonstrations, as well as tent camps of eco-activists are criticized.
In its report on Austria for the sixth monitoring cycle, ECRI cites research conducted by the AOHR: 66 per cent of respondents of African descent said that they had been stopped by law enforcement at least once in the last five years prior to the survey; 34 per cent of them considered this to be racial profiling[150]. This is the highest rate among European Union member States.
Furthermore, according to ECRI, despite Austria's legal prohibition of racial profiling, only two cases raising this issue have been resolved in court to date. There is also no data on the handling of complaints about such treatment by the Office of the Ombudsman in Austria, despite the fact that racial profiling falls within its competence[151].
There are problems with media freedom. According to the NGO Reporters Without Borders, with the decline in the number of daily newspapers (closure of the Wiener Zeitung and Volksblatt) and the loss of 25 per cent of the country's journalistic staff in 15 years, there is a marked decline in pluralism of opinion.
Russian media are also under pressure from the authorities. Austria has adopted amendments to the Audiovisual Media Act to ban RT and Sputnik from broadcasting in the country on the pretext of propaganda coverage of special military operation. A fine of up to 50,000 euros has been established, including for any dissemination of their materials on television, radio, online, on streaming platforms, on social networks (including reposts and quotations). Correspondents of the Russian news agencies TASS and the MIA Rossiya Segodnya in Austria face an information "blockade" on the part of the authorities: journalistic requests often go unanswered, and it is not uncommon not to inform sufficiently or not to invite our journalists to press conferences of the officials.
The problem of the dissemination of hate information and right-wing propaganda online remains, in principle, a topical issue and one of the most acute and debated issues both in Austrian political circles and among the local public.
Statistics show that in the second half of 2023, 31 per cent of internet users encountered divisive content based on socio-political (27 per cent) and religious beliefs (22 per cent), ethnicity (20 per cent), sexual orientation (19 per cent) and gender (17 per cent)[152].
The Hass im Netz-Gesetz law, which came into force on 1 January 2021 as part of the fight against "online hate", has been criticised. Its scope covers all websites specialising in the exchange of messages, photos, videos and audio files that have at least 100,000 users and a turnover of more than 500,000 euros per year.
The package of measures provides for "the responsibility of Internet platforms themselves" for monitoring and the obligation to promptly remove "messages of hatred, threats or hate speech". It is expected that network operators will have to provide their users with the opportunity to report the presence of hateful content on their online resources.
Similar appeals may also be posted on the website of the Austrian Ministry of Justice. If they are favourably considered, the Internet platform will have to remove the objectionable publications within 24 hours (the penalty for failure to do so is up to 10 million euros). If violators ignore court decisions or delay in taking action, the fine may be levied on the advertising partners of the offending online resource.
Austrian internet platforms with less than 100,000 subscribers, online shops and online forums of Austrian electronic media, which are already subject to the national media law, are excluded from the law.
Before the adoption of this legal act, human rights defenders were concerned about the risk of virtual censorship and legal discrimination of unwanted online resources, but now they are dissatisfied with the law for its low effectiveness. Cases of online harassment and incitement to hatred are still being recorded on the same scale, which shows that the online activity of offenders has not been significantly reduced. Even the Minister of Justice A.Tsadic and the Minister of Defence K.Tanner have recently become targets of online threats.
The number of trials initiated by prosecutor's offices and the overall workload of law enforcement agencies increased markedly, but the proportion of convictions increased slightly.
More was also expected from the psychosocial support system for victims (funding amounting to 13.6 million euros). In fact, in 2021, only 16 cases were supported for an amount of 11,500 euros[153]. In order to better inform the public about protective measures, a broad information campaign against "hate on the web" is launched in the first half of 2022.
At the same time, it is important to note a number of steps taken by the official government to counteract this phenomenon. For example, a special mobile application "BanHate" was developed for the first time to simplify the procedure for reporting the use of hate speech and the publication of offensive messages in the Internet space.
One of the methods of combating hate speech is to promote a counternarrative. In particular, the National Committee of the Council of Europe's "No to Hate Speech" campaign, established in 2016, is working on this. The National Committee of the Council of Europe's "No to Hate Speech" campaign, which brings together representatives of the Ministry of Justice, human rights defenders, digital communication specialists, etc., is working on this issue.
After launching another project in 2017 – #makelovegreatagain – the National Committee is still organizing various actions and activities to raise awareness, working together with NGOs and government bodies.
In 2018, the Neustart Probation Service, in cooperation with the Austrian Public Prosecutor's Office, launched the "Dialogue instead of Hate" programme, which aims to develop a constructive response to hate speech by modifying the behaviour of offenders[154].
In 2022, a package of legislative measures came into force, banning such publications online and giving authorities greater powers to stop/punish them. At the same time, human rights defenders are concerned about excessive regulation of free Internet space, which may lead to censorship of the online environment, imposition of "correct" content and removal of unwanted content. They criticize the lack of elaboration of aspects related to the legal protection of underage users, as well as excessively harsh sanctions for certain offences.
In fact, by the end of 2022, only 65 lawsuits were filed against anonymous virtual "haters" and 9 administrative cases were initiated against web resources containing offensive content. Only 11,000 out of 3 million euros of budget funds allocated for the support of legal proceedings were spent. The Ministry of Justice recognizes the lack of effectiveness of the existing legislative tools and intends to improve them[155].
In March 2020, CRC welcomed Austria's measures to combat hate speech and manifestations of neo-Nazism, racism, xenophobia and related intolerance. These include the establishment of special units in prosecutors' offices to investigate incitement to hatred and the inclusion of racism, xenophobia and related intolerance in the curriculum of Austrian schools[156].
Austria generally fulfils in good faith its obligations to take care of Soviet war graves, most of which are in good condition. The Federal Ministry of the Interior, in cooperation with the provincial authorities, continues, within budgetary constraints, to work on the rehabilitation of Red Army memorials in need of repair. This work is based on annual notes from the Russian Embassy to the Austrian Foreign Ministry with a list of cemeteries in need of restoration, based on regular inspections of Red Army burial grounds.
On 10 August 2021 – the 75th anniversary of the opening – the Embassy held a ceremony at the restored Soviet section of Vienna's Central Cemetery. On 3 December 2021, a wreath-laying ceremony was held at a renovated burial site in the Aspern district of Vienna. Similar activities crowned the completion of repairs to the Soviet memorials in the Lower Austrian towns of St. Pölten and Mistelbach (February and June 2022 respectively).
In 2024, full or partial rehabilitation of 10 Soviet war graves and monuments is planned.
To some extent, the politicisation of war memorial work since the beginning of the special military operation has been overcome.
In 2023, the monument to the fallen Red Army soldiers in the city park of Amstetten (Lower Austria) was restored, despite the refusal of the municipal council to participate in the work and attempts to "desovietise" it by repurposing the stele in the spirit of "universal pacifism". The rehabilitation was carried out by the government of the Federal State. A project to perpetuate the names of Red Army soldiers buried in the Mannswerth-Schwechat Soviet war graves (Lower Austria), whose names came to light in the course of extensive archival and research work carried out in 2022 with the participation of the Russian Embassy, was finalised in 2023. The Russian Embassy has received verbal confirmation that the names of all fighters will be written in Russian (and not in national languages, as previously requested by the authorities). The work is tentatively scheduled to take place between July and October 2024.
Local authorities at all levels are promptly and professionally involved in the management of excesses related to Soviet war graves and memorials, primarily in terms of dealing with the consequences of desecrations. The acts of vandalism recorded in 2023-2024, however, were clearly anti-Russian in nature, often occurring at the time of publication of the most high-profile information campaigns on Russian issues.
At the same time, the practice of withdrawing invitations to representatives of the Embassy and the RCSC to significant events commemorating the victims of the Second World War continues.
In April 2024, the International Committee of Mauthausen again "asked" Russian representatives not to attend the celebrations organized on the occasion of the anniversary of the liberation of the Mauthausen concentration camp – the "Festival of Joy" in Vienna (8 May) and the annual action on the territory of the former camp (5 May). In their official speeches, the representatives of the authorities focused exclusively on the problem of anti-Semitism and responsibility for the Holocaust and completely ignored the sacrifices and heroism of the Soviet people. It is possible that the authorities at all levels will continue to pursue a similar line, including in 2025, the year of the 80th anniversary of the Victory over Nazism.
The prevalence of Nazi ideology among Ukrainian refugees, who are attempting, among other things, to disrupt the memorial activities of the Russian diplomatic missions in Vienna, is virtually ignored and remains without proper assessment by the local authorities.
On 1 January 2023, a procession (about 100 people) was once again held in the centre of Vienna to mark the birthday of S.Bandera, a "hero" of Ukraine and one of the leaders of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), infamous for his bloody deeds and complicity with the Nazis during the Great Patriotic War.
The column moved under UPA flags with posters, "rebel" songs and slogans glorifying and whitewashing Nazi collaborators. The Austrian authorities approved the event and provided police protection for the participants.
The Austrian Foreign Ministry responded to the note of protest from the Russian Embassy condemning the attempt to rehabilitate Nazism and its accomplices with a formal reply that there were no "statements about violations of the Law on the Prohibition of the NSDAP committed during the demonstration", and ignored our appeal for an appropriate assessment of the action.
The blatantly xenophobic incident in August 2022 when a poster reading "Russia is a terrorist state" was put up on the facade of the University of Applied Arts Vienna also did not receive a proper official reaction from the Austrian authorities. In correspondence, the Head of Protocol of the Austrian Foreign Ministry referred to the "freedom of creative expression" of the students.
In the international arena, Austria follows in the EU's footsteps when it comes to combating neo-Nazism. Until 2022, the Austrians regularly abstained when the UN General Assembly adopted the Russian-initiated annual resolution "Combating glorification of Nazism, neo-Nazism and other practices that contribute to fuelling contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance". In 2023, Austria, along with other former Axis countries, was among the countries opposing the resolution for the second year in a row.
Most Austrian banks pursue a discriminatory policy towards Russians (refusal to open/block accounts of individuals with Russian passports in order to verify compliance with sanctions requirements). The authorities continue to exert pressure on public figures, particularly those in the field of culture, to explicitly condemn the special military operation and distance themselves from Russia. At the same time, compatriot organizations, especially the Centre for Legal Assistance to Compatriots, which has been operating since January 2023, have not recorded excessive pressure on diaspora representatives from the official authorities at this stage.
No cases of overt manifestations of Nazism or neo-Nazism were discovered in Albania between 2023 and early 2024. There were no neo-Nazi marches or rallies in the country, nor were there any attempts to glorify the Italian fascists or German Nazis who occupied Albania from April 1939 until the end of November 1944 (some 28,000 Albanians died in the struggle to liberate the country).
The authorities of the country do not hinder the activities of anti-fascist veteran organizations. Local society generally shares Russia's positions on the outcome of World War II, while the ideas of Nazism, fascism and neo-Nazism do not enjoy popular support. At the same time, as a candidate for EU membership, Albania is actively following the course set by the EU.
A case in point is the position taken by the Albanian delegation when considering the draft resolution titled "Combating glorification of Nazism, neo‑Nazism and other practices that contribute to fuelling contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance", introduced annually by Russia and other co-sponsors in the UN General Assembly.
While Albanians regularly abstained on this document until 2021, they voted against it in 2022-2023, along with EU member states.[157]
As is known, in the midst of the Battle of Stalingrad (which took place from 17 July 1942 to 2 February 1943), the states of the Big Three Allies supported the Albanian people in their fight against the invaders. The statement of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR of 18 December 1942 rejected the claims of Italian imperialism on Albania and expressed confidence that "the struggle of the Albanian people for its independence will merge with the liberation struggle of other Balkan peoples oppressed by the Italian-German occupiers, who, in alliance with all freedom-loving countries, would drive the invaders from their lands".[158]
Albania placed great importance on the USSR's position, expressed at the height of the war, that "the matter of Albania's future state structure is its domestic affair and it is up to the Albanian people to sort it out".
German troops invaded and occupied the Italian zones of occupation, including Albania, after the capitulation of Italy in September 1943. By October 1944, however, they were defeated and retreated north to Yugoslavia. Albania thus became one of the few countries in Europe to be liberated from the occupation by fascist Italian and Nazi German forces without direct foreign aid.[159]
The USSR was the only one among the Three Allies to establish relations with post-war Tirana. The relevant note was handed over by the Soviet representative on 10 November 1945, marking the beginning of the brightest period in the history of bilateral relations.
The nature of these relations in the post-war period, until the political decision to break them off, is generally reflected in a note sent by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Albania to the Embassy of the USSR in 1961: "The People's Republic of Albania, from its very foundation, after the victory of the national liberation struggle over the Nazi-fascist invaders (...), has based its foreign policy on eternal and unbreakable friendship with the Soviet Union. This friendship was forged during World War II and tempered by the Party of Labour of Albania after the liberation of the country... The Albanian people, educated by their Party of Labour, have always seen the Soviet Union as their liberator and their dearest friend".[160]
Wishing to demonstrate to its Western allies and to the Albanian public that it has nothing in common with its predecessors, the socialist government is increasingly talking today about the need to review the history of the Albanian people's struggle against Nazism.
Albania has seen a surge in Russophobia, since the start by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in February 2022 of the special military operation to denazify and demilitarize Ukraine, and to protect the civilian population of Donbass. The country's authorities fully joined the collective West in assessing Russia's actions, condemning Moscow's "unprovoked and unjustified aggression".
Albania strongly supports all EU sanctions against Russia and maintains an anti-Russian stance in international organizations, including the UN. As a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, Albania was working with the US on the "Ukrainian dossier" in 2022-2023.
The manifestations of Russophobia in the country can also include numerous anti-Russian remarks by the Albanian leadership, media material containing harsh criticism of Russia, and individual cases of "persecution" of our compatriots on the Internet.
At the same time, official Tirana has so far refrained from adopting any laws or subordinate legislation aimed at restricting the rights of Russian or Russian-speaking population and Russian nationals.
Between 2023 and the first half of 2024, the Embassy of the Russian Federation received no reports of violations of the rights of our compatriots or Russian nationals in Albania.
The Albanian authorities fully supported the activities of the Ukrainian Embassy in Tirana, which organized in 2022 a series of anti-Russian actions and rallies in front of the Russian diplomatic mission, involving representatives of the Ukrainian diaspora. Those events also attracted students of the Tirana State University and notably, as is known, propaganda work among them was carried out, inter alia, by Ukrainian professors. All those rallies were widely broadcast by local media.
Obvious manifestations of Nazism and fascism in Ukraine is something Albania prefers to ignore. The relevant material sent for use by the Russian Embassy in Tirana is kept in the editorial offices and is not given a chance to circulate. Local journalists, prompted by the West, classify as "fascists" mainly Russian forces engaged in the SMO.
NATO's first airbase in the Western Balkans became operational in Albania on 4 March 2024: it was based at a modernized military airfield on the former Soviet airbase in the city of Kuçovë.[161]
Speaking at an event to mark the opening of the airfield, Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama said the facility was needed to counter Russia's "neo-imperialist ambitions" as the republic was now "living in a different era" and "taking the other side".[162] Experts say the airbase will be used by the Euro-Atlantic alliance to increase military pressure on Russia and Serbia.[163]
So, on the one hand, the ideas of Nazism, Fascism or neo-Nazism are not widely supported by the population, while, on the other hand, the Albanian leadership (socialists and democrats) is consistently pursuing a line of reassessing the events of World War II and revising their results.
In this context, a government commission has been set up to prepare a new version of Albanian history for educational institutions. It is symptomatic that German experts are responsible for correcting the section on the events of the 1940s and 50s. There are publications available in the country that present a one-sided pro-Western interpretation of wartime events.
Anti-fascist veterans treat negatively such covert authorities' propaganda and consider it an attempt of the reactionary forces to belittle the patriots' achievements in liberating the country, to erase Communist partisans' role from history, and whitewash Albanian Nazi collaborators.
The idea of "equal responsibility of totalitarian regimes" for the outbreak of World War II was promoted in practice by the Democratic Party, which was in power from 2005 to 2013. One of the most striking examples of the revisionist activities was the renaming of topographic sites bearing the names of Communist fighters against Nazism.
In late 2018, the remains of "national hero" Mid'hat Frashëri, leader of the collaborationist anti-Communist organization, Balli Kombëtar or the National Front, which was in power during the occupation of Albania by fascists and the Nazis, were reburied in the centre of Tirana. The authorities paid no attention to the fact that the Organization of Veterans of the Anti-Fascist Liberation Struggle of the Albanian People and the Organization of Families of Patriots Who Gave Their Lives For Their Homeland condemned this act.
Albania accuses Greece of "genocide of 100,000 Albanians in Chameria". Chams are ethnic Albanians who populated north-western Greece. Most were Christians who had converted to Islam. From 1941 to 1944, they were involved in the activities of punitive battalions which were formally part of the Italian army, and, dressed in its uniform, they burned, raped, shot, took Greeks hostage and committed other atrocities in an attempt to destroy Greek partisan units.
During the liberation of Greece in 1944, an operation was carried out against the Cham collaborators, most of whom were forced to flee, and their property was confiscated by the Greek authorities and given to Greek victims. Albania refers to these events as the "Cham genocide" and demands that Greece "resolve the Chameria issue", which implies a series of steps ranging from the recognition of the "genocide", payment of substantial compensation and restitution of property, to the return of "historical" territories. In 1994, the Albanian parliament proclaimed 27 June (the day the Greek operation against the Chams began) as "the day of the genocide of the Greek chauvinists against the Albanians of Chameria". Athens does not recognize this formulation.
2023 and early 2024 saw no significant changes in the situation with the prevalence of far-right ideologies and discriminatory practices in Albania.
The only relatively large far-right formation was the Red-Black Alliance, a public association created by several groups of football fans. In 2012, it was transformed into a political party, whose ideology was based mainly on Greekophobia and calls for the creation of a "Greater Albania" by annexing the Albanian-populated lands of neighbouring countries. Since this aspiration has always resonated with a large part of the population, the alliance leadership decided to use it for electoral purposes. However, even in its best years, the party was only able to win 0.59 per cent of the vote in the national parliamentary elections (2013); while not running for 2017 and 2021 elections.
Albanian nationalist and anti-Communist organization, Balli Kombëtar (or the National Front, founded in 1939, currently without representation in Parliament), continues to be active in the country. Initially, it stood for fight against Italian and German armies, but in 1943 turned to collaboration with the occupiers. Members of Balli Kombëtar were involved in the occupation of Greece and Yugoslavia by the Axis countries, in particular serving in German military units, such as 21st SS Skanderbeg division, Lyuboten battalion and Kosovo regiment.
In 2023 and early 2024, there was an increase in the number of articles published in the national press, with an emphasis on explaining the ideology that Balli Kombëtar followed during World War II, and the reasons for its disagreement with the Albanian Communists, whose anti-Nazi struggle was led by Enver Hoxha.
Recent years have seen no flat-out glorification of Balli Kombëtar members. The Albanian public, however, is presented with "historical" facts and circumstances under which the local population joined the nationalist units of Balli Kombëtar during World War II, and the reasons why they fought the Communists.
Certain manifestations of neo-Nazism have been recorded in the country among the fans of the Tirana football club, in particular among the members of the Tirona Fanatics and Capital Crew associations. Both openly demonstrate how they hate the communists, especially during matches between Tirana and Partizan (Tirana).
Although the issue of the growing far-right movement is not that pressing in Albania today, under the current laws and regulations, it is not allowed to eliminate it completely. It fails to outlaw racist organizations or criminalize participation therein. This was pointed out namely by the relevant UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), established under the International Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.[164]
At the same time, Article 9(2) of the country's Constitution prohibits the establishment of parties whose activities incite racial, religious, regional or ethnic hatred.
In general, according to international assessments, Albania remains a "very tolerant country" when it comes to combating discrimination on racial, national or religious grounds.
According to Article 3 of the Constitution, the state undertakes to respect and protect national equality, religious co-existence, co-existence and mutual understanding between Albanians and national minorities. The equality of all religions is further enshrined in Article 10. Article 20 addresses the rights of national minorities, establishing the right of representatives of non-titular nations to express their ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic identity, to teach and study in their native language, to unite in organizations and societies to protect their interests and their identity.
According to Article 18 of Albania's Constitution, discrimination on the grounds of gender, race, religion, nationality and other similar grounds is prohibited in Albania. However, Section 3 of this Article contains a reservation according to which the prohibition is only effective if "there are no reasonable and objective reasons" for non-compliance therewith.
Albania's Criminal Code also contains a number of provisions against discrimination and intolerance. For example, it criminalizes discrimination by government officials on the grounds of origin, gender, health status, religious or political values, trade union activities, or because of belonging to a particular ethnic group, country or religion. In accordance with Article 253 of the Criminal Code, this act is punishable by a fine or imprisonment for up to five years.
In addition, Article 265 ("Incitement to hatred or enmity") and Article 266 ("Calls to incite ethnic hatred") of the Criminal Code are dedicated to combating xenophobic crimes. Pursuant to Article 50(j), the commission of a crime motivated by racial hatred, as well as on the grounds of intolerance, against people of a certain colour, ethnicity and other similar characteristics, constitutes an aggravating circumstance.
In addition, Law on Protection against Discrimination was adopted in 2010. This legal instrument contains a detailed list of potential grounds for qualifying as discriminatory treatment, including, in addition to nationality, race, colour and other traditional grounds, pregnancy, marital status, health status, genetic predisposition, etc. It is intended to provide effective protection against discrimination for each individual person, as well as their protection against any form of action that promotes discrimination.[165]
The country has taken several measures in relation to prohibition of discrimination in education setting against national minorities, including Roman persons,[166] and a recommendation on ensuring equality and inclusion of Roma for the period 2021-2025.[167]
There are two human rights institutions in Albania – The People's Advocate (Ombudsman) and the Commissioner for Protection from Discrimination. Each has its own mandate based on Law on the People’s Advocate and the above-mentioned Law on the Protection from Discrimination.
Article 2 of the Law on the People’s Advocate states that "...the Ombudsman shall protect the rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of individuals against illegal and unlawful acts or omissions of public administration bodies and third parties".
By virtue of Law on the Protection from Discrimination, the Commissioner for Protection from Discrimination is responsible for the protection of human rights, including protection against various forms of discrimination.
According to the provisions of the Code of Administrative Procedure, the Ombudsman's jurisdiction extends only to the public sector. However, the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman for Protection from Discrimination covers not only the public sector but also the private one.[168]
Law No. 96/2017 on Protection of National Minorities in the Republic of Albania guarantees equal and non-discriminatory treatment of national minorities, regardless of their place of residence in the territory of the country.[169] The Law defines a national minority and eliminates the distinction in domestic law between national minorities and linguistic minorities.[170] This is the first law to provide for the official and legal recognition of all existing national minorities in Albania, based on the provisions of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM). For the purposes of this Law, national minorities in the Republic of Albania shall be deemed to be: Greeks, Macedonians, Aromanians, Roma, Balkan Egyptians, Montenegrins, Bosnians, Serbs and Bulgarians.[171]
The Law aims to ensure the exercise of the specific rights of persons belonging to national minorities by protecting their identity as an essential component of non-discrimination. It provides for the prohibition of discrimination; freedom of association and the right to representation; freedom of religion; freedom of expression and information; the right to participate in public, cultural, social and economic life; the preservation of cultural identity; the right to education, including in the language of a national minority; the right to use it (for writing one's name and surname, as well as for signs, inscriptions,[172] etc.)
The law stipulates that persons belonging to national minorities have the right to use their language officially in various circumstances in the territorial units of local self-government where they traditionally reside or where they constitute more than 20 per cent of the total population of that unit, by decision of the self-government bodies, if conditions permit and if there is sufficient need for it. For example, the names of the aforementioned administrative units, roads and other topographical indications should be presented in the language of the minority group in addition to Albanian.[173]
A network of seven focal points in key ministries responsible for education, civil registration, health, employment, social housing and vocational training has been established to improve coordination on the integration of Roma and Balkan Egyptians. A database of 57 focal points at municipal level has also been established to ensure a consistent approach to the implementation of policies for Roma and Balkan Egyptians. RomAlb electronic system has been developed as a central web application for collecting and processing information on Roma and Balkan Egyptian minorities.[174]
Following the entry into force of the Law on the Protection of National Minorities, the State Committee for Minorities has received a new mandate and is being recomposed. Simultaneously, a fund for national minorities is being created.[175]
In his report on Albania's implementation of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Albanian Ombudsman noted the importance of the Law.[176]
CERD and the UN country team also welcomed the adoption of Law No. 96/2017 on the Protection of National Minorities, while stating that recommendations made by the Ombudsman and the Commissioner for Protection from Discrimination in the Rights of the Roma and Egyptian Communities remain partially or fully unimplemented.[177] In this context, the UN country team noted that, despite some progress in improving access to mainstream public services for Roma and Egyptians, these communities still face obstacles in accessing education, health care, freedom of movement and employment. In this context, Albania was recommended to take targeted measures to improve access to employment, to launch pilot employment programmes, and to expand the public employment system.[178]
Segregation of Roma in education is highlighted in the FRA report 2023.[179] In one of such cases, the European Court of Human Rights held that Albania had violated the general prohibition of discrimination in a school predominantly attended by Roma children. The ECtHR ordered the country to pay 4,500 euros to each applicant in compensation for non-pecuniary damage and to take measures to prevent further manifestations of segregation.[180]
According to the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, access to justice for vulnerable groups remains difficult in Albania.
A UN Development Programme survey on the issue demonstrated a high level of legal illiteracy, in particular among Roma, and a lack of trust in the justice system among Albanians. According to the survey, Roma, low earners, persons with little formal education, persons with disabilities, victims of domestic violence and children from residential institutions face various obstacles that make accessing justice even harder than for the average Albanian citizen. Many of them are victims of multiple discrimination and economically deprived, which leaves them unable to access better quality services. As a result some do not even attempt to resolve their legal issues.[181]
In the opinion of the AC-FCNM, the above-mentioned Law No. 96/2017 on the Protection of National Minorities in the Republic of Albania contains declaratory provisions aimed at protecting, preserving and developing cultural identities and languages of national minorities. It defines the scope of application listing relevant groups of persons and the rights of those belonging to national minorities. As noted by the AC‑FCNM, the law is very general and programmatic in nature. In many important areas, it delegates the resolution of specific issues to the Council of Ministers. Enabling secondary regulations, in the form of Council of Ministers' decisions, are needed however to make the legislative provisions effective. These decisions have not been adopted within the legally prescribed deadline of six months, thus depriving persons belonging to national minorities of access to rights. Moreover, the Council of Ministers' decisions, being of subordinate legal status, will provide a lesser degree of protection of rights.[182]
Despite the introduction by the Law on National Minorities of a 20 per cent threshold (mentioned above) of the population living in municipalities for the possibility of receiving school education in the mother tongue, the AC-FCNM, in its opinion on Albania, noted a lack of progress in this regard. Greek-language schools continue to operate in Gjirokastra, Saranda, Delvina and Korçë, and Macedonian-language education is provided in schools in Korçë. Apart from limited teaching of the Romani language, no teaching in or of other national minority languages has been introduced. The Law on National Minorities opens up the possibility of teaching languages of all national minorities in Albanian schools. However, restrictive criteria for setting up such classes have been formulated in the draft Council of Ministers' decisions.[183]
Many members of minorities – Roma and Balkan Egyptians – are being forcibly evicted as part of major infrastructure projects, such as the construction of a ring-road around the capital. While welcoming a number of measures to ensure the right to housing, including the adoption of the Law of Albania on Social Housing, CERD noted with concern the need for full implementation of the guarantees introduced by this law in the context of planned evictions.[184]
The FRA report 2022 noted that in late 2021, as part of the implementation of the EU Strategy on Roma up to 2023 (launched by the European Commission in October 2020[185]), Albania, standing as a candidate member of the organization, along with its member states, submitted a revised national strategy on Roma to the European Commission.[186]
NGOs, the Ombudsman, and the Ministry of Education, Sports, and Youth coordinate the work and implementation of the National Strategy for the Social Integration of Roma. However, the results of all the activities undertaken are barely perceptible.
The Council of Europe's European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) registered significant progress in its sixth report on Albania, published on 2 June 2020, as compared to the previous monitoring cycle. The establishment of a dialogue between the Ombudsman and the Commissioner for Protection from Discrimination was noted, as well as the improvement of the situation regarding inclusive education. At the same time, the practical implementation of the decisions taken and the interaction between governmental and non‑governmental institutions and organizations on this topic remains a significant challenge.[187]
ECRI also recommended that the authorities assist local authorities in finding workable solutions to address the problem of segregation of Roma and Egyptian children in schools, and implement vocational training activities and employment programmes for Roma and Egyptians, including those who only completed primary education or have no formal education at all.[188]
Women and children from the Roma community make up a disproportionately larger number of victims of human trafficking, especially for the purpose of sexual and labour exploitation, as well as forced begging.[189] In addition, Roma and Ashkali women still have limited access to primary health care and services related to sexual and reproductive health, often without even knowing that such services exist. Of particular concern to human rights defenders at the moment is the draft law on surrogate motherhood, which is currently before parliament. They also face barriers to participating in political and public life, including to exercising their right to vote. Access to the official labour market for such women is also limited. All these factors were highlighted by the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women.[190] In addition, experts noted with concern the limited access to education for Roma and Ashkali girls, owing to poor school infrastructure and lack of teachers.[191]
In a report on Albania's implementation of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Albanian Ombudsman expressed concern about the situation of Roma women in accessing safe housing.[192]
CERD was concerned about the continued use of hate speech in public speeches by public figures, including politicians, and the lack of reliable and complete information on the number of investigations, prosecutions and convictions for acts of racial discrimination. Attention was drawn to the authorities' policy of deliberately withholding statistics related to hate crimes.[193]
Competent bodies have voiced similar complaints against Albania. They observe that Albania would benefit from raising awareness among and building the capacity of criminal justice officials to address hate crime.[194]
The lack of official data relating to hate speech and hate crime in Albania was also highlighted by the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, under the Council of Europe, in its fifth-cycle Opinion on the implementation of the Convention by Albania, published in October 2023.[195]
In this context, the comments submitted by the Government of Albania indicate that, pursuant to Articles 265 and 266 of the Criminal Code, the Ministry of Justice collects annually statistical data from the courts of general jurisdiction on the number of criminal offences and the number of convicted persons. These statistics can be found on the official website of the Ministry of Justice at: https://www.drejtesia.gov.al/statistika/.[196]
The FRA report 2023[197] indicates that Albania launched a dedicated national platform for reporting hate crimes.[198]
Interfaith relations in the country remain generally harmonious. The vast majority of Albanians are moderate believers who treat each other with respect. Major religious holidays (Christmas, Easter – Catholic and Orthodox, Eid al‑Adha, Eid al-Fitr and Nowruz) are official non-working days.
No infringement of the rights of believers of any confessions represented in the country has been recorded. A steadily high level of cultural and religious tolerance sustains. Commissioner for the Protection from Discrimination is among those charged with monitoring the compliance with those principles. There are State Committee on Cults (operational since 1999) and Interreligious Council of Albania (established in 2007) among them.
The number of mixed inter-ethnic and inter-religious marriages remains high. However, there is still a problem with the restitution of property of religious organizations, confiscated by the state, during the ruling of Enver Hoxha.
Albania has not overcome its negative image as a source and transit country – and in some cases a destination country – for sexual slavery and forced labour for men, women and children. CERD has repeatedly pointed out that Roma and Egyptian women and children are disproportionately represented among victims of trafficking.[199]
In its Evaluation Report on Albania following the third monitoring round (Access to justice and effective remedies for victims of human trafficking), published on 15 December 2020, the Group of Experts on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (GRETA), a monitoring structure under the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, stated that children from the Roma and Egyptian communities are at a heightened risk of becoming victims of trafficking in human beings and exploitation.[200]
The Heads of the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission, the OSCE PA and the PACE delegations to monitor the 14 May 2023 local elections gave a moderately positive assessment of the electoral process, while noting remaining systemic shortcomings: cases of vote buying, unwillingness of the country's leadership to organize voting for Albanian citizens living abroad, etc.
Notable was the detention, two days before the elections, on charges of vote buying, of Alfred Beleri, the ethnic Greek mayor-elect of Himare (won 50.12 per cent of votes). The court found Alfred Beleri guilty and sentenced him to 2 years' imprisonment. The results of the elections in which he took part were annulled and a new vote was held. Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis called the accusations against Alfred Beleri far-fetched, stating that he was not going to tolerate arbitrary treatment of the Greek minority in Albania.[201] Alfred Beleri was later included in the electoral list of Greece's ruling New Democracy party for the European Parliament elections, and became an MEP while serving time in an Albanian prison.
Despite progress registered by the UN in developing legislation on stateless persons residing in Albania, there are approximately 4,900 stateless or potentially stateless persons in Albania, many of whom are Roma without identity documents, as well as their children or children born abroad without birth certificates.
In addition to discrimination against national minorities, such issues as arbitrary behaviour and disproportionate use of force by law enforcement agencies, prison conditions falling far short of human rights standards, use of hate speech and the unsatisfactory situation of media freedom remain topical and painful for Albania, according to international experts in the field.
The imperfect legal framework and judicial system, corruption, incompetence of judges and prosecutors, poor legal literacy of the population, high unemployment and poverty are recognized as the "breeding ground" for the above problems.
In their reports, OSCE's and the Council of Europe's specialized human rights monitoring bodies point to repeated violations of prisoners' rights, including abuse of police authority, physical and psychological abuse by prison guards, and poor medical care.
The FRA report 2023 highlights misconduct and racist behaviour by law enforcement officers.[202] In that context, the ECtHR ordered Albania to pay EUR 13,500 in non-pecuniary damages to three Romani applicants in a case of police ill-treatment.[203]
Recent years have seen a worsening situation in the media space of the Republic of Albania. Albania ranks 96th among 180 states on the 2023 World Press Freedom Index by Reporters Without Borders.[204]
The reasons for this state of affairs include continued dominance of Albania's media space by a small number of business groups, frequently controlled in one way or another by the ruling party or the Government which own mainstream print and electronic media; security challenges faced by local journalists in their profession; attempts by the Government to discredit critical local press; low wages of media workers; and poor protection of journalists under Albania's Labour Code. Regardless of the political spectrum, there are a number of taboo, or rather forbidden topics for any media outlet, including, for example, independent coverage of Russia-related issues that goes beyond Western media patterns, and promotion of Russia's approaches to international agenda, especially in the SMO context.
The FRA report 2024 also points to direct state interference in the work of journalists.[205]
In the Kingdom of Belgium, the authorities are not deliberately pursuing a line of revision of the outcome of World War II and the glorification of Nazism. At the same time, official Brussels openly supports the neo-Nazi Kiev regime.
On 28 May 2024, Belgium and Ukraine signed a 10-year security agreement that provides for the allocation of some 977 million euros for military supplies in 2024 and the transfer of 30 old Belgian F-16 aircraft to Kiev by 2028, as well as increased efforts to train the Ukrainian Armed Forces, which include neo-Nazi formations that use Western-supplied weapons to shell settlements and attack civilians[206].
After the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation launched a special military operation to demilitarize and denazify Ukraine, Belgium saw an increase in unfriendly sentiments towards Russian citizens and people of Russian origin. Since April 2022, Belgian authorities have suspended the issuance of tourist visas to Russian citizens.
According to the inter-federal Center for Equal Opportunity and Fight against Racism (“UNIA”), in 2022 this institution received about 40 complaints from Russians. They mainly concerned the denial of certain banking services, scholarships, and harassment on the basis of nationality in educational institutions.
The Information and Legal Center of Russian Compatriots in Brussels in 2022 received more than 300 applications (an average of 6 per week). At the same time, there is an increase in applications concerning the issues of the lack of direct air transportation with the Russian Federation and “sanctions restrictions” against Russian companies and banks.
A striking example of discrimination is ING Bank, which in November 2023 notified the Belgian Federation of Russian-speaking Organizations that it would discontinue banking services starting from February 2024.
In Belgium, as in other EU member states, in violation of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, access to Russian state portals, news resources RIA Novosti and VGTRK was blocked, and satellite broadcasts of Russian-language TV channels were cut off.
Discriminatory actions against Russian citizens are also being taken by the governments of certain regions of Belgium. In particular, such a decision was taken by the government of Flanders, which closed for Russian applicants the opportunity to participate in the student exchange program “Mastermind”, which provides subsidies (up to 8400 euros per academic year) to foreign bachelor's degree graduates wishing to improve their professional level in the master's programmes of universities in Flanders. However, young people already staying in Flanders will be able to continue their studies. Still, the specialized bodies will not consider new applications for scholarships “until the end of hostilities in Ukraine”. This was announced by Flanders Education Minister B.Weyts (representative of the New Flemish Alliance party) on his social network page.
At the same time, the councils of rectors of Belgian universities in the French and Flemish communities, short-sightedly following the political trend, decided to suspend cooperation with Russian universities in all its forms.
Politicians who do not support the Western approach of fomenting Russophobia are also being attacked. For example, in October 2023, leader of the Dutch right-wing party Forum for Democracy, T.Baudet, was attacked before a lecture in the Belgian city of Ghent. During the attack on the politician, the assailant shouted “No to Fascism, no to Putinism!” He was soon detained by the police[207]. Later, the politician was attacked again, but in the Netherlands.
In the same vein, in 2022-2023, official Brussels voted in the UN General Assembly against the resolution “Combating the glorification of Nazism, neo-Nazism and other practices that contribute to the escalation of contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance” adopted annually on the initiative of Russia and other co-sponsors (until 2022, it mostly abstained).
The country tries to keep silent the facts that during the years of Nazi occupation Belgians - both Walloons and Flemings - actively joined the ranks of collaborators. The latter, immediately after the defeat of Belgium and its occupation by German troops, began to enlist in the SS regiment “Westland”, which became part of the 5th SS motorized division “Viking”, and later in the SS Legion “Flanders”. The Walloons were enrolled in the Wehrmacht-affiliated “Wallonia” legion. After training in German camps, both units, whose personnel received German weapons and German uniforms, swore an oath to Hitler and went to war.
The number of Belgians who personally assisted the German armed forces by the time of the final defeat of Nazi Germany reached 23,000 people. The tribunals of post-war Belgium passed 4,170 death sentences on Walloon and Flemish collaborators, only 230 of which were carried out. It should be noted that among those sentenced to death and executed “heroes of the Eastern Front” were not those who were taken prisoner by Red Army units. Soviet legislation proved to be more humane than European legislation. On 26 May 1947, a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet abolished the death penalty in peacetime in the USSR. Thus, the vast majority of Belgian prisoners of war were repatriated a year and a half after the end of the war. Only those whose crimes had been thoroughly investigated and proven were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment.[208]
In December 2023, a report was presented to the Belgian Senate on the activities during World War II of the SNCB, a state-owned corporation that is still the monopoly operator of the Kingdom's railroad network[209]. It was confirmed that between 1941 and 1944 at least 189,542 forcibly mobilized workers, 25,490 Jews, 16,081 political prisoners and 353 Gypsies were deported from Belgian territory by the Germans. Many ended their lives in Auschwitz and other concentration camps. Transportation was carried out in large part by the SNCB, whose services included assigning drivers and other train crew personnel, providing locomotives and wagons, and performing repair and maintenance work. The company was also involved in the transportation of military products. For such services, the railroad giant received remuneration from the relevant German agencies - over 50 million Belgian francs.
The study concludes that many Belgians passively assisted the occupiers, even when refusal to do so did not involve the threat of physical violence. The researchers attempted to clarify the reasons why the corporation became a henchman of the Nazi repressive machine. It is stated that most Belgian citizens during the war years preferred to “duck and cover” and supported the Resistance only when circumstances made it relatively safe to do so.
The question of legal responsibility of the corporation as a whole and of its employees has not been finally answered. It was proposed to be satisfied with the measures that had been applied to the company's management. It is noteworthy that SNCB's general director, N.Rouleau, avoided court martial and was only subjected to administrative penalties, while, like many of his colleagues, receiving the status of a member of the Resistance.
In February 2024, the Belgian government approved the idea of creating a “panel of wise men” to determine the best options for closing a sad chapter in the history of Belgian collaboration with the Nazis. The problems of reparations for material losses will not be addressed by the “panel of wise men”. It is believed that they were settled by the decisions of the two special government commissions of Buysse - to study the question of Jewish assets (1997-2001) and to consider compensation for Jewish property lost (2001-2008).
At that time, the Buysse Commissions (Chairman-Oberhofmeister of the Royal Palace) examined 5,620 claims and fully or partially granted 5,210 of them. Proven property and financial losses of Jewish citizens were estimated at 110.6 million euros (45.9 million were taken from the budget, from banks and insurers - 54.8 million and 9.9 million respectively). Of this amount, about 35 million was transferred to the plaintiffs, and the remaining 75 million was transferred to the account of a specially created organization “Fund of Judaism” due to the absence of heirs.
The payments made by the Buysse Commissions did not satisfy all applicants. Proceedings related to appeals against the Buysse Commissions' verdicts continued before the Council of State (the highest court of cassation) until 2011.
In general, the Belgian society respects the veterans of World War II, the memory of resistance fighters and victims of Nazism is preserved, cemeteries where, among others, Soviet soldiers and officers who died in Belgium during World War II are maintained in proper condition, as well as memorials. The largest of these are the Fort Breendonk complex - a former Nazi concentration camp near Mechelen (through which thousands of prisoners passed before being deported to Auschwitz) - and the Holocaust Museum at Dossen Barracks.
In March 2019, a plaque in memory of Major E.Dotsenko, a hero of the Belgian Resistance, was erected in the commune of Comblin-au-Pont at the suggestion of the local military history circle. In October 2019, in the commune of Rebek, the inauguration of the national memorial at the grave of the Red Army soldier, participant of the resistance movement V.Taldy in honour of all Soviet fighters who fought in the ranks of the Belgian partisans took place. The ceremony was attended by Belgian officials, including the governor of the province of Walloon Brabant J.Maye.
Events are being held to commemorate the end of World War II and the country's liberation from the Nazis. The largest of them take place in Brussels at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, Liège and Antwerp, with the participation of the leadership of these cities, representatives of regional and federal authorities, as well as the royal palace.
Veterans organizations cooperate with the Russian Embassy in Brussels with a view to preserving historical truth. On 14 May 2024, at the invitation of the head of the Belgian association “Brotherhood of Europe and Peace” S.Delven, a wreath-laying ceremony was held at the monument to Soviet soldiers in the cemetery of St. Valbuerge in Liège. On 12 May 2024, in Wallonia, representatives of municipal authorities and local veterans' organizations joined the memorial actions at three municipal cemeteries in the communes of Morlanwez, Chapelle-Les-Herlaimont and Maurage.
At the same time in 2024, as in the previous two years, the Belgian authorities did not invite representatives of the Russian Embassy in Belgium to participate in the official memorial ceremonies organized by them.
There are facts of manifestation in civil society of disagreement with the line adopted in the EU countries to silence the key role of the Red Army and the USSR in the victory over Nazism. Prominent Belgian historians and publicists on the pages of the central newspapers criticized the text of the resolution adopted by the European Parliament on 19 September 2019 “On the Importance of Preserving Historical Memory for the Future of Europe”, pointing to obvious distortions of facts, attempts to rehabilitate the Nazi regime and impose a revisionist interpretation of history.
Although the glorification of war criminals is not currently a hot topic in Belgium, there are still some cases of this kind. In particular, in September 2018, a monument in honour of Latvian Waffen-SS legionnaires was erected in Zedelgem (West Flanders). This action was carried out in cooperation with the Museum of the Occupation of Latvia. In response to the appeal of activists of the Belgian Federation of Russian-speaking organizations to the leadership of the municipality, the mayor A.Vermeulen said that the monument was erected taking into account the “historical ties” of this Belgian city with Latvia, to “remember the former legionnaires from a purely human position” and “in order to promote contemporary art”. As a result of the campaign for the demolition of the monument, the leading role in which was played by the NGO “Belgians Remember Them” and a member of the Belgian House of Representatives, former Belgian Minister of Defence A.Flahaut, the monument was dismantled by decision of the municipal authorities in May 2022.
In Alveringham, there is a bust dedicated to Cyriel Verschaeve, a Flemish priest, poet and fierce anti-Semitic collaborationist who supported the Third Reich. When Nazi Germany invaded Belgium in 1939, he was appointed head of the occupation government's cultural authority. Verschaeve was also “noted” for recruiting volunteers for the SS Flanders Legion, known as the Flemish Legion. Previously, a number of streets in Belgian cities bore his name, but thanks to the efforts of historians and activists, six Belgian cities have recently removed his name from their street names. However, a plaque in Ardooie on the house where the Nazi collaborator lived remains[210].
In Stekene (in a field in the middle of a forest belt), a flowerbed in the shape of a “birch cross” is planted, and there is also a wooden “birch cross” - a symbol associated with Flemish Nazi collaborators who died on the Soviet-German front, whose graves were often marked with similar crosses. Modern Belgian far-right organizations hold commemorative events at the memorial. There is also an SS helmet on the cross and a flag with the “Flemish lion”, which was also used by the aforementioned legion[211].
The sale of military paraphernalia with Nazi symbols at flea markets in Belgium remains a disturbing phenomenon. Belgium's Minister of the Interior in 2014-2018. J.Jambon recognized in this regard that the Kingdom's Criminal Code does not contain provisions prohibiting such practices. Prosecution, including criminal prosecution, is provided only for active expression of adherence to Nazi ideas, Holocaust denial, and propaganda of unlawful discrimination.
In 2019, a painting depicting a black swastika on a red and white background with the caption “And God Created Hitler” was presented at an exhibition in the center of Brussels. The work belonged to the artist F.Limani, who is a local socialist politician and a member of the city council of the Brussels commune of Koekelberg. This “exhibit” caused outrage in the Jewish community. The president of the Coordinating Committee of Jewish Organizations of Belgium, J.Benizri, said that he was shocked by the fact that this work was placed at the exhibition[212].
In 2022, an Israeli man who sent a letter to Belgium received a letter back with a swastika and an anti-Semitic insult on it. According to Belgian media reports, I.Biron sent the letter to his notary in the municipality of Anderlecht in August 2021. Instead of being processed in the usual way for mailing, it was mysteriously delayed in the country and then returned with a swastika and an obscene inscription[213].
On International Holocaust Remembrance Day (January 2024), Israeli Ambassador to Brussels I.Rosenzweig-Abu shared footage from her trip through the region's largest forest, the Bois de la Cambre, on social media. The video captured a tree with a swastika being distributed in fluorescent yellow paint[214].
In May 2024, residential facades in the Brussels commune of Ixelles were desecrated with red swastikas (a total of seven Nazi symbols)[215]. However, this is not the first such incident in the area - in February 2024, swastikas were found on two other buildings[216].
European nationalists use a variety of “codes” and “images” to glorify Nazi views. On Belgian roads, it is not uncommon to see seemingly unremarkable personalized license plates, such as “HH-88” and “1-RAS-88”. In fact, there is a rather dark meaning behind them. Thus, “HH-88” refers to the Nazi greeting and the numeric code for the same Nazi phrase, and “1-RAS-88” stands for “Een ras” (one race). These facts were brought to the attention of the UNIA. Unlike Germany, where strict legislation and guidelines prevent Nazi symbols from appearing on license plates, Belgium has no such laws[217].
Since some personalized license plates with anti-Semitic and Nazi inscriptions have been approved by the Belgian Department of Vehicle Registration, a proposal has been made to allow the authorities to withdraw these plates. However, according to Federal Transport Minister J.Gilquinet, the Government cannot unilaterally revoke these registration plates. He added that a royal decree would be required to officially withdraw a license plate just because of its contents[218].
Belgian legislation still did not contain provisions on making illegal any organization that incited racial discrimination. Nor is there any provision for banning “freedom-destroying” parties or actually existing organizations that promote racial discrimination[219].
According to regular reports by the Belgian State Security Service, since the mid-2010s, the popularity of extreme right-wing forces has been growing in the country. At the same time, there has been a decline in the average age of their supporters and an increasing radicalization of young people[220], a problem that has come to the attention of the Committee on the Rights of the Child[221], among others. According to the special service, another recent trend is the expansion of the range of topics and persons attacked by the extreme right. Traditional “irritants” such as mosques, synagogues and refugee reception centers have been joined by the media, the scientific community, especially virologists, as well as the government and politicians in general. The catalyst for this process was the COVID-19 pandemic and associated restrictive measures[222].
Hundreds of weapons and military equipment were seized during a series of searches conducted by law enforcement authorities in a number of locations in the Flemish region in late September 2022. They belonged to a group of attackers who, according to the Belgian prosecutor's office, were “close to the extreme right”. In particular, J.Verdik, who was killed in a shootout with law enforcement forces, was one of them. On his social media pages, he regularly expressed his commitment to extreme right-wing ideology and hatred of immigrants, Jews and the state, and called for the establishment of a military dictatorship in the country.
There are a number of neo-Nazi groups operating in the country. These include: “Blood and Honour”, “Flemish Resistance”, the movement “Shield and Friends”. A criminal case has been opened against the founder of the latter group, Member of Federal Parliament D.Van Langenhove, on suspicion of violating legislation on gun ownership and combating racism. In early 2023, Holocaust denial was added to the charges[223]. On 18 March 2021, he was stripped of his parliamentary immunity, and in February 2023 he renounced his mandate[224].
D.Van Langenhove is known for his extremist statements. For example, in August 2022, commenting on the situation around the organization of the extreme right-wing music festival in Ypres (later cancelled), Van Langenhove proposed to implement the idea of creating a city whose population would consist exclusively of native Flemings. He returned to this idea in January 2023, after a residential building in Antwerp was shot at and an 11-year-old girl was killed while settling accounts between drug dealers. Speaking about the tragedy, the far-right activist said that such a thing would be impossible in Orania (a city in South Africa populated exclusively by descendants of colonizers), where a child can fearlessly “buy himself an ice cream”[225].
In early 2024, for “inciting hatred and racism”, the court sentenced the former MP to one year in prison, a fine of 16,000 euros, and a ten-year ban from participating in elections[226].
During the rallies of Flemish ultranationalists can often be found paraphernalia with Nazi symbols. In 2020, a car bearing Nazi symbols (a sticker depicting a “Nazi eagle”) joined a demonstration organized by the far-right Flemish Interest Party, causing public outrage[227].
Neo-Nazi manifestations by soccer fans occur from time to time. For example, in 2021, a video appeared in the media in which dozens of soccer fans in Antwerp chanted: “My father was in the Special Forces, my mother was in the SS, they burned Jews together, because Jews burn the best,” while giving Nazi salutes. The incident allegedly took place at the Stadium Cafe (next to the soccer stadium). The men, according to Gazet van Antwerpen, were apparently fans of the Antwerp soccer team “Beerschot”[228].
The resonance was caused by the footage of the use of force and ill-treatment by the police against the detained at the airport of Charleroi citizen of Slovakia J.Chovanec. The incident itself took place in 2018, but the footage was leaked online only in 2020. Particular outrage was caused by the fact that one of the female officers was giving a Nazi salute while other police officers held the man down in the background (it was cited that the policeman sat on the chest of the bleeding Chovanec for 16 minutes). The detainee later died[229].
The protracted duration of the case, now in its sixth year, is illustrative. In January 2024, the Charleroi prosecutor's office decided to drop charges against a total of 31 people (including police officers and paramedics). According to the prosecutor's office, the airport police officers and paramedics called to assist J.Chovanec were not responsible for his death. The Belgian judge's decision on the Slovak's death, which was due to be announced on 3 June 2024, has been postponed until 25 September 2024[230]. In February 2024, the Slovak Minister of Justice stated that if the decision was disproportionate to the gravity of the case, an interstate complaint to the European Court of Human Rights would be considered[231].
On 17 October 2018, three men took part in a “Nazi funeral ceremony” for a fellow neo-Nazi in Charleroi. Video footage showed the defendants, wearing jackets with the “88” sign (meaning “Heil Hitler”), following a hearse, giving the Nazi salute for several minutes[232]. In 2024, a correctional court found them guilty of incitement to racial hatred[233].
In 2021, a court sentenced a Belgian, G.Verreycken, who was photographed giving the Nazi salute at Fort Breendonk, to a fine of 800 euros and a six-month suspended prison sentence “for inciting hatred”. The court ruled that by making the Nazi salute in the former prisoner-of-war camp (notorious for the torture and execution of members of the anti-Nazi resistance, as well as political prisoners and Jews), Verreyckken supported genocide and incited hatred and violence. Verreyckken is no stranger to neo-Nazi ideology: his father is a former member of parliament for the Flemish Interest (Vlaams Belang) and his grandfather was a former senator for the Flemish Bloc (Vlaams Blok), the predecessor of that party. “The Vlaams Blok was the radical right wing of the Flemish movement. In 2004, a court in Ghent ruled that the party had spread discriminatory views and violated the “Anti-Racism Act” of 1981. Because of three charges of racism, they could not receive subsidies as a political party. Shortly after this decision, the party was transformed into the “Flemish Interest” (Vlaams Belang).
When police searched his home, they found a collection of Nazi music marches, an SS uniform and the flag of the pan-European far-right Identitaire Beweging. Another interesting detail is that on the day the photograph was taken, he visited Fort Breendonk with members of the Right Wing Resistance Flanders, a group whose members, according to the Belgian Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis, are right-wing extremists[234].
The laws on the prevention of racist and xenophobic acts (1981), on the prevention of the denial, minimization or justification of the genocide committed by the German National Socialist regime during World War II (1995) and on the suppression of certain forms of discrimination (2007) provide the legal framework for combating racist and xenophobic manifestations.
In a positive step, the Belgian Council of Ministers approved legislative amendments that recognize any form of discrimination, including on ethnic or racial grounds, as an aggravating circumstance for all offences[235].
In practical terms, the coordination of law enforcement agencies' activities to combat discrimination and intolerance is based on a circular of the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of the Interior and the College of Prosecutors General dated 17 June 2013. It stipulates, inter alia, that a special prosecutor should be appointed in each judicial district to investigate this type of crime as a matter of priority.
The House of Representatives of the Belgian Parliament has a “Committee P”, which is accountable to it and monitors the work of the police. This body considers complaints and appeals of citizens regarding violations of the law by law enforcement officers (for example, in cases of abuse of power, racial profiling or unfair investigation of intolerance).
After years of delays, a national plan of action to combat racism and other forms of discrimination was approved by the Belgian Government in July 2022, in accordance with the outcome of the 2001 World Conference against Racism in Durban (South Africa). The document includes 70 measures aimed at combating racial discrimination in employment, service delivery, public administration, asylum, migration, justice, policing and other areas. It was envisaged that anti-racism would be included in training programs for police officers and migration officials, including with a view to preventing racial profiling. Federal agencies would conduct discrimination tests among their employees in order to identify potential bias in their interactions with applicants on the basis of their ethnic origin.
UNIA is responsible for monitoring the situation with regard to discriminatory manifestations in Belgium. The total number of complaints to the Center concerning prejudicial treatment based on “racial criteria” (a term covering skin colour, origin, ethnicity, etc.) in 2023 was 6,706. Most of the cases are about racial discrimination in the spheres of labour, services, social and educational spheres[236].
In 2023, Flanders withdrew from the UNIA. This body will no longer have a mandate to help people affected by discrimination in areas falling within the region's competence (e.g. housing and education). From March 2023, these functions will be entrusted to the Flemish Institute. At the same time, the UNIA will remain in charge of federal discrimination cases concerning discrimination in the workplace, hate speech, etc.[237]
The Flemish authorities also continue to oppose ratification of the Council of Europe's Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM)[238] because of their reluctance to recognize the special rights of the Francophones living in its territory. Belgium had not signed the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. At the same time, the situation in this area is far from cloudless. For example, the Association for the Support of Francophonie in Flanders, an NGO, pointed out that the rights of the Walloons living in the north of the country were infringed. In particular, they have no access to social housing, francophone cultural associations are unable to apply for funding from the region, and in the vast majority of communes, documentation at the level of local government are maintained only in Dutch that contradicts the constitutional provisions on linguistic freedom.
The Brussels-Capital Region also has insufficient access to French-language education for the French-speaking minority[239].
A 2022 report by the EU Fundamental Human Rights Agency (FRA) cites the results of a study conducted in Antwerp to investigate the level of discriminatory attitudes among local employers. As part of it, 2,880 job applications were sent to employers in response to 1,440 job advertisements. It found that candidates whose names were of non-Flemish origin were 17 per cent less likely to get the job they wanted than those with a “Flemish name”[240].
The FRA's 2023 report refers to similar work aimed at analyzing discriminatory attitudes in the housing market. The so-called discrimination tests were carried out in several Belgian cities and revealed that Congolese surname bearers are less likely to be invited to view a property than those whose surname has a Flemish or French sound. The level of discrimination was slightly higher for women than for men (18 per cent and 14 per cent respectively)[241].
Another study, limited to Bruges, showed that prejudice also exists against Polish and Syrian name holders[242].
In May 2021, the Belgian authorities rejected the recommendation of the Universal Periodic Review of the United Nations Human Rights Council (HRC) that an explicit prohibition of racial profiling be enshrined in national legislation. At the same time, the existence of this problem has been repeatedly confirmed by sociological studies. In particular, in June 2019, researchers from the University of Antwerp published data according to which young people from ethnic minorities are stopped by police officers for document checks three times more often than other citizens. The paper concludes that this practice undermines the trust of this group in law enforcement[243].
The UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) has criticized the Belgian authorities for failing to identify which hate speech and hate crimes are manifestations of anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, anti-Gypsyism, Afrophobia or hatred against people of Asian descent. It also does not reliably reflect the specific problems faced by different groups of victims[244].
In general, there was an upward trend in anti-Semitism before the escalation of the situation in the Middle East. The majority of cases were recorded in Brussels and Antwerp, which has the largest Jewish community in Belgium (about 16,000 people). Among them, insults against Jews in public places, acts of vandalism (hanging swastikas, nationalist stickers on the building of the Jewish Museum and the Holocaust and Human Rights Documentation Center), written and verbal threats, and anti-Semitic statements published on the Internet predominate.
For example, in March 2019, the investigation of a high-profile crime against members of the Jewish community in Belgium came to an end (an attack on 24 May 2014 at the Jewish Museum in Brussels left 4 people dead; the crime caused a wave of outrage, indignation and sympathy in Belgium and across Europe). The perpetrator was sentenced by a jury to life imprisonment. The court also noted in its decision the anti-Semitic nature of the attack[245].
The carnival in the Flemish town of Alsta in February 2020 turned into a scandal due to mockery of the Jewish community by a number of participants. The incident raised a wave of public outrage due to obvious signs of anti-Semitism. Belgian authorities condemned the antics. UNIA acted as a mediator in contacts between the Alst administration and Jewish associations on the subject. In the wake of the incident, UNESCO removed the Alsta Carnival from its list of intangible cultural heritage sites for anti-Semitism.
In the context of the escalation of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in October 2023, anti-Semitic manifestations in Belgium reached unprecedented proportions. Against this background, the Antwerp police went on intensive patrols of Jewish neighbourhoods and cultural and religious sites.
Between 7 October 7 and 7 December 2023 alone, UNIA received 91 reports related to the escalation of the Middle East conflict, compared to 57 reports for the whole (!) year 2022. Most of the reports concerned anti-Semitic statements or actions, including Holocaust denial. In 66 cases, members of the Jewish community were targeted. Messages containing hate speech prevailed, mostly spread on the Internet, and xenophobic statements in public places were recorded. Between 7 October and 7 December, the Center also received 8 reports of discrimination or hate speech directed against the Arab population and followers of Islam[246].
In November 2023, the Jewish section of a cemetery in Charleroi. At least 85 graves were damaged and Stars of David were stolen from monuments[247].
In December 2023, vandals sprayed graffiti depicting swastikas and Stars of David on the monuments of a Jewish cemetery in Krajneme[248].
In January 2024, the media reported the arrest of a 19-year-old Antwerp resident suspected of planning an attack on a Jewish institution. The prosecutor's office reported that the person was suspected of possessing weapons and preparing a terrorist attack[249].
In March 2024, swastikas and other anti-Semitic graffiti were sprayed on the door of a student (of Jewish origin) at the College of Europe in Bruges (one of the country's prestigious institutions of higher education)[250].
According to the European Jewish Association and the Israeli Embassy in Belgium, in May 2024, an Israeli tourist had his jaw broken at the Bruges train station after he and his daughter removed an anti-Israel sticker from a pole. The victim A. Ohan's statement about the attack was ignored by the local police. This fact drew the attention of Israel's ambassador to Belgium, I. Rosenzweig-Abu. She expressed the hope that the authorities will condemn this violence in the strongest possible terms and that the perpetrators will be found and brought to justice[251].
In April 2024, two Jewish organizations in Belgium sent an open letter to the country's Prime Minister, A.de Croo, protesting the passivity of the Belgian government in condemning and combating the upsurge of anti-Semitism in the country following the escalation of the situation in the Middle East. The letter was signed by I.Oschinski, a human rights lawyer and president of the Committee for the Coordination of Jewish Organizations in Belgium, and Baroness R.Sluzny, president of the Forum of Jewish Organizations and a Holocaust survivor. The letter emphasizes that the Jewish community feels “abandoned” by the government and is in deep anxiety about its security and future. Against this backdrop, some members of it have begun to consider moving to Israel. A number of public figures have been criticized for speaking out against the actions of the Israeli authorities.
This appeal caused a split within the Jewish community. In another letter, a group of representatives of the Belgian Jewish population pointed out to the Belgian Prime Minister that they felt it was wrong to link anti-Semitic incidents to criticism of Israel by government ministers. This letter emphasized that the foreign policy of the State, the evaluation of Israeli actions and the protection of the Jewish community within the country should be strictly separated[252].
The society increasingly reflects manifestations of Islamophobia. According to UNIA Director P.Charlier, Muslims, especially women in religious garb, are the main victims of religious discrimination. Moreover, he emphasizes that even initiatives of the Islamic community to build mosques cause negative reactions. Charlier is particularly concerned that cases of incitement to hatred or discrimination are hardly ever investigated, primarily due to lack of evidence. The expert emphasized that prosecuting religious intolerance was a very difficult process, as such crimes must be tried in criminal courts, unlike cases of incitement to racial hatred, which, according to Article 150 of the Constitution, could be referred to the correctional courts. Thus, due to this procedural delay, it is almost impossible to prosecute for manifestations of religious intolerance[253].
The trend of deteriorating relations between different ethnic and religious groups in Belgian society continues. The debate on the wearing of headscarves is a clear illustration of these tensions. Although the decision to ban headscarves altogether in higher education institutions was overturned by the Council of State, no fundamental change in practice followed. Higher education institutions retained internal regulations prohibiting the wearing of religious symbols, regardless of the specifics of a particular institution.
In their report (2019), experts from the Council of Europe's European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) recommended that the Belgian authorities ensure that decisions taken by schools and higher education institutions to prohibit the wearing of religious symbols or clothing comply with the principle of legality and are taken in a non-discriminatory manner[254].
In turn, the UN Human Rights Committee has criticized the legislation on wearing the niqab in public places. The fact that it provides for a fine or imprisonment as a sanction indicates a disproportionate interference with the freedom to manifest one's religion or belief. Furthermore, the Committee is concerned about the prohibition on the wearing of religious symbols at work, in certain public bodies and by teachers or students in public schools, which may lead to discrimination and marginalization of some persons belonging to religious minorities[255].
The plight of members of the Roma national minority is of particular concern to international human rights bodies. The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in March 2020 noted omissions in the implementation of the National Strategy for Roma Inclusion and the lack of concrete measures to combat discrimination against members of this group. Experts criticized the increasing number of forced evictions and the simultaneous lack of relevant aggregated data at the federal level, as well as the fact that trailers as places of residence are not adequately protected at the legislative level[256].
UNIA has also previously voiced concerns about a large-scale Operation Strike on 7 May 2019, as part of an investigation into a major auto fraud scheme. It involved a raid on parking lots that resulted in the seizure of 90 mobile homes. As a result, the people living in them were left homeless. According to the Center's representatives, the measures taken by law enforcement officers were excessive and negatively affected families with children, the elderly and people with health problems[257]. In 2020, the European Committee of Social Rights concluded that Belgium had violated several articles of the European Social Charter through its actions[258].
In May 2021, CERD also noted that poverty and social exclusion of the Roma people, in particular children, remain persistent[259]. In addition, child and/or forced marriages persist in Roma communities.
However, the establishment of “neighbourhood stewards” in cities with large Roma communities (e.g. Ghent, Sint-Niklaas, Antwerp, Brussels) is an example of good practice. The aim of the latter is to establish links between the Roma, the city administration and social services. Active work is also carried out with schools, where a large percentage of Roma children are enrolled[260].
Prejudice and anti-Gypsy statements among Belgian politicians are not uncommon. However, it should be noted that they are timely suppressed and condemned by the public. One of the vivid examples of this is the wide resonance, which was caused by xenophobic statements of the former leader of the Flemish Socialist Party C.Rousseau. In September 2023, Rousseau made extremely offensive racist remarks about the Roma population. Amid the scandal, the politician had to resign. This is not the first time he has been embroiled in a racist scandal. In 2022, Rousseau, driving through the Brussels municipality of Molenbeek (where many ethnic groups live, in particular the predominantly Arab community), said that he “did not feel in Belgium”, after which he was also heavily criticized[261].
In 2022, UNIA attempted to analyze the number and topics of applications received by the Center from people of African descent. The report “Discrimination against people of African descent” (similar works were issued in 2011 and 2017) compares data for ten years: from 2010 to 2020. It is noted that since 2015, the number of complaints from this category of the population has increased by 20.8 per cent. The main topics of complaints were difficulties with employment, as well as access to goods and services. It is indicated that in Belgium, the career opportunities of sub-Saharan Africans with higher education are equal to those of native Belgians who have completed high school. Their salaries are also well below those of the general population[262].
According to the FRA report published in October 2023 “Being Black in the EU. Experiences of people of African descent”, in Belgium 58 per cent of respondents of African descent had experienced discrimination in the last 5 years, which is higher than the EU average (47 per cent), and 2 per cent had experienced racism in the last 12 months. Black people in the EU are most often discriminated against when seeking employment or housing. Belgium had the third highest rate of discrimination in housing (44 per cent). Racism was found to be widespread among landlords who refuse to rent to people of African descent. In employment, the percentage of those who had experienced discrimination was even higher: 45 per cent of Belgians said they had felt discriminated against[263].
Racial profiling by law enforcement officials remains a problem: more than half (58 per cent) perceived the last stop by law enforcement as racially motivated in the 12 months prior to the survey. In Belgium, police behaviour is rated as the least favourable (compared to other EU country indicators): almost a third of respondents (31 per cent) stated that the police treated them very or quite disrespectfully[264].
CERD experts noted the high percentage of unemployed people and residents in low-skilled jobs among people of African descent. This population is subject to racial discrimination not only in employment, but also in education and housing, and is underrepresented in public administration, the media, cultural, scientific and university environments[265].
In May 2023, students of African descent protested in Brussels amid frustration that they were unable to continue their education due to “discriminatory practices” by the state. Protesting students marched to the Federal Ministry of Education carrying placards reading “Education is a right”, “We have not had legal documents for months” and “We are students, not refugees”. The criticism came as the minimum salary requirements for “sponsored” foreign students (from 1,700 euros to 2,750 euros) admitted to Belgian higher education institutions were raised. As a result, many lost their scholarships and were unable to continue their education in the country[266].
The incident of 5 September 2023, in which a black nine-year-old child, Mathis, suffered abuse of power by police officers at school, was widely publicized. The boy reacted violently to racially motivated insults from a classmate. Three teachers present on the playground did not intervene to punish the other child, causing Matis to throw a tantrum. Police were called to the scene of the child's altercation. To calm the boy, an agent placed him face down on the ground, crossed the child's arms behind his back, holding a “block” with a knee to his back, such that the schoolboy had trouble breathing. Matis' mother's complaints against the school authorities and the actions of law enforcement officers were dismissed[267].
The effects of systemic racism during the country's colonial past, which inflicted irreparable damage on the local African population, are still lingering. The exact human cost of the Belgian Congo during the reign of King Leopold II of Belgium is still unknown. Various sources cited figures from 3 to 15 million people (the total population of the Congo from 1882 to 1915 decreased from 30 to 15 million people[268]).
In September 2020, a special commission of the Belgian House of Representatives on the colonial past was set up to make recommendations on recognizing Belgium's historical responsibility towards the former African colonies.
In September 2020, a special commission of the Belgian House of Representatives on the colonial past was set up to make recommendations on recognizing Belgium's historical responsibility towards former African colonies.
At the end of October 2021, the first report of the special commission was published, reproducing evidence of the crimes of the colonial administrations. The document debunked the myths about the “civilizing mission” in the states that were part of the Belgian colonial empire (Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Rwanda). It was pointed out that 80 years of Belgian presence in Africa had been reduced to merciless exploitation of the indigenous population on rubber plantations with the use of brute military force. As punishments for failure to fulfill the work plan, hands were cut off or shot. It is recognized that only large Belgian companies enriched themselves, while the indigenous people were forced to work for food.
The work of the special commission was expected to result in recommendations to the Belgian Government to formally apologize to Kinshasa, Kigali and Bujumbura for crimes committed during the colonial period, including illegal and inhumane treatment of the local population (especially the forced expatriation of Métis children to Europe).
In December 2022, the Special Commission on the Colonial Past was dissolved by a decision of the Belgian House of Representatives. The reason for the failure was the lack of consensus on the language to express the attitude of official Belgium towards its own past actions: while the Socialists and environmentalists believed that Brussels should “apologize” for them, the Liberals advocated the expression of “deepest regret”, following the example of King Philippe of Belgium. In the absence of agreement on this issue, the outcome of the commission's work was never put to a vote and the recommendations made were not presented to parliament[269].
The colonial practice of removing children born to mixed couples is particularly acute. Between 1940 and 1950, mestizo children born of Belgian settlers' relationships with local women from Belgium's former colonies (Congo, Burundi, Rwanda) were forcibly removed and placed in boarding schools and orphanages run by the Belgian Catholic Church (under Belgian legal and administrative guardianship) or taken to similar institutions in Belgium. This discriminatory policy was implemented because the Belgian Government saw these children as a threat to its colonial system, which undermined the foundations of the racial theory that underpinned it. These cynical actions mutilated the fates of thousands of children. In the Catholic missions where the removed children were placed, they were subjected to abuse, violence, harassment and insults. On a daily basis, educators indoctrinated them that they were “children of sin”, assuring them that “the devil created the mestizos”[270].
In March 2018, the Belgian Parliament adopted a resolution (Doc 54 2952/ (2017/2018)) recognizing the responsibility of the Belgian leadership for this segregation policy and enshrining a series of measures to enable victims to access their personal files, address the lack of a birth certificate, etc., and to ensure that they have access to their identity documents[271].
It was not until April 2019 that then Prime Minister Michel formally apologized to Métis victims for their targeted segregation, separation from parents and suffering[272].
The consequences of the migration crisis are acutely felt. The main complaint of human rights defenders to the Belgian authorities in this area is the inadequate conditions of detention of asylum seekers, illegal migrants and their families. Often potential refugees have to be accommodated on the street.
The Belgian government's unsatisfactory migration policy is also being heavily criticized at the national level. In December 2022, MPs and supporters of the opposition party “Les Engagés” held a rally in front of the headquarters of the ruling party “Open VLD”: they stayed on the street all night, having previously set up a tent like migrants. The reason for this was the lack of progress in resolving the issue of accommodation of asylum seekers (their number, according to various estimates, is between 2,000 and 3,000), while the temperature outside dropped below zero[273]. According to Anadolu Agency, the number of children among those who lacked warm accommodation was at least 21[274].
The ECRI also noted that the already unfavourable situation of migrants of African and Asian origin had been exacerbated by the large influx of people from Ukraine. The accelerated procedure for granting Ukrainians residence permits, work permits, housing and access to social security has slowed down the resolution of these issues for all those of other nationalities in need[275].
At the same time, the clandestine business of illegal transportation of migrants from the Middle East and North Africa to Europe is establishing transit channels through the territory of Ukraine. This, in particular, was pointed out by the representative of the extreme right-wing party “Flemish Interest” D.Van Langenhove, who stated during the debate in the House of Representatives on 16 March 2022, that, for example, in France, of all asylum seekers who claim to be from Ukraine, every third has no relation to it[276].
In July 2022, the scandalous case of the forced labour of more than 150 people, mostly Filipinos and Bangladeshis, during the construction of the Borealis factory in Antwerp received widespread coverage in the Belgian press.
In 2021, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination also expressed concern about reported deaths of migrants, asylum seekers and persons belonging to ethnic minorities at the hands of law enforcement officials. Such cases were cited as increasing in the context of monitoring self-exclusion measures in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic.
The detention in March 2021 of a Congolese migrant in Liège sparked a wave of public anger and led to a demonstration in defense of people of African descent under the slogan “Black Lives Matter”. The woman accused police officers of racism and violence[277].
An earlier similar situation took place in January 2021 in Brussels, where riots broke out after a 23-year-old Guinean man died in police custody. He was detained after refusing to provide the police with identification and attempting to flee. He collapsed and died at the police station[278].
On 11-12 April 2020, mass demonstrations also took place in the migrant neighbourhood of Brussels Andrélecht. This was triggered by the death of a young man who was killed in a collision with a car while trying to escape from a police patrol. Clashes with the police ended with the use of water cannons and mass arrests.
In September 2020, the online publication Apache discovered a closed racist community of current and former law enforcement officers on Facebook. Head of the Belgian Federal Police, M.De Mesmaeker, threatened police officers with a command investigation if the group was not removed.
It is noteworthy that cases of racist violence by police officers are investigated in isolation. There is no single, coherent and systematic approach to eradicating the problem, which, according to CERD experts, may indicate the existence of structural discrimination in Belgium[279].
In recent years, the consistent policy of Bulgaria's ruling elites to rewrite history has become increasingly vivid. There have been active attempts to devalue the role of the Soviet Union in World War II and the victory over Nazism. At the behest of their Western handlers, the Bulgarian authorities are trying to convert Victory Day to Europe Day and are completely ignoring their international obligations to preserve cultural and memorial sites.
Moreover, the idea that communism and Nazism are equal concepts is promoted at the official level. In 2020, on the 75th anniversary of the end of World War II Bulgaria joined the declaration of the US and a number of Eastern European States which assigned a shared responsibility to the USSR and Hitler's Germany for unleashing the conflict. Later that year, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Ekaterina Zakharieva, when discussing the issue of borders and reparations to Bulgaria, tried to downplay the efforts of Soviet diplomacy at the 1946 Paris Peace Conference.
In this context it is not surprising that, in 2022-2023, Bulgaria voted against[280] the resolution "Combating glorification of Nazism, neo-Nazism and other practices that contribute to fuelling contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance", submitted annually to the UN General Assembly by Russia and other co-sponsors.
One of the "trends" in the activity of falsifying history is the "fight" against Soviet monuments. The most blatant manifestation of the cynical policy of the current leadership was the dismantling of the Soviet Army monument in Sofia in December 2023 under the pretext of the "urgent restoration" and in violation of the ruling of the Sofia City Court. Most of the members of the parties in power (Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria, We Continue the Change, Democratic Bulgaria and Movement for Rights and Freedoms) supported the destruction of the monument, emphasizing that the "symbol of communist occupation" has no place in the centre of the capital.
According to Governor of the Sofia region Vira Todeva, after the restoration the monument is supposed to be moved to the Museum of Socialist Art, but no restoration is being carried out. The bronze figures that crowned the monument, which were cut into pieces, are stored in open areas without proper supervision.[281]
In 2022, the "Alyosha" monument in Plovdiv was smeared with paint. The soldier burials in Dobrich were exposed to disruptive practices twice. On the eve of Victory Day in 2022, the ceramic portraits on the monument to the marine officers in Pomorie were broken, the memorial in Radomir was soiled, funeral wreaths on the burials in Pernik were burnt, and the plate on the Zhukov statue in Strelcha damaged.
Consequences of desecrations are promptly addressed by Russophile organizations, anti-Fascist non-profit organizations and the Embassy of Russia in Bulgaria. Vandals manage to avoid punishment as a rule. Police actions against offenders are often recognized as non-compliant with the law. Therefore, Sophia District Court released the fringe group of people arrested on 25 February 2022 while attempting to write "Save Ukraine" on the monument to the Soviet Army, having stipulated that this act was a form of protest against "Russia's aggression in Ukraine" and the group's arrest was illegal.
Right before the Victory Day in 2022, starting from 4 May 2022, a group of individuals with anti-Russian sentiments tried to wrap the monument to the Soviet Army with Ukrainian flags and to soil and smear it with paint again. A 24‑hour guard was arranged by Russophiles to save the monument from being desecrated.
Vandals have repeatedly desecrated major Soviet military memorials in Bulgaria before as well. For example, on the night of 13 January 2020, the police thwarted an attempt by two schoolgirls to put drawings on the monument to the Soviet Army, and on the night of 30 January 2020, the side part of the Alyosha monument and the exposition with a bas-relief in front of it were stained with red paint and daubed with the words "We have not forgotten" and "We will not forgive".
On 13 February 2020, another act of vandalism was reported after a routine inspection of the mass grave of Soviet soldiers in Sofia's Lozenets: The noses of two warriors in the bas-relief were chipped and their heads damaged. In May 2020, on the eve of Victory Day, head of the local administration K.Pavlov suggested that the memorial be removed from the site altogether. The official has not abandoned the idea after his re-election in 2023.
On the night of 9 April 2020, an act of vandalism was committed against the monument on the mass grave of 45 Soviet officers and soldiers in the city park of Dobrich. Vandals daubed in blue the words "Death to USSR", "Death to Russia", "Bulgaria on its own", "Death to invaders", "Death to Alyoshas", "Death to Communism" and "Enough with self-abasement" on the 7‑meter sculpture and 12‑meter pylon.
On the night of 11 August 2020, the monument to the Soviet Army in Sofia was desecrated again: The words "Boyko, Lukashenko, go away" were sprayed across the central plaque reading "For the liberator Soviet Army from the grateful Bulgarian people." Two months later, on 13 October, the SS double zig rune and the number 700 under it, which stands for the SS anti-tank brigade comprised of 700 Bulgarian volunteers, were written in black on the same plaque. On 17 February 2021, the mass grave in Lozenets was once again desecrated and painted with various symbols.
From 22 to 23 February 2023, a memorial plaque with the inscription "To the Soviet Army-Liberator from the grateful Bulgarian people" on the facade of the Soviet Army monument in Sofia was damaged.
On 3 March 2023, the bust of Nikolay Ignatiev installed in Varna was smeared with white paint.
On 31 March 2023, the Monument to the Soviet Army in Sofia was desecrated. Unknown persons poured red paint on a part of the facade and wrote the inscription "dismantling" in the afternoon.
On 25 April 2023, a swastika was sprayed with black paint on the star decorating the facade of the monument to the Soviet liberator in Ruse ("Alesha in Ruse"). The monument was promptly cleaned up by Russian compatriots. The city administration abstained from this process. The surveillance cameras installed near the site "did not record anyone".
On 12 May 2023, the facade of the monument to the warrior-liberator in Burgas ("Burgas Alyosha") was desecrated with inscriptions "we want Bulgarian monument" and "decommunization."
On 13 May 2023, paint was poured on a slab at the burial place of Soviet servicemen killed during the Great Patriotic War in the town of Bankya (Sofia region).
On 14 May 2023, the sculptures of the mass grave of Red Army soldiers in the capital's Lozenets quarter were vandalized with the signs "Z", "X", sickle and hammer being crossed out, as well as the inscription "Death to the occupier".
On 18 August 2023, fans of the Levski football club attacked a tent camp set up by Bulgarian citizens to protect the monument to the Soviet Army in Sofia from demolition. The vandals smashed part of the marble slab with the inscription "To the Soviet Army-Liberator from the grateful Bulgarian people". During the action, smoke bombs and torches were used and a banner reading "Dismantling" was stretched. The inscription "We want a Bulgarian monument" was painted on the facade of the monument in black paint.
On the night of 20 August 2023, unknown persons desecrated a monument on the mass grave of 50 Soviet soldiers in Stara Zagora: the hands of the warrior were painted in red, the letter "Z" on his jacket was drawn and crossed out. According to media reports, video camera footage in the area of the monument has been handed over to law enforcement for investigation.
On 13 December 2023, the bust of N.P.Ignatiev, installed in Varna, was again painted with white, and, on 10 January 2024, vandals pushed the bust off the pedestal. On 11 January 2024, police arrested a 45-year-old man suspected of vandalism. On 19 January 2024, the restored monument was returned to its pedestal.
On the night of 3 February 2024, the "Alyosha" monument to the Soviet soldier-liberator in Plovdiv was desecrated. On the base of the monument words "murderers", "demolition", "red bastard" were painted red.
On 6 March 2024, the fact of desecration of a sculptural composition on the mass grave of Soviet soldiers in the Sofia district Lozenets was recorded. The facade of the monument was covered with red paint, a Ukrainian flag, words "murderers", a swastika and a crossed-out letter "Z" were painted on the central bas-relief.
On 18 April 2024, the fact of desecration of a sculptural composition on the mass grave of Soviet soldiers in the Sofia district Lozenets was recorded. The facade of the monument was covered with brown paint, on the central bas‑relief there is a Bulgarian flag and some crossed-out letters "Z."
On the eve of 9 May 2024 holiday unknown persons smashed a plaque reading "Eternal Memory" on the memorial to Soviet and Bulgarian submariners in the village of Kamchia, Varna region, the list with the names of those who died for the freedom of Europe was painted red.
On the night of 12 May 2024, a monument to a Soviet soldier, erected on a mass grave in a park in Stara Zagora, was desecrated. The words "decommunization" and "anti-communism" were written on the stela, and the central composition was also covered with red paint.
It is worth emphasizing the fact that the policy of the official authorities does not find a wide response among Bulgarian citizens who cherish the exploits of the Soviet Army and remember its role in liberating the country from the "brown plague."
In 2024, on the eve of Victory Day, the Sofia municipality and the mayor of Sofia banned the march of the "Immortal Regiment." Despite this, hundreds of residents of the capital held a march and honoured the memory of the fallen in the fight against fascism. For their part, President Rumen Radev and Vice President Iliana Iotova laid flowers at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Sofia and personally greeted the participants of the Victory Day march.
Sofia also hosted events at the mass grave of Soviet soldiers and at the pedestal of the monument to the Soviet Army, the sculptures of which were demolished by decision of the authorities. A rally-concert was held at the "Alyosha" monument in Plovdiv to commemorate the heroism of the soldiers-liberators. Similar actions were organized in Burgas, Rousse, Stara Zagora, Varna and other towns.[282]
At the same time, neo-Nazi organizations are gaining popularity in the country. There are several far-right organizations which incite hatred towards national minorities, in particular ethnic Roma, Turks and Jews.
Those include the "Bulgarian National Union" (BNU, the leading neo-Nazi movement in Bulgaria established in 2001 and registered as an NGO, which positions itself as the successor of the Union of Bulgarian National Legions), the youth radical nationalist organization "Koubrat Youth", the Bulgarian branch of the "Blood and Honour" (an international neo-Nazi organization founded in the UK in 1987) in Plovdiv, "National Resistance"[283] (a far-right organization founded in 2008) and the Nationalist Party of Bulgaria (founded in 2013).
It is remarkable that the local legislation places the "dissemination of the fascist ideologies" under the same article with the overthrow of the constitutional order (Article 108 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Bulgaria). However, there were no cases of criminal prosecution on this ground.
The most prominent neo-Nazi structure is the BNU, which holds the "Lukov March" torch procession in Sofia. This event has been held annually since 2003 in memory of General Hristo Lukov, an ideologist of Bulgarian Nazism during World War II, supporter of the alliance with the Third Reich, leader of the Union of Bulgarian National Legions.[284] The BNU and "Lukov March" websites are the major leading voices of neo-Nazi in Bulgaria. Participants in the march wear military uniforms, nationalist symbols, and voice slogans with relevant content. In 2005, a commemorative plaque was placed at their initiative on the facade of the building where Hristo Lukov had lived.
On 10 February 2020, Sophia's Municipal Prosecutor's Office filed a legal claim to Sophia's Municipal Court asking to cancel BNU's registration. The Bulgarian justice rejected the claim with reference to the absence of anti-constitutional statements, incitement of hatred or violence on behalf of the Bulgarian National Union. That judgment was further (on 13 April 2022) also supported by the Court of Appeals. The latter emphasized, in its turn, that the organization shared the idea of Bulgarian nationalism, which per se did not lead to incitement of hatred or hostility.[285] By July 2022, the nationalists provided themselves with a spacious central office located in the centre of Sofia.
Sofia's authorities have taken measures to limit the scale of this event in recent years under the pressure from the dissatisfied Bulgarian public and the international community. Mayor of Sofia Yordanka Fandakova (2009-2023) has repeatedly issued orders banning the torch procession in the city centre, giving those wishing to "honour", if one can put it that way, the memory of the collaborator only the opportunity to gather at the place where he was shot in February 1943. However, such a decision of the local authorities was regularly overturned in court with references to the provisions contained in the Law of the Republic of Bulgaria "on Meetings, Assemblies and Manifestations."
In this respect, the Lukov March in 2023, originally scheduled for 25 February, was no exception. In November 2022, the Sofia City Administrative Court overturned the mayor's order banning the march, while allowing for an appeal. The higher Supreme Administrative Court was to hear the case on 20 February 2023, but the decision was postponed for a week on procedural grounds. For this reason, on the day chosen for the march, a dispute arose between the local authorities and the organizers of the march over its legality. The Bulgarian Prosecutor General also supported the opinion that the march was unlawful. A few hours before the supposed start of the march, neo-Nazis held a protest called "Illegal March" in the centre of Sofia in reacting to his voiced position.[286] Despite all the efforts of the participants of the event in honour of the Bulgarian Nazi collaborator general, the event did not take place: The police did not allow those gathered to leave the original gathering place and march through the city.[287]
On 17 February 2024, the "Lukov March" procession in Sofia (about 300 people) was held under a new sign: "in memory of the victims of the communist regime." Thanks to the firm stance of the new Sofia administration and the actions of the police, the participants were not able to march through the streets of the capital with lighted torches. The so-called "torch service" took place only at the house of Hristo Lukov.
Torchlight processions are held to honour another Nazi collaborator, the Bulgarian military pilot Dimitar Spisarevski. They take place annually on 20 December in the village of Dolni-Pasarel, Sofia region.
Gerhard Wengel, a Nazi Luftwaffe pilot, who died in the Anglo-American bombing of Bulgaria during World War II, is heroized. In 2001, in a small park "Madara" in Sofia, a memorial plaque was erected to Gerhard Wengel, to which neo-Nazis from the BNS and Koubrat Youth come to "honour the memory" of the pilot of the Third Reich.[288]
Every year on 30 April 2019 (the day of Hitler's death), flyers praising the Nazi leader are disseminated in the streets of Sofia and across the region. Graffiti with swastikas and SS insignia often appear on buildings. Souvenirs with Nazi insignia, Hitler's "Mein Kampf" and works of foreign and Bulgarian Holocaust deniers, such as R.Stankov as well as R.Harwood, A.Panayotov, etc., are freely available in market.
The use of far-right symbols has been regularly recorded at stadiums during matches between football clubs. Some fans do not deny their affiliation with neo-Nazi movements. The most high-profile case took place in October 2019, when during the Euro 2020 qualifier match between Bulgaria and England, Bulgarian fans were chanting racist slogans and defiantly extending their arms, imitating a Nazi salute. The incident sparked a massive outcry in Europe. The president of the Bulgarian Football Union was forced to resign after public pressure and harsh criticism from the country's leadership.[289]
In February 2022, the action of Bulgarian MEP Angel Dzhambazki, who made a "Nazi salute" in the hall of the European Parliament, caused a public outcry. This fact was recorded. The disproportionately soft punishment against him was revealing, the MEP was deprived of his subsistence allowance for 6 days (according to some reports, the amounted to 2 thousand euros).[290] Moreover, it had no effect on his political career. He had previously been repeatedly found to have incited hatred, particularly against the Roma population, whom he referred to as "primates." In 2013, he called on Sofia residents to "cleanse the city" of migrants[291] and repeatedly expressed support for the torchlight procession "Lukov March".[292]
International monitoring institutions have expressed their concern over the reports on the increased number of cases related to the use of hate speech and hate crimes, especially against the Turks, Roma, Muslims, Jews, people of African descent, migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers. This is particularly addressed by the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) following its consideration of Bulgaria's combined 23rd to 25th periodic reports in December 2023.[293] Racist hate speech by representatives of political parties and other public figures is recorded, and is particularly frequent during election campaigns. In this regard, the unduly lenient decisions of the courts against them are noteworthy.[294]
There are reported difficulties in the functioning of religious structures. It is alleged, for example, that spiritual leaders of Islam feel disadvantaged. Initiatives to build religious schools in order to educate children about Islam and to publish Muslim literature are ignored at the local level. Amendments to the Act on Religions have significantly limited the sources of foreign funding for religious organizations. Another approved regulation prohibits wearing all kinds of "thick or semitransparent fabric that covers or conceals the face", including scarves, masks, and other garments in public places. An exception is made only for those who cover their faces due to their profession or health problems. Everyone else is allowed to wear burqa and niqab only in religious institutions and at home.
Manifestations of Islamophobia are not uncommon. There have been cases of vandalism against mosques, and arson is periodically committed. Investigations of such cases rarely lead to identification and prosecution of those responsible.
In April 2022, a mosque in Kazanlak was vandalized.
In 2022 in Karlovo, an unknown person committed an arson attack on the Kurshum Mosque, which is a historical site. In July 2019, this mosque was desecrated, swastikas and offensive graffiti were sprayed on the historic building.[295] Later in July 2019, the headquarters of the Office of the Supreme Mufti of Bulgaria was attacked in Sofia. Unknown people threw stones at the building and broke a window.[296]
Traditional local topographical indications in Bulgaria are not displayed in minority languages. Furthermore, in 2018, the Stara Zagora local council decided to replace local toponyms of Turkish-Arab origin with Bulgarian translations or neologisms.[297]
The authorities refuse to enter into a dialogue with persons who continue to request recognition as a national minority. The same applies to persons identifying as Pomaks. A 2019 judgment by the Sofia Court of Appeal confirmed once again the position maintained by Bulgaria for 20 years now that there is no "Macedonian ethnos" in its territory. In January 2022, then Prime Minister Kiril Petkov reiterated that the issue of the Macedonian national minority was not subject to discussion, and moreover, denied the existence of a Macedonian national minority as such.[298]
This problem has come to the attention of CERD. The Committee is concerned about reports that members of the Macedonian minority are prohibited from freely exercising the rights to freedom of assembly and association. There are persistent obstacles and additional requirements for the registration of civil society organizations, namely the refusal of the Registration Agency and the courts to register Macedonian associations on the basis of their Macedonian identity.[299]
Anti-Semitic sentiments are on the rise. On 6 January 2024, unknown people put posters with Hitler's picture and his necrologue on the walls of the synagogue in Sofia. According to Maxim Delchev, the representative of the Spiritual Council of Israel in Bulgaria, such acts of vandalism take place every year: unknown people throw stones at the synagogue and draw Nazi symbols on its walls. However, these illegal acts are not suppressed in any way by law enforcement agencies.[300]
Experts point to insufficient efforts by the authorities to integrate the Roma minority. There is a traditionally high unemployment rate among the Roma and Turkish population, on average twice as high as the general unemployment rate. There have been insufficient efforts by the National Employment Agency for Minorities and Marginalized Groups to explain the important requirement to register with the Agency as a prerequisite for receiving social benefits. Actions to address the lack of adequate housing for members of the Roma community, most of whom live in substandard settlements without developed infrastructure, are still lacking.[301]
Widespread stigmatization of and discrimination against Roma, including children, was also pointed out by the Council of Europe's Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (ACFCNM).[302] This situation, according to experts, only serves to increase violence and hate speech against them.
During the sixth cycle of monitoring of racist and intolerant manifestations in Bulgaria, ECRI experts recorded two cases when Roma were targeted and threatened by protests organized by representatives of other ethnic groups living in their neighbourhoods.[303]
The situation of Roma, particularly in the field of education, has been repeatedly criticized by ECRI. In 2022, its experts once again pointed out that Roma children often do not attend pre-schools, do not attend classes regularly, and do not receive full secondary education.[304] According to the 2023 FRA report, about two thirds of Roma children (64 per cent) study in segregated primary and secondary education institutions in Bulgaria.[305] The concluding observations of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) following its consideration of the combined 6th and 7th periodic reports of Bulgaria also pointed to the segregation of pupils on ethnic grounds, emphasizing that it leads to the social exclusion of Roma children.[306]
CRC remains concerned at the continuing discrimination against children of Roma origin and children belonging to racial minorities. It emphasizes the continued problem of disproportionately high levels of child poverty among Roma settlements, where access to adequate housing, water and sanitation is mostly poor. Discrimination in health care against Roma children is noted. In this regard, CRC recommends that the Bulgarian authorities ensure equal access to quality health services for Roma women and children.[307]
According to experts with the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), Roma girls are particularly vulnerable to the continuing practice of forced marriage.[308] For its part, CRC calls for increased efforts to prevent child marriage, especially prevalent among Roma adolescents, and for the development of a strategy to address the high birth and abortion rates among Roma girls.[309]
As migration flows into the country have increased dramatically, there has been a worsening respect for their rights. The report of the Special Representative of the CoE Secretary General for Migration and Refugees on the fact-finding mission to Bulgaria (from 11 to 14 September 2023) provides the following figures: while 3,487 migrants arrived in the country in 2020, in 2022 the figure was 16,767, during the same period the number of people seeking international protection increased from 3,525 to 20,407. A wide range of violations of the rights of migrants and refugees in the country has been established. The main are: the practice of "pushbacks" of migrants out of the border, which is accompanied by violence and confiscation of personal belongings, poor sanitary conditions in refugee reception centres, the lack of professional staff in these institutions, etc.[310]
Bulgaria is a country of origin and, at the same time, destination in the human trafficking process. This problem is also aggravated by the high flow of illegal migrants. Unaccompanied children are particularly vulnerable, and are subject to a disproportionate risk of being trafficked and abused.[311]
The problem of adaptation of previously arrived migrants and growing intolerance towards them remains, which escalated in March 2024. There have been clashes between Bulgarians and migrants, one of which resulted in an attack on students of Pakistani origin who are British citizens.[312]
In March 2024, there were also rallies in the capital's Ovcha Kupel district, home to the refugee reception centre with the same name, which, as of January 2024, was 104 per cent full.[313] Due to the growing frustration of local residents and the extremely dilapidated condition of the centre, the authorities decided to close it gradually.[314]
According to CERD, living and sanitary conditions in specialized migrant camps are poor and, generally, do not meet European requirements. At the same time, there is an increase in the number of reports on limited access to the territory for asylum-seekers, which leads to systematic refusal of entry at the border and violation of the principle of non-refoulement. Thus, nationals of some countries, including Afghanistan, Algeria, Bangladesh, Morocco and Tunisia, are denied entry without due process. Often asylum seekers and migrants, including children and vulnerable persons, are held at the Bulgarian border without access to asylum procedures, food, water and a place to sleep.[315]
In 2022, there were 5,268 alleged incidents of displacement of migrants attempting to cross the border into Bulgaria.[316]
The same year, images published by the newspaper Le Monde, showed the alleged detention of migrants by border guards in southern Bulgaria in a cage-like construction without any basic facilities, caused a wide public response.[317]
According to information received from asylum seekers during the AOHR experts' visit to Bulgaria (from 6 to 10 March 2023), there were complaints of police violence, emergency expulsion, family separation and confiscation of personal mobile devices.[318] Refugee minors, especially unaccompanied children, appear to be the most vulnerable due to these circumstances.
CRC experts also draw attention to the problem of the extended stay of refugee children in closed reception centres that do not meet international standards. They also emphasize that detention of refugee minors and unaccompanied children, which is practiced in the country, is unacceptable. There is insufficient access to education among migrant children, regardless of their legal status. The Committee is concerned about the limited resources to ensure children's access to qualified legal aid and procedures for their integration.
In recent years, the situation with regard to the spread of neo‑Nazi ideology and various forms of intolerance in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) has not undergone any fundamental changes.
At the same time, since 2022, the country's delegation at the United Nations General Assembly has voted against the annual draft resolution entitled "Combating the glorification of Nazism, neo-Nazism and other practices that contribute to the escalation of contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance", introduced by the Russian Federation and a wide range of States. It is worth noting that earlier the country not only supported the adoption of the document, but was among its co‑sponsors. This decision was taken under the influence of the Bosniak head of the BiH MFA without consulting the representatives of other state-forming peoples in the leadership of the country, as required by law.
In the same vein, Bosnia and Herzegovina did not co-sponsor the Joint Statement of a number of delegations to the OSCE of 9 May 2024 on the occasion of the 79th anniversary of the Victory over Nazism in World War II, although in previous years its Permanent Representative had joined a similar document.
The remaining deep-seated contradictions between the three constituent peoples of the country (Bosniak Muslims, Serbs and Croats) have a negative impact on the situation. The existence of ethnic tensions and divisions in the country hinders legal and institutional progress towards greater social integration and reconciliation.[319] The above-mentioned contradictions concern, among other things, the assessment of the role of each of the peoples in World War II and their contribution to the liberation of the world from the "Brown Plague". Such "fragmentation" of historical memory is a consequence of the armed conflict in BiH in 1992-1995.
Thus, representatives of the Bosniak political elite promote theses about the struggle against the occupiers and about "external aggression" both during the war and in the 1990s, emphasizing that in both cases Bosniaks managed to defend "united and indivisible" Bosnia and Herzegovina. Local Serbs recall the victims of the concentration camps of the Independent State of Croatia (ISC) (1941-1945)[320] and highlight the decisive contribution of the Serbian people to the fight against Nazism.[321]
In their turn, Croats tend to underestimate the number of victims among the Serbian and Jewish population during the war, while promoting the thesis that it is necessary to remember all the dead members of their people, including both those who fought in the ranks of the partisans and supporters of the NSG. In doing so, they ruthlessly criticize the "bloody regime of I.B.Tito" for the massacre of the latter at the end of the war.
Representatives of the Bosnian Croat leadership take part in relevant commemorative events. For instance, in May 2020 in the Cathedral of the Sacred Heart of Jesus in Sarajevo, on the initiative of the head of the Catholic Church in BiH, Archbishop of Upper Bosnia Cardinal V.Puljic[322], a mass was celebrated in memory of the executed Ustasha. This provoked a negative reaction from the representatives of other nations in the country and veterans' organizations. The glorification of war criminals was condemned by the Chairman of the Jewish Community in BiH, J.Finzi.[323] Metropolitan Chrysostom of Dabrobosnia, in his turn, announced the termination of cooperation with the Archdiocese-Metropolitanate of Vrhbosna and personally Cardinal.[324]
In May 2023, in Stolac (BiH), under the auspices of the Croatian National Assembly (political organization of Croatian political parties in BiH) and the organization of the Blyburg Honorary Platoon, an event was held to "commemorate" the victims of the so-called "Blyburg Massacre[325]", namely the Croatian Nazi henchmen, the Ustasha.[326]
In the Muslim-Croatian Federation of BiH (FBiH), with the connivance of the local political elite, there are attempts to "whitewash" Nazi collaborators. In cities with predominantly Bosniak populations, after the 1992-1995 armed conflict, a number of streets were renamed in their honor. In particular, 152 street names were changed in Sarajevo. At the same time, when the city was part of the SFRY, all these streets bore the names of Yugoslav partisans and anti-fascists[327]. There were streets named after the ideologists of the pan-Islamist movement "Young Muslims" M.Busuladžić[328], A.Serdarević[329] and V.Čurčić, the commander of the NGH units during the occupation of Sarajevo S.Pachariz[330], the chairman of the Muslim Charity Society "Merhamet", who later commanded the Muslim detachment M.Panja[331], the director of the Croatian State Theatre during the NGH period A.Nametak.[332] In June 2016, the high school in Gorazhd (FBiH) was named after Imam Huseyin efendi Jozo[333], who was a member of the SS Hajar Division, known for its punitive raids in the Balkans during World War II, formed mostly of Bosniak Muslims. In 2018, the naming of a Sarajevo school after M.Busuladžić received wide media publicity. All of the above-mentioned persons were sentenced to execution by Yugoslav military tribunals after the war.
For a long time, the streets of Mostar bore the names of infamous Croatian figures of the Ustaše Nazi regime during World War II (M.Budak, L.Vokić, M.Lorković, D.Spužević, I.Zelenika and R.Boban). On 14 July 2022, by a two-thirds majority, the City Assembly adopted a decision to name them after famous cultural figures from BiH.[334] However, a similar decision is yet to be adopted for Sarajevo.
On 12 February 2023, on the 78th anniversary of Mostar's liberation from the Nazis, the Union of Veterans' Associations of the People's Liberation War of BiH regretted that "supporters of neo-fascist ideas are coming to power in the city", and six months after all 700 tombstones of the fallen soldiers-liberators in the Partisan Cemetery were damaged on the night of 14‑15 June 2022, not only have the perpetrators of this crime not been found, but there are no funds for the restoration of the memorial.[335] The Veterans Union also stated that the city authorities refused to hold an anti-fascist march through the city under the pretext of security problems, motivating the refusal by the "controversial symbols" of anti-fascists (flags of Yugoslavia), which are associated with "the most vile totalitarian state[336]".
On 11 February 2024, the mayor's office (led by Croatian M.Kordic) banned a peaceful demonstration by the Society of Anti-Fascists and Fighters of the People's Liberation War (composed mainly of Bosniaks) on the occasion of the 79th anniversary of Mostar's liberation from fascism. A branch of the leading Croatian party, the Croatian Democratic Commonwealth of Bosnia and Herzegovina, condemned the anti-fascists "for waving Yugoslav communist flags as it salutes those who fought against fascism, all totalitarian regimes and communism."
Periodically there are clashes between fans of soccer clubs. The last one was recorded in Vlasenica on 31 October 2023 between fans of the teams "Zrinjski" (Mostar) and "Sloboda" (Tuzla), represented by Croats and Bosniaks respectively. At the same time, Croatian fans repeatedly used Nazi symbols, to this day shouting slogans of the Ustasha and other Croatian war criminals.
The leadership and population of the Republika Srpska (RS) and the Serbian people of BiH oppose revisionism and revision of the results of World War II, and actively promote the ideas of anti-fascism. At the initiative of the Government of RS, the educational programs of the Entity starting from the 2018/2019 academic year included extended lectures on crimes and genocide against Serbs and on the Holocaust in BiH. In 2019, on the initiative of the authorities of the Entity, the society "7 February 1942" was established with the aim of collecting information about the crimes of the Ustasha against the civilian Serbian population in the villages of Drakulic, Šargovac and at the Rakovac mine, when more than 2.3 thousand people were killed in one day with particular brutality.
On 30 April 2024, Bishop Sergije of the Bihać-Petrovac Diocese of the Serbian Orthodox Church regretted that a strikeball training center would be organized in the memorial area of Mount Grmeć "Korčanica" (on the territory of the Federation of BiH). During World War II, the central partisan hospital was located there, and on the territory of Korcanica there are burials of several hundred heroes of the national liberation struggle. The monument itself was neglected and fell into disrepair after the 1992-1995 armed conflict.[337]
At the same time, local Serbs are characterized by a special perception of Serbia's role in World War II, in particular the government in exile and its armed forces in the Balkans. In June 2019, a monument was erected in Bileć to the leader of the Chetnik movement, D.Mihajlovic, who took part in the fighting not only against the Nazis, but also against the partisans of the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia.
In August 2021, a similar bust was erected in Bijeljina (RS).[338] This initiative was called by the Bošnjaks "a provocation in a city with 30,000 [representatives of this people]". In addition, every year on the day of D.Mihajlović's arrest (10 March 1946), supporters of the Chetnik movement organize commemorative events in Višegrad.
The general atmosphere of tension between the constituent peoples leads to the fact that certain groups of the population become victims of intolerance on the part of the rest of society. The Serbian people are the most affected.
In 2019, the Orthodox Church of the Annunciation of the Blessed Virgin Mary in the village of Donje Vukovsko. According to priest M.Djuric, two ethnic Serb parishioners of the church lived in the village, but they did not feel safe visiting the church after the attack.[339]
In December 2022, unknown assailants robbed the Holy Trinity Orthodox Cathedral Church in Mostar, which had been rebuilt from ruins after being destroyed in the 1990s Bosnian conflict. As a result, expensive electrical cables were stolen. In accordance with the statements made by the rector of the church, D.Koic, the incident was only the most prominent example of a number of acts of vandalism committed against the Cathedral in recent years.[340] The crime was condemned by the RS leadership as a gesture of intolerance towards the Serbian population and their residence in Mostar.[341]
On 18 February 2023, the Committee for the Protection of Serbian Rights in FBiH issued a statement stating that, on average, Orthodox cemeteries in the Muslim-Croat entity of BiH are desecrated once a month, and the perpetrators almost always go unidentified and unpunished.[342] In the last five years, vandalism, destruction of tombstones and desecration of graves have occurred in 36 cemeteries throughout FBiH, including Mostar and Livno.
On 13 January 2023, on the Serbian New Year holiday, during the Sarajevo International Youth Football Cup Tournament (for teenagers born between 2008 and 2015), in which players of the Zvezdar soccer club from Serbia participated, a group of underage Croatian fans from Split, Croatia, organized chanting of the slogan "kill the Serb". On the evening of the competition, a delegation of young Serbian soccer players and their parents were attacked at a hotel in the Sarajevo neighborhood of Ilidža by masked assailants who shouted anti-Serb slogans, pepper-sprayed and threw burning objects at the children. One of the parents was stabbed while trying to protect them.[343] At the end of the incident, the police identified only eight attackers born between 1995 and 2003. All of them are of Bosniak Muslim ethnicity. The father of one of them was the head of the FBiH police department's unit for cooperation with Europol and Interpol. This crime was strongly condemned by the leadership of both Serbia and the RS.
On 27 January 2023, St. Sava's Day[344], the chief imam of the Majlis of the Islamic Community in Kozarac, Prijedor municipality (Republika Srpska), Amir ef.Mahić, delivered a sermon to the congregation of the town's mosque, in which he referred to St. Sava as the founder of a "Serbian Orthodox sect", referring to the Serbian Orthodox Church. He also said that the teachings of the saint "are based on nationalism and fascism," and he himself is allegedly the founder of the ideology of "hatred of other people".[345] The video of the speech was published in the local media and caused a negative reaction at the level of the RS leadership, and the Prijedor Prosecutor's Office opened a criminal case against A.Mahic for "public incitement to violence and incitement of inter-religious and inter-ethnic hatred". The leadership of the Islamic Community of BiH distanced itself[346] from Mahić's statements, while characterizing him as "an authoritative imam without a single complaint about his activities". The OSCE Office in Sarajevo did not mention Mahić's name or religious affiliation in its statement, calling on "religious leaders to exercise restraint".[347] In spite of the appeal to the Islamic Community of BiH by all four Orthodox bishops of the country, led by Metropolitan Hrizostom of Dabrobosnia, its head H.Kavazovic criticized the decision of the City Assembly of Prijedor to condemn the statements of Imam.[348] Bošnjak emphasized that Bosnian Serbs "have no right to take such steps in a city where genocide was committed against the Bošnjaks," leaving the question of inciting inter-religious discord unanswered. The statement caused a sharp reaction of the President of RS M.Dodik, the President of the National Assembly of RS N.Stevandic and the Presidency of the Presidency of BiH from RS J.Cvijanovic, who specified[349] that "H.Kavazovic is not defending the imam, but his judgments about Serbs", while the others perceived the statements of the imam as an insult to the entire Serbian people.[350]
Against this background, Metropolitan Hrizostom of the Serbian Orthodox Church of Dabrobosan decided to withdraw from the Interreligious Council, a consultative body for religious reconciliation, which de facto ceased its work.
In January 2023, Imam Muharem Stulanovic, Professor at the Faculty of Islamic Pedagogy in Bihać, called the Republika Srpska a "genocidal creation".[351]
In March 2023, serious inter-religious and political tension was caused by a statement by the head of the Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina, H.Kavazovic. "We must show in every possible way that we are ready to defend the state institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina. When they fall, as they did in 1992, we must be ready to defend this country with arms in our hands...," his statement read. In turn, these words were seen as justification and preparation for the resumption of armed conflict.[352]
In addition, the Serbian Orthodox Church is still unable to return the property lost during World War II, as the authorities of the country have not yet fulfilled the prescriptions of the Terezin Declaration of the European Parliament, calling to solve the problem of restitution. The Roman Catholic Church, the Islamic and Jewish communities (the latter estimate the lost property at 3 billion euros) are also interested in adopting the relevant law.
According to the information provided by the experts of the CC FCNM, the Jewish community claims approximately 54 buildings. One notable example is a building currently used by the Ministry of Interior of Sarajevo Canton.[353]
The report on Bosnia and Herzegovina prepared by the Council of Europe's European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) within the framework of the sixth monitoring cycle found that racist discourse in the country continues to be predominantly directed at members of the three main ethnic groups and directed against members of one of these groups. In addition, there is incitement to hatred against Roma and, in previous years, against migrants in transit through the country. ECRI experts regret the absence of official data on the number of incidents of incitement to hatred and the absence of a governmental body to monitor them on a permanent basis. Hate speech remains widespread, especially in political discourse, and in recent years there has also been an increase in hate speech on the Internet and social media.[354]
According to OSCE monthly reports, 144 hate crimes were recorded in BiH between May 2023 and May 2024[355], the vast majority of which were based on intolerance against persons belonging to a different ethnic or religious group. Only a small number of these incidents were publicly condemned by the authorities. The number of judicial investigations remains low.[356]
The period before elections is particularly prone to increased incitement to hatred. In this regard, ECRI recommended that the mandate of the Central Election Commission to monitor the use of hate speech during election campaigns be extended from 30 days before the election date to the entire campaign period. However, this recommendation is yet to be implemented.[357]
Given the small size of the Jewish community in the country, statistics concerning crimes against persons belonging to the Jewish minority are of particular concern.[358]
The incident that took place on 21 March 2024 during a soccer match between the national teams of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Ukraine in Zenica (Federation of BiH) is an example of incitement to hatred on ethnic grounds. Ukrainian fans then displayed an anti-Russian and anti-Serbian banner on the stand, accusing the UN of "inaction both in Srebrenica in 1995 and now in Ukraine."
The activities of the High Representatives, who to this day exercise an "external protectorate" over BiH, also do not contribute to the reconciliation of the constituent peoples. Thus, in response to the refusal of the Serbian people to recognize the validity of the "genocidal" verdicts of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, including attempts to use them to consolidate the thesis of "collective responsibility" of Serbs, in July 2021, the High Representative, bypassing the parliamentary procedure, introduced amendments to the Criminal Code of the country, criminalizing "genocide denial[359]", allowing, in fact, to prosecute Serbian activists.
After such voluntaristic actions of the self-appointed "High Representative", a Bosniak-Western campaign was actively launched to promote the draft resolution of the UN General Assembly on the establishment of a day of remembrance of the "genocide in Srebrenica", which was adopted in May 2024. The adoption of a document with an emphasized anti‑Serb orientation will inevitably provoke a serious escalation of inter-ethnic tensions not only in BiH, but also in the region.[360]
At the same time, the current so-called "High Representative" K.Schmidt (FRG), positioning himself as a spokesman for the opinion of the international community, does not have the necessary international legal legitimacy and is a de facto usurper of the post. His candidacy was not properly agreed upon by the constituent peoples of BiH and all members of the Steering Committee of the Council for the Implementation of the BiH Peace Agreement (Russia opposed it). Nor was the necessary procedure for its approval by the UN Security Council observed: the relevant Russian-Chinese draft resolution of the Council was not adopted during the voting on 22 July 2021.
The existence in the country to this day of an external protectorate represented by the Office of the "High Representative" is completely contrary to the principles of the rule of law. Acts of the High Representative are, in fact, sole decisions of a foreign citizen, which have primacy over laws and cannot be appealed, including in court.
During 2022-24, he repeatedly interfered in BiH legislation and law enforcement practice[361], contributing to an atmosphere of general legal chaos[362], lawlessness and insecurity.[363] The height of cynicism and arbitrariness was his own decision to amend the BiH Criminal Code to criminalize non-implementation of the decisions of the "High Representative".[364]
This occurs against the background of the fact that the judicial system in BiH is already highly politicized and ethnically oriented.[365] In particular, 70-80 per cent of all war crimes cases from the period of the armed conflict are brought against members of the Serbian people.[366] Atrocities committed by members of other ethnic groups are often ignored.[367] Depending on which nationality is being prosecuted, courts arbitrarily apply the legislation of a particular period (former Yugoslavia or modern BiH) against the defendant, imposing heavier penalties on Serbs.[368]
The persistent problem of ethnic segregation in the educational sphere reflects deep-rooted ethnic and political tensions in the country. In some mixed areas of FBiH, there are still "two schools under one roof" – institutions where children of different nationalities (Bosniak Muslims and Croats) are taught not only in separate programs, but also in different shifts.
In the sixth monitoring cycle, ECRI found that the recommendation to promote integration in education, namely by abolishing "two schools under one roof" and other forms of segregation and discrimination in education, had not been implemented. There are still more than 50 such schools where children are segregated on the basis of their ethnicity.[369]
The Advisory Committee of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (ACFCNM) continues to point out the same problem. Drawing attention to the fact that a number of court decisions, including by the Constitutional Court, have found the practice of segregated education to be discriminatory, as segregation is a special form of discrimination under the Law on Prohibition of Discrimination.[370]
Despite criticism of BiH by international human rights monitoring bodies, it should be noted that no new cases of opening such segregated educational institutions have been recorded since 2002. Currently, there is a tendency to further reduce their number.
The problem of naming and teaching the national language of Bosniak Muslims in schools in Republika Srpska is in the same line. The wording "the language of the Bosniak people" used in the naming of the subject in educational institutions is enshrined in the Constitution of Republika Srpska, but it does not suit the parents of pupils who defend the right to be taught the "Bosniak language". In other cases, the debate erupts over the choice of the adjective "Bosniak" instead of "Bosan", which refugee returnees also see as a violation of their rights. This position, however, did not apply until recently to some cantons of the FBiH itself. In May 2018. The Constitutional Court of this entity ruled to correct the spelling of "Bosniak" to "Bosan" in official documents and formally restored the constitutional rights of Serbs, the Serbian language and the Serbian Cyrillic alphabet.
The experts of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), in their concluding observations following the consideration of the periodic report of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the implementation of obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, reported that the non-recognition of three official languages and two alphabets by individual cantons in FBiH has resulted in widespread linguistic discrimination and undermined the educational process.[371]
Returning refugees and displaced persons are another vulnerable and discriminated against population in BiH. They face obstacles to sustainable reintegration into society, full restitution of their property, access to the labor market and social benefits.[372]
In 2023-2024, there were cases of attacks on Serb migrants in the Federation of BiH: in December 2023, R. Simic from Lukavac was beaten on the doorstep of her own house; on 7 January 2024, the house of the Serb Shantić family (who returned to their hometown 18 years ago) in Mostar was stoned. All cases remained unsolved. There were attacks on Bosniaks in Republika Srpska: on 7 January 2024, a returned Bosniak refugee was verbally abused in Vlasenica; on 30 January 2024, Bosniak B.Gušo was beaten in Višegrad, but crimes against Bosnian Muslims were solved by Republika Srpska police.
In addition to physical violence and ethnic hatred, Serbs face opposition from the Federation of BiH authorities to their return and the restoration of their rights to the housing they lived in before the armed conflict. Thus, in January 2024, the Federation of BiH Parliament was proposed to amend the Law on the Return, Provision and Sale of Housing, according to which Serbian refugee returnees would be able to expect only minor compensation in lieu of the right to housing they had before the 1992-1995 armed conflict. Serbs compare such discriminatory legislative initiatives to ethnic cleansing and claim that the Federation authorities seek to rid the entity of its Serbian population altogether. In a similar vein is the "quiet" sabotage by the federal authorities of infrastructure projects in Serb-populated parts of the Muslim-Croat entity, already experiencing catastrophic depopulation and economic decline. For example, there is still no asphalt road between the two largest settlements in the western part of FBiH with a significant Serb population – Glamoč and Drvar.
Human rights organizations note difficulties in ensuring the rights of the country's large Roma community (up to 50,000 people by various estimates), which remains the most marginalized group in BiH. There is widespread prejudice against the Roma population among law enforcement agencies.
In practice, their legally guaranteed rights to freedom of self-determination on ethnic grounds, to form organizations and convene meetings to express and defend their cultural, religious and other rights are not exercised. For example, Roma de facto lack the opportunity to exercise the right to use their native language, including in social and legal relations, in localities where they constitute more than one third of the population, or the right to receive secondary education in their native language in municipalities where the ethnic minority constitutes more than one third of the population (if it constitutes more than one fifth of the population, education in their native language is allowed as an elective). If even in a particular locality there are enough children to be taught in their mother tongue at school, educational institutions cannot provide them with teachers for this purpose.
This segment of the population is very difficult to engage in the educational process. In 2017, only 1.5 per cent of Roma children attended preschool, 69 per cent attended elementary school, and only 22.6 per cent attended secondary school.[373] At the same time, experts lament the lack of clear and reliable data on the situation faced by Roma children in accessing education.[374]
However, there are positive practices for students from disadvantaged socio-economic groups, which often include Roma. In Republika Srpska, free textbooks are provided in the first and second grades and are then provided by local communities. Free transportation and free lunches were also provided for children living more than four kilometers from school. Republika Srpska authorities have implemented projects (involving mediators from the Roma population) to provide access to preschools, particularly in Bijeljina.[375]
A significant number of Roma families live in illegal dwellings or informal settlements without security of tenure, and lack access to basic services and utilities. Other problems include chronic and pervasive stigmatization, an increase in anti-Roma hate speech and hate crimes against Roma. CESCR's concluding observations noted that other small ethnic groups in BiH face similar problems.[376]
One example of the violation of the rights of the Roma community is the "relocation" of the Roma settlement in Ilidzha at the end of 2021, which left several families homeless. As compensation for the eviction from their homes, these families were placed in containerized housing in the Rakovica settlement near Sarajevo – without water, electricity or basic necessities.
The Roma Action Plan (Roma Action Plan) cites information that only 30 per cent do not have access to public health insurance, but experts from the RCNM CC draw attention to the data that the majority of the Roma population in BiH (70 per cent) do not have health insurance and also express concern about the lack of access to reproductive health care for Roma women.[377]
It is also reported that due to difficult access to health insurance, women give birth using someone else's health insurance – this leads to problems with registering children and obtaining basic documents, which is also a common problem among the Roma minority. The number of Roma facing lack of registration documents in BiH is reportedly 3,000.[378]
While preaching profusely about "freedom and democracy", London has returned to supporting fascist ideology in Europe, represented by the neo-Nazi Ukrainian regime that seized power in a coup in 2014.[379]
For example, the British authorities are providing political and military support to the puppet regime in Kiev. In January 2024, British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak and Vladimir Zelensky signed a ten-year "Security Co-operation Agreement" in Kiev, which envisages comprehensive assistance to Ukraine, including the strengthening of the Ukrainian armed forces, which includes neo-Nazi formations.[380] In August 2024, it was revealed that negotiations had begun with the UK on a bilateral agreement to move to a "stronger partnership" for 100 years.[381] Earlier in April 2024, Rishi Sunak announced that the UK would give Ukraine the biggest military aid package in the country's history providing Kiev with £500 million (about $624 million) worth of armaments.[382]
The aid also includes training of the Ukrainian military by British instructors. As reported by the Prime Minister's Office, the UK has trained 37,000 Ukrainian military officers over the past nine years. Since the start of the special military operation to demilitarize and denazify Ukraine and protect the peaceful population of Donbas, 15,000 Ukrainian military personnel have been trained in the UK. Between 2014 and 2022, British instructors trained a further 22,000 military personnel directly in Ukraine under the guidance of British instructors.[383] In 2023, the Chief of the General Staff of the British Armed Forces, Patrick Saunders, said that 30 to 40 per cent of all Ukrainian recruits had been trained by instructors from the UK.[384]
A document from the Danish embassy in Kiev revealed that even before the special military operation, NATO military instructors from Denmark and the UK were travelling to train Ukrainian fighters at a base belonging to the neo-Nazi group Azov; in a note verbale from the Danish embassy dated 21 May 2021, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence was informed that six instructors would arrive via Kiev's Borispol airport to the 56th brigade of the AFU in Berdyansk and Urzuf, where Azov's main base[385] was located at the time.
In 2018, the Guardian published an article stating that neo-Nazi groups involved in the fighting in Ukraine were actively seeking to recruit British far-right activists. According to the watchdog Hope Not Hate, an international neo-Nazi group called the Misanthropic Division, which is linked to the Azov Regiment, worked with representatives of UK-based far-right groups, including the banned terrorist organization National Action and a London-based Polish ultra-nationalist group, to recruit activists to travel to Ukraine.[386]
Speaking at the Eastern Economic Forum in September 2023, President Putin said that the Russia's Federal Security Service had captured several infiltrators from the Ukrainian security services, who were tasked with damaging one of Russia's nuclear power plants. At the same time, they said during questioning that they had trained under the guidance of British instructors.[387]
In 2022, the media showed images of members of the Azov Regiment, a Ukrainian neo-Nazi group, wearing their notorious Wolfsangel uniform patch, with anti-tank missiles made in Belfast.[388]
British mercenaries are being actively sent to Ukraine. In March 2024, the Russian Ministry of Defence reported that at least 822 mercenaries had arrived in Ukraine from the UK since February 2022.[389] Meanwhile, in an interview with BBC One's Sunday Morning Live at the start of the special military operation, the then Foreign Secretary Liz Truss, when asked if she would support anyone who wanted to go to Ukraine as a mercenary, said "absolutely".[390]
The Ukrainian national-patriotic greeting "Glory to Ukraine" has often been heard from representatives of the British political elite as they express their support for Kiev. Among others, Boris Johnson used it on a number of occasions when he was Prime Minister. For example, in August 2019, he was featured in a video dedicated to Ukraine's Independence Day. The footage shows him pronouncing the Banderite greeting[391] in his message on social media on 25 February 2022, later in an address to the Ukrainian parliament on 3 May 2022, and during a visit to Kiev on 17 June 2022.
The slogan "Glory to Ukraine" was also used by Prime Minister Rishi Sunak on Twitter on 19 July 2022 and 8 February 2023, by the UK Permanent Representative to the United Nations Dame Barbara Woodward in her closing remarks at the UN General Assembly on 28 February 2022; by the UK Permanent Representative to the UN Simon Manley in his speech on 12 May 2022, by the Senior Military Advisor to the UK Delegation to the OSCE Ian Stubbs in his speech on 6 April 2022, and by the Secretary of State for Defence Ben Wallace in a tweet on 15 May 2022.
In May 2024, three Azov fighters visited London and spoke to a group of British MPs. Victoria Prentice MP chaired the event. It is telling that the photos of this meeting show the Azov members in military uniforms, where it is impossible not to notice the Azov chevron with Nazi symbols, but apparently this fact does not raise any questions among British lawmakers.[392]
They were received by the country's former prime minister Boris Johnson, who called them "heroes" and was also posed for a picture with the war criminals, holding the Azov emblem – a yellow banner with the Nazi symbol Wolfsangel ("wolf hook"). This symbol was used by German divisions in the Second World War, including the 2nd SS Reich Panzer Division, which was notorious for its war crimes.[393]
The British mainstream media regularly whitewash and rehabilitate Ukrainian neo-Nazis, including members of the Azov Battalion, describing them as defenders and patriots of Ukraine. Since the start of Russia's special military operation in Ukraine, the following materials have been published. The BBC Russian service: articles dated 18 May 2022 about the defenders of Azovstal[394], material dated 27 February 2022 about the defenders of Mariupol[395]. The Times, 30 May 2022 piece about the Azov unit removing neo-Nazi symbols from its equipment because their presence is being used by "Russian propagandists" as evidence that the Azov members are Nazis[396]; 30 March 2022 article about the Azov Battalion being patriots who fight the real Nazis of the 21st century[397], 30 June 2022 story about the exchange of Azov Battalion "heroes"[398]. The Telegraph, 18 March 2022, article on the activities of the Azov Battalion[399], 15 May 2022, article about the Azov Battalion wives[400]. The article with the striking title "Ukraine's worship of Stepan Bandera shows its nationalism", published in The Times on 3 March 2023, is a blatant example of whitewashing Nazi criminals. It was written by Anthony Lloyd, a well-known British journalist, who tries to convince readers that the war criminal Stepan Bandera would not have been so popular in Ukraine if Russia had not used his figure to confirm the reincarnation of Nazi ideology in Ukraine, which contradicts the obvious chronology of the integration of nationalist views into the matrix of Ukrainian identity and later statehood.[401]
In Britain there are a number of monuments to Ukrainian collaborators of the Nazi. A plaque commemorating the 40th anniversary of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (ABN), a group of former Nazis and collaborators who fled to the West after the defeat of Nazi Germany in World War II, has been placed in Bradford. The memorial plaque reads that it was revealed by the President of the ABN, Yaroslav Stetsko, an associate and successor of Bandera, who was the head of the Provod of Ukrainian Nationalists and in 1941 the chairman of the Ukrainian State Board in the occupied Lvov.[402]
Two plaques commemorating the 14th SS Grenadier Division, also known as SS Galichina, have been placed at the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church of St Michael the Archangel in Derby, England. One of them is dedicated to the 60th anniversary of the division, the second one commemorates the Ukrainian SS men who died in the Battle of Brody in 1944, where most of the Hitlerites were eliminated by the Red Army.[403]
In Lockerbie, Scotland, there is a memorial to the mentioned Nazi division near an improvised chapel erected on the site of a former prisoner-of-war camp that once housed SS Galichina soldiers. The chapel attracted renewed interest in 2022 when it was used as a collection point for humanitarian aid for Ukraine. The coverage of this event often omits the fact that the chapel was built by Nazi collaborators. Notably, the chapel received a restoration grant in 2022.[404]
The country that fought the "brown plague" has monuments to the Nazis, because in 1947 Ukrainian SS prisoners (about 8,000), including those from the Galichina Division, were taken from Italy to Great Britain, one of the countries that were part of the anti-Hitler coalition during WWII. The "settlers" were not thoroughly checked for involvement in war crimes. By the early 1950s, the national government hurried to get rid of them – most were voluntarily or forcibly relocated (mostly to Canada and the United States). Their diaspora in the UK, however, has remained large. RIA Novosti cites Metropolitan Police data from 2003, according to which about 1,500 Galichina veterans received pensions and other social benefits in the UK. According to the Daily Mail[405], in 2016, there remained 25 of them. Moreover, the Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain (AUGB), which is still active today, was founded by former SS members.[406]
However, this is not the first time the Anglo-Saxons have nurtured Nazi regimes. In his article entitled "How the Anglo-Saxons promoted fascism in the 20th century and resuscitated it in the 21st. Five questions about history to our former allies"[407] Dmitry Medvedev, the Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, details their role in the emergence of German Nazism, and outlines the steps taken by Great Britain and the United States that contributed to the build-up of military and political power in Germany after the First World War. London, for example, focused heavily on political and diplomatic support for the Third Reich. Britain did everything it could to bring the National Socialist German Workers' Party into the leadership. An important Anglo-Saxon objective was to ensure that aggressive political fringe groups had the legitimacy to build up their military power. In addition, Britain's major industries, backed by the Bank of England, supplied Germany on credit with the raw materials needed for the war industry. The British firms Imperial Chemical Industries and Vickers were supplying commodities and critical materials for the needs of the German war industry. Anglo-Saxon loans, which went mainly to rebuild Germany's military-industrial potential, also played a role. By 1929, German industry was already the second largest in the world. In January 1932, the future Führer and Chancellor of the Reich – Adolf Hitler and Franz von Papen – met with the Governor of the Bank of England, Montagu Norman. The parties made a secret agreement to finance the National Socialist German Labour Party through banks in Sweden and Switzerland.[408]
Another confirmation of the imaginary nature of the alliance with the Soviet Union is the fact that in the spring of 1945, even before the victory over Nazism, the British military, on Churchill's instructions, began to develop a plan for Operation Unthinkable. The plan called for a surprise strike on 1 July 1945 by 47 British and American divisions against Soviet positions in North-eastern Europe and forcing the Red Army out of Poland. The possibility of supporting the British and American forces with 10 to 12 German divisions, which the Allies kept undisbanded in Schleswig-Holstein and southern Denmark, was considered. This plan was thwarted thanks to information obtained by Soviet intelligence. For more than half a century the British government emphatically denied the existence of the mentioned operation plan, but in 1998 the first reports of London's intentions were published in the British and international newspapers. These documents are now held by the British National Archives.[409]
In general, the British have kept alive the memory of their alliance with Russia during the Second World War. They recognize, but do not advertise, the decisive contribution of the Soviet people to the defeat of Nazism. In recent years, the ideas of an "equal responsibility of Germany and the USSR for unleashing the war" and "an agreement to divide Poland" have spread. This is usually done in anticipation of the next anniversary of the beginning and end of WWII, Remembrance Day, Holocaust Remembrance Day and other "generally accepted" dates of remembrance. At the same time, an overwhelming majority of local professors prefer not to engage in public revision of historical events associated with WWII or revise the outcomes of the war.
In December 2023, the UK delegation voted against the resolution "Combating glorification of Nazism, neo-Nazism and other practices that contribute to fuelling contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance" proposed every year by the Russian Federation and other co-authors to the General Assembly of the United Nations.
In May 2022, the Soviet War Memorial Foundation in London cancelled the traditional wreath-laying ceremony at the Soviet War Memorial on Victory Day.
On 24 February 2022, Glasgow suspended its town twinning agreement with Rostov-on-Don in solidarity with Ukraine.
On 22 March, Coventry City Council suspended its twinning relationship with Volgograd to explore options for twinning with Mariupol.
Finally, in 2022, all UK councils suspended all twinning activities with Russian cities as part of the government's overall support for Kiev.
On 18 January 2023, representatives of Manchester City Council refused to take part in commemorative events organized by the Embassy and Russian compatriots to mark the 80th anniversary of the breaking of the siege of Leningrad, despite the fact that Manchester and St Petersburg have been twin cities since 1962.
In 2023-2024, the British side did not invite Russian representatives to participate in commemorative events related to the common pages of history. At the same time, the British government did not object to the laying of wreaths at war memorials and graves in London, Manchester, Aldershot, Dundee, Lendalfoot, Errol and the Orkney Islands, including those attended by the Russian Ambassador to the United Kingdom and the Consul General in Edinburgh, or to visits to pre-revolutionary and Soviet war graves there.
Since February 2022 when the special military operation began, cases of harassment of Russian and Russian-speaking citizens have been registered across the country.
On 24 February 2022, Tom Tugendhat, a Conservative MP and then chair of the Foreign Affairs Parliamentary Committee, suggested that the UK could expel all Russians (including the Russian Ambassador) to protect the interests of the British people and international partners. His position was supported by Roger Gale, another Conservative MP, who on 28 February called for all Russians living in the UK to be "sent home". Labour leader Keir Starmer has made similar statements. The British law enforcement authorities, on the other hand, condone this kind of vociferousness at pro-Ukraine rallies held outside Russian diplomatic missions and other official institutions in the country.
The then Foreign Secretary David Cameron is also known to have made hostile anti-Russian statements. On 3 May 2024, in an interview with Reuters, he said that Ukraine had the right to strike Russian territory using British weapons.[410]
The situation being what it is, it is not surprising that coverage of Russia's special military operation to demilitarize and denazify Ukraine should, according to Ofcom, be exclusively pro-Western. The refusal to describe the events as an "invasion of a sovereign state" cost RT its broadcasting licence in the United Kingdom. In order to justify its decision, Ofcom cited 29 simultaneous investigations into the media company in order to verify the "due impartiality" of its coverage of the events in Ukraine.[411]
The conditions in which Russian media representatives have to work in Britain remain complicated even now. First of all, this is connected to the constant pressure exerted by the country's government. Our correspondents find it difficult to obtain information and make contacts. There have been cases where Russian journalists have had to wait for long periods for the British authorities to renew their work visas, effectively tying them to one place and preventing them from doing normal journalistic work. In addition, Russian media representatives face difficulties in obtaining UK visas for the first time.
Leaflets with the slogan "GOOD Russian = DEAD Russian", clearly borrowed from the 19th century American general Philip Sheridan who tarnished himself as an advocate of ruthless struggle against the indigenous Indian population of North America, were widely used by the owners of public places.
The Consular Section of the Russian Embassy to the United Kingdom was also attacked when "activists" pelted it with eggs and broke windows of the visitors' hall. In breach of the UK's international legal obligations, Russian diplomats' rights to work, to fair and favourable working conditions, to access to any service intended for the use of the general public, and to security of person and protection by the receiving State were compromised.
The spheres of culture and sports have not been spared the anti‑Russian hysteria. For instance, the British auction houses Christie's, Sotheby's, and Bonhams refused to hold auctions of Russian art.[412] The Royal Birmingham Conservatoire banned a Russian graduate from participating in a music competition in Dublin.[413] The Cardiff Philharmonic Orchestra refused to host a recital dedicated to the work of Pyotr Tchaikovsky.[414] The Royal Opera House cancelled the Bolshoi Ballet's London tour.[415] London's National Gallery decided to rename the painting "Russian Dancers" by Edgar Degas as "Ukrainian Dancers" at the request of some Ukrainian artist M.Naiem.[416]
Russian teams and individual racers were banned from competing in the UK. In particular, Nikita Mazepin, a Russian Formula One racing driver, was suspended from participation in the British Grand Prix.[417] Russian tennis players were also threatened that they would be suspended from Championships. For example, it was demanded that Daniil Medvedev should publicly condemn the Russian special operation if he wished to participate in Wimbledon.[418] As a result, all representatives of Russia and Belarus were excluded from the Championship under the pretext of "playing their part in the widespread efforts of Government, industry, sporting and creative institutions to limit Russia's global influence". This absurd decision by the All England Lawn Tennis and Croquet Club (AELTC) was opposed by the world's leading tennis players and major sports associations.
In February 2023, the United Kingdom opposed the option under consideration by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to allow Russian and Belarusian athletes to participate in the Olympic Games in a neutral status. Moreover, having formed around itself a "coalition of like-minded people" of 35 countries, the British authorities issued a joint statement calling the IOC, whose members are 193 countries, to ban athletes from Russia and Belarus from taking part in the upcoming competitions in France in 2024.
In March 2023, Sky News published the results of a journalistic investigation into a growing number of incidents of discrimination against Russian nationals since 2022. The newspaper noted that the assaults had occurred regardless of the victim's position in the special military operation, and only on the basis of nationality.[419]
Among the most egregious criminal offences documented by British law enforcement officers are beating, threats of death and serious bodily harm, vandalism and property damage, "white powder" mailing and "telephone terrorism". Shockingly, according to the publication, the victims of discrimination and attacks based on ethnicity were often children of primary school age. And these attacks, according to one of the experts interviewed, are only "the tip of the iceberg. In fact, there are many more such incidents: from the demand for businessmen to sever all relations with Russia to the imposition of restrictions on parishes of the Russian Orthodox Church in Great Britain.[420]
The 2024 presidential election was no exception. During the voting at the polling station at the Embassy of the Russian Federation in London, a protest action broke out in front of the diplomatic mission building, chanting anti-Russian slogans and obstructing the voters' access to the polling station. Russians living in the UK received threats just before the election.[421] Thanks to the active civic position and genuine patriotism of the Russians, attempts to sabotage the elections failed. The voter turnout reached an all time high – about 2.7 thousand Russian citizens used their constitutional right in the UK. This number is slightly higher than the number of those who voted in other European countries, where only one polling station was set up – in Russian Embassies.
The refusal of the British journal Nature to publish papers by Russian scientists that mention the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology is yet another example of nationalism. Previously, the journal refused to publish an article by Russian physicists in Nature Physics until they removed the reference to the institute that was under sanctions by the United States and some other Western countries.[422]
The roots of Nazism in Britain lie deep in the nation's past. In the 1920s and 1930s, the British authorities purposefully encouraged the spread of extreme radical ideology. There was a large number of pro-fascist groups in the UK. The activities of the British Union of Fascists (1932), led by aristocrat and millionaire Baronet Oswald Mosley, remain the most shameful page in British history. By 1934 there were at least 400 active branches of this organization in England, with an average membership of 50. The pro-fascist organizations did not win the general election in the UK, but they secured support for themselves. One of the documents of the German Foreign Ministry said that the Royal Court, the highest aristocracy, a significant part of the clergy, the Imperial General Staff and other influential circles in England were particularly favourable to National Socialism.[423]
All such groups were banned at the start of WWII, but new organizations soon sprang up. In 1947, Oswald Mosley founded the Union Movement, which brought together more than 50 smaller far-right groups. The right-wing leader argued for the unification of Western European countries, which he said was necessary to thwart the USSR's aggressive ambitions in Europe.
The collapse of the colonial system, resulting in the rapid growth of the migrant population, was a defining moment in the formation of British nationalist ideology. It was at this time that far-right groups focused on the idea of preserving the traditional British way of life, which has remained an important aspect of this ideology ever since. In addition, the far right, who often call themselves "the true conservatives", continue to advocate the unity of the United Kingdom as the territorial, cultural and racial successor to the British Empire, which appeals to a significant proportion of Britons.
Modern political correctness largely prefers to overlook the inconvenient fact that neo-Nazi groups are active in Britain. Despite similar doctrinal foundations, the far-right flank of the British political landscape is hardly united. They focus mainly on online activities, but also organize high-profile public events in major cities such as London, Birmingham, Manchester, Liverpool and Belfast. Striving to find a way into the political establishment, some of these groups have tried to abandon their most radical slogans. Instead of increasing their membership, however, they have faced an exodus of radicalized supporters.
The most prominent far-right organization until recently, the British National Party (BNP) was founded in 1982 by neo-Nazi leader John Tyndall. Throughout its history, the party has opposed mass immigration and strongly criticized the emergence of a "federal superstate in Europe", referring to the European Union. For a long time, the BNP's stated aims included the unification of the global, mainly European, far right, the preservation of "white British family" values, the complete closure of borders to migrants and the return of those who had already entered the country. It was not uncommon for its members to make anti-Semitic statements, including calling the Holocaust a historical mystification.
Despite vying for leadership of the local far right, the BNP's registered membership fell from 13.5 thousand in 2009 to 600 in 2021 due to internal disagreements. Notably, based on the party's 2021 accounts filed with the UK Electoral Commission (the 2022 accounts have not been published at the time of writing), and taking into account the approximate annual fee, this figure May be accurate. However, according to the BNP, the number of its supporters exceeded 3,000 people in 2020-2021.
Since its inception, the BNP has never been elected to parliament. In the 2019 general election, its sole candidate received just 510 votes. Its most notable electoral success was winning two seats in the European Parliament in 2009. However, these were lost in the 2014 general election.
Another noteworthy neo-Nazi group, which also functioned as a political party for some time, is Britain First. It was founded in 2011 by Jim Dowson and other former members of the BNP to oppose "Islamization" and mass migration to the UK. It proclaims as its primary purpose the protection of the traditional British way of life, ethnic and cultural heritage and Christian faith. Its members argued for a speedy Brexit to "save their society from the prevailing political correctness and multiculturalism madness". Britain First has a "combat wing" that calls itself the "party defence force".
The party made headlines in 2014 with a series of provocative actions against Muslims in London, Glasgow and Luton: attacks on mosques, distribution of anti-Muslim propaganda leaflets and protesting near the homes of Muslim community leaders. "Christian patrols" of up to 12 activists were also set up in London to "counter Islamic extremism" (their actions were condemned by clergy representing both the Muslim community and the Anglican Church). On several occasions, BNP leaders have been prosecuted for nationalist statements and insulting religious groups.
The English Defence League is another influential far-right group. It emerged spontaneously in the form of a street demonstration in March 2009 against Marches by Al Muhajiroun, an Islamic group, against Luton parades of British soldiers returning from Afghanistan. The group is led by Tim Ablitt, a far-right activist. It is an informal movement made up mainly of young people who openly oppose the "Islamization" of the nation. Its main form of activity is to hold Marches and demonstrations, organizing public protests against the building of new mosques and against any attributes of Islamic culture being "imposed" on the British.
Researchers of far-right movements in the UK note that since around 2020, traditional far-right groups have been losing ground, giving way to groups with more flexible ideologies that are able to adapt to changing circumstances. The deaths of the most influential neo-Nazi figures, former BNP deputy leader Richard Edmonds and neo-Nazi political activist Eddy Morrison, are arguably the main reason for this. With their departure, the National Front, Blood and Honour and Combat 18, once a serious threat to the country's security, have all but ceased to operate in the UK.
Since 2020, the Patriotic Alternative, founded by former BNP official Mark Collett, has grown in popularity. Experts say it has become a major player in the world of far-right organizations.[424] It primarily targets teenagers and young adults and uses the Internet and modern technology: members communicate via social networks and messengers, computer games promoting violence are also used to recruit new members.
In one case in 2020, the content posted on social media by Scottish supporters of the Patriot Alternative inspired a series of attacks on people of Asian descent. Among other things, radicals vandalized Asian-owned shops by drawing Nazi symbols and writing racist slogans.[425]
The Patriotic Alternative opposes "leniency" towards Black people. In particular, members of the organization have held unauthorized "White Lives Matter" rallies in response to Black Lives Matter Marches. In June 2020, more than 100 far-right protesters turned up at an anti-racism rally in London with Nazi flags, rioted and assaulted several police officers.[426]
The same tactic was used by the Democratic Football Lads Alliance, which held 26 protest rallies against Black Lives Matter.[427]
In May 2020, Stand Up X (SUX), a far-right movement, was founded. It brought together far-right activists (such as Jeff Wyatt from Wales), anti-Semites (such as David Icke, who popularized the anti-Zionist idea that 5G masts contributed to the spread of the coronavirus) and conspiracy theorists (such as Piers Corbin). According to human rights organization Hope Not Hate, the group is expected to remain active in the coming years, holding street rallies and attracting new supporters and public figures to its ranks.[428]
The British Movement, a neo-Nazi organization founded in 1968 (a political party until 1983), has maintained its position. This group also focuses on online activity. It is one of the few national socialist groups still openly active in the UK. The movement has active units in London, Kent, South Wales, the East Midlands, Yorkshire, Humberside, as well as in Scotland and Northern Ireland. Its members maintain close links with the notorious Northern Resistance Movement. Among other things, the group is known for publishing its own regular newsletter containing information designed to undermine the credibility of the national government.[429]
In the UK, some far-right organizations are listed as proscribed under the Terrorism Act 2000.[430]
One of the most notorious of these is National Action, which the authorities classified as a "racist neo-Nazi group", founded in 2013 and banned in December 2016. Its ideology is based on the idea of an imminent "race war" in Great Britain and the use of violence against ethnic minorities and perceived "white race traitors". National Action's online propaganda material, distributed via social media, condones and glorifies terrorism and the crimes of the extreme right.
The Home Office considers that Scottish Dawn, NS131 National Socialist Anti-Capitalist Action and System Resistance Network are to be regarded as front groups for National Action (and their activities are therefore also banned).
In April 2021, a 22-year-old Met Police officer was found guilty on charges of terrorism. The young man had been a member of National Action for several years, possessed information that could be used to prepare terrorist acts and failed to declare this when he joined the police. At the same time, it was noted that the corresponding job application form only mentioned the legalized BNP. According to a spokesman of the Metropolitan Police Counter Terrorism Command, this is the first time a police officer has been officially recognized as a follower of such an ideology.[431] The case prompted a discussion among members of the UK law enforcement community about a possible review of national security vetting procedures.
In December 2021, Ben Raymond, a co-founder of National Action, was sentenced to eight years in prison with the right to parole two years before the end of his sentence. In addition to his active involvement in the development of the neo-Nazi group, the court found that he had kept Norwegian terrorist Anders Breivik's manifesto and instructions for making explosives in his home. Ben Raymond became the 17th member of National Action to be prosecuted for being a member of this outlawed organization.[432]
According to the NGO Hope Not Hate, a total of 20 supporters of extreme right-wing ideology (9 of them underage) were convicted of terrorist offences in 2022, and another person committed suicide after attempting to carry out a terrorist attack. Furthermore, 49 per cent of all people arrested on suspicion of involvement in terrorist activity in the year to September 2022 are believed to be associated with the far right.[433]
Sonnenkrieg Division (SKD), a white supremacist group with the characteristically German-sounding name, a splinter group and largely a successor to National Action, was banned in February 2020. In 2019, several members of the group were convicted of terrorism and possession of material that could be used to prepare terrorist attacks.
In July 2020, Feuerkrieg Division (FKD) was banned. Based on a similar ideology, FKD is a group operating in several countries.
In 2021, in addition to the political wing of the Palestinian HAMAS movement and 14 groups from Northern Ireland, the Atomwaffen Division (AWD, also known as the National Socialist Order), a white supremacist group based in the US and emulated by the British far right, was added to the list of proscribed organizations.[434]
One of the most striking manifestations of neo-Nazism in recent years was the scandalous use of Nazi symbols by the Royal Marines in June 2019. During an initiation, they drew a swastika on the chest of one of their fellow officers and then posted photos of him on social media. Notably, this is not the first time members of the British Armed Forces have displayed Nazi symbols: in 2013, two British soldiers serving in Afghanistan were photographed posing with their hands raised in a Nazi salute against the backdrop of their country's flag.
British law does not criminalize the activities of far-right organizations. Their activities can only be forcibly terminated if they are recognized as terrorist groups under the Terrorism Act. This May be done if the authorities believe that such an organization is "involved in terrorist activities", namely, "commits or participates in terrorist acts, prepares for the commission of a terrorist act, promotes and encourages terrorist sentiments (including illegal glorification of terrorism) or is otherwise associated with terrorist activities". From the moment an organization is recognized as prohibited, belonging to it (or admitting such affiliation), providing assistance (making a call for assistance), as well as displaying the symbols of such an organization (including clothing) are crimes and are punishable by imprisonment for a period of six months to 10 years and/or a fine.
The latter was recognized to be a serious terrorist threat in a UK Government policy paper titled "Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy"[435] presented in March 2021. Home Office statistics show that as of 30 September 2022, there were 239 people in custody in the UK for terrorism-related offences; of those in custody, 66 were qualified as holding an extreme right-wing ideology. By comparison, 155 prisoners were reported as "Islamists". White people accounted for the highest number of terrorism-related arrests – 91 out of 190.[436]
The United Kingdom has sought to extend the responsibility for extremism to cover actions that do not involve the use of physical violence. On 7 October 2019, the UK Government's Commission for Countering Extremism published a report titled Challenging Hateful Extremism, which defined a new category of extremist behaviour – hateful extremism – alongside terrorism and violent extremism. Hateful extremism refers to behaviours that can incite and amplify hate, or engage in persistent hatred, or equivocate about and make the moral case for violence; and that draw on hateful, hostile or supremacist beliefs directed at an out-group who are perceived as a threat to the wellbeing, survival or success of an in-group; and that cause, or are likely to cause, harm to individuals, communities or wider society.[437]
Symptomatically, young Britons account for most of the growing support for radical ideologies. In this context, the following high-profile case deserves special mention. In March 2021, a 16-year-old boy was given a two-year rehabilitation order for possessing and distributing "right-wing material"; he was the suspected leader of the British branch of the aforementioned Feuerkrieg Division (it was established that he had been involved in the illegal activity since the age of 13). The judge's decision to spare the boy from jail was explained by the fact that he had expressed a desire to follow a better path, causing a backlash from members of the Muslim community, who said that a Muslim in a similar situation would have been imprisoned.
Another distinctive feature of the far-right landscape has been the spread of so-called "green nationalism". Its followers, the eco-fascists, essentially justify traditional neo-Nazi attitudes through environmentalist causes. In particular, they advocate the reduction of the world's population on the basis of race and nationality in order to preserve humanity and prevent a shortage of natural resources. This approach to environmental problems is particularly consistent with the ideology of Sonnenkrieg Division, which sees refugee flows as the "great replacement" of the White race.[438]
The Public Order Act 1986 prohibits incitement to racial hatred and provides for imprisonment from 6 months to 7 years and/or a fine for intentionally doing so against a racial group, distributing racist material, making inflammatory speeches, creating racist websites on the internet or distributing information against a person or ethnic group with the intention of spreading racial resentment.
The Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 introduced into British law the concept of offences related to incitement of hatred for religious reasons (punishable by up to 7 years of imprisonment and/or a fine). The provisions of this law apply if verbal language, behaviour, written materials, video and audio recordings, or programs "pose a threat" or "are aimed to incite religious hatred". Discriminatory actions based on religious beliefs in the workplace May also constitute an offence under this act in certain circumstances.
Another legal instrument aimed at combating discrimination is the 2010 Equality Act. It prohibits insults, harassment, and any form of discrimination in the workplace, including that on the grounds of race or religious belief.
At the supranational level, the United Kingdom is a member of the 1995 CoE Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM) (ratified in 1998). Officially, London states that it "respects the rights of ethnic minorities living in the country", speaks of its "constant efforts to eradicate discrimination, support the development of ethnic culture and identity" and emphasizes "government guarantees of their rights and freedoms, including access to education and the media, protection of minority languages and participation of minorities in public life".
Despite the developed legislative and law enforcement tools, racism and its manifestations represent a chronic challenge for British society resulting from its shameful colonial past. The UN Human Rights Council's Working Group of Experts on People of African Descent, which visited the country in January 2023, described the current situation of racism as "deeply worrying". Moreover, despite the recommendations made after the previous visit in 2012 and the subsequent research carried out by the British, the situation has in some respects worsened over the past decade.
There is systemic racism, bias and discriminatory policing, resulting in acute social inequality, according to the post-visit report. People of African descent suffer more than twice the unemployment, poverty, and nearly four times the homelessness in the UK. Nearly half of Black people in the UK live in poverty.[439]
In terms of specific manifestations of racism, considerable attention is given to discrimination against people of African descent in law enforcement agencies, the judiciary and the penitentiary system: direct or indirect manslaughter, neglect in prisons by staff, disproportionately frequent and harsh use of police stop and search – the police carried out over 5,000 stop and searches of children and young people in 2019-2021; significantly, 75 per cent of incidents involved people of African, Asian and other non-British descent.
In its concluding observations on the eighth periodic report of the United Kingdom (March 2024), the Human Rights Committee (HRCtte) expresses concern at reports that racial inequality and discriminatory practices against Roma, people of African descent and other minority groups are on the rise and continue to be overlooked by the authorities, despite a number of positive steps taken by the government in this regard. In particular, the Committee is concerned at reports that significant inequalities persist due to systemic racism and disproportionate and discriminatory treatment of people of African descent and other ethnic minorities by the police, including discrimination in the criminal justice system, the over-representation of people of African descent and ethnic minorities in detention centres, bias in the judiciary, the lack of participation of such minorities in policy and decision-making, as well as the lack of involvement of people of African descent and other ethnic minorities in decision-making, and unjustified racial and ethnic bias in stop and search.[440]
In 2020 in London, the case of "Child Q" had far-reaching reverberations, when a Black female child of secondary school age was subjected to a humiliating strip search in her school doctor's office. The strip search was carried out because a teacher suspected that Child Q might have brought drugs to school. When the teachers found nothing in the girl's personal belongings, they called the police for help. The police arrived and strip-searched the child without the presence of an adult representative and without informing her mother. During the search, the police did not find any drugs in the girl's possession. The child needed psychological help after the stress.
According to the March 2022 Local Safeguarding Children Practice Review commissioned by the City and Hackney Safeguarding Children's Partnership, the decision to conduct a strip search in Child Q's case was likely to have been racially motivated.[441]
The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) draws attention to the continued use of unnecessary stops and searches of children. The experts are particularly concerned that the majority of these cases involve children from ethnic minorities.[442]
In February 2021, the number of young Black inmates aged 15 to 21 in children's prisons was estimated to be 51 per cent of the total number of young inmates (40 per cent in 2017). Experts say this is due to a combination of factors, including reduced funding for local authorities, police, mental health services, increased confiscation of homes from African families, etc.[443] Children of Caribbean descent are reportedly 3.5 times more likely to be excluded from public schools than other pupils.
There are serious challenges in the health care system. It is emphasized that the racial inequalities affect the reproductive health and rights of women of African descent. Black women are almost four times more likely to die during pregnancy or immediately after childbirth. Black babies are twice as likely to be stillborn as white babies.
Human rights defenders are alarmed by violations of the principle of legal equality and systemic racial discrimination in the British judiciary.[444] In November 2022, the University of Manchester published the report "Racial Bias and the Bench"[445], which found that the courts in England and Wales were "institutionally racist". According to the survey of reputable legal professionals cited in the report, over half of the survey respondents stated they had repeatedly witnessed manifestations of racial intolerance and ethnic discrimination by judges during their career, being reflected, above all, in their judicial rulings. In a survey of legal professionals, over a half said they had witnessed at least one judge acting in a racially biased way towards a defendant, including discrimination in judicial decision-making. The study also criticizes the governmental Judicial Diversity and Inclusion Strategy 2020–2025, inter alia, for failing to mention racial bias or racism.
The courts suffer from institutional racism, impacting, above all, attorneys and court personnel of African descent. Lawyers of African descent report being interrogated as to their purpose for being in courtrooms, subject to inferences that they were non-legal personnel or intruders, and subject to professionalism and credibility challenges for raising racism, even where race was directly at issue. Ninety‑five per cent of lawyers believe institutional racism persists in the courts, over half of whom speak from personal experience. Lawyers of African descent report being interrogated as to their purpose for being in courtrooms and subject to professionalism and credibility challenges.[446]
Non‑white Britons are disproportionately targeted throughout the criminal justice system.[447] They are the most frequent victims of abuse by British law enforcement authorities. Data from the London Police Service published in August 2017 showed that Black and ethnic minority people, particularly those of the Caribbean origin, were twice as likely to die due to excessive use of force by law enforcement officers and subsequent lack of access to proper medical care as White Britons. Although African, Asian and minority ethnic groups make up only 14 per cent of the total population, they account for 25 per cent of the prison population. At the same time 40 per cent of the pre‑detained young people are also non‑whites. Human rights defenders point out that the Metropolitan Police Service's Organized Crime Suspects Database has been criticized on the grounds that the number of young black men in the database is disproportionate to the likelihood of their association with the criminal world.[448]
African British people continue to be subjected to unwarranted stops and searches. The most recent high-profile incident at the time of writing occurred in Worcester on 17 July 2024. According to the UK Home Office's July 2024 update, between April 2022 and March 2023, there were as many as 245 arbitrary stop and searches for every 10,000 black people. In comparison, there were 85 and 59 stop and searches for every 10,000 Asian and white people respectively. However, the rate of stop and searches of black people has fallen significantly compared to previous years.
In October 2020, the Office for National Statistics published data showing that people of African descent were 18 (!) times more likely to be racially profiled. What is more, the UK is the first European country to face the issue of institutional racial profiling by the police using technical means, namely test trials of facial recognition technology.
A 2023 INQUEST report[449] on discrimination documented a disproportionate number of deaths of people of African descent "in or following police custody" in recent years. In absolute terms, the number of deaths of people of African descent is much lower than that of white British people (23 to 86 between 2012 and 2021), but they are still far more likely to die than the proportion of the population they represent. The report concluded that black people were seven times more likely to die than white people when restraint was involved. None of the deaths of black people led to officers being disciplined for racism, it was noted. Needless to say, there's a parallel with the United States of America, where this situation mirrors that of its former mother country.
An independent review into the standards of behaviour and internal culture of the Metropolitan Police Service by Baroness Casey, a member of the House of Lords of the British Parliament,[450] testifies to the prevalence of racism in the Met. It was launched after the high‑profile murder of Sarah Everard, aged 33, by a police officer two years prior. The paper draws shocking conclusions about the institutional racism and misogyny in the organization. The report criticizes the Met's recruitment policy that has resulted in gender inequality and under-representation of ethnic groups living in London.
According to a study by Fawcett Society and the Runnymede Trust, three-quarters of women of non‑European descent (about 2,000 women from this group participated in the study along with 1,000 women of European descent) experience racism in the workplace, and just over a quarter faced racist hate speech. More than 60 per cent of non‑White respondents reported having to hide their ethnicity by changing their hairstyles, clothing style, eating habits, and way of speaking. Women of Indian origin also reported changing their names. Forty-two per cent of non-British women say that their superiors favour white employees when making promotion decisions. One third of women of Indian, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi ancestry say their promotion was not only discouraged, but also prevented. By comparison, only 20 per cent (which is also quite a few) of British women of European descent reported such negative experience. More than half of the women in the first group had also experienced discrimination in hiring.[451]
The fact that international human rights monitoring bodies have repeatedly expressed concern over the sharp rise in racially motivated hate crimes over the years (the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) in August 2016[452], the Human Rights Committee (HRCttee) in July 2019[453], the Committee against Torture (CAT) in May 2024)[454] testifies to the chronic nature of racism in the UK. Furthermore, despite the recent rise in reported hate crimes, they remain significantly under-reported due to a lack of trust in the police.
Strong anti‑Gypsy sentiments continue to permeate British society, according to the latest opinion of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (ACFCNM), published in May 2023. Additionally, the number of crimes committed against members of other ethnic and religious minorities, particularly Jews and Muslims, has significantly increased. At the same time, experts have found that government policies not only fail to address the stereotypes about vulnerable groups, but in some cases make the situation worse by fuelling indirect discrimination against them.[455]
The ACFCNM notes that the situation of people of African and Asian descent and Irish Travellers (a nomadic ethnic community, own name Pavees)[456] is particularly alarming in Northern Ireland. Northern Ireland has the highest rate of hate crime in the UK per capita. Furthermore, Travellers do not have adequate representation and participation in political life. The lack of equality data in Northern Ireland prevents concrete solutions being elaborated.[457]
Despite active public condemnation and wide media coverage of anti-Semitism in the UK, human rights activists consider the situation in this area to be highly unsatisfactory. The Special Rapporteur of the UN Human Rights Council on contemporary forms of racism E.Tindayi Achiume in her report to the 74th session of the UN General Assembly on contemporary manifestations of racism and the fight against the glorification of Nazism, pursuant to the UN General Assembly resolution 73/157, draws attention to the large scale of the issue.[458]
As the crisis in the Middle East escalates, the UK has seen a rise in crimes motivated by religious and ethnic hatred. For example, in 2023, the number of anti-Semitic incidents across the country reached 4,103 – a doubling compared to 2022 and a record high since 1984.[459]
At the same time, at the end of 2023, there was a sevenfold increase in the number of hate incidents against the Muslims. Only between October 2023 to February 2024, 2,010 incidents of Islamophobia were recorded. Most of them happen online, but at the same time, there have been numerous cases of physical assault and harassment.[460]
The Attorney General's Office reports that in 2023, 12,737 alleged hate crime cases were brought to court and resulted in a conviction. Of these, 9,245 were racially motivated offences, while 420 were committed on the grounds of religious belief.[461]
The UK is one of the top five countries in Europe with the largest number of hate crimes against Christians. "The Costs of Keeping the Faith"[462] a report from Voice for Justice UK, a Christian organization, has found that British Christians are increasingly suffering harassment and discrimination. The report based on a survey of 1,562 people say that those who hold Christian views were being marginalized and treated with contempt, which particularly affects younger people. The data showed that 56 per cent of respondents had experienced hostility and ridicule talking about their faith and beliefs (the figure reached as much as 61 per cent for the younger age group). More than a half of the respondents felt that there were negative stereotypes about Christians at their place of work; 38 per cent under 35 believed that their freedom was restricted. Seventy-eight per cent of them said that religious discrimination was taken not as seriously as discrimination against other protected characteristics. The research identified hundreds of cases where Christians faced censorship, persecution, harassment or discrimination, often with negative consequences for employment or promotion.[463]
Despite attempts to turn over the shameful pages of its colonial past, its consequences are increasingly affecting Britain's international image. In March 2024 a series of articles[464] appeared in the local press on the fate of half a million Indians taken by Britain to the Caribbean to replace African slave labourers. In historiography they are known as "coolies", although this term is now bashfully avoided by the former British exploiters, who consider it offensive. They were wage workers on paper, but in reality they were tricked into a bondage relationship – being in unbearable working conditions, they were restricted in their rights and were little different from slaves. Even though they had signed agreements, in 90 per cent of the cases, they were never paid for their work and were unable to return home at the end of their "contracts".
Guyana, where more than 40 per cent of the population is descended from people imported from India in 1838 and from China in 1853, is currently launching a campaign to defend their interests. In an interview with the Daily Telegraph, Guyana's President Mohamed Irfaan Ali recalled the atrocities of the British exploiters and called for an acknowledgement of historical wrongs.
According to media reports, Guyana is planning to set up a special commission to study the damage caused by the exploiters, determine its monetary equivalent and work out mechanisms for seeking compensation. It is planned that this topic will be brought up for discussion by the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), a regional grouping of Caribbean countries. In 2014, the organization had already sent the former colonial powers a proposal for compensation – the "Regional Justice Plan". However, the "democratic" Western European capitals then arrogantly ignored these calls.
Although British officials condemn their country's colonial past, they have historically rejected the idea of compensating victims of colonialism. David Cameron, who had many slave owners among his ancestors, mentioned this when he was Prime Minister in 2015.[465] The former head of the Cabinet, Rishi Sunak, refused to make any apologies for London's role in the slave trade. It is worth noting that one of the largest slave owners in the 19th century, John Gladstone, was the father of future Prime Minister William Gladstone.[466]
Allegations that British Special Air Service (SAS) troops committed numerous killings of unarmed people in Afghanistan between 2010 and 2013 continue to receive media attention. In July 2022, the BBC released the results of its own investigation into war crimes committed by SAS special forces against civilians in Afghanistan. They reported that there was evidence of British Army involvement in the killing of 54 Afghan civilians over a six-month period in 2010-2011. According to the evidence presented, the SAS acted with the connivance of their immediate and superior commanders, who were aware of significant abuses of authority by their subordinates.
In June 2023, lawyers representing the Afghan dead, Leigh Day, a British law firm, said they had documented a further 25 "suspicious" deaths.[467] In total, the lawyers claim, there have been 30 "suspicious" incidents in the four years in question, resulting in at least 80 deaths.
An independent statutory inquiry is investigating alleged unlawful activities by UK Special Forces during deliberate detention operations in Afghanistan in the period mid-2010 to mid-2013 is under way under the chairmanship of Justice Charles Haddon-Cave. The testimony of Johnny Mercer, who was the deputy head of the Cabinet Office and the Veterans Minister of the Conservative government, caused particular resonance. At the hearing in February 2024, he cited unnamed military sources when he said that weapons carried by UK Special Forces units were planted on the bodies of Afghan civilians killed during a mission, to justify the attacks.[468]
It is noteworthy that the Chairman of the Inquiry asked Mr Mercer for the identities of the soldiers who had leaked the facts. Despite assurances of confidentiality, the deputy minister refused to provide such information. He explained that he didn't want to put unprotected informants in a vulnerable position. Mercer was ordered to reveal the sources by 25 July 2024. If he failed to do so, he was threatened with enforcement action under the law.
The investigation does not aim to prosecute the perpetrators, as the Foreign Military Operations Act, which came into force in April 2021, only sets a five-year statute of limitations on criminal liability for such acts. Its extension is provided for only in exceptional cases by decision of the Attorney General. The law also limits the possibility of extending the limitation period for bringing civil actions for damages caused by such military operations (which May not exceed six years in any event). A report will be issued following the proceedings.[469]
Amid the lack of meaningful progress in the investigation, another flurry of discussion about the "Afghan dossier" prompted a series of articles in The Times. The journalists travelled to Afghanistan's Helmand province for the first time since the Taliban came to power, where they spoke to victims' relatives and eyewitnesses to gather further evidence of British military atrocities.[470]
In the context of the inquiry, some commentators have mentioned that resettlement applications from former Afghan soldiers, who were involved in joint operations with British special forces, have been blocked. The relevant decisions are subject to the approval of the United Kingdom Special Forces (UKSF) Command, in accordance with the procedure laid down by the authorities. The journalists believe that British special forces are obstructing their resettlement in the UK in order to prevent them from taking part in the investigation as witnesses.[471]
In 2018, Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament published reports regarding the maltreatment of detainees and extradition of suspects following its investigation into the actions of British intelligence and security services. The investigation was prematurely terminated because crucial evidence could not be obtained – British authorities had banned intelligence officers from giving evidence. Nevertheless, the findings on the possible involvement of UK military personnel in torture contained in the documents produced were of particular concern to CAT.
The committee also noted that none of around 3,400 allegations of unlawful killings, torture and ill-treatment committed by UK military personnel in Iraq between 2003 and 2009 received by the Iraq Inquiry Team resulted in criminal prosecutions. Moreover, before its work ceased in June 2017, the Team's remaining investigations were transferred to the Service Police, which had closed most of the cases of allegations.[472] The Committee expressed its regret that no prosecutions or further investigations had been carried out in relation to the allegations of war crimes committed by British soldiers in Iraq and called to repeal or amend the Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Act 2021.[473]
The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) expressed its dismay over the fact that the British authorities protect their military personnel who have repeatedly committed murder and torture. In particular, it was pointed out that no one has the right to impose a statute of limitations on forced disappearance, since the latter is a crime that has no statute of limitations. However, the lack of prosecution deprives the victims of the right to justice and reparation.[474]
In parallel, media outlets have been circulating criticism of the British authorities for numerous offences in Kenya. In particular, representatives of the British training unit BATUK have been accused of violence, sexual harassment, negligent handling and loss of ammunition,[475] and the use of chemicals during training exercises. The unsolved murder of 21‑year‑old Kenyan woman A.Wanjiru in March 2012, committed, according to investigators, by British servicemen, captured the headlines.
In August 2023, the Kenyan Parliament's Defence, Intelligence and International Relations Committee initiated its own public inquiry into the actions of the British troops. During the hearings, which began in May 2024, people who had lived near British Army bases said they had developed health problems (including respiratory and eye conditions, congenital diseases), physical trauma and suffered from soldier misconduct.[476] Kenya Veterans for Peace confirmed the facts of physical violence and deliberate harm by BATUK personnel against local people.[477]
In October 2023 (a few days before the visit of King Charles III), a Nairobi court ordered BATUK to pay for the destructive fire caused by the unit's careless actions during military exercises in 2021. Commentators suggested that London deliberately slowed down the proceedings in order to delay or avoid redress altogether.[478]
The UK has often been criticized by the Council of Europe's human rights institutions. In particular, Strasbourg is concerned about the Conservative government's Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Act 2023.
Despite criticism from international organizations, a number of states (primarily Ireland) and human rights activists, the above‑mentioned law was passed in the UK on 18 September 2023 retaining its most controversial provisions. It envisages the establishment of the so‑called Independent Commission for Reconciliation and Information Recovery (ICRIR), which will establish the circumstances of the offences during the Ulster conflict. Crimes that have not yet been investigated will not be prosecuted if the perpetrators agree to cooperate fully with the new Commission. The law also includes a commitment not to open new criminal cases where there was no murder or grievous bodily harm, not to consider new civil actions and not to launch quasi-judicial "coroner's inquests".
As opponents of the law point out, such "immunity" will be available to ex‑militants from the republican and unionist underground, as well as former British military personnel involved in the death or injury of civilians. Many perceive the "novella" as a loss of opportunity to bring justice to those affected by the conflict.
On 19 January 2024, the Irish government initiated a lawsuit against London at the ECtHR in response to the law. Dublin insists that a number of provisions of the act contravene provisions of the ECHR – Article 2 (right to life), Article 3 (prohibition of torture), Article 6 (right to a fair trial) and Article 13 (right to an effective remedy).
The Labour Party, which came to power in the UK following the general election on 4 July 2024, has repeatedly stated its intention to repeal the Northern Ireland act. The government reiterated its intention to do so in its Legislative Agenda published on 17 July 2024.
One of the most high-profile cases during Northern Ireland's inter-community conflict was the brutal murder of republican lawyer Pat Finucane in February 1989. Human rights defenders are concerned about the British government's refusal to hold a new public inquiry into the circumstances of the case, including the alleged involvement of British intelligence services. In its judgment of 1 July 2003, the ECtHR pointed out numerous inadequacies in the investigation of the murder. However, the verdict did not demand a new trial from the UK government. In 2019 The UK Supreme Court also commented on the actions of the investigative authorities in the context of the Finucane case. In December 2022, following a further application by the family of the deceased, the High Court of London concluded that the mentioned violations had never been remedied by the British authorities.[479] On 11 July 2024, a group of British human rights organisations and Finucane's family said they hoped the situation would change if Labour came to power. They called on the government to initiate a parliamentary enquiry into the incident. The Cabinet has not reacted to it so far.
With the arrival of irregular migrants in the wake of the coronavirus pandemic, protests have become a prominent phenomenon in the places of their compact settlement with a significant racial component due to the origins of these people (mostly from the Middle East, North Africa, South and Southeast Asia). While the protests reflect to some extent the dissatisfaction of Britons with the lawlessness in their districts (especially in the face of the deepening socio-economic crisis in Britain itself), experts suggest that the protests are also inspired by the provocative activities of the far right.
Overall, according to the NGO Hope But Not Hate, the "hunt for migrants" increased by 102 per cent in 2022 compared to the previous year. In 2022 alone, far-right activists visited accommodation housing migrants and asylum seekers at least 253 times.[480]
In August 2024, street clashes between opponents of immigration, including far-right groups, and the police, as well as migrants themselves, swept the country. It was prompted by the brutal murder of three little girls by a 17‑year-old criminal whose family had previously fled Rwanda to the UK to escape atrocities and genocide. Experts say the resentment in society has been building for a long time, as the country's authorities have deliberately encouraged radicalism among newcomers and their unwillingness to integrate into British society over the past decades.[481] According to the Guardian, the forum, which was key to organizing the first protest that turned into a riot in Southport, was allegedly jointly run by a suspected neo-Nazi, who is believed to be based overseas. He is alleged to have called previously for attacks overseas on Jewish places of worship, according to research by the Community Security Trust (CST). In 2023, he was reported to the police for alleged encouragement of violent antisemitism.[482]
The Illegal Migration Act, approved on 20 July 2023, caused mixed reactions in the British society and serious criticism from local and foreign human rights activists, representatives of the UN and the Council of Europe. They say the law essentially denies "genuine refugees" the opportunity to seek protection in the UK and is "cruel" to the most vulnerable migrant groups.[483] For example, the British authorities shall not consider asylum applications from persons who have entered the territory of the United Kingdom illegally. Illegal migrants shall be detained for up to 28 days, after which they shall be deported to "safe countries" (either the country of origin or transit, or a "third country") without the right to return to the UK. Exceptions shall be made for unaccompanied minors, the seriously ill, and those who would face "serious and irreversible harm" in the country of deportation. However, children and pregnant women are also subject to detention, albeit for shorter periods than other persons.
The law also contains provisions that would allow the Home Secretary, in certain circumstances, to ignore temporary injunctions issued by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) to suspend the deportation of illegal migrants[484] which, judging by the media, is what the "reformers" have consistently sought.
Ms Siobhán Mullally, HRC Special Rapporteur on Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children, has expressed concern about the United Kingdom's policy on asylum seekers. In June 2022, for example, she criticized the April 2022 agreement with Rwanda to transfer people seeking international protection who had entered the UK illegally to Rwanda. Special Rapporteur Mullally said that such a practice violates the international legal principle of non-refoulement and does nothing to prevent human trafficking. Therefore, the Special Rapporteur urged the United Kingdom to halt plans to forcibly transfer asylum seekers to third countries.[485]
Not only human rights defenders condemned these plans as inhumane, but also Theresa May, former Prime Minister and Home Secretary. She expressed her displeasure with the new migration policy, questioning its "legality and efficacy".
The most controversial was the passage through parliament and adoption of the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill. It provided for the recognition of the African republic as safe for migrants in relation to the implementation of the "Rwanda Scheme", the reduction of the grounds for appeal against expulsion decisions and the freedom to enforce the ECtHR interim measures in relation to the "scheme". Once the act came into force on 25 April 2024, the UK Home Office began preparing the removal flights. For example, they began sending illegal immigrants who were subject to deportation to temporary detention centres. The concentration of a large number of persons in such centres at short notice made it difficult to provide adequate conditions of accommodation.
This scheme was abolished by the Labour government formed on 5 July 2024. The government has not yet considered the possibility of its implementation with Rwanda. From what can be ascertained, the candidates for expulsion who had previously been sent to temporary detention centres have been released. However, Prime Minister Starmer announced on 18 July 2024 that there was a potential interest in sending illegals to third countries to have their applications for asylum in Britain processed there.
In January 2022, Ms Siobhán Mullally also raised concerns about the Nationality and Borders Bill, the provisions of which she said would encourage discrimination and serious human rights abuses in the UK. In particular, the document does not oblige the state to ensure the protection of migrants and asylum‑seeking children, while certain provisions risk increasing the number of people without nationality.[486] Despite criticism, including from domestic experts, the Bill was passed by the British Parliament in April 2022. The act essentially deprived foreigners of the right to seek asylum from the British authorities if they have arrived in the UK illegally and not directly from the state where their "life and freedom were threatened". The measure is aimed at illegal migrants who arrive in the UK in small boats across the English Channel (28,500 people in 2021, more than 10,000 in the first half of 2022), and who, after traveling through France and other continental European countries, do not meet the criteria of having arrived directly from a "dangerous" country.
In the second half of 2021, amid a growing number of illegal migrants arriving in the UK in small vessels through the English Channel, UK Home Office officials repeatedly stated that the Border Force has the power to physically push back such vessels that have entered British territorial waters or adjacent waters. However, the legal basis for such a measure remains unclear. At the same time, the aforementioned Nationality and Borders Act grants border guards the power to "turn around" vessels and also exempts such officers from criminal liability if they commit offenses in the exercise of their powers (potentially triggering a situation leading to loss of life). The original clause requiring the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea to be taken into account when deciding on such coercive measures was removed from the bill during parliamentary scrutiny.
Critics argue that the pushback tactics May in general or in specific cases contravene Article 4 of Protocol 4 to the ECHR[487] and a number of international maritime law conventions (International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, Convention on the Law of the Sea).
Arguably, especially in view of the poor seaworthiness and technical state of many of the boats used by migrants, it could also be a violation of Article 2 of the ECHR[488], the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, supplementing the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and, in case there are children among these migrants, of Article 3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
In 2023, the following incidents of violation of the rights of refugees by the British authorities caused widespread publicity. On 12 December, an Albanian national, Leonard Farruku, was found dead in the asylum-seekers' detention centre on the non‑self‑propelled ship Bibbi Stockholm, moored in the English port of Portland. A coroner's inquest concluded that the cause of death was suicide. Human rights activists have criticized the British government for the inhumane conditions of illegals on the "floating prison". On 27 December, the UK Home Office published a service report acknowledging the discriminatory nature (on the basis of gender and age) of the detention of refugees on the barge. At the same time, it emphasized that the actions of the authorities do not violate British law.[489]
Another infamous migrant camp is located at the former Wetherfield Air Force Base on a remote island in Essex County. Human rights activists accuse the authorities of violating Article 5 of the ECHR (the right to liberty and security of person), as the detention of migrants there is effectively tantamount to imprisonment. In December 2023, the NGO Care4Calais announced its intention to sue the Home Office for inhumane housing conditions for illegal immigrants, failure to meet security requirements, and damage to mental health (including amid reports of multiple suicide attempts among refugees there). In January 2024, the list of claims against Weatherfield was expanded to include complaints about lack of access to medical care (probably psychological care, actually). As an emergency measure, the international NGO Médecins Sans Frontières sends its staff and volunteers to the migrant camp.[490]
In June 2023, a report was published following a monitoring visit by a CPT delegation to the United Kingdom (25–28 November 2022) to analyse the treatment of foreign nationals who cross the English Channel illegally in small vessels. Interviews with staff and a review of records at the Manston short‑term detention centre confirmed that while migrants were arriving en masse, they were held for 40 days in overcrowded tents with no furniture (other than foam mattresses), poor sanitary conditions, and limited access to fresh air. The CPT's delegation concluded that, between October and early November 2022, foreign nationals detained at the migration centre in question May have been subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment. Such practices violate the UK's obligations under the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. The report makes recommendations to improve migrants' access to health care, including mandatory medical examinations for those detained for more than 24 hours, as well as to ensure medical confidentiality, and to prevent the use of force against detainees.[491]
On February 2024, the CPT published a report following a delegation visit to the United Kingdom from 27 March to 6 April 2023. During the visit, experts inspected immigration detention facilities. The report states that the living conditions in the centres are generally satisfactory. The exceptions were the Colnbrook and Brook House immigration centres, where experts documented numerous violations. There are also cases of mistreatment by the staff of these institutions, the use of excessive measures such as handcuffing women to their beds during visits to hospitals outside the centre. Experts emphasize the urgent need to introduce a time limit for detention in migration centres into migration legislation.[492]
The experts also visited prisons where migrants who had violated migration laws were held. For example, as of 31 March 2023, the 56 prisons in England and Wales held 387 sentenced foreign national offenders (TSF NO; time served foreign national offenders), which is a high number given that the Prison and Probation Service typically provides the Home Office with 300–400 accommodation places for people detained under breach of immigration law. Experts continue to emphasize the principled position that migrants who have violated migration laws should not be imprisoned. The delegation found that administrative detainees in prisons are at a distinct disadvantage in terms of their ability to exercise their right to legal counsel, contact with the outside world, time out of their cells, and access to fresh air. Moreover, the conditions in the prisons they visited were much worse compared to the migrant detention centres.[493] The Committee has expressed its concern over the fact that many individuals are held in such centres for more than 28 days and that there has been an increase in the number of cases in which immigration detention was used unlawfully.[494]
Violations of the rights of minors is particularly relevant for the UK against the background of the worsening migration crisis. CRC experts are deeply concerned about the restrictions imposed by the Citizenship and Borders Act (2022) and the introduction of a two-tier identification system for refugee children. CRC is seriously concerned that under this law children May be deprived of their nationality without notification. Therefore, the Committee encouraged the authorities to amend it in order to avoid the risk of statelessness among children. It also emphasizes the need to repeal National Health Service regulations that prevent asylum‑seeking and children as well as children without a regular residence status from accessing health services on the basis of their migration status.[495]
Human rights organizations express serious concern about the inadequate security provided by the UK authorities for children entering the country illegally without parental consent.[496]
For a long time, such persons were accommodated in the same ordinary hotels as adult migrants, without proper supervision. According to local press reports, more than 400 children have "disappeared" from these hotels during the implementation of this practice. In July 2023, the UK Home Office confirmed that 154 migrant children were reported missing (with the reservation that 100 of them should have reached adulthood since the disappearance, and the age of 25 was disputed).
In March 2024 (latest updated data), the fate of 118 children remained unknown. According to the July 2024 report by University College London, it is highly likely that they have been trafficked into further illegal activity by local criminal gangs.[497] In addition, children staying in hotels faced racism and threats of violence from hotel staff.
Human rights defenders are also concerned about possible non-compliance with established procedures in the treatment of illegal minors in short-term detention centres run by the UK Home Office, particularly in Manston. There May be situations where vulnerable migrants are placed with people who are likely to be facilitators of trafficking. Inadequate accommodation conditions have been noted.
The situation is partly a consequence of the aforementioned 2023 Illegal Immigration Act, which has been criticised for failing to take a more humane approach to children who enter the UK illegally. The Act provides for the arrest of illegal minors on the same basis as adult offenders. Under the legislative process, the opposition was only partially able to soften the provisions originally proposed by the Government. The possible detention period for unaccompanied children was reduced from 28 (as for adults) to 8 days.
Migrant women are disproportionately exposed to discrimination. For example, the Committee is concerned by the lack of sufficient protection for migrant women who are victims of gender-based violence. In particular, it is concerned that the Domestic Abuse Act 2021 fails to provide equal protection for migrant women. Furthermore, the Committee is concerned that migrant women who have experienced violence continue to receive unequal protections and risk being subjected to immigration enforcement upon reporting the abuse they have faced.[498]
International human rights NGOs have criticized the UK government for failing to honour earlier commitments to accept Syrian refugees. In 2016, London announced its intention to grant asylum to 3,000 Syrian minors. However, only 480 people were actually admitted, after which the government announced in July 2018 that it was scrapping the programme. A subsequent attempt by Refugee Aid NGO to challenge the decision in court failed. The High Court in London upheld it and rejected a subsequent appeal.
The difficult situation of asylum‑seekers has also been highlighted by UN human rights treaty bodies, including CERD, CEDAW, CAT, HRCttee, and CESCR. The Committee is deeply concerned about the introduction of legislative initiatives containing elements that discriminate against migrants and that seek to limit access to rights for this category of people. Recent changes to legislation, including the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, amending the Modern Slavery Act 2015, and the Illegal Migration Act 2023, have resulted in the removal of certain protections for potential victims of trafficking and made it harder to identify victims of trafficking in persons and, therefore, to ensure that they have access to justice. In particular, the Committee is concerned that the legislative changes increase the burden of proof when bringing cases before the National Referral Mechanism, criminalize victims of trafficking in persons and will likely result in victims being removed from the State party without their claim being fully considered and without being provided with the necessary support and protections. Similar concerns have been voiced with regard to the visa policy for migrant workers, which makes their situation more precarious and leaves them open to abuse and exploitation by employers.[499]
Hungary’s leadership has consistently taken a hard line against any form of xenophobia, including the spread of Nazi ideology, antisemitism and any other form of religious intolerance. Nazi organisations and related attributes, such as the swastika, the SS insignia or the Arrow Cross, are banned by law in this country.[500]
In recent years, the Hungarian authorities have also blocked attempts by local neo-Nazi associations to hold annual rallies on the "Day of Honour" commemorating the liberation of Budapest from the Nazis in 1945, an event they interpret as a heroic deed by Hungarian soldiers who defended the city from the Soviet Army.[501]
Groups such as Blood and Honour, Betyársereg (Army of the Outlaws), the National Guard of the Carpathian Homeland, the National Self-Defence Movement, the Hungarian National Guard and the Movement for a Better Future were the largest and have been dissolved by court order.
At the same time, some elements of neo-Nazi ideology can still be found in Hungary’s social and political life. Their manifestations can not only be observed in clearly marginalised communities, but also in political circles, where the far-right "Our Homeland" party, represented in the National Assembly, is the main promoter of such ideology. In September 2022, its members installed a bust of Miklós Horthy, the Hungarian dictator and an ally of Hitler, in their parliamentary office. They had originally intended to place it in the main building of the National Assembly, but the Speaker of Parliament, László Kövér, sharply rejected this idea.
"Our Homeland"’s supporters are often seen at neo-Nazi rallies, while the party’s leader, László Toroczkai, was previously the head of a far-right organisation, the Sixty-Four Counties Movement (referring to the number of regions that made up the Kingdom of Hungary before 1918). The party had once faced a real threat of dissolution, then promptly changed its charter, got rid of its legally banned symbols and currently positions itself as a "sports and patriotic movement for the preservation of traditions". However, it is the Sixty‑Four Counties Movement that has, in fact, absorbed the bulk of the neo-Nazi youth who have become the backbone of the existing neo-Nazi movement in Hungary.
Their ideological allies include members of the Hungarian Legion, a radical organisation mainly made up of various groups of football fans who unabashedly flaunt the Nazi ethos of their group.[502] In protest against the Government’s decision to ban "Day of Honour" celebrations in 2022, which would have involved representatives from other European far-right and neo-Nazi groups[503], members of the Hungarian Legion organised their own unsanctioned gathering, where they reaffirmed their unwavering commitment to the ideas of radical Hungarian nationalism and expressed support for the Ukrainian nationalist Carpathian Sich Battalion (in 2019, members of this association participated in a series of events held by the Hungarian Legion in Budapest to commemorate the events of 1956).[504]
Currently, Hungary’s far-right also includes supporters of the Blood and Honour network[505], which hosts annual events, including rallies and a series of concerts by relevant music groups. Representatives from many European countries attend these events. This day commemorates the events that took place on 11 February 1945, when Hitler’s troops and their Hungarian collaborators attempted to break out of Budapest surrounded by the Red Army.
Rallies of right-wing radicals are traditionally banned by the Hungarian police, but then the organisers challenge these decisions in court. The celebration of the "Day of Honour" was banned by the Budapest Police Department in 2022 citing fears of extremism and a threat to public order. The Supreme Court of Hungary upheld this decision.[506] In 2024, the Hungarian police banned another rally, but the court allowed it to take place. The European Roma Rights Centre, an NGO, reported that German, Bulgarian and Czech right-wing radicals attended this year’s event as well as Hungarian supporters of the Blood and Honor. The demonstrators had to stay behind barriers in Városmajor Park during the event.[507]
Private concerts of relevant groups are timed to coincide with this event. In particular, the Hungarian capital hosted a private concert to mark the "Day of Honour" on 11 February 2023. In 2024, Hungary organised a series of private concerts, which was referred to as a two-day commemoration. The organisers announced on their website that the time and place of the concerts were not publicly available so that all participants could get there in time. The announcement also indicates that all attendees are expected to "conduct themselves in a manner worthy of this event".[508]
It should be noted that every year, Hungarian anti-fascists rally against neo-Nazi events. In February 2023, the Antifa movement took the lead in organising a demonstration. It took place at the Buda fortress, which houses the residences of the Hungarian President and Prime Minister. The anti-fascist rally was attended by several hundred people. They were holding placards and banners calling for a policy of zero tolerance towards the glorification of Nazism. Police officers blocked the streets near the Buda fortress to prevent neo-Nazis from entering the rally and clashing with the demonstrators.[509] Right‑wing media reported clashes between the neo-Nazi demonstrators and the members of the anti-fascist movement (such rallies had never been recorded in Hungary before), and it was noted that the anti-fascists acted as instigators. It provoked a violent response from the Hungarian neo-Nazi associations, and the leaders of "Our Homeland" demanded that the anti-fascist movement be recognised as a terrorist organisation.[510] An Italian anti-fascist activist Ilaria Salis was even detained. As of February 2024, she was still held in custody.[511]
In February 2024, anti-fascists organised their own opposition march in Budapest to protest against the rally of right-wing radicals. Protestors "gathered to noisily demonstrate" their disapproval of the neo-Nazi rally (with participants sounding sirens, beating drums, and blowing whistles). Many Roma took part in the anti-fascist march. Besides, additional police units were deployed throughout the city to prevent clashes between demonstrators of different ideologies.[512]
In September 2022, right-wing extremists and Roma advocates held their rallies simultaneously. On 11 September, about 1,000 activists, mostly from the Roma community, protested in Nyíregyháza against a rally of about 400 far‑right extremists from "Our Homeland" and "Betjársereg". The rally against "gypsy crime" followed the murder in August of Gergely Juhász, one of the regional leaders of Betjárszereg, outside a nightclub where he had worked as a security guard. Far-right groups not only blamed the Roma collectively for the murder, but were also outraged that the alleged perpetrator had not been charged.[513]
The Hungarian branch of the far-right organisation "Blood and Honor" has also announced on its website that a festival in memory of the famous British neo-Nazi and musician Ian Stuart Donaldson is planned for 13 and 14 September 2024 in Hungary.
Information about the activities of Hungarian extremist and neo-Nazi groups, their events and demonstrations is disseminated on social media. Their leaders often use popular messengers and social media, and their accounts often have far more followers than those of local mainstream politicians.
As far as the promotion of false interpretations of war history is concerned, it should be noted that the Hungarian Constitution contains the thesis that the self-determination of the state was lost on 19 March 1944 and restored on 2 May 1990 (from the invasion of Hitler’s troops as part of Operation Margarita and the establishment of the Nilášist regime led by Ferenc Szalasi to the formation of the first government after the change of system). In this case, it practically refers to the idea of a "double occupation" of the country by Nazi Germany and then by the USSR, formalized in the supreme legal act of the country. Budapest officially promotes the message that the Communist state and the Nazi regime are equally "guilty of crimes against humanity".[514] Along with the swastika, the SS insignia and the Arrow Crosses, the "red five-pointed star" and the "sickle and hammer"[515] are among the symbols banned in Hungary. At the same time, the Fidesz-KDNP government has refrained from emphasising this idea and usually plays down any differences between the Russian and the Hungarian assessments of wartime and post-war history.
At the same time, the Hungarian authorities do not restrict the commemoration of World War II Victory Day and other events related to the liberation of the country from the Nazi invaders. No attempts to persecute Red Army veterans have been recorded in Hungary.
The integrity of Russian war memorials in Hungary remains protected. Their legal status is currently governed by the inter-governmental Agreement on the remembrance of fallen soldiers and civilian victims of wars and the status of burial sites dated 6 March 1995. Incidents of vandalism against Soviet or Russian war memorials are rare and appear to be mainly linked to the actions of Ukrainian extremists, whose numbers in Hungary have increased significantly since 24 February 2022. Local authorities, for their part, act constructively and in accordance with national legislation and the above-mentioned bilateral agreement.
Hungary’s leadership has consistently taken a hard line against any form of xenophobia, including the spread of Nazi ideology, antisemitism and any other form of religious intolerance. However, national criminal law does not recognise the motive of racial and religious hatred as an aggravating circumstance in criminal offences.[516] Local think tanks specialising in this matter estimate that xenophobic incidents in Hungary are rare and incidental (commonly domestic), and do not involve physical violence by right-wing extremist groups.[517] Proponents of an opposite view, on the other hand, see Hungary as a country with widespread xenophobia. They usually cite the Hungarian Government’s hard-line policy against refugees and irregular migrants, especially at the height of the European migration crisis in 2015.
International universal and regional human rights organisations have often commented on a number of human rights issues in Hungary, and there have been instances of biased approaches.
In particular, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, citing data from Hungarian law enforcement agencies, provided the following statistics. 100 hate crimes were recorded in 2020, 132 in 2019, 194 in 2018, 233 in 2017 and 33 in 2016.[518]
Hate crime statistics submitted by Hungary to the OSCE also indicate a decrease in the number of hate crimes: 194 in 2018, 132 in 2019, 100 in 2020, 38 in 2021 and 58 in 2022.[519] At the same time, experts point out that since police reports are the most cited source, this is a record of mostly violent crimes rather than threats or other manifestations of hatred. Consequently, compared to statistics from civil society organisations, these incidents represent a small proportion of actual manifestations of hatred.[520]
As for antisemitic incidents in Hungary, the general attitude towards the local Jewish community has improved (the country has the second largest Jewish community per capita). It can be explained, among other things, by the fact that the Hungarian government has upheld a zero-tolerance approach to any forms of antisemitism over recent decades.
The EU Agency for Fundamental Human Rights (FRA) in its regular review pointed to a downward trend in the number of antisemitic incidents, citing data from a non-governmental organisation. Thus, the FRA cited data from Tett és Védelem Alapítvány (TEV), an NGO that monitors and analyses antisemitic incidents in Hungary. Since 2013, the organisation, through its Brussels office, has reportedly collaborated with the Hungarian Prime Minister's Office to share data on antisemitism across the country. TEV recorded 45 antisemitic incidents in 2022, also mentioning that the overall trend between 2013 and 2022 shows a general decrease in the number of reported antisemitic incidents, despite an increase in 2021 and 2022. The number of such incidents in 2022 almost reaches the level recorded in 2016 (48). Most of them are related to incitement to hatred and acts of vandalism.[521]
The decrease in the number of antisemitic incidents in Hungary is also stated in a study published by the Center for European Studies at Mathias Corvinus Collegium. The paper describes the situation not only in Hungary, but also in the EU as a whole. It points out that the EU states show quite different trends. Antisemitism is on the rise in countries with relatively small Jewish communities. Perceptions of antisemitic attitudes indicate that residents of France, Belgium, Sweden and Germany are particularly concerned about growing hostility. In France, Sweden and Germany, the number of antisemitic incidents tends to increase, while in Hungary this rate has been declining in recent years. The study says that most antisemitic incidents involve radical Muslims or left-wing political supporters. Viewed against this backdrop, it is not surprising that the majority of people who decide to emigrate to Israel come from France, while the smallest community of people emigrating to that country is in Hungary.[522]
Among specific cases of antisemitism, the experts cite an incident at the Kecel cemetery in 2020, when some headstones were smashed and others desecrated, as well as acts of vandalism in 2022 at the Budakeszi cemetery on the outskirts of the Hungarian capital.[523]
However, some NGOs, pursuing the course of Brussels and Washington, point to negative trends in this area. For instance, according to the Anti‑Defamation League, an American NGO, the number of Hungarians with negative opinions of Jews has been rising consistently since 2012. According to a 2023 report by ADL, around 2.9 million out of 8 million Hungarians hold antiemitic beliefs. Moreover, the watchdog claims that Hungary is one of the most antisemitic countries in Eastern Europe, with negative manifestations more common among young people under the age of 35.[524]
In its 2023 report on Hungary, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), operating within the Council of Europe, stated that the Federation of Hungarian Jewish Communities (Mazsihisz) documented 20 antisemitic incidents in 2019 and 31 in 2020.[525]
The third sociological study by the EU Agency for Fundamental Human Rights on antisemitic incidents in the EU says that Hungary had the largest number of respondents – 1,338. The document indicates that according to the responders' opinion, during a 5-year period since the previous survey Hungary has been among the three countries where there has been little or no increase in the number of respondents who consider antisemitism a serious problem (58 percent). Along with this, the Hungarian population is less likely than other countries to believe that hostility toward Jews in public places is a serious problem (48 percent). Furthermore, Hungary is one of the countries with the lowest number of respondents expressing concern that they or their family members could be attacked for anti-Semitic reasons. Hungary has the lowest number of people who avoid attending Jewish events and celebrations because they feel vulnerable. In this country, the least number of respondents indicate that they, like all Jews, are blamed for Israel's actions in the Gaza Strip. Persecution on the grounds of anti-Semitism, both physically and online, is not widespread in Hungarian society (27 percent of responders faced such incidents in the year preceding the survey). The level of anti-Semitism in sports is quite significant in Hungary (43 percent of respondents identified this as a notable problem). The study notes that in Hungary, along with the Czech Republic, Poland, Romania and Sweden, the stereotypical view that Jews hold too much power is quite widespread. In addition, the use of materials perceived as anti-Semitic by politicians is quite substantial in the country. As for the anti-Semitic images, Hungarian respondents specified that they often see images of swastikas.[526]
In terms of racism and racial discrimination, international human rights bodies have challenged the Hungarian authorities in relation to the situation of the Roma population whose overwhelming majority have a low social status and are therefore allegedly subjected to various forms of discrimination. Reports by international human rights organisations, the Hungarian Ombudsman, and human rights NGOs have repeatedly highlighted challenging living conditions experienced by Roma, limited access to education for children of Roma origin, high dropout rates among school students, and called on the Government to take practical measures to address the situation.[527] Moreover, it was stressed that in recent decades, about 100 ghettos have formed in different parts of Hungary, mostly in the north-east of the country, that are not fully controlled by the authorities and do not serve to improve the living standards or the social adaptation of the Roma.
The issues pertaining to the Roma community have been presented to the Committee on the Rights of the Child[528], the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination[529], the Human Rights Committee[530], the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women[531], the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance[532], as well as the Advisory Committee of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities[533].
The FRA, in turn, made a contribution by pointing out that poverty, discrimination and stigmatisation of the Roma are said to be the problems that, despite all the improvements, still put Roma families at three times the risk of poverty compared to other ethnic groups. The 2022 report noted the restricted access to education for Roma children, forced evictions of Roma, and pandemic-related restrictions that significantly impacted this community.[534] The FRA's 2023 report reflects similar problems and refers to the European Commission, which has started to examine violations of EU regulations by the Hungarian authorities because of the segregation of Roma children in educational institutions. Along with this, the Agency has cited discrimination incidents against Roma refugees from Ukraine, which has been reported both in reception centres and in media publications.[535]
Meanwhile, despite its critical stance, the FRA rightly mentions the National Social Inclusion Strategy developed by the Hungarian government to improve the situation of the Roma population in various spheres.
In its separate study on the situation of the Roma in the 10 EU states with the largest Roma communities, the FRA surveyed Romani people in Hungary. It is noteworthy that Hungary and Romania had the largest number of respondents (1,409 and 1,695 respectively), which means a good representative sample and a broader consideration of Roma perspectives. The results of the study indicate that the Hungarian Roma are doing quite well in the field of employment. Hungary, like Italy, for example, has reached 60 per cent in terms of providing Roma with gainful employment. The number of young Roma aged 16-24 who are not studying or unemployed reaches 35 per cent, compared to the EU average of 56 per cent (although the same figure for Roma girls in Hungary is the lowest in the EU). The sex-specific employment rate of Roma is one of the highest in the EU – 81 per cent for men and 44 per cent for women, and the remuneration rate of the Roma is also the closest to the national level. In addition, the Agency noted positive aspects in education. 41 per cent of young Roma aged 20-24 have at least a general secondary education (the EU average is 27 per cent). Only 16 per cent of Roma children have experienced bullying by classmates at school. The health coverage rate for the Roma (in particular, health insurance) is 93 per cent. At the same time, 85 per cent of Roma live in overpopulated houses.[536]
Efforts by representatives of civil society to protect the rights of the Roma community have noticeably increased. In December 2021, the European Roma Rights Center (ERRC) filed a lawsuit against the Ministry of Human Resources of Hungary. The lawsuit was based on the fact that children from Romani families were more likely to be placed in foster care than children from other ethnic groups.
Although Hungarian legislation prohibits the removal of children from families solely for material reasons, poverty has been a significant factor in the majority of such removals.[537] In particular, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child indicated in February 2020 that children should be prohibited from being separated from their families and placed in alternative care institutions on the basis of the economic situation of their families.[538]
It should also be noted that the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), in its decisions on lawsuits against Hungary handed down in 2020-2024, has noted previous instances of abuse of authority and excessive use of force by Hungarian police officers against Roma. For example, in response to a complaint of ill-treatment of a man of Roma origin by the police (Mata v. Hungary), the ECtHR awarded the applicant 19.5 thousand euros for the fact that he was physically assaulted by officers in 2014. Experts also point out that Hungarian police have often fined Roma for minor offenses as a means of maintaining "public order", which is in fact racial profiling.[539]
International human rights organisations and NGOs, at the urging of Brussels, have met with criticism towards Hungary’s tough measures to curb the influx of refugees via the "Balkan" route. Hungary’s reluctance to accept any migrants has unnerved EU leaders. Brussels has periodically threatened to impose penalties over these issues and a number of others.[540] In particular, the EU Agency for Fundamental Human Rights noted that the "the state of danger due to mass migration" introduced in 2015 was once again extended until 7 September 2024. The FRA also cites a June 2023 decision of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) which found Hungary's asylum regime to be in breach of EU directives in this area.[541]
Many human rights organisations, however, have acknowledged the significant number of refugees and asylum seekers coming to Hungary and the fact that it had led to a crisis situation in the country. For instance, in its report, Amnesty International, an NGO (recognised as undesirable in the Russian Federation), criticised the sweeping measures introduced in 2016, which the watchdog said had flouted Hungary’s obligations to ensure effective access to international protection for asylum seekers.
The Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Migrants of the UN Human Rights Council, Felipe González Morales, conveyed his apprehension about the unfavourable condition of migrants in Hungary following his visit to the country in July 2019.[542] At the same time, the Special Rapporteur praised the programme funded by the Government to educate students from 70 countries in Hungarian universities, which aimed to promote development through education and address the root causes of migration.
Following her visit in November 2021, the UN Human Rights Council’s Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression Irene Khan emphasized the increasing incidence of hate speech towards migrants and refugees, along with the human rights activists who support them.[543]
According to ECRI, the Hungarian public discourse has become increasingly xenophobic in recent years, and political speech has taken on highly divisive and antagonistic overtones, particularly targeting refugees, asylum seekers, migrants and Muslims. These concepts are often being conflated, with migrants being described as "Muslim invaders". However, the Commission acknowledges that the arrival of the substantial amount of asylum seekers in 2015 was perceived as a threat to Hungarian security, national identity and culture, leading to an exacerbation of anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim sentiments. Additionally, ECRI has documented cases when refugees were prevented from seeking asylum. It is worth mentioning that the Commission indirectly acknowledged that Hungarian authorities and society have distinct attitudes towards refugees from the Middle East and Europe when, as it noted the significant influx of refugees from Ukraine in 2022, it also stressed that NGOs and volunteers had been rather overburdened with the provision of services.[544] The report of a special representative of the Council of Europe following a visit to Hungary aimed at examining the measures taken by the authorities to assist Ukrainian refugees also contains similar information.[545]
Experts point out that the generally more favorable attitude of Hungarians towards Ukrainian refugees than towards people from other countries is also due to the fact that the majority of them (some tens of thousands of people) are ethnic Hungarians from the Pre-Carpathian region. In addition, during the surveys 81 percent of Hungarians responded that they had never noticed inappropriate behaviour on the part of Ukrainian refugees, which is much higher than in other countries.[546]
In its 2023 report the FRA notes that Hungary has reinforced its "border hunters", a special unit within the police, who do not have to undergo the same training and obtain the same qualifications as ordinary police personnel. They are charged with patrolling the border, apprehending irregular migrants and escorting them back. As of December 2022, they had apprehended 3,776 migrants who had attempted to cross, or crossed, the fenced Hungarian-Serbian border in an irregular manner.[547] As for accidents at this section of the border, the FRA also noted that in October 2023 there had been a shooting between smugglers and Hungarian border guards, resulting in three deaths and one injury. Notably, in this case, the FRA admitted that such aggressive behaviour justifies the proportionate use of force to counter migrant smuggling. Meanwhile, the Agency emphasized that, in general, the practice of sending almost all asylum-seekers to the Serbian border persisted in Hungary.[548]
Hungarian law enforcement authorities also compile their own statistics. In particular, the police prepare a detailed weekly overview of incidents related to irregular migration.[549] According to official statements, irregular migration is growing: 269,254 people were apprehended in 2022 compared to 122,239 in 2021.[550] In 2023, the peak value of preventing irregular migrants from entering Hungary was 4,328 cases per week, and the number of apprehensions and subsequent expulsions was 5,271. In the first half of 2024, such figures have not yet been recorded: the maximum number of non-admissions per week was 132, and the one of expulsions was 112.[551] In general, this is consistent with the official statistics for previous years, as the largest influx of irregular migrants is recorded at the end of the third and beginning of the fourth quarter of each year.
In July 2023, Hungarian media reported that the national border guard had apprehended almost one million irregular migrants over the past eight years.[552]
The UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women has highlighted that Hungary is a frequent source and transit country for victims of human trafficking, with migrant females being particularly vulnerable to exploitation and trafficking.[553]
The ECtHR also joined the criticism of the Hungarian authorities, which in its decisions on lawsuits against Hungary, issued in 2024, reported violations of a number of provisions of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Among other things, the placement of an irregular migrant in a detention center, forced expulsion through fences at the border with Serbia, and the failure of Hungarian border guards to take appropriate measures, which resulted in the death of one migrant at the border on the Tisza River, were described as unlawful.[554]
Experts note significant improvements in Hungary's migration legislation since the pandemic. These changes were partly driven by a ruling of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in May 2020, which labelled the practice of detaining asylum seekers in transit zones for excessively long periods of time as deprivation of liberty, but at the same time recognised transit zones as legal. This led Hungary to close such transit zones altogether at the border with Serbia, according to experts.[555]
On 29 May 2020, the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Migrants of the UN Human Rights Council, Felipe González Morales, emphasized the closure by Hungary of the "transit zones". He called this government's decision an important step to advance the protection of the human rights of all migrants, especially asylum seekers.[556]
European bodies have also linked Budapest’s steps to regulate the activities of NGOs in the country to the government’s opposition to migration. The authorities have been criticised for an alleged suppression of civil society groups, who are seen as playing a key role in alleviating the difficulties experienced by asylum seekers and irregular migrants and in protecting their rights under international and EU law.
In February 2018, the European Commission launched proceedings with the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to establish whether the Hungarian legislation was in line with EU regulations. The catalyst was the Law on Non-Governmental Organisations from June 2017 obligating relevant NGOs to disclose in all their publications, printed materials and websites that they were "foreign-supported organisations". This became a mandatory requirement for NGOs who received foreign financial assistance exceeding HUF 7.2 million (approximately USD 29,000 at the time of the trial). As expected, in June 2020, the European Court of Justice identified that the regulations of the legislation were in conflict with EU law and motivated it by the fact that these regulations violate the right to free movement of capital, to privacy and protection of personal data, as well as to freedom of association. In response, Prime Minister Victor Orbán sharply criticised the EU for gross interference into the Hungary’s internal affairs.
These laws are being considered in the European bodies together with a package of initiatives adopted by Hungary in 2018, known as "Stop Soros", which criminalise the provision of assistance to irregular migrants. They have also been ruled by the EU Court of Justice to be in breach of EU law.
Irene Hahn, the UN Human Rights Council's Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, added her voice to the criticism of Hungary’s actions in this area. During her visit, she noted the detrimental impact of the Law on Non-Governmental Organisations and urged Budapest to re-evaluate its stance on civil society groups in light of the EU Court of Justice decision.
The FRA has also repeatedly expressed its opposition to the actions of the Hungarian authorities towards pro-Brussels NGOs. For instance, in the 2023 report, the FRA notes that Hungary is mentioned in the European Commission’s Rule of Law reports as a country that restricts the activities of non-governmental organisations.[557] The 2024 report specifically notes that in Hungary, some media still refer to certain NGOs as "Soros organisations", thus linking them with this entrepreneur, who, according to the FRA, "supports liberal democratic causes, and whom the Hungarian government has opposed and criticised".
The same report says that Hungary has adopted an amendment to its legislation, allowing the setting up of an independent body for the "protection of constitutional identity". This body is intended to monitor perceived foreign interventions in the country's public and political life. Although the FRA quotes the head of the established body claiming that its main powers are not investigative, but lie more in the realm of publicity and transparency, nevertheless, the Agency expresses concern about these amendments citing unnamed NGOs. The report highlights vague and broad terms, which would give too much scope for classifying actions as serving foreign interests and posing a threat to Hungary’s sovereignty. The FRA also expresses concerns that the legislation could target journalists, companies, churches, trade unions and local governments.[558]
The same critical assessment was released by the European Commission in its 2023 report on the rule of law.[559]
Budapest’s refusal to adhere to the "pan-European norms" of tolerance, which in reality amount to the propaganda of non-traditional relationships and the artificial imposition of other similar neoliberal values in society, remains another irritant for the EU agencies in Brussels. In 2021, the European Commission presented a legal case before the EU Court of Justice concerning Hungary’s enactment of a legislation restricting the dissemination of information about homosexuality and gender reassignment to minors. In a statement, the European Commission cynically called the protection of minors a legitimate public interest of the Hungarian authorities that the EU shares and aspires to. However, EU officials noted that the information provided by the Hungarian authorities on the adopted laws did not explain why introducing children to LGBT content might be detrimental to their well-being or not in their best interests, displaying a glaring double standard on the matter.[560] In its report for 2023, the EU Agency for Fundamental Human Rights criticised Budapest for banning self-identification and the promotion of a gender identity other than the sex at birth, as well as gender reassignment.
The report also accuses the Hungarian authorities of being reluctant to incorporate the concept of gender, as defined by the Istanbul Convention, into their legal system. The authors of the report make an explicit reference to the Convention's notion of "gender" as socially constructed roles, behaviours, actions and attributes, which contains a definition opposite to that of biological sex and which is increasingly rejected in the world.[561] The UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women has also criticized the authorities’ imposition of "stereotypical attitudes" about the roles and responsibilities of women and men in the family and in society. The Committee claims that this practice impedes the achievement of gender equality.[562]
The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, in line with the Western neoliberal mainstream, identified the deteriorating situation for LGBT persons as one of the main problems in Hungary. Among other things, the ban on adoption of children by same-sex couples introduced by the Hungarian government in 2020 was presented in a negative light. The Commission also disapproved the act on taking more severe action against paedophile offenders and amending certain acts for the protection of children, adopted in 2021. This act prohibits the promotion of gender and sexual diversity in the public sphere, including schools and the media.
In general, it should be noted that the criticism of the Hungarian authorities disseminated by a number of international NGOs and the EU's Brussels does not cause any tangible stir in the country. Budapest, in its turn, accuses these very NGOs of interfering in domestic politics in order to change the current government.
At the same time, the Hungarian authorities admit the existence of certain problems in the human rights field and regularly indicates its readiness to cooperate with multilateral universal and regional structures in order to solve them.
In Greece, no cases have been noted of glorification of Nazism, distortion or rewriting the history of World War II and its results by the official authorities.
Since the launch on 24 February 2022 of the Special military operation (SMO) by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation to denazify and demilitarize Ukraine and protect the civilian population of Donbass, the Greek leadership has not only been turning a blind eye to the abundance of right-wing radicals in armed formations of the Kiev regime, but has also been providing them with public platform: on 17 April 2022, on the initiative of New Democracy ruling party, the Greek Parliament streamed Vladimir Zelensky's video address that included messages by two neo-Nazi Azov regiment fighters.[563]
The fact that extremists have been provided with a platform for Ukrainian radicals caused a scandal in the local parliament and media. Αlexis Tsipras, leader of the main opposition party, Coalition of the Radical Left – Progressive Alliance (SYRIZA), said: "The speech of members of the neo-Nazi Azov regiment in the Greek Parliament is a provocation. The Nazis cannot have a say in the legislature of Greece."[564] Ioannis Oikonomou, Greek Government Official Spokesperson, similarly admitted that including messages by Azov fighters into Zelensky's speech was "wrong and inappropriate".[565]
A campaign to discredit Russia, unprecedented for this country and the past high level of bilateral relations, has been launched in the Greek media, fuelled by anti-Russian statements by Greek officials. The Greek public's access to impartial information about the events in Ukraine and neighbouring Russian regions, as well as Russia's approaches, has been seriously impeded, and the media space is dominated by a fierce Russophobic narrative. The outreach work of the Russian Embassy in Athens and the Consulate General in Thessaloniki is being attacked.
March 2022 witnessed acts of vandalism and desecration of monuments, associated with Russia and other former USSR countries that had not renounced their memorial heritage.
For the first time in many years, a memorial site associated with the anti-fascist struggle was desecrated, i.e. on 19 March 2022, in Kallithea district of Athens, unidentified persons spray-painted the name and symbols of the Ukrainian Azov nationalistic regiment on the Monument to Soviet soldiers who fell for freedom and independence of Greece in 1941-1944.[566]
The Greek Foreign Ministry condemned their actions, and local law enforcement agencies launched an investigation into the offence, but with no results so far.
On 25 March 2022, the monument to Admiral Fiodor Ushakov on Corfu Island was paint-spattered with Russian national flag being torn off. In addition in March 2022, some perpetrators dismantled the plaque on the monument to Aleskey Orlov's squadron on the island of Lemnos, and stole the Russian flag from the flagpole.[567]
Local law enforcement authorities launched an investigation into these incidents, but with no results so far. The Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation opened relevant criminal cases.
The Greek leadership has embarked on a policy of winding down bilateral cooperation in all areas, including cultural and humanitarian one.
On 1 March 2022, the Greek Ministry of Culture and Sport announced the decision to "postpone all events involving Russian cultural organizations, cooperation with them and discussion of any joint plans".[568] The Russia-Greece Year of History under the patronage of the President of the Russian Federation and the Prime Minister of Greece was cancelled, as well as a number of cultural events, including concerts of the Moscow Soloists chamber ensemble led by Yuri Bashmet in Athens and Thessaloniki in late March 2022.
Recently, however, the ban imposed by the Ministry of Culture has become more lenient. In February 2023, for example, Megaro Mousikis concert hall in Athens saw performances of violinist Vadim Repin and pianist Mikhail Pletnev.
Athens joined the European Commission's discriminatory decision of 2 March 2022 to ban the broadcasting of Russia Today and the work of Sputnik agency and their subsidiaries in the EU territory. Access to the Sputnik Greece news website[569], Rossiya 24 TV channel and other Russian information resources[570] was cut off in the country.
At the same time, pro-government media have more than once gave the floor to Kiev-controlled Greek diaspora organizations which promoted a distorted picture of the situation near Mariupol and other territories liberated by the Russian Army.
Everyday Russophobia has increased. Russians and Russian-speaking citizens face aggression and bullying, mostly by nationalistically-minded natives of Ukraine.
On 3 April 2022, a group of Ukrainians attacked participants in the motor rally "For Peace! For Russia! For Greece!" held in the Greek capital. A Russian national, seven‑year‑old girl, was injured. The Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation started a criminal investigation into the incident.[571]
On 24 April 2022, on a beach in Athens a woman of Russian nationality was beaten.[572]
In a Greek school, a sixth-grade schoolgirl from a mixed Russian-Greek family was beaten by her classmates on the grounds of hatred, and hospitalized due to sustained injuries.[573]
In December 2022 and in February 2023, Ukrainian nationals tore the Russian flag off the building of the Honorary Consulate of the Russian Federation in Rethymno (Crete).
Ukrainians continue with the anti-Russian propaganda in social media, calling to violence on national grounds, engage in glorification of neo-Nazi fighters in the ranks of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and nationalist battalions. The Greek Bandera community is raising funds in support of the Armed Forces of Ukraine via Facebook. The local authorities fail to respond to such activities in any way.
Russian citizens, permanently residing in Greece, have for some time had their accounts blocked, without explanation, by local banks, under the European Council Regulation (EU) 2022/328 of 25 February 2022, which sometimes resulted in the loss of their only source of income.[574]
At the same time, no facts of persecution by the state of Russian compatriots residing in Greece were noted in 2023.
The Greek society is characterized by a relatively high level of immunity to far-right rhetoric, with over 65 percent of Greeks rejecting attempts to revise history and whitewash the Nazis and Nazi collaborators. This stems from the living memory of the occupation of Greece by the "Axis" powers in 1941-1944, which took away many civilians and caused enormous material damage, prompting Athens to keep raising the issue of compensations with Berlin.
However, in December 2023, when the UN General Assembly considered the Resolution on combating glorification of Nazism, neo-Nazism and other practices that contribute to fuelling contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, introduced annually by Russia and other co-sponsors, the Greek delegation voted against it, just as in 2022 (while it had always abstained before), following the consolidated position of the European Union member states.[575]
The completion in October 2020 of the trial of the leaders of Golden Dawn nationalist party and its activists (60 in total), charged with, inter alia, murders and illegal possession of weapons, which had lasted since 2013, is recognized as a landmark event in the fight against misanthropic ideology. The organization was found to be a criminal group and prohibited, and its leaders were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment. According to experts, the law enforcement agencies' successful fight against Golden Dawn contributed to a 17 percent drop in antisemitism in the country.[576]
In November 2021, the premiere of the Greek-German film Echoes of the Past (Kalavryta 1943), depicting the atrocities perpetrated by Nazi invaders in the town of Kalavryta in the northern part of Peloponnese peninsula, was met negatively by the public. In late 1943, Nazis destroyed the town and executed, according to historians' estimates, about 1,500 local residents. The Association of Survivors and Victims of the Kalavryta Massacre accused the creators of the film of falsifying historical facts. In particular, the organization was outraged by a scene in which a German soldier frees people trapped inside a house that has been set on fire by the executioners.[577]
In December 2022, the Greek society was shocked by the desecration of the memorial to Thessaloniki Jews killed in WWII, which was located in the territory of the Thessaloniki University built on the spot of an old Jewish cemetery destroyed by the Nazi occupational administration in 1942.[578] The act of vandalism was condemned by the Greek Foreign Ministry.[579]
A long-term project to create a Holocaust Memorial Museum and Human Rights Education Centre is underway in Thessaloniki, which aims, inter alia, to help tackle racism and religious discrimination in Greece.[580]
There still exist a number of right-wing radical parties and organizations, which, with the collapse of Golden Dawn, have been given a chance to gain a foothold on the Greek political scene. These include, among others:
The Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS) – a nationalist party established in 2000. Its followers advocate forced deportation of refugees who are not needed by the Greek economy;
The Popular Greek Patriotic Union (LEPEN) – a party founded in 2016 by former Golden Dawn members that actively promotes anti-migrant and anti-Islamic ideas up to organizing mass rallies against refugees;
The Patriotic Radical Union (PAT.RI.E.), an ultra-nationalist party founded in 2018 officially merged with the LAOS party in 2019;
The New Right, a far-right nationalist party. It also openly stands against Islam, migrants and refugees. The party leader positions himself and his organization as fighters against the Islamic colonization of Greece and Europe;
The Greek Socialist Resistance (ESA), a neo-Nazi organization that adopted the emblem of Oswald Mosley's British Union of Fascists (BUF);[581]
The National Party – Greeks (formerly Greeks for the Fatherland), a far-right party established in April 2020. It was founded by Ilias Kasidiaris, one of the main leaders of Golden Dawn and former member of Parliament (among others was sentenced in 2020 and is currently in prison);
The Spartans, a far-right nationalist party founded in 2017 that calls for the toughest possible migration legislation. The party made it through to Parliament at the last parliamentary election on 25 June 2023, gaining 12 seats out of 300. Former Golden Dawn supporters accounted for more than a half of the party's votes.
In April 2023, the Hellenic Parliament adopted Law No. 5043/2023 prohibiting parties whose leaders were convicted for membership in criminal organizations from running in elections to the national legislature. The law was adopted to prevent the National Party – Greeks, founded by convicted Golden Dawn MP Ilias Kasidiaris, from entering the Parliament. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the National Party – Greeks was prohibited from participating in the parliamentary elections, in May-June 2023 the far-right Spartans party entered the legislature with public support by Ilias Kasidiaris. Most of its activists came from the National Party – Greeks.
The relevant offences are identified as a separate group of crimes in Law 4285/2014 on Combating Certain Forms and Expressions of Racism and Xenophobia by Criminal Law Provisions. This act provided for stricter punishment for fuelling hatred and inciting to violence against certain groups of the population, namely imprisonment for up to three years and a fine of EUR 20,000.[582]
In the spirit of the neo-liberal tendencies prevailing in the European Union, a proposal to amend this law was made in March 2023 in order to counteract homo- and transphobic behaviour as well. On 15 February 2024, the Greek Parliament adopted Law No. 5089/2024 “Equality in Civil Marriage, Amendments to the Civil Code and Other Provisions”, legalizing same-sex marriage and adoption by same-sex couples.[583]
In accordance with the Recommendations of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), under the Council of Europe in December 2020, Greece adopted a National Action Plan (NAP) against Racism and Intolerance, which seeks to eliminate all forms of discrimination based on race, skin colour, religion, belief, national or ethnic origin, etc. The NAP is implemented in four major areas: awareness-raising, education, social integration and justice.[584]
In 2019, in accordance with the European Parliament resolution on combating anti-Semitism 2017/2692 (RSP), the Greek Government adopted the working definition of anti-Semitism used by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) (includes 35 Member States, with Russia not being a member thereof), as part of the preparations for Athens' chairmanship in 2021.
Greece consistently implements the Recommendations of the UN Human Rights Committee, but has not ratified the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (1990), the European Convention on Nationality (1992) and the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (1995). Athens neither signed nor ratified the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (1992).
There are no discriminatory prohibitions with regard to the participation of minorities in the political life and public administration, to which representatives of non-titular nations are admitted. Muslim deputies represent a number of the country's northern regions in the Parliament. In a number of local government bodies, official positions are held by Russian compatriots from the countries of the former USSR.
According to the 2023 report[585] of the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights, only a few EU countries, including Greece, have set up systemic reforms aimed at strengthening the participation of Roma in structures of policy making and implementation.[586]
However, despite Law No. 4648/2019, adopted by the Greek Parliament, which significantly facilitates the exercise of the right to vote by citizens living abroad[587] (in particular, the law has, for the first time, provided for the organization of polling stations on the basis of Greek foreign missions, and launched electronic registration for diaspora representatives wishing to exercise their right to vote), the parliamentary elections held in May-June 2023 showed a low turnout among Greeks abroad. This is explained, first of all, by the selective opening of polling stations due to the lack of staff to organize voting in some Greek foreign missions.
For example, Greek citizens living in Russia were unable to exercise their right to vote due to the absence of a polling station in the Russian Federation. As an alternative, they were invited to vote in Vilnius.
No infringements on the freedom of assembly or belief have been reported in Greece. Human rights defenders point to challenges in ensuring the rights to ethnic, cultural and linguistic self-identification of the Muslim population of the region of Thrace in the North-East of the country on the border with Turkey, as well as a number of islands in the Aegean Sea. The only officially recognized minority ("national minority" has no definition in the legislation) in Greece is the "Muslim" minority, which incorporates all representatives of non-titular ethnic groups living in Thrace: Turks, Pomaks, Gypsies, totalling more than 120,000 people. Athens continues to legislatively limit any possibility to add the term "Turkish" to the names of public, political, sports, cultural or any other associations.[588] Faith leaders of the Thrace Muslims, the muftis, are appointed by the Greek authorities, with "alternative" muftis being elected by the population to act concurrently.
The UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) has expressed concern that Greek Muslims might be denied the right to ethnic, cultural and linguistic self-identification.[589]
With the support of the Ministry of Education and Religion, a house of worship for the Alevi community (2,800 members) has been functioning in Thrace since June 2022; it became the first institution of this sort in Greece, and third in Europe (after Austria and Germany).[590]
In Greece, Russian compatriots' right to freedom of religion is not violated. In the country, there are several Russian-speaking Hellenic Orthodox Church (HOC) parishes. Meanwhile, after the Moscow Patriarchate severed full communion with several HOC dioceses, including the Archbishopric of Athens, in response to the recognition of Ukrainian schismatics by the HOC in October 2019, some local Russian-speaking diaspora believers have been facing difficulties.
Some parishioners of the "Russian" Church of the Holy Trinity in Athens (the Archbishopric of Athens) moved to other parishes protesting against the legalization of the schism.
There is an increase in xenophobia due to a growing influx of migrants from the Middle East and North Africa. According to the UNHRC[591], as of September 2023, there were 169,400 refugees in the country, including from the Middle East, North Africa and several Asian countries (43,200 from Syria, 36,300 from Afghanistan).
Human rights defenders are concerned about conditions in reception centres – overcrowding, disregarded sanitary standards, limited access to qualified medical care, as well as violations of rules regarding detention time limits, separation of children and adults, provision of qualified interpreters, etc.
According to the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights Report 2024,[592] on the 4th of April 2023, the ECtHR issued its ruling A.D. v Greece (No 55363/19). It found that Greece had violated Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) on the prohibition of torture due to providing inadequate living conditions in the Samos Reception and Identification Centre for a pregnant Ghanian woman.[593]
Since 2018, Human Rights Watch NGO has been drawing attention to overcrowding in detention centres and long periods of the accommodation of men and women together in camps. A report released by the organization on 22 December 2021, points to the "intolerable conditions for migrant minors in Greek deportation centres where they are detained, despite the ratification in December 2020 by the Parliament of Greece of Law 4760/2020 prohibiting unaccompanied detention of children".
The EU authorities and human rights NGOs increasingly accuse Athens of illegally expelling potential asylum seekers back into the Turkish territory/sea area when they attempt to cross the border.
In 2022, Greece decided to expel to Turkey 540 immigrants from the Middle East and North Africa. At the same time, by September 2023, Greece had provided refuge to 24.9 thousand Ukrainians.[594] In view of the "easier" entry conditions, fast-track procedure for granting temporary protection and highly tolerant attitude to Ukrainian migrants on the part of the Greek authorities, many humanitarian organizations and human rights NGOs have accused the Greek leadership of discriminatory policies towards other refugees, including from the MENA region.
Greece is being criticised for circumventing EU legal norms and unjustified ill-treatment of refugees, including the practice of "unofficial expulsions" and pushbacks of their boats from national territorial waters, which often endangers their health and lives.[595]
The Report of the EU Anti-Fraud Office (ΟLAF)[596] on the violation of migrants' rights by Greek law enforcement officers, published on 15 February 2022, shows that the practice of pushing back migrants is systemic, and the EU Border and Coast Guard Agency (FRONTEX) deliberately covers up abuses.
According to Amnesty International's 2022 final report on Greece, mortality rates among refugees increased more than twice as compared to 2021.[597]
In June 2023, an Italy-bound fishing vessel carrying more than 700 irregular migrants from Tobruk (Libya) sank in the Greek waters; only 104 people were rescued. It was then reported that Frontex was considering suspending its activities in Greece due to long-standing violations of migrants' rights in the country.
In June 2022, the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs of the European Parliament held a hearing on reported gross violations of the rights of asylum seekers and those who defended their human rights in Greece.
Mary Lawlor, UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders, noted (March 2023) serious abuses by the Greek authorities following her visit to the country in June 2022.[598]
According to the Human Rights Watch, in 2021-2022, those who had been detained when attempting to cross the border began to be engaged in pushback operations receiving weapons and promises of the legalization of their stay after three months of such work. The NGO also points out that despite the Greek Government's continued denial of its involvement in pushbacks, in September 2022, Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis reported a "successful 'prevention' of 150,000 illegal border crossings in 2022".
Human Rights Watch published a report titled "Their Faces Were Covered: Greece's Use of Migrants as Police Auxiliaries in Pushbacks" based on interviews with 26 Afghan refugees who tried to cross the Greek-Turkish land border between September 2021 and February 2022 and were pushed back to Turkey.
The report states that Greek police detained asylum seekers at the land border between Greece and Turkey on the Evros River during the said period, in most cases beating them and stripping them of their clothes, seizing their money, mobile phones and other belongings. Then, the law enforcers handed the migrants over to masked men who pushed them into small boats, took them to the middle of the Evros River and threw them into the frigid water, making them wade to the Turkish riverbank. They employed men who were of Middle Eastern or South Asian origin.
Dunja Mijatović, the then Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, pointed out in spring 2021 in a letter to Notis Mitarachi, Greek Minister of Migration and Asylum, to more than 100 episodes of "pushing back" migrants in 2020.
On 30 June 2022, Ylva Johansson, European Commissioner for Home Affairs, during a teleconference with George Gerapetritis, Minister of State, Takis Theodorikakos, Minister of Citizen Protection, and Ioannis Plakiotakis, Minister of Maritime Affairs and Insular Policy, accused Greece of "pushing back" migrants, abuse and excessive use of force by Greek border services and coast guards, and obliged the Government to develop a mechanism for treating migrants with respect for their basic human rights. Otherwise, the European commissioner promised to stop allocating migration-related funds to Greece.[599]
In March 2022, Notis Mitarachi, Minister of Migration and Asylum, told in the fashion prevailing in the EU that Ukrainians are "real refugees", while those arriving from Syria or Afghanistan are "irregular migrants".
Experts note manifestations of racism and xenophobia, especially against incoming migrants, but also against Roma. They have significant difficulties in accessing basic social services such as housing, employment, education and health care, regularly face prejudice, stereotypes and discrimination, and are subjected to disproportionately frequent checks of identity documents and arbitrary arrests by policemen and other law enforcement officers.
EU Agency for Fundamental Rights Report 2023[600] refers to a report published in 2022 by the Greek Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, according to which in 2022 almost 117,500 Roma lived in the country in more or less segregated settlements with severe living conditions.
The European Parliament resolution of 7 February 2024 on the rule of law and media freedom in Greece points to a number of negative trends and systemic problems in the country's domestic policy that threaten the functioning of democracy and respect for the rule of law.[601]
In its 2020 annual report, Athens Racist Violence Recording Network (RVRN), comprised of more than 51 NGOs, noted an increase in ethnic and religiously motivated beatings, grievous bodily harm and killings.[602] Investigations into such acts often drag on for many months. A similar 2021 report, published by the RVRN on 26 May 2022, documented an increase in racist violence perpetrated by the police in recent years.[603]
According to the 2023 Press Freedom Index contained in the annual report by the Reporters Without Borders, Greece ranked last among EU member states, 107th out of 180 countries (108th in 2022, and 70th in 2021).
It has been emphasized that journalists in this country receive threats of physical violence, are subjected to verbal attacks (including by high-ranking politicians), and face lawsuits.
It has been noted that the police increasingly resort to violence and obstruct journalistic coverage of the refugee crisis and demonstrations in the capital.[604]
Cases of media takeovers by oligarchs and the lack of transparent criteria for the distribution of state subsidies to media companies are noted. The unlawful use by the authorities of the country of the concept of "threat to national security" as a pretext for wiretapping and surveillance of political opponents is condemned. Concerns are raised about pressure, intimidation and persecution of officials representing national supervisory authorities charged with human rights and personal data protection, as well as promotion of transparency.
There has also been a rapid increase in incidents of excessive use of force by police, sexism against female journalists, and obstruction of journalistic coverage of migration issues and demonstrations in the capital.
According to the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights Report 2022, in October 2021, a 20-year-old Roma man was lethally shot during a police chase. This led to widespread protests by the civil society and drew significant publicity in mass media.[605] The Greek Roma Federation insisted that the incident should be thoroughly investigated.[606] Seven police officers were arrested and found guilty.[607] This prompted the authorities to adopt a number of measures to reform the police rapid response system, including training for law enforcement officers.[608] The Greek National Commission for Human Rights which monitors the situation of Roma in Greece also stressed the importance of retraining law enforcement officers.[609]
The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, in its concluding observations of 28 June 2022,[610] pointed to discrimination against Roma children, encouraging Greece to establish legal safeguards to prevent statelessness of children born to foreign parents, and facilitate their access to Greek citizenship.
In Denmark, there have been no cases of glorification of the Nazi movement, the former members of the Nazi SS organization and its branches in 2023 – early 2024. There have been no cases of destruction of monuments honouring those who fought against Nazism during World War II being demolished, as well as no exhumations of remains of fighters against Nazism or prosecution of the Red Army or Allied forces veterans.
The Danish authorities do not oppose holding of events related to the celebration of Victory Day and other anniversaries, providing assistance in the maintenance of graves of the Soviet soldiers located in municipal cemeteries.
However, when voting at the UN General Assembly on the draft resolution "Combating the glorification of Nazism, neo-Nazism and other practices that contribute to fuelling contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance" submitted annually by the Russian Federation and other sponsors, the Danish delegation has regularly abstained or voted against it (in 2011, 2022, 2023), in solidarity with other European Union member States.
Since the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation started the special military operation to denazify and demilitarize Ukraine and to protect the civilians in Donbas on 24 February 2022, the Danish authorities have taken an extremely anti-Russian stance. Despite media reports about the use of the Danish territory to carry out cyber attacks against Russian institutions, the participants in these actions have not yet been brought to justice.
As for the situation of Russian compatriots in Denmark, many of them have complained about an "unfavorable information background" and psychological pressure since the beginning of the special military operation. A number of Russian citizens confirm that they occasionally fall victims of anti‑Russian campaigns and the policy to "cleanse" everything Russian, including the mention of this word in the names of non-profit organizations.
Cases of vandalism against the Russian Embassy buildings, the Russian Center for Science and Culture, the St. Nevsky Church in Copenhagen, and memorials to Soviet servicemen in Copenhagen, Aarhus and Allinge (Bornholm Island) have been recorded.
There are cases of the Danish authorities being slow in informing the Russian Embassy about incidents concerning arrests of Russian citizens, as well as refusals of private clinics to provide medical assistance. Though the Danish law enforcement authorities formally provide consular access to the detained Russians; they still regularly drag on approval time frames for such visits.
As a result, despite the fact that the Danish authorities have not undertaken legislative steps leading to discrimination of Russians and members of the Russian-speaking community, our compatriots do face violations of their rights and psychological pressure in their daily lives.
At the same time, the Danish authorities do not impede overt recruitment of Danish subjects and citizens of other countries carried out by the Ukrainian embassy in Denmark to participate in hostilities in the zone of the special military operation on the side of Ukraine. The aggressive activities of the Ukrainian Embassy, violating the provisions of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, are not limited to recruitment of mercenaries. Information resources of the diplomatic mission are also used for distribution of photographic and video materials containing torture, ill-treatment, and brutal murders of Russian military in Ukraine. The Danish authorities prefer to ignore the illegal activities of the Ukrainian diplomatic mission.
In January 2024, the Jyllands-Posten newspaper published a series of materials[611] with baseless allegations against parishes of the Russian Orthodox Church in Denmark. The above-mentioned publications were a targeted campaign to discredit the activities of the Orthodox parishes and to incite hatred on the basis of religion and nationality.
The government and parliament of Denmark were highly recommended to include the Russian Orthodox Church in the "blacklist" od extremist organizations (which currently features a number of extremist organizations) and to limit financing for parishes provided by the Moscow Patriarchate[612] by law. This would mean it would be impossible for parishes to continue their activities.
The Danish Institute for Human Rights (DIHR) or any other human rights organizations in the Kingdom offered no comments on these provocative publications of the newspaper.
In its annual report on key issues of the human rights profile of the Kingdom, the DIHR, among other things, points out problems concerning the fight against racial discrimination.
The Danish Criminal Code does not have a direct ban on organizations promoting racial discrimination, as well as on participation in such organizations.[613]
There are a number of neo-Nazi organizations active in Denmark (Danish National Front, Danish Defence League, White Pride, and Danish National Socialist Movement). They are not very active, mainly due to a lack of finaning and small membership. Practically, they focus on the distribution of propaganda materials through the Internet and social networks, mainly reflecting the attitude of these organizations towards the government's migration policy, as well as containing calls for intolerance against the followers of Judaism who live in the country.
The right-wing neo-Nazi group Nordic Resistance Movement (NRM) (active in Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and Finland) traditionally stands out. Unlike other similar organizations, the Nordic Resistance Movement has a clear political program (creation of a national-socialist republic, consisting of the countries of Scandinavia, Finland and possibly, the Baltic states, subsequently spreading the national-socialist ideology around the world), as well as a "combat wing" engaging in violent actions. Among the latter we should note the destruction of the Jewish cemetery in Randers in November 2019, which marked the anniversary of 1938's Kristallnacht. As a result of the radicals’ actions, 84 tombs were either damaged or desecrated. In October 2020, two NRM members were prosecuted for these acts; they were sentenced to one year in prison.
In January 2023, Danish media reported that Danish law enforcement authorities had pressed charges against a 16-year-old in a case involving participation in the international neo-Nazi terrorist group Feuerkrieg Division (FKD). According to the police, between December 2021 and April 2022, he led the movement, recruited new mwmbers, and distributed extremist materials and instructions for making explosive devices and weapons.[614]
According to local experts, the neo-Nazi FKD movement, which mainly operates through messengers and social networks, has no deep links in the Kingdom. Nevertheless, the experts unanimously assessed the charge as extremely serious. The criminal case against the teenager was brought under Chapter 114c, item 3 of the Danish Criminal Code (participation in a terrorist organization – up to 8 years of imprisonment), Chapter 114c, item 1 (recruitment to a terrorist organization – up to 12 years of imprisonment) and Chapter 114e, item 1 (assistance in promoting a terrorist organization – up to 8 years of imprisonment).
On the basis of the messages sent via Telegram messenger and other investigative materials discovered by the police, the prosecution demanded to imprison him up to 4 years. In addition to this, a proposal has been made to ban the defendant from contact with persons previously convicted of violating the provisions on terrorism of the Danish Criminal Code. The first hearing in the case took place at Holbæk Court on 14 March 2023. The court judgement is expected to be delivered before the end of 2024.
The involvement of extremist nationalist parties, as well as racist and xenophobic movements and groups in Danish political life remains limited. For example, the right-wing political Stram Kurs (Hard Line) party, which had gained notoriety by conducting provocative actions, including burning the Quran,[615] does not have broad support among the Danish population (it received 63,537 votes (1.8 percent) in the June 2019 parliamentary elections and only 379 votes in 2022).
At the same time, there is an increase in hate crime in Denmark. According to information published by Danish law enforcement agencies, in the first quarter of 2022 alone, there had been 263 hate crimes, which is an increase of 32 percent compared with the same period of 2021. The most vulnerable religious groups include Muslims and followers of Judaism (56 percent and 23 percent of the total number of such crimes respectively).
On 22 July 2023, activists from the Danske Patrioter radical group, known for its insulting statements about Islam, held a stunt and burnt a Quran at the Embassy of Iraq in Copenhagen.[616]
In August 2023, the government proposed to criminalize the improper handling of items important to a religious community. Following a public hearing on 27 October 2023, the government introduced an amended bill prohibiting the improper handling of scriptures of religious importance to a recognized religious community, which was passed by Parliament on 7 December 2023. [617]
The measures taken by the Danish authorities to criminalize incitement to direct violence based on religion or belief were reflected in the report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on "Combating intolerance, negative stereotyping, stigmatization, discrimination, incitement to violence and violence against persons based on religion or belief", submitted in accordance with resolution 52/38[618] of the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) during its 55th session (26 February – 5 April 2024).[619]
Chapter 27, paragraph 266 of the Danish Criminal Code provides for a fine or imprisonment for up to two years for public or intended for subsequent distribution statements and messages which threaten or insult a group of people on the basis of race, colour, national or ethnic origin, religion, or sexual orientation. the propagandistic nature of such acts is an aggravating factor. In practice, however, Article 77 of the Danish Constitution, which guarantees citizens the right for freedom of expression, takes precedence in such cases.
Taking into account this conflict, on 2 February 2023, the DIHR expressed concern that the crime registration system in Denmark generally does not take into account the motive of religious and racial hatred.[620] Human rights activists point out that in 2020 the law enforcement agencies registered 635 crimes of such nature, however, according to a survey conducted by the Ministry of Justice of Denmark, some 12,000 people faced hate-motivated violence over that period. Experts urge police to register all cases as potential hate crimes if the victim considers the motive of hatred to be significant even remotely.
It is noteworthy that there were examples where Danish courts clearly indicated that certain claims and statements of political figures did not fall under the protection of freedom of expression. For example, in one of their reports, the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) mentions a ruling of the Eastern High Court (Danish: Østre Landsret) of 4 July 2019 in the case S‑1099, recognizing certain video addresses of Rasmus Paludan, the founder of the ultra-right Stram Kurs (Hard Line) party and a well-known crusader against immigrants, recorded on the background of the house where a human rights activist of African origin lived[621] as discriminatory.
National and international human rights structures criticize Danish authorities for other shortcomings in countering discrimination as well.
In February 2023, the UN specialized Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), established under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, concluded that Denmark had failed to take effective measures against incitement of racial hatred by dropping investigations against the organizers of an art exhibition featuring racist images. The exhibition in question was held in 2014 in the Danish Parliament building and in a private gallery in Copenhagen under the auspices of the Danish People's Party.
The official representative of the Afro-Swedish National Association, Momodou Jallow, filed a complaint to the Danish authorities against the artist and the organizers of the exhibition, claiming that he fell victim of a violation of his rights guaranteed by the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. One of the paintings depicted M. Jallow as a slave running away from his master, while another depicted him hanging by his neck under a bridge with two other black people. In the first case, the caption on the canvas read: "Our Negro Slave Has Run Away"; in the second, "Hang on Afrophobes."
The Copenhagen Public Prosecutor initially launched an investigation, but then dropped the proceedings, citing Article 10 on freedom of expression of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). After Mr. Jallow's appeal was rejected in Denmark, he appealed to the CERD in 2018.
CERD members arrived to the conclusion that the paintings in the exhibition were "manifestations of racist hatred" because they were based on ideas of "racial or ethnic superiority, hatred or incitement of hatred." According to the experts, the Danish authorities failed to respond appropriately to the manifestation of racial discrimination. The Committee asked Denmark to "apologize to the complainant and guarantee him full reparation."[622]
In February 2020, in its report to the CERD, the DIHR pointed out the lack of progress in incorporating the provisions of the Convention into national legislation. [623]
Meanwhile, according to the information in the 2022 FRA report,[624] Denmark is one of the EU countries which have incorporated the provisions of the EU Framework Decision on Combating Racism and Xenophobia in their internal law.[625] In particular, the Danish Criminal Code has been amended to protect minorities which have become victims of hate crimes.[626]
On 19 March 2022, the Danish Institute for Human Rights (DIHR) published the report titled "Ethnic Profiling",[627] which analyses how often Danish law enforcement officers use the factor related to ethnicity in control, surveillance or investigation activities with no objective justification. The report is based on data collected over a ten-year period from verdicts (2.5 million cases) and arrests (270,000 cases) of permanent residents over 14 years old who live on the territory of Denmark.
The main conclusion of the report is that people from non-Western countries, especially those from the Middle East and North Africa, raise more suspicions among the law enforcement agencies and are thus much more likely to be wrongly detained and convicted and then pardoned than ethnic Danes.
The direct consequences of ethnic profiling in Denmark are distrust and antipathy towards the Danish police on the part of non-Westerners, as well as sense of insecurity and inequality. The authors of the report compiled a "stereotypical profile of an immigrant male" (dark skin colour, sportswear, beard and short-cropped hair), the coincidence with which, even in some points, makes a citizen "a target of police attention." To remedy the situation, the DIHR recommended the authorities to introduce amendments to the Act on Police Enforcement.
Referring to the DIHR's analysis of official data from 2009 to 2019[628], in its 2023 report, the AOHR establishes that immigrants and their descendants are 45 percent and 64 percent more likely than ethnic Danes to be suspected and charged with offenses that end up in a dismissal or acquittal.[629]
Gérald Pandelon, a specialist in criminal law and forensics and a lawyer at the Paris Court of Appeal, the Doctor of Law and Political Science, believes that Denmark has chosen a tough and decisive immigration policy in order to preserve social cohesion while allowing immigrants to truly integrate into the society. [630]
On 4 March 2024, during the 55th session of the HRC, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, while delivering the report "Global Update to the Human Rights," referred to the AOHR's 2023 survey "Being Black in the EU." It found, among other things, that 58 percent of people stopped by police officers perceived the action as racially motivated. Notably, since 2016, this figure has risen in Denmark, Finland, France, Germany and Finland, as well as Ireland. Emphasizing the importance of analyzing the factors underlying such perceptions and their elimination, Mr. Türk noted that "data, where available, show that many states need to take comprehensive measures to combat police police violence and discrimination."[631]
According to the data published by structures for equality in 2021, the number of cases due to racial or ethnic discrimination increased in 2020 in Denmark.[632]
According to the 2022 FRA report,[633] in the first half of 2021 the number of registered hate crimes, many of which were related to the COVID‑19 pandemic, increased by 12 percent compared to the previous year.[634]
As follows from the answer provided in the Denmark's Government reply to the sixth questionnaire (2021) of the Council of Europe's European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), Danish national police reported 100 cases of hate speech in 2019 (there were 68 such cases in 2018, 48 in 2017, and 56 in 2016).[635]
According to a number of human rights organizations, there has been an increase in anti-migrant sentiment in Denmark in recent years. Legislatively, this is reflected by the fact that second and third generation migrants have very limited grounds for obtaining Danish citizenship. This category of persons, especially women, has little involvement in the labour market.[636] Public opinion polls have also confirmed the discriminatory attitude towards migrants and their descendants as well as members of ethnic minorities. The FRA particularly stressed this.[637]
According to the DIHR, about 45 percent of immigrants of "non-Western" origin faced racial discrimination in Denmark in 2022. At the same time, 20 percent of employees belonging to ethnic minorities had experienced discrimination in the workplace. 11 percent of immigrants and 25 percent of descendants of persons of "non-Western" origin were refused public services, including transportation in buses or taxis.
The ECRI report was published on 9 June 2022[638], documenting several "worrying trends" in recent years with regard to the treatment of people of non‑Western origin.
One trend is that Muslims in Denmark are increasingly depicted (including in political circles) as a threat to Danish values and culture. The Commission recommended that the Folketing (the Danish parliament) develop a legal framework for cutting the State funding of and disbanding "racist organizations, including political parties" if their programs are based on religious or racial hatred.
The report also notes that the Danish Government has still not adopted a national action plan against racism, with a particular emphasis on preventing anti-Muslim discrimination (as early as in January 2022, the majority in Folketing decided to elaborate on the said action plan).
According to the National Integration Barometer, more than half of Danish ethnic minorities face discrimination in their daily lives. The Danish authorities are particularly concerned about the situation in Muslim communities. For that reason, they are closely supervised them in order to make sure that Islam stays an integral and harmonious part of society, not allowing religion to become an instrument of any kind of manipulation and pressure.
The Danish Institute for Human Rights (DIHR) draws attention to the fact that the article in the Danish Criminal Code on combating radical Islamic preachers (the so-called "Imams Act", which provides for revocation of citizenship for expressing ideas contrary to the kingdom's "core values"), which has been expanded in 2021 and stays in force permanently since January 2022, restricts freedom of religion and freedom of expression. Human rights activists point out that Danish law does not clearly distinguish between "legal" and "illegal" statements, and applies not only to statements made, for example, in mosques, but also to conversations "in private."
According to the 2023 FRA report, in its report published in 2021[639], the DIHR stated that there was a simplified procedure for obtaining Danish citizenship for young people from Scandinavian countries, noting the need for equal opportunities for all those who wish to gain Danish citizenship without exceptions.[640] This report[641] also noted that parents with Danish names are more likely to send their children to school (25 percent)[642]), than those with names that sound like Muslim ones (15 percent).[643]
As for Jews living in Denmark, according to a December 2018 study by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), 80 percent of them constantly (9 percent), often (32 percent) or sometimes (39 percent) have to avoid wearing or displaying things and objects that would identify them as Jews. 85 percent of respondents consider anti-Semitism to be a very serious or a fairly serious problem (36 percent and 49 percent, respectively).[644] Thus, the Danish Jewish Society traditionally warns against public display of identifying accessories or clothing.
According to statistics from the report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Denmark (sixth monitoring cycle), in 2019 Danish police registered 51 anti-Semitic crimes. Their number has increased in comparison to 2018 (26) and 2017 (38). [645]
According to the Interfax news agency article of 21 March 2024, citing Western media, the Danish intelligence services announced that the terrorist threat level in the country has been raised "to four points out of five due to possible terrorist actions both inside Denmark and against Danish interests abroad." The Danish Security and Intelligence Service justifies these measures by developments in the Middle East.[646]
There are shortcomings in ensuring the rights of the inhabitants of Greenland (Danish autonomy) in Denmark. The Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Francisco Cali Tzay, following his visit to Greenland in February 2023, indicated in his report that some 17,000 Inuit living in Denmark faced racism and discrimination, as well as various restrictions, including access to health care, education and housing despite having Danish citizenship. Persons with disabilities were among the most vulnerable groups. In addition, he drew attention to the lack of statistics on Inuit children living in Denmark and pointed out cases of the denial of mother-tongue education for them.
The report also addressed the forced removal of children in Greenland and their placement in foster care in Denmark. A special study had found that Inuit children were seven times more likely to be removed from their families than Danish children.
Human rights activists were displeased with the low number of MPs, belonging to ethnic minorities, elected in 2022 – only 2 percent, while this group makes up 9 percent of the population.
International human rights organizations have regularly criticized the Danish authorities' harsh refugee and migrant policies, as well as their plans to establish a refugee reception centre outside Denmark.
In 2019, the Danish government initiated a tougher legislation in providing protection to refugees: the duration of the temporary residence permit was shortened, mandatory regular review of cases, restrictions on family reunification and stricter conditions for receiving social benefits were introduced (social security for asylum seekers was cut to 2,000 Danish krones, which is equivalent to 270 euros per month).
The Danish Ministry of Finance explained that immigration from non-Western countries costs the state DKK 33 billion annually (about EUR 4.4 billion) due to the low employment rate of these immigrants and, hence, low tax revenues and the higher costs of social benefits associated with them.
As follows from the 2022 ECRI report, as of 1 January 2021, 617,770 registered immigrants lived in the country. 260,304 of them were from Europe, the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand ("Western", mostly white immigrants), and 357,466 from other 157 countries ("non-Western" immigrants who, according to the Danish Office of Statistics, are considered to be ethnic and religious minorities).[647]
In March 2021, 34,494 people were registered as "Western" and 165,174 as "non-Western" immigrants.[648]
The above-mentioned report also emphasizes that it has become increasingly difficult for refugees and migrants to acquire citizenship which is granted after eight years of residence in the country and depends on meeting a number of criteria. In addition, temporary residence permits of all categories of refugees are verified every one or two years.[649]
On 9 July 2021, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) pronounced its verdict in the case of a Syrian refugee who had brought an action against Denmark in 2017 for the years-long family reunification process. The Court found that the Kingdom had violated the right to family life and ruled that refugee status should not limit this right.[650]
In June 2022, the DIHR published a report noting that "the Danish interpretation of the right to privacy and family life is in some cases too narrow," which results in refugee families risking being separated because "the authorities do not assess a family as a unit."[651]
Over the decades immigration has become a serious political issue in Denmark and in recent years all political parties have taken a tougher stance on the issue, including on irregular migration.
There is a general shift in focus from integration to return, which is reflected in the Danish Government's goal to achieve "zero asylum seekers." Refugees are expected to prepare for return rather than integration, as residence permits are intended for temporary stays and are only issued for two years (previously they were issued for five to seven years).
The focus on return and repatriation of refugees is also emphasized by the fact that the Danish state offers money to people who choose voluntary repatriation.
In this context, in 2021 Denmark joined the EU Joint Coordination Platform on Curbing Migration Flows and Trafficking in Human Beings in the Eastern Mediterranean, which aims to find solutions with regard to border control, returning asylum seekers back to their countries, human trafficking and improving the conditions for asylum seekers.
A significant aim for Denmark is to move asylum processing out of the EU – mirroring its national policy – and is establishing asylum processing centres abroad – in the regions of origin countries (it does not concern those who arrive within the UNHCR quotas). This makes it possible to send asylum seekers to third countries while their cases are considered, which, in its turn, decreases the inflow of migrants into the country.
In September 2022, Denmark and Rwanda announced that they have reached an agreement to strengthen interaction in migration, including the establishment of a mechanism to transfer asylum seekers from Denmark to Rwanda.[652]
Following the parliamentary elections in November 2022 and the formation of a new coalition government, work on the establishment of the center was suspended.
The initiative, incorporated into the Danish migration law, was strongly criticized by human rights organizations in 2022.
Earlier, the Danish authorities were repeatedly criticized in a similar manner by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the Office of the EU Home Affairs Spokesperson, as well as a large number of human rights organizations.
For example, Adalbert Jahnz, Spokesperson of the European Union for Internal Affairs, said that the right to asylum is a fundamental right in the EU and expressed concern about the compatibility of the new law with Denmark's international obligations, as well as at the risk of undermining the foundation of the international refugee protection system around the world.
The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has also opposed the Danish authorities' decision to transfer asylum and international protection obligations to a third country, as "it is contrary to the spirit and letter of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees."
In 2019, the Kingdom passed a law that guarantees refugees only temporary protection under quotas of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), meaning that if the authorities decide that the country of origin is safe for residence, the refugees will not receive an extension of their residence permit in Denmark.
In 2021, Copenhagen recognized certain areas of Syria as such, with natives to be returned to their homeland.[653]
As a result, Denmark became the first European country to revoke the residence permits of refugees from the Syrian regions of Damascus and Rif Damascus the Danish Immigration Service concluded that the security situation in the two provinces has improved. In 2019-2022, 366 residence permits for Syrian refugees were revoked in Denmark.
With regard to its compliance with the right not to be subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment, the DIHR highlights the current practice that exists in the country to detain persons who have been refused asylum or are present in the Kingdom upon the expiry of their residence permit.[654]
This mainly concerns people from Syria, who cannot be deported forcibly, since Copenhagen does not maintain official contacts with Damascus.
Refugees who refuse to return home voluntarily, whether or not they have committed an offence, may be administratively sent to a detention centre for up to six months (up to 18 months in particular cases). The centre conditions resemble imprisonment in many ways,[655] which in most cases forces refugees to leave the Kingdom.
For example, throughout 2022, 450 citizens were detained at the Ellebeck immigration center. At the same time, 23 cases of placement in isolation centers were recorded: 19 people – for a period of 1-14 days, 4 – for 15 days or more.
The DIHR urges to reduce duration of administrative detention of foreigners and use it only as a measure of last resort.
In April 2022, the Danish Ministry of Justice made an agreement with the Kosovo authorities to lease 300 places in local prisons to keep criminals to be deported from Denmark.[656]
On 9 June 2022, the Parliament adopted a number of bills, including amendments to the Danish Criminal Code, in order to implement this initiative. The prison complex in Gnjilane, Kosovo, is currently undergoing renovation work. It is expected to become operational in 2025.
Human rights defenders criticize the agreement, pointing out, among other things, that the right of prisoners to see relatives and friends will be restricted.
The UN Committee against Torture (CAT) has expressed its concern about Denmark's plans to extraterritorially detain third-country nationals who have committed crimes before deportation. According to the Committee's experts, the placement of criminals in Gnjilane prison may have unfavorable consequences for the prisoners' access to medical care.
On 22 November 2023, the CAT completed its review of the report on Denmark and prepared concluding observations and recommendations, including on the authorities' treatment of asylum-seekers, prison conditions, and the use of coercive measures in psychiatric institutions.
The Committee is also concerned about Denmark's decision to return asylum seekers to countries where they are at risk of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.
The DIHR pays attention to the fact that throughout 2022 the UN human rights structures reviewed five cases of the Danish authorities’ refusal to grant asylum and – on this basis – of deportation to Somalia, India and Iran. In two cases, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child criticized the actions of the Danish authorities, which, as noted, did not take into account the interests of children to the necessary extent. As a result, the Danish relevant authorities reviewed the decision and the persons concerned were granted asylum in Denmark.
On 16 November 2023, Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe published a report following her visit to Denmark (May-June 2023), which contains recommendations on the rights of refugees, asylum seekers and migrants? As well as on rights of persons with disabilities.[657]
Contrary to its generally restrictive approach to migration, on 16 March 2022, the Danish government passed a "special law" for Ukrainian refugees that granted them access to the labor market regardless of general asylum rules, the right to education, social benefits and temporary housing, the right to obtain a temporary residence permit (TRP) for two years under a simplified procedure, and also reduced the period, after which individuals become eligible to apply for family reunification from three to two years (since the date a person was granted asylum in Denmark).
Under this law, this particular category of refugees is not subject to the requirement to take Danish language courses and a number of other integration programs. In this regard, the DIHR warned the authorities of the risk of discrimination, as the "special law" guarantees Ukrainian refugees better conditions in comparison with other refugees.
As of 1 December 2023, more than 30,000 Ukrainians with a residence permit were registered in the country. The "special law" is to be in force until March 2025. After that, they will have to seek asylum in order to stay in the country.[658]
According to the article of Berlingske, a Danish daily newspaper, of 23 December 2023, citing the study of the University of Copenhagen, more than half of the interviewed Ukrainian refugees expressed a desire to stay in Denmark even after the end of the "Ukrainian conflict."[659]
In this context, Danish Minister for Foreigners, Immigration and Integration Affairs Kaare Dybvad Bek said that Ukrainian migrants living in the country should return home after the conflict is over. He explained that the Danish authorities regarded the refugee situation as temporary, regardless of where they came from.[660]
The minister explained his appeal by the fact that, although Ukrainians are culturally closer to the people in the country than people from the Middle East, they still live very differently from the Danes. Mr. Dubvad Beck also emphasized that the Ukrainian government is sending clear signals about its desire to bring its citizens home, and Denmark is obliged to respect this. Therefore, Mr. Dubvad Beck is going to oppose the extension of the refugees' stay in the country.[661]
According to a Danish Foreign Ministry press release issued in early May 2024, the Danish government has allocated a total of DKK 400 million (USD 57.7 million) for 2024 to fight illegal migration in Europe. According to the ministry, some 60,000 people have died trying to illegally cross the Mediterranean Sea to reach Europe since 2014.
Countries in the south favor cooperation in preventing the use of illegal migration routes. The Danish government intends to spend DKK 1.1 billion (USD 159 million) until 2029. The money will be used to strengthen border and migration controls, increase attention to issue concerning granting asylum and protection of migrants, as well as to help them return safely to their country through reintegration support programs.[662]
The Danish Government has been especially criticized for its efforts to combat the so-called "parallel societies," a social phenomenon where a large proportion of migrants from the Middle East and North Africa lead isolated lives, remaining outside the Danish language, cultural and legal environment.
They tend to reside in disadvantaged urban areas which had been almost entirely populated by migrants.
Moreover, the concept of a "ghetto" has been officially in effect at the Danish legislative level since 2011. In addition to the discriminatory nature of this term, the criteria included in it also raise questions. In particular, one of the possible grounds for classifying an area as a ghetto is that at least 2.7 percent of the population should have a criminal record.
In March 2018, the Danish government, led by Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen, presented a package of measures aimed at eradicating this "parallel society." The program dubbed "One Denmark without Parallel Societies – No Ghettos in 2030," includes a number of restrictive measures to adjust the national composition of the inhabitants. Its provisions have been implemented in various sectoral regulations in the Kingdom. At the same time, the document solidified the concept of a "ghetto."
Since the beginning of the aforementioned program, the Danish law enforcement authorities were given powers to establish "sharp penalty zones" in ghettos. If an offense is committed in such zones, the perpetrator may face a penalty twice the maximum sentence stipulated for that category of offense in the Danish Criminal Code. If the maximum penalty for a crime is a fine, it could be replaced by imprisonment. As additional policing measures, the Danish government also proposed increasing the police presence in ghettos, including through deploying mobile police units. In addition, a mechanism was approved to identify and subsequently expel repeat offenders and the most "influential" members of the criminal environment from the ghetto.
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) took notice of the situation and expressed deep concern about provisions in the Government programme adopted "in contravention of the Danish Constitution and its international obligations" that "impose differential treatment on grounds such as national origin, social status and residence." In particular, the CESCR viewed as discriminatory the categorization of specific areas as "ghettos" based on nationality of those living in them (the classification of areas as "ghettos" is determined by the proportion of residents from "non‑Western" countries), also pointing to the violation of migrants' right to freely choose their place of residence and educational institutions for their children. The combination of such measures, according to the Committee, not only results in discrimination based on ethnic origin and nationality, but also further marginalizes residents of disadvantaged areas.[663]
Furthermore, the CESCR noted that the authorities had recently taken numerous measures directly or indirectly affecting the economic, social, and cultural rights of refugees and migrants. Among these measures, the Committee pointed to the introduction of a number of preconditions for family reunification, the launch of the temporary stay procedure for refugees, under which local authorities are not required to provide refugees with permanent housing, and the limitation of free interpreter services when visiting medical facilities.
In December 2021, Denmark adopted a law aiming at reducing the number of "non-Western" people living in social housing to less than 30 percent from the total number of residents (the so-called "ghetto" areas) within 10 years. It suggests a number of restrictive measures to adjust the national composition of the inhabitants. In this regard, three judicial proceeding were opened in 2021, raising the issue of the discriminatory nature of this law.[664]
Furthermore, in December 2021, in its concluding observations on Denmark's combined twenty-second to twenty-fourth periodic reports, the CERD, also criticized the Danish legislation on combating "parallel societies," including the use of nationality as a criterion for dividing urban areas into different categories, and the possibility, provided by the Danish law, to forcibly remove migrants and their descendants from "ghetto" areas.
In addition, the CEDR recommended the Danish government to refrain from applying more severe laws and measures to immigrants and their descendants from "non-Western" countries, as well as from using the terms "Western" and "non-Western" in its policy and laws to avoid stigmatization, marginalization or indirect discrimination of any group of people.[665]
Despite recommendations, made by human rights organizations to amend the Danish law, the issue remains unresolved.
In June 2022, the Eastern Denmark Court of Appeal ruled that the tenants of the Neysomhed housing complex were not discriminated against in the course of the termination of their contract. The complex had been listed as a neighborhood with "parallel societies" since 2018. The housing association that owns Neisomhead terminated contracts with tenants on seven floors, which were predominantly occupied by people of "non-Western" origin.
In December 2021, 11 residents of the Mjellnerparken complex filed a lawsuit to the Eastern Denmark Court of Appeal against the Danish Ministry of the Interior and Housing, claiming they were subject to discrimination. The applicants cited information from an urban development plan, in which the number of migrants from "non-Western" countries and their descendants was allegedly a major factor in the settlement of the complex.
In November 2022, the Court of Appeal of Eastern Denmark asked the Court of Justice of the European Union to provide clarification on whether the categorization of the districts "Mjellnerparken" and "Schackenborgvänge" on the basis of the "non-Western" origin of their inhabitants constituted discrimination.
The ECRI calls on the authorities to stop the practice of selling public housing and then resettling migrants and their descendants and to use instead "positive incentives to increase the number of mixed residential areas."
Human rights NGOs note shortcomings in the functioning of the Danish penitentiary system.
According to the Council of Europe's annual prison statistics (SPACE I), the number of detainees in Denmark is 41.3 percent (with European average of 21.7 percent) of the total number of prisoners. This is the third highest percentage of detainees in Europe, after Luxembourg and the Netherlands.
According to the concluding observations of the UN Committee against Torture following its review of Denmark's report, the country's prisons, return and deportation centers, as well as detention facilities are operating at or above maximum capacity and are understaffed. The Committee also noted that high occupancy rates and low staffing levels are directly linked to a higher incidence of staff disciplinary action.
The DIHR estimated that the occupancy rate of Danish prisons in 2022 was 99,6 percent. This number continues to increase, while the number of prison officers, on the other hand, has consistently decreased in recent years (0.45 per prisoner in 2022).
Human rights defenders also have complaints about the conditions of detention in Danish prisons. In particular, they pay attention to the increase in the total duration of pre-trial detention and the introduction of a restrictive regime for detainees, who in some cases are kept in their cells for up to 23 hours a day, which in fact constitutes solitary confinement.
The DIHR has noted a significant increase in the number of cases where prisoners were placed in solitary confinement for more than 14 days as a punishment for breaches of discipline in prisons.
The number of long-term detentions in 2021 was 1,837, in 2022, 3,619 people were detained for an average of five months, which is the highest rate in the five-year period (for comparison: in 2015, this measure was applied seven times, while in 2019, prisoners were placed in solitary confinement for more than 14 days 705 times).
In early 2020, the situation was brought to the attention of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT), that operates within the Council of Europe, following its visit to Denmark in April 2019. The Committee criticized Copenhagen in general for failing to implement its 2014 recommendations and pointed to the continuing problem of overcrowding in Danish prisons, where two prisoners often have to share a single cell.[666]
The Council of Europe representatives noted similar shortcomings with regard to the two Danish asylum temporary detention centres, calling on the Danish authorities to either renovate or close these facilities due to overcrowding and inadequate conditions for rejected asylum seekers.
In 2019, the ECHR noted two more shortcomings in the Danish human rights record. The first case involved the repeated refusals by the Danish prison authorities to allow a person in involuntary isolation[667], to have an independent review of their 2015 medical report, according to which they constituted a danger to society and should remain in involuntary detention. The Court concluded that Denmark had breached the right to liberty and security of person guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights.
In the second case, the ECHR, based on the famous 2016 case "Paposhvili v Belgium," found the Kingdom guilty of violating the right not to be subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment in relation to the deportation of a Turkish citizen suffering from a severe mental illness from Denmark to his home country.
Unwarranted use of pepper spray by police and prison guards in closed spaces remains widespread in the country, and body searches and cell searches are conducted systematically. In 2021, 579 cases of pepper spray use by police were reported, and 11 people went to the emergency wards with injuries.
In 2022, the Danish Supreme Court ruled that the Execution of Criminal Sentences Act does not provide for authority for regular and systematic body searches of prisoners (fully undressed, with hands up, squatting, etc.) without reasons for suspicion.
On 1 January 2020, amendments allowing the Kingdom's police to search homes and seize personal belongings, including means of communication, of persons convicted of sexual offences without a court order, entered into force in Denmark.
A bill providing law enforcement bodies with similar powers in relation to those convicted under the anti-terrorism provisions of the criminal law has also been introduced to the Danish Parliament. As an additional punishment for such convicted persons, it is suggested that an indefinite ban on visiting certain places and contacting certain persons should be imposed by a court. The DIHR believes that this is a violation of the right to inviolability of the home, as well as the right to privacy and the right to freedom of movement.
The UN Committee against Torture has observed a significant increase in violent and threatening incidents among prisoners, which affects their safety and security in prisons. Between January 2014 and May 2019, the Independent Police Compliance Authority reviewed 28 cases involving fatalities and six cases involving deaths in police custody, as well as five complaints of torture. None of the cases resulted in criminal cases against police officers following the investigation.
The Committee also notes that the Criminal Codes of Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands do not contain a provision criminalizing torture as a separate offence.
Detainees are not always provided with prompt access to legal representation, including during police interrogations. Some detainees meet with a lawyer only minutes before appearing in court for a pre-trial detention hearing, requests for meetings with a lawyer and police responses are not systematically recorded. Detainees are not always adequately informed of their rights, in particular due to lack of or inadequate interpretation or translation.
Convicted criminals awaiting deportation after serving their sentence are held together with persons in administrative detention, for example, those whose asylum application has been rejected and those awaiting an asylum appeal.
The UN Committee against Torture is particularly concerned about the situation with children, who may also be subjected to administrative detention, and women who are held administratively in the same center as convicted criminals, including those of the opposite sex.
In some cases, children in social care are placed in secure residential facilities with children serving prison sentences.
The Danish authorities take a noticeably discriminatory approach towards the Danish nationals who participated in terrorist structures. For example, 2019 amendments by the Danish Parliament allow for the in absentia administrative stripping of Danish citizenship from persons whose actions caused "serious damage to the vital interests of Denmark" (adopted due to the reluctance of Danes to repatriate and prosecute their foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) in the territory of Denmark). In addition, under these novel laws, the children of Danish FTFs are stripped of the right to automatically obtain Danish citizenship by virtue of the citizenship of their parents. This provision runs contrary to the obligations of Copenhagen to reduce statelessness (according to the open data of the Danish counterintelligence service, 40 Danish FTFs' children remain in the regions of Syria and Iraq formerly controlled by the Islamic State terrorist organization, banned in Russia). In addition, Danish citizens who remain abroad and have participated in terrorist organizations may be completely denied consular assistance in Danish foreign missions.
The concluding observations of the UN Committee against Torture also point to the low rate of investigations and convictions for human trafficking offenses. According to statistics, the 73 people subjected to human trafficking in Denmark in 2022 came from 28 countries.
In 2022, the Human Trafficking Center received 22 requests about suspected illegal exploitation of Ukrainians. The investigation revealed that four women from Ukraine had been trafficked, all of whom had been exploited for prostitution.
The use of coercive measures in psychiatric institutions in Denmark has increased since 2015. According to a report published by the Danish Health Authority, there has been an increase in the number of children and young people subjected to one or more coercive measures during hospitalization in psychiatric institutions. There has been a 50 percent increase in the use of restraint and emergency sedation, and the use of restraint belts remains widespread.
In 2022, the Psychiatric Patients' Complaints Board reviewed 145 cases of coercion and concluded that in 68 cases out of them it was unlawful. In the last 10 years, there has been an even greater increase in the proportion of involuntary hospitalizations (from 58 percent to 68 percent) under the so-called red papers: a patient is placed in an institution because they are considered dangerous to themselves and others.
Ireland, which officially remained neutral throughout the entire period of World War II (despite pressure from the United Kingdom and the United States), has no observable record of attempts to glorify the Nazi movement and former members of the Nazi SS organizations or its branches, including the Waffen‑SS (e.g. by erecting monuments or memorials dedicated to such persons and organizations, holding public demonstrations in their honour or touting members of such organizations and Nazi collaborators as participants in national liberation movements).
When it comes to combating neo-Nazism, Ireland is following the common agenda of the European Union. For example, until 2022, along with the "collective West", Dublin annually abstained during the UN General Assembly voting on the "Combating glorification of Nazism, neo-Nazism and other practices that contribute to fuelling contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance" resolution, sponsored by Russia in concert with other countries. In 2022 and 2023, when the document was being adopted, Ireland obeyed the EU guidelines and voted against it, thus solidarising itself with those who engage in the glorification of Nazis and historical revisionism.
In the context of the Special military operation (SMO) conducted by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation to denazify and demilitarize Ukraine and to protect the civilians in Donbass, Dublin has sought to use multilateral human rights platforms, including the UN Human Rights Council (HRC), the specialized structures of the Council of Europe and the OSCE, to unabashedly criticize Russia.
Throughout this period, Ireland's foreign policy course was significantly reshaped towards the US- and EU-mandated tasks of collective opposition of the West against Russia. This idea subsumed the traditional priorities of Irish diplomacy – commitment to multilateralism, international law (within the framework of the concept of a "rules-based international order"), peacekeeping, international aid and humanitarian assistance. In their desire to be at the forefront of the West's anti-Russian front, and even contrary to their own historical traditions, Ireland continues to bleed its autonomy in international affairs, voluntarily relying more and more on the decisions made in Washington and EU-Brussels.
In an effort to demonstrate a leading role in establishing sanctions pressure on Russia while advocating for a "maximalist approach", Dublin fully supported all 14 EU restriction packages against Russia, enthusiastically advocating for their further extension with a view to stifle the Russian economy and abrogate the rights of Russian individuals and entities.
The Irish government also provides intentional financial assistance to the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court in The Hague to hold Russia accountable for some alleged "crimes" committed in conflict zones as incriminated by the West and the Kiev regime.
Irish politicians have been regularly noted for their generally hostile and essentially Russophobic statements. Tellingly, on 24 February 2024, the then Taoiseach (Prime Minister) Leo Varadkar published a comment on the occasion of the second anniversary of the start of the SMO, stating the following: "Ukraine is all that stands between a brutal tyrant, and the free Europe we all hold so dear. Slava Ukraine".[668]
On the same day, Tánaiste (Deputy Prime Minister), Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Minister for Defence of Ireland Micheál Martin stated the following: "Ireland will not waver in support for Ukraine, or in determination to stand up and hold Russia to account. We will continue our unified and determined response that Ireland and The European Union have mounted, encompassing political, financial, humanitarian, military, and diplomatic support. Together with to our support for Ukraine, Ireland and our EU partners are committed to holding Russia accountable for its actions. The targeted sanctions against the military, financial, energy, technology, transportation and media sectors of the Russian economy, adopted in response to Russia's actions in Ukraine, are the most sweeping and disruptive in EU history".[669]
On 18 April 2024, Taoiseach Simon Harris stated on the sidelines of the EU summit in Brussels that it was "absurd that Russia would effectively have a veto on where we can send peacekeeping troops".[670]
Dublin has taken a number of unfriendly actions against Russia in the bilateral scope, including the expulsion of 4 embassy staff members amidst the campaign to reduce the Russian diplomatic presence in Ireland. At the same time, retaliatory measures, particularly Russia's November 2022 inclusion of 52 Irish politicians into the list of persons barred from entering our country, provoked almost hysterical reactions among the Irish political establishment and mainstream media.
Since the start of the SMO, the preparation and organization of events linked to the Victory Day began to face hostility from some representatives of the Ukrainian diaspora and the Irish public.
In 2022, the administration of the Phoenix Park in Dublin, where the most massive procession of the Immortal Regiment has traditionally taken place, refused to provide a site.
Urged to do so by the authorities, Irish media widely broadcasted statements of a number of Irish politicians on the inappropriateness of celebrating the Victory Day due to the situation in Ukraine.
On 8 May 2023, despite the ongoing Russophobic campaign in the media, the Coordinating Council of Russian Compatriots in Ireland in Ireland organized a mass motorcade. A convoy of 100 cars, mostly driven by citizens of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic States, travelled through several Irish counties without incident. At the request of the organizers, patrols of Irish law enforcement officers were deployed along the route of the motorcade. The event then culminated in a traditional procession of the Immortal Regiment.
In 2024, the Coordinating Council of Russian Compatriots in Ireland once again organized mass Victory Day celebrations in the suburbs of the Irish capital, including the Immortal Regiment and a traditional motorcade. On 6 May, a group of around 200 cars started their journey from Dublin with Victory banners and St. George ribbons, proceeding to a place near the town of Drogheda, about 50 km away from the capital. The event enjoyed a significant turnout (according to the Coordinating Council of Russian Compatriots in Ireland estimates, 800‑1000 people took part in the rally)[671] and a multinational composition, including nationals of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Baltic States and even of Ukraine, as well as Russian sympathizers from among the Irish. The organizers managed to establish a communications link with Donetsk and hold a videoconference.[672]
Other cities across the country also hosted local Victory Day events on 4‑6 May 2024, including contests for children, creative meetings with the recital of poems and songs about the Great Patriotic War.
An observable tendency to disseminate negative attitudes towards Russia in the public space has persisted In Ireland. The local outlets of the international human rights NGOs such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Frontline Defenders are engaged in this activity. At the same time, there have not been any cases of explicit discrimination against Russian journalists.
The generally stable legal situation of Russian compatriots in Ireland deteriorated markedly after February 2022. Many Russian-speaking residents, including Russian citizens, faced harassment at work, school and in public organizations. This was largely facilitated by the Russophobic campaign artificially fuelled in the Irish media. One striking example was the decision by the Irish broadcaster Raidió Teilifís Éireann (RTÉ) to rename Russian Hour, a popular weekly programme about Russian culture on Dublincity 103.2 FM to "Kaleidoscope".
In this regard, the Coordinating Council of Russian Compatriots in Ireland organized assistance to victims by submitting appeals to local law enforcement agencies or to the members of the Irish representative bodies. The Council also petitioned the Irish Parliament asking it to take measures to protect the Russian diaspora and the Russian language from discrimination. Special attention in the document was paid to the prevention of harassment of Russian-speaking schoolchildren and students.
Russophobic sentiments also affected the Russian diplomatic mission in Ireland. On 7 March 2022, a truck rammed the gates of the Russian Embassy in Dublin. Police officers witnessed the ordeal but took no effort to prevent it. This incident constituted a flagrant violation of Article 22 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961.
Additionally, the Embassy staff members have repeatedly drawn the attention of the Irish authorities to the aggressive actions of protesters, who threw eggs and hurled stones at the cars of our diplomats, damaged surveillance cameras and poured red paint over the Russian coat of arms hanging at the Embassy gates and the fence of the Ambassador's residence.
In accordance with the EU sanctions legislation on Russia, Ireland blocked access to the satellite signal of RT (Russia Today) and Sputnik. There have been no further manifestations of censorship of Russian-language media in Ireland, or attempts to restrict their activities by Irish state authorities, nor any cases of overt discrimination.
In the last year, there have been no complaints from Russian citizens regarding any violations of their rights in prisons or detention facilities.
Despite constant monitoring by the government, the Irish parliament and human rights NGOs, the complete eradication of racial discrimination is yet to be achieved, as admitted by the authorities, even on high political level.
In addition, between the summer of 2022 and March 2023, racism, xenophobia and various types of extremist offences, which until recently had been considered latent phenomena in Irish society, manifested themselves as a pressing social problem.
A new iteration of the Equality Act, which declares equal rights for all citizens, regardless of nationality and religion has been in place in Ireland since 2004. The Act prohibits all forms of racism and discrimination in all areas of social and economic life in Ireland. The Equality Authority and the Equality Tribunal, as well as the Garda (Police) Racial, Intercultural & Diversity Office, are responsible for its implementation and enforcement of its provisions. The local NGO, the Irish Network Against Racism (INAR)[673], is engaged in the prevention of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance.
The Equal Status Act does not prohibit organizations and movements that promote racial discrimination consistent with the Irish legislation, which enshrines the right to freedom of expression and free assembly and organization, thus requiring evidence as to the true nature of this or that organisation.
The EU Agency for Fundamental Human Rights (FRA) report for 2023[674] mentions Ireland as one of the countries developing a national plan of action against racism.[675]
Under Irish legislation, any manifestation of racism, discrimination and xenophobia (Nazism and neo-Nazism are not mentioned because they are not present in the text) represents grounds for adjudication to decide on the punishment.
In practice, in the few occurrences of such cases (graffiti on walls, verbal insults in schools or in the streets) the sentence has been limited to administrative penalties in the form of fines, even though imprisonment sentences were possible.
According to human rights defenders, despite the existing legal framework to counter the spread of racism, xenophobia and other types of intolerance, these phenomena are increasing in scope, which contributes to the ongoing discrimination against national and religious minorities in the country.
The cause for analysis of the situation in Ireland was, inter alia, the anti-racist demonstrations in the United States in the summer of 2020.
The overall assessment was given by Irish President Michael D. Higgins, who noted the growing ressentiment towards migrants and people of colour in Ireland, with nationalism beginning to threaten Irish democratic principles.
The political authorities and the public began to recognize that refugees, migrants and other minority groups were increasingly seen in some parts of Irish society to be a threat to the "rights of the majority". Under this pretext, certain local extremist groups have resorted to racist and anti-Semitic criminal activities.
Manifestations of racism have also been detected in the field of education (despite the adoption of a new law prohibiting the practice of discriminatory admission of children to schools on the basis of their parents' religion).
According to the 2022 report of the FRA, the results of surveys conducted in EU countries testify to the existence of discrimination against ethnic minorities and migrants in education.[676]
For example, according to a survey among 3,323 respondents conducted by the Higher Education Authority of Ireland, over a third (35%) of the employees belonging to ethnic minority groups had been discriminated against on the grounds of race and/or ethnicity while working in educational institutions or remotely (online), compared to 16% of other White respondents and 3% of White Irish respondents.[677]
According to a number of non-governmental organizations, 51 cases of racially-motivated violence were registered in Ireland in 2020. According to information published in 2021, the number of cases of inciting hatred on the Internet[678] increased significantly, as well as the number of complaints of discrimination on racial and ethnic grounds.[679]
Moreover, according to NGO experts, domestic racism remains a serious problem for Irish society, given the virtual absence of effective legislation and law enforcement measures to curb it (the relevant laws are outdated and practically not applied).
The Irish people have become more willing to report hate speech incidents in recent years. The aforementioned INAR notes an exponential increase in the number of complaints about offensive publications on the Irish segment of the Internet (by comparison, in 2014, there were 108 complaints over relevant illegal publications online, in 2019 – 174; in 2020 the number reached 334).
According to online racist incident reporting system iReport.ie, launched by INAR, there have been 700 racist incidents in 2020 (530 in 2019), including 159 constituting a criminal offence. It also recorded a sharp increase in reports of racism on the Internet – 334 (174 in 2019), including in social networks and in Facebook accounts of reputable radio and print media establishments, with Facebook featuring the highest number of such publications (119 incidents). It was noted that this all contributes to an increase in far-right-themed content.[680]
On 12 July 2023, Ireland submitted its fifth report to the Council of Europe's Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (AC FCNM) on measures taken by the country to implement the provisions of the Convention. In particular, it indicates that the Internet Safety and Media Regulation Act (adopted in 2022) entered into force on 15 March 2023, establishing a media commission (Coimisiún na Meán). Its tasks include, inter alia, applying mandatory network security codes to certain information resources to prevent malicious online content, including hate speech, from entering the Internet, and harmonizing national legislation with the EU Audiovisual Media Services Directive.[681]
In its 2021 report dubbed "Reports of racism in Ireland", the INAR highlighted racist crimes most commonly targeted the Chinese, Black-African origin, and the Black-Irish.[682]
The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), established under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, pointed out that there is a record of manifestations of racism in Irish society, citing the high preponderance of racial profiling on the part of the Irish police ("Garda"), as well as an increase in incidences of hate speech. An increase in racist rhetoric and its frequent use by Irish politicians, particularly during election campaigns, was highlighted. The CERD noted in this regard that the 1989 Prohibition of Incitement to Hatred Act had proven ineffective in combating hate speech, especially hate speech on the Internet.[683]
The Committee noted with concern the considerable number of racially motivated hate crimes against representatives of ethnic minorities, noting that other grounds of discrimination, such as gender and religious affiliation, were often also present in such cases. It was highlighted that existing Irish criminal law did not feature offence categories in which racial hatred was a primary motive, nor was it specified as an aggravating circumstance.
According to CERD experts, this leads to misreporting of such crimes, as the underlying racist motives are systematically not taken into account in criminal proceedings. Amid an increase in far-right rhetoric and hate crime against ethnic minority groups, the Committee also highlighted the absence of laws banning racist organizations in the country.[684]
On 4 March 2024, during the 55th session of the UN Human Rights Council (HRC), the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, in his Global Update referred to the AOHR's 2023 "Being Black in the EU" survey. It found, among other things, that 58% of people stopped by police officers perceived the act as racially motivated. And this figure has risen since 2016 in Denmark, Finland, France, Germany and Finland, as well as in Ireland. Emphasizing the importance of analysing the factors underlying such perceptions and addressing them, the Commissioner noted that "data, where available, shows that many States need to adopt comprehensive measures to combat police violence and discrimination".[685]
To remedy the existing situation, human rights activists emphasize the importance of the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission's recommendations regarding the need to update the 1989 Prohibition of Incitement to Hatred Act and to develop a comprehensive state-level regulatory framework to combat hate speech on the Internet, with an independent State body to monitor compliance. Experts also point out the urgency for the authorities to take measures to raise public awareness on the issue of combating racial discrimination.
It is worth noting, however, that the authorities are taking certain steps in this direction. In April 2021, under public pressure, the Irish Department of Justice began drafting the Hate Crime Bill. Its main purpose is to increase the penalties for public insults and aggressive attacks, including on the Internet, on the grounds of nationality, race, colour, ethnicity, or a number of other distinctions.
According to the report of the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission and international human rights NGOs, the most troubling areas include the protection of the rights of national/religious minorities, migrants, and the Roma, as well as the situation in detention facilities.
For the most part of its history, Ireland had been a country of emigration out of Europe. However, over the past two decades, due to increasing immigration flows, it transformed into a popular destination country.
According to the 2022 census, Ireland's population had increased by 7.6% since the 2016 census, reaching over 5.1 million people in April 2022. This increase is equally attributable to immigration and natural population growth. Around 13% of the population (646,000 people) are not Irish citizens (including 180,000 who are neither UK nor EU citizens).[686]
Immigration flows to Ireland grew steadily from 2010 to 2018, but then subsided to 65,200 people in 2021. Most immigrants in 2020 were Irish (39%), Brazilian (8%), Romanian (7%), Indian (7%), or British (5%).
As of late April 2021, one year after Brexit, flows to and from the UK have grown significantly (125% and 182% respectively) when compared to the preceding years. Over the same period, immigration of EU citizens decreased by half to 14,100 people (as of April 2021).[687]
In 2020, the Migrant Rights Centre Ireland estimated of the number of irregular migrants in Ireland to be around 17,000-20,000 people. According to NGO reports, most of them entered legally but overstayed their visas.[688]
In the first three months of 2022, Ireland received 2,182 asylum applications, almost the same number as for the entirety of 2021. In January-March 2022, the asylum seekers mainly originated from Somalia (20.4%), Georgia (10.1%), Algeria (9.3%), Nigeria (8.5%), Ukraine (7.6%) and other countries (44.2%).
Migrants and refugees from Asia and Africa are among the most vulnerable members of society. In accordance with the programmes of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the European Union, Ireland has committed to host 4,000 people. The Irish government eventually accommodated around 1,100 people out of this number, mostly those from Syria.
According to the government's plan, refugees are to be placed in temporary accommodation centres (usually hotels rented by the state), where they await all the necessary documents for them to stay in Ireland. However, the unreasonably protracted legalisation procedure has led to a situation where the vast majority of refugees are forced to reside in such centres for extended periods, causing discontent among the local population as well.
In 2019 and 2020, some of these facilities were set on fire, which in some cases resulted in fatalities among refugees. As a result, a wave of protests erupted across the country demanding that the authorities update the existing procedure for refugee admission.
The overall situation with asylum seekers in Ireland is characterized as critical due to a severe shortage of housing for their resettlement. Many of them are forced to live in unsanitary conditions or even dwell in the streets (up to 500 people), including during cold periods. Local human rights activists and the opposition members blame the government for these violations of human rights standards, demanding urgent measures to be taken to remedy the situation.
Amnesty International Ireland pointed to the shortage and poor quality of state-provided housing for this category of citizens, which allegedly negatively affected their "mental state", and also led to "infringement of dignity" and inability to ensure a normal "private life".
The Irish Minister for Children, Equality, Disability, Integration and Youth noted the shortage of school places in areas populated by the displaced persons.[689]
A 2023 report by the EU Agency for Fundamental Human Rights[690] listed Ireland as one of the countries where authorities are housing displaced people in empty private homes, having first checked the dwellings to ensure that women and children could live there safely.
Ireland's coalition government, formed in June 2020, has committed to dismantle the processing centres and develop new procedures of admitting and accommodating refugees.
Immediately after the start of the SMO, the Irish government made a politically motivated decision to allow all Ukrainian nationals unimpeded entry to the country (without prior notice and visa requirements), mounting a large-scale effort to admit them as refugees. As of 10 July 2022, 43,256 Ukrainian nationals had been granted temporary asylum in Ireland.[691]
At the same time, the attitude of the Irish state towards people from other countries (mainly those from the Middle East and Afghanistan) seeking asylum for humanitarian reasons remains much less graceful – the local competent authorities can take up to two years (on average – 1.5 years) to review their applications for entry into Ireland.
This selective attitude towards refugees provoked discontent and criticism from a number of local human rights organizations, which qualified such a policy as "racist".
The situation has deteriorated since Ireland suspended the implementation of the European Agreement on the Abolition of Visas for Refugees of 1959 on 19 July 2022 and adopted a decision in June 2023 to refuse to accept another group of migrants in the numbering 350 people (according to the EU quota), which resulted in Ireland paying a fine of 1.5 million euros to the EU budget.
In taking these steps, the Irish authorities are urgently trying to relieve the additional burden placed on their migration and social agencies by restricting the entry of refugees from other signatory countries of the European Agreement on the Abolition of Visas, which previously allowed those people to stay in Ireland without visas for up to 3 months with the appropriate documents.
Thus, Dublin has essentially prioritized Ukrainian refugees, whose total number in the country exceeded 105,000, while noticeably limiting the admission of asylum seekers from other parts of the world.
This situation is a telling example of the double standards on the part of the Irish authorities in the humanitarian domain.
On 28 October 2023, the Irish Times reported with a reference to an Ipsos research, that according to a survey, 56% of Irish people said that the country should stop accepting Ukrainian refugees[692], and only 34% of residents supported the continued admission of Ukrainians. 61% of respondents said that there were "too many refugees" coming to the country. 34% of respondents disagreed with this notion.
The unprecedented continuous influx of Ukrainian refugees (currently more than 100,000 people), as well as asylum seekers from other countries (some 20,000 people) into Ireland, combined with a significant rise in the cost of living and a housing crisis has spiked local protests against the liberal policies of the government and led to the growth of manifestations of far-right ideology within the Irish society.
On 23 November 2023, far right groups instigated unprecedented riots in Dublin, with property damage, looting of shops, burning of cars, buses and trams, and clashes with police officers. The unrest was incited by the news of an attack on a private kindergarten in central Dublin perpetrated by an immigrant, allegedly of Algerian origin, which left three young children and a teacher stabbed and injured.
According to the Russian State-owned multimedia online platform Smotrim.ru, on 7 May 2024, thousands of people took to the streets of Dublin. Due to the increase in crime committed by newcomers in Ireland, the protesters demanded to stop the endless flow of arrivals from the Middle East and Africa, and called on the authorities to toughen the migration legislation.[693]
On 26 April 2024, residents of a village near Dublin set fire to a migration centre building in protest against the influx of people from the Middle East and Africa. The protesters were dissatisfied with the authorities' migration policy, which consists in accommodating illegal immigrants in government buildings and even schools.[694]
In many cities, including the capital, demonstrations by local residents (with far right-wing radicals being the most active) against the settlement of immigrants in their municipalities have become a regular occurrence.
There have been arson attacks against buildings reserved by the authorities to house migrants. Between November 2022 and January 2024, at least 9 such incidents have been recorded by law enforcement agencies, which is of great concern to the Irish authorities and local human rights defenders.
On 15 July 2024, several hundred people protested against the creation of a resettlement centre in north Dublin intended to house 550 asylum seekers, including married couples and women with children. A group of violent men waving Irish flags pelted police officers and their vehicles with firecrackers, bricks and bottles and set fire to an excavator. 21 people were detained. They have been charged with public disturbance.[695]
According to local media and human rights organisations, such as INAR, there has been an increase in the number of cases of violence against newcomers. Although official statistics on such offences have not yet been disclosed by the authorities, the Irish government openly acknowledges the deteriorating situation in this area and speaks of the need for stricter preventive measures.
Recently, the most high-profile incident reported by all major Irish media outlets (RTÉ, the Irish Times, the Irish Examiner, etc.) occurred on 28 January 2023, when a makeshift immigrant tent camp in the Ashtown area of north‑west Dublin was attacked. According to published information, a group of unknown persons armed with baseball bats and iron bars, bringing dogs (including fighting breeds), attempted to evict homeless foreigners (mostly from Eastern Europe, with some from India, Portugal or the United Kingdom) from 15 makeshift dome tents spontaneously set up in August 2022. There were no fatalities. A criminal case has been initiated following the attack.
A number of smaller incidents officially recorded by the police in January-February 2023 are related to anti-migrant protests in Dublin.
Occasionally, law enforcement agencies detain the organizers and most violent activists of the rallies for questioning on suspicion of spreading extremist propaganda. However, currently there is no information that any of these individuals would be arrested for subsequent judicial inquiry.
Anti-migrant protests provoke a response in Irish society reflected in demonstrations against xenophobia and in support of migrant inclusion.
The largest protest under such slogans took place in Dublin on 18 February 2023. According to its organizers, the number of participants reached 50,000 people, an impressive figure by local standards.
At the same time, the Irish state cannot handle the influx of Ukrainians – several hundred of them have not been provided housing, and tent camps are being set up in different regions of the country to accommodate new families arriving from Ukraine, albeit scarcely suitable for living due to lack of sanitation.
In their publication of 27 May 2024, the Irish Times cited a spokesman for Ireland's Department of Integration stating that the Irish authorities intend to dismantle a "significant number" of Ukrainian refugee centres in the coming months. Starting from 14 March 2024, these centres will be partially vacated following measures the government's December 2023 measures to limit the support for Ukrainians.[696] In particular, the period for which Ukrainian refugees were provided with accommodation has been reduced to 90 days.[697]
Previously, the Irish government also cut subsidies for Ukrainian refugees from 220 to 38.8 euros per week. According to Irish Finance Minister Michael McGrath, the reduction in benefits affected a third of Ukrainians in the country – 27,000 refugees out of 86,000. The curbing of these support measures caused the number of Ukrainians arriving in Ireland to drop by 65%.[698]
The problematic situation of migrants in Ireland was highlighted by CERD[699] and the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI)[700], functioning within the Council of Europe. In this context, they mentioned lengthy processing of applications for international protection, unreasonably lengthy processes of obtaining a work permit, the long periods of inadequate accommodation of migrants in reception centres, and the concealment of deaths of residents in these centres. They also noted that the media, including the mainstream Irish media, engaged in spreading anti-migrant publications.
ECRI, citing a conducted study, noted with concern that 40% of migrants working on Irish trawlers reported encountering racially motivated insults and humiliation at workplace. They also quoted the EU MIDIS II survey, which showed that Ireland had one of the highest levels of hate-related persecution when it comes to migrants and descendants of sub-Saharan African migrants.[701]
Human rights activists are still alarmed about the situation surrounding the steadily growing Muslim community in Ireland (numbering in more than 70,000 people).
According to the Report of the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission[702] and the Immigrant Council of Ireland's report[703] of the same year, the number of incidents of racism generally directed against Muslims generally remains at the same, rather elevated level. About 40% of Muslims in Ireland officially stated that they had experienced violence (verbal or physical aggression) at work, in educational institutions, in everyday life because of their faith. However, experts with these human rights bodies note that the real figure is much higher – about 80%.
The plight of a large (over 30,000 people) ethno-cultural group of the Irish Travellers, who have no fixed dwelling and prefer a nomadic lifestyle, remains a pressing issue in Ireland. This community in Ireland also includes the Roma.
Irish Travellers complain about racial discrimination, including when it comes to employment. However, since they rarely seek official legal assistance, assessing the real scale of the issue becomes complicated.
Human rights defenders continue to point out that members of this group are significantly more likely to experience abuse on the part local law enforcement agencies. This, in particular, explains the disproportionately high proportion of Travellers among prisoners in Irish prisons, as noted by experts from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).
According to Irish human rights activists, the official recognition of such people as an ethnic minority in 2017 has not fundamentally changed the overall situation. At present, more than 25,000 Travellers are still living in poverty. Around 30-50% of prisoners of both genders in Irish prisons belong to this group.
The Irish public and human rights activists acknowledge the fact that no effective solution to the problem of the Travellers is yet to be found, due in no small part to their culture, which is relatively incompatible with a sedentary lifestyle and socially useful work.
This problem also came to the attention of international universal and regional human rights monitoring mechanisms, primarily CERD and ECRI. It was noted, for example, that Travellers and the Roma, along with people of African origin, are disproportionately becoming victims of racial profiling on the part of the police and make up the majority of the penitentiary system population. It is these vulnerable groups that racist rhetoric in the media and on the Internet is directed against.
These ethnic minorities are extremely under-represented in the Irish public sector and in political positions at all levels. They have limited access to social housing, face serious discrimination and inequality in renting in the private housing sector, and as a result are disproportionately at risk of becoming homeless.
It has been noted that local authorities have been using the 2002 Housing Act to justify forced eviction of Travellers. In addition, local authorities demonstrate a reluctance to fully use the budgeted allocations for providing housing to such persons. Unemployment is extremely high among the Travellers and the Roma, and children in these communities are very rarely enrolled in schools. All members of these groups are in a very poor state of health.
Taking into account the issue of Traveller accommodation, the ECRI made recommendations to Ireland following its fifth monitoring cycle in 2019. However, according to ECRI Conclusions on the Implementation of the Recommendations in Respect of Ireland subject to Interim Follow-up (Interim Report of 3 March 2022), the Irish authorities failed to take measures to improve the situation with regard to Travellers.[704] The Traveller-specific accommodation budget of 14.5 million euros was used to manage the aftermath of COVID‑19. Furthermore, as of July 2021, just 2.5 million out of the budget of 15.5 million euros were spent and 17 out of 31 local authority bodies had not drawn any budget in this area.
Therefore, ECRI proposed to introduce liability measures against officials for the misuse of the funds allocated to address the problem.
CERD referred to racially-motivated abuse in Irish maternity homes, including racial discrimination in the child adoption process, as well as physical, emotional and sexual abuse, affecting children of mixed racial origin the most.[705]
In its Concluding observations of 28 February 2023, the Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) also highlighted persistent discrimination of minority children and those in disadvantaged situations.
The Committee also noted the complications faced by some groups of children in accessing birth registration. According to the CRC, the legislative framework is restrictive when it comes to obtaining Irish citizenship.
The problem of torture or ill-treatment of prisoners in detention facilities is yet to be addressed. According to the 2019 report of the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission, about half of Ireland's correctional facilities are overcrowded, and demands from the public for the authorities to provide a detailed report on the prison situation have been ignored since 2016, the last time such an analysis was presented.
Official Dublin has been criticized by the local and international human rights community for being too liberal in its attitude toward certain organizations and individuals who freely distribute extremist and racist publications in the digital media, hiding behind the right to free speech and using loopholes in Irish legislation, which allows experienced lawyers to refute any accusations of spreading extremist ideas in court. The authorities refuse to take action against those people (including bans and blocking of content), citing the right to free speech on any subject except for direct calls to violence.
However, Irish authorities heavily cracked down on those who protested the COVID‑19 epidemic quarantine restrictions that exceeded the length of quarantines in other European countries.
Media reports mentioned heavy police presence during a protest in central Dublin at the end of February 2021, which ended in clashes. Law enforcement dispersed the demonstrators with batons after what looked like a lit firecracker was thrown at a police officer. 23 people were detained.[706]
On 6 March 2021, large-scale protests took place in different parts of the country. In the city of Cork, the centre of the eponymous county, the number of participants gathered was estimated by journalists to be around 400‑500 people. RTÉ reported that 4 protesters were detained in Cork, Kerry and Kildare counties for breaches of anti-coronavirus restrictions, in particular for moving outside their neighbourhood boundaries without a valid reason.[707]
The HRC, in its Sixth Universal Periodic Review for Ireland (2021), made over 250 recommendations to Dublin in the following thematic areas, including:
- Ensuring equality and non-discrimination, reducing inequalities, ensuring decent work environment and economic growth, access to education, gender equality, sustainable cities and communities (47 recommendations);
- Countering racial discrimination (7 recommendations);
- Preventing torture and ill-treatment, including towards detainees (3 recommendations)
- Conditions of detention (9 recommendations);
- Combating trafficking in human beings and modern forms of slavery (16 recommendations);
- Combating discrimination against women (19 recommendations);
- Protecting women from violence (4 recommendations);
- Protecting the rights of persons with disabilities (4 recommendations);
- Protection of the rights of migrants (6 recommendations);
- Protection of refugees and asylum seekers (5 recommendations).
In July 2022, the OHCHR published an interim update on Ireland's follow-up to these recommendations.
The OHCHR has made complaints to Dublin regarding the state commission monitoring of compliance with human rights standards in detention facilities, corruption, and women's rights (the relevant national strategy expired in 2020 and has not been updated since).
The experts also pointed out the half-heartedness of measures Ireland takes to protect the labour rights of Irish Travellers, counteract discrimination against people of African origin, or expand the availability of medical care for migrants.
At the same time, during the COVID‑19 pandemic Ireland saw an increase in complaints of racially intolerant attacks against people of Asian origin.
According to the Council of Europe's Commissioner for Human Rights, human rights concerns in Ireland may well be exacerbated by the introduction of a law dubbed the Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Act.
The Commissioner noted in particular that the adoption of this law requires meticulous step-by-step planning.[708] The Act presupposes establishing an independent conciliation and information exchange commission, limiting the possibility of investigations into offences, marginally narrowing the scope of procedural rights of the parties involved, and, most importantly, granting amnesty to criminals who killed and/or injured persons during the conflict in Northern Ireland, which lasted until 1998.
According to Joanna Cherry, a Scottish National Party MP, the bill contradicts Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which enshrines the human right to life.
No cases of public attempts to glorify the Nazi movement and neo-Nazism at the State level, the erection of monuments to former members of the Nazi SS organization and its components, or the desecration of memorials to anti-fascists have been recorded in Iceland. Anti-fascists, veterans and their organizations are not persecuted. Neo-Nazi demonstrations are not held.
Despite an overt anti-Russian policy of the local officials, through 2023 and into the first half of 2024, the authorities did not create obstacles to the war memorial events organized by the Russian Embassy and compatriots living in the country, provided police escort for the events, and did not ban the demonstration of St. George ribbons and the Victory Banner.
Before the special military operation of Russia to denazify and demilitarize Ukraine, as well as to protect the civilians in Donbas, President of Iceland Guðni Thorlacius Johannesson, in part due to his professional education in history, regularly participated in commemorative events dedicated to memorable dates in the history of the war.
The country preserves the memory of its contribution to the formation and escort of the Arctic convoys of 1941-1945, which became an example of combat interaction between the fleets of the anti-Hitler coalition countries during World War II.
Icelanders maintain in proper condition the war memorial facilities (the monument to the sailors participating in the Arctic convoys "Hope" in Reykjavik, monuments in Isafjordur, Bolungarvik and on the Whale Fjord), as well as the burial places of Alexander Malley, a sailor and a participant of the Great Patriotic War, who died in the hospital in Reykjavik in August 1942, and Mariya Mitrofanova, a veteran of the Great Patriotic War.
At the same time, since the beginning of the special military operation, Iceland, which does not have an army of its own, has been trying to keep up with its "senior" allies and has been providing comprehensive support to the Kiev regime, including financing arms procurements and training the Ukrainian military. On 12 March 2024, the Icelandic government published a long-term plan to increase assistance to the Zelensky regime.
In order to demonize Russia and justify assistance to Ukrainian nationalist militants, the Icelandic authorities attempt to falsify historical events. In particular, in March 2023, the country's parliament adopted a resolution declaring the Holodomor (the Ukrainian Famine) a genocide.[709]
The leadership and other Icelandic officials have falsely accused the USSR of "tyranny" and "occupation" in relation to the former Soviet republics[710] many times.
The Icelandic media regularly publish biased materials that distort the history of Russia and the role of the Soviet Union in the victory over Nazism during World War II.[711]
Icelandic politicians, including the acting Prime Minister of Iceland Bjarni Benediktsson, have repeatedly used Ukrainian Nazi slogans in public statements.[712]
In 2022-2023, at the UN General Assembly, the Icelandic delegation opposed the resolution "Combating glorification of Nazism, neo-Nazism and other practices which contribute to fuelling contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance," introduced annually by Russia and other co-sponsors (until 2022 Reykjavik had traditionally abstained referring to the necessity for the text of the resolution to include provisions providing guarantees the freedoms of expression and assembly).
Iceland has seen manifestations of neo-Nazi activity. The Icelandic extremist group Norðurvígi (Northern Front), affiliated with the neo-Nazi North European Resistance Movement, remains active. With the support of neo-Nazis from other European countries, it spreads hateful ideology in public places, including through leaflets and posters, as well as the Internet, and promotes an anti-Semitic, anti-Muslim and anti-migrant agenda.[713]
In its sixths report on Iceland, The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), which operates within the Council of Europe, repeatedly expressed concern regarding the activities of the Norðurvígi (Northern Front) group that incite hatred in the Icelandic society.[714]
Recently, Iceland saw a number of cases of vandalism involving the use of neo-Nazi symbols[715] and the display of swastika flags in residential windows.[716]
In September 2022, Reykjavik police reported the arrest of two Icelanders in their early 30s who were planning to carry out a terrorist attack against members of the Althing (parliament) and law enforcement officers using 3D‑printed weapons. According to the police, the suspects supported the views of Anders Breivik, a far-right Norwegian nationalist and mass murderer. In particular, a search of their homes yielded swastika flags and books on Nazi ideology.[717] In March 2024, the Reykjavik District Court acquitted the defendants on terrorism charges, however, the ruling was appealed by the prosecution to the Icelandic National Court of Appeal.[718]
Given the increasing number of refugees in Iceland in recent years, as well as the escalation of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Iceland has seen a rise in racism, xenophobia and anti-Semitism.[719]
On March 31 2022, Sigurður Ingi Jóhannsson, Minister of Infrastructure and chairman of the Progressive Party, made a racist remark (as assessed by the local media) concerning Vigdís Hasler, Head of the Icelandic Farmers Association of Indonesian origin, saying literally that "he would not take photos with this black woman." Opposition parliamentarians initiated a review of the case in the Althing Ethics Committee. In September 2022, the hearing against Mr. Johannsson was closed allegedly for "lack of reliable facts" confirming racist statements. After the politician made a public apology, the conflict was resolved.[720]
There are no facts of spreading right-wing radical and neo-Nazi views among law enforcement officers in Iceland. However, according to the local media, the father of Sigriður Björk Guðjónsdóttir, National Police Commissioner, was somehow involved in a terrorist attack planned for September 2022, which resulted in her removal from the investigation.[721]
There have been cases of complaints against Icelandic police officers accused of racism in connection with operational activities against black citizens. For example, in April 2022, the Armed Police Special Forces erroneously stopped a 16-year-old black teenager twice, mistaking him for a wanted criminal. In September and December 2023, police detained a 17‑year‑old and a 28-year-old black citizen, respectively, who were later released and characterized the actions of the law enforcement agencies as racial discrimination.[722]
The above-mentioned facts, together with other problems in law enforcement, indicate certain shortcomings in ensuring human rights in Iceland.
Icelandic society is attempting to analyse the situation, the reasons for the penetration of racist and white supremacy ideas, as well as their impact on people's minds. In part, these processes may be accounted for by the U.S. Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement emerged in the wake of the killing of African-American George Floyd by police officers in the United States in May 2020.
According to the Iceland Monitor[723] newspaper, in March 2021 the Icelandic government agreed to allocate about EUR 20,000 to erect a monument to Hans Jónatan, believed to be the first black settler in Iceland.
Among other things, there are cases of "positive racism," when enterprises and organizations invite people with migrant backgrounds to events. The goal in such cases is to stress the participation of non-Icelanders in different events.[724] For example, an online conference organized by Amnesty International at the University of Iceland in February 2021 focused on racism in Iceland. Students of non-European descent who had first-hand experiences of domestic racism also participated in the event.
Human rights organizations have occasionally expressed concern that the measures taken by the Icelandic authorities to counter racism are insufficient. Furthermore, under the Icelandic law, penalties are only imposed for serious and repeated offences, and this does not happen often. As a result, the effective prosecution and punishment of those responsible for spreading hateful ideas and speech faces difficulties.
In April 2022, the HRC's Universal Periodic Review (UPR) Working Group published its recommendations for Iceland, including the need to adopt effective legislative measures to combat racial discrimination, to include racial hatred as an aggravating circumstance of a crime in the Criminal Code.
The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) created under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination recommended in its concluding observations on twenty-first – twenty-third periodic reports of Iceland adopted in August 2019 to take measures to ensure full implementation of existing legal provisions prohibiting racial discrimination, to take decisive measures for countering racist hate speech, including from political and public figures, to ensure that all racial hate crime be brought to the attention of competent authorities and investigated, that the perpetrators be brought to justice and duly punished if found guilty, and that the victims be provided with legal protection.
The CERD also recommended Iceland to register racial hate crimes and to provide the Committee with statistics on registered hate crimes, results of investigations and sentences imposed.[725]
Iceland also has issues associated with refugees and migrants.
There are attempts by some political forces, in particular the ruling Independence Party, to improve their domestic political positions through an anti-migrant agenda and the implementation of measures to toughen refugee policy, which is considered by some experts as incitement of hatred.[726]
Migrant-phobia is usually spread by the far-right. At the beginning of 2020 there were a number of rallies in support of refugees on the verge of expulsion from the country against the backdrop of the growing activity of such structures.
Violations of refugee rights are regularly registered in Iceland, including wrongful deportations of asylum seekers, including children. For example, in November 2019, Iceland expelled a nine months pregnant refugee from Albania with her two-year-old child,[727] in November 2022 – an Iraqi refugee in a wheelchair, who was subjected to force by the police,[728] and in May 2024–three Nigerian women, who fell victims to human trafficking.[729] In 2023 saw a high-profile case when many Venezuelans, who were denied refugee status en masse, were deported from Iceland back to Venezuela (in 2019-2022, asylum seekers from the country received international protection under a simplified procedure).
Immigrants in Iceland often face violations of their labor rights,[730] discrimination, financial and housing problems, difficulties in integrating into society and obtaining education, and racial prejudice. According to experts, this leads to their marginalization, polarization in society and increased socio-economic disparities in the country.[731]
There is discriminatory treatment of asylum-seekers from other states compared to Ukrainian citizens, who, in particular, are admitted under a simplified procedure and receive benefits unavailable to other refugees.[732]
The reception of migrants and refugees affected the general public sentiment. For example, in 2015 the media reported public protests against the construction of a mosque in the suburbs of Reykjavik, accompanied by acts of vandalism. According to experts, this expression of discontent was related to Icelanders' fears that this religious facility would contribute to the spread of Islamic radicalism in the country.
In September 2023, the ECRI presented its sixth report on Iceland, which, like the previous fifth report, found evidence of hatred towards refugees and migrants, including on the Internet and by authorities, the dissemination of racial stereotypes about Muslims, and vandalism of religious sites.[733]
In its concluding observations on twenty-first – twenty-third periodic reports of Iceland, adopted in August 2019, the CERD noted that the number of foreign citizens residing in this member State continued to grow substantially (from 7.6 per cent of the total population in 2009 to 12.6 per cent in 2018). The CERD welcomed the measures taken by the country to facilitate their integration, including the creation of the Multicultural and Information Centre in Reykjavik, which offers a full range of services in several languages and conducts awareness campaigns to promote diversity.[734]
At the same time, the Committee expressed concern by the persistently high level of unemployment among members of ethnic minorities or people of migrant background; it reaches 7.4 per cent, which is more than twice the level of unemployment among the total population.[735]
In March 2023, the Icelandic Parliament passed amendments to the 2016 Foreign Nationals Act. The amendments, which came into force in July 2023, provide for the removal of asylum-seekers' statutory rights to housing, social support and health services 30 days after they receive a final denial of international protection. As a result of the amendments, the relevant rights of more than 50 refugees, including victims of trafficking, have been revoked, many of whom are now forced to live on the streets.[736]
In February 2024, the Icelandic government submitted to Parliament draft amendments to the above-mentioned 2016 Foreign Nationals Act aimed at reducing the number of refugees arriving in the country. The document, among other things, provides for the abolition of the provision on the need to consider asylum applications from persons who have previously received international protection in another state if they have special ties to Iceland or in other special circumstances. It is also proposed to tighten the procedure for family reunification of refugees and to shorten the duration of residence permits for internationally protected persons.
In January 2024, the Icelandic government submitted a draft law on Temporary Detention Centers (TDCs) for refugees for public consultation. It envisages that foreigners who are under consideration for deportation from the country due to rejection of asylum will be "as a last resort" placed in closed TDFs pending removal (adults for up to eight weeks, children accompanied by parents or guardians for up to nine days).
Placement in the centers implies restrictions on visits, searches, and the use of force by the staff of the TDF "if necessary." The draft law has been strongly criticized by human rights organizations, according to which the document contradicts Iceland's obligations under international human rights treaties, including the European Convention on Human Rights, the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.[737]
According to the 2023 report[738] of the EU Agency for Fundamental Human Rights (FRA), in June 2022, Iceland, along with EU Member States, signed the "Voluntary Solidarity Declaration," a resettlement scheme from Greece to other European countries,[739] and accepted several unaccompanied children and children with families as part of this initiative.
Amid the escalation of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, there has been a hardening of rhetoric against non-European refugees[740] and a rise in anti-Semitism.[741]
In March 2024, the Icelandic media reported that a Nazi flag had been placed on the window of an apartment building in Reykjavik (the photograph was published in the local press). After the police contacted the person who had hung the flag, it was removed. According to the information available, no prosecution was initiated against the perpetrator, although the act violated Article 233 of the Icelandic Criminal Code on incitement of hatred.[742]
In 2020, Icelandic neo-Nazis attacked members of the Jewish community living in the country: anti-Semitic posters denying the Holocaust and accusing Jews of abuse of women and paedophilia were distributed near synagogues and Jewish institutions. The action was organized by the Northern Resistance Movement not only in Iceland, but also in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. These actions, organized by right-wing radicals during the Jewish community's celebration of Yom Kippur, sparked outrage from international Jewish organizations.
In October 2020, Simon Wiesenthal Centre for International Affairs director Shimon Samuels sent a letter to Icelandic Prime Minister Katrín Jakobsdóttir, expressing concern about these events (letters were also sent to the leaders of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden). The letter noted that given the total relatively small population of the country, neo-Nazis could hardly remain unknown to the authorities. Reykjavik was called on to follow the example of Finland, which banned the Northern Resistance Movement in September 2020, and to take action against the instigators of this anti-Semitic campaign.[743]
As of the end of June 2024, less than 300 Jews live in Iceland (out of the total number of the population of 385,000 people). [744] Even though the Jewish community[745] is small, in 2021 Judaism was registered as an official State religion in Iceland for the first time.[746] The official status, among other things, provides Jews with tax exemptions.[747]
There are cases of the use of the slogans "Iceland for Icelanders" and "Europe for Europeans"[748] in the Icelandic segment of social networks.
No cases of discrimination, harassment and violence against ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities were displayed in Iceland last year.
There is also no comprehensive law explicitly criminalizing all forms of violence; women and girls facing various forms of discrimination are insufficiently protected from violence.
According to the results of studies conducted at the University of Iceland, children of foreigners and children of mixed marriages are often vulnerable to bullying. These children have more difficulties to establish contacts with their peers, even if they have grown in Iceland and Icelandic is their native language.[749]
Iceland has seen an increase in the number of cases of human trafficking against persons of foreign origin.
The UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) noted that the victims of these crimes mostly originate from East Asia and South America.[750]
Between 2019 and 2020, the Icelandic police investigated 71 relevant case. The majority of them concerned forced labor of migrants and refugees, mainly in the construction, tourism and catering industries, as well as sexual exploitation. 38% per cent of the alleged victims in these cases were women under 40 years of age and 11 per cent were children. Only one case was prosecuted but the accused was acquitted.[751]
Most frequently, the perpetrators were African and Asian nationals with residency permits in Iceland.[752]
In June 2021, the Althing approved amendments to the Icelandic Criminal Code initiated by the Ministry of Justice. The amendments aim to provide protection to victims of human trafficking, especially women and children.
In October 2023, the Council of Europe's Group of Experts on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings published its third assessment report on Iceland, highlighting a number of challenges in the Icelandic authorities' work in this regard, including the lack of adequate mechanisms for identifying victims of trafficking, insufficient training for those responsible, and a lack of financial and human resources.[753]
Iceland has a number of problems in ensuring the rights of prisoners, there are cases of unjustified police brutality during arrests of citizens, and the detention of juvenile offenders together with adult criminals.
In January 2023, the Amnesty International NGO published a report establishing that the authorities of Iceland vastly overuse solitary confinement in pre-trial detention on violation of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. In 2012-2021, 825 people were subjected to it, including children and people with physical and mental disabilities.[754]
In December 2023, Iceland's National Audit Office released a report that found a number of failures in the Icelandic prison system, including unsatisfactory prison conditions, especially for women, "gaps" in providing prisoners with adequate medical care, and poor training of prison guards. The document established that due to years of underfunding of the prison service, and in particular the lack of sufficient prison facilities, 275 convictions that had expired between 2012 and 2022 were not executed in a timely manner. Of these, 31 convictions concerned cases of violent crimes and four concerned crimes of a sexual nature, including against children under 15 years of age.[755]
The Ombudsman's monitoring visit to Houlmsheidi Prison (Reykjavik) in May 2021 revealed numerous "overreaches" by warders when conducting searches. The expert community expressed opinions on the advisability of relaxing the search procedure. It was suggested, in particular, that body searches should be conducted only when absolutely necessary, and that the use of intimate searches, which are offensive to prisoners, should be minimized.[756]
According to the Russian-language news portal RUS.IS, since the beginning of the special military operation there has been a rise of Russophobia in Icelandic society, incited by national media, declarations of government members and restricted access to unbiased and comprehensive information.[757]
Iceland has joined all illegal EU sanctions against Russia, including restrictive measures against Russian media and journalists.
On 27 February 2022, the Prime Minister of Iceland announced on TV the intention to cancel all visas issued to Russian citizens. Later the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iceland corrected her words and informed that only visas of specified categories would be revoked.[758]
Since February 2022, a disinformation campaign to discredit Russia's policy in the context of the events around Ukraine has been underway in the Icelandic media. The mainstream Icelandic press has published a significant number of biased publications of a blatantly anti-Russian nature without providing alternative sources of information or without analyzing the situation objectively and neutrally.[759]
Since the beginning of the special military operation, in Iceland there have been a number of rallies in front of the Russian Embassy’s Consular Division.[760] On 28 February 2022 it was attacked: a person with mental disorder broke down the gates and tried to knock down the camera.[761] The offender was arrested and brought to the police.
In the night of 14-15 April 2022, an unidentified man spent half an hour banging on the metal fence of the Embassy’s Consular Division with an iron rebar and throwing various items (children's toys, chairs, etc.) left outside by participants in an anti-Russian rally held the previous day over the fence. A police patrol arrived only half an hour later. The citizen (presumably an Icelander) managed to get a considerable distance away from the building of the Consular Division, but was subsequently detained and taken to the police station, where he was given a talk. Russian diplomats constantly received insults and threats by e-mail and telephone.[762]
In 2022, there were cases when Icelandic service companies denied their services to Russians living in Iceland.[763]
According to the compatriots, after the beginning of the special operation some members of the Russian diaspora experienced insults and threats on Facebook from Icelanders, as well as from Balts and Poles residing in the country. Russian compatriot Nataliya Stefaunsson in her interview for the RT TV channel documentary "The West: Territory of Hatered" talked about threats of physical violence and calls to leave Iceland by local acquaintances.[764] After the film was released, threats of "investigation" by the Icelandic authorities and calls to "return to the homeland" continued.
In March 2022 vandals desecrated the chapel at the construction site of the Russian Orthodox Church in Reykjavik, drawing two swastikas on it.[765]
While signing the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Iceland made five reservations, including the non-application of Article 20(1) on the prohibition of the propaganda for war. Following the publication of the 2016 HRC Universal Periodic Review, which noted this fact, Reykjavik committed to consider withdrawing the reservation in question. Iceland's sixth periodic report on the implementation of the Covenant, published in January 2023, reported that the Icelandic authorities had nevertheless decided not to withdraw the reservation because the prohibition of propaganda, in their assessment, "may limit freedom of expression."[766]
The Spanish leadership, irrespective of its party affiliation, has traditionally paid increased attention to combating neo-Nazism and contemporary forms of racism, xenophobia and intolerance, both in domestic policy and on the international arena. It is taking consistent steps to counter impunity and strengthen accountability for such offences, and generally building upon the recommendations of multilateral universal and regional structures and relevant international NGOs.
At the same time, following the general confrontational line of the EU, in 2022‑2023 Spain voted against the resolution "Combating glorification of Nazism, neo-Nazism and other practices that contribute to fuelling contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance", adopted annually at the initiative of Russia and other co-sponsors within the framework of the UN General Assembly, which condemns various manifestations of the rehabilitation of Nazism and its henchmen. This action contradicts The Spanish political leadership's claims of increased attention to combating neo-Nazism, contemporary forms of racism, xenophobia and intolerance.
The Spanish right-wing nationalism appeals mainly to the period of Francoism (1939‑1975). At the same time, despite the differences in the approaches of political forces to the assessment of this period in the country's history, the most controversial manifestations of Francoism and its "legacy" are discussed mainly within the framework of historical scientific discourse.
A landmark event was the adoption on 19 October 2022 of the "Law on democratic memory" – one of the key points in the programme of the ruling coalition of the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party and the extreme left-wing Unidas Podemos bloc. The law provides for strong measures to counter the apologetics of Francoism, including the abolition of all associations dedicated to the memory of the dictator, the revision of court verdicts and assignments of aristocratic titles and awards of the period, and the imposition of fines for damaging memorial places of victims of the regime or praising Franco.
Even the patriotic party "Vox" which opponents and critics try to label as "neo-Francoist" endeavours to reject any accusations of sympathy for Francoism.
According to the Spanish NGO "Movement against Intolerance" ("Movimiento contra la intolerancia"),[767] Spanish far-right groups, with more than 10,000 members, hold dozens of events each year, and about 1,000 websites promoting neo-Nazism and xenophobia were registered on the Spanish Internet.
There have been cases of various forms of neo-Nazism in reality, not only on the web. For example, since 2007 the members of far-right organizations have held annually in February a procession through Madrid in memory of the fallen soldiers of the "Blue division", (which fought as part of the German forces on the territory of the USSR in 1941‑1943), chanting antisemitic slogans and displaying nazi symbols. Previously, local residents have repeatedly protested and demanded to ban such events (in 2022, on February 13 the procession was not permitted by the authorities for the first time, and participants were subjected to administrative fines).[768] On 11 February 2023, another march through Madrid took place, with approximately 200 people taking part. On the eve of the event, about 150 people laid wreaths at the memorial to the fallen members of the division in the Almudena cemetery. At the same time, the radicals held a memorial ceremony for Matias Montero, a figure from the far-right Spanish Falange party, who was killed in 1934 and is considered by the extreme right as the first "martyr" of the Falangist movement and later of the Franco dictatorship.[769]
On 4 February 2023, the annual closed meeting of the Spanish movement "Becoming Europe" ("Devenir Europeo", recorded in the Ministry of Interior's register as a cultural association), which openly adheres to neo-Nazi views, was also held in Madrid. The event was attended by about 80 people, the main guest "star" being the Swedish right-wing extremist, leader of the "Nordic Resistance Movement" S. Lindberg. This fact once again confirms that there is a worrying trend in Europe towards increasing international links and internationalisation of the activities of such organisations.
On 24 April 2023, some 200 Francoist supporters shouting various nazi slogans gathered near the San Isidro cemetery in Madrid, where the exhumed remains of J.A. Primo de Rivera (1903‑1936), the founder of the nationalist far-right Spanish Falange party, had been moved. As a result of clashes with the police, three of them were arrested for disturbing public order.
It should also be noted that the mass protests held in November and December 2023 across the country against the amnesty of Catalan separatist politicians convicted of attempting to organise the separation of Catalonia from Spain in 2017 were also actively "fuelled" not only by the right-wing non-systemic opposition, but also by the far-right forces of the country that were not represented in the government. At the same time, right-wing extremists were seen among the rioters in Madrid demonstrating Hitler salutes.[770]
Spanish far-right groups (e.g. "Bastión Frontal") maintain stable horizontal ties with their like-minded members from other European organisations: the Italian "Casa Pound", the Greek "Golden Dawn" and others. It is noteworthy that some of their members are periodically involved in criminal cases including grievous bodily harm, hooliganism, drug trafficking and robbery.
In practice, there are numerous cases of racism, xenophobia, religious, ethnic and ideological intolerance in Spain, which are regularly highlighted by the media and local NGOs.
According to statistics from the Spanish Ministry of the Interior,[771] the number of hate crimes has been on a steady upward trend since 2014. Thus, in 2021 there were 1,802 cases (3.8 per 100,000 inhabitants), 28.6 percent more than in 2020 (1,401 cases) and 5.6 percent more than in "pre-pandemic" 2019 (1,706). Of these, 639 cases were related to racism and xenophobia and 326 to ideology. There was a 266.6 percent increase in the number of manifestations of antisemitism (11). The number of related cybercrimes (232) (threats/insults on the Internet and social networks) increased by 22.7 percent. The detection rate for such offences was 63 percent, 743 people were arrested or are under investigation, and more than 80 percent of the offenders were Spanish. These statistics take into account only officially investigated cases. According to law enforcement officials themselves, only 20‑25 percent of victims turn to the police.
According to the Spanish Ministry of the Interior, the total number of hate crimes in 2022 was 1,869, including those related to xenophobia and racism – 755 (678 in 2021) and ideology – 245 (336 in 2021).[772]
These are only duly registered cases. The detection rate for such offences averages around 64 percent. According to Spanish Interior Minister F. Grande-Marlaska, only 8 out of 10 cases of hate crimes are reported to the police. At the same time, it is noted that the increase in hate crimes is not a purely Spanish phenomenon, but a pan-European phenomenon.
For example, the above-mentioned "Movement Against Intolerance" NGO detects an average of over 5,000 such incidents a year, including attacks on Muslims in the streets, insults directed at them on the Internet and the desecration of mosques. It was also noted that the vast majority of victims of racist behaviour (primarily Roma and migrants) did not report to the police. There had also been an increase in racist behaviour at sporting events and among fans. According to the NGO, some 1,000 websites promoting neo-Nazism and xenophobia were registered on the Spanish Internet.
Such disappointing conclusions are also confirmed by the EU Agency for Fundamental Human Rights (FRA), which has noted a serious problem regarding public confidence in the actions of law enforcement officials. In its 2023 report, the Agency noted that in Spain only one in ten victims (i.e. 10 percent) of hate crimes is reported to law enforcement authorities. This high level of distrust in the police is due to people's lack of confidence that their reports will be properly dealt with or fear of retaliation.[773]
It should be clarified that Nazism, neo-Nazism and various contemporary forms of racial discrimination and related intolerance are considered by Spanish leadership in the context of human rights in general. Victims of neo-Nazism are thus placed in the same category as victims of discrimination on other grounds.
According to the study "Youth and Racism",[774] some 25 percent of young Spaniards have racist and xenophobic attitudes and do not hide their intolerance towards Roma, Moroccans and sub-Saharan Africans. The Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General on Violence against Children, N. Maalla M'jid, also points to the aggravation of this problem.[775]
The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in May 2023 noted with concern that legislative measures adopted by the Spanish authorities targeting vulnerable categories of the population have not been effective in practice. In particular, the Committee, although referring to the adoption of the National Strategy for Roma Equality, Inclusion and Participation in Spain (2021-2030), nevertheless expressed concern at the lack of specific legislation and the persistent gap in various areas of life (such as education, employment, health, social welfare and participation in public life) between Roma and non-Roma women in all areas of the country.[776]
For its part, the Spanish Ministry of Inclusion, Social Security and Migration has recognised that there is a "structural problem of racism in social, financial and political bodies" and is therefore developing a long-term "Strategic Framework for Citizenship and Inclusion, against Xenophobia and Racism". The project includes the creation of an "anti-racist administrative team" that will monitor information published in the media and on the Internet for intolerance.[777]
The manifestations of Russophobia in Spain continue to cause concern. The discourse of the official authorities, which has changed dramatically since the beginning of the special military operation by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation to denazify and demilitarise Ukraine and protect the peaceful population of Donbass, has had a negative impact on the situation of Russians living in that country. The Russophobic propaganda in the media, the mass arrival of refugees from Ukraine (in 2022-2023, the Spanish authorities granted about 196 thousand Ukrainians temporary protection under the mechanism provided for by EU Council Decision No. 2022/382 of 4 March 2022), and the activities of a number of Ukrainian nationalist organisations also played an important role. The blatant Russophobic rhetoric of Spanish officials also contributed to the situation (in particular, the mayor of Madrid, J.L. Martinez-Almeida, in a conversation with the pranksters in June 2022, agreed with the need to "punish the Russian bastards").[778]
2022 saw a sharp increase in negative attitudes towards our compatriots in daily life, as well as the widespread use of Russophobic rhetoric on social media. Russian-language chat rooms in Spain often received messages about the fight against "propagandists of the Russian world", which, in violation of local legislation, called for the collection of information about Russians and their personal data on a specially created website. There have also been cases of bank accounts and cards belonging to Russian citizens being blocked without explanation, as well as isolated episodes of bullying Russian-speaking children and teenagers in Spanish educational institutions and psychological harassment of Russians living in Spain. Among other things, cases of such discriminatory treatment of children were reported to the Russian Embassy by compatriots. However, in 2023 the situation began to improve.
Despite this, various assets (accounts, movable and immovable property) allegedly belonging to Russian individuals or legal entities on the EU sanctions lists with a total value of over 1 billion euros remain frozen in Spain.
An important factor is the presence in Spain of a large number of Ukrainians (over 285,000 as of 31 December 2023). Russians and Russian-speaking citizens periodically face manifestations of aggression and harassment, mainly from nationalist Ukrainians.
Of serious concern is the cleansing of the Spanish media space from Russian media (the broadcasting of the RT and RT en español TV channels and the Sputnik news agency have been banned since the first half of 2022) and the introduction of strict anti-Russian censorship. As a consequence, there is a lack of alternative information about Russia's policy, which is especially significant in the context of propaganda pressure from the collective West along Anglo-Saxon lines. There are also attempts to ensure information isolation of the Russian Embassy.
In addition, the local authorities, despite numerous appeals from the Embassy, continue to condone the holding of an aggressive anti-Russian picket in front of the diplomatic mission on a daily basis, the participants of which use criminal Bandera symbols, insults and threats of death and violence on ethnic grounds.
Nevertheless, in such unfavourable conditions, in May 2023, associations of compatriots, with the support of friendly Spanish organisations, managed to hold a number of events to mark Victory Day in the Great Patriotic War. The central events were the "Immortal Regiment" processions and "St. George's Ribbon" actions, which took place with the permission of the local authorities in Madrid (over 1,000 people participated), Barcelona (about 120 people), Almeria (over 600 people) and Vigo (about 70 people). They took place despite threats to the organisers from Ukrainian nationalists and calls by some Ukrainian officials to ban them in Spain. The above-mentioned events took place in a generally calm atmosphere, the Spanish authorities ensured an adequate level of security, and law enforcement officers foiled some attempts by Ukrainian activists to disrupt the marches.
As part of the Victory Day celebrations in Spain in 2024, the Compatriotic Movement organised a number of patriotic events aimed at preserving historical truth and memory, as well as consolidating our diaspora.
The main event was the procession of the "Immortal Regiment" (5 May – Almeria, Madrid, 11 May – Barcelona, 12 May – Alicante), which was attended by about 2 thousand people. Also in honour of the 79th anniversary of the Victory in the Great Patriotic War, rallies were organised in San Sebastian, Bilbao, Pamplona (9 May), "Mayevki" in Vigo (11 May) and on the islands of Gran Canaria and Tenerife (12 May), a car rally "Victory in the Great Patriotic War" between the cities of Bilbao and Pamplona (12 May).
On 18 May 2024 in Madrid, the Union of Organisations of Russian Compatriots of Spain and Andorra with the support of the Russian Embassy in Spain held a large-scale X Festival "Victory. As long as we are united – we are invincible", which was attended by creative groups of Russian compatriots and Spanish citizens from all over the country.
In addition, the Representative Office of Rossotrudnichestvo in Spain held an exhibition "Vernissage of the Victory Museum – Dialogue of Generations" (8 May 2024, Madrid). The Association Russian House in Alicante organised an exhibition "The Battle of Stalingrad" (17 May 2024, Alicante), the Association Slavic House of La Rioja organised a military-patriotic film festival (April-May 2024, Denia, Logroño, Madrid, Torrevieja), Association Russian Alliance in the Canary Islands together with the Rossotrudnichestvo Representative Office in Spain – an exhibition of posters from the Great Patriotic War (18 May 2024, Madrid).
In addition to participation in such events as "St. George's Ribbon", "Candle of Memory", "Garden of Memory", "Songs of Victory", activists living in Spain also organised "Teleconferences of Courage", "Victory Dictations", "Lessons of Memory", children's drawing contests "Children Draw Victory", etc. in April and May.
On 9 May 2024, at the Fuencarral Cemetery in Madrid, the staff of the Russian Embassy in Spain, together with colleagues from the diplomatic missions of CIS countries, traditionally laid wreaths and flowers at the monument In Memory of the Soviet Volunteers 1936-1939, who fought on the side of the legitimate government of Spain during the Civil War, as well as at the monument to the Spanish anti-fascist fighters. On the same day, employees of the Consulate General of Russia in Barcelona laid flowers at the memorial to the Soviet volunteer pilots who died in defence of the Spanish Republic, located in La‑Senia.
Manifestations of antisemitism in Spain are not frequent. According to official figures, only three antisemitic offences were recorded in 2020, 11 in 2021 and 13 in 2022, with the highest number of incidents in 2014 (24). This was the result of improvements in the system of crime recording by the relevant authorities as part of the fight against hate crimes.[779]
According to the third sociological survey on manifestations of antisemitism conducted in 2023 by the FRA among representatives of Jewish communities in several EU countries, Spain was among the three countries where more than 80 percent of respondents indicated that they considered antisemitism in political life to be a very serious or serious problem. Approximately two-thirds of respondents (63 percent) consider hostility towards Jews in their country to be a problem. Negative stereotyping that Jews have taken over the world's power and control the world's finances is also very common in Spain (91 percent). Spain was also ranked among the five EU countries with the highest incidence of incitement to hatred and violence against Jews (69 percent). Spain was also named among the countries with the highest percentage of members of the Jewish community who avoid, at least sometimes, wearing symbols and objects indicating Jewish origin. At the same time, the country has the highest level of antisemitism on the Internet – 72 percent (with politicians spreading such content quite often – 23 percent). In the FRA study, Spain was named among the countries where the number of antisemitic incidents has increased from 23 percent in 2018 to 30 percent in 2023. In addition, Spain was named among the countries with the highest level of reported antisemitic incidents – 33 percent. Swastika imagery was also identified as a fairly common manifestation of antisemitism in Spain. 57 percent of respondents in Spain believe that the escalation of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in October 2023 has significantly or fairly significantly affected their perception of their own security.[780]
At the same time, in recent years, members of Spain's Jewish community have been periodically targeted by neo-Nazi sympathisers. In 2022, for example, the Spanish Ministry of the Interior initiated criminal proceedings for the desecration of Jewish graves and family burials in Madrid's La Almudena and Hoyo de Manzanares cemeteries, as well as the painting of antisemitic slogans on the buildings of the synagogue in Villanueva de Cañada and the Jewish cultural centre in Alcobendez.[781]
In the autumn of 2023, following a major escalation of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the country experienced a surge in antisemitism from early October onwards. In addition, demonstrations against Israel, accompanied by the burning of Israeli flags, took place in many of Spain's major cities, including Melilla, Barcelona and Madrid.[782]
Irregular migration continues to be one of Spain's leading complex problems. According to the Spanish Ministry of Interior, in 2022, 31,219 (in 2021 – 41,945) illegal migrants entered the country (15,682 people – through the Canary Islands). At the same time, over 1,750 illegal migrants were expelled. The International Organisation for Migration has noted the high mortality rate of migrants who attempt to reach Spain using the services of organised criminal groups and smugglers.
The migration crisis gives rise to humanitarian and human rights problems. The Government's harsh measures to suppress attempts at illegal entry of migrants (including refugees) are of serious concern to the special procedures (experts) of the HRC, the European Commission, the EU Agency for Fundamental Human Rights, the Council of Europe, as well as to Spanish opposition parties, human rights defenders, independent lawyers, and the public. These include the practice of immediately expelling them (even after physically crossing the Spanish-Moroccan border) back to Morocco without checking their documents and drawing up a protocol or granting them the right to seek asylum (these procedures are provided for in EU directives and international treaties signed by Spain). The expulsion of migrant minors immediately upon arrival (unaccompanied) on Spanish territory has been investigated by the Juvenile Chamber of the Public Prosecutor's Office of Ceuta.[783]
A number of irregularities have been noted in the administrative expulsion from Spain of persons who have entered the country illegally: lack of a proper medical examination to confirm readiness to travel; unjustified use of handcuffs; and organisation of air travel without prior warning to those being expelled. Experts draw attention to outdated and inaccurate methods of forced medical age verification of underage migrants.
The tragic attempt of about 2,000 African migrants to break through the Melilla border crossing (24 June 2022), which, according to official figures, resulted in 23 deaths (some NGOs raise this figure to 80) and hundreds of people injured (including Spanish and Moroccan police officers), caused a loud public and political resonance in Spain and EU Brussels. According to human rights defenders, the reason was the severe misconduct of Moroccan border guards "with the connivance of the Spanish". In this regard, the International Organisation for Migration and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees once again called on all authorities to give priority attention to the safety of migrants and refugees, to refrain from the excessive use of force and to protect their rights.[784] The head of the Spanish Interior Ministry had to report to the European Parliament, several internal investigations were opened, but in the end the authorities managed to put the story "on the brakes".
Human rights structures are still concerned about the situation in overcrowded migrant accommodation centres. Experts, in particular, pointed to inadequate living conditions in migrant centres in the Canary Islands.[785]
The temporary accommodation centres in the Spanish semi-exclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, located in Morocco, where the number of migrants often exceeds permissible norms: more than 1,500 and 1,000 people respectively, while the estimated capacity of the centre in Ceuta is 500 and Melilla 780, represent a serious problem. Documents from the HRC, the Council of Europe, opinions of the Spanish Supreme Court, studies by NGOs and Spanish universities have noted over the past few years that there has been no improvement in living conditions in temporary detention centres for migrants.
In particular, the UN Committee against Torture has noted with concern the overcrowding of such centres and the low level of health care provided in them, which is clearly insufficient for the families and vulnerable individuals housed there. It also noted the excessive use by the Spanish authorities of the detention of irregular migrants in these centres as a preventive measure prior to expulsion (the average length of stay was 40 days). Such measures were also used against persons with serious health problems and pregnant women. The Committee has also documented widespread cases of violence and ill-treatment in such centres, which are not usually investigated.[786]
In 2022, the topic of forceful suppression of illegal migration by Spanish law enforcement agencies was again at the centre of an international scandal: on 24 June, over 2,000 migrants from African countries attempted to cross the Spanish-Moroccan border in Melilla. As a result of the incident (the migrants were actively counteracted by the police of both countries), according to various estimates, from 23 to 38 people were killed, 76 were missing, and over 200 were injured. Among other things, the Agency noted that the Spanish Attorney General's Office opened an investigation into the incident, but then closed the criminal case because it found no violation of Spanish criminal law.
The incident also came to the attention of the United Nations Committee against Torture, which noted with concern that the investigation initiated by the Public Prosecutor's Office had been discontinued because no offence had been committed by Spanish law enforcement officials.[787] It also noted that the disciplinary investigation initiated by the Guardia Civil had been closed because it had not been possible to identify the officers responsible. The Spanish authorities were requested to investigate the actions of the security forces promptly and impartially and to take all necessary measures to ensure that such a situation would not recur in the future.
The sea route for irregular migrants travelling to the Canary Islands remains equally dangerous. In 2023, the FRA noted in its 2024 report that the Canary Islands had the two largest fatal accidents on the route from West Africa to the Canary Islands: 191 migrants were estimated to have died on 6 November and 113 on 8 November.[788] And this is despite the fact that on this Spanish territory the number of arriving migrants more than doubled over the year: from about 16 thousand people in 2022 to almost 40 thousand people in 2023. According to the Ministry of the Interior of Spain, a total of 55.6 thousand illegal migrants arrived in the country in 2023 (in 2022 – about 29 thousand people).[789]
The situation of migrants trying to reach Spain has come to the attention of the CoE Group of Experts on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (GRETA), which has recommended that Spanish authorities strengthen proactive detection of potential victims of illegal migration routes in Ceuta, Melilla and the Canary Islands.[790]
The FRA in its 2023 report also pointed out such problems of migrants.[791] Among other things, the FRA drew attention to the fact that Spanish legislation, along with the legislation of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, contains provisions allowing the authorities to expel refugees from third countries without any official procedures back to their country of origin. However, it is specified that such a provision applies to the above-mentioned semi-exclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. In addition, the Agency's report indicates that in September 2023, the European Commission launched a procedure on Spain's violation of the EU Return Directive (2008/115/EC). The same provision on the possibility of expulsion of refugees was also referred to by the FRA in the 2024 report.[792]
In 2023, the European Commission launched an infringement procedure against Spain because Spanish national legislation did not take into account the EU directives on the reception of refugees (Directive 2013/33/EC on reception conditions and Qualification Directive 2011/95/EC).[793]
Human rights defenders pay special attention to the problems of migrants. For example, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women in May 2023 pointed out that a significant number of migrant women are victims of human trafficking, the main areas of which are forced labour, especially in the agricultural sector, and sexual exploitation.[794] Victims of trafficking were not often detected by border officials. Furthermore, they often face obstacles in accessing justice. Separately, the Committee noted the low level of education among women and girls from migrant and Roma communities, as well as the challenges faced by refugee women in accessing education.
The NGOs Amnesty International[795] and "SOS Racismo"[796] note that refugees and migrants are discriminated against on the basis of nationality from the moment they arrive at reception centres and subsequently when their asylum applications are examined by the Spanish authorities. People from Africa and the Middle East were the most affected by prejudice.
Discriminatory attitudes towards Roma continue to be a problem. In addition to the above-mentioned manifestations of discrimination against this group of society, the following should also be highlighted. The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI, within the framework of the Council of Europe) has noted the persistent problem of the Roma community in Spain. In particular, emphasis was placed on the low school attendance and graduation rates of Roma children, despite the fact that the authorities are taking measures in this regard.[797] In the observations on the implementation of its 2018 recommendations to Spain, the Commission called on the authorities to take additional steps to prevent Roma children from being segregated in schools and to ensure that they do not drop out of school. It found that no funding had been allocated in this area.[798]
ECRI's findings that many Romani children are discriminated against in the field of education were confirmed by the EU Agency for Fundamental Human Rights in its 2023 report. It should be noted that this phenomenon has been observed not only in Spain, but also in other EU countries, including Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Romania.[799]
The authorities are making efforts in this area, but so far they have not led to significant progress. Since 2021, official statistics on episodes of hatred or discrimination against Roma have been published. There are also examples of perpetrators being brought to justice. For example, the FRA cites a case in which three women were sentenced to three months' imprisonment by a court for regularly insulting a Romani family living in their neighbourhood.[800]
In its separate study on the situation of Roma in the 10 EU states with the largest Roma communities, the EU Agency for Fundamental Human Rights highlighted the following key aspects of Roma life in Spain (it should be noted that the country ranked third in the study in terms of the number of surveys conducted). Overall, the level of discrimination against Roma is not the highest: 37 percent of respondents had experienced such negative experiences in the year preceding the survey. At the same time, very few respondents reported such incidents – 4 percent. In addition, the gap between the overall level of trust in law enforcement agencies in the country (79 percent) and the level of trust Roma have in them – 34 percent – is quite high.
The Roma community is characterised by a higher poverty rate in all the countries surveyed, but Spain has one of the highest rates at 98 percent. There is still a noticeable gap in the rate of secondary schooling of Roma children (a trend that is common to all monitoring countries), although Spain does not have the highest rate in the EU – 28 percent, with an overall rate of 76 percent (the previous study recorded 24 percent, which shows a slight increase in the number of Roma who have completed at least secondary school). In terms of manifestations of discrimination in educational institutions, Spain does not have the highest level of this negative manifestation, with 8 percent of respondents having experienced it (both parents of pupils and pupils themselves), with more discrimination against boys than girls.
At the same time, Spain has the highest rate of unemployed Roma youth, at 71 percent (the figure was calculated taking into account study or work). Spanish Roma have a housing shortage problem, and this varies by age, with more older people living in unfavourable housing conditions than children. Compared to the 2016 survey (13 percent), the percentage of Roma who have experienced discrimination in finding a job has almost tripled (36 percent).[801]
Italy possesses a substantial legal framework to counteract contemporary manifestations of fascism and efforts to revive it. Article 12 of the final provisions of the Italian Republic's Constitution prohibits the re-establishment of any fascist party that had been dissolved following Italy's defeat in World War II.
In 1952, the Shelby Law was enacted, making it a crime to organize associations, movements or groups that exhibit characteristics of the Fascist Party and aim to restore it. Publicly lauding "the figures, principles, acts, and methods of the fascist regime or its anti-democratic objectives" was a criminal offence. In 1957, the Constitutional Court made changes to the Shelby Law, penalizing only those fascist apologetics which could result in the resurgence of a fascist party.
In 1993, the Shelby Law was followed by the Mancino Law, which criminalized "the dissemination of ideas founded on racial superiority, racial and ethnic animosity, and the praise of figures, principles, acts, and methods of the fascist government or its anti-democratic objectives".
At the end of 2017, the Chamber of Deputies (the lower house of the Italian parliament) approved the Fiano Law in the first reading, condemning "the production, marketing, distribution, sale of objects with images and portraits of fascist figures, symbols, propaganda in public space of symbols and attributes of the fascist party, including gestures". The use of the Internet for those purposes was deemed an aggravating factor. However, this law has not been adopted.
Nevertheless, Italy's legislation still contains remnants of the fascist regime. Sergio Rizzo and Alessandro Campi, authors of "The Long Shadow of Fascism" (2022), reveal that there are currently 249 legal norms (regulations, decrees and laws) in Italy that mention the concept of "race".
In 2022-2023, Italy, together with its former Nazi Axis allies of World War II (Germany, Japan, etc.), cast its vote for the first time opposing the draft annual UN General Assembly resolution on "Combating glorification of Nazism, neo-Nazism and other practices that contribute to fuelling contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance". The annual resolution was proposed by Russia and other co-sponsors. This marks the inaugural occasion in which former Axis members of World War II openly dissented against a document condemning the glorification of Nazism and various forms of racial discrimination. Previously, the official Rome had followed the EU's collective stance by abstaining from voting.
The Italian authorities exhibit leniency towards the ideological successors of Benito Mussolini. They appear to neither perceive nor acknowledge a real threat to public order and state security emanating from these marginal political groups. The case of Ignazio La Russa, the President of the Italian Senate and co-founder of the Brothers of Italy party, which secured the largest number of votes in the 2022 parliamentary elections, serves as an illustration in this regard. The politician is known for his loud statements on his unwillingness to commemorate the day of Italy's liberation from fascism (25 April) and his intentions to maintain a collection of fascist memorabilia at his residence, which includes photographs, medals, and a bust of Mussolini.
The topic of fascism in the social and political life of Italy is not taboo, but the majority of representatives of the executive and legislative branches of Government try not to publicly give reasons for nostalgia for the "iron hand of the Duce".
Italy has a number of far-right organizations with nationalist and near neo-fascist views, the largest of which are the national far-right parties Casa Pound[802] ("House of Pound"), Forza Nuova[803] ("New Force") and Movimento Fascismo e Libertà – Partito Socialista Nazionale ("Fascism and Freedom Movement – National Socialist Party"). They have traditionally received no more than 1 percent of the vote in parliamentary and European elections. There are also a number of small radical associations at regional and local level.[804]
Italian law enforcement officers monitor the activities of illegal neo-Nazi groups. In October 2021, the media published reports about the detection in a number of major Italian cities (including Rome, Naples, Turin, Siena) of cells of an extensive network of the Order of Hagal, an association engaged in the dissemination of misanthropic ideology, recruitment and military training of followers. 26 people were detained on suspicion of having links to it.
On 15 November 2022, a law enforcement operation in Naples, Caserta, and Avellino (Campania region) led to the detention of four individuals belonging to the Order of Hagal group. Members of the Order circulated prohibited literature online and conducted training for knife and hand-to-hand fighting. Further enquiries exposed that the group had communication with Ukrainian neo-Nazis belonging to the Azov Battalion and the Right Sector.[805]
In October 2022, Italian law enforcement apprehended individuals linked to a neo-Nazi organization associated with "The Base" from the United States in Bari (Apulia region). During the detention, propaganda assets and objects featuring swastikas were seized. The cell members are under suspicion of planning terrorist attacks.[806]
Experts note that, in addition to legally established socio-political associations, there are also radical cells and loners operating in Italy, which may have at their disposal an arsenal of firearms, explosives and relevant extremist literature.
Radicals regularly hold events in sacred places (such as Milan's Maggiore Cemetery, where fascist figures are buried) or organize, with varying degrees of success, public actions to mark important dates for the fascist movement. In many Italian cities, including the capital, there are still monuments and memorial plaques dedicated to the Italian fascists and to the participants in the colonial wars. Most municipalities do not take any measures to combat this "architectural heritage". In a number of towns (usually of provincial importance), Benito Mussolini retains the title of "honorary citizen", mainly due to the reluctance of local authorities to repeal the municipal regulations adopted in the 1920s. The following towns are among such examples: Pietrasanta (Tuscany region), Carpi (Emilia-Romagna region).
On 30 October 2022, on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the March on Rome by the militants of the National Fascist Party, a commemorative procession was held in Predappio (Emilia-Romagna region), where Benito Mussolini was born. Fascist slogans and relevant symbols were used, which can be easily purchased in Italy on the Internet. Participants in the "march" included direct descendants of the dictator. According to the organizers, the event attracted approximately 4,000 individuals (2,000 according to official sources), with only eight arrests made by law enforcement forces. This "march", known for its regularity, is attended by a few thousand radicals annually.
On 7 January 2024, over a hundred representatives of right-wing radical movements, who make no secret of their commitment to the "legacy" of Mussolini's time, openly displayed the fascist "Roman salute" during an annual rally in Rome in memory of the members of the youth wing of the Italian Social Movement party who died in 1978. Following an investigation by local law enforcement, 19 participants in the rally were detained. In January 2024, the Italian Supreme Court of Cassation, having reviewed an earlier judgment of another court, ruled that the use of the "Roman salute" was a criminal offense if it "constitutes a direct threat to public order or is demonstrated in circumstances that suggest the re-establishment of a fascist party".[807]
According to a 2020 public report by Italian intelligence agencies,[808] the Italian far-right intensified its activities on the Internet in the face of the COVID‑19 pandemic, with the use of the available social media tools to promote racism, antisemitism, xenophobia, and to spread conspiracy theories and disinformation. In their activities they emphasize the deterioration of the socio-economic situation in the country. In addition, the far-right uses slogans about the defence of national identity, which are traditional for them and understandable for the population.
Respectful treatment is generally noted in Italy for memorials and monuments erected in honour of those who fought against Nazism and fascism. Graves of Soviet citizens who died in the Apennines during World War II are detected, and new memorial sites are installed. In October 2020, a monument to the Soviet partisan Vladimir Tulisko was unveiled in Caldiero (Verona province).[809]
Nevertheless, there have been cases of desecration of memorials to victims of fascism. On 25 April 2022, such incident occurred in Gallarate (Lombardy region). On 19 February 2023, radical individuals constructed a swastika-shaped object in a Milan municipal park adjacent to a monument dedicated to victims of deportation. The perpetrators responsible for these actions have not been identified.[810]
There are obvious cases of history being rewritten, including the glorification of Italian fascists in historiographical and journalistic works. For instance, on 26 January 2023, the Luigi Pecci Contemporary Art Centre in Prato (Tuscany region) hosted the presentation of a book in which the image of the fascist naval officer Salvatore Todaro (1908-1942) is presented in a positive way. On 30 August 2023, at the 80th Venice International Film Festival, the film Comandante by Italian director Edoardo De Angelis was presented.
In Italy, there is an open promotion of the cultural and architectural heritage of the fascist twenty years. For instance, from 14 April to 1 September 2024, the MART Museum of Modern Art (Rovereto, Trentino autonomous province) hosted the art exhibition "Art and Fascism", where the exhibits glorifying the Duce were presented in isolation from the historical and political context.
Italy turns a blind eye to the wide spread of neo-Nazi ideology in Ukraine, and publications often appear in the Italian media glorifying fighters from nationalist battalions. On 3-17 September 2023, Milan hosted the Eyes of Mariupol exhibition that glorified Azov National Battalion fighters.[811]
It should be noted that anti-fascist organizations are also active in the country. The National Association of Italian Partisans (ANPI) is the primary organization in Italy countering manifestations of neo-fascism, racism, and xenophobia. Catholic and international human rights organizations also actively work in this field. Anti-fascists arrange rallies, marches, and concerts to encourage tolerance and oppose racism, involving migrant communities actively. For instance, a demonstration against fascism was held in Florence on 21 February 2023, with a reported attendance of over 3,000 individuals.
Manifestations of xenophobia and racial discrimination in Italy are not solely related to the activities of neo-fascists, according to experts. It is noted that a significant number of such incidents are manifestations of racism that occur in everyday situations. Among the main reasons for the growth of xenophobic attitudes in recent years, they suggest deterioration of the socio-economic situation of the population, high level of youth unemployment and influx of migrants from Africa and Asia. The media, both local and national, cover the most prominent cases.
In February 2022, the leading Italian print media featured excerpts from the report of the Office against Racial Discrimination of the Italian Council of Ministers. The data cited shows that 1,379 incidents of racial and ethnic discrimination were detected in Italy in 2021 (913 in 2020), and that only refers to registered appeals. 82 percent of cases relate to online aggression.
The EU Agency for Fundamental Human Rights (FRA), in its 2023 report, with reference to the same body, highlighted a substantial number of complaints regarding racial and ethnic discrimination. Specifically, the Agency noted that out of the 1,379 cases of discrimination recorded by the national equality body in 2021, 709 (51 percent) were connected to racial and ethnic discrimination.[812]
Manifestations of intolerance in the country have been documented by human rights organizations. For several years, the NGO Italian Centre for Human Rights ("Osservatorio italiano sui diritti") has been implementing the project "Map of Hate Manifestations" (in 2023, published for the seventh time), which analyzes social media posts for discriminatory and offensive language against certain population groups. According to the study, 43.2 percent of negative publications were about women, 33.6 percent about people with disabilities, 7.3 percent about migrants, 6.6 percent about Jews, and 0.1 percent about Muslims.[813]
International organizations have also brought attention to the rise of racism and xenophobia in Italy. For instance, Michelle Bachelet, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights at that time, pointed to the intensification of racial discrimination in her speech on 22 January 2022 at the meeting of the Extraordinary Commission of the Italian Senate against intolerance, racism, anti-Semitism and incitement to hatred and violence.[814] This commission was created in 2019 on the initiative of lifelong senator and prisoner of Nazi camps Liliana Segre, but only began work in 2021.[815]
The UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) in August 2023 indicated with concern that racist discourse inciting hatred against certain ethnic groups is increasingly used in Italy's public space, media and on the Internet, and is in fact becoming the norm. Such practices are resorted to by politicians, including members of the Government and other high-ranking public officials, against ethnic minorities, especially Roma, people of African descent, as well as migrants, asylum-seekers and refugees. CERD considers that this leads to a proliferation of racist hate incidents. This is confirmed by the increasing number of reports of racist hate crimes, including verbal and physical violence against ethnic minorities, resulting sometimes in death. The prevalence of negative stereotypes about Roma, people of African and Arab descent and migrants in Italy was also noted.
In addition, the Committee raised the issue of the widespread use of racial profiling by Italian law enforcement officials. This is accompanied by a high number of cases of abuse and ill-treatment, including excessive use of force against ethnic minorities, Roma, people of African descent as well as migrants. CERD called on the Italian authorities to take measures to combat these negative practices, to amend the algorithms and actions of police officials, and to establish an effective mechanism to monitor data relating to racial profiling, racial discrimination and abuse of authority by law enforcement officials, including in the context of identity checks, traffic stops, border searches.[816]
The aggravating problem of racial profiling was also pointed out by the International Independent Expert Mechanism to Advance Racial Justice and Equality in Law Enforcement following a visit to Italy in early May 2024. The experts of this relatively recently established structure have been studying the situation of racial profiling in Italy, which is the basis for identity checks and searches by Italian law enforcement authorities based on the assumption that a person is not an Italian citizen or that such persons may be involved in criminal activities. Among other things, it was noted that racial bias, stereotyping and profiling create harmful and false associations of black people with crime and offenses. Experts also noted that the legitimate task of ensuring the safety and security of citizens should not be seen by law enforcement officials as an authorization to carry out racial profiling. Such practices undermine confidence in law enforcement agencies and, as a consequence, reduce their effectiveness. Among the findings of the mechanism is the lack of complete statistical data disaggregated by race or ethnicity in all aspects of the lives of the focus persons, especially with regard to their interaction with law enforcement bodies and the criminal justice system. Such a lack of disaggregated data hinders the State's efforts to rectify racial disparities. At the same time, the experts of the Mechanism expressed concern about overcrowding in Italian prisons, highlighting the disproportionate number of people of African descent imprisoned. This, in their opinion, further emphasizes the widespread nature of systematic racism in Italy. Concern was also expressed about the challenges faced by migrants and asylum-seekers in applying for legal defence. Abuse of power by law enforcement bodies and bureaucratic delays were identified as the most common.[817]
Since the escalation of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in October 2023, Italy has seen a surge in anti-Semitism. According to the 2024 report of the Contemporary Jewish Documentation Institute ("Osservatorio antisemitismo della Fondazione" CDEC), a research centre on antisemitism,[818] there were 454 antisemitic offenses in 2023 (241 in 2022), including one assault and 40 cases of threats. At the same time, 259 incidents were related to incitement to hatred on the Internet. According to the responsible editor of the report, Italian sociologist Betti Guetta, "antisemitism today is becoming much more aggressive and at the same time less hidden. Insulting Jews is no longer a taboo. The Gaza conflict is used as a shield to insult and provide no justification for that". According to the report, 10 percent of Italian citizens openly express their negative feelings and attitudes towards Jews.
Comments on the situation were made in January 2024 by Italian Minister of the Interior Matteo Piantedosi, who recognized "a significant increase in the number of episodes related to antisemitism".[819] In particular, it concerns anti-Semitic writings on walls and public insults. He said Italian law enforcement agencies had identified 42 people having committed such acts. One of the most recent cases is the appearance of "Death to the Jews" graffiti in different districts of Procida (Campania region) on 15 May 2024.
In the second sociological study of antisemitism conducted by FRA among representatives of Jewish communities in several EU countries, it has been noted that 65 percent of respondents in Italy said that they considered hostility against Jews in the public sphere to be a problem. Moreover, Italy has the highest percentage (94 percent) of those who said they had encountered the stereotype that Jews had seized global control of finance, media, politics and the economy. The proportion of respondents who have experienced incitement to violence against Jews (68 percent) and those who identified antisemitism in sport as a significant problem (43 percent) is also high in Italy. 70 percent of Italian survey participants said they had experienced antisemitism online, with 89 percent dissatisfied with the way online platforms responded to their complaints about antisemitism. The escalation of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in October 2023 contributed to the dissemination of comparisons in Italy between Israel's policies and those of the Nazis. Swastika images have proved to be common in the country, according to polls. At the same time, Italy is among the countries with the lowest proportion of respondents who avoid attending Jewish celebrations (21 percent).[820]
Such manifestations of antisemitism have been recorded before. According to a report published in January 2021 by the Eurispes Institute for Social and Political Studies,[821] there was an increase in the number of people in Italy in 2020 who deny the mass extermination of Jews by the Nazis – 15.6 percent (by comparison, in 2005 there were only 2.7 percent). 16.1 percent of respondents say that the persecution of Jews resulted in "not so many casualties". 61.7 percent of respondents believe that cases of antisemitism in Italy "are isolated and do not indicate the existence of a problem". 19.8 percent of respondents believe that "Benito Mussolini was a great leader who made a few mistakes".
These data correlate with numbers provided by the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. In its research on the manifestations of anti-Semitism in European countries, FRA cites statistics of the Italian Observatory for Security against Manifestations of Racism (Osservatorio per la Sicurezza Contro gli Atti Discriminatori – OSCAD), which records an increase in detected cases of anti-Semitism in Italy, based on investigations conducted by either the National Police or the Carabinieri Corps: 91 incidents in 2019, 101 in 2020 and 2021 each, and 94 in 2022. The most common offenses of this kind were incitement to violence (79 cases in 2021 and 81 in 2022), acts of vandalism (22 in 2021, nine in 2022), and defacement of Jewish-owned properties (five cases in 2021, 29 in 2022).[822]
Unofficial data show an even higher number of manifestations of antisemitism. The same Observatory for Security against Manifestations of Racism recorded 241 manifestations of antisemitism in 2022, 226 in 2021, 230 in 2020, and 251 incidents in 2019.[823]
It is also worth noting that significant differences in the number of such incidents for 2010-2018 and 2019-2022 are attributed to different methods of counting. But this difference does not affect the overall trend of antisemitic incidents in Italy: even for the first period there is a growth in the number of documented antisemitic cases from 16 in 2010 to 56 in 2018, with a maximum value of 64 in 2014.[824]
The above-mentioned Map of Tolerance study, which analyzes social media posts, also points to an increase in manifestations of antisemitism in social media.[825]
The Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (AC FCNM) functioning within the framework of the Council of Europe has reported the prevalence of hate speech in Italian political discourse and the media. The Committee also highlighted that expressions of hatred against individuals based on their religious affiliation frequently overlap with those based on their ethnic origin. Notably, out of the 224 antisemitic incidents that were recorded in 2020, 117 were linked to hate speech disseminated in social media or on the Internet. Some other incidents were connected with derogatory posters, graffiti and inscriptions. The report also mentioned hate speech and hate crimes targeting Muslim communities, encompassing activities by right-wing radical groups and affiliated movements during protests against temporary facilities accommodating Muslim worshippers (often migrants), and politicians criticizing Islam. Furthermore, there is a tendency to underreport hate crimes against Muslims. Moreover, the AC FCNM highlighted that, in recent years, there have been instances, notably between 2018 and 2019, where migration centres have been subject to verbal and physical abuse propagated by political remarks aimed at migrants and refugees.[826]
The increase of the number of migrants caused a growth of anti-immigrant rhetoric in political discussions, which was noted with concern by the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI).[827] Experts stated the inefficiency and the lack of financial, organizational, and regulatory tools in Italy to counter this phenomenon.
The UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies have a rather balanced approach to dealing with the migration situation in Italy. At the same time, the need is constantly pointed out to ensure the rights of migrants and asylum seekers, improve living conditions in migrant primary registration centres, migrant reception centres, as well as specialized "crisis centres" and centres for unaccompanied children, and to stop the practice of keeping migrants in detention for more than 48 hours. However, the problem has recently reached such proportions that international control mechanisms have been forced to pay close attention to it. The situation of migrants has been brought to the attention of, inter alia, the UN Human Rights Committee,[828] the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child,[829] the UN Committee against Torture,[830] the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (in 2016[831] and 2023[832]), the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (in 2015[833] and 2022[834]), and the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women in 2024.[835] In particular, in the October 2022 concluding observations, the CESCR expressed concern that the 2018 legislation on migration and citizenship regulation (Law No. 132 of 1 December 2018) has contributed to an increase in the number of irregular migrants in the country, which in turn increases the risk of exploitation. In addition, the Committee pointed out that there were attacks on journalists and human rights defenders advocating for or supporting migrants.
The problems faced by migrants in Italy were also highlighted by the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights in 2022.[836] Among other things, its experts noted the inadequate conditions in the initial-reception facilities for migrants (inter alia, on the island of Pantelleria), the lack of information on the asylum procedure, detention of migrants, as well as cases of push-backs in violation of the principle of non-refoulement.[837]
In 2023, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination expressed concern about the Law 132/2018 of 1 December 2018 on immigration and security and the recently adopted Law 50/2023 of 6 May 2023 (Cutro Law), which in its view made it difficult for migrants and refugees to obtain the necessary protection from the Italian authorities. These included the difficulties faced by migrants and asylum-seekers in the refugee status determination procedure, and abuses by the Italian police and border control authorities. CERD also noted the deplorable living conditions in migrant reception centres and the continuing reduction in the provision of psychological, legal and counselling services to migrants. The sharp decline in the granting of "special protection status" to migrants by authorized bodies and cases of collective expulsions of migrants were also noted. Particular attention was also paid to the widespread practice of detention of migrants in special centres for prolonged periods, including prohibiting migrants from leaving the centres. In addition, CERD expressed concern about the legal restrictions imposed by the Italian authorities on search and rescue operations at sea and the pressure, including criminal prosecution, exerted on human rights defenders and civil society organizations for assisting migrants at sea.[838]
It is notable that the Committee paid considerable attention to the protection of migrants' rights in Italy. In its follow-up letter to the examination of the information sent by the Italian authorities on this issue after the penultimate round of examination of the Italian dossier in 2018, the Committee specifically requested the inclusion in Italy's next periodic report of information on measures to protect the rights of migrants, as well as on the situation of Roma.[839]
FRA also highlighted the limitations of NGOs' work in assisting migrants in its 2023 report, noting that only 16 percent of all migrants are brought to the country's ports during these rescue operations. As of the end of 2022, only three NGO-owned vessels and one aircraft were carrying out search and rescue operations, while five vessels were blocked pending legal proceedings and several others were temporarily in port for maintenance. An example is also given of two vessels, the Ocean Viking and Humanity 1, which in October 2022 were refused permission by the country's authorities to disembark migrants rescued at sea in Italian ports for an extended period of time. After a three-week wait, the Ocean Viking vessel was diverted to the French port of Toulon, where the people on board were disembarked, while the Humanity 1 vessel was allowed to dock at the port of Catania after a two-week wait. As of January 2023, a new decree by the Italian authorities introduced additional restrictive provisions relating to sea rescue operations.[840]
Concerns were raised in February 2023 by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk during the consideration of draft legislative amendments that aimed to restrict search and rescue operations in the Mediterranean Sea. The proposed amendments included mandatory ports of disembarkation for people rescued at sea, which could sometimes be days away from the original rescue site. Humanitarian rescue vessels would also be required to return to port immediately after each rescue, forgoing additional rescue operations. Volker Türk called the proposed document "simply the wrong way to address this humanitarian crisis". He said that the document could potentially impose penalties on both migrants and those who offer them assistance. Moreover, the document might result in a rise in fatalities in maritime disaster incidents.[841] Volker Türk also touched on the migration issue in his speech before the Senate Emergency Committee on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights. Among other things, he pointed to the widespread use in Italy of long-term detention of migrants and asylum-seekers, as well as their detention in hot spots without a clear legal basis.[842]
In 2022, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) ruled for the first time on a complaint concerning the Italian authorities' incorrect assessment of the age of migrants (Darboe and Camara v. Italy, which concerned two minors from Gambia and Guinea placed in a reception centre together with adult migrants. These persons had applied for asylum as unaccompanied children).[843]
The challenges faced by migrants from African and Asian countries employed in Italy's commercial sector (agriculture, clothing and logistics are among the problem sectors) were highlighted by experts of the UN Human Rights Council Working Group on Business and Human Rights following their visit in late September – early October 2021. In this regard, inhumane working and living conditions of many migrant workers and serious problems in the field of occupational health and safety were noted.[844] The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights highlighted the same issue in October 2022. It noted that the migration problem was also aggravated by a large sector of the shadow economy, which employed a significant number of workers without labour and social guarantees. Italian authorities adopt a punitive stance towards these workers. The UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination highlighted this issue in August 2023. It was reported that a considerable amount of migrants, primarily seasonal workers in the agricultural sector, are victims of violence and exploitation in Italy.[845] The same issue was touched upon by the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women in February 2024.
In September 2023, the migration situation was sharply exacerbated by the arrival of thousands of irregular migrants on the Italian territory, particularly on the island of Lampedusa off the coast of Tunisia. The number of illegal migrants there outnumbered the local population. Massive clashes broke out between the migrants over the distribution of food. The head of the Italian government, Giorgia Meloni, appealed to the EU to help stem the flow of illegal immigrants arriving in the country via the Mediterranean route, noting that Italy was facing a significant increase in migratory pressure.[846]
The term "national minorities" is lacking in the Italian basic law. Constitutional lawyers explain the absence of the term "national minorities" in the basic law by the fact that "language, and not nationality or ethnicity, is the defining instrument for identifying foreign and multilingual communities in need of protection". Unified rules governing language policy in the country are contained in the 1999 Law on Norms for the Protection of Historically Established Linguistic Minorities. 12 linguistic minorities (2.5 million people living in 14 regions of the country), which have developed as ethnic communities within their linguistic areas, are recognized at the state level. Moreover, the law only mentions those ethnic groups that have historically lived in the territories of present-day Italy. In this regard, the rights of numerous Roma groups living in the territory (this group includes the Roma and Sinti communities, as well as the Camminanti, an ethnic group living mainly in the south of Sicily) are effectively ignored, which has repeatedly led to criticism of Rome by multilateral universal and regional human rights monitoring mechanisms.
In Italy, there is a full range of problems faced by Roma. A significant part of them is related to the fact that the existing Roma settlements in the country are generally illegal buildings on the outskirts of towns and villages. These areas are criminalized, and drug trafficking often flourishes there. Law enforcement agencies regularly raid places where Roma live, and illegal buildings are periodically demolished. Italy recorded one of the highest numbers of Roma displaced from their homes in the EU – 15 percent.[847]
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (in 2015 and 2022), the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (in 2016 and 2023), the Human Rights Committee (in 2017) and the Committee on the Rights of the Child (in 2019) drew attention to the importance of addressing the situation of Roma, including in housing, access to social services and education, and the labour market. In October 2022, the CESCR noted that the Roma continue to face segregation, with most living in settlements without any infrastructure, and discrimination against Roma children in education. In August 2023, CERD referred to the segregation of Roma children in educational institutions and, more generally, to discrimination against Roma in the provision of health services. In February 2024, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women expressed concern about the high dropout rates among schoolgirls from Roma communities and highlighted the discrimination and obstacles to access to education faced by Roma, refugee and migrant women and girls.[848]
At the same time, FRA explained that, in general, in Italy the level of segregation of Roma children in schools is not as high as in a number of other EU countries and is below 15 percent. The Agency also noted the average level of enrollment of Roma children in education in general. However, it indicates that the greatest disparities between the Roma and the mainstream population are observed in the field of preschool education, as only 30 percent of Roma children attend kindergartens. At the same time, according to FRA, about half of all Roma children attending Italian schools face bullying and violence from their classmates.[849]
In addition, research by the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights on the situation of Roma in EU countries shows that Italy has a relatively high level of anti-Roma sentiment: 40 percent of survey participants experienced hate-motivated aggression in the previous year, and one in ten members of the Roma community were physically attacked for the same reasons. There were no significant differences by gender, but they were recorded according to age: the highest prevalence of incidents was found among Roma aged 25-44 (17 percent), followed by respondents aged 45-64 (6 percent) and 16-24 (4 percent).[850]
Discrimination against Roma, including the use of offensive language and names in relation to them, was also highlighted by the AC FCNM.[851]
In December 2022, the case of a disabled Romani man who fell out of his apartment window during a police search of his home, leaving him seriously injured and in a coma, came to the attention of human rights defenders. Four police officers were charged with attempted murder, abuse of power, perjury and torture.[852]
A manifestation of xenophobia with a political (and in the context of relevant international documents – racist) background is alarming – large-scale discrimination against Russian citizens and compatriots, which became widespread in the first half of 2022 against the backdrop of the Ukrainian crisis.
In early 2022, Russophobia manifested itself sharply in Italy following the beginning of the special military operation aimed at denazification and demilitarization of Ukraine and protection of the civilian population of Donbas by the Russian Federation. This mass hysteria had a significant impact on Russian citizens and Russian-speaking people from the former Soviet republics living in the Apennines. Anti-Russian sentiment was at its strongest between February and April 2022. Russian embassies and consular offices received numerous reports from compatriots of threats against them. Aggression towards representatives of Russia and Russian diaspora, with the connivance of official Rome, came mostly from representatives of the numerous Ukrainian diaspora in Italy, one of the largest in Europe.
Since the end of February 2022, Russian citizens have been discriminated against by major banks refusing to service cards and open new accounts. Their access to health care has been restricted. Students studying in Italy (as a rule, they had come here in the framework of exchange programmes), found themselves under serious pressure; estimates show that by the end of February 2022 there were about 350 of them in the Apennines. After the blocking of Russian bank services and freezing of accounts they were virtually deprived of their means of subsistence and had either to prematurely terminate their studies and return to Russia or look for other ways out of the situation.
The massive campaign against Russian culture and its representatives launched in Italy led to a number of ignominious incidents. For instance, on 28 February 2022, mayor of Milan Giuseppe Sala, also head of La Scala Theatre, demanded that the world famous conductor Valery Gergiev publicly condemned Russia's actions in Ukraine under the threat to end cooperation and, in particular, to ban him from participation in the performance of the Queen of Spades opera by Pyotr Tchaikovsky.[853] After receiving no reply to this ultimatum, the authorities of Milan announced that La Scala Theatre "refuses further cooperation with the Russian conductor".
In February 2023, the mayors of the Italian cities of Brescia and Bergamo banned Russian pianist Denis Matsuev from performing at the 60th International Piano Festival.
There are also problems with ensuring press freedom in Italy, in particular with regard to the Russian media. According to a decision adopted by the EU Council, the Russian media outlets "RT" and "Sputnik" have been banned on the territory of the EU starting from 27 February 2022. This very fact has affected the access of the citizens of the Italian Republic to accurate information. The latter is particularly significant in the context of propaganda pressure from the collective West and the blatant anti-Russian campaign in the Italian media. Information about events taking place in the world is presented solely on the basis of Western or Ukrainian sources and fake news.
Deaths of Russian citizens in Italian prisons have been recorded. On 4 July 2020 in the "Sergio Cosmai" prison in Cosenza (Calabria region) a Russian citizen A.A. Nosenko committed suicide. This correlates with the negative trends noted by human rights activists in the Italian penitentiary system. In 2023, 68 prisoners committed suicide in places of detention (85 in 2022). Often no investigations are carried out in relation to such cases.
Serious concerns are raised about the living conditions of prisoners in Italian prisons, which often pose a threat to their health and life. On 9 May 2023, Russian citizen V.I. Pereshchako died of cardiac arrest in the penitentiary institution of Augusta (Sicily), having gone on hunger strike due to the Italian authorities' failure to comply with his request to transfer him to the Russian Federation to continue serving his sentence.
Russian citizen A.O. Volkov, who was detained in the Italian capital in August 2023 on an extradition request to the U.S., was literally held in inhumane conditions in a Roman prison.[854] Due to the lack of a table in the cell, he and two cellmates had to use a chair to eat for three months, sitting on the floor. Because the prison authorities did not switch on the heating, the temperature in the room dropped to 12 degrees Celsius at night. Medical examinations and treatment were superficial, and most of the chronic diseases that the Russian had were not included in the medical records. Thanks to persistent requests of the Russian Embassy, the Ombudsman for Prisoners' Rights in Italy conducted an inspection of the place of detention of A.O. Volkov, confirming all the facts stated, as well as the mental and general state of health of the Russian citizen that caused concern.
There are also disparities in the situation of different groups of Italian society, including territorial and ethnic divisions. For instance, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, highlighting the difficult situation in Italy with regard to the implementation of social and economic rights, pointed out the persistent disparities between the northern and southern regions of the country, which affect, inter alia, the access of the population to social and health services. These disproportions are also reflected in the low level of financial and administrative capacity of local self-government, and the lack of coordination between the national and local government agencies.
Differences for Italian regions are being revealed: in recent years, poverty rates have increased in several of them due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The rising cost on food has the greatest impact on the most disadvantaged and marginalized groups, including migrants, families with low income, and persons living in the southern regions. At the same time, there is a high level of absolute poverty among non-nationals, a significant proportion of whom are illegal migrants.[855]
Human rights mechanisms identify a number of discriminatory aspects in the implementation of children's rights in Italy. According to the CESCR, the school dropout rate in Italy remains among the highest in the European Union. Taking into account regional disparities, children in the country's southern regions are most affected, as well as migrant children (sometimes referred to as "foreign-born children") and Roma children. Moreover, the Committee also raised the issue of child obesity due to the prevalence of junk food.[856]
For many decades, the Canadian authorities have pursued a policy of justifying and glorifying Nazism. By openly supporting the Nazi regime of Kiev in the international arena, and, even more so, by increasing military aid, they trample on the memory of the exploits of Canadians who fought against Nazism and fascism in the anti-Hitler coalition.
It is telling that in 2022-2023, the Canadian delegation voted against[857] the draft resolution "Combating the glorification of Nazism, neo-Nazism and other practices that contribute to the escalation of contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance", introduced annually by Russia together with other co-sponsors, in the UN General Assembly.
Canada became a "haven" for Nazi war criminals[858] and their accomplices from various Waffen-SS units and collaborators. In this country, such individuals were granted permanent residency and then citizenship. Canadian authorities shielded them from justice and prevented their extradition to other countries for prosecution.
Here are just a few cases of harbouring of Nazi henchmen on the territory of this country that received wide publicity:
The most striking example of the cynical "tolerance" towards war criminals is the public praise of 98-year old Bandera member Yaroslav Hunka who was member of the SS Division Galicia, arranged in September 2023.[859]
On 20 October 2023, the Main Investigative Directorate of the Investigative Committee of Russia charged Yaroslav Hunka in absentia with genocide of civilians on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR during the Great Patriotic War (Article 357 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation). The investigation also sent requests for legal assistance to Canada, Poland and Belarus. In December 2023, the Russian Prosecutor General's Office sent an official request for the extradition of Yaroslav Hunka from Canada. However, in February 2024, the Canadian Department of Justice refused to extradite the criminal, cynically stating that membership in the SS Division allegedly did not indicate his involvement in the crimes.
In 1946, after being held captive in Italy, the former Sturmscharführer of the SS Division Galicia Yaroslav Kunitsky fled to Canada.
In 1948, Alfred Valdmanis, former Director General of Justice in the Latvian Government controlled by Nazi Germany, emigrated to Canada, and in 1950, he was appointed Director of Economic Development in the Provincial Government of Newfoundland.
In 1948, Haralds Puntulis, ex‑Nazi auxiliary police officer in Latvia, who was involved in the mass murder of civilians in Nazi-occupied territories, mostly Jews, settled in Canada. In 1965, Canada refused to extradite Haralds Puntulis to the USSR, nor did it take any steps to prosecute him in Canada.
In 1948, Ulas Samchuk, a Nazi writer and member of the Nazi organizations, namely the Carpathian Sich and the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), and Aleksander Laak, an Estonian collaborator and former commandant of the Jägala concentration camp, also arrived in Canada.
Since 1949, Oleksa Hai‑Holovko, former Minister of Information and Propaganda in the so-called "Ukrainian national government"[860], and Semen Pidhainy, a member of the Nazi occupation "administration" of Kharkov, have been living in Canada.
Since 1949, Vladimir Katryuk, a member of the 118th battalion of the Nazi auxiliary police, responsible, among other things, for the punitive destruction by the Nazis of Khatyn (Belarusian SSR), as a result of which 149 civilians were killed, has been living in Canada. Vladimir Katryuk has not been punished in Canada for his crimes he had committed. In 2007, the Cabinet of Canada refused to revoke his citizenship despite judicial confirmation that he had provided false information about himself upon entering the country. Moreover, the Canadian authorities did not authorize his extradition to the Russian Federation. The war criminal died peacefully in 2015 (at the age of 93) at his honeybee farm in Ormstown, near Montreal.
Ferdinand Eckhardt, a Nazi, lived freely in Canada from 1953 until his death in 1995. During a journalistic investigation conducted in November 2023, it was found that the former director of an art gallery in Winnipeg (province of Manitoba), famous Austrian-Canadian art historian Ferdinand Eckhardt was a supporter of the Hitler regime, directly involved in the process of the "Nazification of culture". He served in the German Wehrmacht, after taking an oath of "loyalty to the Führer", and worked for the criminal concern I.G. Farbenindustrie, which had a contract to produce the poison "Cyclone‑B" for Auschwitz for mass extermination of prisoners. At first, the management of the gallery, with the tacit approval of the federal authorities, tried to conceal the unpleasant details of Eckhardt's biography. It even stated that the allegations were unsubstantiated and lacked credible "references" to evidence. Only under the pressure of the facts revealed by the results of the internal audit, and fearing the public reaction, did the administration of the institution admit that it had made a mistake and hastily publicly disassociate itself from the former director and remove his name from the list of honorary figures.[861]
Since 1954, Leonid Perfetsky, a member of the SS Division "Galicia", who took part in the battles against the Soviet Army as a war correspondent and an artist, has been living in Canada. After moving to Canada, he settled down in Montreal and pursued his art career; in 1962, Edmonton even hosted a solo exhibition of Leonid Perfetsky, who had once fought on the side of the Nazis.
In 2021, the Canadian authorities refused to extradite to the Russian Federation Helmut Oberlander (immigrated to Canada in 1954), a former interpreter of the SS Sonderkommando 10-A that committed a mass murder of inmates of the Yeisky children's homes in 1942. The Nazi criminal was not extradited even though he was stripped of his Canadian citizenship by a decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in December 2019, and thus nothing prevented his extradition. The Canadian judiciary proved unable, or unwilling, to deport him for decades, postponing the decision until his death in late 2021.
In 1987, Peter Savaryn, who served in the SS Division "Galicia" during World War II, was awarded the Order of Canada, Canada's highest civilian honor. Peter Savaryn was a lawyer, a member of the Progressive Conservative Party of Alberta, a former Chancellor of the Canadian University of Alberta and, more significantly, a leader of the Ukrainian World Congress headquartered in Toronto (in 2019, the Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation recognized the organization as undesirable). It was not until October 2023 that Mary Simon, Governor General of Canada, apologized for the fact that a high state honor had been awarded to a Nazi accomplice.[862] It should be noted that this very "belated" apology was preceded by a wide public resonance caused by the honoring of his "colleague" Yaroslav Hunka in the Parliament.
On 1 February 2024, Canada announced the release of the full version of the 1986 report by Alti Rodal, historian, on Nazi war criminals in Canada, prepared at the request of the Commission of Inquiry on War Criminals in Canada.
The latest version of the report contains information that had previously been classified. The document notes that after the end of World War II, Canadian authorities did not take checks of entry traffic to Canada seriously enough, resulting in war criminals coming into the country. Since the 1950s, Ottawa has authorized the arrival of German citizens, including those who served in various military units.[863] In 1967, Pierre Trudeau, former Canadian Prime Minister (who was then Minister of Justice), refused to extradite a Latvian Nazi fugitive to the USSR, arguing that deporting a war criminal would set a harmful precedent. Furthermore, Trudeau claimed that Canada had not made a mistake in granting him citizenship.[864] the report says that, with the assistance of Bohdan Panchuk, a Canadian citizen of Ukrainian origin, and his organization, the Central Ukrainian Relief Bureau, at least 8,000 "volunteers" who had fought in the SS Division "Galicia" were taken from Great Britain to Canada (in 2020, the Globe and Mail mentioned a figure of 30,000 people).[865] There are numerous facts that show that the justification of Nazism has become a systemic state policy in the country.
In the wake of a wave of new revelations about the harboring of Nazis in Canada, representatives of pro-Banderite structures tried to organize a campaign to whitewash their "idols". On 25 January 2024, the Ukrainian World Congress released a 30-page booklet "The Galicia Division: They Fought for Ukraine" by Lubomyr Luciuk, professor the Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston. In his booklet, the author hypocritically argues that members of the SS Division "Galicia" cannot be equated with the Nazis, and the monuments commemorating this unit do not contain Nazi symbols. The Nazis' involvement in mass executions of civilians was allegedly unproven, so the fighters who took refuge in Canada were granted citizenship legally.
Memorials to those who fought for Hitler's Germany are also treated with special tolerance here.
The acronyms of various units are written on plaques on a monument obelisk in the shape of a cross at St. Michael's Cemetery in Edmonton, Alberta, with the inscription "To the Fighters for the Will of Ukraine": the Sechevoy Sagittarians, the West Ukrainian People's Republic's Galician Army, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN-UPA), and the 1st Division of the Ukrainian National Army (created from former units of the 14th Waffen-SS Grenadier Division "Galicia").
In the same city of Edmonton, on the territory of the Ukrainian Youth Unity Complex, there is a bust of Roman Shukhevych, founder of the OUN-UPA, Deputy Commander of the "Nakhtigal" battalion, commander of the 201st SS Schutzmannschaft battalion, and organizer of mass killings of Belarusians, Poles, Jews and Ukrainians during World War II.
Another example is Oakville, Ontario, where two memorials are located at the Ukrainian cemetery of St. Volodymyr; one memorial honors OUN-UPA members, and the other, a cenotaph, commemorates members of the punishing division "Galicia" who died in combat with the Red Army for Brody on 13‑22 July 1944.[866] The second memorial was dismantled only in March 2024 at the public's request in light of the scandal with the honoring of the Banderite Yaroslav Hunka in the Canadian Parliament. It is important to note that the Canadian authorities have ignored repeated calls to dismantle this monument, erected in 1988, for decades. Nevertheless, the public should not turn its attention away from the fate of this monument: in April 2024, there were some reports saying that the memorial had been dismantled for restoration, and that it might later be returned to its place.
The Ukrainian Canadian Congress and the numerous Ukrainian Banderite organizations operating under its authority actively contribute to whitewashing the Nazis in Canada and distorting history. It is important to note that it was the Central Ukrainian Relief Bureau established in September 1945 with the support of the Ukrainian Canadian Committee (changed its name to the Ukrainian Canadian Congress in 1989) that facilitated the removal of former members of the SS Division "Galicia" from Great Britain and granting of Canadian citizenship to them.
The Ukrainian Canadian Congress also equates Nazism and communism, portraying the "Holodomor" tragedy as an act of genocide against the Ukrainian people without mentioning that other citizens of the Soviet Union also perished in the 1930s famine.
The memorial to the "victims of communism" in Ottawa is a case in point in this regard. This project was initiated by the Tribute to Liberty organization[867], which launched a "brick-buying" campaign called Pathways to Liberty. The campaign sells "virtual bricks" that appear on the organization's website and in their newsletter. Each "brick" is dedicated to a certain alleged victim and includes biographical information about that individual. It turned out in 2021 that some organizations wanted to immortalize Nazi criminals, including the previously mentioned Roman Shukhevych, in the list of "victims of communism", which caused a public outcry.[868] Only some names of the Nazis were subsequently removed from the list, and the unveiling of the "memorial" was scheduled for November 2023. However, due to the huge scandal related to the honoring of the Nazi Yaroslav Hunka, the opening ceremony was postponed; an additional review of the names to be included in the list of "victims of communism" has begun. For now, the unveiling is postponed to an undetermined date in 2024.[869]
The Latvian Relief Society of Canada, a local branch of the Daugava Hawks organization[870], whose members met with Edgar Rinkevics, former Latvian Foreign Minister who is now the President of Latvia, during his official visit to Canada in 2017.[871]
As of 2022, there were 16 former Latvian SS legionnaires in the country who may have been involved in war crimes and crimes against humanity during World War II, according to a report prepared by the History Foundation in cooperation with the Foundation for the Support and Development of Jewish Culture, Traditions, Education, and Science.
The high-profile UNIFIER training mission, under which Ukrainian military personnel are being trained by Canadian instructors[872], has been extended until 2026, despite the fact that in 2021, evidence was made public that Ukrainian military personnel, that claim to be affiliated with the Canadian armed forces, are members of the extremist Nazi groups Centuria, Azov and Right Sector.[873]
From time-to-time, Canadian politicians openly demonstrate their support for the Nazi ideology, some of them even being descendants of Nazi collaborators.
On 16 June 2024, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau shouted the Nazi greeting "Glory to Ukraine" (the slogan of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, OUN) during a photo shoot at the so‑called conference on Ukraine in the Swiss town of Bürgenstock.[874]
It is not surprising that Mikhailo Chomiak, grandfather of Deputy Prime Minister Chrystia Freeland (an ardent Russophobe), served the Nazis. During the Nazi occupation of Poland, he was editor-in-chief of the collaborationist newspaper "Krakivs'ki Visti", aimed at Nazi propaganda.
On 27 February 2022, Chrystia Freeland posted a photo on her social media account in which she holds a black and red scarf with the UPA slogan "Glory to Ukraine". A few hours after social media users started actively commenting on the post, Freeland replaced the image with a new one without the slogan.
In April 2023, Bob Rae, Canada's permanent representative to the United Nations, cynically described, on his social media page, the Russian war correspondent Vladlen Tatarsky (real name Maxim Fomin), who was killed in a terrorist attack planned by the Ukrainian security services, as "a vitriolic propagandist, a spreader of hate and misinformation".[875] The position taken by a high-ranking Canadian diplomat with regard to this brutal murder, which resulted in numerous victims, was yet another manifestation of the Russophobia fomented in Canada, when crimes committed against Russia and its citizens, including those of a terrorist nature, are justified or hushed up.
Throughout the state's history, Canadian leadership has repeatedly resorted to governance practices comparable to those of the Nazis.
For instance, the creation of boarding schools for indigenous children, that existed from 1883 to 1996, had caused catastrophic damage to indigenous people. The aim of the Indian Residential School System established by the Canadian government was to assimilate indigenous children by denying them the opportunity to adopt the traditions, customs, values and languages of their people. "Deliberate and often brutal strategies were used to destroy family and community bonds" under this system.[876]
Canadian official statistics present a grim and horrifying picture: more than 150,000 children have subjected to a "forced acculturation and civilizational integration". More than 6,000 children died from starvation, sexual and other forms of violence, as well as from unsanitary conditions in residential schools, and the survivors of these horrors broke down. Those who survived told stories of children constantly disappearing and of newborn babies being burned in incinerators. They said there were cases of children being forced to dig graves for their classmates who died.[877] In the event of a child's death, neither the cause of death nor the child's name and surname were recorded. As a result, it is impossible to accurately estimate the precise number of individuals who have died or gone missing so far. Following the discovery of 215 unmarked graves in May 2021 on the grounds in Kamloops, British Columbia, indigenous communities started to search for new burials and continue their activities to this day. More than 1,900 remains were found between 2021 and 2023.
Such inhumane methods of assimilation through residential schools have been experienced by members of the Russian Dukhobors religious minority who immigrated to Canada in the early XXth century. Between 1953 and 1959, at least 200 children were forcibly separated from their families and placed in a former tuberculosis sanitarium in New Denver at the behest of the British Columbia government.
Children were forcibly taken from their families: the police broke into Dukhobor homes, trashed them, and took away the children. Parents were allowed to visit their children twice a month for one hour, but these visits took place through a three‑meter‑high chain‑link fence (which the children were forced to build) and under the supervision of the institution staff. In residential schools, children who spoke only Russian were severely punished for using their mother tongue. Dukhobor survivors told harrowing stories of beatings and sexual abuse by teachers.[878]
In 1916, the Construction Battalion No. 2 was formed in the Canadian province of Nova Scotia and then operated in France during World War I. The unit consisted primarily of Black Canadians who constantly faced discrimination, including confinement in concentration camps and denial of basic medical care, food, and equipment. In July 2022, "only" 106 years later, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau formally apologized to descendants and relatives of members of the Construction Battalion No. 2 and acknowledged the "blatant racism" their ancestors were subjected to.[879]
Influenced by the propaganda of euthanasia in the country, more Canadians are voluntarily taking their own lives through euthanasia, which was legalized in the country in 2016. In 2022, 13,241 people died under Canada's Medical Assistance for the Dying (MAID) program, a 31.2 per cent increase from 2021, and the annual increase in this number has remained stable since 2019.[880] A total of 44958 people have ended their lives through euthanasia since 2016.[881]
Another "benefit" of euthanasia is what its proponents call budgetary savings. The example of Nazi Germany can be cited in this regard: documents from the Hartheim euthanasia centre (one of many opened by the Nazis as part of the Tiergartenstrasse‑4 program) indicate that 70,273 people were killed between 1940 and 1944, bringing 885 Reichsmarks into the Third Reich's coffers. For comparison: the amount of medical spending per Canadian citizen in 2022 was CA$8,653. The fixed cost of the euthanasia procedure in the country is CA$2,237; in the explanatory note to Bill C‑7, it was emphasized that the implementation of the MAID program would save the Canadian budget up to CA$87,000,000.[882]
Residents of Canada's far north have been victims of experiments of dubious purpose.
In the 1940s and 1950s, the government had conducted nutritional experiments on indigenous children in residential schools. During this study, which had been conducted since 1947 by Lionell Pett, Canadian medical doctor and biochemist (it was under his leadership that the federal Nutrition Services Division was established in 1941), children were literally subjected to the child wasting to examine the effects of malnutrition. Close to 1,000 children in six boarding schools across the country were tested in this experiment.[883]
In May 2019, details regarding a puzzling study carried out in Igloolik Township, Nunavut Territory, in the early 1970s came to light in the media. Witnesses claim that at the time, the International Biological Program gathered DNA samples from 30 locals in order to examine how vaccinations affect isolated civilizations' health by scraping a thin layer of skin from the subject's palm of the hand. Prof. John Dossetor, the study's author, the Ministries of Health and Indigenous Services, declined to provide any information available to the general public.
In February 2024, indigenous representatives filed a class‑action lawsuit with information about an alleged secret medical experiment. For example, at least 60 people (indigenous people) were subjected to additional research during the MRI procedure, without their knowledge and consent.[884]
The House of Commons Committee on Public and National Security published a report on the emergence of violent extremism driven by ideology in Canada in June 2022. According to interviewed experts, there has been a sharp increase in the number of radical groups in the country. At least 300 such organizations have appeared since 2015. They are primarily based in British Columbia, Alberta, Ontario, and Quebec. Islamophobia, animosity against immigrants and women, and the idea of re-establishing power by revolution are all part of the radicals' goal.[885]
A number of neo-Nazi and radical groups still operate in the country: the Northern Guard, the Canadian Coalition of Concerned Citizens[886], La Meute (The Swarm), located in Quebec, as well as regional branches of the Soldiers of Odin, and the PEGIDA movement (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the West). In addition, the extremist organization Jewish Defense League of Canada has been noticed to be active.
One of the most active public and political figures who openly adheres to and promotes neo-Nazi ideology is Paul Fromm, head of the Canadian Association for Free Expression and Citizens for Foreign Aid Reform. In 2007, his teaching license was revoked, with one of the reasons cited being Fromm's participation in Hitler's birthday celebration in 1991 and the fact that he was seen on the same stage with Ku Klux Klan[887] leader David Duke in 1994. However, this did not prevent him from running for various political posts again and again, most recently as mayor of Hamilton in 2022.[888]
The Internet and social media are rife with the propaganda of neo-Nazi views. Aside from the Internet, sports clubs are utilized to recruit and rally supporters of neo-Nazism and white supremacy ideas. The Canadian Active Club international network today has numerous branches throughout British Columbia, Alberta, Ontario, the Atlantic provinces, and even in Ottawa. According to a Canadian Network Against Hate study, these businesses are owned and operated by Vinland Hammerskins members and are only permitted to be visited by people of color. This is a basic requirement, but it is not the only one. Forming a "client base" requires the use of special recruiters whose responsibilities include completing multi-stage background checks on potential recruits. Members of the club get together once a week to train and practice martial arts.[889]
It is known that Canadian Active Club members were also part of certain terrorist groups, including the Atomwaffen Division (an international neo-Nazi terrorist group originally based in the United States).[890]
In April 2022, a report on systemic racism and discrimination in the Canadian military, commissioned by the Department of National Defence, was released. The study's experts determined that the number of supporters of extreme ideologies in the military department is increasing. A growing number of Canadian military members are secretly joining white supremacist and ultra-nationalist groups.[891]
It is worth noting that the authorities are making efforts to identify extremist groups – the federal police are monitoring the activity of far-right and neo-Nazi groups. In 2022, its officers carried out multiple raids to apprehend Atomwaffen Division adherents.[892]
The US intelligence agencies are also monitoring the actions of the Canadian far-right because certain members of the aforementioned organizations participated in riots in a number of American cities.
In August 2019, it was made public that Reserve Corporal Patrik Matthews, an explosives-trained engineer corporal, had persuaded other soldiers in Bosejour, Manitoba, to join the right-wing extremist group the Base. Matthews was later compelled to flee to the US, where the FBI detained him and his American associates.[893]
Patrick G. Macdonald became the first adherent of far-right ideology in Canada's history to be charged with both terrorism and hate propaganda in July 2023. Investigators claim that the radical activist was engaged in the production and dissemination of three videos that promoted the Atomwaffen Division, attracted new followers, and encouraged participation in terrorist acts.[894] However, just a month later, in August 2023, Macdonald was released on bail.[895] Since then, the Canadian media has not published any updates on the case.
In December 2023, Matthew A. Althorpe and Kristopher E. Nippak were charged with making videos promoting terrorism and recruiting for the Atomwaffen Division. They were charged with participating in the activities of a terrorist group, while Althorpe faced a number of other charges, including three counts of hate crime offences, facilitating terrorist activity, and instructing a person to carry out a terrorist activity.[896]
Gabriel S. Chaput, a resident of Montreal, was charged with using hate speech, which sparked widespread public protest, particularly among Jewish community leaders. He published a post on the neo-Nazi website Daily Stormer, which set off the events. It was packed with racist pictures and derogatory references to Jews, as did the resource itself, which included multiple images of Hitler. The defendant claimed in his defence that the Daily Stormer was a "parody website" and that the piece was intended to criticize excessive political correctness. However, the prosecution interpreted his remarks on the necessity of non-stop Nazism as an actual call for a massacre of Jews. The judge, considering the case, reached the judgment that state prosecutors had failed to credibly establish a connection between Nazism and the Holocaust in July 2022 after hearing the prosecution's claims. He was of the opinion that an expert historian should have been heard in the courtroom for this purpose. In reply, the defence side attempted to emphasize the absence of such a link, claiming that the elimination of death camp captives was motivated exclusively by economic need rather than ideology. The country's Jewish population is understandably outraged at such a sacrilegious position in the Canadian legal system. As a result, the Canadian chapter of the international Jewish group B'nai Brith (Sons of the Covenant) released a statement on its website on 11 July 2022, denouncing the court's judgment and asserting that Canadian justice should neither deny the Holocaust or misrepresent its history.[897] It was not until September 2023 (five years after the charges were brought) that Chaput was found guilty of incitement to hate and sentenced to 15 months in prison. However, in October 2023, he was released from prison while an appeal against his conviction was filed and heard.[898]
Despite the fact that since 2022 the Criminal Code of Canada envisages an imprisonment for up to 2 years for public Holocaust denial or downplaying the role of the Nazi regime in the mass murder of Jews, anti-Semitism remains a systemic problem in the country.
According to the May 2024 B'nai Brith annual report on anti-Semitism in Canada, a total of 5,791 anti-Semitic incidents were recorded in 2023, an increase of 109.1 per cent compared to 2022 (2,769 anti-Semitic incidents), i.e. more than a twofold (!) increase. As per usual, Ontario (1,353 cases), Quebec (523 cases) and British Columbia (482 cases) are headlining the statistics. It is noteworthy that artificial intelligence technology was actively used to spread anti-Semitic slogans.[899]
Montreal Commissioner on Racism and Systemic Discrimination Bochra Manaï was criticized by Jewish non‑profit institutions because of her inaction regarding the acts of anti-Semitism.[900]
The uptick in anti-Semitism in Canada presents itself in numerous verbal threats and vandalism attacks against Jewish institutions, businesses, and places of worship. On 6 November 2023, Molotov cocktails were thrown at the Beth Tikvah synagogue and a social centre in the Montreal suburb of Dollard‑des‑Ormeaux.[901] On 8 and 12 November 2023, unknown assailants shot at Talmud Torah and Yeshiva Gedola day schools in Montreal.[902] On 25 May 2024, a Jewish women's school in Toronto was shot up.[903] In late June 2024, two Toronto synagogues, Pride of Israel and Kehillat Shaarei Torah, were desecrated, the latter being targeted for the third time since April 2024.[904]
Amidst an unprecedented upsurge in intolerance, a growing number of Jewish-Canadian residents are deciding to immigrate. Nefesh B'Nefesh, a non-profit organisation that facilitates the immigration of Jews to Israel from North America, reports that the number of applications has multiplied. Since October 2023, 1,091 Jews have applied for immigration (517 applications were submitted during the same period in 2022-2023).[905]
It has become widely publicised that Birju Dattani, who will take up the position of High Commissioner of the Canadian Human Rights Commission (CHRC) in August 2024, is an ardent anti-Semite. According to media reports, between 2012 and 2015, while living in the UK, Dattani took part in a number of anti-Israeli acts, including a protest outside the Israeli Embassy in London. Moreover, in 2015 B.Dattani participated in an event attended by Adnan Khan, member of the terrorist group Hizb Ut-Tahrir.[906] He had also previously circulated anti-Israeli articles, which he signed with his middle name, Mujahid.[907]
In addition, the Commission itself had previously been heavily criticised, namely for its pervasive racial bias. The report of the Standing Senate Committee on Human Rights of the Canadian Parliament on the results of the investigation into the facts of systematic discrimination of Blacks and people of colour in the CHRC confirms the previously published media information that racial minorities are excluded from career advancement and training opportunities, isolated from communication within the community. Federal public servants have repeatedly appealed to the Commission. However, employees of the CHRC have usually dismissed the complaints related to violation of rights on the basis of ethnicity and race. For example, in 2018, only 6 per cent of all claims were accepted.[908]
In February 2024, uncovered facts of racial discrimination at CHRC caused a number of non-governmental organisations and trade unions to file a complaint with the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions (GANHRI). In turn, GANHRI's accreditation subcommittee launched a procedure to re-evaluate the international status of CHRC and downgrade it from "A" to "B".[909]
Along with the upsurge in anti-Semitism, Islamophobia is also widely present in the country. It is to note that high rate of intolerance faced by followers of Islam has been reported earlier as well. The research by Canadian scientists published in February 2023 confirmed the hypothesis that the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) pursued an Islamophobic policy. Having interviewed 95 Muslim community leaders living in 5 major Canadian cities, the scientists found that CSIS was carrying out total surveillance of adherents of Islam. Mosques are treated as incubators of extremism and terrorism, and priests are forced to give information about the worshippers. Such control extends even to minors – there were cases of interrogation of pupils by CSIS without their parents' consent. Particular attention is paid to those who criticize Canada's policy in the Middle East.[910]
According to the sociological survey by Angus Reid Institute carried out in March 2023, 39 per cent of Canadians feel unfavourable towards Islam (Christianity is in the second place with 30 per cent). In Quebec this number reaches 52 per cent.[911]
On 2 November 2023, the Standing Senate Committee on Human Rights of Canada's Parliament published a report "Combating Hate: Islamophobia and its Impact on Muslims in Canada".[912] According to the document, incidents of discrimination are a daily reality for the Muslims living there. Moreover, Canada leads the G7 in terms of targeted killings of Muslims. At this background, Islam adherents in Canada constantly feel unprotected.
Due to the escalation of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, anti-Islamic incidents have increased in frequency. Palestinian restaurant owners in Vancouver began receiving threats and insults via phone, email and letters.[913] In Toronto, a 28-year-old man was arrested for a series of attacks against Muslims.[914]
At the same time, there are a number of highly controversial laws in the country. For example, Bill 21 which bans religious symbols for civil servants was adopted by the National Assembly of Quebec on 16 June 2019. The document invokes a constitutional clause,[915] which allows the province introducing a moratorium on appeals to the court within five years against a legislative act affecting fundamental rights, including the right to freedom of conscience and religion.
The Quebec bill was sharply criticized by the representatives of various confessions who have conceived the authorities' measure as discrimination of religious persons, depriving them of an opportunity to work in public service. An Angus Reid survey showed that 57 per cent of Quebec citizens supported Bill 21, while in other Canadian provinces the majority (65 per cent) of citizens had a negative attitude towards it.
In April 2021, Quebec Superior Court Justice Marc‑André Blanchard, having considered a number of appeals, ruled that Bill 21 violated the fundamental rights of religious minorities in the province but was legal because of Section 33 of the 1982 Constitution Act. In November 2022, the case was brought before the Quebec Court of Appeal,[916] and only in February 2024, the Appeal Court upheld Quebec law.[917]
Although the concept of multiculturalism is endorsed as official policy, race discrimination is widespread in the country. This is particularly noticeable in Canadian law enforcement, where racial profiling is a routine practice. It has a particularly detrimental effect on Aboriginal people, as well as Muslims, Afro-Canadians and other ethnic minority groups.[918]
Racial prejudice is also widespread in the workplace. A 2024 survey of 1,000 Black Canadian specialists discovered that 81 per cent of them had experienced some form of racism or aggression in the workplace because of their race. Black women are particularly vulnerable: the number of women who have experienced some form of racism or discrimination in the workplace has increased by 10 per cent since 2023 (the figure for Black men was 7 per cent). Racism comes from colleagues, superiors and customers: Black workers are disproportionately denied promotion opportunities and have their wages cut. They experience implicit or overt insults and stereotypical comments.[919]
The UN Working Group of Experts on People of African Descent reported the frequency of racial profiling in Canada. Experts noted that approximately 1,500 Ontarians have been racially profiled by police in the workplace, educational institutions, hospitals, shopping malls, and the airport in their report to the 74th UN General Assembly, citing the Ontario Human Rights Commission's report "Under Suspicion: Research and Consultation Report on Racial Profiling in Ontario".[920]
Black and Middle Eastern drivers were stopped more frequently than other drivers, regardless of their gender or age, according to a York University research team from Canada that investigated traffic stops by Ottawa police by race. Despite representing less than 4 per cent of drivers in Ottawa, people of African origin were stopped 7,238 times over the course of two years, accounting for 8.8 per cent of all traffic stops during that time.[921]
A Canadian Broadcasting Corporation survey found that a Black person is three times more likely to be killed by a police officer than a White Canadian. Nearly half of all reported homicide victims are of the Caucasian ethnicity, which is the largest racial group in Canada. However, when one examines the country's overall racial and ethnic composition, the numbers are biased towards Afro‑Canadians and indigenous people.[922]
For more than six years, Ottawa has done nothing to implement the recommendations contained in the 2017 report of the UN Working Group of Experts on People of African Descent composed in the aftermath of its mission to Canada. The document's authors urged the authorities to apologize to people of colour for slavery and issue reparations.[923]
The UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) noted earlier that anti-racism framework law did not exist in all Canadian provinces and territories.[924] Another barrier to resolving racial prejudice was that Canada did not routinely gather statistics "by skin color" to measure socioeconomic disparities in society.
In general, crimes motivated by racial intolerance are common in the country and are still on the rise. According to the report of the Statistics Service published in March 2024, 3,360 hate crimes were reported in 2022, a 27 per cent increase in comparison with 2021. From 2019 to 2022, there has been an 83 per cent increase. of these, 1,950 were racially-motivated (829 against blacks, 220 against Southeast Asians) and 750 were religion-based (502 against Jews, 108 against Muslims, and 52 against Catholics).[925]
In June 2024, Toronto Police reported that 221 hate crimes have been recorded since the beginning of 2024, a 55% increase over the same period in 2023. 45 per cent of these were anti-Semitic in nature. A total of 333 hate crimes have been identified since 7 October 2023. There have been 107 arrests and 268 charges put forward, mainly for property damage, death threats and assault.[926]
According to social surveys, discrimination against people of Asian descent is on the rise (20 per cent are regularly experiencing racially-motivated attacks)[927], which peaked during the COVID-19 pandemic – a March 2021 report by the Chinese Canadian National Council and several partner organisations[928] mentioned that between 10 March 2020 and 28 February 2021, 1,150 people reported cases of anti-Asian racism.
A report by the Stop Anti-Asian Hate Crimes Advocacy Group Association of Canada provides information on 19 incidents of anti-Asian hate crime received by the association's free hotline between 31 December 2021 and 31 December 2023. According to the report, 32 per cent of the 19 victims said they were physically assaulted by strangers, 28 per cent were subjected to racially motivated-verbal abuse, 24 per cent faced abuse linked with stereotypical perceptions, and 16 per cent experienced harassment or threats.[929]
The HRC Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of slavery Tomoya Obokata also indicates the poor situation of migrants in the country. In his report, published in the aftermath of his visit to Canada in 2023, the Special Rapporteur criticized Canada's temporary foreign worker programs, describing them as "a breeding ground for contemporary forms of slavery". In particular, he drew attention to the fact that the employer-specific work permit regimes, including certain Temporary Foreign Worker Programs, make migrant workers vulnerable to contemporary forms of slavery. Moreover, they cannot report abuses without permanent fear of deportation.
The majority of the migrants interviewed pointed to adverse working conditions, being denied access to healthcare and unsanitary living conditions. It is stressed that the work of labour protection commissions is not effective in addressing current negative circumstances as it is carried out online.
In 2024, the 2024-2028 National Strategy for Culture and Media Development was adopted.[930] It immediately came under sharp criticism for being "superficial", with an argument that it "does not present pragmatic and long-term solutions to address systemic racism".[931]
Manifestations of Russophobia – another form of xenophobia (or racism, according to some experts) – were observed in Canada long before the "collective West" agreed on the stance to promote it. However, after the Russian Federation launched a special military operation to demilitarise and denazify Ukraine and protect the peaceful population of Donbass (SMO), the Russophobia took on an unprecedented and overt character, including on the part of the Canadian political establishment.
Russian Embassy in Ottawa still records violations of the rights of Russian citizens and compatriots permanently living abroad. Such high level of Russophobia may be connected to the high preponderance of Nazi criminal descendants in the country, as well as the large community of Ukrainians some of whom can trace their origin to followers of S.Bandera and R.Shukhevich.
The authorities have blocked remittances to and from the Russian Federation. Even in case of force majeure humanitarian situations, Russian compatriots are deprived of any possibility to send or receive funds. This affected many Russian students who whose tuition fees in Canadian universities were provided by their relatives from Russia. This caused mass expulsions of compatriot students for non-payment. The elderly Russian citizens in Canada are no longer able to receive Russian pensions. If attempting to use the State Programme to Assist Voluntary Resettlement of Compatriots Living Abroad, Canadian banks refuse to give the account holders the funds accrued from the sale of their personal property, motivating this by "countering the support of the SMO". As a result, compatriots who have sold everything they own cannot get their funds, and banks give them small payments every month for subsistence, rendering them unable to leave the country.
The situation with Russian schools and Russian-speaking students in Canadian schools deserves a separate mention. With the former, Russian schools experienced outright pressure and attempts to close them down. Endless unscheduled inspections under made-up pretexts, Ukrainian "activists" petitioning the Canadian authorities with demands to close these educational organisations, cases of intimidation of parents and their children at entrances and exits of schools, as well as at nearby playgrounds, significantly complicate the process of teaching Russian and in Russian. As a result, several Russian schools in Ontario, Quebec, Manitoba and Alberta were forced to close.
Special attention should be paid to the mass sackings of employees for any connection with Russia. Among the most high-profile cases is the dismissal of a Russian compatriot who was subsequently left destitute with her two minor children for having once visited the Russian Embassy as a guest. Another woman was fired when her employer opened an office cupboard with her personal effects, where he found a badge with the Russian flag.
When it comes to dealing with Russian compatriots, the legislative norms are either not applied or used selectively and lopsidedly. Law enforcement agencies, when asked for protection, either fail to act or openly state that they cannot qualify offences as incitement to hatred on ethnic grounds.
On 26 February 2023, Slavic holiday – Maslenitsa was to be celebrated in Ottawa. However, a few weeks before the festival, representatives of the Canadian Ukrainian Congress (CUC) started a massive harassment of the organizers and their families, at the same time sending communications to the city administration and police requesting to ban the event. As a result, the celebration was cancelled.
Preparation and holding of the events related to the Victory Day in 2023 were again accompanied with persecutions motivated by racial hatred. Organizers of the patriotic motor rally in Toronto received daily death threats. Windshield of the car of the motorist, who was supposed to lead the column, was hit during the night. Police did not find the intruders.
On Russia Day in 2023, organizers of the holiday picnic in Toronto received an anonymous letter of warning that in case of a gathering of guests in nature on this occasion they will be beaten up. A day before the event, a request was submitted to the police department of the city, to which the cynical response was that the police would not take any preventive measures for protection and was only prepared to respond in case of an attack.
It is worth noting that in 2024 the authorities did not prevent Russian compatriots from holding Victory Day celebrations, which is positive. On 9 May, Vancouver, Victoria, Windsor, Calgary, Ottawa and Toronto hosted marches of the "Immortal Regiment", holiday picnics, and car rallies. In Ottawa, a group of compatriots visited the Canadian War Museum with the legendary T‑34 tank on display.
In Montreal, the authorities have approved the "Immortal Regiment" to be held on the central streets of the city. Thus, after a forced five-year break, at least 1,500 people participated in the marches in 2024. It was followed by the traditional festive car rally.[932] At the same time, a marginalized group of radical representatives of the Ukrainian community tried in every possible way to prevent the march by deploying their own anti-Russian "demonstration" and shouting the slogan of the OUN Nazis "Glory to Ukraine."
The nationalist pro-Ukrainian activists did not ignore the wreath-laying ceremony at the Russian Embassy in Ottawa. In front of the Embassy building, several radical individuals tried to disrupt public order by shouting Nazi and Russophobic slogans.[933]
Canada's indigenous peoples remain the most oppressed and marginalized groups in the country's history, facing constant discrimination.[934] Report of the Special Rapporteur of the UN Human Rights Council on the rights of Indigenous Peoples, following a visit to Canada, (from 1 to 10 March 2023), states that in ten years (!) (the previous visit to the country took place in 2013) the situation related to economic, social and cultural rights of indigenous peoples in the country has not improved. Poor living conditions, violence against women and children, and high rates of incarceration are identified as the main problems among indigenous peoples. The Special Rapporteur has also called on Canada to compensate First Nations people who lost their Indian status as a result of the Indian Act[935] of 1876. Furthermore, it is emphasized that the provisions of the Act continue to discriminate against indigenous women, despite several amendments in 1985, 2010 and 2017.[936]
Of particular concern are the negative environmental impacts of economic activities on indigenous peoples' ancestral lands. Twenty‑eight long‑term drinking water advisories remained in effect in 26 Indian reservations as of January 2024.[937]
The UNHRC Special Rapporteur on the human rights to safe drinking water and sanitation, Pedro Arrojo-Agudo, visited the country from 8 to 19 April 2024.[938] In his statement at the conclusion of the country visit, he urged Canadian authorities to increase efforts to eliminate discrimination and marginalization of Indigenous peoples, to respect the human right to water and sanitation. Recognizing some progress made by Canada in this area, he stressed that there are still serious pending challenges, including the reiteration of recommendations on water resources, toxic contamination of the water sources, and criminalization of those defending water resources. During his visit, he received compelling testimonies about the harsh living conditions on‑reserve where, in many cases, not even Indigenous Peoples' human right to drinking water is guaranteed.[939]
Arrojo Agudo noted that while First Nations' water supply is under federal jurisdiction, their water sources are often impacted by productive activities and discharges under the control of the Canadian provincial authorities, jeopardising their right to water and sanitation. The expert urged Canada to legally recognize the human rights to drinking water and sanitation at Federal level. "Indigenous Peoples disproportionally face the brunt of risks of toxic water contamination with serious health impacts," he said. He also expressed grave concern about the criminalisation, repression and persecution faced by Indigenous Peoples opposing large infrastructure projects.[940]
In June 2022, the Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) raised serious concerns about the plight of Anishinaabe Indian children in north‑western Ontario. The water in the area is contaminated with mercury, which has had an extremely negative impact on the health of local residents. In particular, the Committee noted that children suffer from speech disorder and learning disabilities and are prone to seizures.[941]
In 2023, Indian tribes again accused officials of violating their rights and causing environmental damage by building part of the second leg of the Trans Mountain pipeline in their traditional territory. They were particularly concerned about construction work near Lake Jaco, a sacred lake for indigenous people.[942]
Human rights activist Marie-Josée Houle has published a report on her visit to Inuit settlements. The Canadian criticized the federal government for the unacceptable housing conditions in which members of the small northern peoples are forced to live. In particular, some Inuit families do not have access to water, sewage and fuel to heat their homes.[943]
In March 2024, Karen Hogan, Canada's Auditor General, issued a report on the findings following the inspection in the housing in First Nations communities. According to the report, the situation in this field has not changed since 2015. In 2022, 19.7 per cent of residential properties were in a state of emergency and required major repairs, 6.5 per cent were subject to demolition. It also turned out that the government had abandoned a strategy to tackle the mould issue, which was launched in 2008. It was also found that the Ministry of Public Safety did not provide sufficient protection for indigenous settlements due to understaffing in the police force and failure to meet the budget expenditure plan.[944]
Access to health care remains a problem. Indian tribal leaders in remote parts of Manitoba and Ontario demanded in April 2023 that officials take swift action to fill staffing gaps in health care facilities, accusing them of negligence and racism. They said that two people had died in recent months, including a mother of five children, after they had not received professional medical care.[945]
Forced sterilisation is a manifestation of Canada's ongoing "colonial violence" against indigenous people. On 14 July 2022, the Canadian Senate Human Rights Committee released the second part of the report on the outcome of the 2019 inquiry into forced sterilisation[946] (the first was released a year earlier on 3 June 2021[947]). All the affected women complained to the parliamentarians that their consent to the surgery was not free, prior and informed. Medical staff threatened patients and misinformed them about the necessity, or the effects, of sterilization. In some facilities, tubal ligations were performed without any consent of the patient at all.
In November 2022, researchers at a Quebec university published a report saying that at least 22 indigenous women were forcibly sterilised in Quebec between 1980 and 2019 (the youngest victim was 17). More tellingly, Quebec is the only province to have declined to participate in a federal government initiative to examine the practice of forced sterilization.[948]
Moreover, there was a case where a similar surgery was performed on a 14‑year‑old girl, without her knowledge or consent. The fact of sterilisation was not find out until several years later.[949]
In the light of the human rights violations identified, the senators called on the Canadian authorities to introduce a separate article in the Criminal Code to penalise forced sterilisation. A corresponding bill (Bill S‑250) was introduced into the Parliament in June 2022.[950] However, the amendments have not yet been adopted.
International human rights monitoring bodies have paid considerable attention to disappearances and killings of First Nations, particularly women. The importance of investigating such cases and the need to establish a national body in this regard was touched upon in the concluding observations by such bodies, as the CEDAW[951], HRCttee[952], CESCR[953], CERD[954], and CAT.[955] It should be noted that disappearances and killings of First Nations women were the subject of a CEDAW investigation in 2013, with a separate report published in March 2015.[956]
Under the pressure from international human rights legal arrangements, the Canadian authorities established a National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls (later referred to as the "National Inquiry"), which concluded its work in early June 2019.[957] The main conclusion of the experts was that for centuries the Canadian authorities had systematically subjected the Aboriginal peoples to socio-economic, cultural and linguistic discrimination based on colonial, ethnocentric and racist beliefs rooted in Canadian society. In this regard, the Government was recommended to urgently forge new social fabric without colonial ideology.
According to the National Inquiry's report, girls of Indian descent were six times more likely to be killed than white girls. Following a series of murders and disappearances of women in 2022, leaders of Indian organizations demanded that the authorities take steps to better protect the rights of this population.
The National Inquiry also came to disappointing conclusions when considering the issue of access to health care for First Nations women: when complaining to health centres, Indigenous women receive less quality care than their white compatriots.
The National Inquiry also called for further scrutiny of Ottawa's international crimes, including crimes against humanity, describing Canada's policies toward its indigenous peoples as colonial genocide.
It is noteworthy that, under public pressure, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau publicly referred to the government's policy toward indigenous Canadians as "Canadian genocide"[958], but later the Head of Cabinet and some of his ministers, concerned about the international legal consequences of such a hasty "honest confession," chose to use more muted language in public, describing the events in question as a "sociocultural oppression."
Former commissioners state the lack of considerable progress in addressing the issue, emphasizing that five years after a national inquiry delivered more than 200 recommendations aimed at protecting Indigenous people, there's been too little systemic change across the country. Former chief commissioner of the inquiry Marion Buller and fellow commissioner Michèle Audette, who now sits as a Quebec senator, told CBC News they aren't seeing evidence of the political will needed to deliver the paradigm shift in Canada's relationship with Indigenous people.[959]
One of the steps taken by Canadian authorities in this area is the launch of the Red Dress Alert system in the province of Manitoba, which will inform the public when an Indigenous woman or girl goes missing.[960]
A structural nature of discrimination against indigenous children and children of African descent was also criticized by the CRC. Experts noted that the areas of greatest concern remained education, health and adequate standards of living. The Committee also noted the difficulty for indigenous parents in accessing the birth registration.[961]
The issue of infringement of the linguistic rights of indigenous peoples is serious. For instance, in Nunavut, Inuit are virtually denied the opportunity to be educated in their native Inukitut language. Most of schools teach in English, while 94 per cent of students are Inuit. Inukitut is studied optionally up to grade 3 in only 10 out of 43 schools. In 2016, local authorities published statistics that the number of Inukitut speakers had fallen by 12 per cent over the past decade. According to experts' estimations, with such dynamics the share of citizens speaking this language in the region will decrease to 4 per cent by 2050.
CERD was concerned at the reported disparity in resource allocation for education and the lack of sufficient funding of mother tongue education programmes. As a result, some groups of children, especially African‑Canadian and indigenous children, do not have equal access to quality education, which contributes to future socio‑economic disparities among these groups.[962]
In addition, the CERD has highlighted that black students are disciplined more harshly than other students, which forces them out of learning environments and contributes to the "school‑to‑prison pipeline".[963]
According to CRC experts, indigenous children and children of African descent are currently still dominant in terms of numbers in the alternative care system, realized including in the form of foster care. Moreover, they are often disconnected from other people of their ethnicity. These children are more likely than others to be victims of violence and abuse, and to suffer from a lack of attention from their carers.[964]
The Superior Court of Quebec has accepted a class action lawsuit alleging discrimination in Indian (from 1951 to 2014) and Inuit (from 1963 to 1978) high schools run by the provincial and federal governments. The claims say that this educational system was designed for cultural assimilation similar to the infamous residential schools. As a result, many students were psychologically, physically and sexually abused by staff.[965]
According to the Assembly of First Nations NGO, at least 200,000 people have fallen victim to Canada's social welfare system. In February 2023, the Newfoundland and Labrador provinces established a commission of enquiry into the causes of juvenile deaths in the welfare system at the request of an Innu chief who advocated for an end to the forced removal of juveniles from their families. The investigation is currently underway (the final report to be published in October 2024). During the hearing, one of the victims testified that as a 13‑year‑old in 2005, she was placed in a foster home in Ontario (1,600 km away from her hometown) where her foster parents forbade her to talk in her native language to her grandmother over the phone.[966]
It has been reported that in the territories where indigenous peoples live, they have no representatives in Canadian local authorities. For example, the UN Human Rights Council Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Victoria Tauli‑Corpuz, pointed out in a report to the 74th session of the UN General Assembly that the Inuit are underrepresented in the Nunavut administration, preventing this body from adequately considering and implementing their traditional knowledge.[967]
The over‑representation of indigenous persons in Canada's penitentiaries remains a problem. Indigenous people are over-represented in federal prisons: the proportion of indigenous people has increased from 23 per cent to 32 per cent in the last 10 years (4,200 people in total), and indigenous women now account for half of all women.[968] Indigenous people are mostly placed in maximum‑security institutions, held longer and often placed in solitary confinement. In the western provinces, recidivism among indigenous people is as high as 70 per cent.[969]
The overrepresentation of Indigenous and Afro-Canadians at all stages of the justice system, from arrest to incarceration, was noted by CERD in September 2017.[970] The fact that indigenous peoples and people of African descent in Canada face disproportionate levels of poverty than the rest of the population was also criticized by the CERD.[971]
In 2019, researchers at the University of Toronto analysed the results of a social survey involving 491,000 Canadians and found that black people are more affected by food insecurity. Only 10 per cent of white households are food insecure, while the figure is twice as high among Black households, at 28.4 per cent.[972]
In May 2022, the Karen Hogan, Canada's Auditor General, discovered as a result of a check of the Correctional Service of Canada that officers of this agency, guided by long‑outdated instructions, disproportionately placed people of colour and Indigenous people in maximum security units. Consequently, inmates were forced to stay in the penitentiary institution longer than the court sentence required. Karen Hogan described the practice as clear evidence of systemic racism. However, investigators have already drawn attention to this problem in previous years (2015, 2016, and 2017).
Compared to other ethnic groups, the percentage of Blacks and Indians in maximum security cells is 51 per cent. The situation is even worse for convicted First Nations women: 70 per cent of them are in such cells. The statistics do not favour minorities of colour either: 53 per cent of women of colour, 46 per cent of men of colour, and only 33 per cent of white citizens are transferred to maximum security cells.[973]
The 2023 Report by Canada's Correctional Investigator Dr. Ivan Zinger states that indigenous communities remain disproportionally represented in the correctional system. The proportion of indigenous people has increased from 23 per cent to 32 per cent in the last 10 years (4,200 people in total), and indigenous women now account for half of all women.[974]
A recent high-profile example of systemic racism against Indigenous people by law enforcement agencies was an incident involving Indigenous people in the province of Nova Scotia. On 26 March 2024, Kevin Hartling and Blaise Silliboy (both Indigenous) claimed to have violated a ban on fishing for tiny baby eels in Nova Scotia and were detained by the Department of Fisheries and Oceans officers. They said police drove them 200 km out of town, took their shoes and cell phones and drove away, leaving them freezing at a gas station in the middle of the night.[975]
However, this is far from an isolated case. This practice of so-called "starlights tours" has been used for a long time. It involves taking an indigenous person to the outskirts of the city and leaving him or her to freeze to death in extreme cold when detained by law enforcement authorities. The Guardian article cites Darrell Night's (an Indigenous person) traumatic experience when, on a freezing winter evening in 2000 (temperatures reached minus 25 degrees Celsius), he, in a vulnerable state of alcohol intoxication, was detained by Saskatoon police officers, taken away and abandoned by them in a deserted area on the outskirts of the city. He managed to survive after finding a nearby power station and calling for help. A few days later, two other men, Rodney Nystus and Lawrence Wegner, were found frozen to death in the same area where Darrell Night had been left by police.
The case of Neil Stonechild, a 17-year-old Cree boy, who was found dead in a field on the northwestern edge of Saskatoon in 1990, resonated. The temperature when he was last seen was close to minus 30 degrees Celsius.
Police initially suggested the allegations against officers involved in the "starlight tours" were isolated incidents, but in 2003, Saskatoon police chief Russell Sabo admitted there was a possibility that the force had driven other Indigenous people to the city limits and left them in the cold, including a woman in 1976, according to reporting by the Saskatoon StarPhoenix.[976]
The authorities of the Republic of Cyprus make no attempt to justify or revive Nazi ideology. There has been no evidence of persecution of anti‑fascists, including veterans, or banning the symbols of the Red Army and the USSR.
However, amid the Russian Federation's special military operation to demilitarize and denazify Ukraine, and to protect civilians in Donbass, the country's leadership supports the Nazi regime in Kiev and fails to condemn the war crimes it is committing.
Moreover, for two consecutive years (starting from 2022), the Cypriot delegation to the United Nations General Assembly has voted against[977] the draft resolution titled "Combating glorification of Nazism, neo-Nazism and other practices that contribute to fuelling contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance", annually introduced by Russia and other co-sponsors.
A number of radical right-wing organizations are active in Cyprus.
Far-right political party "The National Popular Front"("ELAM"), founded in 2008, is gaining ground and growing in popularity. ELAM's rating reached 12.5 per cent in January 2024 (12 per cent in September 2023), making the party the third major political force on the island.
In the elections to the European Parliament (June 2024), the party gained unprecedented support and won a seat in the EP for the first time.
Earlier, its leader Christos Christou won six per cent of the vote in the first round of presidential elections on 5 February 2023 and ranked fourth on the list of leading candidates. The association makes no secret of its ties with the Greek far‑right party "Golden Dawn", whose leaders were sentenced to long‑term imprisonment for heading an armed band in 2020.
APOEL football club (based in Nicosia) has a fan movement, whose members have repeatedly been displaying paraphernalia with Nazi symbols. At a match against Swedish football club "Djurgarden" in August 2022, fans gave the so‑called Roman salute. In March 2020, APOEL fans chanting racist slogans: "A good Turk is a dead Turk", held a protest in Nicosia, calling for the closure of all checkpoints in the north of the country.[978]
There are concerns about the increased persecution of Cypriot human rights organization KISA which draws attention to the growth of racism in the country and speaks out against aggressive anti-migrant rhetoric. For example, on 5 January 2024, the organization's offices were attacked with an explosive device planted by an unknown person or persons, which destroyed the glass panels of the premises, almost all of the organization's electronic media and office equipment. Before, KISA had received threats from racist and nationalist groups.[979]
In late August and early September 2023, the Cypriot government faced an unprecedented wave of anti-migrant protests. Violent ethnic clashes between radical right-wing forces and Syrian migrants resulted in pogroms in Limassol, the largest city in the republic.[980] A protest march, coordinated with local authorities, turned chaotic as more than 200 nationalist radicals attacked migrants and threw Molotov cocktails at retail outlets they owned.
The situation with respect for the rights of migrants and asylum-seekers has radically degraded. At the same time, there is clear evidence of cynical policy of "double standards": unlike migrants from the Middle East and North Africa, Ukrainian refugees are granted temporary protection status under a privileged accelerated procedure. According to Eurostat data for January 2024, Cyprus has one of the highest rates in the EU in terms of granting temporary protection status to refugees from Ukraine (21 persons per 1,000 population, the EU average is 9.5 people). The processing time of the respective applications of migrants from other countries exceeds several months, while they wait for a decision to be made by the Cypriot authorities in the overcrowded temporary detention centres.
In May 2024, the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) published a report, following its periodic visit to the country from 9 to 17 May 2023. As part of the visit, the CPT delegation visited Nicosia Central Prisons, a number of migration establishments, including Menoyia Detention Centre and Pournara Initial Registration Centre.[981]
The CPT found that the situation of persons detained at Nicosia Central Prisons had deteriorated significantly since 2017. A number of allegations were received of verbal, including racist, abuse towards foreign prisoners by staff.
At Menoyia Detention Centre for irregular migrants, the experts found unsanitary conditions, overcrowding, lack of any structured daily regime, insufficient outdoor exercise, and systematic rejections of family visits.
A visit to Purnara First Reception Centre (for the modernization of which 25 million euros were allocated in early 2023) horrified CPT experts. "Inhuman and degrading" conditions of detention were noted. Persons held in the Centre were accommodated in severely overcrowded living conditions frequently offered only 1 to 2m² in either prefabricated plastic containers or tents. Many of these structures were in a dilapidated and worn-out condition. Migrants, including single mothers and children and unaccompanied and separated children, were often forced to sleep on worn out mattresses or directly on sheets placed on the ground, crammed next to each other. When it rained the mattresses absorbed water, causing mould to form on the walls and in the corners of the structures. Further, the tents and plastic containers were inappropriate for the long lengths of stays due to the lack of electricity and hot water. Some residents refused to use the dirty toilets and showers and instead used the communal outside areas for their toilet needs. These factors cumulatively led to a foul smelling unsanitary situation in the Centre.[982]
Previously, in July 2023, the CPT published a report on Cyprus, monitoring a return operation to the Democratic Republic of the Congo of 8 November 2022 and supported by the EU Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex). The report also noted several allegations of ill-treatment of migrants after aborted removal attempts.[983]
EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) Report 2024 contains information on ill-treatment of and rights violations against migrants. In at least one instance, the authorities summarily returned a group of newly arrived people by sea to Lebanon in a commercial vessel lacking basic amenities, thereby putting their lives at risk.[984] It is noteworthy that even earlier, in its 2022 report, the FRA had already drawn attention to "significant difficulties" in ensuring adequate reception conditions for asylum seekers in Cyprus.[985]
The United Nations Secretary-General also expressed concern over blatant violations of asylum procedures and incidents of the pushback of boats carrying asylum seekers to third countries. His report on the United Nations operation in Cyprus contains information on boats carrying asylum seekers being pushed back to Lebanon: from 31 July to 3 August 2023, 109 Syrians who arrived by three separate boats to the Republic of Cyprus were returned to Lebanon and deported to the Syrian Arab Republic (SAR), without having their protection needs assessed.[986]
The Cypriot authorities suspended asylum applications from Syrians in April 2024, amid the escalating migration crisis.[987] It is worth noting that this goes against the EU line of granting asylum by EU members to all SAR natives, on the grounds that the country is on the list of "unsafe countries".
At the same time, with the active participation of the Cypriot leadership, work is underway on a European Union agreement with Lebanon that will provide Beirut with a funding package. The above steps are aimed at reducing the influx of irregular migrants to the European Union.[988]
Experts of the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) are concerned about violations of the rights of refugee and migrant children. In its concluding observations on periodic reports of Cyprus, the CRC has repeatedly pointed out to the Cypriot authorities that this category of minors is deprived of access to healthcare and social services on account of their nationality, residence and legal status of their parents.[989]
Manifestations of racial and religious intolerance are not uncommon in the country.
In March 2021, a group of far-right activists vandalized a mosque in the city of Limassol, having written "death to all Turks" on the building.[990]
On the night of 25 August 2023, an attacker threw bottles containing liquid flammable material at the building of the Koprulu Haci Ibrahim Aga Mosque (Limassol). As a result, the site sustained material damage.[991]
In its turn, Council of Europe's European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) draws attention to a number of gaps in the implementation of criminal legislation to combat hate speech and hate-motivated violence. The Commission points to the need to review the criminal legislation pertaining to hate speech and hate-motivated violence, and provide suitable training to police officers, prosecutors and judges.[992]
In its concluding observations on the fifth periodic report of Cyprus adopted on 20 July 2023, the United Nations Human Rights Committee (HRCttee) expressed concern over undue restrictions on the exercise of the right to freedom of thought and faith by religious minorities, particularly Muslims and Jews. There is limited access to places of worship, including Hala Sultan Tekke mosque. In addition, the Cypriot authorities continue to perform autopsies on deceased members of the Jewish community in cases of non-suspicious deaths, and the repeated requests for the Chief Rabbinate of Cyprus to be authorized to issue marriage, death and divorce certificates continue to go unanswered.
Furthermore, the HRCttee remains concerned about the failure to revise article 2 of the Constitution, under which only those religious groups that had more than 1,000 members on the date on which the Constitution came into force, in 1960, are recognized (Greek Cypriot community includes three religious groups whose status have been established at the constitutional level – the Armenians, Maronites and Latins). This means that equal recognition is not accorded to all religious communities.[993]
Council of Europe's Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (ACFCNM) acknowledged the lack of interaction between the state and religious and ethnic communities without a constitutional status. For instance, the Roma living in Cyprus are officially regarded by the authorities as belonging to the Turkish community of Cyprus. This hinders their access to certain rights and their possible enjoyment, given that the Roma community remains socially and economically marginalized.[994]
Persisting collective stigma and discrimination against Roma was acknowledged by Maria Stylianou Lottides, Commissioner for Administration and Protection of Human Rights, in her announcement to mark international Romani day. In particular, she highlighted existing problems with employment, access to appropriate health and welfare services, as well as precarious housing conditions of the most part of this population segment.[995]
After the Russian Federation had launched the special military operation to demilitarize and denazify Ukraine, and to protect civilians in Donbass, an increase in discrimination against Russian nationals was noted in Cyprus.
Cyprus has seen anti-Russian protests involving members of the Cypriot House of Representatives (Parliament). In March 2022, the national flag of the Russian Federation was removed from the flagpole in front of the office of the Honorary Consul General of Russia in Limassol.
There have been cases of psychological pressure in educational institutions, in particular schools, by classmates of Russian-speaking children, including those from mixed families. Members of the Ukrainian diaspora, filled with nationalist sentiments, tried to exert moral and physical pressure on Russians living on the island to force them to publicly renounce their patriotic stance. Personal data of participants in pro-Russian events were made public, with calls for violence.
The financial sector has been facing difficulties after Nicosia had joined anti‑Russian restrictions imposed by the European Union, as well as the UK and the US. Their expansive interpretation by the executive authorities of Cyprus has repeatedly led to the blocking of transfers even from non-sanctioned Russian banks.
On 5 October 2023, a correspondent of Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Alexander Gasyuk, was detained under a false pretext and subsequently deported from the country. He and a member of the Russian diplomatic mission, who was at the scene, were injured as a result of the use of brute force by Cypriot government officials. All official requests, sent in a timely manner by the Russian side to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of the Interior of Cyprus, were ignored.
What causes concern is the fate of Russian national Artur Petrov, who was detained at Larnaca airport on 26 August 2023, at the request of the United States, on charges of allegedly circumventing anti-Russian sanctions (including export of US‑made microelectronics to Russia). On 26 January 2024, the Larnaca District Court refused to extradite the Russian national to the United States. However, Artur Petrov remained in custody until consideration of the state prosecutor's appeal, which had to be filed within 42 days. In April 2024, the Court of Appeal in Nicosia agreed to extradite the Russian national to the United States.[996] And this is despite, among other things, publicly available information about the deplorable situation in the United States penitentiary establishments, the unacceptable conditions in which raises questions not only among experts from relevant international human rights organizations, but also among Americans themselves. In August 2024, the Russian citizen was extradited to the US[997].
Latvia pursues a policy of deliberate falsification of history, justifying former Waffen-SS legionnaires and Nazi collaborators who are honoured as participants in "national liberation movements." The building-up of a parallel historic reality is used everywhere to justify Latvia's blasphemous glorification of Latvian SS legionnaires, Nazi collaborators, and to justify the open struggle against the memory of the Red Army soldiers who liberated Latvia from Nazism.
Latvia, along with Canada, Lithuania and Estonia, is among the few countries in the world where SS criminals continue to be openly honoured, contrary to the verdict of the Nuremberg Tribunal, as well as numerous international acts, including the annual resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly on combating the glorification of Nazism.
Moreover, in 2022 and 2023 Latvia openly opposed the fight against glorification of Nazism by voting against the UN General Assembly resolution "Combating glorification of Nazism, neo-Nazism and other practices that contribute to fuelling contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance" which is repeatedly submitted by Russia and a large number of co-sponsors.
At the same time, the nationally-oriented ruling coalition, formed following the parliamentary elections in October 2022, continues to pursue a policy to build a mono-ethnic model of the state, while creating a parallel reality in everyday life as well. For this reason, a significant part of the country's Russian-speaking population is in a disadvantaged position being regarded by the authorities solely as an alien and destabilizing element.
After the beginning of the special military operation of the Russian Federation to denazify and demilitarize Ukraine and protect the civilian population of Donbas, Latvia took the most anti-Russian position among all of the Baltic States. There was a sharp upsurge of Russophobia in the country, and violations of the rights of national minorities became more frequent. In general, for Latvian politicians, the Ukrainian crisis became a convenient occasion to realize their Russophobic aspirations. Under the pretext of fighting the symbols of "Russian aggression," the authorities are carrying out another stage of struggle against historical memory and Russian-speaking residents, thus trying to divert attention from the rapid deterioration of the socio-economic situation in the country.
The officials in Riga present this state of affairs as an unwavering intention to continue supporting the Kiev regime. This approach is convincingly illustrated by the words of Latvian Prime Minister Krisjanis Karins about how the Baltic States have shown by their own example that "it is more important to support Ukraine rather than to think about short-term good, leaving some ties with the Russian Federation open."[998]
Meanwhile, the residents of Latvia, as well as neighbouring Lithuania and Estonia, felt the full effect of the anti-Russian policy of their own authorities almost immediately after its introduction. The economic situation, among other things, was affected by inflation, an increase in utility tariffs, and a drop in GDP and industrial production.[999]
As to the direct actions of the Latvian authorities to glorify former Nazis and collaborators, such a policy is implemented in many areas of the public life. For example, there are efforts to cultivate nationalistic and Russophobic sentiments among the general public. This policy, among other things, is based on the declaration "On Latvian Legionnaires in World War II" adopted by the Latvian Saeima on 29 October 1998. Contrary to the historic facts, it stated that "the purpose of the conscripted and voluntary soldiers was to defend Latvia against the restoration of the Stalinist regime" and that they "never participated in Hitler's punitive actions against civilians." In 2000, a memorial complex was opened in the village of Lestene with the support of the state and donations from the organization "Daugava Hawks," created by the veterans of the Latvian Legion, dedicated to the memory of the participants of that very formation.[1000]
Besides, according to "The Forward" project that study memorials to Nazis in a number of European countries, Latvia has monuments to the Waffen‑SS Latvian Legion in the city of Bauska (the Monument to the Defenders of Bauska, unveiled in 2012), a Memorial in the city of More, two monuments to the SS Legionnaires in the city of Pienava and one more – in the city of Sati.[1001]
In this regard, we cannot nut mention the decision made by the Prosecutor General of Latvia in February 2019 to terminate the criminal proceedings on the possible involvement of Latvian pilot Herberts Cukurs[1002] (who was a member of the Arajs Kommando[1003] – a unit of the Latvian Auxiliary Security Service (SD) Police – and was nicknamed "the butcher of Riga") in the extermination of the Jewish population of Latvia during World War II. The investigation had been conducted since 2006 under Article 71 ("genocide") of the Latvian Criminal Law. The proceedings were terminated due to the fact that the Latvian prosecutor's office did not find the corpus delicti provided for in Article 71 in the actions of Herberts Cukurs. The decision was reconsidered and the investigation was reopened only under pressure from the public, Latvian and international Jewish organizations, including after the Council of Jewish Communities of Latvia addressed the Prosecutor General on this issue in May 2019.
Public efforts to distort and falsify history and justify collaborators are made by representatives of not only right-wing radical forces, but also the Latvian authorities, including the country's leaders.
To promote the ideas of advocates of the "occupation doctrine," all kinds of pseudo-scientific works on "occupation" are published (e.g. "Crimes of the USSR occupation army in Latvia, 1940 – 1991" by Janis Riekstins). Moreover, books aimed at shaping a positive image of the Nazis and their accomplices are used as supplementary history books in schools.
Every year, on 2 March, a commemorative event in honour of the Forest Brothers is held in the area of the Stompaku bogs in the Viljaka region, with the participation of the Latvian officials. During the Great Patriotic War, battles took place in this area between the Soviet state security agencies and the Forest Brothers. The gang of about 300 nationalist partisans was headed by Peteris Supe, who was air-assaulted to Latvia on 2 October 1944 as a member of the Lapland German intelligence unit, and had been previously trained with Abwehr's Group 212 of frontline intelligence officers in Eastern Prussia. As part of the Lapland unit that had been deployed specifically for this purpose, Peteris Supe consolidated the scattered anti-Soviet groups and units in the areas of Abrene, Vilaka, Balvi, Aluksne, Gulbene, Valka, Cesis and Madona. In addition, the date of 2 March is declared "Day of Remembrance of the Armed Resistance of National Partisans."
On 2 March 2023, a traditional gathering in honour of the Forest Brothers was held in Stompaku. President of the Republic Egils Levits made another revisionist speech during his visit to the bunker church and burial grounds of Latvian collaborators, calling to honour the memory of the Latgalians who in March 1945 "won the biggest battle in the history of Latvian national partisans" and "did not submit to the Soviet occupation regime."
Popularization of the Forest Brothers is carried out in Latvia, in particular, by means of organizing tourist routes to the places of "military glory" of the Forest Brothers. There is a guided tourist path near Stompaku bog, with various tasks and historical information. In general, the Baltic States implement a number of measures to incorporate locations related to the Forest Brothers into a network of tourist facilities. In May 2021, Latvia and Estonia created a map and a brochure listing military and historical tourist sites related to the Forest Brothers (over 150 well-kept "former military sites" with exhibitions, as well as natural sites such as battlefields, trenches and bunkers).
Moreover, the Forest Brothers, many of whom are former Waffen-SS legionnaires, are in a more privileged position, especially when compared to veterans of the Great Patriotic War who fought against the Nazis. For example, veterans who fought against Nazis are not entitled to pension supplements and social security benefits in Latvia. Back in January 2018, through the efforts of the then-president of the country, the law On the Status of a Participant of World War II was adopted, which effectively equalized Soviet soldiers and "national partisans" who fought on the side of the Nazis.
In February 2023, the Latvian Ministry of Culture announced the transfer of 300,000 euros to the State Cultural Capital Fund for the shooting of the film "Invisible Fortress" about the collaborator Ernests Laumanis, who took part in the siege of Leningrad as a member of the 21st Liepaja Police Battalion together with the occupational authorities, the Nazi forces and their accomplices, including volunteers from Latvia. The siege claimed lives of more than a million people and, in October 2022, was recognized as a war crime, crime against humanity and genocide of national and ethnic groups comprising the population of the USSR, peoples of the Soviet Union.
On 17 March 2023, the Latvian "Museum of Occupation" announced a fundraising campaign of 75,000 euros to build a monument "Against Alien Rules" in memory of the Forest Brothers.
On the same day, employees of the country's defence industry took part in an event to commemorate the 74th anniversary of the last battle of the "national partisans" in the Ile bunker in the Dobela district.
In 2021-2022, Latvian efforts to glorify Nazism and justify the crimes of Nazi collaborators took on unprecedented forms and proportions. Latvia has cynically decided to focus on dismantling monuments to the soldiers who liberated the country from Nazism and banning Victory Day celebrations.
The pinnacle of many years of revanchist aspirations of the Latvian leadership and the result of Riga's perennial efforts to rewrite history was the legislative enshrinement of bans on celebrating 9 May (in fact, outlawing Victory Day), public display of symbols of victory over Nazism and holding public events near Soviet war memorials.
On 11 November 2021, the Latvian Saeima passed several amendments to the laws "On the Safety of Public Entertainment and Festivities" and "On Holidays, Remembrance Days, and Celebrating Days," which banned the use of the St. George's Ribbon.[1004]
On 31 March 2022, the Saeima adopted a series of amendments to the Security of Public Events Law which banned events within 200 meters of any memorial that "glorifies the victory and memory of the Soviet Army or its servicemen in Latvia."[1005]
On 7 April 2022, the Saeima adopted the Law On Establishing the Day of Remembrance of the Victims in Ukraine, which declared 9 May a day of mourning with a ban on mass and festive events. The law had "one-time application" and was repealed on 11 May 2022.[1006]
On 20 April 2023 ("coincidentally" – on Hitler's birthday), the Latvian Saeima passed the Law On Prohibition of Certain Public Events on 9 May, according to which restrictions are imposed on mass gatherings (marches, meetings, small protests) and the use of pyrotechnic products on that day. The only exceptions are the events dedicated to Europe Day. On 26 April, the law was approved by the Latvian President.
An overwhelming majority of MPs were in favour of the adoption of the bill proposed by the head of the Saeima Commission for Human Rights and Public Affairs, Ieva Brante (United List party). At the same time, none of the political forces represented in the parliament dared to challenge the approval of this legislation, including representatives of the Russian-speaking electorate from the For Stability! party, who cowardly withdrew from the vote, citing the fact that they allegedly did not have "time and opportunity" to familiarize themselves with the text of the bill.
Even though the statutory bans were in place, the local authorities also made practical steps to prevent people from laying flowers to the Monument to Liberator Soldiers in Riga's Victory Park on 9 May 2022: on the night of 8 May 2022, the State Police fenced off the Monument without warning and closed the nearest public transport stops, thereby blocking access to the Monument for the general public. Nevertheless, thousands of concerned citizens came to honour the memory of the fallen Soviet heroes.
On 9 May 2022, law enforcement agencies detained 35 people and initiated 49 administrative cases, most of them for the "use of symbols glorifying military aggression and war crimes,"[1007] which was understood to be the St. George Ribbon. On the morning of 10 May 2022, the authorities used an excavator to barbarically remove flowers laid on the square by the Monument.
These blasphemous actions of the authorities against the memory of the fallen liberators caused justifiable outrage among many residents of Riga who continued to bring flowers to the monument on 10 May 2022. The same evening, Latvian patriot nationalists with the help of the State police forced all visitors out of the Victory Park and blocked access to the monument until 31 August 2022.
The most high-profile case in this context was the arrest of Alexander Dubyago, a Latvian citizen who came to the Monument with the Russian flag in order to honour the memory of Soviet servicemen. Although the young man did not chant or promote any political slogans, the police charged him under Article 74.1 of the Penal Code – "Justification of Genocide and Military Crimes" – which stipulates up to five years in prison.
He was held in the same cell with HIV patients until June 2023, when he was finally released on his own recognizance. On 30 December 2022, due to the absence of body of a crime, the trial was terminated and the proceedings were transferred to those administrative under Article 13 of the Law on Administrative Offenses (in the sphere of public order and use of the state language). The reason for the "favour" was mainly the student's appeal to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) (a separate closed session of the Latvian Cabinet of Ministers in April 2022 was dedicated to this issue).
Alongside with Alexander Dubyago, Victoriya Matule, who also came to the Monument to Riga's Liberator Soldiers and stood next to Alexander Dubyago, was also prosecuted by the Latvian authorities. Prior to that, the young people did not know each other. After the action, Victoriya Matule had to immediately flee from Latvia, as there was information that State Security Service started to follow her and planned to arrest her.[1008]
The attempts of local residents to celebrate 9 May online were not left without a reaction from the law enforcement agencies of the republic. Thus, on 19 July 2023, referring to Articles 13 and 131 of the Law On Administrative Penalties for Offenses in the Sphere of Administration, Public Order and Use of the State Language, the Latvian State Police began to impose fines on a massive scale on residents of the republic who published congratulations on Victory Day in their social media accounts.
In a "preventive" manner, the Latvian authorities also took measures in 2023 to prevent the Russian Embassy from organizing public events on the occasion of the 78th anniversary of the Victory in the Great Patriotic War.
Thus, on 24 April 2023, the Latvian Foreign Ministry, in response to a note from the Embassy about the planned laying of flowers and wreaths on the occasion of Victory Day at fraternal war graves, cynically informed the Russian diplomatic mission that "in the Republic of Latvia the Day of the Defeat of Nazism and Remembrance of the Victims of WWII is celebrated on 8 May" and, referring to the law adopted by the Parliament, pointed to the ban on holding festive events on 9 and 10 May.
In response to a request from the Russian Embassy for further clarification on the possibility of laying flowers at Soviet war memorials on Victory Day, representatives of the Latvian Foreign Ministry invited the Russian chargé d'affaires "for a conversation", during which they handed another note warning that "collective public events" of the diplomatic mission would be considered contrary to the Law "On Prohibition of Certain Public Events on 9 May" and calling "to comply with Latvian legislation."
The Latvian authorities did not stop at these anti-Russian steps, continuing to "level" the risks of mass gatherings of Russian compatriots as the memorable date approached. On 26 April 2023, the Latvian State Security Service issued a statement urging people to report "provocations" planned for 9 May, referring to attempts by local residents to organize the laying of flowers at the dismantled memorials.
In addition to the restrictions, the Latvian authorities took steps to prevent public commemoration of 9 May and the laying of flowers at the site of destroyed Soviet memorials, including in the area of Victory Park. On the night of 8‑9 May, Latvian police officers fenced off the perimeter of the Monument, blocking access to the site for residents of the capital. On 10 May, Latvian police officers covered a wreath in the colours of the Russian flag laid by employees of the Russian Embassy with wilted flowers. A representative of the Embassy who tried to clear the flowers was threatened by the police with administrative charges.
In addition, the Latvian authorities prevented the celebration of 9 May in any form and by all means available to them. For example, on Victory Day, law enforcement officers on duty outside the Russian Embassy detained a veteran of the Great Patriotic War who was leaving the diplomatic mission after attending a Victory Day reception "for displaying Soviet symbols."
Latvian law enforcement authorities also persecuted local residents for trying to celebrate 9 May online. On 19 July 2023, the Latvian police, citing Articles 13 and 131 of the Law "On Administrative Penalties for Offences in the Field of Administration, Public Order and Use of the Official Language," launched a massive administrative case against Latvian citizens who had posted Victory Day greetings on their social media pages.
Since 2022, the Latvian authorities, in the heat of ultra-nationalist upheaval, have intensified their efforts to destroy Soviet memorial heritage and falsify history. On 12 May 2022, the Latvian Saeima members urgently legitimized the "dismantling" of the Monument to the Liberators in Victory Park, suspending Article 13 of the 1994 Russian-Latvian Intergovernmental Agreement on Social Protection of Military Pensioners, under which Latvia was obliged to protect Soviet memorials on its territory.[1009] Members of the Saeima's Foreign Affairs Commission, who were the authors of the amendments, supported this cynical decision by openly stating that "Latvia's commitments under article 13 of the Agreement do not extend to such structures as monuments anymore."
To implement this decision, at the extraordinary meeting on 13 May 2022, members of the Riga City Council voted by majority (39 votes against 13) to bring down the Monument to Soldiers Liberators.[1010]
Having prepared the necessary legislative ground, local radicals launched a massive campaign to demolish Soviet memorials, focusing their efforts on the main symbol of victory over Nazism – the Monument to the Liberators of Riga from Nazi invaders.
The dismantling of the monument came with insulting statements of top Latvian officials. In particular, Latvian President Egils Levits publicly called the memorial a "thorn in the soul of Latvians."[1011] Former president Vaira Vike-Freiberga, whose family together with her fled from Latvia in 1944 away from the advancing Red Army to Nazi Germany and later settled in Canada for many decades, called the monument "a pillar of shame from the feudal times."[1012] For his part, Latvian Prime Minister Krisjanis Karins said that "thanks to the demolition of the monument, the Latvian people have finally freed themselves from the consequences of the occupation and from the feeling that they are not the masters of their own land."[1013]
Edgars Rinkevics, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, warned against participation in protests against the imminent demolition of the monument, and directly threatened to expel from the country any foreigners, regardless of nationality, found guilty of "illegal and unauthorised actions" during the demolition.[1014]
The Latvian authorities began demolishing the monument on 23 August 2022, the 33rd anniversary of the Baltic Way, and on 25 August 2022 the last element of the monument, a 79‑metre high stele, was dismantled.
Numerous requests from the Russian side to the Riga authorities to help evacuate the Monument to Russia and prevent its destruction were unequivocally rejected.
It is also indicative that the Latvian authorities, in the nationalist frenzy of their campaign to demolish the Monument to the Liberators of Riga, completely ignored the opinion of international human rights mechanisms and their obligations under international treaties. On 26 August 2022, the UN Human Rights Committee (HRCttee) addressed the Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in connection with complaints received regarding violations of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (attempt of public activists to suspend the dismantling of the Monument to the Liberators of Riga and Latvia). The Committee's appeal did not prevent the demolition of the monument, but the Latvian government was ordered to provide the HRCttee experts with an explanation of the situation by 26 February 2023. Press secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia Diana Eglite, while commenting on the HRCttee's address to the Latvian authorities, said the following: "The Committee is not a court and its conclusions are not legally binding for the country."
The Monument to Soldiers Liberators in Riga has long angered right-wing nationalists. Options have been proposed to rename or transform the memorial to reflect its alleged "true meaning." An initiative to demolish it has been discussed in a working group formed in the Saeima of Latvia. The Internet has been used as well. Next to the Russian name of the Victory Monument, Google Maps displayed a false "translation" into Latvian – Okupacijas piemineklis ("Monument to the Occupation"). The administrators of the American resource did not respond to the complaints.
The Monument to the Liberators of Riga was one of the first to fall victim to vandalism of monuments to Red Army soldiers who liberated the country from Nazism during WWII, which spread across Latvia after the start of the special military operation to demilitarize and denazify Ukraine. On 24 February 2022, vandals poured paint over the monument. Later, a vandal tried to hit the monument with a hammer. The offender was arrested by the police. In this context, Latvian Justice Minister Janis Bordans called for the demolition of the monument, describing it as a threat to national security and encouraging the Latvian authorities to find loopholes to circumvent the provisions of the treaty with Russia that protects the monument.
In 2022, the Latvian authorities stepped up efforts to remove memorials honouring Red Army soldiers by introducing a legal framework for such actions. On 16 June 2022, the Saeima fast-tracked the adoption of the Law "On the Prohibition of Exhibiting in the Republic of Latvia of Items Glorifying the Soviet and Nazi Occupation Regimes,"[1015] which obliges municipalities to demolish Soviet memorials, including the monument in Riga, by 15 November 2022. About 300 Soviet memorials dedicated to the Red Army soldiers who liberated Latvia from Nazism fall under the scope of this law.
President Levits, who spent most of his conscious life in Germany until 1991, publicly supported this act, noting that it was dictated by the desire to prevent "any glorification of Russia's imperial ideology in the public space."
On 14 July 2022, the Latvian government approved a list of 69 Soviet monuments subject to mandatory dismantlement by 15 November.[1016]
In 2022, Latvia saw a sharp increase in incidents of desecration of Soviet military monuments.
While in 2021 the Russian Embassy in Latvia registered four acts of vandalism against Soviet monuments on the territory of Latvia, in 2023, as of 1 July, 22 Soviet monuments and 5 communal cemeteries were desecrated, more than 120 monuments and 4 communal cemeteries were illegally destroyed.
In a number of cases such blasphemous acts were approved by local legislative bodies. In particular, it is known that such acts were approved by regional councils of Ogre and Jelgava.
The attitude of Latvian local authorities and their specific leaders is also demonstrated by the fact that a number of local governments took the initiative in the demolition of Soviet memorials without waiting for the legislative amendments to come into force. For example, on 31 May 2022, Sigulda authorities announced their plans to demolish three monuments: a Panfilov Division memorial in the village of Malpils, a Young Communist League memorial and a Soviet prisoners of war memorial stone in Sigulda.
On 14 June 2022, in violation of Latvia's international legal obligations, the authorities of the city of Jekabpils started the practical implementation of the unlawful decision of the regional council to dismantle the fraternal war grave located at 205 Rigas Street, in close proximity to the memorial complex. Heavy machinery demolished the pedestal of the monument to Soviet artillery men, the remains of three Soviet officers buried underneath were exhumed. On the same day, the memorial complex adjacent to the burial site in memory of the heroes of the Soviet Union who died during the Krustpils operation was demolished. Head of Jekabpils local council Raivis Ragainis allowed himself to publicly call the dismantled memorial stones "pieces of concrete without any historical value."
The Jekabpils monument had been attacked by vandals previously as well. On 24 February 2021, a 76‑mm gun was stolen from the pedestal of the monument. This act of vandalism, committed by unknown persons, was clearly perceived by Latvian nationalists as an act of patriotism and received the warmest approval of the authorities. Latvia's Defense Minister Artis Pabriks said in this regard: "Any such construction represents some kind of value, political influence or political direction. We have to carefully assess the presence of Soviet-era monuments in the country, especially if they are associated with military symbols. There's no room for that cannon – that's for sure." A few days later, the former mayor of the Krustpils region, Gundars Kalve, in an interview to the scandalous journalist Elita Veidemane, transparently hinted that it was he who stole the cannon and threw it into the river. During the interview, he also confidently stated that the cannon will not return to the pedestal because "this garbage has been removed, and it will never return to our city again." At the beginning of March the cannon was found at the bottom of the Daugava River. The robbers were identified, but no names were released. No official announcements were made.[1017] Later, the case was dismissed.
On 25 October 2022, the Liepaja authorities demolished the monument to the defenders of the city, erected on the embankment of the Liepaja Canal at the Parade Square in 1960 to commemorate the events of 22‑29 June 1941, when the city was defended from the Nazi troops.[1018]
In late October 2022, a part of the Friendship Mound memorial located near the border of Latvia, Russia and Belarus, was damaged by heavy equipment.[1019] The memorial complex was built in 1959. It is a symbol of the heroic struggle of Russian, Belarusian and Latvian partisans during the Great Patriotic War. A month later, in late November, the Latvian authorities destroyed the pedestrian bridge over the Siniukha River near the monument.[1020]
On 31 October 2023, two monuments to Soviet soldiers were demolished in Daugavpils – a stele in the Square of Glory and a memorial on November 18 Street, opposite the Fraternal Cemeteries. Notably, the mayor of the city and local residents opposed the dismantling of monuments. On the day of the demolition, the police cordoned off the monument and eventually detained 37 people and drew up reports on them, including for singing songs allegedly glorifying the hostilities.[1021]
On 4 November 2022, a monument dedicated to the soldiers of the Second Baltic Front, who liberated Latvia from the Nazis in July 1944, was demolished in Ludza with the permission of the city council.[1022]
On 6 November 2022, a monument to Soviet partisans, memorial plates and tombstone with the names of buried Red Army soldiers (about 30 people) were demolished in the village of Shkiaun, Dagda region. The monument was razed to the ground by heavy construction equipment. The remains were not exhumed.[1023]
A few days later, a mass grave of Soviet soldiers was unearthed in the Tukum region, but their remains were moved elsewhere. Local authorities said: During the demolition of a Soviet monument in the Tukum region, the grave of more than fifty soldiers was found. According to the documents, they were not supposed to be there'. The journalist Alekey Stefanov says, "The remains of 52 people could not simply have been forgotten, even though the Latvian authorities are now trying to portray it that way. Allegedly, these remains should have been reburied in 1977, but they were not. And now they have the audacity to tell us that the vandals also did a good thing – they reburied the remains of the heroes."[1024]
On 9 November 2022, the last of the large monuments to Soviet soldiers on the territory of the country – the monument in Rezekne known as Alesha – was demolished. Mayor of the city Alexandrs Bartasevics said that the demolition of Alyosha is a desecration of memorials and an act of vandalism. But the central authorities did not hear him.[1025] In his address to the townspeople on 8 November, the mayor said that the options he proposed, involving transfer of the monument to the territory of the city cemetery, were rejected by Riga. Latvia also ignored the opinion of the UN Human Rights Committee, which urged that the monument be preserved. For his independent position and the efforts to preserve the Soviet memorial heritage Bartasevics in November 2023 was removed from the mayor's office, where he had worked for 14 years, under far-fetched pretexts. He was also expelled from the Concord party. The Latvian prosecutor's office charged him with disclosing restricted information to his wife Olga. At the same time, the Anti-Corruption Bureau charged him with concealing transactions worth almost 270,000 euros as part of another criminal trial.[1026]
In the evening of 19 November 2022, in the city of Jurmala, unknown persons stole 16 memorial slabs that stood in the military fraternal cemetery in the Bulduri district, where Soviet soldiers are buried.[1027]
Of serious concern are the increasing cases of reburial of Soviet servicemen's remains in circumvention of the 2007 Russian-Latvian agreement on the status of burial sites, under which the parties undertook to ensure "the arrangement, maintenance and protection of burial sites on the territory of the States" and to rebury remains from burial sites where the original burial took place "only with the consent of the other party".
Thus, in addition to the unauthorized exhumation of the remains of Soviet soldiers in Jekabpils, similar illegal actions took place with regard to mass graves in Rudbarji settlement and Jaunsatu parish, as well as in Shkiaune settlement, where the grave was simply destroyed. In July 2023, the Balva Regional Council announced the decision to exhume the remains of Soviet partisans buried in Viljaka. The monument of the same name, erected at the burial site, was supposed to be destroyed.
Even monuments erected in honour of Latvian Red Army soldiers are demolished. For example, on 9 May 2022, the monument to the famous Latvian intelligence officer Arvids Roze and the Baikals reconnaissance group that he was in charge of was demolished in the village of Tome in Ogre Municipality. During the Great Patriotic War, Roze and his group sent important information to the headquarters of the 1st Baltic Front about the movement of Nazi troops and the construction of fortifications near Riga.[1028]
The Latvian authorities have gone so far as to publish regular official statistics on their efforts to destroy monuments to those who fought against Nazism. As of 14 November 2022, 124 monuments to Red Army soldiers were dismantled in Latvia. This was announced by Lita Kokale, Head of the Public Relations Department of the Ministry of Culture. According to her, municipalities of the Baltic Republic reported to have demolished 69 sites that should have been dismantled by a Cabinet of Ministers decree before 15 November. Another 55 objects were demolished by the municipalities on their own initiative.[1029]
In 2023, on the eve of Victory Day, numerous cases of desecration of the remaining memorials to Soviet soldiers were also recorded. Acts of vandalism were committed against war graves in Riga's Bergi district, Jaunpiebalgi settlement, and city of Valmiera.
It is also indicative in this respect that officials in Riga widely use repressions against those who oppose their course to destroy memorials. Latvian special services launch investigations and disciplinary checks against those mayors who try to oppose or "sabotage" (delay) the demolition of Red Army monuments. For example, on 9 November 2022, Daugavpils Mayor Andrejs Elksnins was summoned to the Latvian State Security Service for explanations in relation to his interview to a local TV channel where he condemned the dismantling of Soviet memorials in Latvia and called Crimea part of Russia.
By 2023, most of the memorials to Red Army soldiers had been demolished. Some of the surviving memorials were temporarily forgotten because they were located in low-traffic areas, but they are gradually being "found" as well. For example, in November 2023 in Riga's Agenskalns district, the monument to Zenta Ozola, a nursing instructor of the 43rd Guards Latvian Rifle Division, who died in the battles near Staraya Russa, was destroyed. The memorial stone was erected in Soviet times near the school where Zenta Ozola studied.[1030]
Latvian MPs from nationalist parties, dissatisfied that the 2022 campaign of mass demolition of Soviet monuments did not lead to the complete disappearance of monuments to Soviet soldiers in Latvia, put forward a new initiative in 2023.
At the end of October 2023, several committees of the Latvian Parliament received proposals from members of the National Bloc faction (A.Kirsteins, E.Shnore, N.Puntulis, I.Indriksone, A.Butans, J.Vitenbergs and J.Dombrava) to demolish all remaining monuments and memorials to Soviet soldiers located in crowded places in the country. The remains buried under these monuments are proposed to be transferred to fraternal cemeteries in hard-to-reach places, similar to what happened in Estonia in 2022.[1031] Edvins Snore, a co-author of the bill, said the following: "These burial sites turn into places of propaganda. Many of them are tended by the Russian Embassy. We want to dismantle them."[1032]
In 2023, another trend regarding monuments appeared in Latvia, namely the fight against Russian historical memory. A vivid proof of this was the demolition in Riga of the monument to the great Russian poet Alexander Pushkin in May 2023 and the monument to academician Mstislav Keldysh, one of the authors of the Soviet outer space program, who was born in Riga, in October 2023.[1033] It is indicative that the vice-mayor of Riga Linda Ozola described the demolition of the Pushkin monument as its "removal" from Kronvalda Park and its delivery for storage to be later handed over to the Museum of the Latvian Union of Artists.[1034]
In July 2024, it became known that Deputy Mayor of Riga Edvards Ratnieks sent a list of 8 monuments associated with the Soviet and Russian past, which are to be demolished, to the Public Memory Centre, whose main task is "desovietization" of Latvia. The list included monuments and memorial stones to the battle commander Michael Barclay de Tolly, Alexander Pushkin, Valentin Pikul, Māris Liepa and others. According to Edvards Ratnieks, the above-mentioned monuments remind of the "pain of the past and occupation." Deputy Mayor also called them "tools of propaganda" that are used to undermine Latvia.[1035]
Although the Latvian laws provide for the demolition only of monuments without burials of Soviet soldiers who liberated the country from Nazism underneath, however, in July 2024, discussions about the dismantling of monuments erected on soldiers' graves as well began in the country. In particular, the media published a statement by sculptor and member of the Riga City Council Monuments Board Gleb Panteleev that municipalities have the right to make independent decisions on the demolition of monuments on their territory. He also said that "it is bad when burials are located on the central square of a village or a city."[1036]
It is regrettable to note that a negative trend has been firmly established in Latvia as a whole. Numerous notes from the Embassy of the Russian Federation addressed to the Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs demanding that international obligations in the war memorial field be fulfilled in good faith and that unilateral unlawful actions by local governments be stopped are invariably left unheeded by the Latvian authorities. Until recently, the consequences of acts of vandalism have been eliminated only thanks to the initiative of local residents, despite the fact that it is municipalities that are responsible for the maintenance and preservation of memorial sites. Now the authorities intend to prevent such initiative.
Conspicuous is the fact that Latvian law enforcement agencies and the Latvian authorities in general do not pay due attention to numerous cases of desecration of graves of Soviet soldiers, while isolated actions against graves and monuments in honour of SS legionnaires do receive a response from Latvian law enforcement officials. For example, in July 2024, it became known that the Latvian State Security Service (VDD) arrested a "criminal" allegedly recruited by Russian special services who turned out to be an Estonian resident with Russian and Estonian citizenship. The detainee is accused of having poured red paint on the memorial stone erected in honour of Latvian Waffen‑SS legionnaires[1037] on 29 January 2024.
It is noteworthy that representatives of the Latvian authorities of various levels not only justify the destruction of monuments in honour of the Red Army soldiers who liberated Latvia from the Nazis, but also allow blasphemous statements about these monuments, comparing them to garbage and promising to destroy them accordingly. For example, the head of the Jekabpils Regional Council Raivis Ragainis, as mentioned above, allowed himself to publicly call the dismantled monuments from the fraternal war grave and the adjacent memorial "concrete pieces that have no historical value." Head of Ogre Municipality Council Egils Helmanis, who actively supported the demolition of four monuments in honour of the Soviet soldiers and officers fallen during the liberation of Latvia from the Nazis and the monument to diplomatic courier Theodor Nette, cynically stated that the monument in Madliena will be used for road construction works.[1038] Mayor of Riga Martins Stakis also "rose to the occasion" by declaring that no parts of the Monument to the Liberators would be preserved after its demolition and promising to recycle the monument completely, claiming it had no artistic value.[1039] As the media pointed out, the Riga City Council turned its press conference on the demolition of the monument into a TV series to satisfy the vindictive urges of Russophobes.[1040]
Moreover, the Latvian authorities deliberately distort the facts and interpret history in order to justify their own dishonourable actions. This approach, as stated above, is being used to justify Latvia's glorification of Latvian SS legionnaires, Nazi accomplices, and an open struggle against the memory of the Red Army soldiers who liberated Latvia from Nazism.
On 14 October 2022, a month and a half after the demolition of the monument to the Liberators of Riga, the Latvian Foreign Ministry responded to Russia's protests sent as early as 24 August. Parallels were drawn between modern Russia and the USSR which had "occupied" Latvia after Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. It was then concluded that the exploits of the Soviet army were cultivated by Russia to justify its own "aggressive geopolitical ambitions." On these grounds, the Foreign Ministry rejected Russia's note of protest and allegations of violation of Article 13 of the Intergovernmental agreement on social protection of military pensioners, pointing out that Latvia had been "honestly" fulfilling the said agreement for 30 years.
This was then followed by a conclusion that with the start of the "Russian aggression in Ukraine," the Liberators of Riga Monument turned into a "symbol of violence and threat," standing no chance to exist in a "democratic Latvia." Then came the conclusion that the "aggression" compelled the world community to reconsider its attitude to symbols associated with the Soviet Army.
In February 2024, the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs put some 60 Latvian politicians on a wanted list in the case of the destruction of graves (Article 243.3 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation). The wanted list includes 15 out of 38 Riga City Council members who have decided to demolish monuments to Soviet soldiers, including the acting mayor of Riga, Vilnis Kirsis, and his predecessor, Martins Stakis, as well as 59 out of 68 Saeima members who have voted in favour of terminating the Russian-Latvian agreement on preserving Soviet monuments. Also wanted are some cabinet members – Latvia's Agriculture Minister Armands Krauze, Finance Minister Arvils Aseradens and Justice Minister Inese Libina-Egnere – and Marija Golubeva, who held the post of the Interior Minister until May 2022.[1041]
Such steps are monitored by the Latvian authorities. On 6 December 2022, for example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia, taking into account the criminal investigations conducted by the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation regarding the dismantling of Soviet monuments in the Baltic States, published recommendations to Latvian civil servants on how to travel abroad. In its recommendations, the Ministry warned them against visiting countries with which Russia "maintained close legal cooperation"[1042] (in September 2022, the Russian Investigative Committee reported that officers were working on 16 investigations into 143 cases of desecration or destruction of or damage to war graves, monuments and memorials to Soviet soldiers; 173 foreign nationals from Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Poland and Ukraine[1043] were indicted in absentia for the said offences).
While waging a fierce battle against Soviet monuments and historical heritage, the Latvian authorities continued their efforts to glorify the Latvian Waffen-SS legionnaires and shelter surviving collaborators from the court.
In September 2021, the competent authorities of the country denied Belarus legal assistance in the criminal case on genocide during the Great Patriotic War, not allowing the interrogation of 22 members of the Latvian SS legion, citing possible "damage to the sovereignty of the Republic of Latvia."
The Prosecutor General's Office of Belarus made the request in June 2021,[1044] after the "Historical Memory" Foundation and the Foundation for the Support and Development of Jewish Culture, Traditions, Education, and Science published a report titled "Accomplices to Nazi crimes. 96 veterans of the SS Latvian Legion who are still alive." It included information about almost a quarter of about 400 former Latvian SS Legionnaires living in Latvia and abroad, at least some of whom may have been involved in serious crimes during World War II. It identified 22 former members of the SS Legion in Latvia, as well as 19 in Australia, 2 in Argentina, 3 in Brazil, 4 in the United Kingdom, 16 in Canada, and 33 in the United States.[1045]
As the above-mentioned report notes, between 1991 and 2020, not a single Nazi collaborator from the Latvian SD Auxiliary Security Police, Latvian police battalions or other units of the Latvian SS Legion was convicted of war crimes or crimes against humanity. The only exception was the case of Konrads Kalejs, the commander of the Salaspils camp guard who had been involved in mass murder of Jews. After details of Konrads Kalejs' biography during the Second World War were revealed and his U.S. citizenship was withdrawn in 1994, the Latvian authorities belatedly sent a request to Australia for his extradition only in 2000, a year before his death. Due to bureaucratic delays on the part of the authorities of the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom and Australia, as well as delay with the request from Latvia, the war criminal, who had left many obvious traces, was never brought to justice.[1046]
Continuing its work to identify Nazi collaborators, in 2021, the "Historical Memory" Foundation published a report "Retired Butchers. Latvian Nazi Criminals Serving in the CIA." The report identifies 23 Latvians who collaborated with U.S. intelligence in the late 1940s-1960s. It also clearly demonstrates that most Latvian CIA agents served the Nazis during World War II, and many of them were directly involved in crimes against humanity, including the Holocaust, punitive operations against civilians of Soviet republics, the blockade of Leningrad. Among these criminals was Janis Cirulis,[1047] who as part of a special unit of the Security Police and the Security Service took part in mass murders of civilians in Latvia and the USSR, including near the village of Zhestyanaya Gorka (Novgorod Oblast).
The violent reaction of Latvian ultra-patriots to the Belgian authorities' decision to demolish the monument to Latvian Waffen-SS legionnaires in Zedelgem, erected in 2018 (dismantled on 31 May 2022), is also noteworthy.
In addition, in December 2021, Latvian Minister of Culture Nauris Puntulis (from the "National Alliance" party) spoke in defence of the monument, urging "to respect the memorial," and the official representative of the above-mentioned political party Laima Melkina stated that "attempts to accuse Latvian legionnaires of Nazi war crimes and the Holocaust clearly contradict the decisions of the Nuremberg Tribunal." The Latvian Embassy in Belgium sent a note on this matter to the Belgian Foreign Ministry, and Latvian Foreign Minister Edgars Rinkevics addressed a letter to the leadership of Flanders.
Latvia regularly sees events to honour former Waffen-SS legionnaires.
Annually, on 8 May, the Latvian authorities organize a wreath-laying ceremony at the Riga Fraternal Cemetery to lay wreaths at the memorials dedicated to the memory of members of the Latvian SS Legion buried in the cemetery. The first grave, the most honourable place, is the grave of Voldemars Veiss, the chief of the auxiliary police who exterminated the Jews of the Riga ghetto, and later the commander of one of the regiments of the Latvian SS Legion.[1048] The grave of Rudolf Bangerskis, one of the founders of the Latvian SS Legion, is also there.[1049]
On 16 November 2021, the Saeima of the Republic of Latvia officially approved the establishment of the National Partisans Armed Resistance Remembrance Day on 2 March to commemorate the fight of the Forest Brothers near the Stompaku bog in the Viljak region.[1050]
Events dedicated to this day were held in 2022 for the first time, under the auspices of the official State Day of Remembrance, during which President of Latvia, Egils Levits, opened a memorial to "national partisans" – in fact, open Nazi collaborators – buried in Stompaku.
On 16 March 2022, on the day of remembrance of Latvian Waffen-SS legionaries, there was the traditional procession of sympathizers of "national heroes" attended by members of the "Daugava Hawks" nationalist organization dressed in uniforms with Nazi chevrons. Once again, representatives of the National Alliance – advisors to the prime minister of Latvia Imants Paradnieks and Janis Iesalnieks, leader of the party Raivis Dzintars and deputy of the Saeima Janis Dombrava – took part in the procession to the sound of the songs of the Waffen-SS legion. Igor Shishkin, a well-known Latvian extremist and a former member of the banned Perkonkrusts movement (an anti-Semitic nationalist group), was also present there.
Meanwhile, Riga City Council rejected the Latvian Anti-Nazi Committee application to hold a parallel event against justifying Latvian punitive division crimes. On the same day, Saeima Speaker Inara Murniece "honoured" the legionnaires' cemetery in the village of Lestene with her presence, where she laid flowers and gave another revisionist speech. In particular, she said she was honouring "the memory of the fallen, missing and forgotten legionnaires destined to fight in World War II with German insignia on their uniforms." [1051]
Before 16 March 2023, the Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs published a brochure on the "significance" of this day "for the history of the Republic," claiming that the events taking place on this occasion were dedicated to the memory of those who had been "forcibly" and "against their will" mobilized into Wehrmacht units and had become "martyrs" caught between the millstones of two totalitarian regimes. At the same time, the Latvian Foreign Ministry lied in a press release that the procession was "not attended by top state officials and members of the government" and did not "use symbols of Nazi Germany, which are banned in Latvia." Years of practice show exactly the opposite.
And on the very day of 16 March 2023, under the auspices of the "Daugava Hawks, " the traditional procession in memory of the Latvian SS legionnaires took place once again. The procession was led by priest Guntis Kalme, mayor of Ogre municipality Egils Helmanis, chairman of the national-conservative National Alliance party Raivis Dzintars and some members of the party: chairman of the Saeima's National Security Commission Janis Dombrava, advisor to the Minister of Communications Janis Iesalnieks, Imants Paradnieks and Edvins Snore. Some marchers wore uniforms with Nazi chevrons, and the Waffen-SS anthem was played during the demonstration.
The Latvian Foreign Ministry's attempt to conceal the participation of top government officials in the Waffen-SS commemoration did not prevent Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Inara Murniece from once again visiting the legionnaires' cemetery in Lestene. In particular, in her new revisionist speech, the politician called the Latvian Nazis "part of the nation's history" and promised "to cherish their memory."
The get-together of "national patriots" in Riga was not spared from incidents: Andrey Pagor, a member of the Jelgava City Council and co-chairman of the Latvian Anti-Nazi Committee, was arrested for displaying a poster commemorating the crimes of Latvian collaborators. He stood with a poster with little-known information about the atrocities committed by punishers of the Waffen-SS Latvian Legion. On 18 July 2023, Andrey Pagor won an appeal to the court. The court ruled to return him the money paid earlier as a fine and the poster.
The Latvian Anti-Nazi Committee, which in previous years had organized its own events to demonstrate the true nature of Latvian SS legionnaires, did not apply for a permit to hold a counter-demonstration in 2023, apparently understanding that such a permit would not be facilitated by the Riga City Council (in 2022, the application to hold a demonstration against the justification of Waffen-SS crimes was rejected on the basis of the "law enforcement opinion that it could pose a threat to public safety").
On 16 March 2024, Riga saw yet another traditional procession in honour of SS legionnaires. As usual, Nazi decorations and symbols were publicly displayed during the procession, although these symbols are officially banned in Latvia. According to the media, the event itself went off without conflicts, but under increased police surveillance.[1052] It is noteworthy that on 6 March, on the eve of the action, Chief of the Latvian State police Armands Ruks announced a reinforced regime of work of law enforcement agencies. He also said that the police would take action "without the slightest pity" against any actions aimed at glorifying Russia. However, with regard to the glorification of members of the Nazi organization called criminal by the Nuremberg Tribunal, he promised no action to be taken. Thus, these statements indicate the Latvian chief of the law enforcement body endorsed the Nazis.
The level of support for neo-Nazi marches among the Latvian population is also noteworthy. For example, the Russian Embassy in Riga noted that in recent years there has been a steady downward trend in the number of participants in such marches, and as a rule the number of participants do not exceed 100‑150 people.[1053] According to the observations of the LETA agency, in 2024, the number of participants was lower compared to previous years.[1054]
However, we cannot but state that such pro-Nazi events have, at the instigation of the authorities, have essentially come to be routine and have in fact become a "trademark" of the Latvian capital.
The marches of Waffen-SS veterans have heavily criticized by the international community. The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), which operates within the Council of Europe, has repeatedly expressed concern in its reports about the annual commemoration of Latvian legionnaires of the Waffen-SS on 16 March. The ECRI pointed to the fact that parliamentarians from the National Alliance party, which is part of the ruling coalition, has been seen attending the ceremonies. The Commission has repeatedly recommended that the Latvian authorities condemn all attempts to commemorate persons who fought in the Waffen-SS and collaborated with the Nazis, and that they call on MPs to abstain from attending such events.[1055]
The Latvian authorities tend the graves of former SS men. On 13 October, 2022 a draft law (to allocate money) was adopted in the first reading on the Lesten Lutheran Church, in the cemetery of which Latvian Waffen-SS legionaries are buried. This memorial is a kind of mecca for nationalists from the Latvian political establishment. Speaker of the Saeima, Inara Murniece, is a regular visitor to the annual events held there in honour of the SS.
Nazi symbols are also used in everyday life. In late November 2022, it was reported that the Christmas tree in the town of Lielvarde was decorated with swastikas.[1056] Basically, such incidents are not something new to Latvia. Back in 2017, one of the buildings in Saldus was decorated for the holiday with a Nazi swastika, that the local authorities called "fiery cross."[1057]
By contrast, any attempt to paint over the Nazi symbol is persecuted by the authorities. For example, in April 2022, Latvian police arrested three Russian sailors who tried to paint over the swastika drawn on the Russian state flag in downtown Riga.[1058]
Meanwhile, Latvia continues its practice of holding mass events aimed at denying the Soviet Union's contribution to the country's liberation from Nazi invaders.
On 20 May 2022, nationalists marched from Freedom Square to Victory Park in Riga under the slogan "For liberation from the Soviet legacy!" The organizers of the event, along with their demands to demolish Soviet monuments in Latvia, called for the change of all place names bearing the names of Soviet functionaries and the expulsion of people who were "disloyal" to the state. Symptomatically, the police did not prevent the presence of people wearing symbols of the Ukrainian neo-Nazi battalion Azov (recognized as a terrorist organization in the Russian Federation) among the demonstrators.
On 23 September 2022, the Salaspils City Council banned the Latvian Society of Prisoners of the National Socialist regime "Remembrance for the Future" from holding its annual commemoration at the Salaspils concentration camp memorial, citing the unacceptability of glorifying the "Soviet occupation regime."
The efforts of the Russian-speaking community to preserve the memory of the heroic deeds of the Red Army that liberated Latvia from Nazism have been met with a harsh reaction from the Latvian authorities who are already constantly persecuting community activists by putting pressure on them and conducting demonstrative "punitive actions." As a rule, they are accused of "anti-state activities," "assistance to a foreign state in its activities against Latvia", "organization of mass disturbances" and "espionage."
Over the past few years, the Latvian authorities have been prosecuting and harassing Alexander Gaponenko, a well-known human rights defender and public figure, co-chairman of the United Congress of Russian Communities and head of the public organization "Congress of Non-Citizens," under far-fetched pretexts. On 17 December 2020, a Latvian court found him guilty of "inciting enmity and hatred on the grounds of race, ethnicity and nationality." He was given a one-year suspended sentence for his statements that in the 1930s and 40s many Latvian residents had voluntarily cooperated with Nazi Germany. On 8 February 2022, Alexander Gaponenko was convicted to one and a half years of suspended imprisonment. The court's verdict was appealed by the defence. On 4 April 2023, he was sentenced to one year of suspended imprisonment and one year of probation, i.e. attending preventive interviews with a supervisor. On 12 March 2024, Alexander Gaponenko received a new sentence for criticizing the entry of American troops into Latvia. He was given an 11‑month suspended sentence and two years of probation.
Criminal proceedings have been initiated against Alexander Filey, a Russian language and literature teacher and member of the Board of the Russian Union of Latvia and permanent author of the Russian analytical portal Rubaltic.ru (for glorification of the "Soviet occupation"). The reason was a post that he published on 17 June 2019 congratulating Latvia on joining the USSR un the summer of 1940. The Riga District Court delivered a guilty verdict under Article 74 of Criminal Law ("denial of genocide, crimes against humanity and peace, war crimes"), sentencing him to 10‑month suspended imprisonment, with a ban to leave the country and police supervision.[1059] On 28 May 2024, the Latvian prosecutor's office appealed against the court's suspended prison sentence and demanded to apply a real term of imprisonment to Alexander Filey.
The government puts serious pressure on EMP Tatyana Zhdanok, a well-known human rights activist (the case against her and a number of other Russian community activists in connection with the organization of the All‑Latvian Parents' Meeting was opened in August 2020 and closed in 2018; later, a case against Vladimir Linderman was reopened, a well-known public figure in Latvia – he remained in detention from 21 June to October 2022 and was released on bail of EUR 6,000).
On 16 March 2024, it was announced that the Latvian authorities had opened a criminal case against Tatyana Zhdanok on charges of collaborating with the Russian security services. In February, Zhdanok said that she had been summoned for questioning by the State Security Service (VDD), but the agency had forbidden her to reveal the details of the interrogation. Miroslav Mitrofanov, co-chairman of the Russian Union of Latvia, also spoke about the interrogation.[1060] At the end of July 2024, the VDD searched the premises linked to Tatyana Zhdanok confiscating data carriers, records and documents. Earlier, the VDD reported that it was analyzing information about likely cooperation of Zhdanok with the Russian security services between 2005 and 2013. The European Parliament also joined the campaign pressurizing Zhdanok and launched an investigation into the accusations brought against her by the Latvian authorities of links with the Russian security services.[1061]
There has been no progress in the case of Oleg Burak, a veteran of the Latvian Interior Ministry. His complaints and appeals to all kinds of authorities about torture in prison remain unaddressed. It is still not known what exactly he has been charged with and what evidence has been gathered against him. After exhausting all possible legal avenues and means of defence in Latvia, Oleg Burak and his lawyers began preparing an appeal to the ECtHR. However, he immediately faced serious opposition and sabotage from the prison authorities, who tried to prevent him from filing a complaint with the court within the prescribed time limit.[1062]
Yuriy Alekseev, a Latvian publicist and social activist, has been persecuted for many years. On 29 October 2021, he was sentenced to 14 months in prison on trumped-up charges of inciting ethnic hatred. On 30 January 2023, the Latvian Court of Appeal dropped one of the charges (possession of cartridges) following an appeal against the verdict, but the sentence was reduced by only one month.[1063] On 30 January 2023, Yuriy Alekseev was sentenced under a far-fetched pretext to one year and one month in prison for "incitement of hatred" and "trafficking in child pornography".[1064] In 2024, the pressure on the journalist intensified. On 23 May 2024, the Senate of the Supreme Court of Latvia decided to reconsider the previously dropped charges against the journalist in the ammunition possession case. In addition, the journalist is still facing a criminal case as the creator of the IMHO club online debate forum. At the same time, he has been charged with anti-state activities. The journalist faces 5 to 15 years in prison, the trial began on 13 April 2023. Alekseev is accused together with Petr Pogorodniy and Dmitriy Sustretov (Sumarokov). The case is still pending before the trial court.[1065]
In connection with this biased verdict, the Russian community in Latvia has issued a statement saying that the verdict, along with the Latvian Constitutional Court's decision justifying the abolition of education in the Russian language, which has a long history in Latvia, the whipped-up hysteria about "Russian spies" and the prosecution of Russian-speaking journalists – all demonstrate that the Latvian government is intending to take political reprisals against the Russian-speaking community. It was stated that the Latvian judicial system had long ago lost the trust of Russian-speaking Latvians.
The defence included public figures and journalists who openly promote alternative opinions contrary to Riga's Russophobic policy, such as Alexander Yakovlev, Ruslan Pankratov, Vladimir Dorofeev, Lyudmila Pribylskaya, Sergey Melkonov, Alexader Malnach, Andrey Solopenko, Alla Berezovskaya and others. As is known, Ruslan Pankratov and a few others, who have been persecuted for essentially political reasons, have had their social security numbers cancelled by the Latvian Ministry of the Interior, making it impossible for them to have a bank account, register at their place of residence and receive medical care, including emergency care.[1066]
The largest organization of military pensioners in the country, the Republican Association of Veterans in Latvia, came under heavy pressure from the authorities and was closed down by a court on a formal pretext (the decision cited violations of accounting rules). On 6 October 2020, the organisation's chairman, retired Russian military officer Vladimir Norvind, was separated from his family and forcibly expelled from Latvia, despite having suffered a heart attack. His residence permit was cancelled by the Latvian authorities.
The special military operation to denazify and demilitarize Ukraine and protect civilians in Donbass by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation has given extra impetus to the persecution of Russian-speaking activists in Latvia.
Since the end of February 2022, the VDD and the State Police have actually started "hunting" dissenters inside the country. These government agencies summoned activists en masse for "corrective talks" across Latvia. For example, Yuriy Alekseev, a former member of Riga's city council who was threatened with a new criminal case by Latvia's security services for his active citizenship, told about such a summons on his social media. It has emerged that Latvia's security services have summoned contributors to such "talks" from virtually all the country's Russian-language media, including such major outlets as "Segodnya newspaper," "Telegraph magazine," "Latvian News weekly," "Subbota," "Sem Super Sekretov," "Baltcom radio," and the websites mixnews.lv, pross.lv, bb.lv.
As mentioned above, the persecution of T.Zhdanok intensified in 2024. On 22 February, the VDD launched criminal proceedings against her under the pretext that, according to media reports in late January, Tatyana Zhdanok allegedly cooperated with Russian security services.[1067]
Over the past two years, Latvian national legislation has been changed to criminalize any show of support for Russia and its special operation. For example, Latvia's criminal law now provides for responsibility for "justifying and glorifying Russia's crimes in Ukraine".
On 31 March 2022, the Saeima adopted a law on amending the criminal legislation to criminalize the use in public spaces of letters "Z" and "V" "for the purpose of supporting the aggressor." The St. George's Ribbon, which is also banned in Latvia, is also seen as such a symbol. All such acts are punishable by up to 5 years in prison.
Since February 2022, the VDD has initiated dozens of criminal proceedings related to "glorification of genocide and war crimes", "incitement of national discord", etc., mostly for comments or other online activities. The charges are mainly based on the notorious article of the Latvian Criminal Law on "justification of genocide, crimes against humanity, crimes against peace and war crimes" (meaning support in any form for Russia's special military operation). Between February 2022 and February 2023 alone, the VDD initiated over 40 criminal cases on these charges. A pre‑trial detention measure was applied to several citizens of the Republic of Latvia. In all of 2023, the VDD opened 173 such criminal cases, and in the first three months of 2024 alone, there were 49 such cases.
In July 2023, following the results of the special services' social media monitoring, hundreds of Latvians received notices of administrative proceedings against them for posting about the Victory Day celebrations and even for liking such posts.
As practice has shown, in order to obtain the status of a "suspect" in Latvia under a criminal or administrative article, it is enough to demonstrate Russian or Soviet symbols, including the letters "Z" and "V", in public space or online. In addition, in September 2023, the Latvian State Police announced that inscriptions on cars reading "I am Russian", i.e. demonstrating ethnic self-identification, would be treated as "glorification of military aggression" and constitute an administrative offence.[1068]
Symptomatically, Latvian law enforcement agencies and courts try to keep politicized criminal cases out of the public eye and cover up procedural violations and evidence of torture of victims of this repression. Nevertheless, the following cases have been highly publicized.
The unlawful arrest in May 2022 of student Alexander Dubyago for his public expression of opposition to the destruction of the monument to the Liberators of Riga has been mentioned above.
Aivis Vasilevskis, an activist of DVS "Urantia," was the first to be arrested under the politically motivated article on the "justification of war crimes". His father, Ventis Vasilevskis, and the head of the organization, Skaidrite Alekseeva, were also arrested with him. Only Aivis Vasilevskis was in detention during the hearing of the case (only for three months, then he was released on bail of 20 thousand euros). In May 2023, the decision of the court in this case was announced: Aivis Vasilevskis was fined 11,160 euros, Ventis Vasilevskis was fined 6,820 euros, and Skaidrite Alekseeva was sentenced to 216 hours of community service.[1069]
In March 2022, blogger Kirill Fedorov, a Latvian citizen, who in his videos spoke favourably about Russia's special military operation, was detained by the VDD in Riga; an electric shocker was used to torture him. He was charged under Article 74.1 – "justification of genocide, crimes against humanity, crimes against peace and war crimes", and Article 78 – "incitement to national, ethnic or religious hatred or enmity" of the Criminal Law (he faced up to five years in prison).[1070] Before being released on bail (55,000 euros) in June 2022, the activist was held in a detention centre by the security services, where he was tortured and beaten. He was subsequently forced to pay a hefty fine of over 27,000 euros.
A number of activists managed to escape the fabricated persecution by the Latvian authorities.
In April 2022, the Russian-speaking activist Alexander Tsvetkov, a native of the Latvian town of Rezekne, who had been living in Daugavpils for the past few years and had been actively involved in defending the rights of the Russian-speaking community to use the Russian language, became the subject of persecution. He addressed all Latvian state authorities, including the Saeima and the State Security Service, asking them to stop putting pressure on the Russian-speaking population of Latvia. As a result, he himself became a target of the Latvian security services. On 6 April 2022, Tsvetkov's house was searched and he was forcibly taken to the Daugavpils police department. He was released after two days in custody. After that, the activist was forced to flee Latvia.[1071]
Latvian citizen Sergey Vasilyev, who used to run a trading company in Helsinki, was subjected to repression because of his support for Donbass. It was through this company that he started sending humanitarian aid to Donbass. He was charged with "sponsoring terrorism" as well as money laundering and tax evasion. Vasilyev was tried in two countries at the same time – Finland and Latvia – on the same grounds and with the same charges. The court in Finland concluded the hearings and issued a decision. The case was heard with numerous violations: he was not allowed to see the case materials, study the summaries on the merits of the case during the court investigation, ask questions to the prosecution, and make his final statement. After the activist was summoned to court in Latvia on the same charges for which he had already been convicted in Finland, he was compelled to flee the country.[1072]
In October 2022, musician and composer Mikhail Kasper was forced to leave Latvia. He also disagreed with Latvia's position on the Ukrainian crisis, supported Donbass, went to rallies in support of the Russian language, and actively participated in the defence of the monument to the Liberators of Riga.[1073]
In the same month, the Latvian authorities expelled from the country Konstantin Gorshkov, a Lithuanian programmer who actively participated in protecting Soviet monuments, including filing lawsuits and appeals to the court and the United Nations in support of the Monument to the Liberators of Riga. The reason for his expulsion was not explained to him.[1074]
In December 2022, activist and blogger Sofia Vasilyevskaya, a Latvian citizen, was also forced to flee Austria, where she had been living for the past four years. Latvian nationalists persecuted Vasilyevskaya because of her pro-Russian position and the materials she posted on social media. They revealed her personal information, including where she lives and works, on social media and urged employers to refuse to hire the young woman. She was then fired from her job without explanation, and then her rental agreement was terminated. The VDD officers came to the house of Vasilyevskaya's relatives, interrogated and intimidated them.[1075]
Unfortunately, the persecution by the Latvian authorities has not ended safely for many civil society activists. On 8 May 2022, Igor Kuzmuk,[1076] former member of the Riga City Council, public figure and teacher at Riga Gymnastics School, was brutally detained and beaten by armed special operations forces. The reason was that he had made "pro-Russian" posts on his Telegram channel, which included a bank account number to support the author. He was charged under Article 77.2 of the Criminal Law of the Republic of Latvia – "indirect assistance to terrorists", which carries a maximum sentence of 10 years of imprisonment. In October 2023, under pressure from the VDD, he was suspended from work for 3 months without pay. In January 2024, the first court hearing in the case took place, during which the prosecutor requested that Igor Kuzmuk be sentenced to two years in prison. On 13 February 2024 Igor Kuzmuk was acquitted. However, the judge who heard the case later openly said that he would have convicted him but for the poor work of the prosecutor.
From August 2022 to January 2023, another former Riga City Council member Ruslan Pankratov detained by the VDD (released on bail), was held in custody as part of criminal proceedings under Article 74.1 of the Criminal Law, which was later replaced by Article 78 by the defence. He was accused of spreading "unfounded" publications about the situation of Russians in Latvia and statements "inciting hatred and distrust towards Ukrainians and refugees from Ukraine" through information resources used for "the purposes of aggressive Russian propaganda". In addition, in January 2023, another criminal investigation was opened against the politician under Article 80 – "undermining the democratic order and attempting to overthrow the government by force" – and Article 81 of the Criminal Law – "working for a foreign state". As mentioned above, in April 2023, the Latvian Minister of the Interior decided to cancel all of Ruslan Pankratov's identity documents on the basis of a certain classified VDD report. The criminal proceedings are ongoing.[1077] Facing the danger of arrest, the politician has had to seek asylum in Russia.
In early January 2023, Latvian special services arrested Marat Kasem, the editor of Sputnik Lithuania. After several months in detention, the journalist was released on bail and later agreed to cooperate with the investigation and paid a fine. Media reports that the journalist was pressured by the Latvian authorities to cooperate with them while in prison have been largely confirmed by his behaviour since his release.
According to the available public data, at least 6 people have been accused of "carrying out anti-state activities in support of the interests of Russia as an aggressor state" as part of a high-profile criminal case regarding the creation of a criminal group, which has been fabricated by the VDD since the beginning of 2023.
The first victim of this Russophobic campaign was Tatiana Andriets, a member of the Russian-speaking diaspora and a student at St Petersburg State University. She was arrested on 6 February 2023, accused by the VDD of participating in the moderation of the Telegram channel Baltic anti-fascists, which, according to the security service, glorified "aggression".[1078]
Initially, the public activist was charged under two articles of the Criminal Law: 81.1 – "Assisting a foreign state in activities directed against the Republic of Latvia" and 84 – "Violating sanctions established by international organizations and the Republic of Latvia". In June 2023, the prosecution replaced Article 81.1 with a harsher one – 89.1 (part 1) – which provides for a sentence of 8 to 17 years, with possible confiscation of property and probation for up to three years, for "forming and participating in a criminal organization of at least five persons for the purpose of committing particularly serious crimes against humanity or peace, war crimes, genocide or particularly serious crimes against the state".
In the same month, however, it emerged that the VDD had again reclassified the charges against Tatiana Andriets and other defendants – from Part 1 to Part 2 of Article 89.1 of the Criminal Law – which provides for life imprisonment or a prison sentence of 10 to 20 years, with probationary supervision for up to three years and possible confiscation of property, for "leading a criminal organization and participating in crimes committed by such an organization". On 4 October 2023, the Riga City Court released Tatiana Andriets from custody on her own recognizance.
The Latvian authorities used physical and psychological methods against Tatiana Andriets during her detention. Her health has deteriorated due to the appalling conditions in the Latvian prison.[1079]
Local public activist Alexander Zhgun, who had (like Tatiana Andriets) actively protected the Monument to the Liberators of Riga and Latvia from vandals until it was demolished, was also unofficially named among the defendants in this trial. He was detained from April until August 2023, when he was released on bail.
In August 2023, Sergey Sidorov, a Russian-speaking taxi driver, was arrested by the VDD under Article 85, Part 1 of the Criminal Law ("illegal collection and transfer of information to foreign intelligence service") which provides for up to 10 years of imprisonment. He is being charged with activities "against the interests of Latvia's national security". Specifically, this refers to the transmission of information to the administrators of the Telegram channel "Baltic anti-fascists".[1080] Sidorov, who is raising his son alone, is being persecuted for his activism against the closure of Russian schools and the demolition of Soviet monuments. He also took part in cleaning the graves of Red Army soldiers and helped the needy by delivering food during the coronavirus pandemic.[1081] On 20 December 2023, the court changed his pre‑trial restriction measure from custody to a non-custodial measure.[1082] However, after his trial began, the man was arrested again on 13 May 2024.
On 20 October 2023, the Prosecutor's Office of the Republic of Latvia charged six residents of the Republic (Tatiana Andriets, Alexander Zhgun, Stanislav Bukayn, Sergey Vasiliev, Victoria Matule and Roman Samul) under the Article of the Criminal Law of the Republic of Latvia entitled "leadership of a criminal organization and participation in its crimes". They could face prison sentences of 10 to 20 years or even life imprisonment.[1083]
On 9 November 2023, former member of the 6th, 7th, 10th, 11th, 12th and 13th convocations of the Latvian Parliament, Latvian Interior Minister (November 1994-1995) Janis Adamsons was sentenced to 8.5 years in prison on charges of spying for Russia. As Minister of the Interior, Adamson is remembered for his successful fight against organized crime. In particular, he made considerable efforts to neutralize the group headed by the "king of Latvian racketeering". As a deputy, he became known for investigating high-profile scandals involving Latvia's top officials. For example, Prime Minister Andris Skele was forced to resign after Adamsons accused him, along with Justice Minister Valdis Birkavs and State Revenue Service chief Andrejs Sonciks, of paedophilia.[1084]
Since 2019, the VDD has been prosecuting Benes Ayo, a Russian citizen (he held Latvian citizenship until February 2021), who has been involved in the armed conflict in South-Eastern Ukraine, and since February 2022 in the special military operation, under Article 77.1 of the Criminal Law – "participation in an armed conflict directed against the territorial integrity and inviolability of a foreign state".
The Latvian authorities are persecuting Jelena Kreile, a Latvian citizen and ethnic Latvian living in Riga, by bringing far-fetched criminal cases. On 27 February 2022, she walked alone to the Russian embassy with a banner saying "Russia, I am with you". She was then followed and her telephone conversations were tapped. On 16 March 2022, during the traditional procession of Latvian SS legionnaires in Riga, she was the only one from the whole of Latvia who came there not to support the neo-Nazi action, but to express her protest, which was expressed by sewing a small image of the Russian flag to her jacket. Kreile was taken to the police station for this action, detained for two days in a temporary detention centre, an administrative case was opened against her and a fine was imposed. In her interview, Kreile said that Latvian security services had previously questioned and searched her husband, who runs a military history club dedicated to the First and Second World Wars and also has a private museum. They have also often taken part in historical re‑enactments.[1085][1086]
In 2023, she hung a Russian flag and posters in support of our country in the window of her flat, wore the Russian tricolour on her jacket and the letter Z on her bag, and held pro-Russian solitary pickets. On 2 November 2023, she was sentenced to a year's probation "for glorifying and justifying Russia's war crimes". In total, more than 30 administrative cases were brought against our fellow citizen, mainly for "public use of symbols glorifying military aggression and war crimes", and 4 criminal cases, later merged into one, under Article 74.1 of the Criminal Code, for which she faces up to five years of imprisonment, community service and a fine. The activist was repeatedly detained and searched. She remained under arrest from March to May 2023. On 2 November 2023, the Riga District Court sentenced her to one year of suspended imprisonment.[1087]
On 16 March 2024, she was fined for appearing in the centre of Riga in what Latvian police described as the attire of a "Soviet-era commissar" – the activist was wearing a leather coat, boots, a blue beret with a red flower with five petals, and carrying an officer's bag. According to the activist, the complaints did not target any of the items taken separately. Latvian law enforcement officials confiscated her clothes and bag, claiming that they were "instruments of administrative offence".[1088] In 2023, the Latvian security services arrested Kreile and put her in a temporary detention centre for two days to prevent her from coming to the Latvian SS legionnaires' march on 16 March.
On 7 January 2024, unidentified vandals attacked Jelena Kreile's flat. They threw bricks at her windows, and the woman was injured. Although she filed a police report, the police refused to open a criminal investigation into the attempted murder.
In addition, while Jelena Kreile was on trial for supporting Russia, several other cases were brought against her. One of them went to trial. On 4 April 2024, a Latvian court arrested the activist for two months and she was placed in Ilgucieme Women's Prison. Reportedly, the Latvian authorities tried to prove Jelena Kreile guilty of "publicly glorifying and justifying aggression and war crimes" after searching the activist's flat and finding boxes and folders in the colours of the Russian flag, rolls of white adhesive tape, homemade flags of the Russian Federation and the Russian Empire, posters saying "Putin is my friend", "I am a Russian-Latvian-Soviet person" and "Dievs, sarga Latvija" ("God save Latvia"), which had been used to make installations in her window.[1089],[1090] In the opinion of the prosecutor's office, the items and their placement manifest the justification of war crimes, thus warranting the request for an actual prison term of 3.5 years. On 10 July 2024, Kreile was sentenced to three years in prison by the court for the installations.[1091]
In addition, Riga has launched a campaign to prosecute 16 Russian-speaking journalists (Andrey Yakovlev, Vladimir Dorofeev, Lyudmila Pribylskaya, Sergey Melkonov, Alexander Malnach, Andrey Solopenko, Alla Berezovskaya, and others) on charges of "violating the EU sanctions regime" (Article 84 of the Criminal Law) for cooperating with Russian news outlets. This case is being tried in court.
In 2023, Yuriy Mikhailov, administrator of the Russian-language Facebook group called Criminal Latvia, was convicted under the aforementioned "political" Article 74.1 of the Criminal Law and spent more than two months in prison. The authorities of the Republic of Latvia interpreted the information he posted as "glorifying Russian aggression against Ukraine".[1092]
On 14 April 2023, Martin Grikis and Sergey Khodonovich were detained for "spying" for Russia. In October 2023, they were sentenced to five and four years in prison respectively. On 11 March 2024, the Court of Appeal mitigated the sentences: Grikis' sentence was reduced to three years and Khodonovich's to two years and eight months.
In September 2023, the VDD fabricated a criminal case against former MEP and journalist Andrejs Mamikins for "glorifying and justifying Russia's crimes in Ukraine."[1093] The social activist was forced to move to Russia. On 7 June 2024, the VDD applied to the Prosecutor's Office to open a criminal case against Andrey Mamykin. On 15 July 2024 Latvia put him on an international wanted list.
Facing politicized criminal prosecution, the family of Russian-speaking historian Igor Gusev was forced to move to Russia.
In August and December 2023, the VDD detained four Latvian citizens and two Russians on trumped-up charges of "espionage" in favour of Moscow. At the same time, on 30 December 2023, amendments to the Criminal Law, introduced on the initiative of Latvian President Edgars Rinkevics, came into force, providing for harsher penalties under the "espionage" articles, up to life imprisonment.
As journalist Alla Berezovska notes, in 2024 Latvian police has all but officially proclaimed its new policy to "lock everyone up and let no one in". In practice, this means that anyone who thinks differently, acts differently, speaks differently, writes differently on social media or sings the wrong songs on public transport will be punished.[1094]
On 7 March 2024, the VDD opened a criminal case against former Latvian MP Gloria Grevtsova on charges of justifying war crimes and inciting national hatred. The criminal prosecution of Grevtsova was launched after she had published a video on social media in which she stated that in the Occupation Museum in Riga "the facts did not match" and the tour guide had presented "a parallel, fictitious history". She was declared wanted by the Latvian prosecutor's office on 3 April 2024.[1095]
On 4 April 2024, the trial of Inga Tukhbatova, who had previously been nominated as a candidate for a seat in the Saeima, began. Latvian special services accused her of spying for Russia. Tukhbatova failed to appear in court, after which she was officially put on a wanted list.[1096] The Latvian media linked Tukhbatova's criminal case to the case of the "Baltic Antifascists", against whom the VDD filed a criminal case on 28 November. The special services accused the Baltic Antifascists Telegram channel of deliberately and systematically using the messenger channels for actions against Latvia's national security interests.[1097]
On 9 April 2024, the Kurzeme District Court in Liepaja sentenced Valeriy Lazarev to two years of imprisonment for causing a scuffle with a member of a Russophobic and Latvian-Ukrainian nationalist march in May 2022. Initially Lazarev was sentenced to 200 hours of forced labour; he compensated the victim 6034 euros for moral damage, but after the victim's side protested, the Latvian prosecutor's office overturned the court's decision and the case was reopened. After the retrial, the court sentenced the activist to two years of suspended imprisonment under Article 55 of the Criminal Law, with a two-year suspended sentence. However, this sentence was also challenged on appeal, leading to a review by the district court and a prison sentence.[1098]
At the end of April 2024, bloggers Dimitri Mataev and Aigars Augustans were arrested for criticising the Latvian authorities.[1099],[1100]
At the beginning of May 2024, the Rezekne police detained a man who had brought red and white carnations three times between 15 March and 14 April 2024 near the site of the destroyed monument to Soviet soldier-liberators known as Alyosha. A criminal case has been opened against him under the article "Justification of war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity and peace." Under this article, he could face up to five years in prison.[1101]
On 4 May 2024, a long-distance lorry driver, Alexander Demidov, was arrested in Liepaja for putting a sticker with the image of the Soviet Order of Victory, without any inscriptions, to the building of the City Museum. Demidov too, shared the opinion that it is inadmissible to demolish Soviet monuments, as his family attached great importance to this matter: during the Great Patriotic War, Demidov's mother was forced into slavery by the Nazis. The Russian citizen was charged under Article 74.1 of the Criminal Law "Justification of genocide, crime against humanity, crime against peace and war crime", as well as Article 81 "Assistance to a foreign state in activities directed against Latvia." On 25 June 2024, his detention was extended for a further 2 months.[1102]
On 15 May 2024, the Latvian security services arrested Svetlana Nikolaeva, the mother of Alexander Dubiago, who had raised the Russian flag at the monument to the Liberators of Riga on 10 May 2022 and was subsequently detained for more than a month. Nikolaeva actively campaigned to get her son acquitted, which compromised the public image of the VDD. Nikolaeva had serious health problems; she had to undergo a full medical examination and prepare for surgery. The Latvian court, however, did not take this into account and sent her to prison for 2 months. The Latvian security services have also reportedly filed charges against Nikolayeva for giving money to taxi driver Sergey Sidorov, who is accused of spying for Russia, so that he could pay for a lawyer.[1103] On 17 July 2024, the Latvian court left Svetlana Nikolaeva in custody, despite the fact that Nikolaeva had a suspected case of cancer. The woman has not received proper medical care in the Latvian prison. Human rights defenders are positive that Nikolaeva's arrest was ordered by the Latvian authorities. The espionage charges against her raise serious concerns that such a method is being used to stifle dissent and intimidate those who do not support Latvia's official stance on Russia.[1104]
At the end of May 2024, Valeriy Duden, a political prisoner known for his criticism of the Latvian prosecutor's office and police, died in prison under strange circumstances. According to journalist Aleksey Stefanov, this is at least the second such incident in Latvian prisons. Prior to that, in November 2023, Igor Bobyr, who had been arrested on suspicion of espionage, died in Liepaja prison.[1105]
On 18 June 2024, two residents of Rezekne were fined 300 euros each for singing the Russian song "Katyusha" on a bus. Latvian law enforcers considered that the song "glorifies the Soviet army and the occupation regime."
On 26 June 2024, the Latvian security services opened a criminal case against the head of the Liepaja branch of the Latvian Russian Union (LRU), Jelena Osipova, who had previously run for the European Parliament from the LRU. Like other civil society activists, she was charged under Article 74.1 of the Criminal Law on the justification of genocide. The reason was that Osipova published a video dedicated to Victory Day on the party's social media accounts. The video included footage of war newsreels and a shot of party supporters marching with red flags against a backdrop of Baltic landscapes. The activist was summoned for questioning.[1106]
In addition to criminal prosecution, Russians in Latvia have faced massive intimidation, insults and threats from individuals. In fact, "unreliable citizens" who express any form of support for Russia or simply hold balanced views have been harassed on social media.
Since autumn 2021, Latvia has the website https://myrotvorets.team similar to the notorious Ukrainian "Myrotvorets". The website publishes personal data of people who have supported Russia's special military operation to denazify and demilitarize Ukraine and protect civilians in Donbass. These include the staff of the Russian Embassy in Latvia, local journalists, activists from the Russian-speaking community (including members of the Latvian Russian Union party) and other "unreliable" citizens who have posted relevant statements on their social media. It is significant that the Latvian authorities did not consider this website illegal, including in terms of Riga's international obligations, including the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. The Latvian State Data Inspectorate found no violations and cynically noted that the data presented on the website had been processed in accordance with the right to freedom of expression.
It is well known that pupils from families of Russian citizens are subjected harassment on grounds of their ethnicity and language in Latvian pre-school and general education institutions. Parents of the affected children are forced to send them to home schooling. One of the most high-profile manifestations of bullying of Russian-speaking children was a case in a kindergarten in the Jelgava region of Latvia, where pupils were forced to squat for every word spoken in their mother tongue.[1107] The identities of those who forced them to do such "exercises" are known.
Latvian law enforcement authorities subject Russian citizens crossing the border to severe pressure. In order to enter Latvia, they have to sign a declaration of disagreement with the policies of the Russian Federation. If they refuse, they are denied entry on the pretext that they pose a threat to public order and national security.
In December 2022 the State Security Service of Latvia, trying to intimidate citizens with false threats, addressed the residents of the republic with a "request" not to travel to Russia and Belarus during the Christmas and New Year holidays, recalling that special services of Russia and Belarus were "recruiting" Latvian residents in their countries.[1108]
The Russophobic hysteria consumed the Latvian authorities to such an extent that in August 2022 the Latvian parliament declared Russia a "state sponsor of terrorism".
Under the fake pretext of fighting "Russian propaganda", all dissent in the Latvian media is being wiped out; as a result, representatives of the Russian-language media are under serious systemic pressure. The persecution intensified from the end of February 2022, when the broadcasting of all Russian channels was gradually banned in Latvia. On 24 February 2022, the channels "Russia RTR," "Russia 24" and "TVC International" ceased broadcasting. As of 2 March 2022, the broadcasting of "RBC TV" was banned, "Belarus 24" was suspended and the broadcasting licences of "First Baltic Channel Estonia" and "First Baltic Channel Lithuania" were withdrawn. On 7 March 2022, the Latvian National Council on Electronic Media decided to shut down 18 more Russian channels in the country: "ТNТ Comedy", "ТNТ 4", "ТNТ 4 International", "ТNТ", "ТNТ Music", "PYATNITSA International", "KHL TV", "Kinopremiera", "Kinosvidanie", "Muzhskoye Kino", "La‑Minor TV", "Auto Plus TV", "Nostalgia", "Zhivi!", "Kto Yest Kto", "Malysh TV", "Russkaya Noch", "Zee TV". In June 2022, the broadcasting of the remaining 80 TV channels was restricted. As of today, Latvia has banned all Russian TV channels and blocked hundreds of online news outlets (including those pertaining to Russian government bodies).
The ban hasn't affected the popularity of the banned channels, and Latvian citizens continue to watch them on "illegal" communication devices. The Latvian authorities have introduced administrative liability and a fine of up to 700 euros for watching Russian TV programmes via "illegal decoders" and satellite dishes. The distribution of such equipment can be viewed as a criminal offence.
In early December 2022, it emerged that the State Police in Riga had arrested a man on suspicion of installing "illegal television" in homes. He was accused of setting up unlicensed and illegal TV channels. It was also noted that "the detainee has for a long time provided television connection and service to almost 100 households in the Riga region".[1109] Another such case was reported in March 2024 – the authorities arrested a technician, who had helped at least 181 Latvians set up "illegal" Russian channels. Police searched the suspect's home and seized equipment that he had used to receive and transmit the broadcasts.[1110]
On 5 March 2024, another man was arrested for setting up Russian TV channels for Latvians in Nitzgale, Augsdauhava region. The man is under investigation.
Under the guise of implementing European Union sanctions, the Latvian regime has taken measures that grossly violate the property rights of Russian citizens.
On 12 September 2023, Latvia closed off the entry of Russia-registered passenger cars. On 15 November 2023, legislation amendments trampling the rights of Russian citizens came into force.[1111] The changes mean that Russian-registered vehicles that have been imported into Latvia without being re-registered with the local Road Traffic Safety Directorate of Latvia before 14 February 2024 will be confiscated by the police. Under the law, the decision to expropriate a vehicle can be taken no matter where the owner of the vehicle is. A notice to the person using the vehicle is deemed to be enough. In addition to being authorized to identify the "offenders", the police officers are will be able to impose fines of between 150 and 400 euros and to use wheel clamps to prevent vehicles from being moved for their subsequent removal.
Exceptions are made only for vehicles used by diplomatic missions and for single transit journeys, provided that the duration of the journey does not exceed 24 hours and that the information regarding the vehicle and its owner is submitted in advance to the competent Latvian authorities.
In February 2024, Latvia made numerous attempts to put pressure on Russian citizens living in the country in order to prevent them from voting in the Russian presidential elections in March 2024. This demonstrates the complete unwillingness of the Latvian side to fulfil its international obligations and follow the generally accepted international practice to ensure adequate security conditions around polling stations in Riga. The Russian Embassy's requests made in advance in this regard were ignored by the Latvian side for several months, as were the Embassy's requests to ban anti-Russian demonstrations in front of the diplomatic mission on the election day, which have recently become commonplace with the connivance of the local authorities.
On the day of the Russian presidential on 17 March 2024, the persecution against Russian citizens who came to vote at the Russian Embassy in Riga became especially ruthless. The Latvian authorities checked the documents of all the citizens who came to the Embassy. The Latvian security forces cordoned off the streets adjacent to the embassy. There were multiple cases of Latvian identity documents (identity cards with residence permits) being confiscated from Russian voters. Russian citizens with expired permits were required to go to the Migration Service to get an order of departure. In doing so, the Latvian authorities contradicted their previous statements, in particular those of Justice Minister Inese Libina-Egnere, who claimed on 14 March that the authorities of the Baltic state would not prosecute Russians for voting in the Russian presidential election.[1112] At the same time, it is known that on 11 March 2024, the State Police and the State Border Guard announced that they were going to check visitors to the polling station at the Russian Embassy to ensure that they have the right to be in Latvia. In addition, the head of the State Police, Armands Ruks, said that visas and residence permits of those travelling to the Russian Embassy will be scrutinized at the checkpoints set up by his department, and if visitors are found to have violated the rules of stay in Latvia, deportation procedures will be immediately initiated against them.
On 18 March 2024, the head of the Latvian police stated that on 17 March the immigration check of all those who took part in the elections was carried out by decision of the Minister of Internal Affairs Rihards Kozlovskis. The State Police checked 1,001 voters from among the Russian citizens who came to the polling station at the Embassy. Twenty-four Russian citizens were said to have expired residence permits in Latvia. That meant that deportation proceedings were initiated against them.[1113] The police also detained four people for the offences they had allegedly committed. Journalist Aleksey Stefanov shared the following information provided by an eyewitness. At around 19:00, Latvian border guards detained a man near the polling station, put him in their minibus and drove away.[1114]
The authorities showed shocking cynicism towards the Russian people when they banned the laying of flowers at the Russian Embassy in Riga for those who wished to commemorate the victims of the horrific terrorist attack at the Crocus City Hall, a concert hall in Krasnogorsk, Moscow Region. The terrorist attack took 144 lives, 551 people were injured. A spontaneous memorial was set up on the side of the street opposite the Russian diplomatic mission.[1115] When the Russian Embassy reported this on its Facebook account, the Latvian Foreign Ministry added Oleg Zykov, Russia's Charge d'Affaires in Latvia, to the list of undesirable persons and ordered him to leave Latvia. The official reason given for the expulsion of the Russian Charge d'Affaires in Latvia was "deliberate, unacceptable and provocative public messaging by the Russian Embassy aimed at discrediting Latvian state institutions and inciting hatred in Latvian society."[1116]
The entire Russian-speaking population of Latvia is under pressure from the Latvian authorities. Russian residents in Latvia are seen by the Latvian leadership as an alien and destabilizing element. For this reason, the nationalist policies of the authorities are aimed at disenfranchising the Russian community. In practice, this takes the form of numerous violations of the rights of this population group. Among other things, they have difficulties receiving pension from the Russian government. Meanwhile, pensions in Latvia are among the lowest in the EU. According to the latest information available from the State Data Agency (SDA), 40.5 percent of people over 65 and 22.5 percent of the total population will be at the poverty line in 2021. According to Eurostat data, one in four Latvians was at risk of poverty and social exclusion in 2022 (26 percent). The media cite even more shocking data: while the average old‑age pension is 337 euros, 15 precent of Latvian retirees receive only 183 euros per month.[1117]
The main remaining problem is the fact that a significant part of the Latvian population does not have Latvian citizenship. According to the SDA data, as of January 2023, there are 175,400 "non-citizens" (9.3 percent) in the country; according to OCMA information, they are 187,400.
"Non-citizens" account for about 200,000 of the country's residents (11 percent of the population), 65 percent of whom are ethnic Russians. The Latvian authorities do not recognize "non-citizens" as ethnic minorities and, consequently, have excluded them from the scope of application of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, ratified by Latvia in 2005 with significant reservations.
The rate of obtained citizenship declines every year: 725 individuals "naturalized" in 2020, 419 in 2021, and 518 in 2022. Since the start of the "naturalization" process on 1 February 1995, 148,478 people have been granted citizenship of the Republic of Latvia, with a peak in 2004‑2006 in connection with the country's accession to the EU (51,600 people). At the same time, the term "naturalization", apart from its legal aspect, is largely artificial, since in most cases it refers to people who are not migrants but who have always lived there. The number of "non-citizens" is diminishing now only due to the natural decline of this segment of the population and its emigration, and not due to any active measures by the competent local authorities to eradicate this phenomenon that is a disgrace to the European Union.
Eliminating mass statelessness is not currently on the agenda of the Latvian authorities.
On 5 November 2019, Latvia adopted a law on the automatic granting of citizenship to children born to "non-citizens". However, it only applies to a few dozen new-borns each year (in 2020, 31 babies in Latvia were granted the "non‑citizen" status).
"Non-citizens" living in the country live in a discriminatory environment. They continue to be deprived of a range of social, economic and political rights. Independent Latvian human rights activists currently distinguish about 80 differences between citizens and "non-citizens". In particular, the latter do not have the right to vote or be elected, to hold civil or military office, to be a judge, etc. As a result, Latvia's Saeima elections on 1 October 2022 were held in the absence of universal suffrage and with a continuing "long-term democratic deficit" (as noted in PACE and OSCE reports in 2002 and 2006 respectively).
The issue of "non-citizens" in Latvia is given considerable attention by Latvian Russian-speaking NGOs, most notably the Latvian Human Rights Committee (LHRC). It systematically cooperates with human rights bodies and other interested structures and prepares alternative reports on the human rights situation for relevant international organizations. This activity is usually criticized by local authorities and is reflected in the annual reports of the Latvian security services.
The Latvian authorities are promoting discriminatory initiatives which target citizens of the Russian Federation. According to the amendments to the Immigration Act adopted by the Saeima in 2022-2023, in order to retain permanent residence permits, residents of the Republic of Latvia from among former "non-citizens" and Latvian citizens who received Russian citizenship after 2003 (about 25,000 Russians – former "non-citizens" and Latvian citizens – fall into this category) will be required to undergo a Latvian language proficiency test within a short period of time (the majority of certificates of knowledge issued by state authorities have been cancelled), to prove that they have a monthly income of at least 600 euros and to fill in questionnaires with provocative content, proposing to recognize the "annexation" of the Crimea, to condemn Russia's "military invasion" of Ukraine and to approve the dismantling of Soviet monuments in Latvia. In addition, the fee for the examination and the submission of the Commission's opinion has been raised to 70 euros. This is five times higher than the usual fee for such actions. Given that many of those who have been forced to reconfirm their residence permits are elderly, usually on small pensions, with no property and relatives in Russia, their future fate raises serious concerns. This is a serious shock to the emotional, psychological and physical health of Russia's pensioners. There are several cases of elderly applicants for Latvian residence permits who died before their "legalization" in Latvia.
In September 2023, the VDD reported the identification of 80 "politically unreliable" Russians who, despite having passed the test, were deemed by the agency to be "a threat to national security" in Latvia. These "politically unreliable" individuals were denied permanent residency status by the Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs (OCMA) of the Latvian Ministry of the Interior.
Of particular concern is the threat of deportation announced by the local authorities (specifically, the OCMA) for those who fail to pass all the "filtration" procedures (limited deadlines were set for passing the tests, with those who missed the deadline for enrolling facing deportation from 2 December 2023, and those who failed the test after two attempts facing deportation from 28 March 2024). On 2 September 2023, the OCMA sent out notices to several thousand Russian people to "leave the country within three months", despite the authorities' rhetoric about their intention to "soften the regime".[1118] As practice has shown, the Latvian authorities later tightened the requirements for Russians living in the country in the spirit of Nazism.
Human rights activist Elizaveta Krivtsova (Soglasie) initiated collective action to the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Latvia to invalidate these odious amendments with more than 300 people joining in. In January 2023, LRU members Yulia Sokhina and Vladimir Buzayev sent letters to several international organizations (OSCE, Council of Europe, and the United Nations) and major international NGOs, including Amnesty International, about the threat of expulsion of thousands of Russian citizens.
All these efforts have led to some changes. In early September 2023, the Latvian Ministry of the Interior suggested postponing the implementation of the discriminatory immigration law for several years, allowing Russians to obtain "temporary" residence permits until the necessary procedures were completed. On 14 September 2023, the Saeima approved the proposed amendments relaxing the requirements for persons with Russian citizenship. According to the document, Russian citizens who failed to pass the test, as well as those who did not register for the test "for a valid reason", can apply for a temporary residence permit for a period of two years, while retaining access to the same social package and public services. During this time, they will be required to pass the Latvian language test.[1119]
The Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (AC FCNM) has expressed concern about this measure of the Latvian authorities. It pointed out that the temporary residence permit that Russians can receive for the period of the test does not provide access to the same social and medical protection that they had before, and also involves additional costs for each renewal. The AC FCNM has also expressed concern about the possible negative impact on the realization of the right to privacy and family life for the families of Russians taking the test. The Advisory Committee expressed particular concern over the risk of deportation for those unable to take the test, including due to the lack of testing facilities, leading to potential family separation. The Advisory Committee considers that all these requirements create legal uncertainty and will impose an insurmountable or disproportionate burden on persons belonging to national minorities and their families, without taking into account the circumstances of all persons affected by these restrictive measures.[1120]
Apparently, the Latvian authorities took this decision partly because they lacked the capacity and staff to implement the discriminatory law. Maira Roze, head of the Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs, admitted that the office only has 46 employees. In order to individually examine the cases of Russians permanently residing in Latvia who have not submitted documents confirming the residence permit (and as of September 2023 there will be about 6,000 of such people), which will take at least four working days each (studying documents, collecting information from databases, etc.), all employees will have to give up other duties and deal only with these two full working years.[1121]
Nevertheless, the authorities have not given up their intention to organize mass deportations of the country's Russian-speaking population. Before September 2023, Russian-speaking residents failed to pass the language test in more than half of the cases. According to the OCMA, more than 5,000 Russian citizens had their residence permits revoked as of January 2024 for failure to meet the above requirements. In accordance with these requirements, 1,167 Russian citizens were subject to deportation, about 800 of whom were over the age of 60.
Representatives of the State Centre for Educational Content reported that 17,865 people planned to take the language test in 2023, 1,780 people registered, and 919 failed to show up. About 5,000 people did not register for the test; 6,367 passed, while 5,494 failed.
In 2024, participation in the language proficiency test has been low and few people have passed the test. On average, 100 people pass the test each month. In the first three months of 2024, 303 people signed up for the test. Of these, 23 percent passed, 56 percent failed and 21 percent did not attend.
The Russian citizens, who immediately found themselves in the status of "illegal immigrants", were deprived of the right to free medical care, access to public services, social benefits and pensions.
Moreover, there have been outrageous cases, where deaf‑mute and even blind citizens with certain disabilities and duly issued medical documents confirming this had to take the language test (which includes written, oral and listening sections). All of them, for obvious reasons, could not pass the language test and were deprived of the status of permanent residents of Latvia.
Such cases have been described by Russian citizens in their reports to the Russian Embassy in Latvia, where they say that in recent months there has been a multiple increase in the number of applications to the diplomatic mission from Russians who have fallen under the flywheel of repression of the Latvian authorities, as a result of which many of them have lost their permanent residence permits. These reports are often personal accounts of tragedy, and over time they increasingly resemble a collective cry of despair. In some cases, outrageous situations are described in which frail, bedridden, even deaf-mute and blind Russians who, due to insurmountable circumstances, including limited physical ability and artificially created bureaucratic obstacles, were unable to pass the Latvian language proficiency test in a short period or obtain a medical exemption from the test, are threatened with deportation.[1122]
Moreover, taking the test is no guarantee that Russian-speaking residents will not be persecuted. There have been cases where Russians who had successfully passed the language test and submitted their documents for a residence permit on time received notices of impending expulsion, allegedly due to a "technical error".
On 15 February 2024, the Latvian Constitutional Court ruled that the amendments to the Immigration Act, which require Russian citizens who were previously Latvian citizens or non-citizens to pass a Latvian language test and declare their source of income within the time limit set by the law in order to obtain permanent residence status in the EU, are in accordance with the law. In fact, this decision, which was declared final and not subject to appeal, was the beginning of a gradual deportation campaign on grounds of nationality: Latvia's Supreme Court authorized the eviction of people under a retroactive law (previously issued residence permits were indefinite). This law also applies to elderly people who have children and grandchildren who live in Latvia and have Latvian citizenship. The court found that the Immigration Act did not contravene the rights to privacy and equality before the law enshrined in the Latvian Constitution, and was in line with Article 4 of the Fourth Protocol to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Particularly strange is the statement in the court's ruling that there will be no mass deportation, as law enforcement officers will assess the "danger" of each deportee individually, although during the hearings it was repeatedly mentioned that more than 3,000 people would be subjected to repression. At the same time, it was announced that the process of deporting the first 985 Russian citizens who did not apply for the next Latvian language test had started even before the court hearings.[1123]
As of March 2024, the authorities have begun to implement the deportation law. The Latvian Ministry of the Interior has said that two Russian citizens who had failed to comply with the requirements of the new immigration law and had been issued with deportation orders have left the country. What is more, nine Russian citizens, who had not applied for any kind of Latvian residence permit, received exit orders by March 2024. Seven deportation orders are pending and it has been announced that the State Border Guard will forcibly deport these people if these orders are not challenged and overturned in court.[1124]
In the summer of 2024, deportations became more frequent, further evidence of the Latvian government's desire to emulate the German Nazi regime as much as possible. Russian residents are being expelled almost on a daily basis. The number of deportation orders issued and the number of Russian citizens who have left the country change daily. The authorities report that as of 27 May 2024, they have issued 34 deportation orders. The Latvian border guards have checked about 800 people, and found out that about 600 of them have already left the country. The border guards have failed to locate more than 100 people in their homes. One month later, on 24 June 2024, OCMA issued a deportation order to 56 Russian citizens who did not comply with the requirements of the Latvian authorities and did not apply for a residence permit. Thirteen of these deportation orders have been executed and the deadline for the execution of seven others has been extended.
Some of the deportation cases are downright shocking. On 12 January 2024, a Latvian border guard forcibly deported Boris Katkov, an 82‑year‑old military pensioner, long-time chairman of the board of the Latvian-Russian Cooperation Association and representative of Baltic Federal University named after Immanuel Kant, to Russia, claiming that he was a "threat to national security". They gave Katkov virtually no time, although, under local legislation, he had one month to challenge the decision of the Latvian Ministry of the Interior. This unlawful decision of the Latvian authorities (the Minister of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Latvia personally suggested to expel Boris Katkov) grossly violates the norms of international law, above all, the provisions of the 1994 bilateral intergovernmental agreement on social protection of military pensioners and members of their families, as well as the principle of "non-division" of the family – the elderly Russian had all his close relatives in Latvia. According to human rights defender Vladimir Buzaev, who is representing Katkov in court, Latvian law enforcement officials failed to present convincing arguments and evidence confirming the legality of the deportation during the court hearing on 25 April 2024.
At the same time, in 2024, the Latvian authorities have begun to tighten the legislation by making screening and language proficiency tests mandatory for a wider section of the Russian population in Latvia. In this way, the Latvian authorities are increasing the number of people they intend to expel from the country. On 2 May 2024, the Saeima adopted amendments to the Immigration Act affecting Russian citizens under the age of 75. These include many retired military personnel and members of their families, who were covered by the 1994 Intergovernmental Agreement on Social Protection retired members of the Russian Federation armed forces. The newly adopted amendments stipulate that if persons from this category of Russian residents in Latvia did not apply for permanent residence status in the EU by 30 April 2024, their temporary stay in Latvia will be invalidated from 15 May 2024. The speed with which these amendments were considered (approximately one month; they were introduced in April 2024) and the short period given to those affected by them show that the Latvian authorities do not intend to leave them the possibility of continuing to live in the country. They announced that these measures were "necessary to ensure "public safety" in Latvia".[1125] It is noteworthy that the OSCE, which has a mandate from its participating States to monitor the situation of Latvian military pensioners, remains indifferent to the fate of these people, whose average age is around 80.
It should be noted that in response to the serious problem concerning the situation of "non-citizens", more than 50 recommendations have been published by international universal and regional human rights mechanisms, including on simplifying naturalisation procedures, granting voting rights to "non-citizens", and respecting the full range of language rights of national minorities. However, the official Riga continues to ignore all the numerous recommendations.
Latvia has never signed the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages of 5 November 1992; it only ratified the Council of Europe's Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM) in 2005, with two reservations that significantly limit the impact of the Convention's provisions: in Latvia, national minorities are not given the opportunity to communicate with the authorities in their mother tongue in the areas of their compact settlement, nor are they allowed to use it in topographical names. Moreover, an additional declaration adopted by the Latvian Parliament to the ratified FCNM separately stipulates that "non-citizens" are not subject to the said Convention, meaning that only Latvian citizens can be recognised as representatives of national minorities.
The UN human rights treaty bodies have also been made aware of the issues of "non-citizens" in Latvia. For example, in December 2019, the UN Committee against Torture, while generally welcoming the progress made by Latvia in addressing the issue of statelessness, expressed concern that the law granting automatic citizenship to children born to "non-citizen" parents did not cover all minor "non-citizens".[1126] In 2018, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination also expressed concern about the reform of the education system and the remaining problem of "non-citizens". The Committee's experts recommended that the Latvian authorities take the necessary measures to ensure that its language policy and laws do not create direct or indirect discrimination against the population.[1127] The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights noted that discrimination against "non-citizens" persisted in the country in 2021; according to its data, the number of "non-citizens" in Latvia in that year was about 209,000.[1128]
In November 2023, the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities also noted that statelessness remains significant: one in ten permanent residents of Latvia is still a "non-citizen", which limits their rights to participate in political life.[1129]
In the context of the coercive derussification policy, it is becoming more and more noticeable that the authorities are actively limiting the scope of application of the non-official languages. The Latvian language is being strenuously promoted as the only language allowed for communication with authorities, topographical signs, and other inscriptions, as well as identity documents.
It should be noted that Russian is the second most widely spoken and used language in Latvia after the state language. According to the latest census (2011), Russian is the native language of 37.7 percent of the Latvian population. According to the latest data from the Central Statistical Bureau (2017), around 78 percent of Latvians speak Russian as a foreign language. Meanwhile, according to surveys conducted in 2019 for the Language situation in Latvia 2016‑2020 report, 96 percent of Latvian respondents confirmed that they were proficient in Russian.
Despite the best efforts of the Latvian authorities, the proportion of the Russian-speaking population is declining slowly, by only 1.5 percent over the last twenty years. This trend is typical of all regions except Latgale (Latvia's south-eastern region with the highest proportion of Russian speakers), where 54.5 percent of the population speak Russian as their mother tongue. The concentration of Russian speakers in Riga also remains significant – about 56 percent of the population.
The latest attempt to legitimise the Russian language in the country was the 2012 referendum on granting it the status of a second state language. 273,347 people (24.88 percent of those who took part) voted in favour of the decision. At the same time, the survey didn't include the opinion of the 15 percent of (then) "non-citizens" who were denied the right to vote even on such an important issue for them. As was expected, the Russian language received significant support in Latgale – 55.6 percent (85.2 percent in Daugavpils, the region's capital, and 90.3 percent in the Zilupe region bordering Russia). Thus, Russian still has the legal status of a foreign language in the country.
The discriminatory language policy of the official Riga is based on the exclusive need to preserve the Latvian language and culture as the basis of the Latvian nation. The use of the Latvian language is controlled by the State Language Centre (SLC), whose inspections have been dubbed the "language inquisition" in the Russian-speaking community. According to the SLC's latest report, 2,255 inspections were carried out in 2021 (compared to 2,061 in 2020), 531 proceedings were initiated on administrative offences (compared to 530 in 2020), and 517 people were fined. More than 60 percent of all cases on this issue are related to what the "inquisitors" consider to be insufficient use of the state language in the performance of professional and official duties. Through the Friend of the Language app, which has been operational since 2018 and was actively promoted by local authorities, only 58 reports of language violations were submitted (compared to 136 in 2020).
The Latvian authorities present the Russian language as the main threat to the development and even the existence of the state language. The State Language Policy Guidelines for 2021‑2027, adopted on 25 August 2021, stipulate that one of the main tasks is to combat the consequences of the "Soviet occupation" in society's linguistic behaviour, including the allegedly unreasonable demand for knowledge of the Russian language in the labour market. It is also noted that children must be given the opportunity to learn one of the official EU languages as a second foreign language at school (English is usually the first). It is worth noting that due to a lack of teachers, some educational institutions offer only Russian as a foreign language, and there is still sufficient demand for such lessons among young people.
Since Russia launched the special military operation to denazify and demilitarise Ukraine and protect the civilian population of Donbass, abandoning the use of the Russian language in Latvia has occupied a central place in the rhetoric of the country's leadership. It has been repeatedly stressed that "the Latvian core value – the state language – needs to be promoted more than ever" in the current geopolitical conditions. It comes as no surprise that this is to be done by suppressing the Russian language. In fact, the country has launched an open propaganda of discrimination on the basis of linguistic principle, which in practice translates into persecution on the grounds of ethnic origin.
With this in mind, the Latvian government is systematically working to push the Russian language out of all areas of public life in the country. In June 2023, the Saeima adopted legislative amendments allowing election campaigns to be conducted only in the state language. At the same time, the draft law on limiting bilingualism, announced by the Minister of Justice of the Republic of Latvia Janis Bordans (The Conservatives party) in August 2022, which provided for restrictions on the use of Russian at work and in public places, was perceived by the public as a populist step and remained at the approval stage. The same fate befell another initiative from the same party in October 2022, which proposed a total phase‑out of the Russian language, including in the private sector (the bill ensuring the status of the Latvian language as the only state language in Latvia).
At the same time, the Latvian state apparatus began to massively reject the use of the Russian language. Thus, Minister of Welfare Gatis Eglitis and Minister of Economics Ilze Indriksone decreed that interactions in the institutions of the ministries should be conducted only in the state language. And so it was done: from 1 September 2022 the Ministry of Economics and from 1 October 2022 the Ministry of Welfare switched to communicating only in the state language. This applies to information on websites and social media, messages to clients, and interviews with the Latvian media. That said, the Russian-language version of the website of the President of Latvia, Egils Levits, has been blocked since 24 August 2022, and the official portal president.lv is now available only in Latvian and English (the Russian-language version was blocked in August 2022). Furthermore, a number of ministries (Culture, Agriculture, Economics, Justice, Environmental Protection and Regional Development, Education and Science, and Welfare) also refused to communicate with the public in Russian.
Alongside the efforts of the local officialdom to stop the use of the Russian language, there have also been "initiatives" by Latvian NGOs. For example, in May 2022, the public association for the Latvian language launched the campaign of derussification of Latvia under the leadership of poet Liana Langa (real name Liana Boksa), the chairwoman of the organisation's board. In July 2023, she reported on the results of her activities: all regional governments, as well as the municipalities of Latvia's major cities, had removed the Russian versions of their websites. And this is the same person, Liana Langa, who used to translate from Russian herself and who criticised the Latvian authorities a few years ago, saying that "the moment is fast approaching" when "she will be ashamed to live there [in Latvia]".
In fact, the Latvian authorities have eliminated the Russian-speaking educational space through a comprehensive educational reform. It includes the conversion of schools and kindergartens to the Latvian language of instruction, the development and implementation of new educational content, a streamlined school network, and a ban on teaching in Russian at private universities.
In 2021, Latvia underwent yet another language reform. At the same time, the transitional period of the school reform ended on 1 September 2021, and from the 2021–2022 school year, all primary and secondary schools will teach almost exclusively in the state language. Years 10 to 12 will be taught in Latvian only, while years 7 to 9 will have 80 percent of instruction in the state language.
The discriminatory measures taken by the Latvian authorities to "derussify" education are supported by the judiciary. Thus, in 2019 and 2020, the Constitutional Court of Latvia recognised as constitutional the provisions on the derussification of education and the introduction of compulsory education in the Latvian language at various levels of education.
As a result, Russian-speaking residents were forced to turn to international bodies, as they had no way of defending their interests within the country. In connection with this reform, parents of schoolchildren belonging to national minorities filed complaints with the European Court of Human Rights. The Latvian Russian Union (LRU) assisted parents of schoolchildren and preschool children in submitting some 350 individual complaints concerning linguistic discrimination against children in the context of the above-mentioned reform. Russian compatriots have also submitted a collective complaint to the UN Human Rights Committee on the threat of the abolition of education in minority languages.
As for the ECtHR, it has fully confirmed its biased approach to considering complaints from parents of schoolchildren about the elimination of Russian-language education in the country. In September 2023, the Court sided with the Latvian state when considering complaints from parents of schoolchildren against legislative innovations restricting Russian-language education in public schools. In November 2023, the Court ruled against the plaintiffs who challenged Latvia's educational reform, which involved a significant reduction in the amount of Russian-language instruction in private schools. In fact, in both cases – on the language of instruction in public schools and in private schools – the ECtHR examined only one of the three articles that the applicants claimed the reform violated, namely Article 14 of the Convention (on the prohibition of discrimination). The Court ruled that the measures taken by the Latvian government to "increase the use of the state language" in schools were "proportionate and necessary", in particular to ensure the unity of the education system. At the same time, the ECtHR stated that in its analysis of the violation of the prohibition of discrimination, it relied on the opinion of the Constitutional Court of Latvia, according to which the state had already regulated the language of instruction in private schools before the 2018 reform. Thus, in the Court's view, there are legitimate reasons not to separate private schools from public schools.[1130]
According to parents and lawyers, there is still a chance to fight for Russian-language education in Latvia, as the version of the reform that severely restricts Russian-language education has been challenged at the ECtHR. However, this reform is outdated, as a complete conversion of education to Latvian has already been initiated.
In September 2022, the UN Human Rights Council's Special Rapporteur on minority issues, Fernand de Varennes, the Special Rapporteur on the right to education, Farida Shaheed, and the Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights, Alexandra Xanthaki, sent a request to the Latvian government criticising the conversion of all schools to Latvian and asking for comments on the process of discussing this decision and plans for its implementation. According to the HRC Special Rapporteurs, the amendments adopted in Latvia "severely restrict education in minority languages" (the appeal lists Russian, Ukrainian, Belarusian, Hebrew, Lithuanian, and Estonian) and "contradict international human rights standards, including the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of language and the Convention on the Rights of the Child". The experts also criticised the Latvian authorities for the way they conducted the process of reviewing and discussing the draft law on the conversion of school education into Latvian. In particular, they were concerned that the discussion of the initiative "lacked effective and meaningful participation of the minorities concerned". Calls to wait until related complaints pending before the ECtHR and the UN Human Rights Committee could be dealt with were also ignored.[1131]
In 2022, under the pretext of the Ukrainian crisis, the Latvian ruling circles decided to force the conversion of educational institutions to the state language, accelerating the progress of initiatives aimed at the final elimination of Russian-language education. Amendments to the Education Law were adopted in the final reading on 29 September 2022, providing for a full transition to teaching in Latvian in kindergartens from 1 September 2023 and in schools from 1 September 2025. Grades 1, 4, and 7 will also be taught exclusively in the state language from 1 September 2023. The language and culture of national minorities will only be available as interest education programmes subsidised by the state or an individual municipality.
The changes introduced by the law affected 129 schools (out of 563, or almost 23 percent of the total number of educational establishments), 43,000 schoolchildren (out of 220,051, or almost 20 percent of the total number of schoolchildren), and around 4,000 teachers (out of 25,986, or 15.5 percent of the total number of teachers).[1132],[1133]
Furthermore, in July 2023, the Latvian Minister for Education, Anda Čakša, called on the country's law enforcement authorities to thoroughly investigate the actions of public activists spreading information about Russian distance learning programmes online, arguing that this could pose a threat to national security.
The overall situation regarding education in the Russian language is extremely unfavourable. The proportion of Latvian in kindergartens was increased as early as 1 September 2019, and it is the main means of communication for children from the age of five. The regulation obliging Russian-speaking municipal kindergartens to open groups with instruction in Latvian upon request is still in force (on 14 May 2020, the Saeima of Latvia adopted amendments to the Education Law, according to which all municipal preschool educational institutions are required to provide educational programmes in the Latvian language).
At present, higher education in the Russian language is also not available at the public universities in Latvia. The only exceptions are the Russian philology programmes at the University of Latvia and Daugavpils University, where certain subjects are taught in Russian. On 1 January 2019, private higher education institutions stopped enrolling Russian-speaking study groups and teaching is currently possible only in the official languages of the EU.
The ban on admission of students to Russian-language programmes in private higher education institutions, which became effective on 1 January 2019, remains in force despite the fact that on 28 June 2023 the Constitutional Court of Latvia declared the amendments to the Law on Higher Education, which prohibit the teaching of foreign languages in private educational institutions, except for certain programmes in EU languages, incompatible with the country's basic law and ordered the Saeima to revise them by 1 July 2024.
On 21 November 2022, the Ministry of Education and Science announced plans to require that only one of the EU languages be taught as a second foreign language in all educational institutions from the 2026‑2027 academic year, in order to "promote Latvia's core value – the national language – and a strong Latvia in the common family of the European Union". Learning Russian as a second foreign language would therefore be impossible.[1134] This initiative was put on paper in September 2023, when the Ministry of Education and Science of Latvia submitted for public consultation amendments to the government regulations on the gradual abolition of teaching Russian as a second foreign language in schools. As expected, the amendments would require schools to offer students one of the official languages of the European Union or the European Economic Area as a second foreign language from the 2026‑2027 school year. Russian is not included in this list.[1135]
At the same time, Russian is taught as a second foreign language in almost half of Latvian schools, according to the Ministry of Education and Science of Latvia.[1136] However, these official figures do not reflect reality. When the entire education system was switched to the Latvian language on 1 September 2023, many previously bilingual Latvian schools and preschools refused to give Russian children additional lessons in their mother tongue. The reason given was a lack of funding and other bureaucratic difficulties.[1137] It is also noteworthy that in many educational institutions where state-guaranteed language courses have been organised, such courses are held only once a week (instead of the recommended three times a week) and outside the permissible limits of the academic schedule (times are early in the morning or late in the evening).
The Russian-speaking teachers found themselves in a very difficult situation. Teachers in national minority schools are subject to constant checks on compliance with the highest level of Latvian language proficiency, which has become more stringent since the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis and the decision to eliminate Russian-language education. Between 2018 and 2022, the SLC identified 396 teachers (114 for the period January-April 2022 alone) who do not speak the state language at an acceptable level.
According to the data of the State Language Centre, in the last school year (2022‑2023) 107 teachers were subject to administrative liability for insufficient knowledge of the Latvian language. The published data shows that teachers in Riga were the most likely to be punished, with 52 teachers failing to comply. In Liepāja and Daugavpils, 18 and 16 teachers respectively were held liable. In addition, it turned out that if the State Language Centre finds that a teacher's use of the Latvian language does not correspond to the extent necessary for the performance of professional and official duties, the perpetrator is subject to an administrative penalty ranging from a warning to a fine of 35 to 120 euros. Teachers found guilty of such violations will be suspended until they are retested on their knowledge of the state language, which is to take place within three months. If a teacher fails to pass the retest, they will be dismissed.[1138]
According to the State Service of Education Quality, as of March 2024, 45 teachers have been suspended since the beginning of the current school year due to insufficient knowledge of the Latvian language. According to Denis Klyukin, headmaster of Riga's Rinuzu secondary school, teachers are not always fired for their poor knowledge of Latvian – most often it is because they are too nervous during the test. The specific feature of the 2024 test is that, due to changes in legislation, teachers who fail the test are immediately marked in the State Information Educational System, and until this mark is removed (i.e. until they successfully pass the language test), these teachers cannot carry out any educational activities. Moreover, teachers of the Latvian language are not required to take this test.[1139]
The Latvian authorities are "derussifying" educational institutions and converting them to the Latvian language, despite a shortage of Latvian-speaking teachers. In May 2023, Ivars Balamovskis, the head of the Education Board, said that the lack of teachers was jeopardising the transition to Latvian in the country's schools. The example of Riga is instructive in this respect. There, educational institutions have been adapting their timetables and teaching staff to the changes adopted in 2022, which stipulate education in the Latvian language from 1 September 2023. Twelve schools of national minorities in the capital have indicated the need to hire a Latvian language teacher and 14 schools a mathematics teacher. There was also a shortage of music teachers. At the same time, only 68 percent of schools in the capital said they had found a teacher for the first grade. In Riga, 51 schools run programmes for the education of national minorities. Seventeen schools offer only basic education programmes for national minorities.[1140]
By the start of the 2023-2024 school year, schools across the country were short of more than 300 teachers. The situation was particularly dire when it came to Latvian language, literature, and mathematics teachers. Language tests, heavy workloads, low salaries, and constant stress are the main reasons for the shortage.[1141]
In August 2023, the Latvian Trade Union of Education and Science Workers also identified problems with the conversion of education to the Latvian language. According to Inga Vanaga, the Union's President, there is a big problem with converting educational institutions to the state language and Latvia lacks teachers. There are still nearly 1,500 teaching positions unfilled. She also stated: "This issue is the result of other issues that have not been addressed over the years, including teachers' rights, salaries, teaching materials, and violence in the workplace. All of these have contributed to making teaching a discredited profession". Inga Vanaga also pointed out that national minorities should be given the opportunity to preserve their language and culture. This also applies to the Russian-speaking population. "We can't ignore the people for whom this is a value. We'll see how this works in practice. The war in the neighbourhood is absolutely unacceptable, but we must respect people whose mother tongue is Russian or any other language".[1142]
On 31 August 2023, a picket was held in front of the Saeima building against the transition to education in the Latvian language only and the discontinuation of general education programmes for national minorities. It was organised by the Latvian Association for Support of Schools with Russian Language of Instruction. The association stresses that the Latvian authorities must ensure that children are educated in their mother tongue.[1143]
There have also been discriminatory public statements against Russian speakers in Latvia. Such openly racist judgements cannot take place without the tacit consent of the authorities. In early August 2023, for example, journalist Elita Veidemane declared that teachers who are unable to learn Latvian "due to their narrow-mindedness or small-mindedness" should be dismissed from schools. She called those who do not speak Latvian but have lived in the country for a long time "unscrupulous" or "mentally retarded".[1144] Given the Latvian authorities' policy of destroying the Russian language, it is hardly surprising that they have never condemned these discriminatory remarks. Moreover, there has been no information about any action taken against the person who made the racist remarks.
The trend towards the displacement of non-state languages (primarily Russian) has also become quite noticeable in other areas of public life in Latvia. There has been a consistent policy of removing the Russian language from the media. Over the years, regulations have been introduced to increase the proportion of broadcasts and publications in Latvian and EU official languages, while at the same time limiting radio and television broadcasts and publications in Russian.
According to the new Law on administrative penalties for offences in the field of administration, public order, and use of the official language, as of 1 July 2020, liability was introduced for demonstrating "serious disrespect for the official language", concluding contracts with employees who do not know Latvian, and unwillingness to ensure the use of the Latvian language at work. Printed promotional items distributed among citizens of the country should be in Latvian only. The sole exception is when a person has agreed to receive materials in other languages.
This restriction significantly affected mass vaccination in the country in 2021. The situation in the health care system was critical and there were significant problems in organising the vaccination campaign, especially among the elderly (this age group makes up a significant part of the Russian-speaking population in Latvia). However, the authorities did not even agree to temporarily suspend the law, thereby restricting our compatriots' access to vital information.
On 16 June 2022, amendments to the Law on Political Parties were also adopted, making it possible to suspend the activities of political associations for "denying crimes or expressing support for undermining the sovereignty and territorial integrity of democratic states". Despite the absence of any country names in the text of the amendments, this innovation is clearly aimed at those political parties representing the interests of Latvia's Russian-speaking population, who are in favour of maintaining ties with Russia.
There are also initiatives to ban the use of Russian in public spaces and communication. For example, the Minister of Health of Latvia, Hosams Abu Meri, stated in February 2024 that hospital staff should discuss all issues during working hours only in Latvian. He also indicated that if the patient does not speak Latvian and insists on communicating with the doctor in a foreign language that the doctor does not understand, the patient should bring an interpreter.[1145]
In early July 2024, it became known that a complaint had been filed with the State Labour Inspectorate against a home-type boarding house for the elderly in Bolderaja run by well-known Latvian journalist Natalia Mikhailova, as well as a second boarding house she had recently opened in Kengarags. This was prompted by a job advertisement for boarding house staff, which stated that Russian was required to work with the elderly, as it was the mother tongue of the majority of people living there. At the same time, Mikhailova herself noted that none of the applicants had been refused a job on the grounds of "a lack of knowledge of the Russian language".[1146]
The linguistic policies of the Latvian authorities, who actively seek to create a monolingual society, have been repeatedly criticised by international human rights mechanisms. According to the opinion of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, adopted in 2018, the linguistic policy pursued by the Latvian authorities leads to a reduced space for using the languages of national minorities.[1147] In particular, the comprehensive educational reform in the country is actually aimed at eliminating bilingual schools and abandoning the use of Russian in educational institutions at all levels. Russian was declared the second most widely spoken language in Latvia. According to a 2017 study by the Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia, it was spoken by 37.7 percent of the population, while Latvian was spoken by 61.3 percent.[1148]
The AC FCNM also pointed out that the educational reform of the Latvian authorities certainly puts national minority students at a disadvantage in terms of academic performance, which in turn may have a negative impact on their ability to successfully integrate into the socio-economic life of society.[1149]
The opinion of the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission of the Council of Europe) on the educational reform in Latvia of June 2020 also highlighted problems in the area of education for national minorities. According to the Commission, the issue of introducing Latvian as the main language in kindergartens should be reconsidered, as education in the mother tongue is important for preserving identity and linguistic diversity in society. It was also noted that private schools should have the right to implement programmes in minority languages, which is prohibited by the Latvian authorities' legislative innovations.[1150]
The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights also expressed concern about the measures taken by the official Riga to Latvianise education. In particular, it noted that this language policy adopted by the authorities may have a discriminatory impact on persons belonging to minorities, especially in the fields of education, employment, and access to services. It was also noted that the Committee remained concerned that the amendments to the Education Law and Cabinet Decree No. 716 of 21 November 2018 had a discriminatory effect on minority groups and created undue restrictions on teaching and learning in minority languages, both in public and private schools in the preschool and primary education system.[1151]
The Resolution of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on the implementation of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities by Latvia of 3 March 2021 also referred to discrimination against national minorities in Latvia.[1152] According to the document, "cases of inflammatory statements by public figures have not led to the authorities taking sufficient action, creating an impression of impunity and ambivalence, thus affecting negatively the interethnic climate". Moreover, "restrictive policies and other pressures driven by a political agenda [...] are particularly evident in the education system, the media, and with regard to the use of national minority languages". It was also noted that such broad scope of application of linguistic requirements adversely affects the possibility for non-native speakers of Latvian of accessing many positions within the public service.
In July 2022, the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities Kairat Abdrakhmanov sent a letter to the Saeima of Latvia regarding the government's new proposal to fully convert schools to Latvian as the language of instruction from 2025. He referred to possible violations of international law in the implementation of this initiative and recalled the importance of children being educated in their mother tongue, as well as the need to take into account the opinion of members of national minorities when implementing reforms. The response of the Latvian Ministry of Justice, which is illustrative in this regard, mentions that there is allegedly no evidence that Russians in Latvia are a national minority (they are supposedly a group of "Soviet-era migrants"), and also notes that the state language is not sufficiently dominant in the country.
The latest opinion of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities on Latvia, published in February 2024, notes a decline in the level of implementation of this international instrument by Riga and the disregard of the recommendations of the AC FCNM within the previous reporting cycle. In particular, it is stressed that Latvia continues to restrict the use of national minority languages in public communication and their learning and that, following the conversion of the education system to Latvian as the sole language of instruction, it no longer meets the standards of the Framework Convention. In particular, the Advisory Committee indicated that, following a significant reduction in minority language education in 2018, a second reform adopted in 2022 aims at the phasing out of teaching in minority languages in most public and private preschools, schools, and universities by 2025. It was noted that, while exceptions will apply to a small number of schools teaching in Polish and Ukrainian, the termination of teaching in Belarusian and Russian will affect about 20 percent of all children of schooling age. The AC FCNM also emphasised that, with plans also underway to discontinue the teaching of Russian as a foreign language, the offer will be reduced to extracurricular courses of language and culture. The Advisory Committee concluded that should all these measures be implemented as planned, Latvia's system of minority education will no longer comply with the Framework Convention's provisions regarding equal access to education, the right to set up private minority educational establishments, and the right to being taught the minority language or for receiving instruction in this language. The Committee also noted the differential treatment of minority languages by the Latvian authorities depending on whether or not they are also EU official languages and whether or not they are covered by bi- or multilateral agreements. In this regard, the AC FCNM indicated that Russian and Belarusian do not fall under either of these categories and are therefore in a less favourable position. The Committee also stressed that the cutback of provisions for the use of the Russian language also limits the access to rights of persons belonging to other minorities whose first language is Russian.[1153]
Against this background, the efforts of official Riga, noted by the AC FCNM, to preserve the Livonian language, spoken by around 40 people, or Latgalian, which is more widely spoken but still not comparable to the number of Russian speakers in Latvia, seem quite contrasting. However, the Latvian authorities are making efforts and providing funding to preserve these languages, even to the extent of establishing the Institute of the Livonian Language at the University of Latvia and teaching Latgalian in 17 schools.
The AC FCNM urged the Latvian authorities to substantially reconsider the decision to move to full Latvian language education in view of its possible negative consequences for equal access to quality education for children belonging to national minorities. The Latvian authorities were called upon to monitor closely the impact of any measures on children's educational outcomes, with particular attention to preschool and primary education and to children with special educational needs. The Advisory Committee also recommended that the Latvian authorities ensure that members of national minorities can establish and manage their own private educational institutions offering instruction in minority languages at all levels. Moreover, Riga was called upon to reconsider the decision to phase out bilingual education in close consultation with representatives of the national minorities concerned. In particular, the Committee emphasised the importance of providing part of the education in a minority language and of teaching a minority language as part of the core curriculum at all levels, if parents so wish, and not just as an elective subject. The AC FCNM also pointed out the need to develop educational programmes based, inter alia, on data on the demand and level of proficiency of children from national minorities in both Latvian and their mother tongue. The Advisory Committee is of the view that this would require the effective participation of minority representatives in the development of such programmes, as well as in the preparation of relevant learning materials and teaching methods, and in the training of teachers.
Pending the publication of the AC FCNM's opinion, in January 2024, Latvian media circulated a commentary by the Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stating that official Riga considered the Advisory Committee's stated requirements unacceptable because they allegedly ignored the "factual and historical situation", including "the fact of the Soviet occupation and its unfavourable impact on the indigenous inhabitants of Latvia".[1154] The recommendation to use national minority languages in public communication, according to the authorities of this Baltic state, contradicts the Constitution of the Republic of Latvia, which establishes Latvian as the only state language. Latvia also accused the AC FCNM of being "biased" in favour of residents of Russian origin and their rights at the expense of other minorities. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs directly expressed Latvia's disagreement with the Advisory Committee's recommendations to reconsider the decision to switch to Latvian language education and abandon the bilingual education model, as "Latvian is the only official state language, whose status is confirmed both in the Constitution and the State Language Law".
Although there are no formal restrictions on participation in political life and public administration in Latvia (except for the disgraceful problem of "non‑citizens"), the current version of the Saeima Election Law prohibits the participation of persons who were members of certain Soviet organisations after 13 January 1991 (the Committee for State Security, the Communist Party of Latvia, the International Front of the Working People of the Latvian SSR, etc.). This makes it possible to exert pressure on the forces of the radical left (for this reason, for example, the co‑chair of the Latvian Russian Union, Tatyana Zhdanok, cannot take part in the elections). Since 2013, there has also been a procedure for depriving deputies of their mandate due to insufficient knowledge of the state language (this has been applied to the mayors of the cities of Zilupe and Daugavpils, as well as several deputies from predominantly "Russian" municipalities).
The Latvian authorities took advantage of the special military operation launched by Russia to begin the widespread introduction of the culture of "cancelling Russia". In June 2022, a request agreed by the State Language Centre was submitted to the Riga City Council to rename the capital's streets named after Russian scientists and cultural figures. There is no doubt that this initiative will be implemented, especially since the Latvian authorities are sympathetic to the "civic activism" of nationalist forces that present such ideas. In July 2022, the Centre of Public Memory collected 78 names that "glorify" the USSR and Russia and that they believe should be changed. Most of them are in Riga – 16, Daugavpils – 9, and Jurmala – 6. In addition to the names of Russian personalities and names associated with Russia, the list included many names of Latvian writers and public figures from the Soviet era.[1155]
On 19 June 2023, Latvian President Egils Levits called on the Saeima to adopt a law on the changing of names introduced as a result of the Communist totalitarian regime and russification policies. Municipal authorities are taking similar steps. Thus, in February 2024, the Riga City Council put forward an initiative to change the names of the following streets: Maskavas (Moscow) to Latgales, Lomonosov – to Valerijas Seiles, Gogol – to Emilijas Benjaminas, Pushkin – to Karlis Milenbahs, Lermontov – to Vilis Pludons, and Turgenev – to Vilhelms Purvitis. Vice-Mayor of Riga Edvards Ratnieks said the return of the name of Latgales to Moskovas Street would be a "restoration of historical justice". The renaming of Riga's Moscow Street, one of the longest streets in the Latvian capital, was discussed in the spring of 2023. It has been called Moscow Street since 1859, with a short break of two years from 1938 to 1940, when it was called Latgales, after which it was again called Moscow Street.[1156] On 16 February 2024, the initiative to change the name was approved.
In December 2023, the Latvian State Security Service initiated a politicised criminal case "for violation of sanctions" against the House of Moscow in Riga and its director, and conducted searches and seizures of documentation and electronic storage media.
Latvia persecutes anyone who has the courage to attend events in Russia. For example, in February 2024, the Latvian Hockey Federation suspended the licences of Latvian athletes who had taken part in the international Games of the Future competition in Russia.[1157]
Russophobia is deeply rooted among Latvian politicians, who have allowed themselves to make discriminatory statements about Russians. Inter-ethnic confrontation has often been aggravated by such statements. For instance, on 26 May 2022, Janis Iesalnieks, a member of the Saeima from the National Alliance, stated in a parliamentary session that "there are two societies in Latvia – Latvians and the occupiers" and "as long as the occupiers walk on our land and celebrate their monuments, our children will live in hatred". In July 2022, National Alliance MEP Inese Vaidere expressed outrage on social media that Riga Airport announces flights in three languages (Latvian, English, and Russian) and its website is also available in Russian. Andrejs Faibusevics, a National Alliance deputy, banned the use of Russian in his bar in the Russian-speaking city of Daugavpils. He also published a racist post about Latvian boxer Mairis Briedis, who speaks Russian. Apparently not daring to express his "complaints" to the boxer in person, the deputy wrote that if Briedis had not spoken Russian, he "would have remained a normal Latvian instead of turning into a 'vatnik'. The problem is the ability to consume Russian information. Figuratively speaking, when you walk through a pigsty, it's quite difficult not to get your feet dirty".[1158] On 24 August 2022, Latvian President Egils Levits declared that the negative effect of the "war in Ukraine" was the emergence of "a part of Russian society that is disloyal to the state" and that "the task is to subdue and isolate it". On 16 December 2022, Alexandrs Kirsteins, a member of the Saeima, proposed deporting 250,000 Russian-speaking residents from the country. Earlier, he said on his social media page that the Russian nation does not exist and that "the Russian language emerged as a dialect when the Mongol-Tatars tried to speak Ukrainian".[1159] In January 2024, it was reported that Janis Dombrava, a member of the Latvian Saeima, said that Latvians were still forced to communicate in the "language of the colonists". Latvian politicians are also making calls against Russian citizens living in the country. Thus, former Minister of Defense Artis Pabriks said that Russian citizens should either integrate or return to their homeland.[1160]
Such russophobic manifestations, some of which border on dense ignorance, have not come out of the blue. Data collected by international universal and regional human rights monitoring mechanisms have repeatedly revealed the spread of intolerance towards various groups in Latvia. Thus, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) referred to a 2016 survey conducted by the Latvian Centre for Human Rights among representatives of NGOs, migrants, and foreign students, which found that almost 68 percent of respondents had been victims of hate speech, hate crime, or discrimination, and 33 percent had witnessed or heard about such incidents from others. Thirteen percent of respondents had been victims of attacks or had heard of other victims. According to respondents, hate crime incidents occurred due to victim's race (36 percent), ethnic origin/xenophobia (25 percent), language (22 percent), and religion (6 percent). More than 40 percent of third-country nationals reported experiencing discrimination, for example when interacting with government authorities, the police, medical facilities, when passing through border checkpoints, on the street, and on public transport.[1161]
ECRI also pointed out the gaps in Latvian legislation concerning the prohibition of racial discrimination, as well as the public expression of or incitement to hatred, and insults based on race, language, religion, or ethnic origin. The Commission also noted an increase in Islamophobic rhetoric in public and political discussions in Latvia.[1162]
The UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination noted that "unofficial data show a higher number of hate crimes and hate speech than are officially reported" by the Latvian authorities and was concerned "at reports that victims of hate crimes are unwilling to report crimes to the authorities". The Committee also pointed out to the use of hate speech by politicians in relation to the upcoming elections, including online.[1163] This observation by the CERD is regularly confirmed in practice by the Latvian authorities. An example of this is the statement by the then Latvian Minister of Defence, Artis Pabriks, who, during the spread of the coronavirus infection in 2020, proposed not to treat those who came to pay tribute to the Red Army soldiers at the monument to the Liberators of Riga on 9 May, and instead to oblige them to pay for the treatment of "those who were around them".
The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights expressed concern about the absence of a comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation and policy framework aimed at ensuring equality and non-discrimination in the economic, social, and cultural domains. The CESCR also noted the prevalence of prejudice and discrimination based on colour, language, religion, and national or ethnic origin that hinder disadvantaged and marginalised groups' access to economic, social, and cultural rights.[1164]
The Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities also noted discrimination against national minorities in Latvia in 2023. For example, the AC FCNM pointed out that the approach of official Riga to building societal cohesion on the basis of the Latvian language, accompanied by a large range of measures on minority rights, unduly restricts these persons' rights and is therefore not in conformity with Latvia's obligations under the Framework Convention. The AC FCNM indicated that in addition to the educational reform, which has narrowed national minorities' rights, the Latvian authorities are also pursuing restrictive policies in areas such as employment, participation in public affairs including elections, language use in the media, topographical signage, identity documents, and contact with the administration. The Committee emphasised that the authorities' predominant focus on the use of the Latvian language, whilst restricting the rights of persons belonging to national minorities, risks worsening inter-ethnic relations rather than promoting social cohesion and integration, as claimed by the Latvian authorities.[1165]
The AC FCNM also cited data from a 2022 report on hate speech. Based on this data, the Advisory Committee indicated that such manifestations constitute a serious problem, particularly on social media and websites. It was noted that hate speech on ethnic grounds is widespread, especially against Latvians, but also against Russians or "Russian-speaking" people. Hate speech peaks on certain dates, in particular 9 May, and also increases in relation to political decisions on issues of social integration or education, as well as in the context of the special military operation conducted by Russia.
It was also noted that negative stereotypes and prejudices against Roma are widespread and are reinforced by the media, which often portray Roma as criminals. According to the AC FCNM, public reaction to such discriminatory statements is usually weaker, as anti-Gypsy remarks are perceived as normal in Latvian society. Anti-Semitic rhetoric and conspiracy theories of a corresponding ethnic nature are also widespread, for example in the context of the COVID‑19 pandemic.
Discriminatory attitudes towards migrants are also reported in Latvia. This issue has been noted by various international human rights mechanisms. The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees has repeatedly drawn attention to the need to review Latvia's refugee policy on the border with Belarus. On 9 August 2022, the Council of Europe's Commissioner for Human Rights sent a letter to the Latvian Ministry of the Interior calling on the Latvian authorities to "ensure access to border areas for representatives of civil society, international organisations, and the media in order to provide adequate humanitarian assistance to people in need" and to "protect borders in a manner consistent with the country's obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights". The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights pointed out that there were recurring cases of pushbacks of illegal migrants across borders in Latvia. At the same time, it was noted that Latvian legislation allows border guards to expel illegal migrants from Latvia to the countries from which they entered Latvian territory. It was also indicated, with reference to the International Organization for Migration, that one migrant had died on the Belarus-Latvian border due to prolonged exposure to the cold in winter.[1166]
In July 2022, the NGO "Amnesty International" also expressed concern about the Latvian authorities' intention to extend the state of emergency in areas near the eastern border, which allows to refuse asylum to refugees and migrants. Experts reproached the Latvian authorities for the fact that people trying to enter the country from Belarus (mainly Afghan and Iraqi citizens) faced stiff resistance from law enforcement agencies of the Baltic state.
As early as August 2021, in response to the migrants' complaints, the ECtHR ruled that the Latvian authorities had an obligation to respect the refugees' basic human rights, namely to provide them with food, temporary shelter, and medical care. This position was last expressed by the ECtHR in January 2023 in relation to a group of Syrian migrants. And on 6 February 2023, in a letter to the Latvian Ministry of the Interior, the Council of Europe's Commissioner for Human Rights called for an end to repression and respect for the human rights of refugees seeking protection at the border with Belarus.
On 8 August 2023, the Latvian Cabinet of Ministers decided to introduce an enhanced regime of protection of the Belarus-Latvian border, citing the growing flow of illegal migrants and the presence of "Wagner" PMC fighters in Belarus. In September 2023, Latvian Minister of the Interior Rihards Kozlovskis announced Latvia's plans to build a fence even on swamps as part of measures to strengthen the border with Belarus.[1167]
The discriminatory actions of the Latvian authorities are confirmed by real examples. There are regular incidents of Belarusian border guards finding beaten migrants on the borders with the Baltic states. In mid-December 2022, Belarusian border guards found a refugee who had been forcibly expelled from Latvia. By the foreigner's own account, he was in Latvia on his way to Germany. After being detained by the Latvian police, he was taken to a forest and left on the border with Belarus. According to the Belarusian Border Committee, the refugee said he had been staying in Latvia with his brother. However, his relative died in a Latvian hospital, where he had been taken after being beaten by local police officers.[1168]
The media reported another incident in late March 2024, when Belarusian border guards found a beaten migrant on the border with Latvia on 23 March. He was a citizen of the Republic of Congo. He said that people in military uniform had beaten him on Latvian territory. They punched and kicked him and used a stun gun. Instead of offering him help, food, and water, representatives of the Latvian side took him to the border.[1169]
All of the above indicates that the Latvian authorities are deliberately pandering to radical manifestations of neo-Nazism; by continuing the violent revision of historical events and glorifying Latvian legionnaires under the false pretext of their alleged participation in the "national liberation movement", the Latvian authorities have actually set a course to put Nazi ideology into practice. The policy of racial discrimination against the Russian and Russian-speaking population of Latvia, mainly "non-citizens", is a convincing confirmation thereof.
The Lithuanian authorities openly pursue a course of falsifying the history of World War II and glorifying Nazi collaborators, honouring them as participants in the struggle for "national independence" and equating them with national heroes.
As in a number of other European countries, Lithuania's State policy of falsifying the history of the World War II is based on the thesis that the Soviet Union and Hitler's Germany were equally responsible for unleashing the war. At the same time, the country's authorities openly justify the crimes of Nazi collaborators and Forest Brothers. In addition, there is widespread discrimination against national minorities, primarily in the educational sphere. Persecution, including on political grounds, is directed primarily against the Russian-speaking population of the country. There are also numerous cases of restrictions on freedom of expression. In recent years, hatred against Russians and everything related to the USSR and Russia, including monuments in honor of Soviet soldiers who died during the liberation of Lithuania from fascism, has been added to this. At the same time, Lithuania's anti-Russian actions, as well as those of Latvia and Estonia, have long ago gone beyond the legal framework and are looking more and more like something described by G.Orwell.
Such an aggressive Russophobic course is contrary to the interests of the Lithuanian state and its citizens. Experts note that such actions of official Vilnius together with support for the neo-Nazi regime in Kiev cause serious degradation of the economic situation in the country. Lithuania, as well as other Baltic states, was among the EU leaders in terms of GDP and industrial production decline. Accordingly, the country's population is experiencing a sharp rise in the price of basic goods and services, rising utility tariffs and high inflation. This is confirmed by numerous facts.[1170] Thus, in November 2023, members of the Seimas adopted amendments to the Law on Food, which allowed from 1 January 2024, the sale of food products suitable for consumption after the expiration date. This innovation was presented as a measure to reduce food waste.[1171] In addition, in 2023, the idea of issuing food cards, which emerged in 2018, was revived. In February 2024, the first delivery of social cards for the purchase of food and consumer goods to municipal administrations and the "Maisto Bankas" Charity and Support Foundation began.[1172]
The actions of the Lithuanian delegation in voting in the UN General Assembly on the traditional resolution "Combating the glorification of Nazism, neo-Nazism and other practices that contribute to the escalation of contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance", which Russia, together with co-sponsors from all regions of the world, annually submits to the General Assembly, serve as a convincing demonstration of the true aspirations of the Lithuanian elites. Until 2022, representatives of Lithuania, following the foreign policy guidelines of the EU Brussels, consistently (except for 2011, when Lithuania voted "against") abstained from voting on this resolution. In 2022-2023, when voting on the draft resolution, the Lithuanian delegation, also acting in unison with former Axis powers and other countries of the "collective West", voted against the document, thus publicly confirming its support for Nazism.
At the highest level, the Lithuanian authorities regularly voice revisionist assessments and outright falsifications of historical facts.
Along with the traditional long-standing Marches held by Lithuanian neo-Nazi organizations and right-wing forces on the occasion of the public holidays of 16 February ("Day of Restoration of Lithuanian Statehood") and 11 March ("Day of Restoration of Lithuanian Independence"), the political establishment of the Republic of Lithuania, in an impulse of historical revisionism, has set a course for the demolition of monuments to Soviet soldiers located at the burial sites of Red Army soldiers throughout the country in 2022. This policy is motivated by the authorities' desire to get rid of the "totalitarian legacy". This policy is motivated by the authorities' desire to get rid of the "totalitarian legacy". After the communist period of the country's history was officially recognized as an "occupation" on a par with the Nazi occupation, all objects reminiscent of that time, primarily monuments, became targets for destructive efforts of Lithuanian leaders at all levels.
On 13 December 2022, the Lithuanian Seimas adopted by majority vote the "Law on the Desovietization of Lithuanian Public Spaces", which entered into force on 1 May 2023. This document prohibits "propaganda of totalitarian and authoritarian regimes and their ideology" in the country.[1173], [1174] The law also creates conditions for the demolition of unwanted monuments, memorial sites, as well as renaming of street names and other placenames. The initiators of the bill themselves did not conceal that this initiative is aimed at creating conditions for the removal from all public places of Soviet monuments, other memorial objects, names of streets, squares and other objects, which they declared "symbols of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes".
Lithuanian political elites continue their efforts to destroy everything connected with Russia. Thus, at the end of June 2024, the Seimas Committee on Law and Order approved a bill declaring the Communist Party a "criminal organization". The said document, in particular, proposes to prohibit members of the Lithuanian Communist Party who have held leadership positions from participating in the political and diplomatic activities of the republic. At the same time, attention is drawn to the scandal that broke out in 2023 in Lithuania, when it turned out that the country's president G. Nauseda had previously been a member of the Communist Party, but kept silent about this "shameful" fact of his biography during the election campaign in 2019. Documents from the Lithuanian Special Archive, confirming this fact, were published in 2023 by Lithuanian journalist D. Panzerovas. It turned out that in May 1988, G. Nauseda wrote an application requesting to be admitted to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and a month later he became a full-fledged communist.[1175]
In fact, the Russian Federation's Special military operation to denazify and demilitarize Ukraine and protect the civilian population of Donbas was used by the Lithuanian authorities as a pretext for such actions. After the start of the Special military operation, a wave of vandalism swept through Lithuanian populated areas, resulting in the desecration of some 30 memorials and obelisks, mostly located at military burial sites. Law enforcement authorities reported the initiation of investigations into the incidents, but no vandal was ever punished.
It is obvious that the Lithuanian authorities are not interested in solving such crimes and are ready to turn a blind eye to them, since such actions fully fit in with their own political course. An example is the situation around the monument to the Soviet soldier in Kurkliai, Anikščiai district, which was desecrated by vandals on 10 April 2022. On 18 May 2022, the Utena District Prosecutor's Office issued a ruling to terminate the pre-trial investigation of the incident "due to the absence of a crime". This result was facilitated by the fact that on 5 May the sculpture had already been dismantled by decision of the local government.[1176]
In addition, in April 2022, the Lithuanian Seimas approved amendments to the Code of Administrative Offenses to ban the public display of the St.George Ribbon, which was seen as a symbol of a "totalitarian regime" that "promotes military aggression".[1177]
Vandalism of Soviet monuments is condoned and even encouraged by the top officials of the Lithuanian state. Thus, President G.Nauseda (who lived almost half of his life in the USSR, or rather in the Lithuanian SSR as a part of the Soviet Union) made it clear that he does not intend to "put up with vestiges of Soviet propaganda".[1178] And Prime Minister I.Šimonīte, who also attended a Soviet school in her childhood, stated that she allegedly did not understand "why monuments are considered as some kind of heritage and in general – what kind of heritage they are".[1179] The Lithuanian Minister of Culture S.Kairis also took a similar approach. The Lithuanian Minister of Culture S.Kairis also distinguished himself in this approach. On 19 April 2022, he signed an order allowing local governments to determine the future of "aggression-emitting and war-symbolizing" Soviet monuments in cemeteries.[1180] At the same time, the Lithuanians made a formal reservation that the graves of the fallen with tombstones would remain untouched, because, they said, Vilnius undertook to fulfill the relevant provisions of the relevant Geneva Conventions. In practice, however, this was often not respected.
In April 2022, the Kaunas authorities demolished a monument at the military cemetery in Aukšteji Šanciai depicting a Soviet soldier. In this cemetery are buried 5065 soldiers and officers of several rifle corps of the 5th Army of the 3rd Belorussian Front who died in July 1944 in battles in this area, including 12 Heroes of the Soviet Union.[1181]
In May 2022, the Lithuanian authorities demolished the monument to Soviet soldiers in Palanga, erected on the grave of 106 Red Army soldiers who died fighting the Nazis. The Mayor of Palanga S.Vaitkus pathetically called this heinous act "a new page in the history of the city". The municipal authorities explained their action by the fact that the sickle and hammer on the monument allegedly did not fit well with the church building next to it. However, the most probable reason is that in close proximity to the demolished monument there is a monument to Jonas Žemaitis, who during World War II served in the Nazi punitive unit "Lithuanian Local Detachment" and later led nationalist gangs – for all these crimes he was executed in 1954.
On 4-6 July 2022, the dismantling of the sculpture of the three soldiers, the sword, and the red star with the eternal flame actually destroyed the memorial to the Red Army soldiers in Klaipeda.[1182]
In October 2022, in Raudone, Jurbarka district, a monument at the burial site of Soviet soldiers, a sculpture of a soldier holding a banner in his hands, was demolished. The remains of 190 soldiers and officers from the Red Army units that liberated the town from the Nazis and their henchmen in October 1944 were buried in this military cemetery.
In total, in 2022 Lithuanian municipal authorities reportedly decided to demolish about 20 monuments, memorials, obelisks and other memorial objects, including in the largest cities of the country.[1183]
The struggle against the memory of the heroic feat of liberating Lithuania from Nazi invaders peaked in the demolition of the Antakalnis Cemetery in Vilnius, where the largest Red Army burial ground in Lithuania is located (3,098 soldiers and officers of the Red Army, including five heroes of the Soviet Union, are buried there), of six monuments representing Soviet soldiers of various branches of the armed forces and the central element of the memorial.[1184]
For decades, this monument was the main place where the Embassy of the Russian Federation held wreath-laying ceremonies on the memorable dates of the Great Patriotic War. Russian compatriots also gathered there en masse on such days.
The sacrilegious actions to destroy the monument were repeatedly preceded by barbaric acts of desecration of the memorial by local vandals. In October 2022, the Russian Investigative Committee opened a criminal case on these facts.
In June 2022, the Vilnius authorities decided to demolish the memorial. Mayor R.Shimashyus at a meeting of the City Council called the monument "a militaristic monstrosity that does not correspond to the graves".[1185] At the end of November 2022, demolition work began,[1186] which was completed on 9 December. The destruction of the monument was not prevented by the appeal of the UN Human Rights Committee to the Lithuanian authorities not to destroy the memorial. This appeal for interim measures against the memorial steles was sent to Vilnius after the Committee received a complaint from a group of concerned Lithuanian citizens against the actions of the authorities.[1187]
Commenting on the actions of the Vilnius authorities, who ignored the appeal of the international organization, Mayor R.Šimasius called this act of vandalism a response to "Russian aggression" and agreed that "the UN is not an institution that has the right to tell Lithuania or Vilnius whether the symbols of totalitarianism can be located there".
The chairman of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation instructed to make a legal assessment of the actions of those involved.
On 7 February 2024, Lithuanian authorities announced the completion of the demolition of the monument to Soviet soldiers-liberators in Antakalnis cemetery.[1188] On 22 February 2024, on the occasion of Defender of the Fatherland Day, employees of the Russian Embassy in Lithuania laid a wreath and flowers to what was left after the barbaric intervention. The Embassy emphasized that this time it was impossible to hold the commemorative event in the central part of the memorial complex, as the Lithuanian authorities continue the barbaric destruction of this largest war memorial in Lithuania. The Embassy published several photos from the Antakalnis Cemetery. The images show a broken tombstone, a muddy road damaged by heavy machinery to the place where the war memorial used to stand not so long ago.[1189]
The destruction of the memorial did not prevent concerned residents of Vilnius and other Lithuanian cities, who honor the feat of Soviet soldiers, to pay tribute to them on 9 May 2024. Candles were brought to the burial site itself, as well as to the place where the memorial to Soviet soldiers used to stand, and flower arrangements and wreaths were placed. Lithuanian police officers were on duty at the site, who scrupulously recorded the developments.[1190]
Since 2018, when the Lithuanian authorities began active steps to systematically destroy Soviet military monuments, until the beginning of 2023, the majority of such monuments in the country were demolished. But this did not seem enough to the initiators, and in 2024 they proceeded to a new stage.
The Lithuanian authorities have been determined to demolish monuments to Red Army soldiers up to the present time. In February 2024, the Lithuanian Seimas unanimously adopted a resolution on the continuation of decommunization of the Republic of Lithuania on the proposal of the head of the ruling faction in the parliament, R.Morkunaite-Mikulienė, which calls on the authorities of Lithuanian cities to more actively demolish Soviet monuments.[1191]
In the same month, a group of parliamentarians introduced amendments to laws in the Seimas that would allow the remains of Soviet soldiers to be removed from cities and towns and reburied in ordinary cemeteries located remotely. It also proposes that in cases where graves and cemeteries are recognized as "propagandizing totalitarian, authoritarian regimes and their ideology," they should be allowed to be destroyed, even though they are listed in the Register of Cultural Property.[1192]
On 13 June 2024, these amendments were adopted. Eighty-nine parliamentarians voted in favor, five abstained, and no votes were cast against them. From now on, Lithuanian legislation considers graves of Soviet soldiers as objects subject to the prohibition of "propaganda of totalitarian, authoritarian regimes and their ideologies". Thus, the provision prohibiting the liquidation of graves and cemeteries included in the "Register of Cultural Property" no longer applies to soldiers' graves.[1193]
According to media reports, these amendments were made in response to a request from two Lithuanian municipalities, Pumpenai (Pasvale district) and Šauliai. In these two cities the local authorities had previously demolished monuments at the mass graves of Soviet soldiers located in the city center. And in Pumpenai, the burial site itself was even destroyed. It was carried out in July 2023 by the public organization "Service for the Protection of Cultural Property", which acted with the permission of the local authorities. The remains of 31 Red Army soldiers were exhumed and subsequently buried in another place, much less visited. The Lithuanian Department of Cultural Heritage, explaining the reasons for this barbaric act, stated that "over the years, the social need to make the central square of the town of Pumpenai, where the burial site was located until now, the main place of public life has become obvious".[1194]
On 8 July 2024, it became known that the authorities of Šiauliai are planning to use the adopted law and move the remains of 52 Soviet soldiers who liberated the city from the Nazis from the city center to a regular cemetery. On this occasion, the Mayor of the city A.Visotskas stated the following: "Some burials of Soviet soldiers of World War II were tendentiously and deliberately arranged in representative places of settlements in order to instill a sense of gratitude and moral obligation to the soldiers of the [Soviet] occupation army, to glorify it".[1195]
At the same time, cases of vandalism of the few surviving memorials to Soviet soldiers continue to be recorded. On 23 February 2024, two Red Army burial sites were desecrated in Alytus County in southern Lithuania. One of the targets of vandals was a memorial sign at the place where the Nazi concentration camp for prisoners of war "Stalag 343" was established on the territory of the barracks in Alytus in 1941‑1943, and then from May 1943 to July 1944 it also held persons displaced from the western regions of Russia. About 20,000 people died in this camp. The second victim of vandals was the monument in Druskininkai at the mass grave of 250 Red Army soldiers who died in July 1944 during the liberation of the city.[1196]
The Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation is investigating the destruction of memorials erected in memory of Red Army soldiers who died fighting the Nazis. In September 2023, the Investigative Committee reported that it had 16 criminal cases under investigation for 143 cases of desecration, destruction or damage to war graves, monuments and memorials to Soviet soldiers. For the commission of these crimes, 173 foreign nationals – citizens of Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Poland and Ukraine – have been brought as defendants in absentia.[1197] On 24 February 2024, the head of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation Alexander Bastrykin instructed to investigate the desecration of the memorial sign to Soviet soldiers in Druskininkai.[1198]
In October 2023, the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs declared the chairperson of the Historical Memory Commission of the Vilnius City Council Kamile Šeraite wanted for active efforts to "desovietize" Vilnius.[1199] In December 2022, after the Lithuanian Seimas adopted a law on the desovietization of public space and announced the city authorities' plans to remove Soviet symbols and inscriptions in Russian from 16 monuments and memorial plaques in the capital, Kamile Šeraite pointed out the need to rid the city of the ideology of sickle and hammer.
On 13 February 2024, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia declared the Minister of Culture of Lithuania S.Kairis wanted in the case of destruction of monuments to Soviet soldiers.[1200]
The former Mayor of Vilnius R.Šimasius was also declared wanted.[1201]
Another area of struggle against the Soviet heritage was the renaming of topographical names. As noted above, in December 2022, the Lithuanian parliament passed a law banning propaganda of totalitarian regimes, otherwise the document is called the "law on desovietization of public space" (it became effective in May 2023). The law prohibits the propaganda of "totalitarian, authoritarian regimes" and prescribes the removal from public space of public objects promoting them. The Soviet Union is one of the regimes that official Vilnius considers to be subject to the new law. Local authorities have been given twenty days to collect and submit materials on the sites covered by the new law. The new law makes it easier for Lithuanian authorities to deal with Soviet heritage sites. It allows not only to destroy monuments and other memorial objects, but also to rename streets, squares and public objects. Even images of people fall under the law.[1202] The adopted law refers to Soviet party figures – objects dedicated to them were gotten rid of back in the early 1990s – but to Lithuanian writers, poets and artists who lived safely under the USSR and received badges of honor from the Soviet government for their merits.[1203]
In 2023, 13 streets were renamed in Lithuania, the names of which were associated with the country's "Soviet past". In seven cases, new names were given to Piatras Cvirki Street, in three cases to Ludas Gira Street, in one case to Teofilis Tilvitis Street, in one case to Yuriy Gagarin Street, and to Pioneriu (Pionerskaya) Street.[1204]
In June 2023, the Commission for Desovietization, established by a Seimas decision, stated that it had found three monuments in Lithuania that it considered to "propagandize authoritarian regimes" and recommended their removal. In addition to these objects, it recognized the names of two streets as "propagandizing authoritarian regimes". Thus, it is about the monument to Forest Brother Juozas Krikštaponis in Ukmerg district, which the Lithuanian Jewish Community had earlier demanded to demolish. In addition, the commission noted a monument to Soviet soldiers in Šalčininkai district. The commission also recommended the demolition of the monument to Antanas Ubagiavičius in Anikščiai district, who was the secretary of the Komsomol organization. In 1947 he was shot dead as a Soviet activist. The commission also felt that the street of Piatras Cvirka in Gargždai, a classic of Lithuanian literature who is condemned in modern Lithuania for collaborating with the Soviet authorities, should be renamed. Another street – Yuriy Gagarin Street in Gruzdziai – should not be renamed, but an explanatory plaque should be erected because, according to Commission Chairman V.Karrčiauskas, "his name was used by the Soviet authorities as an instrument of ideological influence".[1205]
At the end of February 2024, the desovietization commission decided that streets in Lithuanian cities named after the Soviet writer Salomeja Neris[1206] should be renamed.[1207]
However, the process of changing the names of streets and other topographical objects was not so fast in Lithuania. By November 2023 already, more than half of Lithuania's municipalities had raised questions about the compliance of public places and monuments with the "law on desovietization". According to media reports, the Center for the Study of Genocide and Resistance of Lithuanian Residents received inquiries and requests from 36 municipalities to evaluate the names of streets and institutions, monuments, sculptures, memorial plaques, and decorations of house facades located in their territories. Among the municipalities that sent requests were large cities such as Vilnius, Kaunas, Klaipeda, Šiauliai, Alytus.[1208]
The adopted law was also used by the Jewish Religious Community of Šiauliai County, which asked for clarification as to whether the memorial plaque hanging in the city to Jonas Noreika, an officer of the Lithuanian anti-Soviet partisan movement, was illegal, since, according to the latest information, he took part in the Holocaust. For the same reason, the issue of the memorial stone to "partisan" Juozas Krikštaponis (Kryštaponis) in Ukmerga was raised, which raises many questions among representatives of the Jewish community.[1209]
In some cases, renaming of topographical objects was postponed due to the position of local residents. For example, in Klaipeda, residents opposed the renaming of a street named after the Lithuanian and Soviet poet Ludas Gira. The decision to rename the street was made by the Center for the Study of Genocide and Resistance of Lithuanian Residents in August 2023, because its name "does not comply with the law on the prohibition of propaganda of totalitarian, authoritarian regimes and their ideologies". Klaipeda authorities tried to implement the decision to rename the street and even appealed to the city council, but "residents resisted the change." After that it was announced that the decision on the new name of the street will be made after the formation of a new commission on memorialization of famous people, historical dates, events and naming of streets. A similar situation occurred with the removal of a memorial plaque in honor of the Lithuanian and Soviet writer Antanas Ventslov from one of the houses of the city.[1210] However, given the determination of the central Lithuanian authorities to desovietize Lithuania, there is a high probability that the decision to change the name will be taken.
The Lithuanian authorities do not limit their efforts to "war" against Soviet memorials to Red Army soldiers and the renaming of topographical objects alone. The glorification of Nazi collaborators is also taking place in the sphere of education, as a result of which children are inculcated with the corresponding ideas – we know very well what can come out of this from the example of fascist Germany with its hateful Nazi ideology and the "Hitler Youth" ("Hitlerjugend").
The consolidation of the idea of the "Soviet occupation" of the Baltic States, which is unfolding as part of Lithuania's state policy of falsifying the history of the World War II, is manifested in school curricula, including sections on the glorification of the Lithuanian post-war banditry. In 2022, school administrations, with the approval of the authorities, took radical measures: they began to fire[1211] those teachers who demonstrated dissent in historical issues and on the current political agenda, primarily on the subject of Russia's Special military operation.
The whitewashing and glorification of the Forest Brothers (in the Lithuanian interpretation – "partisans", and in reality – bandits) is carried out under the guise of "heroes of the national liberation movement" and "fighters against the Soviet power". It should be recalled that the detachments of these "figures", numbering up to 30,000 people, which operated in Lithuania from 1944 to 1956, were responsible for the murders of more than 25,000 civilians, including children, women and the elderly. Most of the victims were ethnic Lithuanians. Many of the bandits were collaborators, members of the occupation administration of the Third Reich and were directly involved in the Holocaust in Lithuania during World War II, when about 220,000 Jews (96 percent of the Jewish population living in the territory at the time) were killed. According to eyewitnesses, the Forest Brothers came from the same villages whose inhabitants they murdered and robbed.[1212] After the war, they continued their terrorist activities, killing, in addition to the Soviet authorities, also those who had rescued Jews from the Nazis during the war.[1213]
In modern Lithuania, annual commemorations of the Forest Brothers are organized. Scientific works are published and various commemorative events are organized: installation of monuments and memorials to the Forest Brothers, search for and ceremonial reburial of their remains, publication and distribution of memories of collaborators, etc.
The first monument to the commander of the Forest Brothers A. Ramanauskas-Vanagas was erected in Vilnius in October 2020. The opening ceremony was attended by the Lithuanian president, prime minister and speaker of the Seimas.[1214]
In May 2021, in one of the cemeteries in Vilnius, in the presence of members of the Lithuanian parliament and representatives of the executive branch, including Deputy Defense Minister J.Tomkus, Lithuanian Army Commander Lt.Gen. Rupsis, as well as the director of the Center for the Study of Genocide and Resistance of Lithuanian Residents[1215] A.Bubnis, a monument to another Forest Brother A. Kraujalis, nicknamed "Siaubūnas" (translated from Lithuanian as "monster"), was unveiled. The tombstone was consecrated personally by the Catholic Archbishop G.Grushas[1216] (born and educated in the USA, and moved to Lithuania in the 1990s). One of the participants of the mentioned event is noteworthy – A.Bubnis, the head of the abovementioned Center, whose historical "scientific" achievements are very peculiar. For example, his work on World War II was sharply criticized by Jewish experts in Lithuania because of his position on the Holocaust.[1217]
In December 2021, the Vilnius authorities opened a new square in the capital and named it in honor of the "hero" J.Luksha, one of the most famous leaders of the Lithuanian anti-Soviet movement, a member of the "Lithuanian Activists' Front", as well as an agent of Western intelligence services, who was sent to Lithuania to fight against the Soviet power after the end of the Great Patriotic War (at the same time, the official Vilnius is silent about the fact that J.Luksha was an active participant of the Holocaust in Lithuania). This event was preceded by the decision of the Lithuanian parliament to declare 2021 the year of Luksha. An appeal to the parliament by the chairman of the Lithuanian Jewish Community (LJC), F.Kuklianski, demanding that the resolution be repealed, angered right-wing forces and provoked a scandal.[1218] Earlier, on the day of Luksha's death, Lithuania honored his "exploits" in the fight against the Soviet authorities. The event was attended by then Lithuanian Defense Minister Anušauskas, members of the Seimas, city Mayors and local residents. President G.Nauseda recalled that Luksa's remains had not yet been found and called it the duty of Lithuanians to find them. He also qualified this Forest Brother as an example of patriotism and courage for Lithuanian youth.[1219]
In Lithuania, a monument to the Nazi collaborator who served in the 2nd (12th) Lithuanian police battalion under the war criminal A.Impulyavičius[1220] and later joined the Forest Brothers J.Krikštaponis is preserved in Ukmergė (it was erected there because the place where he was liquidated by the Soviet security services is not far from the city). Lithuanian Jewish organizations repeatedly urged the city authorities to demolish it, but their efforts were unsuccessful. In June 2023, the chairwoman of the Lithuanian Jewish Community F.Kuklianski and the chairwoman of the Ukmerga Jewish Community A.Taitsas called for the demolition of the monument once again at a meeting with the new Mayor D.Varnas. F.Kuklianski emphasized that the issue of demolition of the monument to "partisan" Krikštaponis, who was one of the initiators of the extermination of Jews in Belarus, was raised in 2021, but was not resolved. She reminded that the criminal actions of Krikštaponis are documented, so "it is immoral to heroize him and worship a man responsible for the murder of thousands of Jews". This statement was made after the above-mentioned meeting, as representatives of Jewish organizations realized that the issue would not be resolved".[1221]
The facts of glorification of Nazi collaborators in Lithuania were brought to the attention of the U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Lithuania K.McDonald, who stated that Lithuania should remove from public space the monuments to participants of the Holocaust, even if they later opposed the Soviet regime. The ambassador pointed out that U.S. representatives are monitoring the condition of several such monuments, including those erected in honor of Nazi collaborators J. Krikštaponis and J. Noreika.[1222]
It was noteworthy that against the background of the scandal surrounding the monument to J. Krikštaponis in Ukmerga and the LJC's calls to remove this object, the Lithuanian nationalist party "National Association" decided to seek the preservation of this monument and at the same time demanded the demolition of the Soviet sculpture "Banners" installed in the same town. The justification for the demolition was that the "Banner Bearers" sculpture, installed on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the USSR, allegedly symbolizes the Soviet occupation. The party submitted such a request to the Desovietization Commission of the Center for the Study of Genocide and Resistance of Lithuanian Residents, noting publicly that the request was made because the local government did not want to demolish the Soviet sculpture. With regard to Krikštaponis, it was noted that his participation in the mass murder of Jews has not yet been proven by any court decision and "at the moment is only the opinion of individuals".[1223]
Antisemitic manifestations continue to be recorded in Lithuania. The ambiguous actions of the Lithuanian authorities also contribute to this. In 2020, the Seimas was considering a bill stipulating that neither the Lithuanian state nor its leaders are responsible for participation in the Holocaust during World War II.
For example, in November 2020, the Lithuanian Center for Human Rights posted information on its official Facebook page that an unknown person had attached a portrait of A.Impulyavičius to an exhibition stand dedicated to the researcher and public figure who was one of the victims of mass murder during the Paneriai massacre in the summer of 1941, Moshe Shalit.[1224] It was reported that the "soldier of the Lithuanian army" escaped responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity, namely, mass murders of people in Lithuania and Belarus. The publication states the fact of refusal of a part of Lithuanian society to recognize the crimes of the Holocaust. The role of some Lithuanian military, politicians and public figures in the realization of this terrible crime is also noted.
In late December 2022, the Parliament adopted amendments to the Law on Real Property of the Jewish Community, which provided for the allocation of 37 million euros for Jewish compensation payments for confiscated private property of Jewish community members during the Holocaust. Compensation payments for religious property expired in 2022, for which Lithuania allocated the same amount for compensation payments – 37 million euros. The funds allocated for the payment of compensation to individuals were supposed to be channeled into the Goodwill Fund, which is considered an instrument for the payment of compensation between 2024 and 2030 to surviving members of the Jewish community and their families for property taken from them during the war. The fund also finances other projects to assist the Lithuanian Jewish community.[1225] Lithuanian Prime Minister I. Šimonīte, who presented the bill, stated that its adoption would close the issue by establishing symbolic compensation for expropriated property.[1226]
At the same time, Lithuanian political circles shamefully conceal the facts of direct participation of ethnic Lithuanians in the mass extermination of Jews on the territory of this Baltic republic during the war years. Individual attempts to tell the truth meet with fierce resistance from the authorities. One such example is the book "Ours" by journalist R.Vanagaite, published in 2016, which caused a great scandal in Lithuania. The book tells about Nazi collaborators, in particular that the commander of the Forest Brothers A.Ramanauskas-Vanagas, who was declared a "national hero" in Lithuania, participated in the extermination of Jews during World War II.
Besides, the book reflects the facts of 2nd (12th) Kithuanian Police Battalion, in particular chaplain Zenonas Ignatavičius, staying in Belarus in 1941. The above statement is supported by the photo of the religious service of the chaplain for the Lithuanian punishers in Shatsk. In May 2019, a memorial plaque in honor of Z.Ignatavičius was unveiled in the Lithuanian town of Vilkia, and the accompanying news reports covering the event justified the immortalization with religious activities, omitting the fact of his collaboration with the German occupation authorities.[1227]
After the campaign against the writer, her books were withdrawn from sale and she was attacked by the Lithuanian nationalist public. The persecution of R.Vanagaite was not stopped by the publicly expressed support of the European Jewish Congress. Congress President M.Kantor called it unthinkable that in 2017, books with ideas that were undesirable to someone were not published for purely political reasons. The attacks on R.Vanagaite reminded him of "dark times." The Congress called on Lithuania's political elite and official authorities to examine the role of the country's citizens during the Nazi occupation to stop glorifying those who collaborated with the Nazis and those who were complicit in the murder of Jews. The organization also stressed that Lithuanians who saved Jews at the risk of their lives should not be forgotten.[1228]
As a result of the campaign against R.Vanagaite, her books were recognized as a threat to national security and withdrawn from sale. The persecution forced the writer to leave Lithuania.[1229]
At the same time, the Lithuanian government is making efforts to glorify the members of Nazi formations and hide surviving collaborators from the court. In early January 2022 it became known that the Lithuanian authorities (as well as Latvia earlier) officially refused to assist Belarus in the investigation of the criminal case of genocide of the Belarusian people during the Great Patriotic War. This was stated by the head of the investigation team of the General Prosecutor's Office of Belarus, V.Tolkachev. Vilnius and Riga refused to provide legal assistance to Minsk in the investigation of the mass murder of civilians, justifying that such cooperation could affect their national security matters.[1230] By equating the issues of bringing to justice Nazis guilty of committing grave crimes with national security, Lithuania and Latvia actually confirmed how important Nazi ideology and those who put it into practice, including on their own territory, are for them.
In February-March 2023, an exhibition of works by artist Jurgis Juodis was exhibited in the Lithuanian city of Prienai, as the organizers indicated in a press release. But they hid the fact that Jurgis Juodis served in the 2nd (12th) Lithuanian police battalion, which killed civilians and prisoners of war in Lithuania and Belarus during the Great Patriotic War.[1231] Former coworkers of J.Juodis called him an adjutant of the battalion commander – war criminal A.Impulyavičius.[1232]
The Lithuanian and Latvian authorities' determination to whitewash the Nazis and prevent their prosecution was also confirmed by the Prosecutor General's Office of the Republic of Belarus, which reported on 11 September 2023 that during the investigation of the criminal case on genocide the names of the executioners of the Belarusian people during the Great Patriotic War and the post-war period from among Lithuanian and Latvian punishers were established. "The 2nd Battalion, which arrived in the BSSR in October 1941 and was later renamed the 12th Battalion, took part in the extermination of death camp prisoners, massacres of civilians, destruction and looting of settlements".[1233]
The criminal activity of the 2nd (12th) Lithuanian Police Battalion only in the fall of 1941 on the territory of the BSSR consisted of many episodes of mass extermination not only of the civilian population, but also of murders of Soviet soldiers and prisoners of war.[1234]
Commenting on the visit to the Uruchye Tract, the Prosecutor General of the Republic of Belarus A.Shved said that in this sad place civilians and prisoners of war were mercilessly killed not only by German punitive units, but also by the infamous 2nd Lithuanian Police Battalion.[1235] The same conclusions have been drawn by Russian historians.[1236]
The General Prosecutor's Office of the Republic of Belarus has established and documented that the Nazis and their accomplices also actively created Latvian military-police formations, which included the Latvian SS Volunteer Brigade of the 1st and 2nd regiments, Latvian police battalions, the 19th Latvian Waffen–SS Volunteer Division and Latvian SD forces, which were named the Latvian SS Legion. A list of Nazi criminals among Latvian and Lithuanian punishers and the crimes they committed has been compiled and will be updated as new information becomes available. In the statement of the General Prosecutor's Office of Belarus it is also noted: "Having studied this list, there is no doubt in the far-fetched refusal of the political elites of Lithuania and Latvia to provide legal assistance in the investigation of the criminal case of genocide of the Belarusian people under the pretext of ‘causing harm to their sovereignty or security, rights and legitimate interests of citizens’. Such a position shows a blatant complicity in hiding war criminals, an elementary denial of the value of human life, evasion of the principle of inevitability of responsibility and ignoring international obligations".[1237]
The deliberate connivance of the Lithuanian authorities with modern Nazi followers is also confirmed by manifestations of antisemitism. For example, for many years, acts of vandalism at Jewish cemeteries have been a regular occurrence in the country. As a rule, the perpetrators are never found. In September 2021, the old Jewish cemetery "Piramontas" in the capital's Shnipiskes district was desecrated.[1238] A Nazi swastika was depicted on a plaque that called for respect for the final resting place of Jewish people.
In November 2021, the authorities of the Lithuanian city of Siauliai were forced to stop the construction of a bicycle route, as it turned out that it passes through the mass grave of Holocaust victims. The decision was not taken immediately: it was made only after the Jewish community raised the alarm.[1239]
In the spring of 2022, unknown perpetrators vandalized four times the memorial to Holocaust victims and World War II fallen in Paneriai near Vilnius. In a statement condemning these incidents, the Lithuanian Jewish Community noted "the apathy of the responsible authorities and the tolerance of society towards such attacks".[1240]
In May 2022, a monument to Holocaust victims erected in a forest near Darbenai, Kretinga district,[1241] was destroyed, and in November, the site of the murder of 11,000 Jews in Ukmerg district was desecrated.[1242]
In September 2022, another case of vandalism was recorded at the Paneriai memorial.
The official statistics of the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA)[1243] do not provide data on antisemitic manifestations in Lithuania for 2021. In 2022, Lithuanian law enforcement authorities registered two antisemitic incidents, both on the Internet, as well as three cases of vandalism against monuments to Holocaust victims. Three such incidents were recorded for 2020 and five for 2019.
It was also noted that five investigations into incitement to antisemitic hatred were opened in 2021 (13 in 2020). Of these five investigations in 2021, two were subsequently suspended due to the inability to identify the perpetrator, and another three investigations were terminated because no criminal offense was identified.[1244]
At the same time, the FRA had to note the absence of these non-governmental organizations. Thus, it turns out that the real statistics on manifestations of antisemitism are not published. The officially recorded data do not allow us to fully judge the manifestations of antisemitism in Lithuania.
Nationalist circles, the Department of State Security (Lithuania's main intelligence service) and the country's law enforcement agencies harass and repress anyone who publicly claims Lithuanian participation in the Holocaust and the mass murder of civilians. Vilnius is making active efforts in this direction, despite the fact that these unsightly facts have historical confirmation. In particular, the fact that Lithuanians themselves participated in the Holocaust has been pointed out to the Lithuanian authorities by LJC Chairperson F.Kuklianski.[1245]
In February 2023, the Lithuanian Jewish Community expressed indignation at the antisemitic statement of R.Laugalis, a local Conservative, the headman of Nemakščiai village in Raseiniai district, who said at a meeting with voters: "Whoever does not vote for me can bury himself in the Jewish cemetery".[1246]
In early May 2023, a blatantly Russophobic and at the same time antisemitic post by Seimas deputy R.Zemaitaitis was published on social networks in connection with the demolition by Israeli authorities of a Palestinian school built with EU money. Then he wrote that "in addition to Putin, another animal has appeared in the world – Israel" and quoted sayings about Jews with a call to kill them ("A Jew was climbing the stairs and accidentally fell down. Children, take a stick and kill this Jew"). Caught under a barrage of criticism from the country's top officials, R.Zemaitaitis stated unhesitatingly that he did not feel guilty. After the words of Lithuanian Prime Minister I.Shimonite during his visit to Israel in June 2023 about historical ties between Lithuanians and Jews, the odious deputy called these theses "nonsense" and declared the participation of Jews together with Russians in the "Holocaust of Lithuanians".[1247]
On 13 February 2024, vandals toppled the monument to the prisoners of the Jewish ghetto on Jokubo Street in Druskininkai. The monument was erected in 1992 on the site where a ghetto was established in the fall of 1941, where about a thousand Jews were deported. In November 1943, the ghetto was liquidated and the Jews in it were transported to the Kolbasino concentration camp near Grodno.[1248]
In the same month, Jewish communities in Vilnius and Šiauliai county were attacked, Nazi symbols appeared on a pedestrian bridge in the capital's Viršuliši district, and public transport was pasted with symbols of the extremist group. Vandals also vandalized the Vilnius Choral Synagogue and the synagogue on Geliu Street.
After these cases, LJC Chairperson F.Kuklianski publicly stated that such actions resemble an organized action. As the community noted, in the last few months the number of attacks on the Jewish community "has been growing exponentially", and the case in Druskininkai is only one of many. The manifestations of antisemitism have intensified after the hate speech of R.Zemaitaitis, and another aggravation of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict served as an additional trigger. According to Kuklianski, representatives of the Lithuanian Jewish community receive insulting messages every day, synagogues are vandalized, and antisemitic statements are heard from the Seimas.[1249]
The Lithuanian authorities were also forced to pay attention to the hate speech of Zemaitaitis amid the scandal. At the end of April, the Lithuanian Constitutional Court recognized that the deputy had violated his oath of office as a member of the Seimas and the country's constitution with his antisemitic statements. After that, the politician filed a petition to strip him of his mandate. In May 2024, the chief prosecutor of the Vilnius District Prosecutor's Office drew up an indictment and referred the criminal case against the person to the court for consideration. The indictment notes that as a state politician, Zemaitaitis publicly caused discord and provoked intolerance towards Jews. In 2023-2023, he posted texts on social networks in which he ridiculed, insulted and incited hatred towards a group of people of Jewish nationality. The prosecutor's office also indicated that the former MP publicly spread the idea of normalizing antisemitism during the plenary session of the Sejm on 9 May 2024, humiliating Jews and promoting hatred towards a group of people and individuals because of nationality. The criminal case was transferred to the Vilnius District Court.[1250]
It should be mentioned separately that the policy of official Vilnius to whitewash and glorify the Forest Brothers who took the most active part in the extermination of Jews is regularly and officially condemned, including by Israel, which claims that Lithuania is promoting "false narratives" about the history of the Holocaust.[1251] Moreover, in the early 2000s, Lithuania several times demanded from Israel the extradition of N.Dushanskiy, a veteran of the USSR state security agencies, but to no avail. The reason for the prosecution of the veteran by the Lithuanian authorities was the fact that N.Dushanskiy in the post-war years in Lithuania was engaged in the fight against gangs of Forest Brothers. He also published memoirs in which he wrote that the leaders of the Forest Brothers, who are now honored in Lithuania, took part in the Holocaust and committed crimes against civilians.
Even Washington criticized its Lithuanian "protégé". On 12 December 2022, E.Germain, the U.S. State Department's Special Representative for the Holocaust, called on Vilnius to recognize the fact that those people who "are praised, commemorated with monuments and seen as national heroes because they fought against the Soviets, were at the same time Nazi collaborators, participated in the crimes of Nazism, in genocide".[1252]
Names associated with fascists are still used in Lithuania. In some cases, their use creates direct references to Nazism. For example, since 2019, the international military exercise "Iron Wolf" (one of the largest tactical exercises in Lithuania) has been conducted in May at the Gaizhunai training range together with NATO units by a Lithuanian infantry brigade with the same name. In May 2023 they involved about four thousand troops from 11 NATO countries and more than one thousand units of military equipment.[1253] In 2024, the exercise took place for two weeks in June at the military training grounds of Gaižiunai and Kazlu Ruda, as well as on the territory of Kaunas, Jonava, Kaisiadora and Prainas districts. More than 3,700 Lithuanian military personnel and military units from Belgium, the Czech Republic, the United States, Luxembourg, Norway, the Netherlands and Germany were involved.[1254]
A similar name – "Iron Wolf" (Geležinis Vilkas) – was used by a Lithuanian nationalist antisemitic and fascist movement (also known as the "Association of Iron Wolves") founded in 1927, which called for the creation of a powerful state in the image of European fascist movements. Its members actively participated in massacres of Poles and Jews. Later, after the disintegration of the organization, its members joined Lithuanian collaborators and together with them continued to participate in the extermination of Baltic Jews. In 2021, the scandal of the exercise became public when German soldiers stationed in Lithuania as part of the NATO contingent organized a celebration of Hitler's birthday, during which they sang Nazi Marches and antisemitic songs, as well as mocked and beat fellow soldiers, including one of Afghan origin. According to German press reports, the Bundeswehr leadership condemned these unpleasant actions of their subordinates and decided to return them immediately to Germany for investigation.[1255]
Also within the modern paramilitary organization "Union of Lithuanian Riflemen", whose members during the Great Patriotic War defected to the German occupation authorities and later to the Forest Brothers, there is a unit named after General Povilas Plekhavicius, a collaborator who also collaborated with Nazi Germany.
In addition, denial of the Lithuanian assessment of the period of the country's being part of the USSR as "occupation" entails, under article 170 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, criminal prosecution for "denial of the Soviet occupation" with a penalty of up to two years' imprisonment. In addition to the pro-Nazi attitudes noted above, violations of the prohibition of retroactive application of the law, the principle of presumption of innocence and the right to a fair trial persist in Lithuania's legal sphere. These provisions are used by Lithuanian intelligence and law enforcement agencies and nationalist circles to persecute and harass anyone who expresses alternative views on Lithuanian domestic and foreign policy and history, and even more so to make public statements about the involvement of the Forest Brothers in the Holocaust and the massacre of civilians. According to a number of human rights defenders, Lithuania has developed a whole system of measures and ways to influence dissenters. Article 170-2 of the Lithuanian Criminal Code, which introduces criminal offenses, plays a significant role in this system.
A striking example is the multi-year trial on the politically fabricated criminal case of the notorious events at the Vilnius TV Tower in January 1991. On 31 March 2021, the Lithuanian Court of Appeal partially satisfied the prosecutor's protest against the decision of the Vilnius District Court of 27 March 2019, under which 67 former Soviet party and state officials, special forces fighters and military personnel, most of them Russian citizens, were sentenced to long prison terms for allegedly committing "war crimes and crimes against humanity." As a result, the Russian citizen, officer Y.N.Mel (released in March 2023), who had been in custody in Lithuania since March 2014, had his prison term increased by 3 years, cumulatively to 10 years (on 30 June 2022, the Supreme Court of the Republic of Lithuania reduced the term to 9 years). G.A.Ivanov, who was previously chosen a preventive measure in the form of a signature not to leave, was given a generalized punishment – imprisonment for five years.
The media also reported that the Lithuanian judicial system demonstrated double standards in this case. Russian citizens were sentenced to long prison terms. At the same time, exceptions were made for some defendants with other citizenship. A.Radkevich, a Ukrainian citizen who served in the Soviet army and also took part in the events at the TV Tower, was sentenced to four years in prison. But in November 2022 his sentence was reduced to one and a half years. A possible reason could be the fact that he is a veteran of the Ukrainian "ATO" and could return to the AFU after his release.[1256]
The Russian side does not ignore this issue. On 6 September 2023, the Basmanniy Court of Moscow ordered the arrest in absentia from the moment of detention on Russian territory or extradition to its territory of the Lithuanian judges who passed knowingly unjust sentences on dozens of innocent people in the politicized "13 January case".[1257]
Another illustrative example of discrimination by the Lithuanian authorities against Russian citizens is the case of K.Nikulin, a former policeman of the Riga OMON of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, who was sentenced by the Vilnius District Court on 11May 2011 to serve life imprisonment for the murder of seven persons and the attempted murder of one person at the Medininkai checkpoint in July 1991. He was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder of seven persons and attempted murder of one person at the Medininkai checkpoint in July 1991. Initially, he was charged with "murder of two or more persons" (the statute of limitations for such crimes had expired by the date of the trial, so the charge was deliberately changed). No clear evidence of K.Nikulin's involvement in the crime attributed to him was presented, but the Russian citizen was sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of 650,000 euros. Despite the fact that the Russian citizen received a group 3 disability in 2021, the prison administration twice refused to transfer him from a strict to a lighter detention unit. Despite repeated requests from the Russian Embassy, our citizen has been denied medical diagnostic procedures, which he has been requesting for several years due to increasing stomach pains. In March 2020, after two years of consideration of K.Nikulin's application for transfer to continue serving his sentence in Russia in accordance with the Russian-Lithuanian Treaty on the Transfer of Persons Sentenced to Imprisonment to Serve their Sentences of 25 June 2001, the Lithuanian Ministry of Justice reported "that the transfer of the convict is not possible".
The gross violations by the Lithuanian authorities of the right to freedom of opinion and expression can be seen in the activities of the country's main intelligence service, the State Security Department. This structure has launched a campaign of harassment and intimidation under the pretext of far-fetched accusations of espionage in favor of Russia against a group of Russian and Lithuanian citizens and local journalists. Since 11 May 2022, after the Lithuanian Court of Appeal approved the guilty verdict, the well-known Lithuanian opposition activist A.Paleckis,[1258] who visited the Russian Crimea and has his own point of view, different from the official authorities, on the events in Vilnius in January 1991, has been imprisoned. The Lithuanian authorities started persecuting Mr. Paleckis after he challenged the official version of the events at the Vilnius TV Tower and the Press House that took place in January 1991. Citing eyewitnesses, Mr. Paleckis stated that the bloodshed was provoked by radicals seeking power and that when the TV Tower in Vilnius was taken under control, "their own people shot at their own people". This phrase was the reason for initiating criminal proceedings against Paleckis under the article stipulating responsibility for "denial of Soviet aggression and occupation".
Such accusations looked all the more unconvincing because Lithuanian society was aware that this tragedy had been organized by the Lithuanian secret services. The first revelations began almost immediately after those bloody events. Already in the summer of 1991 the deputy of the Supreme Council of Lithuania V.Jasukaityte declared the death of people on 13 January as a consequence of provocation of V.Landsbergis. This was even publicly stated by the persons involved in its organization. In particular, A.Butkevičius, a former associate of V.Landsbergis, stated that he planned the bloodshed on 13 January as an act of "psychological warfare" against the "Soviets". Another former associate of V.Landsbergis V.Petkevičius wrote in his memoirs how activists of the "Sayudis" organization led snipers inside the TV center. Participants of the events of 13 January and residents of the surrounding houses testified that they saw snipers on the roofs.[1259]
The charges against the activist alleged that Paleckis and businessman D.Bertauskas were recruited by the Russian intelligence services and were tasked with gathering information about the judges and prosecutors who handled the "13 January case". During the case, Paleckis was detained from October 2018 to April 2020, after which the Lithuanian Court of Appeal replaced the arrest with another preventive measure – intensive supervision with the payment of bail in the amount of 50,000 euros and seizure of personal documents. On 27 July 2021, the court found the politician guilty and sentenced him to six years in prison.[1260] The sentence was later reduced to 4.5 years. Paleckis' lawyer told the media that the politician was kept in solitary confinement. He was severely malnourished and had health issues.[1261] The Vilnius businessman D.Bertauskas, who pleaded guilty in the criminal case and testified, was released from criminal liability.
Galina Sapozhnikova, "Komsomolskaya Pravda" correspondent in Europe, who in her book "Who Betrayed Whom" also expressed a viewpoint on the events of January 1991 that was unfavorable to the Lithuanian official history, was persecuted for a similar "crime" of publishing the truth. The journalist was then issued a lifetime ban on entering the country.
In 2022, the Lithuanian authorities also launched a prosecution against the Association "International Neighborhood Forum" founded by A.Paleckis under the article of the Criminal Code providing for liability for assisting another state in actions against Lithuania.р[1262] In February 2023, the Vilnius Regional District Court ordered the liquidation of this non-governmental organization[1263]. The NGO was accused of "unlawful activity", which was expressed in the fact that its activists voice an interpretation of Lithuania's recent history and current events in the country and the world that differs from the official Vilnius interpretation and advocate normalization of Lithuania's relations with Russia and Belarus. A broad campaign to discredit the Forum was launched in the media, involving all the country's major media and politicians. In October 2022, its Chairperson E. Švenčienė was searched and the law enforcement authorities opened a criminal case for assisting another State in actions against Lithuania. It is also indicative of the fact that during the court hearing of the Forum's liquidation case, which began at the end of December 2022, the court rejected the organization's request to postpone the hearing in order to finalize the agreement with the lawyer. E. Schwenchenene said the entity had little time to find a lawyer. According to her, other lawyers were afraid to defend the organization for fear of losing their lawyer licenses[1264].
In December 2023, prosecutors referred the case against activists Erika Švenčionienė and Kazimieras Juraitis to the Vilnius County Court; both are charged with acting against Lithuania and publicly "endorsing Russia's crimes." Lithuanian law enforcers said that, in 2022, members of the dissolved International Forum of Good Neighborhoods allegedly assisted Russia and Belarus in their actions against Lithuania.[1265] Under the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, they face imprisonment for up to seven years.
At that time another case was brought to court against human rights defender Algirdas Paleckis, who was already serving his prison term. This time around he was charged under articles on defamation and justification of "crimes committed by the USSR against Lithuania".[1266] The first hearing on the case was held on 28 February 2024.[1267]
In addition, Erika Švenčionienė is being persecuted by the Lithuanian authorities for publishing posts on social networks. In 2022, she was fined EUR 500 for publishing a post comparing the EU to the Soviet Union, and for publishing an image of the EU and Soviet Union flags. In late December 2023, Kaunas police fined the activist for publishing an image with a sickle and hammer on social networks. In 2024, by the decision of the administrative court, she was fined EUR 700 for publishing a picture of Vladimir Lenin which she posted on 22 April 2024. Erika Švenčionienė announced her intention to appeal against the fine.[1268]
Valeriy Ivanov, a Russian citizen, former leader of the pro-Soviet organization "Yedinstvo" (Unity) and chairman of the Union of Russian Writers and Artists "RAROG", has also been subjected to politically motivated persecution. On 25 September 2023, he was charged under the article on "justification of crimes committed by the USSR against Lithuania".[1269] The prosecutor's office did not specify the nature of his unlawful acts. However, in May 2023, he participated in the events held by the Russian Embassy at the Antakalnis Cemetery in Vilnius and dedicated to the Victory over Nazi Germany and, answering questions from a journalist, said that he gave credence to the Russian version of the events taking place in Ukraine. In November 2023, the Lithuanian authorities deemed Valeriy Ivanov a "threat to national security" and revoked his residence permit on the same "grounds".[1270] He has by all means been foiled by the Lithuanian authorities in his attempts to appeal against this unlawful decision. On social networks, Valeriy Ivanov reported that, on 13 January 2024, he received an official notification from the Department of Migration that his residence permit had been revoked on 7 November 2023. His immediate appeal to the first instance court was met with a reply from the Administrative Court of Regions, located in Kaunas, that the "appeal was not accepted for consideration" because the deadline for its submission had been overdue. Since the deadline for filing an appeal (two weeks) from the date of receipt of the official notification of revocation of residence permit had not been violated, Valeriy Ivanov made a similar appeal to the higher court.[1271] On 27 March 2024, the Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania rejected his appeal, thus upholding the decision of the first instance court.
In January 2024, the Vilnius District Court launched a hearing on the merits of the case against the Forum and its leaders Erika Švenčionienė, Kazimieras Juraitis and Valeriy Ivanov.
It should be noted that persecution of human rights defenders in Lithuania has taken place before, which only proves its systemic nature.
For instance, in June 2020, the Vilnius District Court issued a guilty verdict against the above-mentioned writer and public figure, Valeriy Ivanov, who was a witness in the "Paleckis case", for "illegal possession of firearms" (a defective starter pistol was found in his possession during a search). He was sentenced to a two‑year ban on leaving Vilnius and his place of residence during night‑time hours.
In March 2020, Aleksejus Greicius, leader of the "Juvenus" youth organization and organizer of the "Immortal Regiment" in Klaipėda, was subjected to repression. For the 70th anniversary of the Victory, his organization published brochures on the liberation of Klaipėda and donated them to the city's school libraries. On 12 November 2021, the District Court of Klaipėda found him guilty of "spying for the Russian Federation" and sentenced him to four years of imprisonment. According to the case materials, the human rights defender was accused of collecting and transferring information to the "special services of the Russian Federation" about the events he had organized, photographs of people who participated in these events, video materials and articles, a video report about the trial of Klaipėda politician Viačeslav Titov, and information about the employees of the State Security Department. On 5 July 2022, the Lithuanian Court of Appeals upheld the verdict against the human rights activist.[1272] Another defendant in the case, Mindaugas Tunikaitis, was sentenced to 18 months of imprisonment and pleaded guilty. The court noted that the information passed to Russia was not a secret, but the judges labelled it as such, as it was allegedly of interest to "foreign secret services".[1273]
In late 2019, a persecution campaign was launched against the head of the Association of Russian School Teachers of Lithuania, Ella Kanaite (who is also a member of the CCRC and a founder of the Centre for the Study and Protection of Fundamental Rights"). She was fired from the school where she worked as a teacher.[1274] In 2022, Ella Kanaite fell victim to another round of the persecution campaign in the Lithuanian media, after which she was forced to resign from her post as deputy director of the Vilnius kindergarten-school "Svaja". Journalists drew attention to her older social media posts in which she confessed her pro-Russian views.[1275]
In 2019, a criminal case was initiated against the head of the Forgotten Soldiers Association,Victor Orlov, who is engaged in the search for the remains of Soviet soldiers. The case was dropped a year later, however, he had been subjected to pressure for a long time, and received threatening phone calls.[1276] In 2020, Tatyana Afanasyeva-Kolomiets, organizer of the Immortal Regiment in Vilnius, was also searched and interrogated by the State Security Department.
The Lithuanian authorities abolished the Lithuanian Russian Union. Its leader, Sergey Dmitriyev, is also constantly being attacked and threatened in all kinds of ways.
An illustrative example in this regard is the decision of the ECtHR dated 12 March 2019 in the case "Drelingas v. Lithuania", which upheld the sentence of a Lithuanian court against Stanislovas Drėlingas, a former KGB officer who participated in the 1956 operation to detain Adolfas Ramanauskas-Vanagas and his wife (later, by decision of the Soviet court, the leader of the gang was executed by shooting). Official Vilnius interprets this ruling of the ECtHR as the alleged recognition of the struggle of the Soviet authorities against the "partisans who fought for the freedom of Lithuania" as "genocide of the Lithuanian people" (we should remind that these were the "partisans" who collaborated with the Nazis, and who continued to take part in the killing of civilians after the war).
In October 2020, the Central Electoral Commission of the Lithuanian Republic prevented opposition politician Viačeslav Titov from running for the Seimas, rejecting part of the signatures collected by him that were required for registration. He accused the ruling elite of "blocking" the non-systemic politician "through bureaucratic means". In 2019, Viačeslav Titov was fined EUR 10,000 for his criticism of perpetuation of the memory of one the above-mentioned commanders of Forest Brothers, Adolfas Ramanauskas-Vanagas.
Because of persecution by the Lithuanian authorities, the Chairman of the Socialist People's Front, anti-fascist Giedrius Grabauskas, who also opposes the glorification of Forest Brothers and the promotion of Russophobia, was forced to leave the country.
Since the beginning of Russia's special military operation to denazify and demilitarize Ukraine and protect the civilians of the Donbass, the Lithuanian authorities have taken unprecedented efforts to denigrate everything related to Russia. As a result, incidents of Russophobia and discrimination against people of Russian origin have become more frequent.[1277]
The media were among the first to face the restrictions, as a large-scale attack on the Russian mass media was launched. First, the Lithuanian Radio and Television Commission (LRTC) suspended the broadcasts of RBC TV and Mir‑24 for five years and imposed similar sanctions on six other Russian and Belarusian channels. The same month, the LRTC disconnected other TV programs of interstate TV and radio company Mir from the Lithuanian airwaves and blocked more than 50 news websites and several official resources belonging to the Russian authorities. In April, this questionable Commission suspended re-broadcasting of 32 Russian-language TV channels ("Kinokomedia," "NTV Mir," "Pyatnitsa," "Cinema of India," TNT, "Malysh-TV," and others) controlled by Russia's Gazprom-Media, under the pretext that the media holding belonged to "Gazprombank", a bank sanctioned by the US Office of Foreign Assets Control (not Lithuanian!). Furthermore, according to the Commission, the broadcasting or distribution on the Internet of TV programs whose owners are subject to anti-Russian sanctions is contrary to the interests of Lithuania's "national security".[1278] In September, the Seimas decided to stop broadcasting Russian and Belarusian channels in Lithuania, under the pretext of the need to "protect its information space from the flow of disinformation". The new ban is effective until 1 October 2024.[1279]
In September 2023, the LRTC blocked IP addresses enabling to watch the banned TV programs.[1280]
In January 2024, the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court rejected the complaint filed by Musu TV Internet portal, and upheld the decision of the Lithuanian Radio and Television Commission to penalize it with a EUR 2,000 fine for disseminating "false information". According to the LRTC, the reports published on the website conveyed a "favorable opinion" about the foreign policy pursued by Russia and Belarus, and contained material discrediting the Lithuanian authorities. It was noted that the reports presented a "biased reaction" to the events in Ukraine, questioning its sovereignty and territorial integrity.[1281]
The Lithuanian authorities are introducing legislative measures aimed at preventing Lithuanians from sharing the sentiment of support for Russia's special military operation in Ukraine. On 17 March 2022, the Seimas of Lithuania approved draft amendments to the Lithuanian Criminal Code which, under the guise of criminalizing war propaganda, introduced criminal liability for public support of the operation. At the same time, in mid-March, the Lithuanian Parliament approved legislative amendments governing public procurement that allow to exclude companies of hostile states (i.e. Russia and Belarus) from tenders and terminate contracts signed with them.
On 19 April 2022, the Seimas of Lithuania adopted amendments to the laws on administrative offenses and on assemblies, banning the public display of the St. George Ribbon and other symbols of "totalitarian and authoritarian regimes" used "for the propaganda of aggression, crimes against humanity and war crimes" (including the letters Z and V). Individuals face fines of between EUR 300 and EUR 700, and up to EUR 900 for repeated offenses, while legal persons face higher fines – up to EUR 1,200, and up to EUR 1,500 for repeated offenses.[1282]
It should be noted that the Lithuanian authorities have previously taken steps to establish a legal basis for putting pressure on pro-Russian activists. In May 2021, the Seimas adopted amendments to the Law on the Legal Status of Aliens that prohibited persons supporting or participating in the "aggressive" policy of a foreign state from entering Lithuania. The new amendments were aimed primarily at Russian citizens, including popular media figures who openly express their civic position in support of the actions of the Russian leadership.
In September 2022, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, in violation of all international rules on freedom of movement of citizens, reached an in-principle agreement to restrict the movement of Russians across their borders with Russia and Belarus. In line with this policy, on 14 September 2022, the Cabinet of Ministers approved new entry rules for Russian citizens that are blatantly discriminatory, including in terms of Vilnius' international human rights commitments. According to the regulation, Russian citizens entering the Republic of Lithuania through all border checkpoints are subject to individual enhanced search during the state of emergency.[1283] On 22 November 2022, Agnė Bilotaitė, head of the Lithuanian Ministry of the Interior, signed amendments to decrees tightening the procedure for issuing documents to foreigners wishing to enter and live in the country.
These changes resulted in a special mandatory questionnaire for Russian and Belarusian citizens applying for a visa or residence permit (as well as for extension of the latter). Part of the questionnaire probe into the applicant's opinion on the situation around Ukraine. Applicants are also required to answer questions about their education, previous employment, military service, business connections and contacts with government bodies in non-NATO and non-EU countries. Given Vilnius' general policy of fomenting Russophobia, it is not surprising that "wrong" answers on the questionnaire are used as grounds for entry bans. Cases of people being refused entry on such grounds have been confirmed by Arnoldas Abramavičius, Deputy Head of the Lithuanian Ministry of the Interior.[1284] According to Evelina Gudzinskaite, director of the Migration Department, the mentioned document is an "additional security filter that allows us to identify more quickly foreigners who May pose a threat to national security because of their past activities or ties to undemocratic regimes".[1285] The system appears to be actively used by the Lithuanian authorities. According to Giedrius Mišutis, representative of the State Border Guard Service of the Ministry of the Interior, 1,343 Russian citizens were denied entry to Lithuania between 19 September 2022 and 18 September 2023.[1286] The figure is quite impressive, given that this country, which used to be a very popular destination for Russian and Belarusian tourists, has long lost its former attraction due to the openly discriminatory policy of its leadership.
By the end of 2023, the discriminatory measures against Russians received legal support in the form of the Law on Imposing Restrictive Measures Regarding the Military Aggression against Ukraine (entered into force in May 2023).[1287] The Law aims to significantly reduce the already small inflow of Russian citizens who still wish to obtain a residence permit here. Those living in Lithuania are subject to security screening by the State Security Department.
According to the Migration Department, 397 Russians and 1,644 citizens of Belarus were deemed a "threat to the national security of the country" between November 2022 and December 2023. They were denied a temporary residence permit or its extension, previously issued permits were revoked, or permanent residence permits were revoked or denied.[1288]
On 12 February 2024, Lithuania extended its national sanctions against Russian and Belarusian citizens until 2 May 2025. In addition to the extension of restrictions for a year, the amendments provide for stricter checks of Russian and Belarusian citizens crossing the border of Lithuania with a Schengen visa. Furthermore, the sanctions have been extended to legal entities whose beneficiaries are Russian citizens, regardless of whether or not they have a temporary or permanent residence permit in Lithuania.[1289]
The Lithuanian authorities decided to press ahead. On 17 April 2024, the Seimas Committee on National Security and Defence supported the initiative to deprive Russians and Belarusians of Lithuanian residence permits for trips to their home country.
On 25 June 2024, the Lithuanian Seimas approved the denunciation of the agreement between Russia and Lithuania on legal assistance and legal relations in civil, family and criminal matters, thus closing one of the few remaining international legal channels of interaction in this area. Even Lithuanian experts have pointed to the recklessness of such a move.
The Lithuanian authorities, like other Baltic states, required the Russians staying in the country to condemn Russia's Special military operation. Both campaigning and pressure methods were used. For instance, an active campaign was launched in March 2022, supported by the country's largest media outlets, calling on Russian-speaking Lithuanians to "publicly condemn the policy of the Russian Federation in Ukraine". In the same month, a campaign of mass phone calls was launched to put psychological pressure on people in Russia. To this end, huge posters titled "Call Russia" were installed in Lithuanian cities, inviting "all concerned" to make calls through callrussia.org technological platform to Russian numbers and convince people to oppose Russia's Special military operation. The organizers asserted that this resource had at its disposal a database containing 40 million Russian private telephone numbers. When organizing these calls, volunteers were assisted by technology, advertising, and communications experts who instructed them on how to conduct the conversation. Moreover, the project organizers suggested that its participants call their friends and acquaintances in Russia for the same purposes. It is clear that such an expensive campaign was carried out at the expense of local taxpayers, with already almost empty wallets.
In order to exert pressure, official Vilnius also sent questionnaires to Russian and Belarusian citizens living in the country, which included, among other things, questions about who Crimea belongs to and whether they support "Russia's military actions in Ukraine". Based on the results of their answers, the authorities canceled 2,905 residence permits and 160 permanent residence permits.
Lithuania's President Gitanas Nauseda decided to strip figure skater Margarita Drobiazko of her Lithuania citizenship granted to her "for Special merits"[1290]; she was accused of supporting aggression" because she continued to perform in our country after the Special military operation began. This was followed by the Lithuanian Ministry of the Interior initiating the same procedure against Russian ballerina, Ilze Liepa, for her sympathies for the Russian President, which was interpreted by the Lithuanian authorities as " support for the war in Ukraine and contempt for the West and its values".[1291], [1292]
Businessman Yuriy Kudimov, against whom the Citizenship Commission was also considering an application for revocation of citizenship, because he "potentially poses a threat to Lithuania's national security", also came under pressure.[1293] It was stated in the case that the entrepreneur was allegedly involved in the management of Russian state-owned companies and opaque Russian funding of election campaigns in Western countries, had ties to influential people in Russia and was linked to its secret services.
On 7 March 2024, Lithuanian President Gitanas Nauseda signed decrees depriving Ilze Liepa and Yuriy Kudimov of their Lithuanian citizenship.
A check has also been initiated against almost 800 persons granted Lithuanian citizenship by exception for "threatening national security and supporting an aggressor state".[1294]
In July 2023, the Migration Department cancelled the residence permit of Russian citizen journalist Vladimir Vodo, following the conclusion of the State Security Department that he allegedly posed a "threat to national security". The journalist was accused of "being disloyal to Lithuania and spreading propaganda on social media". Vladimir Vodo had been living in Lithuania since 1989, his first permanent residence permit was issued in 1993, his last permanent residence permit in Lithuania was to be valid until 2027.[1295] On 20 March 2024, the Vilnius Chamber of the Regional Administrative Court upheld the decision of the Migration Department to revoke Vladimir Vodo's residence permit. On 27 April 2024, the Court suspended Vladimir Vodo's deportation to Russia. As early as on 15 May 2024, however, the Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania delivered its final verdict which upheld the initial decision to deport the Russian citizen. And on 24 May 2024, the Lithuanian authorities deported Vladimir Vodo to Russia.[1296]
In late February 2024, it came to light that Lithuania was going to expel a 75-year-old pensioner, Valentina Vatutina, from the country, since she could become a potential "recruitment target" for Russian special services. This came to light after the Vilnius Chamber of the Regional Administrative Court upheld the conclusions of the Migration Department and the State Security Department.
Valentina Vatunina spent most of her life in Lithuania, worked as a teacher and paid much attention to local history work. However, the Lithuanian authorities refused to extend her residence permit and recognized her as a "threat to the national security" of the country. The reasons for the deportation were the following. The fact that she honours her Russian roots and for some time headed the Russian Cultural Centre in Panevėžys, which was closed down five years ago, played against Valentina Vatutina. In addition, on social networks she spoke out against the demolition of the monument to the soldiers of the USSR. Another reason could have been the woman's "wrong" political position, because when filling out the above described odious questionnaire as part of the migration interview Valentina Vatutina did not recognize Crimea as Ukraine's territory. However, the fact that the pensioner did not express her position on the territorial belonging of the peninsula in the manner required by the Lithuanian officialdom was sufficient for deportation. Valentina Vatutina answered that she had no idea whom the peninsula belonged to, as she had not been interested in politics for many years. Moreover, the elderly woman had already been interrogated several times by the Lithuanian special services since the start of Russia's special military operation. On the first occasion, she was reported to possess a portrait of Vladimir Putin by Ukrainians who did not like it. She was summoned for questioning again because of a collage featuring her photo which had been made by her acquaintance on Victory Day. Apparently, she could be accused because the collage was dedicated to a holiday "forbidden" in Lithuania, and she herself was standing against the background of the USSR flag in the photo.[1297]
Valentina Vatutina started having serious health problems, due to the atmosphere of tension and anxiety at the hearing of her case on revocation of residence permit. Valentina Vatutina also told the mass media that during the hearing of her case in court in Lithuania, medical organizations refused to operate on her.[1298]
After all, on 22 April 2024, the Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania cancelled the decision of the Migration Department to deport Valentina Vatutina. The Court's verdict is final and cannot be appealed.[1299]
The Lithuanian media strongly emphasized that "intellectual" stratum of society formed part of the "anti-war" movement. A special place was given to the publication of open letters from cultural and scientific figures in support of Ukraine, calling on Russian citizens to protest and on Russian-speaking Lithuanians not to trust "Kremlin propaganda". One of the first to issue such a statement was the staff of the Faculty of Philology at Vilnius University, together with the staff of the Alexander Pushkin Literary Museum in Vilnius.[1300] In addition, the Lithuanian media actively published interviews with Russian-speaking Lithuanians who "repented" and called for "anti-war" protests in Russia.[1301]
Many figures of culture and art who refused to publicly condemn Russia's actions were also subjected to pressure. In late February 2022, Simonas Kairys, Minister of Culture of Lithuania, insisted on the dismissal of those employees of Lithuanian theatres, who also carry out their activities in Russia. On his Facebook page, he wrote, in particular, that "no performer from Russia will set foot in Lithuania". In addition, Vilnius banned concerts by a number of Russian artists, and local radio stations, following this unambiguous "signal," refused to retransmit Russian broadcasts and play Russian music in support of Ukraine.[1302]
Official Vilnius also imposed a number of other restrictions on Russian citizens residing in the country. In March 2024, for example, the Lithuanian authorities did not allow to set up polling stations for the Russian presidential election in other Lithuanian cities as before, but approved only one polling station, i.e. the premises of the Consulate at the Russian Embassy. And so the voting was held only on 17 March. Lithuanian police officers stood next to Russian citizens waiting their turn to enter the Consulate, as well as journalists who took photographs, generated reports and interviewed Russian citizens, thereby exerting an intensified psychological influence on them. According to our compatriots, police officers wearing the chevrons of the Lithuanian Border Guard Service approached them and checked their documents, including Russian passports.[1303]
The efforts of the Lithuanian authorities to denigrate and discriminate against anything related to Russia have resulted in cases of hate speech and discrimination against Russian citizens and Russian-speaking residents of the country since February 2022. The level of anti-Russian and Russophobic rhetoric in the country has risen sharply, and these sentiments are being actively imposed on society from above.
According to human rights defender, Giedrius Grabauskas, cases of threats made against Russian-speaking residents grew in number in 2022. It got to the point of smashing cars, and attacking people on the streets.
Russians living in Lithuania, who until recently lived relatively comfortable lives, at least compared to Estonian and Latvian "non-citizens", now report an increase in threats against them, damage to their cars, and even direct attacks in the streets.[1304]
In September 2022, Diversity Development Group NGO and the Department of Ethnic Studies at the Institute of Sociology at the Lithuanian Centre of Social Sciences conducted a survey, which showed that hostility towards Russians is growing in the Republic. 74.6 percent of respondents said that attitudes towards Russians living in Lithuania had significantly worsened or somewhat worsened over the past year.[1305] According to the survey, 23.1 percent of Lithuanian residents would not rent their accommodations to Russians (9.9 percent in 2021), 13.6 percent would not share their workplace with Russians (4.5 percent in 2021). Head of the Department of National Minorities,Vida Montvydaitė, called this trend "alarming, even dangerous".[1306]
So far, radical Russophobic rhetoric has been opposed by Lithuanian society. In February 2024, Stasys Jakeliūnas, member of the European Parliament for Lithuania, asked the Prosecutor General's Office of the Republic of Lithuania to check whether the insulting remarks made by TV presenter Algis Ramanauskas with regard to Russian-speaking residents of the Republic, during one of the broadcasts in the Lithuanian media, were aimed at inciting hatred. Algis Ramanauskas, for example, said the following: "The vast majority of those who say that 'it was better with the Russians are animals'" and "in Lithuania, a quarter to a third of those worth exiling are all this Russified cattle, the Soviet masses".[1307]
Russophobic hysteria has affected culture as well. Ingrida Šimonytė, Lithuanian Prime Minister, said that Lithuanian society was "poisoned by Russian culture".[1308] Simonas Kairys, Lithuanian Minister of Culture, called for a "mental quarantine" for Russian art.[1309] Plays based on works by Russian authors began to be removed from theatre repertoires: the Old Theatre of Vilnius (called the Lithuanian Russian Drama Theatre until the summer of 2022) excluded plays by Vasily Shukshin, Pavel Sanaev, and others from its programme. Even the children's play "Cat's House", based on Samuil Marshak's fairy tale of the same name, fell victim to this policy.[1310] The repertoire of the Lithuanian National Opera and Ballet Theatre lost several ballets – "The Nutcracker" by Pyotr Tchaikovsky, "Romeo and Juliet" by Sergei Prokofiev, "The Rite of Spring" by Igor Stravinsky.[1311] Apparently following the example of Ukraine, Lithuanian libraries began removing books by Russian classics.
Lithuanian publishing houses, including those that print materials in the Russian language, have also been subject to persecution. For example, the White Swans publishing house, which publishes books in both Lithuanian and Russian, is under pressure. The army of this Baltic country also joined the ranks of the most zealous censors. For example, there are reports that books from this publisher have been confiscated from libraries and shops under the influence of the Lithuanian Armed Forces Strategic Communication Department.[1312]
Russophobic attitudes have also become pronounced at the local level. For example, Russian tourists are denied access to the largest Baltic Pakruojis manor.[1313]
Vilnius's xenophobic policies are also fully manifested in the education sector. The legislation adopted in this area discriminates against members of national minorities, with the greatest impact on the Russian-speaking population of the country.
Following the repeal of the 1989 Law on National Minorities in 2010, efforts to draft new comprehensive minority protection legislation have been unsuccessful. The new law was never adopted by the Seimas. This was highlighted in the concluding observations of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in 2019.[1314]
The Council of Europe's Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (AC FCNM) has noted the lack of efforts by the authorities to mitigate the negative effects of assimilation policies on minority language learners. It was noted that the 2011 Law on Education introduced Lithuanian as the sole language of instruction in all schools and unified the state language exam in grades 10 and 12. This created significant difficulties for minority children, and a transition period of eight years was introduced in 2012. Graduates from minority language schools who sat this exam in 2013 received 818 fewer hours of Lithuanian language lessons than their peers from Lithuanian language schools. The knowledge of a minority language is not reflected at all in the final grade. Only the results in Lithuanian language, mathematics and one foreign language (usually English) count towards that final grade, while Polish or Russian language can only be taken as an optional exam. Therefore, members of national minorities with lower final exam results were clearly in a disadvantaged position when compared to Lithuanians, in terms of access to higher education.[1315]
The number of hours of Lithuanian language teaching and in particular the teaching and learning methodologies and materials are still not sufficiently adapted to the needs of children from families where minority languages are mostly spoken. Many children entering primary school start learning Lithuanian almost as a foreign language and are overstrained by the requirements of the unified curriculum.
In addition, the number of Russian-language schools in the country is decreasing, while the number of subjects taught in Lithuanian is increasing, and the requirements for passing the Lithuanian language matriculation exam for graduates of national minority schools and Lithuanian students are being fully equalized. As a result, in 2020, one in five graduates of secondary schools with instruction in a language other than the title language failed the state exam in Lithuanian, which prevented them from accessing free higher education. In 2021, the Lithuanian Ministry of Education, Science and Sport increased the compulsory Lithuanian language classes in preschool institutions for national minorities to 5 hours and provided funding for the professional development of teachers who will teach Lithuanian to preschool children. The Ministry of Education has outlined the long-term goal of abandoning the teaching of Russian.[1316] To this end, it intends to reduce the number of students wishing to study the subject and has urged Russians to change their qualifications, assuring them that it will provide them with the opportunity to do so, including covering the costs of retraining. In 2022, the sixth-grade Russian language textbook was taken out of circulation because it "glorified Russia". Publishers were also instructed to re-examine the content of the other textbooks.[1317]
In total, during the years of independence the number of Russian schools decreased from 85 to 26. In September 2022, the Alexander Pushkin Gymnasium in Kaunas was renamed the Kaunas International Gymnasium because, according to its director, the new name "better reflects the list of services provided and their specifications". Russian compatriots living in Lithuania are denied the opportunity to receive full higher education in their mother tongue (limited opportunities remain at the European University in Vilnius and the Department of Russian Philology at Vilnius University).
The Lithuanian authorities have no intention of stopping there. In early January 2024, Gintautas Jakštas, Lithuanian Minister of Education, Science and Sport, announced that his ministry was looking into possible ways to close schools for Russian-speaking children in the country and was assessing Lithuania's legal framework for doing so. This was prompted by an incident at a Russian-language school in Vilnius in late December 2023, when two teenagers fired an air rifle at their classmate because of his political views. Gintautas Jakštas emphasized that when a school is established by a municipality, the founder can make decisions. But the Lithuanian Ministry of Education wants "to make decisions at the state level as well, so that schools for Russian national minorities can begin to disappear". He also hypocritically stated with concern that Russian-speaking "children grow up divided and it is more difficult for them to integrate in Lithuania". Therefore, according to Gintautas Jakštas, "everyone will be better off if there are no schools for the Russian minority in the future".[1318]
At the end of the same month, Gintautas Jakštas also outlined the tactics being used by the Lithuanian authorities with regard to the study of Russian in Lithuanian schools. His statement implied that the Lithuanian authorities were relying on the gradual retirement of older generations of Russian teachers, while no new Russian language teachers were being trained in Lithuania at all. In contrast, the country provides intensive training for teachers of other foreign languages. According to the Lithuanian Minister of Education, this has already led to a decrease in the number of children choosing Russian as a second foreign language. Over the last two years, the number of students choosing Russian as a second foreign language has fallen from 20,300 to 14,100. Gintautas Jakštas expects that "if we continue with such tendencies as we have today, the opportunities to choose Russian language will be very limited, when a small part will be able to study Russian in several schools".[1319] The words of the high-ranking official confirm yet again that the Lithuanian ruling class has no intention of honouring its international commitments to protect the rights of national minorities, but will continue to do everything in its power to deprive them of these rights, thus attempting to erase their ethnic and linguistic identity.
It should be noted that Lithuania also has balanced views on this issue. For example, Asta Skaisgirytė, the Lithuanian president's chief foreign policy adviser, criticized the above-mentioned proposal by Education Minister Gintautas Jakštas to close Russian-language schools. She acknowledged the problems of integration of national minorities in Lithuania and pointed out that it would be much more useful to discuss possible ways of integrating them. In her words, "we should not be thinking about the abolition of schools, but about the integration of young people from national minorities into Lithuanian life; about the ways to ensure that young people have a good command of Lithuanian when they leave school, so that they can pass the state language exam and fully integrate into life".[1320]
The real level of Russian language use is also indicated by the following fact. At the beginning of February 2024, it was found out that children from the families of Ukrainian refugees and representatives of the Belarusian opposition, who found themselves in Lithuania, studied in Russian at Russian schools throughout their stay in the country. The information was made public by Arūnas Šileris, deputy Mayor of Vilnius, who stated that it was necessary to "change the model of education for such students" and transfer them to education in the state language during the year. According to him, some 11,000 students study in Russian-language schools in the Lithuanian capital, which is mainly populated by Ukrainians and Belarusians who have moved to Lithuania. There are up to 4,000 of them in public and private schools across Lithuania.[1321]
Vytautas Sinica, member of the Vilnius City Council and deputy leader of the National Alliance party (which is not represented in the Lithuanian parliament), then said that it was necessary to take measures against the spread of the Russian language in Lithuania. He noted that the majority of migrants arriving in the Republic of Lithuania stay in Vilnius, which is why the Seimas is already discussing the population growth of the capital from 300 thousand to one million people. In Vilnius, however, they will all speak Russian, not Lithuanian, "because Russian is the common denominator for all the main countries of migration to Lithuania, and especially to Vilnius: from Belarus to Uzbekistan, everyone speaks Russian". At the same time, the politician admitted that even under the current conditions in Lithuania, it is possible to do without the Lithuanian language: it is still possible to graduate from a Russian-language school, find a job without knowing Lithuanian, and, moreover, knowledge of Russian is still valued in the service sector in Vilnius.[1322]
The negative political and informational background to the problem of minority language education in Lithuania has led to constant discussions about Russia's ideological influence on the Lithuanian population, interrogations of Russian school teachers by State Security Department officials in connection with students' trips to Russian summer camps, and proposals by some officials of the Republic of Lithuania to close these educational institutions.
National minorities in Lithuania, in particular Russians and Poles, also need their rights protected as regards the authentic spelling of names in documents and geographical names in their mother tongues. The Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania stipulates that names, surnames and place names in documents must be written in accordance with the rules of the Lithuanian language. This contravenes Article 11 of the Council of Europe's Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. According to the AC FCNM, the right to use a personal name in a national minority language and to have it officially recognized is a key linguistic right closely linked to personal identity and dignity.[1323]
Therefore, persons with foreign names face legal problems and have to defend their rights in court. In January 2022, Vilnius finally legalized the spelling of surnames using letters that are not in the Lithuanian alphabet, but the right to use foreign diacritical symbols was not supported.[1324]
The Russophobic hysteria in Lithuania correlates with the manifestations of xenophobia that have been observed in the country by international human rights monitoring mechanisms. Relevant international organizations have repeatedly documented persistent violations of the rights of national minorities and certain social groups. For example, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) noted the prevalence in the country of prejudiced attitudes towards members of vulnerable and minority groups, especially migrants, Muslims and Roma, as well as "hate speech" and insults against them, including antisemitic statements in the media and on the Internet.[1325]
The AC FCNM noted that the authorities' efforts to mitigate the negative effects of assimilation policies on minority language students were insufficient and that linguistic minorities faced challenges in using their mother tongue.[1326]
Among other human rights concerns, international monitoring bodies have identified deep-rooted prejudices in Lithuania against vulnerable and minority groups, particularly migrants, Muslims, Roma and Jews. The UN Human Rights Committee has noted that this has led to the prevalence of "hate speech", including in the media, including Internet sources, and in the political sphere.[1327]
The international community remains concerned about the anti-discrimination provisions of Lithuanian legislation. Even the European Commission, which is generally lenient towards Vilnius' Russophobic tendencies, has noted that Lithuanian legislation does not adequately integrate EU norms on the criminalization of certain forms of hate speech that incite violence or hatred. For example, liability for the public condoning, denial or gross trivialization of international crimes and the Holocaust in Lithuania is prescribed only when public order is disrupted and only when perpetrated in the territory of Lithuania or against Lithuanian citizens.[1328]
The FRA, referring to data from national authorities for 2021, also indicated that the number of complaints to the relevant authorities about manifestations of racial and ethnic discrimination had increased in Lithuania.
Lithuania's policy towards migrants is a clear evidence of the xenophobic nature of the Lithuanian regime. Their image is stigmatized by high-ranking politicians who see them as a "terrorist threat" or directly call them "spies of enemy regimes".[1329]
Since April 2021, Vilnius has been taking measures to deal with the influx of refugees, irregular migrants and asylum seekers. The authorities allow discrimination, resulting in more favourable accommodation conditions for some applicants, while others are subjected to violence and detention. The country experienced an influx of people, mostly from Asia and Africa, fleeing armed conflicts and dire living conditions at home. Illegal immigrants were housed in tent camps, barracks, empty buildings, and former prisons. These temporary housing facilities were under armed guard to quell occasional riots (people repeatedly complained of inhumane conditions: lack of food, lack of warm clothing, denial of medical care, prohibition to leave these "reservations").[1330]
In July 2021, Lithuania adopted a law[1331] restricting appeals against refusals to grant asylum and allowing deportation during the appeal process. The legislative amendments deprive asylum-seekers of the right to appeal against first-instance court decisions, although the Constitution does not permit the adoption of a legal provision that denies the possibility of reviewing first-instance court decisions and correcting possible errors made by the court. In short, the country is ruled by the likes of Šimašius, for whom not only the UN, but also their own constitution is not authoritative.
Since 1 August 2021, the Lithuanian authorities have legalized the practice of "pushbacks": migrants were simply forced to return to the territory of Belarus. The principle of "pushbacks" is also enshrined in the Seimas resolution on the state of emergency, adopted on 13 September 2022.[1332]
In January 2023 yet another step was taken in this direction: the Lithuanian Cabinet of Ministers approved amendments to the Law on the State Border, allowing, in the event of a declared state of emergency, for the "turnaround" of migrants who have violated the rules for crossing Lithuania's borders (to come into force in May 2023). Presenting the draft law, Minister of the Interior Agnė Bilotaitė, in the spirit of the double standards adopted in the European Union, emphasized that a distinction should be made between natural migration and migration as a political instrument, and that "different procedures should be applied to them".[1333] The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has repeatedly expressed concern about the adoption of the amendments. Vilnius itself believes that the migration crisis of recent years is "a consequence of the actions of "the Lukashenko regime" which "supports the Kremlin".
The Lithuanian authorities reinforce legislative measures against migrants by erecting a "physical barrier". In late August 2022, Lithuania completed the construction of a fence along the board with Belarus.[1334] On 27 September 2023, Minister of the Interior Agnė Bilotaitė announced Vilnius' intention to build a border fence in wetlands along the border with Russia and Belarus. These additional measures are explained by the need to protect the border from migrants, as in 2023 alone, about 700 illegal migrants attempted to enter Lithuania from Belarus through wetlands, and 13 cases of smuggling were also detected.[1335]
The media regularly published articles portraying the deplorable conditions in which foreigners were held: meager food, lack of medical care, overcrowding, etc. There were reports of repeated incidents of security abuse and even sexual violence by Lithuanian refugee workers.[1336]
The "turnaround" of migrants trying to sneak into the country was also often accompanied by the use of force and dogs to intimidate them.[1337] There were occasional reports of refugees dying from beatings at the border or from hypothermia in the woods. There is also information about repeated attempts by local border services to force refugees from the territory of Lithuania, Latvia and Poland into the territory of Belarus.[1338]
According to official data from the State Border Guard Service at the Lithuanian Ministry of the Interior, in the first half of 2024 alone, Lithuanian law enforcers forced 253 illegal migrants into the territory of Belarus.[1339]
Lithuanian politicians, as well as the leaders of other Baltic countries, are not giving up their attempts to lobby the EU for the right not to meet European requirements for the reception of migrants. In June 2024, Lithuania, along with Latvia, Estonia and Finland, was among the northern European countries that appealed to the EU political leadership to tighten the rules for potential asylum seekers in the EU. They asked Brussels for "more effective tools to combat the instrumentalization of migration" and demanded permission to break EU law "to protect their national security".[1340]
This state of affairs has been criticized both domestically (report of the Lithuanian Seimas Ombudsperson on inhumane detention conditions and degrading treatment of migrants[1341]), and by numerous human rights organizations and mechanisms (Amnesty International,[1342] International Committee of the Red Cross,[1343] Doctors Without Borders,[1344] Frontex,[1345] European Commissioner for Home Affairs Ylva Johansson,[1346] Centre for European Policy Studies,[1347] Human Rights Monitoring Institute, Lithuanian Red Cross, Human Rights Centre, and Diversity Development Group[1348]). Their reports documented gross violations of the fundamental human rights of illegal migrants arriving in the country, and stated that Lithuania's practice of "pushing back" refugees was contrary to the EU legal system and that such actions against migrants were illegal. It was found that the forcible expulsion of migrants to the territory of Belarus traumatizes them emotionally and physically, and that the methods used directly threaten their safety and lives.
The issue of migration was also raised by the NGO Amnesty International[1349] (listed as an undesirable organization in the Russian Federation). In July 2022, it published a report in which it accused the country's leadership of racism and ill-treatment of refugees from Africa and the Middle East. It is noted that the Lithuanian authorities are unwilling to treat all asylum seekers equally – this difference is especially noticeable against the background of the "friendliest" treatment of Ukrainians in the country. The text also refers to torture, inhumane conditions of detention, cases of sexual violence, denial of access to asylum procedures and forcing refugees to "voluntarily" return home.
In December 2023, the Human Rights Monitoring Institute and Mental Health Perspectives organization issued a report on the migration policy of the Republic of Lithuania.[1350] It highlights the "traumatic experience of crossing the border" and the detention of asylum seekers, and describes the legal assistance provided by the authorities as poor. It is argued that the legal procedures are too complicated for them, and there is no policy for the integration of migrants in the republic.
The humanitarian organization Sienos Grupė which helps illegal migrants and monitors violations of their rights, informs that it has recorded 10 migrant deaths in Lithuania since 2021. These include three minors who died in detention centres and three people who died in road accidents while being chased by local law enforcers. The number of missing people remains unclear and could be in the dozens.[1351]
By the end of 2023, the Investigative Committee of Belarus had opened six criminal cases against Lithuanian border guards for violence against migrants.[1352]
Multilateral human rights organizations also highlighted the critical humanitarian situation with migrants on the Belarusian-Lithuanian border (as well as on the Belarusian-Polish and Belarusian-Latvian borders). According to the data provided by the FRA, by the end of 2021, 8,000, 28,000 and 4,000 migrants were not allowed to enter Lithuania, Poland and Latvia respectively.[1353] In its 2023 report, the Agency pointed out that Lithuanian legislation allows for the expulsion of irregular migrants to third countries without allowing them to apply for asylum. It also noted that there were cases of "pushbacks" of migrants at the Lithuanian border.[1354]
In addition, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), which has approximately 70 cases of expulsion of migrants pending before it, has ruled that the measures taken by the authorities following the declaration of a state of emergency due to the massive influx of migrants were contrary to the EU Asylum Procedures Directive (2013/32/EU) and that that the placement of irregular migrants in detention for the sole reason that they are staying irregularly on the territory of the Member State is contrary to the EU Reception Conditions Directive (2013/33/EU).[1355]
In February 2023, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights drew attention to the problem of migrants. In particular, the Committee expressed concern that Lithuania continues to expel asylum-seekers and migrants and that there are still cases of preventing these people from crossing the border. All this leads to migrants being forced to stay near the border in dire conditions, without access to emergency assistance, provision of food and water, let alone the possibility to go through the asylum procedure.[1356]
In February 2024, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) also expressed concern about the situation of refugees and migrants at Lithuania's borders. In particular, it referred to cases of detention of underage asylum-seekers, which is all the more permissible under Lithuanian law. CRC also noted that Lithuanian border guards continued to prevent asylum-seekers and migrants, including children, from crossing the border. The Committee experts also noted the lack of appropriate age determination procedures in the country. The Lithuanian authorities are called upon to stop the negative practice of detaining migrant children, forcibly expelling them ("pushing them back") and ensuring appropriate age determination procedures, as well as to take measures to improve the socio-economic situation of such children, including those who have entered the country illegally, and to grant full benefits from the child protection system to unaccompanied migrant children.[1357]
The AC FCNM[1358] and CERD[1359] have previously expressed concern about the unsatisfactory conditions in foreigners' registration centres and the unreasonably long periods of detention of migrants (up to 18 months). However, the CERD highlighted the insufficient capacity of such centres to provide adequate accommodation for newly arrived asylum-seekers, in particular families with children. In addition, the country does not take into account the special needs of applicants, in particular women and girls, who are not provided with safe places to stay.
The Lithuanian authorities are not going to abandon the measures applied to migrants. Minister of the Interior Agnė Bilotaitė said, in particular, that Lithuania considered the tactics of pushing back illegal migrants as a turning point in the fight against the migration crisis and was not going to abandon its decisions despite criticism from human rights organizations. Vilnius justifies its harsh anti-migrant measures by the need to protect itself from the influx of illegal migration.[1360] Belarusian border guards have repeatedly noted that Lithuanian and Polish law enforcers forcibly push back migrants into their territory. The maximum number of people pushed back in 2022 was recorded on 18 July (80 people).[1361]
The situation of migrants of African and Asian origin is in stark contrast to the reception of Ukrainians. From the first days of the Russian Special military operation, the Lithuanian authorities at all levels declared their readiness to welcome thousands of Ukrainian refugees and urged their fellow citizens to accommodate them in their own flats. The rest were placed in vacant houses, hotels, holiday hotels, and, as a last resort, in school buildings. They also received help with housing, rent and employment. Minors were immediately enrolled in public schools and universities. However, they were not required to know the state language, as was the case for other residents. Moreover, in their case they receive a special status which allows them to avoid such requirements from the employer (which is stipulated by Lithuanian legislation for members of local minorities). By August 2023, about 80,000 people from Ukraine had arrived in Lithuania. This is in sharp contrast to the data provided by the Border Guard Service, which says that since 2021 it has "pushed back" some 21,000 irregular migrants from Asia and Africa, for whom the "reception resource" for refugees was allegedly completely exhausted.
Linked to the migration problem is the issue of trafficking in human beings, as highlighted by the CoE Group of Experts on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (GRETA) in February 2024. It called on the Lithuanian authorities to pay increased attention to the identification of victims of trafficking among asylum seekers and to intensify awareness-raising activities to identify child victims of trafficking. According to the Group's experts, Lithuania is primarily a country of origin for victims of trafficking in human beings, but in recent years it has also become a country of destination. The total number of identified victims for the period 2018‑2022 was 148, some 60 percent of which were women. Only 10 of the identified victims were children. Over 90 percent of the identified victims were Lithuanian citizens and about half of them were exploited in the territory of Lithuania. Approximately 45 percent of victims were trafficked for sexual exploitation, 29 percent for forced crime, 22 percent for labour exploitation, and the rest for forced begging and forced marriage. At the same time, GRETA indicated that the number of investigations into criminal cases of trafficking in human beings, including those resulting in court sentences, especially cases of labour exploitation, had decreased in the country.[1362]
Specialized international organizations have repeatedly documented violations of the rights of Roma, as well as other national minorities and certain social groups in Lithuania. The persistence of discrimination against Roma, particularly in the realization of their rights to housing, health care, employment and education, has been noted with concern by UN human rights treaty bodies such as the UN Human Rights Committee and the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, as well as by the Council of Europe's Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI). It was pointed out, inter alia, that the Roma community faced social exclusion and was disproportionately affected by poverty. ECRI pointed to the problem of legalizing Roma buildings in the Kirtimai settlement in Vilnius.[1363] In May 2019, the CERD noted the prevalence of prejudice, "hate speech" and insults towards members of vulnerable and minority groups, in particular migrants, Muslims and Roma, including antisemitic speech in the media and online.[1364]
The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights also noted unresolved housing issues for Roma, including in the mentioned settlement. The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in February 2023, also addressed the crisis situation of Roma in Lithuania. In particular, it expressed concern about the lack of meaningful progress and the persistent stigmatization and social exclusion of, and discrimination against, Roma, particularly in the areas of housing, health and employment. It was noted, inter alia, that the low educational attainment and high dropout rates of Roma children and their placement in special schools continue to persist. In addition, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights emphasized that, because the buildings in the Kirtimai settlement have been destroyed, the current housing and living conditions of the Roma living there raise multiple questions.[1365]
According to data for 2023 published by Eurobarometer in January 2024, Roma discrimination is most widespread in Lithuania. Human rights activists argue that the authorities are not doing enough to improve the situation.[1366]
In February 2024, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child called on official Vilnius to adopt specific measures to improve the socio-economic situation of Roma children in the most marginalized and disadvantaged situations, including by maintaining the universal child benefit and including Roma children in its orbit.[1367]
The official authorities of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg (hereinafter referred to as "GDL") do not attempt to glorify Nazism and seek to prevent the emergence of extremist right-wing movements on the territory of the country.
There is no open activity of neo-Nazi movements or organisations in the public space of the GDL. No facts of public propaganda of the ideas of Nazism and racial superiority have been recorded. Unlike in a number of countries of the collective West, the glorification of former members of the SS organisation and its constituent parts, including the Waffen‑SS, in any form is also uncommon in the GDL. No monuments or memorials to the Nazis and their collaborators are erected. No public demonstrations are held to glorify the Nazi past.
The importance of preserving the memory of the tragic events of World War II is declared by the top authorities of Luxembourg. The country's leadership is making efforts to promote the thesis of its people's heroic resistance to Hitler supporters during World War II. In 1940, despite its neutral status, the GDL was occupied by the Nazi Germany. The policy of Germanisation began, and citizens were forcibly conscripted into the Wehrmacht. There were cases when Luxembourg soldiers, unwilling to fight on the side of the Third Reich, voluntarily surrendered to the Red Army or Allied forces. On the territory of Luxembourg itself, resistance to the occupation turned into a General strike by 1942.[1368]
Events related to the struggle against the Nazi regime are solemnly celebrated at the state level. First of all, these are the General strike anniversary (31 August) and National Remembrance Day (10 October), when the Grand Duke takes part in the Eternal Flame lighting ceremony at the Luxembourg Solidarity Monument.
Despite the domestic policy of Luxembourg on this issue, for two years in a row (since 2022), the Luxembourgish delegation has voted against[1369] the annual UN General Assembly draft resolution "Combating the glorification of Nazism, neo-Nazism and other practices that contribute to the escalation of modern forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance" submitted by Russia and other co-sponsors.
The state authorities not only openly support the neo-Nazi regime in Kiev on the international arena, but also increase military supplies to it. In 2024, 69.5 million euros were allocated for military aid to Ukraine, and almost 90 million euros in 2023, which amounted to 17 per cent of the country's defence budget.[1370] Meanwhile, they turn a blind eye to the fact that Nazi views are widespread among Ukrainian fighters.
Thus, in 2015, a Luxembourg exhibition on "life in Ukraine under conflict" (organised by a number of Ukrainian diplomatic missions) featured a photo of a Ukrainian fighter from the Azov battalion, whose cap bore the corresponding insignia, including the Wolfsangel and the black sun Nazi symbols.[1371] Following a complaint from the left party "déi Lénk" and after public attention was drawn to this fact, the exhibit was removed from the exhibition.[1372]
In 2023, it happened again. As part of an exhibition at the city station, organised by the LUkraine ASBL (Luxembourg's Ukrainian community), a portrait of a fighter from the Azov battalion was seen. The Azov chevron with the same aforementioned Nazi symbols was visible on his uniform.[1373] The photo was soon removed.
There are reports in the country about some individuals who share the ideas of neo-Nazism and extremism.
In November 2021, police found weapons and right-wing extremist propaganda materials in the home of a Luxembourger in Schifflange. The authorities were concerned about the large-scale (by local standards) uncoordinated protest actions of Covid dissidents that took place at the end of 2021, which in some cases took aggressive forms. Some of the demonstrators "stormed" Christmas markets, tried to enter the parliament building and deliberately staged rallies near the houses of Minister for Family Affairs Corinne Cahen and Prime Minister Xavier Bettel. At that time, the police did not rule out the participation of representatives of radical groups in organising these protests.
Late 2021 saw the end of the first trial in Luxembourg's history of a young couple accused of having links to ISIS and distributing terrorist material on social media. The man was sentenced to 3.5 years, and the young woman to 2 years.
The so-called "Steve Duarte case" became a high-profile one. The 35‑year‑old rap singer, a Portuguese national born in Luxembourg, left in 2014 to fight for the Islamic State in Syria. In Luxembourg, he was accused of committing grave crimes in the ranks of ISIS (he appears in one of the videos published by Islamists during an execution). At the moment, he is allegedly being held in a Kurdish-controlled prison in Syria.[1374]
The case of Steve Duarte is not an isolated one. According to a 2014 statement by former Luxembourg Foreign Minister Jean Asselborn, another six people were suspected of joining the ranks of ISIS in Syria.[1375]
In April 2023, three residents of the Duchy were charged with financing terrorism. For two of them, preliminary detention was chosen as a measure of restraint, the third one was placed under judicial control (a measure similar to giving a written undertaking not to leave). Yet, the law enforcement agencies disclosed neither the names of the accused, nor the name of the commune where they had been detained nor the date of the search by the Judicial Police Anti-Terrorism Department. It was only reported that this operation was carried out in the south of the country, and the person to whom the funds had been channelled identified himself as a supporter of Islamic radicalism.[1376]
In order to preserve historical evidence of Luxembourgers' participation in World War II, a special decree of 2005 established the Committee for the Commemoration of Forced Conscription into the Wehrmacht and its Documentation and Research Centre. In 2016, a World War II Memorial Committee was established to bring together members of veterans' organisations and representatives of a number of ministries. The Committee is tasked, inter alia, with protecting the rights and interests of Luxembourg citizens forcibly conscripted into the Wehrmacht and Holocaust victims. In addition, the Committee engages in organising celebrations dedicated to World War II, the search and identification of historical and memorial places, as well as awareness-raising activities among young people.
On 27 January 2021[1377], an agreement was signed between the Government of Luxembourg and representatives of the local Jewish community, providing for an ambitious set of measures aimed at restoring historical justice. First of all, a landmark decision was made to compensate all Jews affected by Hitler's regime in the country for losses and confiscated property. To this end, a special restitution fund is to be created, which would be receiving 120,000 euros annually from the State budget over a period of 30 years. Until then, compensation measures had applied only to nationals (about a thousand people), while refugees and stateless persons, who numbered 3,000 to 4,000 people, were actually left behind the legal framework. An additional 2 million euros is being allocated for various research and archival work, and the creation of a Holocaust memorial and educational centre has been started in the former Luxembourg Abbey of Cinqfontaines.
However, in general, the interpretation of the events of the war years is ambiguous, which is also associated with the facts of collaborationist activities.
Despite the fact that communal authorities maintain World War II monuments and memorials, as a rule, in exemplary condition, a 2022 wave of vandalism against Russian and Soviet memorial sites also reached Luxembourg. Thus, in October 2022, the administration of the commune of Bous reported the disappearance of a memorial plaque installed at the local cemetery on 9 May 2015 by compatriots living in the Grand Duchy, in memory of two Soviet prisoners of war shot by the Nazis during World War II. A crossed-out letter Z was drawn in its place. The GDL police conducted an official investigation, all the leading Luxembourg media announced witness search, however, the perpetrators were never identified. A new memorial plaque in the cemetery of the commune of Bous was unveiled on 5 May 2024 by the Russian Embassy in Luxembourg together with the Coordinating Council of the Organisation of Russian Compatriots (CCORC).[1378] The authorities of the commune "politely declined" the Embassy's invitation to take part in the action, but assured in writing that they would not obstruct the unveiling of the memorial sign.
On 25 February 2022, the Luxembourg side suspended the work on installing a monument to Soviet citizens forcibly taken to Luxembourg for forced labour during the Great Patriotic War, agreed in 2019.
In January 2024, Frank Schroeder, the director of the National Museum of Resistance and Human Rights, the organiser of the memorial ceremony in Esch-sur-Alzette dedicated to the memory of the victims of the Holocaust and the anniversary of the liberation of the Auschwitz concentration camp, guided by political motives, withdrew an earlier invitation to the Russian Ambassador to Luxembourg, Dmitry Lobanov, to take part in the event.
The Russian Embassy in Luxembourg did not encounter any obstacles from the local authorities when organising events dedicated to the 79th anniversary of the Victory in the Great Patriotic War. However, representatives of municipal administrations continue to refuse to take part in memorial events together with the Russian Embassy.
After the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation launched a special military operation to demilitarise and denazify Ukraine and protect the civilians of Donbass, the Grand Duchy authorities, including country's former Prime Minister Xavier Bettel and former Foreign Minister Jean Asselborn, repeatedly publicly stated the inadmissibility of any discrimination against Russians living in Luxembourg and made it clear to radicalized local Ukrainian activists that if this condition was not met, the Government might reconsider its policy of accepting refugees. Thus, Russophobic attitudes did not take root in the GDL. Yet, isolated cases of Russophobia were recorded.[1379]
Luxembourg has a well-developed system of institutions to combat various forms of intolerance. At the same time, there is a lack of coordination between these bodies and there are also difficulties that this multiplicity of structures creates for a potential victim wishing to contact the most appropriate institution.[1380]
Despite repeated recommendations given over the years by the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) which operates within the Council of Europe, until recently the commission of a hate crime was not defined as an aggravating circumstance in the national Criminal Code. It was only in April 2023 that a law (dated 28 March 2023) came into force amending the GDL Criminal Code to include an aggravating circumstance for all hate crimes, offences and misdemeanours.
In addition, there is no provision in any legal act to declare illegal and prohibit any organisation that incites racial discrimination[1381], although the possibility of holding legal persons liable in such cases is provided for at the legislative level.
Experts also noted that the Act on Equal Treatment of 28 November 2006 does not contain criteria of national origin, colour and descent.[1382]
ECRI reiterates the discriminatory nature of Article 15 (1) (former 10 bis (1)) of the Constitution, the wording of which – "Luxembourgers are equal before the law" – implies the existence of inequality between citizens and stateless persons, and contradicts, inter alia, the practice of the Luxembourg Constitutional Court and Article 16 (former Article 111).[1383] This aspect was previously criticised by the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) in May 2022, the UN Human Rights Committee (HRCttee) in September 2022 and the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) in November 2022.[1384]
Besides, human rights activists have repeatedly brought to the attention of the authorities the need to implement measures to integrate foreigners who permanently reside in the country into the political life of Luxembourg, in particular, by entitling them to vote.
On 8 March 2017, the Luxembourg Nationality Act was adopted to facilitate the requirements and procedure of naturalisation, however, it is impeded by the requirement to pass a Luxembourgish language exam.
In 2022, the Voting Law was amended (dated 22 July 2022) so that EU or third-country nationals residing in Luxembourg no longer need to meet the five‑year residency requirement to vote in municipal elections.
Today, international human rights monitoring mechanisms face difficulties in assessing whether different population groups fully enjoy the rights provided for in the relevant international human rights treaties. This is due to the fact that GDL does not collect statistical data disaggregated by ethnic origin.[1385]
According to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)[1386], the HRCttee[1387] and ECRI[1388], anti-Semitic attitudes, Islamophobia and migrant phobia with discriminatory stereotypes in the media and on the Internet are widespread in Luxembourg, which contribute to the formation of prejudices against certain groups of the population.
According to the Research and Information Centre on Antisemitism in Luxembourg (RIAL) annual report for 2023, the organisation recorded 36 incidents of anti-Semitism in the first nine months of 2023, an average of four per month, rising to 108 anti‑Semitic incidents in the last quarter of 2023.[1389]
Minister of Family and Integration Corinne Cahen came under attack because of her Jewish background. In 2019, the anti-Semitic insult "Juddepak", which literally translates as "a bunch of Jews", was left on her social media page.[1390]
In the 2022-2023 report of the Observatory of Islamophobia in Luxembourg (OIL), the researchers highlight the prevalence of discrimination faced by Muslims in accessing and exercising their fundamental rights and freedoms. For example, during 2023, one in five respondents experienced Islamophobia, 22 per cent of respondents reported that they had been victims of Islamophobic acts, and 29 per cent had witnessed such incidents but had not been directly affected. It is stated that women are more likely than men to be victims of discrimination, especially when wearing religious paraphernalia (burqa, etc.).[1391]
In 2021, discrimination on ethnic grounds became the "dominant form of discrimination" for the first time. The most frequent victims were people of Portuguese origin, people from the former Yugoslavia and the countries bordering Luxembourg.
There is societal prejudice against people of Roma origin, who are often disparagingly referred to as "beggars" ("mendicants").[1392]
The case of ultra-nationalist Pierre Peters, who in 2015 published an open letter in the press full of hate speech against Roma, was a high-profile one. In 2022, he was sentenced to 12 months imprisonment for incitement to hatred, as well as a fine of 2,000 euros.[1393] However, he was acquitted on appeal in January 2023.[1394]
ECRI notes that whereas court cases relating to hate speech have almost quadrupled in recent years, the number of convictions is still low, with six decisions on the merits in 2021, 12 in 2020, 6 in 2019, 10 in 2018 and 26 in 2017.[1395]
In May 2022, CERD noted an increasing trend in racial hate speech against migrants, refugees, asylum seekers and people of African descent, particularly online. To counter this phenomenon, the BEE SECURE Stopline platform was launched. With its help, evidence of hate speech on the Internet is collected and forwarded to the police.[1396]
Opinion polls on anti-discrimination, including the EU-wide ones (e.g. the 2023 study "Being Black in the EU" by the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights among 6,700 respondents from 13 states) show that in Luxembourg the average prevalence of racial discrimination in the 5 years preceding the survey was 47 per cent. If only those who self-identify as people of African descent or as Black people are included, the figure is 57 per cent.[1397]
According to the study "Racism and Ethno-racial Discrimination in Luxembourg" published in March 2022, people of African descent suffer from racism and discrimination in employment, education and housing in much higher proportions than other population groups.[1398]
According to the statistics on complaints (latest at the time of writing this report) received by the Centre for Equal Treatment, the body responsible for combating discrimination in Luxembourg, in 2022, ethnic origin was the reason for intolerance in 48 pending cases (20 per cent, or the second highest number of complaints in 2022, following the extensive category of "other grounds", in 2021 this group came out on top); in 13 cases (5 per cent) the grounds for discrimination were religious affiliation.[1399]
Despite the absence of an explicit legal prohibition of ethnic and racial profiling in the GDL, the latter is not generally practised among law enforcement officers. At the same time, the very service in the ranks of the Duchy police is conditioned by the obligatory presence of Luxembourgish citizenship. Meanwhile, there is no such requirement for volunteers in the ranks of the armed forces. Along with this, the GDL Labour Code, as well as the Act on Equal Treatment, the Act establishing the general status of state officials and the Act establishing the general status of municipal officials, do not directly prohibit discrimination on the basis of colour and descent.[1400]
ECRI experts emphasise that migrant children and children of parents of foreign citizenship, especially Portuguese, still face significant challenges in education. Also of concern is the high prevalence of discriminatory attitudes and prejudice against migrants when looking for rental accommodation, particularly in relation to people of African descent and Portuguese nationals.[1401]
International monitoring mechanisms also noted the poor refugee situation in the Grand Duchy. According to many human rights activists, the subsistence allowance granted to them is clearly insufficient and employment opportunities are limited. CEDAW expressed concerns over the situation where requirements in vernacular language are perceived as a barrier for foreigners and migrants in the labour market and education.[1402] The methodology of registering newly arrived refugee families also attracts criticism: spouses and children are added to a single file created for the head of the family, which leaves room for possible discriminatory attitudes.
In this regard, the policy of double standards of the official authorities in this matter is indicative. Due to the influx of refugees from Ukraine in Luxembourg, asylum seekers from other countries, primarily Afghanistan, Syria, and Eritrea complain about the bureaucratic difficulties. In mid-March 2022, mayor of Luxembourg Lydie Polfer demanded that rooms in a specially created temporary accommodation centre for refugees in the capital be vacated for arriving Ukrainians. Meanwhile, it is unclear, where the evicted refugees from the Middle East and African countries were sent to. This fact caused discontent, including among local human rights organisations.
A significant number of complaints are made about the treatment of children from migrant families. According to the Committee on the Rights of the Child, unaccompanied children may be transferred several times from one accommodation to another, sometimes being placed together with adults, before being accommodated in specialized reception centres for unaccompanied children, sometimes without the prior consent of the child. Under certain conditions and under certain circumstances, Luxembourg's legislation on immigration and asylum allows the detention of minors. Meanwhile, the maximum length of detention for families with children was extended from three to seven days.[1403] In addition, according to CEDAW, migrant girls and adolescents are most exposed to bullying in educational institutions.[1404]
Despite the fact that Valletta, following the EU's Brussels' policy, voted against the resolution "Combating the glorification of Nazism, neo-Nazism and other practices that contribute to fuelling contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance" introduced annually by Russia and other co-sponsors within the framework of the UN General Assembly in 2022‑2023 (it had previously consistently abstained)[1405], the sentiments in the country about the role of the Soviet Union during World War II and other aspects of Russian history remain quite favorable.
It is noteworthy that there is a public consensus on the matter and it tends to remain outside the realm of political speculation and is not used by the authorities or the opposition to achieve their political goals.
Such actions of local political establishment generally reflect Malta's public opinion. They assess the historical significance of the Victory and the decisive contribution of the peoples of the Soviet Union from an unbiased point of view, and recognize the need to preserve the memory of the war and draw lessons from it, primarily in terms of countering manifestations of extremism and neo-Nazism.
Malta's leadership maintains the consistent policy of preventing manifestations of Nazism and neo-Nazism in the country, glorification of members of the Nazi movement, construction of monuments to the Nazis and their accomplices, holding of related public demonstrations, whitewashing of former members of Nazi organizations, desecration of memorials to fighters against Nazism or prosecution of anti-Nazi fighters. They also pay due attention to the conservation of monuments to the victims of World War II.
The historical journey that Malta has made in the 20th century is a factor that largely restrains the spread of fascist ideas in the country.
During World War II, being a British colony, Malta was a member of the anti-Hitler coalition. The War has directly affected the islanders as the island was subjected to heavy bombing, attacks were carried out by the air forces of the Third Reich and Fascist Italy. The defense of Malta against the Italian and Nazi invaders was one of the most notable events in the Mediterranean theatre of war. The heroism of the Maltese during World War II was recognized and marked by the British leadership: on 16 April 1942, the George Cross was awarded to the island of Malta by King George VI for people's courage and heroism.[1406]
Malta gained independence from Great Britain in 1964. In 1981, the country declared its neutrality and since then has sought to develop relations with both the United States and the USSR. Neutrality in foreign policy has allowed the Maltese to keep an open-minded attitude towards matters of history.
There are no bans on symbols of the Red Army or the USSR in Malta, and no cases of interference into the activities of veterans' organizations and relevant NGOs have been recorded.
Despite constructive approaches to the preservation of historical memory, the Maltese fail to make concerted efforts to countering the attempts to revise the outcome of World War II or denying the Nazis' crimes against humanity.
The Maltese media, which predominantly tries to avoid historical falsifications, distortions or revaluations in its material, allows itself to periodically reprint politically biased publications of Western information agencies (mainly Reuters and Associated Press) on "the role of the Molotov‑Ribbentrop Pact in the outbreak of war," "totalitarian post-war enslavement of the peoples of Europe, including the Baltics, by Stalin's regime," etc.
In April 2023, Malta Television (TVM) aired a programme with Ronald Bugeja, local non-professional historian, on his book titled "My Führer Adolf Hitler: History and Biography" (Mein Führer Adolf Hitler, L-Istorja u l‑Bijografija), which is positioned in Malta as "the first biography of Hitler in the Maltese language." The author's motivation was the realization that "most people know absolutely nothing about the details of the life" of the Führer. The book has a revisionist orientation and is an attempt to justify Hitler and relieve him of personal responsibility for the inhuman crimes of Nazism under the pretext of introducing certain previously ignored historical sources (their reliability is highly questionable.)
The information that appeared in the press that Ronald Bugeja had thanked the National Book Council of Malta for its help in working on the book added fuel to the fire.
Provocative statements by an amateur historian on the main local TV channel have stirred up the Maltese public. The organizations which reacted to scandalous remarks of Ronald Bugeja expressed outrage at the insult to the memory of the victims of Nazi Germany, accused Maltese television of neglecting its functions of promoting the values of democracy and tolerance, and demanded an official investigation. A number of media outlets and NGOs sent requests to the national broadcasting service and the Ministry of Culture.
Officials of the relevant Maltese government authorities headed by Owen Bonnici, Minister of Culture, decisively distanced themselves from the figure of Ronald Bugeja and categorically condemned both the content of his statements and the fact of their appearance on the national television. The National Broadcasting Service reported that the scandalous program had been cancelled and promised to conduct an investigation and take disciplinary action against those responsible.
Mark Camilleri, Chairman of the National Book Council of Malta, categorically denied any connection to the author, emphasizing that no financial or informational support was given to the publication. The book was withdrawn from sale.
In general, pro-Nazi sentiments are historically unpopular in Maltese society. Nevertheless, the dangerous manipulation of historical memory by the European political establishment for the sake of political climate leads to such situations. It is also worth noting that Maltese officials completely ignored the key liberating role of the Red Army in their statements on International Holocaust Remembrance Day on 27 January 2023.
In May 2023, for the second time, the Maltese authorities did not authorize the Russian Embassy to hold the traditional ceremony of laying flowers and wreaths on the occasion of Victory Day at the main War Memorial in Floriana.
The ceremony of laying flowers at the tombstone of Captain First Rank E. A. Shlippenbach on the occasion of the Day of the Russian Navy in July 2023 was banned as well.
In October 2023, Valletta hosted the Price of Freedom photo exhibition showing Ukrainian neo-Nazis. The venue for the exhibition in the center of the capital was provided by the Malta Society of Arts. The organizer of the photo exhibition is Dmitry Kazatsky, the former chief PR officer of the neo‑Nazi Azov battalion (a terrorist organization banned in Russia.) Among other "heroes" of the exhibition are Nikola Mirovic and Dmitry Kotsyubailo, members of the extremist organization Right Sector. Nikola Mirovic has a tattoo of the German Iron Cross (the identification mark of the Wehrmacht) on his arm. As a member of the medical brigade, he was involved in the trafficking of organs of seriously wounded Ukrainian soldiers. Dmitry Kotsyubailo repeatedly shared details on humiliating residents of Donbass, saying that he "feeds his wolf with the bones of Russian-speaking children."
On 25 October 2023, the Russian Embassy in Malta issued a press release demanding the immediate closure of the exhibition and clarification from its organizers.
As an integral part of the Western community and a member of the European Union, Malta has positioned itself as a mono-ethnic State consistently advocating democratic freedoms and human rights.
The sixth report pursuant to the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, submitted by Malta to the Council of Europe on 3 June 2024, says that there are no national minorities in its territory.[1407] Despite this, Malta's legal framework prohibits any manifestation of intolerance against national minorities.
The 1964 Constitution provides protection against discrimination on the grounds of race, national extraction, political opinion, religion and sex.
The prohibition of racial discrimination is enshrined a number of other legislations. For instance, the Criminal Code (art. 82A) provides for six to eighteen months of imprisonment as a punishment for acts aimed at inciting racial intolerance. Article 83B classifies manifestations of racism and xenophobia as an aggravating circumstance. These measures are assessed by human rights defenders (including the local branch of the European Law Students' Association) as generally adequate in terms of preventing hate speech and incitement to violence.
Malta acceded to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in 1987 and a law against discrimination in employment on the grounds of religion or religious belief, disability, age, sexual orientation, racial and ethnic origin was adopted in 2004.
At the same time, Malta has no legal ban on organizations and movements that promote racial discrimination and glorify Nazi ideology.
Imperium Europa, a far-right party (locally referred to as neo-fascist), was officially registered in the country in 2019. Its leader, Norman Lowell, is an ultra-nationalist who openly denies the Holocaust.[1408] In his statements, he has repeatedly made positive comments about Hitler and has also repeatedly praised Carmelo Borga Pisani, fascist of Maltese origin, who worked for Italian intelligence during World War II. Today the party is not popular with the public – the island republic inherited the two-party system of the former metropolis, and the neo-fascists fail to gain the necessary number of votes to be elected to the House of Representatives or the European Parliament.
Despite the respect for history and the absence of significant forces promoting fascism in Malta's political space, the situation with combating manifestations of racism and xenophobia remains far from perfect.
Violations of the rights of migrants, mainly from Africa and the Middle East, who regularly face various forms of racial discrimination and xenophobia from the local population, also continue to be significant issues in the local human rights record.
This is evidenced by the fact that Malta has lost a number of cases brought by this category of citizens before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in recent years.
In March 2021, the European Court of Human Rights issued a decision on the case "Feilazoo v Malta" finding the Maltese authorities guilty of violating Articles 5 (right to liberty) and 34 (Individual complaints) of the European Convention on Human Rights for detaining a Nigerian national beyond the legal maximum period (14 months instead of nine) and hindering in the exercise of his right to bring the case to court.
The 2024 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights Report mentions another case (No. 12427/22 "A.D. v Malta.") ECtHR finds violations of Article 3 (prohibition of ill treatment), Article 5 (right to liberty) and Article 13 (right to an effective remedy) of the ECHR by Malta for keeping a person claiming to be a child in detention despite the person being diagnosed with tuberculosis and post-traumatic stress disorder.[1409]
Malta's research shows that more than 60 per cent of black Africans in the country regularly face manifestations of intolerance in daily life and rarely communicate with local residents. At the same time, about 30 per cent of them have been victims of racial hate crimes in the past.
According to an opinion poll conducted by journalists of the "Malta Independent" in February 2022, 67.5 per cent of the Maltese population recognizes that Malta does face the problem of racism.[1410]
Expressions of racism and xenophobia against migrants in Malta, including race-based violence and racial discrimination in accessing employment, housing and services, as well as the lack of enforcement of anti‑xenophobia laws, were highlighted in the UN Human Rights Council's (HRC) Universal Periodic Review of Malta.
The Council of Europe Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (AC on the FCNM) has also noted cases of discrimination on grounds of racial or ethnic origin in employment, access to housing and health care.
In the Committee's view, indirect evidence points to instances of racially motivated crimes, bullying in schools, and the treatment of people of other skin color as perpetrators of crimes rather than as victims or innocent bystanders.[1411] It is observed that certain teaching materials negatively portray groups of people of non-Maltese origin and that there is a lack of reference to religious and cultural celebrations of these groups of people in the curriculum of educational institutions.[1412]
In its latest report on Malta, the ACFCNM referred to the results of a public opinion survey which showed that 38 per cent of immigrant respondents from Sub-Saharan Africa had experienced discrimination on the basis of their skin color. With regard to employment, 20 per cent of respondents said that their ethnicity or origin had been the reason for discrimination when applying for a job. A further 15 per cent reported that they had experienced discrimination once in the workplace.[1413]
According to the ACFCNM, these factors may hinder the integration of migrants, asylum-seekers and refugees.[1414]
Experts note that refugees remain the most vulnerable and marginalized group in Malta, facing isolation and relatively low levels of interaction with the local population.
This is stated, inter alia, in the sixth monitoring round country report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), operating within the Council of Europe[1415], which, in the previous report (published on 15 May 2018)[1416] and the concluding observations (published on 18 May 2021)[1417] on its implementation, has repeatedly pointed to Malta's insufficient implementation of recommendations on the protection of the rights of migrants and asylum-seekers, including those relating to the granting of citizenship through naturalization, as well as the absence of specific legal provisions to facilitate the naturalization of children born or educated in Malta.[1418]
It was noted that many irregular migrants complained of low wages and exploitation by employers who preferred to hire migrants without proper legalization. The excessively harsh policy of the authorities, according to which holders of the temporary humanitarian protection status (as opposed to refugee status) are not entitled to family reunification, has also been criticized.[1419]
Xenophobic rhetoric often appears in Malta's online space and in the media. According to a study by Eurobarometer, the country has the highest rate of the use of "hate speech" in the European Union.
According to ECRI, social media in Malta are full of violent content, and public opinion towards migrants is largely negative. There have also been isolated instances of xenophobic and Islamophobic rhetoric used by political and public figures in Malta.[1420]
According to the ACFCNM, as confirmed by Eurobarometer research, social media in Malta continues to be a means of disseminating racist discourse, with an abundance of violent and offensive content towards migrants.
In its interview (August 2021), Omar Rababah, prominent Maltese human rights defender of Syrian origin, characterized Malta as a "racist country."
The above-mentioned ECRI reports on Malta say there is still no systematic data collection on the number of reported incidents of racist hate crime.[1421] In 2021, the ACFCNM called on Valletta to establish a publicly available data collection system on hate crime incidents.[1422]
According to 2021 ECRI conclusions on the implementation of the recommendations in respect of Malta, the absence of the aforementioned system is due to the fact that the number of hate crimes is small enough, which is why the Malta Police Force records the number of hate crimes reports in general.[1423]
According to the same document, the Hate Crime and Speech Unit, inaugurated in October 2019, which works closely with the Maltese Police Force, compiles statistics and processes cases of hate crime and hate speech. The Unit also supports victims of hate crimes by providing free therapeutic and legal services.[1424]
As of 19 January 2021, the Unit had received 249 reports, 193 of which were complaints against individual suspects.[1425]
In its above-mentioned reports ECRI recommended that the Maltese authorities step up their efforts and place additional emphasis on training of law enforcement officers, prosecutors, and judges.[1426]
On 10 March 2021, the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) published a report on a “rapid response” ad-hoc visit to Malta[1427] from 17 to 22 September 2020 and the response of the Maltese Government [1428]. The report focuses on the issue of the detention of migrants. In the paper, the CPT urges the authorities to change their approach to the detention of migrants in order to ensure that all migrants who are detained are treated with dignity and held in humane conditions.
According to the report, the delegation visited the following establishments: Marsa Initial Reception Centre, Hermes Block (Lyster Barracks), Hal Far Reception Centre / "China House", Safi Detention Centre, Floriana Police Station and Lock-Up, and Zejtun Police Station. The CPT acknowledges that Malta's authorities are facing challenges associated with receiving a steadily increasing number of migrants. Nevertheless, this situation cannot absolve the Maltese authorities of their international human rights obligations and duty of care to all migrants deprived of their liberty by the Maltese authorities.
While noting that the Maltese migration system takes all possible measures to address the problem, the CPT notes that it is based on an isolationist approach to the detention of migrants. As a result of institutional negligence, migrants are kept in inappropriate conditions for months at a time and are subjected to inappropriate treatment. The CPT considers that certain of the living conditions, regimes, lack of due process safeguards, treatment of vulnerable groups and some specific Covid-19 measures undertaken are so problematic that they may well amount to inhuman and degrading treatment contrary to Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
It was also noted that the carceral design of detention centers such Hermes Block and the Warehouses at Safi Detention Centre are totally inappropriate – large rooms crammed with beds, no privacy, and communication with staff via locked doors. As a rule, migrants stay in their assigned premises offered no purposeful activities, or access to daily outdoor exercise. Other deficiencies noticeable in most, if not all, places in which migrants in an irregular situation are detained include a lack of maintenance of the building (especially the sanitary facilities), insufficient personal hygiene products and cleaning materials, inability to obtain a change of clothes. Furthermore, the report emphasizes that detainees were systematically not provided with information about their situation and that this situation was exacerbated by their minimal contact not only with the outside world, but even with the staff of the institution.[1429]
NGO representatives note that living conditions in the temporary migrant detention centers often do not meet international standards, which periodically leads to riots (the last such riot took place in January 2020). The inmates of the "closed" centers continue to complain about the quality of food and water, lack of heating and air conditioning systems.
The Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights who visited the Maltese centers in October 2021 highlighted a number of problems regarding the conditions of detention of refugee children in her report. The Commissioner was particularly critical about the accommodation of refugees in overcrowded barracks with no heating or ventilation, despite the fact that the number of irregular migrants arriving in Malta has been decreasing for the third consecutive year (832 persons in 2021, 2281 – in 2020, 3033 – in 2019). In addition, she pointed out that children living in these centers said they were not attending school or any sports or creative activities, and "generally have a poor view of their future."
There have been regular reports in the local press about cases of Maltese security forces' bias against black migrants, including excessive use of force. The most high-profile of these were the attacks against migrants by two servicemen of the Maltese Armed Forces (in February and April 2019) with firearms, which seriously injured two people of African descent and killed a national of Côte d'Ivoire. This was the first case of racially motivated murder in Malta. At the same time, one of the Maltese arrested in that case confessed to hating people of African descent.
The 2024 AOHR report refers to the ECHR's finding that Malta arbitrarily detained an Ivorian national who reached Malta by sea in 2021. The refugee was detained for several months under the pretext of preventing the spread of disease.[1430]
In October 2023, the European Court of Human Rights ordered Malta to pay 28,000 EUR in compensation to a refugee from Côte d'Ivoire for the violation of his rights during his detention in 2021 (as a minor, the Ivorian was held with adult irregular migrants for more than six months, being subjected, according to the court, to "inhuman and degrading treatment by the prison administration, having no effective recourse to legal remedy.") In its judgment, the court also expressed concern about Malta's "flawed penitentiary system which fails to respect human rights".
Another similar case that took place in October 2022 demonstrated that the State has serious problems. Then, three police officers brutally beat a black man from Somalia after arresting him. The law enforcement officers were suspended from duty, and an investigation was launched.
Dozens of local human rights defenders and migrants living in Malta called for thorough investigation, punishment for those responsible, as well as measures to eradicate racial inequality in the country when they gathered to protest in November 2022. The situation has not gone unnoticed by the relevant international organizations.
For the fifth consecutive year (starting from 2019), the NGO Amnesty International is fighting for the dismissal of charges against three African teenage refugees held in Malta on their own recognizance for the alleged hijacking of the El Hiblu ship, which can result in up to life imprisonment.
According to the court order, the accused are under administrative supervision and must report to the police three times a week. However, in September 2023, during a regular court hearing, a police spokesperson reported that one of the Africans (A. Kader) had not been seen by the police for the past six weeks. An official investigation into the reasons for the inaction of the Maltese law enforcement authorities during this entire period was therefore initiated and the said national was placed on an international wanted list.
Recently, the issue of discrimination against migrants in the provision of health care services has become a growing issue in the Maltese media.
In December 2021, a news story about the death of a 22-year-old woman due to the negligence of staff at a public health center was reported. According to the report, such treatment of migrants is widespread - doctors often recommend that they take painkillers instead of providing proper medical care.[1431] The CPT has also expressed concern about the frequent lack of necessary medical care.[1432]
In an interview with Malta Today on 9 July 2024, Josef Bugeja, Secretary General of The General Workers' Union of Malta, stressed that wage inequality between locals and foreign workers was aggravating racial attitudes. At the same time, he pointed to racism and abusive behavior on the part of employers when employing citizens from third (non-EU) countries. "These migrant workers were asked to pay thousands of euros before coming here, often resulting in their entire family being bonded by debt, on the promise that they would be finding a decent wage in a Maltese job. Instead, they either must work more hours than necessary to earn a salary that is equivalent to a job of 40 hours work or are given no job, which turns them into illegal overstayers, a situation that either leads to deportation or being employed illegally." This, the union said, resulted in suicide, deportation, working illegally, debts and usury, but also prostitution and human trafficking.[1433] In this regard, Bugeja expressed hope that with new legislation that came into effect on 1 April 2024 new rules for recruitment agencies would curb the abuse by some temping agencies that import workers from outside the EU; through the new rules, these agencies are required to acquire a license to operate.[1434]
In general, despite attempts by the Maltese leadership to bring its human rights record in line with modern European democratic standards, the current state of affairs in combating contemporary forms of racism and xenophobia remains far from perfect.
National authorities seek to limit the influx of migrants as much as possible. Sea-Eye Charity Organization reported that the Maltese coordination center regularly ignores distress signals in the Maltese search and rescue zone from vessels carrying migrants (most recently, on 11-12 May 2022.[1435])
In 2019, Joseph Muscat, then Prime Minister of Malta, and Adrian Delia, then leader of the opposition, made public remarks about the "overwhelming dominance of migrants" in the Maltese labor market.
In May 2019, a prominent businessman and Iceland's honorary consul in Malta, M. Mizzi, said that Muslim illegal migrants should be banned from coming to the island republic which he would like to see as a "Catholic country". He said too many large Muslim families were arriving in the country, which would "eventually" lead to a "takeover" of Malta.
On 21 May 2020, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) have called on authorities in Malta and other European States to speed efforts to bring some 160 migrants and refugees, who were rescued in the Mediterranean Sea and have been on board two vessels for more than two weeks, on to dry land. The response of UN agencies was prompted by the fact that families with young children and women - 21 people in total - were already evacuated and disembarked in Malta several days ago. The other 160 refugees and migrants were left to drift at sea. According to UNHCR and IOM, these people are not sure about their future and are afraid of being forcibly deported to Libya.[1436] Recognizing the need for measures related to preventing the spread of coronavirus, UN agencies stressed that they should be applied without discrimination against migrants and refugees.
Malta was encouraged to discuss with other European States the resettlement of new arrivals once they disembarked and, if possible, to ensure the safe return to their country of origin of those not in need of international protection.
UNHCR and IOM reiterated to Malta and other European States that no one rescued at sea should be returned to Libya, which is facing intensifying conflict and widespread human rights violations. Libya cannot be considered a place of safety. The UN warned that direct or indirect State involvement through commercial boats in the return of rescued migrants and refugees to Libya may constitute a violation of international law.[1437]
According to the 2024 AOHR report, four Maltese civil society organizations expressed concern that Malta provided GPS coordinates of people in distress at sea, being rescued in Malta’s Search and Rescue Zone, to armed groups operating in eastern Libya. As a result, the migrant vessels were intercepted and returned to Libya where these people are subjected to gross human rights violations.[1438]
Data on refugee disembarkation for 2023 following search and rescue operations in the central Mediterranean illustrate the low number of people brought to Maltese ports: 157,651 people were rescued and disembarked in Italy, 17,190 in Libya, and only 380 in Malta.[1439]
Despite the targeted restriction of migration flow to Malta, the authorities of the island Republic listen to the opinion of relevant international organizations.
The country is taking a number of educational measures aimed at promoting a culture of tolerance and mutual respect, combating racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and intolerance. The education of children and young people in these aspects is structured in accordance with the national education strategy for the period 2014-2024, as well as the Respect for All framework programme adopted in 2014. UNESCO Global Citizenship Education is being implemented in the country to provide relevant assistance to educational institutions.
In September 2018, SOS Malta NGO and the Times of Malta newspaper launched a year-long #stophate project aimed at countering the spread of hate speech by raising the awareness of this phenomenon, training volunteers to moderate online content, and conducting research in this area.
The National Commission for the Promotion of Equality regularly conducts events aimed at raising awareness of non-discrimination. Other State and non-State actors also carry out activities with such a thematic focus. In November 2018 and February 2019, the Office of the President of Malta organized seminars on interfaith dialogue with the participation of representatives of 12 religious communities and organizations. These efforts resulted in the signing of the Malta Declaration on Interfaith Harmony on 8 February 2019.
In 2021, the ACFCNM noted that the Maltese authorities pursued their efforts to reinforce their integration policies, in particular by adopting the National Migrant Integration Strategy and its Action Plan.[1440]
The sixth report pursuant to the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, submitted by Malta to the Council of Europe on 3 June 2024, lists the initiatives taken by the authorities to integrate migrants and to counter discrimination and racism.[1441]
The Government of Malta is regularly criticized for its weak policies to combat human trafficking.
According to the US State Department, forced labour and sexual slavery have occurred and are still occurring in Malta. The relevant "risk group" includes people from South-East Asia, China and Eastern Europe, as well as women from Central and Eastern Europe, Russia and Ukraine. In this regard, over the past years, the country has been consistently included in Washington's "Tier 2 Special Attention List" as a country whose state authorities fail to fully comply with the minimum requirements of the law to protect victims of human trafficking, despite certain efforts to do so.
In November 2017, a Maltese man and a Chinese woman were detained on charges of forced prostitution and trafficking. In March 2018, eight Maltese and foreign nationals were arrested for allegedly being involved in a human trafficking scheme involving South-East Asian workers employed by local cleaning companies.
The Russian community in Malta consists of about 7-8 thousand people, which as a percentage of the population of the Republic (according to the Maltese National Bureau of Statistics, as of 2020 there were 516 thousand people living in the country) makes up one of the largest foreign diasporas. Two thirds are women between the ages of 20 and 50.
The majority of the Russian community consists of Russians and representatives of the titular peoples of the former Soviet republics (Ukrainians, Belarusians, etc.), who live all over the country, including Gozo. The Russian diaspora is mainly formed by women arriving from Russia and CIS countries, marrying Maltese citizens, as well as children born in mixed marriages.
The next largest category is highly skilled professionals, whom Malta has been recruiting since 2010 in the online gaming, financial services, assisted reproductive technology and aviation sectors.
The third group includes applicants for Maltese citizenship by investment (the so-called "Malta Individual Investor Program.")
Since March 2022, Valletta has suspended the golden passport scheme for Russians and Belarusians.
The Russian community is deeply integrated into the local society and actively engages in public life; it makes a noticeable contribution to the social and economic development of Malta, which is also noted by the Maltese authorities. There are no ethnic conflicts between Russian compatriots and local residents.
It should be noted that local politicians did not support Russophobic tendencies and used conciliatory language towards the large Russian community from the very beginning of the special military operation. In particular, in April 2022, Prime Minister Robert Abela publicly declared the "unacceptability of xenophobia towards Russians and Russian-speaking people living in the country."
Despite the lack of interest of the Maltese authorities in the escalation of internal inter-ethnic conflicts, after the launch of the Russian special military operation to denazify and demilitarize Ukraine and protect the peaceful population of Donbass on 24 February 2022, the Russian Embassy in Malta recorded regular cases of hostile acts against Russians, mostly by local NGOs and members of the Ukrainian diaspora, which significantly expanded in 2022-2023. A number of small anti-Russian rallies in Malta (including near the Russian Embassy) organized by them between March and May 2022, took place without incident and in the presence of the police.
Currently, there have been no public cases of discrimination against Russians.
At the same time, some compatriots continue to face problems in the banking sector related to the freezing of accounts and financial transactions, although in a lesser extent than in 2022. A number of compatriots living in Malta on short-term permits complain about delays in the issuance of documents, up to 3-4 months in some cases. All this time, Russian citizens have to live with their accounts being blocked for the absence of a valid ID card. It is difficult to get a long-term residence permit for Russians.
Since March 2022, access to Russian satellite TV channels and the Internet resources of Russia's leading news agencies (RT, RIA Novosti, TASS, etc.) has been blocked in the country in accordance with the EU's unlawful sanctions measures and in violation of freedom of expression and freedom of the media.
Thus, today there is no Russian-language media in Malta, magazines "My Malta" and "Malta Herald" were closed after the beginning of the special military operation. Under these circumstances, the Embassy and the Russian Center for Science and Culture moved their activity to social networks. Various types of information are regularly shared with compatriots through social networks and two Telegram channels. Information materials about the work of the Russian Center for Science and Culture and the situation in Malta are regularly published for a wide audience on the Dzen platform.
The media space in Malta has seen an increase in the presentation of materials from a Russophobic point of view since March 2022, the main part of which still consists of reprints of publications of Western news agencies (AFP, Reuters, etc.), as well as articles of representatives of the Polish political establishment.
In addition, the level of verbal aggression in local online communities has increased significantly.
There are reports about individual cases of inappropriate behaviour against Russian-speaking children in local schools. The Russian Embassy is working in a targeted way with compatriots and local authorities to resolve the problem. As a result of this work, the Ministry for Education of Malta brought recommendations on interaction with Russian-speaking students to the attention of the heads of educational institutions, which greatly improved the situation.
Currently, the interaction between educational institutions of the two countries within the framework of the intergovernmental agreement on the mutual recognition of qualifications and degrees signed in 2016 has been practically suspended, despite occasional statements by representatives of Maltese academic circles about the need to resume it.
The coordination and supervision of all non-profit and non-governmental organizations in Malta is the responsibility of the Office of the Commissioner for Voluntary Organizations, which is managed by the Ministry for Inclusion, Voluntary Organizations and Consumer Rights. To date, almost all local volunteer organizations have suspended any contacts with representatives of the Russian Federation, practically cutting Russians out of their activities. The exception is the volunteer organization "Friends of Ta Braxia Cemetery," which arranges burial places, including those of Russian emigrants who died in Malta, and with which the Russian Center for Science and Culture has launched the project "The Year of Russian Exiles in Malta."
Moldova is rapidly sliding towards supporting neo-Nazism and racial discrimination ideologies. The invariable pro-European course of the Moldovan leadership headed by Maia Sandu implies a complete break of historical and cultural ties with Russia. Taking advantage of the events in Ukraine, the "collective West" continues its persistent attempts to draw Moldova into a coalition of ardent Russophobes. Along with condemning the Russian SMO and calling for an end to military actions, the Moldovan authorities verbally express their commitment to European integration and constitutional neutrality, but in reality a totalitarian regime is being established.
On the instructions of Western curators, the official Chisinau copies in its policy the actions of nationalist regimes of Ukraine and the Baltic States based on Russophobia and borrowed from the Cold War era, caveman anti-Sovietism. Such a course cultivates in society the idea that confronting Russia, either today or in the past, including the USSR, is absolutely the right thing to do, which leads to artificial approximation of the concepts "Russian-communist-fascist".
What is happening in Moldova today almost completely coincides with the processes that were observed in Ukraine. The regime of Maia Sandu, like the ones of Vladimir Zelenskiy, and Petr Poroshenko before him, "on the path to Eurointegration" seeks to "cancel" an entire stage of the history of its own country through totalitarian methods, destroying all Soviet heritage, to include any manifestations of the culture of national minorities.[1442] To this end, the government of that country is making every effort to break the historical ties between Russia and Moldova, whose cultures are mutually close, and to eradicate everything Russian in the country. Moreover, for the sake of joining the EU (or acceding to Romania, as many experts believe), the Moldovan authorities even demonstrate their readiness to destroy the national – Moldovan – identity of the country, passing it off as Romanian.
Moldova, as Ukraine, is experiencing major problems in the socio-economic sphere nowadays. Industrial production and foreign trade are going down and prices up, the people are actively leaving the country. But instead of taking measures to put things right, the Moldovan president shuts the mouths of those who might say something against government. Moreover, Maia Sandu, like the Ukrainian authorities, is persistently trying to distract the people from the existing urgent problems by speculating about European integration.
"Such actions have far-reaching consequences, undermine the foundations of a democratic state and create unfavourable conditions for business and investment," as Victor Petrov, deputy chairman of the Executive Committee of Gagauzia, commented on the official Kishinev's sanctions policy.[1443]
According to Alexey Petrovich, head of the National Coordination Committee "Victory", "the anti-Russian rhetoric of the current government was worked out in the last century by Goebbels... This is a search for an external enemy. In the last century, according to Nazi propaganda, the Jews were guilty of everything. Here, it's the same story. Who is to blame for all the troubles of the Action and Justice party? According to them, it is the Russians. But if Goebbels and his fascist gang managed to mark the "guilty" with Jewish stars, deprive them of their rights, and then eliminate them in gas chambers, then the current Moldovan government will not be able to do anything like that. These are different times. When government points a finger at the alleged "enemy", not everyone here believes it."[1444]
The Republic of Moldova continues its attacks against historical memory of the Great Patriotic War, while revisionist pro-Western tendencies are getting stronger and stronger. Radicals from among those who support the liquidation of Moldovan statehood and accession to Romania have recently become more active. Against this background, attempts to glorify Nazism and its accomplices to "whitewash" them in the public consciousness are becoming increasingly clear in the country.
The idea of a "liberating" role played by dictator Ion Antonescu, Romania-born Nazi collaborator, is being openly disseminated in the public space; the current Moldovan President Maia Sandu (who has Romanian citizenship) considers him "an outstanding historical figure about whom both good and bad things can be said" (her famous statement on the air of a Moldovan TV channel in 2018).[1445]
The reconstruction and installation (often funded by external sponsors) of memorials in honour of "heroes of the Romanian army", that occupied the territory of present-day Moldova in 1941, have been put on a systematic basis with the assistance of the official Moldovan authorities and the leadership of Action and Solidarity party.[1446] At that, the occupation of Moldovan territory by the troops of fascist Romania, as allies of Nazi Germany, and the regime of terror and mass murder established by them, when more than 300,000 Jews and over 50,000 Roma were killed, are presented as "liberation". Romania erects monuments to the Romanian military and maintains cemeteries of Romanian soldiers who fought on Hitler's side. They are opened with military honours. There are also cases of changing the meaning of memorials.
The media presents such history distortion as initiatives of local residents, often supported by grants from Romanian organizations. Romanian diplomats, clergymen of the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and representatives of Moldovan authorities at various levels invariably attend inauguration ceremonies of the memorials that have been erected or restored.
In addition, the organization "Monumentum" which is engaged in the construction of monuments to Romanian Nazi collaborators on Moldovan soil is actively operating with the support from authorities. It is known about the construction of a large temple complex in the Kantemirovsky district to honour the soldiers of Ion Antonescu's army.
The following examples of the glorification of Romanian collaborators can be cited. On 26 October 2021, for example, a monument was opened in the central Kishinev "Valea Morilor" park to the Romanian army soldiers who fought on the side of Nazi forces during the Great Patriotic War. The unveiling ceremony was held with military honours and a military band, and was attended by representatives of the Romanian Embassy in Moldova. A "General Pavel Ion Georgescu's Spring" memorial, erected in 1937 to commemorate the brotherhood of the Russian and Romanian armies during World War I who fought side by side against the German forces at Mărăşti, used to stand there before. The monument was opened in October 2021 and bears the inscription "To the 80th anniversary of the liberation of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina by the Romanian Army".[1447]
In 2019, a monument to 78 Romanian soldiers was unveiled in the village of Stoicanȋ, Soroca district. A plaque on the monument says that the Romanian military buried there "shed blood for peace, freedom and national values" of their descendants. The Moldovan village is referred to as "Romanian land" at that. The monument was erected with the support of the authorities of the Romanian county of Buzău which is twinned with Moldova's Soroca district. The Romanian national anthem was played at the unveiling ceremony. It was attended by clergy members, headed by Bishop Antony of the Romanian Orthodox Church, as well as representatives from Buzău and Romanian military.[1448]
In 2020-2021 Moldovan NGOs arranged a "cemetery of Romanian soldiers" who fought on the Nazi side, in the territory of Pushkin Theoretical Lyceum in Faleşti for grant funds from Romania. A monument in the shape of a cross was unveiled there on 17 September 2021. Iulian Rusanovschi (received the Kishinev City Hall award "for the preservation and restoration of cultural heritage" this April 18[1449]), a local lawyer and head of the "Monumentum" association known for its monuments to Nazi collaborators in what is now Moldova, who initiated the installation of the monument, pointed out that the cross would be a reminder of the "sacrifices of Romanian soldiers". The opening ceremony was attended by the Romanian Consul General in Bălți, city administration officials and Moldovan MPs.[1450]
In the second half of 2022, memorials to "Romanian heroes" were opened or restored in the following localities: Slobozia-Horodişte, Rezina district (August 2022)[1451], Novaci, Călăraşi district (September 2022)[1452], Ocnița (October 2022).[1453] The materials published on Romanian-language information resources present fallen soldiers of the Romanian army as "liberators who fought for the independence of Bessarabia". They promote an idea that the reconstructed memorials, once allegedly erected by local residents, were purposefully left to oblivion or destroyed during the Soviet period, and that their restoration is an act of historical justice.
On 28 April 2023, the eve of the latest Victory Day anniversary, a memorial dedicated to 81 Romanian soldiers killed in battles with the Red Army was opened in the village of Lăpuşna, Hȋnceşti district. The event was attended by Sergiu Plop, State Secretary of the Moldovan Ministry of Defence, local authorities, as well as soldiers from the Honour Guard Company. The Romanian side was represented by Eduard Bachide, State Secretary of the Romanian Ministry of National Defense, and Romanian Embassy staffers. The ceremony commemorating the Nazi soldiers was also attended by military attachés from several diplomatic missions accredited in Kishinev.[1454]
The Simon Wiesenthal Centre, a non-governmental organization specializing in counter-terrorism, antisemitism and Holocaust studies, published in April 2023 an open message to Maia Sandu on The Jerusalem Post website, urging her to remove the monuments erected in Kishinev in honour of "fanatic Romanian antisemites and Nazi collaborators"; the bust of the former Romanian Prime Minister Octavian Goga in Kishinev's Stephan the Great Central Park is one of them[1455] (according to media reports, his bust was demolished in Bucharest for his collaboration with the Nazis[1456]). The second monument, which the Simon Wiesenthal Centre called "extremely offensive and insulting," is located in the Valea Morilor Park. It is part of the aforementioned memorial dedicated to the "80th anniversary of the liberation of Bessarabia" by the Romanian army, during which, according to the Centre, "150,000 of the 205,000 Jews of Bessarabia were murdered". Over and above the bust of Octavian Goga in the Kishinev park, according to "The Forward", a project dedicated to the study of monuments in honour of the Nazis and their accomplices in a number of countries around the world, several Moldovan cities also have streets named after this fascist figure: in Kishinev, Glodeni and Hȋnceşti.[1457]
On 24 October 2023 the plans were unveiled of the authorities of the village of Bravicia, Călăraşi district, to install a monument to soldiers of the Antonescu army on the mass grave of Soviet soldiers. According to information from local media, this project is financed by the Romanian Embassy in Moldova and initiated by the "Monumentum".[1458]
On 20 April 2024, the eve of the 79th anniversary of the Victory in the Great Patriotic War, a "Romanian army mausoleum" was opened at the former Russian garrison cemetery in Kishinev "to honour ... more than a hundred Romanian heroes who died for the liberation of Kishinev in July 1941."[1459]
On 28 April 2024, in the village of Micleuşeni, Straşeni district, a ceremony of remembrance of the Romanian soldiers who died on the fronts of two world wars was held with military honours.[1460]
Moldova, where are over two thousand monuments to Soviet liberator soldiers, has faced difficulties preserving these monuments over the recent years. Thus, local and central authorities fail to maintain the proper condition of monuments, in particular, carry out scheduled repairs due to financial reasons. Sometimes, however, local authorities take decisive measures to make the memorials look properly, as was the case with the restoration of the monument to the Red Army soldiers in the village of Tomai in 2021. Amid the current policy of total falsification of history by that country's central authorities, such examples demonstrate the respectful attitude of Moldovans towards their past.
As noted above, the recent years witnessed repeated instances of soldiers from the Honour Guard Company taking part in ceremonies of opening of monuments to Nazi collaborators. With that, the Moldovan Ministry of Defence refused to pay military honours at the ceremonies of reburial of Soviet soldiers' remains discovered during search operations and at the funerals of veterans and persons who received state awards. The refusal of Moldovan authorities to hold a farewell ceremony for Pavel V. Gladkov, who died at the age of 102 in November 2023, is an example; the veteran was the last living participant in the Battles of Stalingrad and Kursk who lived in Moldova and a knight in the Order of the Republic. The Agency for Military Science and Memory of Moldova refused to hold a farewell ceremony in the Column Hall of the House of the National Army, and the Ministry of Defence provided no salute team. All this was done with reference to the provisions of the state of emergency. At the same time, during the same period, at farewell ceremonies for other famous citizens of Moldova, the authorities granted all the honours required by law.[1461]
Moreover, cases have been registered of desecration of Soviet memorials. In 2019, for example, Moldova's "Eternity" Memorial Complex was attacked twice: a memorial plate was broken and elements of the entrance group stolen. Regional news reports contained similar cases of a memorial plate destroyed at a former permanent fortification in Coşnița, Dubasari district, which had been installed by civil activists and a T-34 tank pedestal desecrated in Leuşeni, Hȋnceşti district.
In January 2021, a memorial to the 95th Rifle Division 161st Rifle Regiment heroes was desecrated in the village of Rusca, Hȋnceşti district.
In June 2021, vandals caused a serious damage to the "Glory to Heroes" memorial in Vulcaneşti (Gagauzia). The eternal flame star was ripped off the pedestal of the monument and thrown away nearby.
On 21 August 2021, a memorial plaque installed in honour of the Guards Uman Airborne Division which had reached the USSR State border near the Prut river in March 1944, was smashed near the village of Corpaci.
A sign "Inspected. No mines" on a building recognized as a historical monument by the municipal authorities was desecrated on 23 August 2021 in Kishinev.[1462]
In March 2022, Ukrainian migrants and Moldovan pro-Romanian radicals from Anatol Șalaru's "National Unity Party" vandalized the "Victoria" memorial complex near Leuşeni. The front part of the pedestal was painted yellow and blue, and commemorative plaques covered in paint. Furthermore, vandals desecrated the T-34 tank monument in Bălți on 4 March, memorial plates on the permanent fortification monument in Coşnița, Dubasari district on 27 March (the memorial had been attacked by vandals several times before), as well as the Vladimir Lenin monument in Anenii Noi on 9 March.
On 4 November 2022, vandals desecrated the "Grieving Mother" Soviet memorial complex in Edineț. Radicals painted swastikas on the monuments and bas-reliefs.[1463]
On 13 August 2023, a monument in honour of Soviet soldiers near Corpaci, Edineț district, was desecrated by offensive inscriptions and symbols of the Romanian fascist organization "Iron Guard". The next day, the monument was cleaned up by local activists – Renaissance party supporters.[1464]
On the night of 11 September 2023, unknown vandals desecrated a monument commemorating the exploits of the Soviet liberator soldiers from the 6th Tank Army in Corneşti, Ungheni district: the pedestal of the T-34 tank memorial in honour of the first soldiers to reach the USSR state border in March 1944, was offensively inscribed.[1465] Volunteers from the city of Bălți joined the work of cleaning the monument.[1466] The Investigative Committee of Russia began investigating this fact of monument desecration.[1467]
On 6 October 2023, the memorial of the 95th Moldavian Rifle Division 161st Regiment in Rusca, Hȋnceşti district, became the object of blasphemous acts. Radicals supplemented Robert Rozhdestvensky's immortal lines with anti-Russian and anti-Soviet inscriptions.[1468]
On the night of 15-16 January 2024, an information panel was torn down on a Bălți street named after Marshal of the Soviet Union Rodion Y. Malinovsky, whose name is inextricably linked to the Moldovan land. Fortunately, on 18 January, through the efforts of caring young activists, the information panel was returned to its rightful place, and one more was installed on another street named after a Great Patriotic War hero.[1469]
On 8 February 2024, Aleksey Petrovich, chairman of the "Russian Historical and Patriotic Club" search movement recorded the disappearance of a Soviet soldier sculpture – part of the monument on a mass grave in Old Biliceni, Sȋngerei district (northern Moldova).[1470], [1471]
On 24 February 2024, the monument to A.B. Kolbinsky, Guard Captain and Great Patriotic War participant, erected on the Eternity memorial of military glory was damaged in Kishinev. The tombstone made of black granite with inscriptions and a photograph of the deceased was thrown off the pedestal, and consequently minor damage remained on the surface of the granite slab. On 28 February 2024, this cultural and historical heritage memorial site was restored through a joint effort by the Russian Embassy in Moldova and search movement activists.
On 17 April 2024, an act of vandalism was recorded against the monument to anti-fascist Komsomol members in Rîşcani (northern Moldova). Unknown persons painted offensive inscriptions and Nazi symbols on granite slabs.[1472]
On 6 May 2024, radical nationalists posted a video on social networks insulting the natives of Bubuieci who fought in the Red Army on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War, and calling to demolish the monument erected in this place to honour the Soviet liberator soldier.[1473]
Despite the relevant provisions on punishment for vandalism existing in Moldovan legislation, no one has ever been prosecuted for such offences.
In all such cases, the Russian Embassy took swift action by publicly expressing its tough position that such actions are inadmissible and calling on the local authorities to take steps to find and punish perpetrators.
Within this series of incidents involving the desecration of monuments to Soviet soldiers, the incident of 22 October 2022 should also be mentioned, when the Moldovan Ministry of Defence announced that it was forced to extinguish the Eternal Flame at Moldova's largest "Eternity" memorial complex due to low pressure in the gas transmission network. The Eternal Flame was off for several hours. The authorities' decision sparked public outrage. Thus, Igor Dodon, the former Moldovan President, called the incident a disgrace, and citizens and public figures began to gather with candles at the "Eternity" memorial. After that, the authorities lit the Eternal Flame again. A number of experts, as well as Russian officials, described the incident as an attempt by the Moldovan authorities to put pressure on Russia in for discounts on gas supplies amid the latest negotiations on a new long-term contract for "blue fuel" supplies to Moldova and the gas crisis that followed.[1474]
The Moldovan authorities' policy of opposing preservation of memories of the Great Patriotic War in any form has sharply strengthened over 2022. This attitude took most absurd shapes when cases of singing wartime songs caused sharp reaction on their part, including at the top level. On 16 December 2022, for example, President Maia Sandu called on the Moldovan security services to investigate concerts in Bălți when children sang songs of the Great Patriotic War time wearing Soviet soldier uniforms, for a possible threat to national security.[1475] This was probably done since the concerts, as well as the parallel "Immortal Regiment" exhibition were organized with the assistance of the Russian Embassy in Moldova and Moscow government.
In 2022, Moldova began to introduce restrictions on celebrating 9 May and other commemorative dates of the Great Patriotic War. Traditionally, this holiday has been widely celebrated in the country. Earlier, even the Presidential Administration, Party of Socialists and Russian compatriots were among its organizers. In particular, on the eve of the 75th anniversary of the Great Victory, a plan of events was adopted at the governmental level and a working group was set up, which included the Prime Minister, heads of Ministries, and social activists, such as Aleksey Petrovich, Chairman of the Coordinating Council of Russian Compatriots (CCRC). Orders and medals, military uniform from the Soviet times, the Red Banner, and St George's ribbons were freely and popularly used during festive events.
However, since the Russian Federation launched the special military operation to denazify and demilitarize Ukraine and protect the civilian population of Donbass, attacks on the Victory symbols have intensified in Moldova. In line with this approach, on 14 April 2022, the Moldovan Parliament approved amendments to the Code of Offences to introduce fines or forced labour for the use of attributes and symbols of "military aggression", such as the "black-orange bicolour ribbon", i.e. St. George Ribbon, as well as "Z" and "V" symbols. On 19 April, the amendments were approved by President Maia Sandu. The new provisions of law came into force on the date of their publication, i.e. just before the 9 May celebrations.
These legislative changes provoked discontent among certain parts of Moldovan society. The ban was opposed in particular by Igor Dodon, the former Moldovan President; he called it unconstitutional and took part in the 9 May celebrations, ostentatiously wearing a St George's ribbon. The politician was subsequently fined, and expressed his intention to challenge the fine in Moldovan and, if necessary, international courts.
Despite persecution by the authorities, some 37,000 people took part in 9 May events throughout Moldova in 2022.[1476]
Gagauzia opposed the ban on wearing St. George Ribbon. On 16 April 2022, a car rally in support of this Victory symbol was held in the regional capital, Comrat.[1477] On 29 April 2022, deputies of the People's Assembly of this Autonomous Territorial Unit adopted the regional law On the Use of Victory Symbols in the Territory of Gagauzia. The law that had been approved on 3 May 2022 by Irina Vlah, head of the autonomy, allowed to produce, store and use St George's ribbon, Red Banners of Victory and other symbols related to the Victory in the Great Patriotic War in the territory of Gagauzia. In addition, the law also authorized a number of events in the territory of Gagauzia to perpetuate the memory of war veterans and promote patriotism among the younger generation.
The law On the Use of Victory Symbols in the Territory of Gagauzia displeased the central Moldovan authorities, who appealed to court to suspend it. Deputies of the People's Assembly of Gagauzia expressed their disagreement, noting that the law on the special legal status of the autonomy allowed local authorities to adopt resolutions and bills even if they were at odds with the position of central authorities. Deputies A. Toporaş and L. Chios appealed against the fines issued to them for wearing St George's ribbons on Victory Day.[1478]
In 2023, M. Sandu's government continued its efforts to restrict Victory Day events. On 19 June 2023, the Moldovan government approved a bill proposed by the ruling Action and Solidarity party to rename Victory Day for "Victory over Nazism and Remembrance of the Fallen in World War II" and shift it from 9 to 8 May.[1479] This was done despite the fact that the parliamentary opposition, extra-parliamentary parties and movements, as well as civil society activists strongly condemned the proposal and initiated a parliamentary public hearing on this draft law on 7 June. Their statement noted that "President Maia Sandu and Action and Solidarity Party (PAS) are increasingly opposing themselves to the people, whose votes have helped them to gain power in the country. People believed their promises to fight corruption and improve living standards. M. Sandu and PAS, however, promised not to touch upon topics that would arouse conflict in society, in particular, the cancellation of Victory Day 9 May celebrations".[1480] On 3 June 2023, hundreds of people rallied in central Kishinev against renaming Victor Day and shifting the holiday date.[1481]
In 2024, the ruling forces of the Republic continued their fight against historical memory. On 3 April 2024, at the initiative of the Prosecutor General's Office, Ministry of Justice and Information and Security Service of Moldova, the Kishinev District Court recognized the extremist nature of a flag with three horizontal lines of black, yellow and white colours, which was used in the Russian Empire.[1482]
In 2024, the leaders of Moldova almost completely distanced themselves from participation in numerous commemorative events on the occasion of the 79th anniversary of the Victory in the Great Patriotic War, limiting itself to modestly laying flowers at the Eternal Flame and granite steles of anti-fascist soldiers. All efforts were thrown into celebrating "Europe Day" on 9 May 2024. For this occasion, a "European Town" was deployed in the central square of Kishinev, where one could learn about the life of EU member states. However, despite the openly anti-Russian position of country's current pro-Western forces, over 50,000 people from both banks of the Dniester took part in the memorial events held in Kishinev and regions of the Republic.[1483] "Immortal Regiment" Marches, commemorative rallies at the memorials to liberator soldiers, car and bike rides, festive concerts by local creative teams were among the most large scale ones. At the Comrat and Orhei military glory memorials, the Eternal Flame was lit from a particle of the Eternal Flame on the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Moscow. Veterans of the Great Patriotic War were presented with greeting cards signed by Russian President Vladimir V. Putin. Victory Volunteers joined the "Call a Veteran" Victory Day campaign.
In terms of attitudes towards the glorification of Nazis and their accomplices, indicative is Moldova's vote on the UN General Assembly draft resolution "Combating the glorification of Nazism, neo-Nazism and other practices that contribute to the escalation of contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance" introduced annually by Russia together with other co-sponsors. In 2022 and 2023, acting "in unison" with EU delegations, the Moldovan delegation voted against the Russian resolution (while it abstained in 2021).
The unequal position of various ethnic groups in the Moldovan state is also linked to the implantation of Romanianization ideas. A still small number of pro-Romanian radicals act more decisively in the Moldovan information space than apologists of Moldovan statehood and stronger relations with Russia. Unionists freely promote their ideals, demanding unification of Moldova with Romania and accusing Russia of occupying the country. Meanwhile, in the context of an anti-Russian line pursued by the authorities, Russian-speaking residents, primarily Russian compatriots, in many cases feel constrained, fearing "to unnecessarily aggravate the situation". The groups themselves are few in number, yet their presence in the media space contributes to social tensions and is also used by the right-wing liberal opposition to destabilize and divide society. One can mention a few such cases. For example, leaders of some Unionist groups allowed themselves a number of xenophobic statements like "the Russian language brings us poverty and divides us", "Russians are a dead people" at an anti-government rally on 1 March 2020. Under President Igor Dodon such rhetoric was condemned, yet no efforts were made to curtail the activities of its authors at the legislative level. As a rule, xenophobic statements were not legally assessed either.
According to the Jewish Community of Moldova, since the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in the Gaza Strip escalated in October 2023, dozens of cases of incitement to antisemitism have been recorded in the country. This is especially noticeable on social networks. However, there are also manifestations of antisemitism in real life. An utterance of a social studies teacher in a Kishinev school that "Hitler did a good thing, but did not complete it – did not exterminate all the Jews" aroused much controversy. After the incident became public, the teacher quitted.[1484]
However, experts and public figures have noted recently xenophobia and intolerance being instilled in Moldova. In particular, Igor Dodon, the former Moldovan President, said at a ceremony of laying flowers at the monument to the victims of fascism on 27 January 2024, that country's residents were increasingly being divided by language, origin and other characteristics, and that this must be countered.[1485]
Experts are particularly alarmed over the steps by authorities aimed at revising the language legislation, reducing the Russian language use, and restricting Russian-language broadcasting. According to expert estimates, over a million people in the country regularly speak Russian in everyday life (out of a total population of about 2.6 million).
According to Moldovan Constitution Article 13, "The State shall acknowledge and protect the right to preserve, develop and use the Russian language and other languages spoken within the territory of the country". However, a Constitutional Court ruling of 4 June 2018 was in force declaring the 1989 law On Languages Spoken within the Territory of the Moldovan SSR "obsolete and useless". This fundamental legislative act established Moldovan as the State language, while considering Russian a means of interethnic communication.
The social-democratic coalition in power at the time (the Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova (PSRM) and the Democratic Party of Moldova (PDM)) was in no hurry to raise the language issue. One of the reasons for the stalling was PSRM's desire to avoid confrontation with its ad hoc partners, "pro-Europeans" from the PDM, in order not to jeopardize further existence of the ruling alliance in a difficult electoral period. Basically, the Moldovan leaders limited themselves to statements about "the priority of difficult economic issues, so the issue of the Russian language, which, of course, has the status of a one of interethnic communication, could be addressed thereafter". In parallel, references were made to the above-mentioned constitutional Article 13.
In December 2020 a law On Languages Spoken in the Republic of Moldova was adopted; it was drafted on Mr. Dodon's initiative after the Constitutional Court recognized outdated the 1989 law of the same name. The law assigned Russian the status of a language of interethnic communication and stipulated that all official documents and the names of State institutions of the country were to be duplicated in Russian. Simultaneously, the President endorsed legislative amendments returning Russian news, analytical programs and talk shows to the Moldovan television (their broadcasting was also banned in 2018 under the pretext of combating propaganda; meanwhile, it was repeatedly noted that before the ban on Russian TV channels, they were watched by the majority of Moldovans).
However, in January 2021, a month after it had been adopted, the country's Constitutional Court, at the request of PAS deputies, declared it unconstitutional, thus depriving Russian of the status of a language of interethnic communication.
The status of the Russian language as a language of interethnic communication was also confirmed in 2023 by the Council of Europe's Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (AC FCNM).[1486]
This important status of the Russian language was also confirmed by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in April 2024.[1487]
It should be noted that the attack on the Russian language in Moldova commenced in the first half of the 2010s. The Russian language was no longer mentioned as a language of instruction and actually classified as a language of one of the national minorities of Moldova in the updated 2014 Education Code. Such transformation of the education laws spurs a further reduced student body in Russian-language schools (and, consequently, a gradually reduced share of such schools in line with the course for "optimization" of educational institutions that receive insufficient government funding, determined on the basis of "per capita approach"). Over the period of the "optimization" reform, almost 200 Russian-language schools were closed in the country, and the total number of educational establishments decreased by 221 units between 2012 and 2015, the same period was also marked by a sharp reduction in the number of pupils, students and teachers.[1488] As a result, Moldova has only 23 university students and 6 vocational training students per thousand residents, which is the lowest of all CIS countries, the EU and most developed and developing countries of the world.[1489]
According to the AC FCNM 2023 data, Moldova had 260 public and private schools with Russian as the main language of instruction. At the same time, in the 2021/2022 academic year, 19.3 percent of students studied in Russian, 80.6 percent in Romanian (Moldovan), and 0.1 percent in other languages.[1490]
Besides schooling, the efforts by the Moldovan authorities have affected also higher education institutions. Considering there were too many universities in the country, Sandu's government announced another "reform" to unite them, which left 11 universities out of 16. This activity has yet another dimension. Under the guise of the so-called "reform of the Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Moldova" dozens of hectares of land became alienated from public property as well. Some of the property privatized by the government from the Academy of Sciences as a result of the so-called research reform was put up for sale.
The education reform has led to a decrease in the overall level of education of the population and contributed to the transformation of a younger Moldovan generation into migrants for the needs of Western market, since a lack of educational opportunities prompts young people to leave the country. According to expert estimates, the number of young people in Moldova May almost halve by 2025 compared to 2010 and account for only 5 percent of the population. The emigration of Moldovan youth abroad has become massive: approximately 4,500 people leave every year. 35 percent out of the total number of students who had undertaken their studies at universities of Moldova in 2019, failed to complete them having chosen to live abroad. This was reported by economist Veaceslav Ioniță, who emphasized that over 4,000 students left the country in 3 years alone.[1491]
In July 2024, Member of Parliament Alexandru Nesterovschi stated on his social media account that the country had faced the largest wave of emigration ever in the last three years: "Over the last three years, more than 168 thousand Moldovans have left Moldova – this is the largest emigration wave since independence. The reason for this mass exodus is the unstable socio-economic situation and the lack of prospects."[1492]
The situation is aggravated by population decline, including through migration. According to the National Bureau of Statistics of Moldova, the number of population with usual place of residence amounted to 2512.8 thousand people as of 1 January 2023, which is 52,300 people less than in early 2022. In 2021, the Moldovan population equalled to 2626.6 thousand. The population decline was largely attributed to net migration, which surged in 2021, when 45,400 people left the country. In 2022, this number reached 43,000 people.[1493]
The Academy of Sciences of Moldova came to the conclusion that over the years of independence, the number of residents of the republic (together with Transnistria) has steadily decreased from 4.4 million to 3.5 million people. According to their forecasts, by 2050 the country's population would decrease by another third – from the current 3.5 million to 2.5 million residents.[1494]
In August 2024, a rally against the authorities' migration policy was held in Kishinev. About a hundred of its participants, mainly young people, came to the presidential palace demanding the resignation of M. Sandu and her government, as well as the ruling PAS. The speakers at the rally criticized the government, which failed to stop the exodus of the population from the country. They accused M. Sandu of closing schools and institutes in the country, as well as of intending to fix the presidential elections scheduled for 20 October to stay in power at any cost.[1495]
In addition, the National Bureau of Statistics of Moldova has gradually abandoned the publication of disaggregated data on the number of Russian schools in the country, citing general statistics on secondary educational institutions. This approach allows to distract attention from the problem of derusification of education. Meanwhile, Russian-language schools remain in demand in Moldova among people of Ukrainian origin. The fact that Ukrainians study in Russian-language schools was noted, in particular, by the AC FCNM in 2023.[1496]
The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination noted in 2024 the lack of progress in ensuring that members of ethnic minority groups can access education in their mother tongue, the low qualification level of qualified teachers and the inadequate resources allocated to schools where mother-tongue education is offered. The Committee also expressed concern about the low level of representation of members of ethnic minority groups, including Roma, in Parliament and the lack of detailed information on the representation of members of ethnic minority groups, particularly women, at the central and local levels in the public sector, the judiciary, law enforcement and in decision-making and high-ranking positions.[1497]
Separate cases of manipulation with the minds of younger generation in Moldova's education institutions are became known via Telegram channels. On 12 February 2023, "KP in Moldova" posted photos of a Kishinev college information stand that equalized the terms "communism" and "fascism" and drew comparisons between Joseph Stalin and Adolf Hitler.
Moreover, Moldovan authorities' aspiration has become noticeable to artificially reduce the importance of the Russian language together with the Russian-speaking community by highlighting the Ukrainian community, which the Moldovan authorities call the country's largest national minority, and, accordingly, to the Ukrainian language. As for the language, there are plans to increase the number of schools with instruction in Ukrainian. Such plans were reported, in particular, by the AC FCNM.[1498]
Against this background, it is no surprise that the Russian-speaking population continues to face discrimination on the part of public authorities. We have to note with regret that Russian compatriots residing in Moldova and Russian-speaking citizens in general often face difficulties enjoying their rights to access to the government service, choice of the language of education and upbringing, free access to information in native tongue. Over the recent years this trend has aggravated due to Moldovan authorities' more and more diligent fulfilment of the instructions from their Western handlers. The experts are alarmed over authorities' steps to revise the language legislation and reduce the Russian language uses, limit broadcasts in Russian.
The refusals of public officials to speak Russian or to receive written applications in Russian are common, language-based domestic conflicts occur. Public authorities in charge with combating such phenomena, Agency for Inter-Ethnic Relations and Council to Prevent and Combat Discrimination and Ensure Equality, distance themselves from such functions, referring to a lack of authority.
The issue of Moldovan public authorities discarding the Russian language was raised in April 2024 by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. In particular, the Committee highlighted discrimination in accessing employment, participating in elections, obtaining public information and accessing justice owing to restrictions imposed on using, and the refusal of public authorities to use, Russian, despite the protection granted for the use of Russian and other languages pursuant to article 13 of the Constitution and the guarantee, contained in article 12 of the Act on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National Minorities and the Legal Status of their Organizations, that Russian May be used to communicate with public institutions and submit complaints. The Moldovan authorities were recommended to ensure the use and protection of the languages used by ethnic minority groups, particularly Russian as an inter-ethnic communication language, including special measures addressing intersectional inequalities among the members of ethnic minority groups and removing the structural barriers faced by members of ethnic minority groups.[1499]
An incident in the Republican Clinical Hospital with a doctor who refused to treat a Russian-speaking patient and expressed desire to kill Russians was quite reverberating in late July 2023. A video spread across the social media where audiologist Eduard Cernoleu denied a Russian-speaking patient a surgery solely because she greeted him in Russian. On top of that, he said he wanted "to pull at a Kalashnikov rifle and shoot" the patient because she was "an enemy right away". Although the hospital's management condemned the doctor who blatantly violated professional ethics and promised and take punitive measures against him, many officials in the country supported this manifestation of racism. For example, Health Minister Alla Nemerenko spoke in defence of the doctor, quoting another Nazi – Octavian Goga, Romanian Prime Minister in 1937-1938, who asserted the exclusive right of "ethnically proper Romanians" to live in Romania and revoked the citizenship of quarter million Romanian Jews. Igor Sharov, the Former Education Minister and current Rector of country's leading university – Moldova State University, took a picture with Mr. Cernoleu and posted it in his social media as a token of support.[1500]
The media draw the attention to the fact that many resonant cases of Russophobia in Moldova are directly linked with the ruling Party of Action and Solidarity. For example, Oazu Nantoi, this party's deputy, said in a conversation on one of the pro-government TV channels in early June 2023: "Russia is a state with numerous domestic problems, flawed genetic code and Russia will stop posing a threat only when… I'd rather stop here, so as not to cross borders". Lidia Guzun, Măgdăcești Village and Criuleni District Council member of the ruling party, posted a text in her social media, entitled "Why don't we deport Russians?" where she noted that "we will not kill their children, just let them leave". The post was removed after it got wide publicity, but the screenshots remain. In July 2021, Maia Sandu congratulated Moldovan writer Vladimir Beşleagă on his anniversary; he is widely known for his Russophobic views. In particular, in May 2015, at a Party of Action and Solidarity and Platforma DA rally Beşleagă openly stated that Moldova needs to clean itself from "Russian dirt".
In 2023, supporters of a dissolved Moldovan statehood held several actions in support of the unification of Moldova with Romania, featuring the symbols of Ukrainian paramilitary nationalist association Azov,[1501] as well as portraits of Ion Antonescu besides Romanian flags.[1502]
Another resonant case took place in November 2012, when Victor Cravcenco, a geography teacher in a technical college in the city of Bălți (second largest in Moldova with over a half of its population being Russian speakers), during a lesson insulted students with Russian surnames by calling them "bastards" who turned the city into a piggery and called for "chasing the Russians away with a pigpen broom". The college administrative council decided to fire the teacher for resorting to physical and psychological violence; it was also concluded that such a teacher had no moral right to work with children. However, after Education Ministry officials had intervened, Mr. Cravcenco wrote a letter of resignation at his own request.[1503]
In June 2023, Vasile Șoimaru, a PAS deputy, during a Council on preventing discrimination an ensuring equality of chances report suggested fining his deputy colleagues who speak Russian.[1504] In October 2023, Diana Caraman, the Kishinev Mayoral candidate from the Communist Party, was denied participation in televised debates due to the use of the Russian language.
In April 2024, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination pointed out a set of problems related to the spread of hateful ideologies in Moldova. In particular, the Committee noted that the Moldovan legislative framework does not contain provisions that expressly criminalize racist hate speech and hate crimes, such as all dissemination of ideas based on racial or ethnic superiority or hatred by whatever means, incitement to contempt or discrimination, and does not include all the grounds of discrimination recognized in article 1 of the Convention, particularly descent. In addition, it expressed concern over the spread of racial discrimination, racist hate speech, hate crimes and the dissemination of negative stereotypes of members of ethnic minority groups. The Committee highlighted the use of hate speech by politicians, particularly at the local level. According to CERD, the country has low level of reporting of acts of racial discrimination, hate speech and hate crimes and the frequent failure to adequately recognize and investigate hate crimes, which are often categorized as misdemeanours rather than initiating criminal procedures. Only 11 hate motivated crimes were investigated and prosecuted by the courts between 2022 and 2023. In addition, a lack of information was emphasized on measures to monitor the spread of racist hate speech in the media, on the Internet and in social media. The Committee's experts directly stressed to the official Kishinev that an absence of complaints and legal actions relating to racial discrimination May reveal a lack of suitable legislation, poor awareness of the legal remedies available, a lack of trust in the judicial system, a fear of reprisals or a lack of will on the part of the authorities to prosecute the perpetrators of such acts. CERD called on the Moldovan authorities to condemn any form of hate speech, distance themselves from racist hate speech expressed by politicians and public figures and ensure that such acts are investigated and appropriately sanctioned. Kishinev was also called upon to strengthen its efforts to combat racial discrimination, racist hate speech and hate crimes targeting members of ethnic minority groups, including by ensuring the effective implementation of its legislative framework.[1505]
The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance 2021 conclusion on the implementation of the recommendations in respect of the Republic of Moldova subject to interim follow-up noted with regret the ineffectiveness of Moldovan anti-discrimination bodies, namely the Council to Prevent and Combat Discrimination and Ensure Equality (CPPEDAE) and the People's Advocate (the Ombudsman) in the field of combatting the manifestations of discrimination. Complicated system of financing, low salaries and high levels of staff turnover[1506] were indicated among the reasons of their inefficiency. Although it's obvious that the ECRI-indicated factors are rather consequences than causes of the language policy chosen by the current authorities.
The AC FCNM provided the following data on the work of the Equality Council: in 2021, this body received 310 complaints (82 percent received in Romanian and 18 percent in Russian), resolved 282 cases, initiated two ex officio investigations, and issued 255 decisions. Discrimination was found in 49 cases (19 percnet) and the main areas for which discrimination was found concern violation of human dignity (25 percent), discrimination at work (25 percent), in access to publicly available goods and services (18 percent), as well as in access to justice (14 percent). Only 4 percent of the decisions concerned discrimination in education. People's negative attitudes were the strongest towards Muslims, Roma and persons of African descent, whilst Russians and "people who do not speak Romanian" were the most accepted.[1507] CERD pointed out with concern to the ineffectiveness of Equality Council, noting that the latter's mandate is restricted to issuing decisions after considering complaints of racial discrimination and that it does not have the authority to impose sanctions or submit complaints to the Constitutional Court. The Committee further noted that the low implementation rate of the Equality Council's decisions relating to combating racial discrimination owes to the fact that the authorities regularly appeal against these decisions. The scarce financial resources allocated to the Equality Council and the low salaries paid to Council staff compared to similar posts in the public sector were also stressed. Moreover, CERD expressed concern over the low level of implementation of activities relating to the situation of ethnic minorities under the national action plan on human rights (2018–2022) and the action plan for the implementation of the Strategy on Strengthening Inter-Ethnic Relations for the period 2017–2020, owing to the insufficient allocation of resources and the lack of clear indicators to monitor and evaluate the impact of activities implemented to improve the situation of ethnic minorities.[1508]
In 2017 the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights expressed concern over the situation of the Russian-speaking population noting that after the amendments introduced in 2012 into the legislation governing the issue of identity papers in Moldovan passport system, the names of the people belonging to ethnic and linguistic minority groups, in particular Russian minority, are not recognized.[1509] ECRI also pointed out to the prevalence of discrimination and the ineffectiveness of actions by Moldovan specialized bodies called upon to combat this phenomenon in its 2021 conclusions on the implementation of the recommendations in respect of the republic of Moldova subject to interim follow-up.[1510]
According to the Moldova Ethnobarometer 2020 survey, conducted with the financial support of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, Russian residents of Moldova experience the highest level of discrimination in the labour market, while Gagauz people feel the most discrimination in the healthcare sector. Persons belonging to the Roma community experience discrimination in all spheres of life, especially in contacts with government officials, in healthcare and employment. They find it difficult to file complaints with law enforcement agencies, including due to mistrust and a lack of knowledge about the legal and institutional framework for combating discrimination.[1511]
The complaints Russian-speaking citizens address to the lawyers of compatriots organizations most frequently concern violation of the right to use the Russian language to contact authorities, including courts, medicine sold without instruction manuals in Russian, no information in Russian in healthcare institutions.
Russian Embassy in Kishinev also receives complaints from Russian-speaking citizens of their discrimination in contacting government and municipal institutions, since the Moldovan public officials refuse to communicate or consider applications in Russian.
Moldovan authorities force the Russian language out not only from the media field. On 1 December 2022, Moldova's Parliament adopted in the second reading Election Code amendments that envisage the ballot papers to be printed in the official language only, whilst they can be printed in Russian upon the exclusive request of local election commissions. For the November 2023 general local election, 6 million copies were printed in the state language and only 1.6 million in Russian. Along with expulsion of the Russian language from the ballot papers, the algorithm was changed for appointing Moldovan Central Election Commission members. Their number was reduced from nine to seven and now they are appointed by the President, Parliament, Government and Supreme Council of Justice. Today all these bodies are controlled by the ruling PAS.
Such alterations were criticized by international human rights mechanisms. A joint opinion on this matter by the relevant OSCE and CoE structures was published in October 2022.[1512] In particular, it noted that printing ballot papers only in the state language "threatens to adversely affect the electoral participation of national minorities by reducing the possibility of making an informed choice, especially in the case of referendums, when there May be multiple questions." The Moldovan authorities were recommended to take measures so that in localities where minorities represent a certain percent of the population, the ballot papers and the relevant voter information be produced in both Romanian and the languages spoken by national minorities. AC FCNM also expressed concerns in 2023 over this change in legislation.[1513]
The decision of the Moldovan authorities to change the abbreviation of the Kishinev International Airport from KIV to RMO from 18 January 2024 – as stated, with the aim of "getting rid of the Soviet legacy" and "fostering national identity" is a clear example of the country's ongoing artificial de-Russification.[1514]
In early July 2024, the ruling PAS proposed to exclude all languages except Romanian from the document flow of the Moldovan parliament. PAS included this proposal in the draft Code on the parliament structure and operation to replace the current rules of procedure.[1515]
According to the current rules, "a bill is submitted in Romanian along with a translation into Russian", and according to the draft Code – strictly and only "in Romanian".
The statement by Dumitru Budianschi, Moldova's Minister of Finance, at the 12 December 2022 parliamentary discussion of financing schools with minority language instruction, speaks of Moldovan Government's true attitude towards the rights of not only Russian-speaking population, but other national minorities. He proposed to "settle the problem" of such schools being underfunded through transferring them to the official language of instruction. According to him, the workload on schools with different languages of instruction is easily reduced by transferring them to instruction in Romanian.[1516]
Along with the suppression of the Russian language, the trend to impose everything Romanian and discard own Moldovan identity has gained significant momentum in Moldova. One can calmly say that the development of national identity, allegedly suppressed during the Soviet period, in fact consists of the rejection of Moldovan identity in favour of the Romanian one, and the gaining of independence and proclamation of the Republic of Moldova, are thus a transitional period to its absorption by the neighbouring Romania. Moreover, the processes of "national self-consciousness revival" took place under the patronage of Romanian special services and over the years their influence on the political processes in Moldova has only increased. Almost all the present-day leaders of Moldova – the heads of state, government and parliament, deputies and ministers, judges and many senior government officials – are holders of passports of Romania. Taking this into account, experts are not surprised that all the activity of Moldovan authorities is aimed at eradicating national identity and replacing it with the Romanian one under the guise of European integration motto.[1517]
Furthermore, people with Romanian citizenship have been appointed to many key government posts in Moldova. In January 2024, Romanian citizen Anca D.P. Dragu became Governor of the National Bank of Moldova, having been granted Moldovan citizenship within 24 hours for this position. Literally the next day after her appointment to this post, Romanian media, for whom this also came as a surprise, reported that Ms. Dragu, among other things, was a senior officer of the Intelligence Service of Romania.[1518]
In November 2022, D.-M. Staicu, who previously headed the Romanian National Office for the Prevention and Control of Money Laundering, was appointed head of the Service for the Prevention and Control of Money Laundering, an important financial agency. The media also revealed that 9 Romanian citizens were sent as EU advisers and high advisers (out of 13 posts) to executive authorities.
Thus, Daniel Funeriu, the former Minister of Education of Romania, became an adviser to the President of Moldova overseeing education in the country. Nicolae Grigore, former manager of the National Bank of Romania, is an adviser to the financial services sector of the National Bank of Moldova, and Gabriela Scutea, the former Prosecutor General of Romania, supervises the Ministry of Justice and Prosecutor General's Office of Moldova. A. Sendulescu, the former head of the National Energy Regulatory Authority of Romania, oversees Moldova's energy policy. Quaestor (brigadier general) V. Apreutesei, former first deputy head of the Romanian police, supervises law enforcement agencies. V. Giosan, the former head of the secretariat of the Romanian government, also participates in the governance of Moldova.[1519]
Moreover, the Moldovan authorities justify their actions by saying that the appointment of foreign citizens to important posts is an advantage for the country. As Igor Grosu, speaker of the parliament of the Republic (also a Romanian passport holder), put it on the air of "TVR Moldova" television channel, "If there is a good expert, and not necessarily from Romania, this is our advantage. We must be resourceful and find the right person, and we will be lucky if he leaves his post in Brussels or Romania and comes to Moldova."[1520]
One of the first noticeable steps towards the "Romanianization" of the Republic were the efforts of over ten years ago when Maia Sandu, the then Minister of Education, launched a reform to "optimize" education system. In her opinion, schools in Moldova were exceeding the required number, so "extra" funds were spent on education. The "optimization" resulted in closure of schools across the country en masse and transformation of Moldovan language and history courses into Romanian ones. The key objectives were the revision of the assessment of 1918 events when Bessarabia was occupied by the Kingdom of Romania and promotion of the need to return to that configuration, i.e. to discard the independence in favour of Moldova becoming part of Romania. For exactly this purpose the native tongue for all Moldovans in all school programmes became designated as Romanian and the school subject entitled "History of Moldova" was replaced with "History of Romanians" and taught with Romanian textbooks[1521]. This study course is compiled with an eye on the official Bucharest and, as a result, interprets many events of Moldovan history in a distorted form. The following historical fact can serve as an example. The most famous Moldovan ruler Stefan cel Mare, whose monument stands on the central square of Kishinev, repeatedly fought with the neighbouring principality of Wallachia and did so quite successfully – under his leadership, troops captured the Wallachian capital of Bucharest twice. However, the textbooks that Moldovan schoolchildren are taught today do not say a word about this. They also keep silent about the fact that Stefan cel Mare was on friendly terms with the Russian state and even became related to Moscow rulers.[1522]
Cession of the National library of Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia historic building to Romanian Orthodox Church by the authorities in March 2023 became another step towards forced Romanianization[1523]. The experts estimate such precedent as deliberate strengthening of Romanian Orthodox Church's influence in the country by M. Sandu's government and provoking an ecclesiastical division.
Steps by government officials also corroborate serious expert concerns over the concept of Romanian expansion in Moldova. For example, 24 March 2023 saw the entry of the law that renamed the official language in Moldova from Moldovan to Romanian into force. In accordance with this law, the wording "Moldovan language" in any grammatical form is to be replaced with "Romanian language". Moreover, amendments have even been introduced into the Constitution, although this usually requires a referendum[1524]. On 21 November 2023, speaking on a Moldovan TV channel, Maia Sandu called the existence of the definition "Moldovan language" nothing more than a "shame".[1525]
Moldovan opposition believes that the ruling party directly violated the law. According to the Constitution, amendments thereto shall be adopted by two-thirds of parliament (minimum 67 members). Besides, the Constitution May not be revised during public emergency; such was imposed in Moldova in autumn 2021 and has been extended regularly since then[1526] (up to 31 December 2023). The opposition Bloc of Communists and Socialists challenged the parliamentary decision to rename the state language to Romanian in the Constitutional Court of Moldova. However, on 11 March 2024, the court upheld the authorities' decision, calling it legal.[1527]
It is also noteworthy that authorities openly, including at the highest level, announced intentions to replace the term "Moldovan language" with "Romanian language" in Moldova's basic laws. Thus, in September 2022, President Maia Sandu publicly expressed regret over the fact that Moldovan, not Romanian, language was still titled as the official language in the Constitution of Moldova. In December 2022, that idea gained a more specific form. On 17 December, Speaker of Moldovan Parliament Igor Grosu mentioned on air of "Moldova-1" that the ruling PAS was exploring the replacement of "Moldovan language" with "Romanian language" in the Constitution of Moldova. He promised to correct this historic mistake as soon as possible noting that "this event must take place in historically significant context"[1528].
The leaders of Romania also support the efforts by the Moldovan authorities. Thus, in October 2023, Marcel Ciolacu, the Prime Minister of Romania, stated: "The Moldovan language should no longer exist, since it never existed. This is an invention of the Russian Federation, especially for Bessarabia, for Romanian citizens from the territory of Bessarabia, so that they no longer call themselves Romanians, but Moldovans." In August 2023, he also demanded Ukrainian leaders to recognize that the Moldovan language did not exist.[1529]
Experts emphasize that such initiatives are to a large extent artificial, since according to the 2014 Moldova population census, only 7 percent of people identified themselves as Romanian and 75 percent as Moldovan. 24 percent called the Romanian language their native tongue, while 54 percent – Moldovan.[1530]
The Advisory Committee of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities indicated that the second dominant language in Moldova is Russian: almost all Russians, half of the Ukrainians and a third of the Gagauz and Bulgarians who participated in the Moldova Ethnobarometer 2020 survey named Russian as their native language, the rest consider the language of their ethnic group as their native language. Bilingualism or multilingualism among Moldova's national minorities means that they speak their "native language" and Russian, rather than Moldovan (now called Romanian). The vast majority of national minority respondents studied in schools with Russian as the language of instruction. The vast Gagauz majority (70 percent) prefer Russian as the language of instruction at school. And only about a third of respondents belonging to other national minorities choose Romanian (Moldovan). About a fifth of all survey participants expressed a desire for Russian to be taught in schools as a second language. Thus, these data indicate the desire of national minorities for their children to live and study in a more diverse linguistic environment than the current one.[1531], [1532]
The Moldovan authorities pursue a policy of elimination of any forms of dissent in the country by clearing out the last alternative viewpoints from the national information landscape through totalitarian censorship. In keeping up with the "collective West", the Government of Moldova commenced the "cleansing" of the country's media landscape from Russian-language print media in early 2022. Upon a Security and Intelligence Service of Moldova (SIS) decision "Sputnik Moldova" news agency was shut down and access to its website blocked on 26 February 2022. On 13 September 2023, V.A. Denisov, head of "Sputnik Moldova" was expelled. Later on, similar restrictions were imposed against the sites of a number of other Russian and Russian-language Moldovan media, including "Gagauznews" and "Region trend analytics". Other news and analytical outlets ("RTR-Moldova" and "NTV-Moldova") faced serious financial sanctions. Hundreds of journalists from these news outlets lost their jobs at the behest of politicians.
It is noteworthy that the Moldovan authorities have demonstrated resolve to take the most stringent measures to prevent the rise of any opposing viewpoints. For example, the public state of emergency, imposed on 24 February 2022 (initially for 60 days, later extended) provided for a number of limitations, including a ban on any mass social and political events. However, this could not hamper regular daily protests outside the Embassy of Russia in March-April 2022, which interfered with the normal work of Russian diplomatic mission.
Recently, cases of openly anti-Russian provocations have become more frequent – the Russian Embassy in Kishinev is almost constantly picketed by groups of protesters with Ukrainian flags. Moreover, minors participate in those rallies that is prohibited by law. However, the police and carabinieri, who are on duty to protect the Embassy, pay no attention to these violations. In addition, in February 2024, the Russian Center for Science and Culture in Kishinev was doused with red paint; this incident has not yet been investigated so far, and the perpetrators have not been held accountable, despite that their identities were established immediately after viewing the video surveillance recordings.
The Russophobic attitude of M. Sandu and PAS regime has negatively affected the ability of Russians in Moldova, especially in Transnistria, where more than 200 thousand residents have Russian passports, to exercise their right to participate in the electoral process. During the Russian presidential elections held in previous years, Russian citizens who were in the country had no problems with the ability to express their will. For example, 27 polling stations were opened during the 2018 elections. The Maia Sandu government deliberately delayed the opening of polling stations, thereby once again violating the rights of residents of Transnistria.
The Russian Embassy notified the Moldovan authorities as early as in November 2023 of its intention to organize polling stations on the territory of the country to hold presidential elections so that Russian citizens permanently residing in Moldova could participate in them. Accordingly, the Embassy requested that, as is customary in international practice, the security of future polling stations be ensured. In response to the legitimate request of the Russian side, the Moldovan authorities allowed only one polling station to be open for voting in the Russian presidential elections – on the premises of the Russian Embassy in Kishinev. Mihai Popșoi, Moldovan Foreign Minister, called Russian side's request to open polling stations "actions that contradict the sovereignty of the Republic of Moldova."[1533] As a result of such steps, tens of thousands of Russian citizens, especially those living in Transnistria, faced restrictions on their right to participate in the elections. Moreover, the Moldovan authorities failed to properly ensure the security of even this – the only – polling station. On 17 March 2024, a Molotov cocktail was thrown onto the premises of the Russian Embassy, causing a fire. The provocateur was detained. The fire was extinguished.[1534]
Since March 2022, Russian news and socio-political TV programs are banned in Moldova, 16 Russian-language TV channels have been suspended or stopped broadcasting, the remaining few are fined on a regular basis, information resource sites are blocked. In addition to the above restrictions, there is a ban on Soviet and Russian films and television programs about the Great Patriotic War. Under the pretext of "limiting the disinformation", inter alia, the Moldovan authorities suspended broadcasts from the states that hadn't ratified the European Convention on Transfrontier Television, thus imposing the pro-Western news agenda on country's population. This measure has "cut off" the population of Moldova from a number of Russian TV channels. The authorities justify this anti-Russian approach by Russian information channels promoting Russia's "aggression" in Ukraine and misinforming Moldovan society. Over and above that, such reasons as "fight against disinformation", "biased coverage" of the special military operation, "inaccurate information" which might hinder national security, are named among the pretexts for limiting freedom of speech and expression.
In June 2022, the law On Protecting the Information Space entered into force in Moldova; it became another framework for combatting the Russian media. Television and radio broadcasting development strategy which was approved later provides for an obligation to prioritize the content in the national language. At the same time, the authorities ignored the fact that 381 thousand residents of the country (over 11 percent) considers Russian as their native tongue and around 541 thousand people (16 percent), including 130 thousand ethnic Moldovans, use it as their language of choice in everyday life.[1535]
Experts express concerns that this law would also be used primarily to limit the last opportunities to access Russian news and analytical resources. In particular, they have repeatedly noted that since Telegram and TikTok messengers are so popular among the Russian-speaking population of Moldova, the country's current government would seek to limit access to them and control messages in all Moldovan social networks. Government representatives have openly stated their intentions. In February 2023, in particular, Liliana Nicolaesu-Onofrei, chairperson of the parliamentary commission on media, stated the following: "Although we have some tools to prevent and suppress disinformation in the audio-visual sphere, we have problems related to the fight against disinformation in cyberspace, and we are looking for solutions, but we know this is not easy."[1536]
These concerns turned out to have some ground beneath them. In early July 2023, the Moldovan Parliament adopted a Counter-Information and Foreign Information Activities bill, which authorizes special services to control social networks in the country. The law allows the Information and Security Service of Moldova to conduct investigative activities.[1537]
In late May 2023, M. Sandu announced plans to create a "Patriot" National Center for Information Protection and Counteraction to Propaganda. The head of state explained the need for it, saying that Russia "is attacking Moldova with information in order to sow hatred and weaken people's trust in our democracy." According to her, the center would coordinate and implement the policy of the Moldovan state in the field of information security and identify, prevent and combat disinformation at the national level.[1538]
On 18 August 2023, a law on the Center for Strategic Communications and Combating Disinformation came into force; this Center is aimed primarily at countering "Russian propaganda". On 22 December 2023, the Moldovan Parliament approved the Concept of Strategic Communication and Countering Disinformation, Information Manipulation and Foreign Interference for 2024-2028.
The campaign to close Russian and Russian-language media outlets was accompanied by biased and unsubstantiated accusations provoking Russophobia in Moldovan society.
In total, by January 2024, about 100 Internet resources were blocked, including the websites of major Russian media and news agencies.[1539] The few remaining channels are regularly fined by the Moldovan authorities for insufficient broadcasting in the Moldovan (now Romanian) language. For example, in January 2024, 17 TV channels were fined for insufficient local content and its share in the Romanian language.[1540] Also, the websites of Russian government agencies are blocked without any official announcement on the territory of Moldova.
Meanwhile, Russian channels freed up frequencies for Ukrainian ones, who actively joined the Russophobic information campaign.[1541]
Trying to sterilize country's information space in every possible way, the Moldovan authorities also resort to financial levers. Moldova's draft budget for 2023 provided no funds for "MIR" TV channel, in violation of Kishinev's obligations under a relevant CIS intergovernmental agreement. This became possible due to Moldovan leaders' 2023 policy U-turn for exiting CIS structures. The decision to quit from the "MIR" international television and radio company and shut down its country office was the first step in this direction. Along with that, under the pretext of a U-turn towards the West and "European integration" the official Kishinev started denouncing its CIS agreements one after the other.
It should be noted that the policy of Maia Sandu government contradicts the opinion of people's majority. A Date Intelligence (iData) survey shows that over a half of the percent of respondents supported the Republic exiting the Commonwealth.[1542]
Such a policy of the official Kishinev has attracted the attention of even European human rights organizations. As stated by the Swiss NGO "Solidaritätsnetz International", the European Union granted Moldova EU membership candidate status in advance under certain conditions, which the country's authorities were supposed to fulfill, which, however, is not the case.
The violation by Kishinev of its international obligations regarding freedom of the media and the rights of journalists was also reflected in an "Amnesty International" report (this NGO was excluded from the register of branches and offices of international organizations and foreign non-profit non-governmental organizations over the identified violations of the current legislation of the Russian Federation). In particular, it was emphasized that the establishment of political censorship in the Republic of Moldova has effectively deprived citizens of basic values – freedom of speech, pluralism of opinions, access to alternative information sources.
At the same time, numerous projects on supporting the freedom of expression in Moldova and countering "disinformation" led by the US, several European countries and pro-Western NGOs in the recent years are worth noting. In this regard, a US State Department's grant declared by the ruling PAS together with US Embassy in Moldova on making up a kind of "rating" of Moldovan TV channels with "credible" information should be mentioned. This step is fully in line with Moldovan authorities' policy to strengthen the Western propaganda in social life. The following example is illustrative. The NGO "Independent Journalism Center" (receives foreign financial aid) published a report in early December 2021 which concludes that broadcasting of three Russian TV channels "First in Moldova", "NTV Moldova" and "RTR Moldova" "does not contribute to shaping the correct opinions" and "threatens information security of the country". A few days later, on 8 December, Igor Grosu, Speaker of the Moldovan Parliament, said that foreign propaganda "comes from Russia".
In March 2023, an "IREX Moldova" Russian-language entertainment content development fund was established with the participation of the US Embassy in Moldova; the activities of the fund are allegedly aimed at supporting the production and broadcast of high-quality Russian-language television content of Moldovan origin[1543]. On 14 March 2024, the US Embassy donated the Audiovisual Council of Moldova equipment for media monitoring through automatic processing and transcription of video materials in Romanian and Russian. According to officially disclosed data by the USA, USD 215,300 was allocated for this project.[1544]
After Russia launched its special military operation to denazify and demilitarize Ukraine things changed for the worse for Russian citizens and Russian-speaking residents of Moldova.
The events in Ukraine caused significant inflow of refugees into the country. Seizing this dramatic opportunity, the collective West continues its persistent attempts to draw Moldova into the coalition of outspoken Russophobes. Alongside with condemning the Russian special operation and calling to stop all hostilities, the Moldovan authorities verbally declare commitment to European integration and constitutional neutrality. However, according to experts, in reality, a totalitarian regime is coming up.
The attitude towards people from Ukraine has been illustratively changing over time in Moldova. With the flow of financial resources allocated by international organizations for Ukrainian refugee alimentation exhausting, as well as mood changes in European countries in relation to them, the Moldovan authorities are gradually abandoning measures to support Ukrainians remaining in the country. Special rules for their stay were cancelled already in May 2023. Now, Ukrainian citizens who have not obtained a residence permit or refugee status are equated to tourists and required to leave after 90 days under threat of deportation.[1545] The number of refugee accommodation centers has been reduced in several stages from 130 to 15.[1546]
The ruling party is exerting pressure on all civil society organizations that maintain contacts with or related to Russia. There have been reports of threats to Russian-speaking journalists. The editor of the newspaper of the "Russkoe Slovo" compatriot movement was among those to receive such threats and insults. There are also cases of putting pressure on and intimidating pro-Russian activists.
The practice continues of banning entry into Moldova for citizens of the Russian Federation and compatriots. The total number of entry bans (including land checkpoints) is in the dozens daily. The action taken by the Moldovan authorities against Russian citizens who arrive at the Kishinev International Airport are of particular concern. Passengers with Russian passports are regularly subjected to particularly close inspection. There are cases of them being denied entry into Moldova by the border control service: several Russian passengers are deported from almost every flight. The ban on entry into Moldova for the head of Tatarstan Rustam Minnikhanov who intended to visit the Gagauz Autonomous Region in mid-April 2023 is among the most recent cases. He was declared an undesirable person and not allowed to disembark the plane. Another similar case occurred in May 2023, when the famous Russian biologist A. Panchin, who had arrived in Moldova to give a series of scientific lectures, was denied entry into the country under the pretext of a "lack of grounds".
The denial of entry to the country and deportation of 15 philologists from Russia and four other CIS countries (Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) got a wide outcry in the Russian and Moldovan media in September 2023. The scientists were heading to Tiraspol to participate in an international scientific conference on the Russian language, held as part of the 2023 Year of the Russian Language as a Language of Interethnic Communication declared in the CIS. The Moldovan authorities failed to provide any clear explanations. Documents confirming the purpose of the trip that the conference participants had on them were ignored. According to available information, many of them were held at the Kishinev airport for more than a day while awaiting deportation, without being provided with basic living conditions, including water and food.[1547]
There are cases of detention of Russian citizens permanently residing in Transnistria by Moldovan border guards at the Kishinev airport.
Moreover, in early July 2024, the Moldovan FlyOne airline announced that passengers transiting to Kishinev from Moscow through Yerevan would be additionally checked, and the list of passengers would be transferred to competent authorities of the Republic of Moldova.[1548]
The Moldovan leaders' Russophobia shows, among other things, even in the organization of concerts and various performances. Thus, in June 2022, the Moldovan police, under a far-fetched pretext, blocked the shows of Philip Kirkorov, Yegor Creed and a number of other Russian artists who supported their country. On the contrary, Arena Chisinau, the country's largest concert venue, was allocated for the concert of rapper Myron Fedorov (Oxxxymiron, recognized as a foreign agent in Russia), against whom several administrative cases for extremism have been opened in the Russian Federation. Also, the National Palace hosted a performance by Maxim Galkin, who has repeatedly made anti-Russian statements. In March 2023, concerts by rap artist "Face" and "Bi-2" group (these artists are recognized as foreign agents condemning the Russian SMO) were held there. Ukrainian performers are also widely used for anti-Russian purposes in Moldova. Thus, in particular, a concert at "Kishinev Arena" by "Okean Elzy" group, whose lead singer is known for his Russophobic views, turned into an openly anti-Russian event.[1549]
Politically motivated public interference with church affairs also has a Russophobic basis. Pressure is being exerted on the Orthodox Church of Moldova (OCM), which unites about 70 percent of all believers in the country thanks to its successful opposition to Western neoliberal values, which are actively imposed by the M. Sandu regime.
The Moldovan leaders are seeking to break the centuries-old close spiritual ties of the OCM with the Russian Orthodox Church and substitute the canonical church for the Romanian Orthodox Church Bessarabian Metropolitanate. The same methods that have already been tested in Ukraine are being used to create a loyal church at the behest of Western patrons.
The official Kishinev's action against the OCM completely repeats the Ukrainian algorithm. The West-supported regime artificially strengthens the Bessarabian Metropolitanate of the Romanian Orthodox Church, thereby expanding the influence of the Romanian Orthodox Church, which is alien to Moldovan society. Romania actively supports the Bessarabian Metropolitanate as another tool to implant unionist sentiments among the people of Moldova, in addition to M. Sandu and the ruling PAS.[1550]
The Romanian Church is being introduced into the Moldovan military: the Defence Ministry of Moldova and the Bessarabian Metropolitanate signed a cooperation agreement. Defense Minister Anatolie Nosatyi thanked the head of this metropolitanate for "providing religious support and patriotic education in the National Army." The media notes that such cooperation leads to the opening of monuments to Hitler's allies – soldiers and officers of the Romanian occupation army who lost their lives during the World War II invasion of Moldova.[1551] As noted above, events dedicated to Romanian soldiers are usually accompanied by a church service conducted by the Bessarabian Metropolitanate clergy.
Alongside with that, Moldova is beginning to introduce neo-Nazi traditions. In particular, following the example of Ukrainian neo-Nazi suite, another National Army anniversary was celebrated in 2024 with a torchlight procession. The Moldovan opposition condemned the imposition of neo-Nazi traditions. "Torchlight processions in the modern world are firmly associated with the Nazi Germany, Ku Klux Klan movement and other racist and chauvinistic forces," the opposition Party of Socialists said in a statement[1552].
Despite pressure from the authorities, OCM priests spoke out in support of the Moscow Patriarchate at an October 2023 Synod meeting and decided not to leave the Russian Orthodox Church. The decision was made despite knowing that, according to the opposition, the authorities intend to seize part of its property – in particular, monasteries.
The government-initiated court case that led to the agreements between the Ministry of Culture of Moldova and the OCM being annulled is a clear confirmation of the Moldovan authorities' resolve.[1553] Two agreements between these organizations were terminated on 5 April 2024. Igor Dodon, the former President of Moldova, stated that this decision could result in the seizure of OCM monastery buildings and expulsion of monks from there.[1554]
To officially justify such steps, the Romanian Church referred to politics rather than canons, i.e. Russia's SMO to protect Donbass. Bucharest representatives labelled the Orthodox Church of Moldova as "a Moscow Patriarchate occupation structure".[1555]
The media also reported that Bucharest promised money and serious prospects in exchange for OCM parishes switch over to the Bessarabian Metropolis. Supervisors pay each Bessarabian Metropolis minister about 450‑600 euros per month through the church. A priest receives 2,000 euros for the transfer from the OCM, while the return journey is very difficult for a cleric who has transferred.[1556]
Instead of fulfilling their election promises, the members of Maia Sandu's Party of Action and Solidarity started a fight against the opposition after having come to power. The law enforcers and special services were especially active in 2022. Under far-fetched pretexts criminal investigations were initiated against Moldova's ex-President Igor Dodon (including the case of high treason), ex‑Prosecutor General Alexandr Stoianoglo, former Speaker of Parliament Zinaida Greceanîi as well as Vice-President of ȘOR party Marina Tauber and a number of opposition deputies.
The Sandu regime made significant efforts to hinder the opposition ȘOR party. On 19 June 2023, the country's Constitutional Court granted a government's petition to declare the ȘOR party unconstitutional. In April 2023, Ilan Șor, leader of ȘOR party, was sentenced in absentia to 15 years of imprisonment with confiscation of property. In May 2023, trying to prevent Eugenia Guțul, the allegedly "pro-Russian" ȘOR candidate, from winning local elections in Gagauzia, Moldovan leaders initiated the verification of the constitutionality of this political organization.
In order to remove the ȘOR party from the elections, a ban was imposed in July 2023 on members of political parties recognized as unconstitutional from running for election. Despite the negative opinions of the Constitutional Court of Moldova and Venice Commission,[1557] the ruling forces of the Republic adopted relevant amendments two days before the end of registration period for candidates for local elections; they contained no other criteria for banning members of political parties from running for election, except belonging to the ȘOR party. The Venice Commission was not the only international mechanism to draw attention to the illegal persecution of the political opposition in Moldova. The European Court of Human Rights decision in Alexandru Stoianoglo case of 24 October, 2023 was among the most resonant ones on complaints against Moldova. In it, in particular, the Court recognized that the Moldovan authorities violated Mr.Stoianoglo's right to a fair trial and obliged Moldova to pay 3.6 thousand euros compensation to the plaintiff.[1558]
The official Kishinev has taken a course for discrimination against the Gagauz, a national minority who for the most part reject the course of the ruling elite to break off relations with Russia. There is a deliberate elimination of the region's autonomous rights: the elected head (Başkan) Eugenia Guțul, was never appointed a member of the government in violation of law. The Moldovan authorities are isolating Gagauz leaders from any external contacts, cutting the autonomy's budget by changing VAT reimbursement rules, and preventing gas supplies at reduced prices.
I t is also symptomatic that even the CoE structures that are loyal to the Moldovan authorities have paid attention to this crisis situation. In particular, in its conclusion on Moldova, the AC FCNM noted that during its experts' country visit, representatives of national minorities expressed their concerns over this case. In particular, they pointed out that some decisions by political leaders from the ruling party or communication from such leaders casting doubt on the loyalty to the state on the part of certain national minorities at large put at risk the longstanding tradition of interethnic dialogue and mutual respect in the Republic of Moldova. Such doubts are even in contradiction with responses collected in the context of the Ethnobarometer Moldova 2020". The experts of the AC FCNM also expressed regrets that minority issues and minority cultural events have occasionally been politically instrumentalised. For example, some of the decisions taken have created unnecessary tensions, being perceived as retaliatory measures against electoral constituencies inhabited by large numbers of persons belonging to national minorities which gave less support to the ruling political party at the last elections. Such measures May foment fear and resentment among persons belonging to national minorities, particularly among persons belonging to the Russian and Gagauz minorities, but also among Russian speaking national minorities overall. All of these ethnic groups feel negatively and unnecessarily targeted. In their opinion, this attitude is counterproductive and not conducive to peaceful interethnic relations and a cohesive society. On the contrary, it could result in an increase of interethnic tensions. The AC FCNM also cited their fear that such statements by government officials could also lead in practice to national minorities' exclusion from certain structures, to further alienating persons belonging to national minorities from the majority society, to inhibit them from working in public services, or to cause them not to declare their ethnicity in the forthcoming census.[1559]
CERD Concluding observations on Moldova touched upon the Roma issue. It noted with concern that Roma community members continue to face discrimination in their access to education, employment, health care and housing
CERD pointed out at, in particular to the low attendance rate and the high dropout rate at all levels of education among Roma children, particularly girls. The limited access of Roma to health-care services and the lower rates of Roma covered by the compulsory health insurance scheme compared to other ethnic minorities also caused Committee's concern. CERD also touched upon the high rate of unemployment among Roma and the low enrolment rate of Roma with the National Employment Agency.[1560]
Besides, the Committee experts pointed out to discrimination in relation to Ukrainian refugees belonging to Roma communities. They are in particular discriminated against in accessing education, housing and health care. This refugee category is subjected to segregation in refugee accommodation centres and discrimination in accessing housing outside the centres. Very few Ukrainian refugee children belonging to Roma communities get school enrolment owing to the prejudice against them and the lack of education available in their mother tongue.[1561]
However, despite the attempts of the Kishinev regime to wage an unequal fight against historical memory, the majority of Republic's residents are ready to defend sovereignty, independence and national identity of their native land. According to the latest sociological surveys, 71.7 percent consider themselves Moldovans and 44.3 percent speak Moldovan at home.
There are currently no widespread manifestations of neo-Nazism, xenophobia and antisemitism in the Netherlands. Nevertheless, there is still a problem, and a rather serious one due to, inter alia, insufficient legislative and practical efforts by Dutch authorities.
Acts of vandalism against monuments to Soviet soldiers in the country are not common, but they still occur. They include the incident that happened not far from Amersfoort on the Soviet Field of Honour Memorial Complex, where 865 soldiers of the Red Army, died in German captivity in the territory of the Netherlands and Germany, are buried. The unknown persons there put on graffiti with nationalist slogans, as well as references to Ukrainian nationalists. The management of the Complex appealed to law enforcement agencies.[1562] It is worth noting that earlier some funds were allocated from the budget of the Netherlands to carry out works on this Complex. Besides, thanks to the efforts of the Soviet Field of Honour Foundation Dutch public organization, the activities on identifying the buried Soviet prisoners of war and searching for their relatives have been intensified.
Amidst the beginning of the Russian special military operation (SMO) to demilitarize and de-Nazify Ukraine and protect civilians on Donbass, fuelled by the Dutch media and statements by the government, the Russophobic and Russians-oriented discriminatory attitudes started to manifest in the Netherlands. They include, inter alia, anti-Russian speeches and publications, and threats of physical harm. Employees of the Russian Embassy in the Netherlands regularly receive threatening letters, including against their family members.
The Coordination Council of Russian Compatriots in the Netherlands recorded numerous cases of anti-Russian statements and publications. Information about "lists with addresses of Russians in the Netherlands" was circulating on social media, with threats usually added to them. Members of the Ukrainian community, among others, have been noticed in such activities.
At the same time, the law enforcement authorities, the Dutch Government and the local press are quite loyal to manifestations of Nazi ideology in Ukraine. Thus, the Dutch media, even if they acknowledge that certain Ukrainian structures (such as the Azov battalion[1563]) promote openly Nazi ideology and use Nazi symbols; however, they do their best to avoid discussing the ideological component of such actions.
On 26 March 2022, the Nieuwsuur (News Hour) programme broadcast a report entitled "Russia calls the Azov battalion Nazis, but what do they themselves say?"[1564] in which the authors of the story were forced to admit that this structure promotes Nazi ideology and uses Nazi symbols, but by all means avoided any discussion of the ideological component. Michael Colborne, a Bellingcat journalist, who participated in the programme and was involved in the flight MH17 investigation, also failed to neglect the nationalistic nature of Azov, but justified the neo-Nazis by saying that Ukraine allegedly had no other choice.
Since 2022, against the background of worsening Russian-Dutch relations, the Dutch side has prevented members of the Russian Embassy from participating in events dedicated to World War II (for example, in early 2023, a local Jewish organization withdrew the invitation sent to the Russian diplomatic mission to attend a Holocaust commemoration event under pressure from the Dutch authorities). In the context of the Victory Day celebrations, it is not permitted to use Russian flags and St George's ribbons in the Netherlands.
Until recently, during consideration within the framework of the United Nations General Assembly of the resolution entitled "Combating the glorification of Nazism, neo-Nazism and other practices that contribute to fuelling contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance," introduced annually by Russia and other co-sponsors, the delegation of the Netherlands, in line with the common position of the European Union, abstained from voting. However, in 2022-2023, abiding by the EU's policy of falsifying history, the Netherlands voted against the initiative that condemned the glorification of Nazism, as well as any manifestations of neo-Nazism and other forms of racial discrimination.
In recent years, international human rights mechanisms have paid considerable attention to manifestations of antisemitism in the Netherlands. However, they indicate that the problem remains quite acute. The EU Agency for Fundamental Human Rights (FRA) in its report on manifestations of antisemitism in 2012-2022 indicated that the police in the Netherlands recorded 549 antisemitic incidents in 2022, including 412 antisemitic statements, 54 threats and 28 violent incidents. Many incidents concern employees with public tasks being referred to as "Jew," often in combination with swear obscenities and insults. Moreover, it is noted that the Dutch Public Prosecution Service recorded 144 cases of discrimination resulting in punishment in 2022, of which 61 were grounded in antisemitism (39 percent). There were slightly more such acts in 2021 – 157 specific discriminatory offences, of which 58 involved antisemitism (31 percent).[1565]
According to the annual report of the Centre for Information and Documentation Israel (Centrum Informatie en Documentatie Israel (CIDI), 379 antisemitic incidents[1566] have been registered in the Netherlands as of October 2023 (155 incidents[1567] – in 2022, 183 incidents – in 2021, and 135 incidents – in 2020). Over 30 percent of discrimination related cases filed and considered by the competent authorities in 2022 involved allegations of antisemitism.[1568] The greatest number of cases is recorded in Amsterdam, which has a large Jewish diaspora.[1569]
There also numerous cases of antisemitism on the Internet. According to the Dutch police and Public Prosecution Service, over 30 percent of discrimination-related cases that were filed and considered by the competent authorities in 2021 involved allegations of antisemitism.[1570]
In the third sociological study of antisemitism conducted by the FRA, there are also trends of increasing antisemitism in the Netherlands among members of Jewish communities in a number of EU countries. In particular, in the Netherlands, as well as Germany, Spain and Sweden, respondents ranked antisemitism the third most concerning problem. At the same time, the Netherlands has one of the highest percentages of those who perceive that antisemitism in the country has increased over the past five years (83 percent). There is a large number of respondents in the Netherlands who also deem expressions of hostility towards Jews in public areas as a "very big" or "fairly big" problem (72 percent). About 9 out of 10 respondents in Italy (94 percent), the Netherlands (90 percent), Spain (91 percent) and Sweden (92 percent) reported having encountered "negative stereotypes accusing Jews of holding global power and control over finance, the media, politics or economy." Jews in these countries and Belgium and France reported the highest rates of experiencing manifestations such as ‘denying Israel the right to exist as a state’ (more than 80 percent), "holding Jews collectively responsible for the actions of Israel" (more than 84 percent) and "comparing Israel’s policy to the Nazi policy" (more than 84 percent). There are also a large number of those who have experienced "incitement to violence against Jews" (68 percent). Of the respondents, 25 percent encountered antisemitism at sports events. In the Netherlands, 42 percent of respondents avoid visiting certain places in the neighbourhood because they do not feel safe as Jews. A small number of respondents (35 percent) reported experiencing antisemitic harassment. The level of those who reported antisemitic discrimination was even lower (20 percent). The survey also showed that the Netherlands, along with Belgium, France, Spain and Sweden, has one of the lowest levels of respondents' satisfaction with the governmental measures to combat antisemitism.[1571]
The Dutch media periodically publish articles about the problem of antisemitism in society, which is revealed among various age groups of the population. Eddo Verdoner, National Coordinator for Combating Antisemitism, notes that the most frequent discrimination is faced by schoolchildren who are forced to change schools. Many are afraid to display symbols of Judaism, including a kippa, in public places.[1572]
On 24 March, pro-Palestinian activists interrupted a concert by Lenny Kuhr,[1573] a Dutch singer with Jewish roots, by unfurling a Palestinian flag shouting "terrorists" and "Zionists." In this regard, 13 of the 15 parliamentary factions issued a joint statement (members of the Denk Party, an ethnic Turk party, and the People's Party for Freedom and Democracy abstained) calling on the government to take decisive action to counter hatred of Jews, whose "security and freedom in the Netherlands are in danger."[1574]
Acting Prime Minister Mark Rutte was forced to admit that the incident with the Lenny Kuhr's concert "goes beyond all boundaries" and that the situation with antisemitism in the country "is going in the wrong direction."[1575]
According to the Dutch media, in May 2024, a wave of pro-Palestinian protests swept through higher education institutions in the Netherlands (universities in Amsterdam, Groningen, Maastricht, Nijmegen, and Utrecht).[1576] At the University of Amsterdam, demonstrations escalated several times into riots that required the intervention of the Kingdom's law enforcement agencies.[1577] Thus, as a result of violent clashes with the police on the night of 7-8 May 2024, about 200 people were detained. Acting Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte described the events as "unacceptable" and called for refraining from violence. Mark Rutte promised to discuss the rapid rise in antisemitic sentiment in the country with several civil society organizations, noting that Dutch people with Jewish roots are not responsible for Israel's actions in the Gaza Strip.
On 11 May 2024, the Royal Academy of Art, based in the Hague, announced under pressure from students that it would cease educational exchanges with the Bezalel Academy of Art and Design in Jerusalem.[1578] Many Dutch universities are also considering whether to continue co-operation with Israeli universities.[1579]
Alongside student protests, there are regular pro-Palestinian rallies in the Netherlands. On 11 May 2024, a demonstration supported by thousands of people took place on Dam Square in Amsterdam and marched to the City Hall, shouting slogans "Halsema, shame on you!" and "Halsema resign!" at its Head (Femke Halsema).[1580]
Relatives of Israeli servicemen living in the Netherlands are being harassed.
According to a survey conducted by a profile organization among young Dutch people (born after 1980) in December 2022, nearly a quarter of them (23 percent) question the Holocaust (calling it "a myth") or consider the number of Jewish people killed during the Holocaust to be "exaggerated." Besides, in general, this generation knows remarkably little about the events of World War II: more than a half of the respondents could not say how many people were killed during the war and even did not mention the Netherlands as one of the countries where the Holocaust happened. Finally, 22 percent of the Dutch respondents under 42 consider individual neo-Nazi statements "acceptable." The then Dutch Prime Minister of the Netherlands Mark Rutte found the results of the survey "shocking."[1581]
The lack of awareness of the country's population on this issue leads to isolated illustrative incidents. Thus, at the end of 2022 and beginning of 2023, unknown people projected the slogan "White Lives Matter"[1582] with a laser onto several buildings in Rotterdam at once, and in early February 2023, the inscription "Anne Frank, inventor of the ballpoint pen" was similarly projected onto the Anne Frank House in Amsterdam, thereby questioning the authorship of the famous diary.[1583] Relevant photos appeared in the Telegram channel "The Lazer Nazi Bunker."
There is still no legally binding criminalization of public denial of the Holocaust in Dutch criminal law. In September 2021, this problem was brought to the attention of the European Commission that initiated at that time an infringement procedure against the Netherlands (along with Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland, and Sweden) for not fully and correctly transposing the provisions of the Council Framework Decision on combating Racism and Xenophobia[1584] into national law. In particular, it has been noted that the States have failed to correctly transpose the criminalization of specific forms of hate speech that incite violence or hatred, since public condoning, denial or gross trivialization of international crimes and the Holocaust do not fall within the definition of national laws.[1585] The Commission suggested that the Hague would immediately provide for this ban in normative acts of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in accordance with the obligations undertaken within the European Union).[1586]
The Kingdom of the Netherlands had taken a number of additional measures in recent years to counter manifestations of racial discrimination. Thus, the National Coordinator on Antisemitism[1587] has been working since 1 April 2021, and the position of National Coordinator for Discrimination and Racism has been introduced. The Work Programme 2022–2025 intends to focus on building appropriate institutions, raising awareness, combating denial of the Holocaust, international cooperation, etc.[1588]
In July 2023, the cabinet decided to establish criminal penalties of up to one year in prison for publicly denying the Holocaust.[1589] However, the relevant bill was not passed. The glorification of terrorist acts has also not yet been criminalized in the Kingdom of the Netherlands (the relevant bill has been "pending" since 2016).
At the legislative level, the issue is primarily regulated by the general provisions of the Dutch Criminal Code (CC). Article 137(c) of the CC criminalizes any public insult, either verbally or in writing or through images, against a group of persons because of their race, religion or beliefs, or a number of other grounds, while Article 137(d) criminalizes "incitement to hatred or discrimination" on a wide range of grounds.
It should also be noted that the court practice related to combatting antisemitism in the Netherlands is quite poor. Convictions are rare. Provocative statements and acts are punishable only if their objectives go far beyond "open discussion based on freedom of expression in a democratic society."[1590] However, there are also opposite situations. The case of importing about 100 daggers with swastikas, Waffen-SS symbols and slogans of the Third Reich into the Netherlands for the purpose of selling them to Dutch nationals (the defendant was eventually found guilty under Article 137 (e) of the Criminal Code), which was brought to the Supreme Court of the Netherlands in 2012 is a vivid example of the application of anti-discrimination articles of the Criminal Code in relation to the use of Nazi symbols.[1591]
There are also 'high-profile" precedents. For example, in early 2017, several Dutch citizens were sentenced to community service and/or fined for shouting antisemitic slogans and displaying symbols of the "Combat 18" and "Defend Europe" right-wing radicals.[1592] In early 2020, a Dutch citizen was sentenced to community service for posting SS symbols on the Internet and calling for violence against members of the Jewish and Muslim communities.[1593] In February 2021, another Dutch citizen was also sentenced to community service for posting racist and antisemitic materials on the "VKontakte" social network.[1594]
One of the antisemitic incidences that caused a massive public outcry in the Netherlands was the story associated with the naming of the world largest twin-hulled vessel after Pieter Schelte Heerema, a famous Dutch Nazi who was a member of the Waffen-SS during the Nazi occupation of the Netherlands. Due to the negative reaction in public and the media, the vessel owner re-named it to call the Pioneering Spirit, thus retaining the original abbreviation.
A scandal broke in 2021 over the Dutch website "bol.com," which sold books with antisemitic content (in particular, denying the Holocaust). A number of relevant NGOs filed a complaint against the company in an attempt to hold it criminally liable. The incident provoked a public discussion about the lack of appropriate regulations (censorship, among other things). The National Coordinator for Combating Antisemitism called the situation unacceptable, and called for the company to be held accountable, as well as for the legislation in this area to be tightened in general. However, the Dutch Public Prosecution Service terminated the investigation in December 2021, deeming its continuation unreasonable.[1595]
The demonstration of the Nazi symbols (including badges, uniform attributes, greetings, etc.) is not regarded as a separate crime in the Netherlands, but may be subject to criminal prosecution based on general anti-discrimination provisions.
In practice, every action is considered by the court depending on its context. Nazi greeting as a gesture does not in itself entail criminal responsibility, but it may be punishable in cases where it is purposefully performed in public or during memorial services, accompanied by the voicing of Nazi slogans, etc. However, the same Nazi greeting addressed to a particular person, rather than to a group of people, is most likely to fall within the scope of Article 266 of the CC (i.e. as an ordinary insult). At the same time, falsifiers of history (as well as, for example, owners or administrators of websites where such content is posted) may be held liable under the mentioned Articles of the CC. However, in practice, these provisions are not often applied.
There are regular publications in the Dutch media about alleged cases of Dutch military personnel expressing support to Nazi ideology. It became publicly known in 2018 that the Dutch military exchanged extremist views and statements via messengers, sent swastikas and other Nazi symbols, and expressed interest in the ideas of Adolf Hitler and his associates, as well as relevant literature.
Moreover, issues related to the facts of cooperation between the Dutch authorities and the Nazis during World War II have not been fully resolved, including the assistance provided by the municipal authorities of individual cities in identifying undesirable persons and the transportation of Jews, Roma and members of other 'second-class nations' to Nazi concentration camps by the Nederlandse Spoorwegen, a Dutch railway company. One such high-profile challenge was the dispute over the payment of compensation to Nazi victims, who had been charged by the Dutch railway company for transporting them to concentration camps.
In this regard, attention is drawn to the 'conclusions' made by experts of the UN Human Rights Council (HRC). In particular, Ahmed Shaheed, HRC Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, revealed the sceptical attitude of members of the Jewish community to the willingness of Dutch institutions to combat antisemitism, as well as to their actions related to the payment of compensations to the victims of the Holocaust and their relatives. He also noted that many of those he interviewed highlighted the inability of the Dutch police to recognize antisemitic insults and sometimes to accurately identify antisemitic incidents.
In the Netherlands, there is a political party that can generally be described as neo-Nazi – the Dutch People's Union founded in 1971. It is known for a number of radical appeals (it stands for a constitutional amendment stating that German-Christian culture should remain dominant in the Netherlands, for introduction of the subject of nationalism in schools and stricter migration policy, opposes the construction of new synagogues and mosques in the Netherlands, and uses the slogan "White lives matter" and others), but it does not have any real political power.
Furthermore, in late 2020 and early 2021, several scandals erupted around the Forum for Democracy, a popular party in the Netherlands (it won 3 out of 150 seats in the House of Representatives in the parliamentary elections in November 2023). In particular, racist comments about ‘white supremacy’ made by Thierry Baudet, Party Leader, via WhatsApp, became public.[1596] He has also stated that he considers the Nuremberg Trials illegitimate, thus causing strong dissatisfaction of the Centre for Information and Documentation Israel,[1597] and in December 2021, he compared the restrictions introduced in the background of the spread of COVID-19 to the Holocaust, thereby prompting legal action.
Discrimination against members of ethnic, national and religious minorities and migrants, including legal and naturalized migrants, continues to be recorded in the Netherlands. The spread of such sentiments is facilitated by the activity of a number of right-wing politicians in the Netherlands. Moreover, in 2018, the essentially xenophobic statement of Stef Blok, then Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, that there were no "peaceful multicultural societies" and that it was genetically determined that man cannot connect with "unknown people" caused a wide resonance.[1598] Meanwhile, according to the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (AC FCNM), approximately 26 percent of the Netherlands' residents have a migrant background, i.e. are not indigenous.[1599]
Children of migrants and ethnic minorities face significant discrimination in education: because of their background and appearance, they receive lower marks when entering secondary school, as well as for academic performance during their studies. Moreover, they are limited in their opportunities for internships, that negatively affects their future prospects in the labour market. The Committee on the Rights of the Child has called on the Dutch authorities to ensure that such children are provided with normal educational opportunities and not to use the practice of sending them to special schools.[1600] In addition to these problems, persons with a migrant background face labour discrimination. Yet another area where migrants face limitations is health care.
Moreover, the FRA, referring to the 2022 Dutch housing market studies in the Netherlands, noted that discriminatory attitudes towards non-Dutch tenants persisted in the country. Thus, it turned out that profiles with a Moroccan-sounding (Arabic-sounding) male name have a 23 percent lower chance of being invited for a viewing than profiles with a Dutch-sounding male name. Similarly, profiles with a Moroccan-sounding (Arabic-sounding) female name have a 22 percent lower chance of being invited for a viewing than profiles with a Dutch-sounding female name.[1601]
Meanwhile, children are being forcibly inculcated with neoliberal values. The provisions of a new Civic Education Act oblige primary and secondary education establishments to teach children "respect for diversity, including religion, belief, ethnic origin, gender, disability and sexual orientation."[1602]
Members of the Muslim community who feel alienated and isolated by the provisions of the Act prohibiting wearing traditional Muslim women's face-covering clothing are segregated in society. The same applies to amendments to the Law on Citizenship (Law on Temporary Administrative Counter-Terrorism Measures), which provide for the possibility of stripping of citizenship if a person is suspected of involvement in terrorist activities – that is, based on assumptions, rather than the established fact of committing a crime. The prevalence of anti-Muslim sentiments in the Netherlands was also noted by the HRC Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, E. Tendayi Achiume, who pointed out with concern the considerable tolerance for Islamophobic sentiment in society, including among human rights defenders.[1603]
According to the AC FCNM, out of the 151 incidents of religious discrimination registered by the Dutch police, 91 percent related to anti-Muslim hatred. Two-thirds of the 304 reports of religious discrimination received by ADVs were directed against Muslims. The AC FCNM provided an example of hate speech against Muslims which, according to its data, often remains unpunished. As an example, on 18 December 2018, a court declared as unsubstantiated the complaint by several human rights organizations challenging an earlier court ruling that the statement "Islam kills" used in an advertisement by a political party during the March 2018 municipal elections was not punishable on the grounds that this was directed against a religion and not against a group of people.[1604]
Residents of the Dutch overseas territories also face neo-colonial discrimination. Experts note that Dutch legislatures and local authorities make a distinction between citizens of the Kingdom of the Netherlands born in the Netherlands and citizens born in or migrated from Aruba, Curaçao and Sint Maarten. Moreover, in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, these territories received less economic support than the European part of the country. According to survey data, over a quarter of the respondents with Dutch Caribbean origin (27 percent) and Surinamese origin (26.2 percent) felt discriminated against on the grounds of their race or skin colour in 2021.[1605] The results of another sociological study on people with a migrant background also confirmed the high degree of discrimination against people from the Dutch overseas territories. The highest prevalence of discrimination was among people with Surinamese (17 percent) and Dutch Caribbean (16 percent) backgrounds. Among all groups surveyed, second-generation migrants reported higher levels of discrimination. The figures were almost twice as high as for first-generation migrants among those of Turkish and Moroccan origin.[1606]
The spread of discrimination, racist sentiments, and xenophobia in the Netherlands was indicated by various multilateral universal and regional human rights mechanisms. In 2019, The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) has identified a number of unresolved problems in government policies to combat intolerance in society as a whole (strict requirements for the integration of foreigners, discriminatory and xenophobic statements by some politicians and journalists regarding Islam, Muslims, migrants, LGBT people, etc.).[1607] Moreover, it was noted that such ideology is used not only by ultra-right parties, but also by individual moderate politicians and officials who openly express their racist beliefs. Cases of implementation of such an ideology in practice have also been recorded (for example, opening of websites for reporting complaints over workers from Romania, Poland and Bulgaria and asylum seekers). ECRI, inter alia, called on the Netherlands to tighten civil, administrative and criminal law and to ensure full independence of the competent authorities in this field.
Having pointed out shortcomings in Dutch legislation in the field of combating racism and xenophobic speech, ECRI initiated in 2021 infringement procedures against the Netherlands (along with Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland and Sweden) for not fully and correctly transposing the provisions of the Council Framework Decision on Combating Racism and Xenophobia into national law.[1608] In particular, it has been noted that the States have failed to correctly transpose the criminalization of specific forms of hate speech that incite violence or hatred, since public condoning, denial or gross trivialization of international crimes and the Holocaust do not fall within the definition of national laws.[1609]
ECRI, inter alia, called on the Netherlands to tighten civil, administrative and criminal law and to ensure full independence of the competent authorities in this field.
In 2021, it was confirmed that the ECRI recommendations were not implemented by the Kingdom of the Netherlands.[1610]
The high degree of polarization of the Dutch society and the stigmatization of certain religious communities in the country was also pointed out by Ahmed Shaheed, HRC Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, following his visit to the Netherlands in 2019. In particular, pointing to the proliferation of ideas of a "superior" Dutch national identity in public discourse, he noted that the "Dutch values" were increasingly mentioned in public policy debates and often used to implicitly define behavioural norms. In this context, Islam and the "Dutch" or "Western European way of life" are usually characterized as incompatible. For example, calls by the political parties for Muslims to recognize the Dutch or European culture as dominant and to assimilate with it are not uncommon. He believes that this may contribute to further polarization of religious communities.
As specified in the report of the fourth cycle of the Universal Periodic Review within the framework of the UN Human Rights Council,[1611] problems in the field of combating discrimination at the legislative level have not been resolved in the Netherlands. International human rights monitoring mechanisms have drawn attention to this issue. The UN Human Rights Committee (HRCttee) has expressed concern at the chronic use in the Netherlands of racist hate speech against migrants, refugees, Muslims and ethnic and religious minorities by politicians and senior public officials on social media and at public events such as football matches. He also noted that hate speech not only caused significant damage to the rights and reputations of individuals and groups who were subjected to it, but also contributed to a climate of intolerance and hate crimes in the country. The Committee recommended that the Netherlands review its anti-discrimination legislation to ensure full and effective protection against discrimination on all prohibited grounds in accordance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in all fields and areas, and to prohibit direct, indirect and multiple discrimination.
In November 2021, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), highlighting the continuing tensions with minorities in the Netherlands, pointed, inter alia, to discrimination against Jewish and Muslim communities. It also expressed concern at the racist motives prevalent in the media and at the dissemination of racist statements and threats on the Internet. Further, the Committee addressed the figure of Black Pete, a character in Dutch New Year celebrations, which "reflect negative stereotypes and are experienced by many people of African descent as a vestige of slavery." CERD also recommended that the Dutch authorities ensure through its criminal legislation that racist motivation is taken into account as an aggravating circumstance in the commission of criminal offences.[1612]
The FRA, in its 2023 report, referred to a nationally representative survey covering residents aged 15 or older. Of the 11 percent of the respondents who had felt discrimination against in the 12 months preceding the survey, 36 percent said this was because of their race or skin colour. Over a quarter of the respondents with Dutch Caribbean origin (27 percent) and Surinamese origin (26.2 percent) felt discriminated against on the grounds of their race or skin colour in 2021.[1613]
Additionally, according to the FRA, the police registered 6,580 discrimination-incidents in 2021, 42 percent of these incidents related to ethnic origin.[1614] In addition, according to the report of the former HRC Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, E. Tendayi Achiume, dated July 2020,[1615] in the Netherlands, despite the existence of relevant laws, there are many problems with their practical application. The Special Rapporteur also emphasized the high degree of polarization in the political sphere of life in the Dutch society. She also noted that the stereotype of a genuine Dutch as a person of western origin is popular in public discourse, while people of African and Asian descent – even when they hold full citizenship and have done so for multiple generations – are characterized as not really Dutch. According to the Special Rapporteur, this was reflected in the fact that race, ethnicity, national origin, religion and other such categories determine who is considered as fully Dutch. There is racial and ethnic profiling and obvious challenges in combating terrorism (due to the citizenship-stripping procedure). The government is recommended to "remediate socioeconomic gaps between racial and ethnic minorities and ethnic Netherlanders" as well as improve the education system. The expert also recommended that the Netherlands take the necessary special measures in the political, economic, social and cultural spheres to ensure equality of racial and ethnic minorities and provide them with effective protection from and access to remedies for racial discrimination.[1616]
The Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities drew attention to intolerance against Jews, along with Muslims in the Netherlands, as noted above, in 2023. The Dutch authorities were encouraged to combat and publicly condemn at the highest political level any instances of antisemitic and anti-Muslim discourse by public figures. It encouraged also to actively support awareness raising measures against all forms of hatred in society, including antigypsyism. To this end, according to the AC FCNM, the Dutch authorities should strengthen their efforts to prevent, investigate and prosecute effectively hate crimes, including on social media, and increase awareness of persons belonging to the communities most exposed to hatred about various reporting possibilities and legal remedies. The Committee also advised the Netherlands to include grounds of "language," "skin colour" and "ethnic origin" into the General Equal Treatment Act.[1617]
Poor members of the society are also subject to racial discrimination by the Dutch authorities. The child benefit scandal caused a wide resonance: the Dutch government headed by then Prime Minister Mark Rutte resigned in early 2021 due to the fact that for several years in the country the tax authorities accused poor families, mostly of migrant origin, of fraud and deprived them of social benefits due to minor errors in documents. This problem was caused by the Dutch authorities using a social security fraud detection tool called the System Risk Indication based on an algorithmic risk assessment model. Based on this tool, authorities identify certain people as more likely to commit benefit fraud. It is used mainly in areas with a high proportion of low-income residents, migrants and ethnic minorities. This problem was highlighted by Philip Alston, HRC Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, who pointed out that the use of such tools by the authorities discriminates against the poorest members of society and undermines the right to privacy.[1618] Besides him, the problem was highlighted by Balakrishnan Rajagopal, HRC Special Rapporteur on the right to adequate housing, at the conclusion of his visit to the Netherlands in December 2023. The Special Rapporteur noted that there were serious gaps in the protection of the right to housing for certain social and ethnic groups in society. The latter included primarily non-Western communities, but also migrant workers, illegal migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, and Roma.[1619]
Moreover, the Dutch media, with reference to the competent authorities, published information that the Netherlands had become a "transit point" for people seeking to reach the UK through continental Europe. Experts called the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU the reason for the intensification of such activities.
The situation with refugees and migrants has worsened amid the Ukrainian crisis. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, 110,140 refugees from Ukraine are registered in the country's municipalities (as of May 2024).[1620] In summer 2022, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and various NGOs criticized Dutch refugee reception centres, highlighting poor conditions and lack of sufficient food.
Due to the overloaded system, the authorities forced the municipalities to assist in the reception and accommodation of refugees from Ukraine. The Parliamentarians who questioned the existence of legal grounds for such "coercion" were forced to intervene.
According to the 2022 Report on the Most Resonant Human Rights Violations in Certain Countries of the world by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus, situation in March 2022 revealed problems with the general lack of sufficient number of places in the Netherlands to accommodate refugees from various countries of the world, as well as discrimination of refugees from other countries compared to Ukrainians. For example, the Reception Centre for Asylum Seekers in Ter Apel and temporary shelters around the country received 37,000 asylum seekers, among them 15,000 Ukrainians. Ter Apel was overcrowded and had a shortage of camp beds. Asylum seekers from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq, among others, spend their first nights there on a chair or on the floor.
The issues of irregular migrants and asylum seekers had been highlighted by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights in a report following his visit to the Netherlands.[1621]
The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) has also noted a number of issues related to migrant treatment. In particular, the attention was drawn to the fact that the burden of the integration of migrants was shifted to migrants themselves with the simultaneously introduced sanctions for non-compliance with those requirements (for example, for failing in the exams). Besides, individual integration measures aimed at certain most vulnerable groups were lifted. According to the ECRI, such policies lead to discrimination and exploitation of migrants, as well as to the situation when children of migrants and people originating from the Dutch Antilles make up the core of special needs schools' students. The Commission also pointed out to the fact that most migrants were not aware of any organization that would offer support or advice to them. They are oftener checked by the Dutch police. The unemployment rate is higher among migrants.[1622]
Human rights community continues to be concerned about the inhumanity of Dutch policy towards asylum seekers and irregular migrants, including excessive detention of these categories of persons, including minors, ineffective enforcement of the rights of foreigners in detention, lack of adequate medical care, insufficient flexibility in the system of granting residence permits, as well as weaknesses in the system of ensuring the rights of persons subject to deportation who have been refused asylum (especially from Afghanistan).
The UN Committee against Torture, in its concluding observations to the seventh periodic report of the Netherlands, pointed out such problematic aspects of the treatment of undocumented migrants and asylum seekers as unfair processing of asylum applications, long periods and harsh conditions of detention in special facilities.[1623] The discrimination against migrants was also highlighted by the HRC Special Rapporteurs on freedom of religion or belief[1624] and on contemporary forms of racism.[1625] The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child also raised the issue of detention of migrant children in migration centres and problems with their reunification with families.[1626]
The Amnesty International, a human rights NGO (recognized as undesirable in the Russian Federation), has pointed out that the regime in migrant detention centres is similar to that in prisons. The centres are overcrowded; there is a shortage of staff in the competent authorities to consider migrant applications, etc. The Netherlands Institute for Human Rights indicated that the processing time for asylum applications for all is limited to eight days, but is preceded by a waiting period of about 10 months. Due to the increase in the number of asylum seekers, the latters are placed not only in reception centres, but also in temporary shelters that are not suitable for this purpose. The COVID-19 pandemic has only made this situation worse.
The Human Rights Committee was concerned that the number of persons in immigration detention had significantly increased in the country and that the duration of such detention was often prolonged and, at times, exceeded the maximum timeline laid down in the European Union so-called Return Directive on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals. It also pointed out that the Dutch authorities hardly ever applied non-custodial alternative measures to migrants. Besides, there have been frequent cases of long delay in judicial reviews of immigration detention decisions.[1627]
Dutch human rights institutions also recognized the problems in the infrastructure for receiving migrants and refugees. According to the June 2023 report by the National Ombudsman and Ombudsman for Children, conditions for refugees, especially children, in the Netherlands are unsatisfactory. It is noted that most places for receiving refugees do not meet the necessary standards, and asylum decisions have to be awaited for many months, if not a year.[1628]
A significant problem for the Netherlands, as well as for a number of other European States, remains the issue of the return of the Dutch who have joined the terrorist organization under the name "Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant." According to the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD), as of the end of April 2024, there are around 100 adult Dutch citizens in the region (Syria, Iraq, and Türkiye) (a third of them detained in the Kurdish-controlled al-Hol (women) or Roj camps or in detention centres in north-eastern Syria (men)).[1629] There are about 25 Dutch citizens in jihadist groups. There are approximately 150 minors of Dutch origin living in the region (70 of them are members of jihadist groups in north-western Syria). The government previously insisted that the minors could not be returned in accordance with decisions by The Hague Court, which in 2019 reversed a lower court's decision to return 23 women and 56 children from Syria and ruled that the government had no obligation to these individuals. According to the verdict, the final decision rested with the cabinet, and was a matter of political expediency rather than law. In June 2020, the Dutch Supreme Court upheld the decision. In May 2022, the Rotterdam Court decided that all suspects must be returned to their homeland, otherwise the proceedings against them would be terminated. In November 2022, the media reported on the return of 12 women suspected of terrorist activities and 28 children from northern Syria at the end of already the third special operation by the Dutch Ministry of Justice and Security and Ministry of Defence.[1630] On 13 April 2023, the Rotterdam District Court sentenced four women associated with ISIL to prison terms ranging from 30 to 36 months with a probation period of 12 to 15 months.
Human rights structures pay special attention to the widespread practice of ethnic and racial profiling by law enforcement agencies. For example, two Dutch citizens filed a related complaint with the Dutch Court in 2021, but the court found the ethnic profiling applied by the Dutch Border Guard and contained in the decision of 22 September 2021 to be lawful (the use of race or ethnicity can be a factor when considering who to pick out for further checks on their arrival in the Netherlands), which caused strong criticism from human rights NGOs.[1631] In February 2023, an appeals court in the Netherlands reviewed such findings and ruled that such actions were still discriminatory.[1632]
The demonstration of racial profiling by the Dutch police is confirmed in the report of the Senate's parliamentary committee of inquiry on the effectiveness of anti-discrimination legislation, which was precisely focused on the police. In particular, the report concludes that ethnic profiling (physical and algorithmic) by the police and discrimination within the police work environment are the two most pressing discrimination problems within the police. Major reasons cited included lack of clear standards, discriminatory police culture and inadequate complaints procedures.[1633]
Following an internal investigation within the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a report was published in December 2022 which concluded that racism was widespread within the Foreign Ministry. The then Foreign Minister Wopke Hoekstra and other Dutch officials were surprised by the results and declared their intention to fight the problem. In February 2024, data from a regular survey of 4,500 civil servants were released and showed that every tenth official faces racist manifestations at work, and about 11 percent of respondents observed racist manifestations on the part of colleagues when communicating with citizens.
The Human Rights Committee[1634] and the UN HRC Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism pointed out racial profiling against ethnic minorities practiced by the Dutch policemen.
The main problems faced by members of the Roma community remain unresolved: poverty, unemployment, and social exclusion. The proportion of the educated Roma is low in the Netherlands. Roma children have poor knowledge of the Dutch language, they hardly attend preschools, and in secondary schools, they constitute, along with migrants, the main part of the students attending specialized schools. Moreover, there is a high dropout rate from primary and secondary schools, as well as absenteeism among members of these groups.[1635] The problems of the Roma community, including the failure of the Dutch authorities to recognize them as a distinct national minority, were brought to the attention of the Advisory Committee of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities in 2023.[1636]
Manifestations of racism, especially against irregular migrants, were recorded in the Caribbean part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Moreover, corruption scandals in Sint Maarten and Curaçao became public, with several former ministers, acting parliamentarians and other public officials accused of human trafficking alongside corruption.
There are also problematic aspects in the reception and accommodation of migrants and refugees in this part of the Netherlands.[1637]
This is also confirmed in the 2022 report on the Most Resonant Human Rights Violations in Certain Countries of the world by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus, according to which in Curaçao, with the direct involvement of the Dutch government, human rights are being violated and refugees from Venezuela are being treated unacceptably. Human rights activists have identified at least eight cases of underage children who were detained separately from their mothers and fathers and unlawfully deported without parental guidance or consent. There are also records of tortures in the detention centre in Koraal Specht. In one of the uprisings in the barracks the Venezuelans who had participated were called one by one out of sight of the cameras into a bathroom and beaten.
This issue has also been raised by the UN Committee on Enforced Disappearances. In particular, it was concerned about reports alleging the disappearance of migrants at sea while attempting to reach Dutch territories in the Caribbean, including alleged victims of human trafficking. The Committee is further concerned about the high number of unaccompanied minors that have disappeared from asylum reception centres in the European part of the Netherlands, including in the context of suspected human trafficking. The Dutch authorities are encouraged to redouble their efforts to prevent and investigate such cases.[1638]
The problem of the crimes of colonialism remains relevant for the Caribbean part of the Netherlands. In March 2021, it was reported that the Parliament of Sint Maarten filed a complaint against the Netherlands with the HRC Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, accusing The Hague of neocolonialism, racism and numerous human rights violations. The United Nations is also invited to address the situation concerning the violation of this entity's right to self-governance. According to the Sint Maarten leadership, the Netherlands is infringing on its autonomy amid the COVID-19 pandemic and the devastating effects of the hurricane: a prerequisite for the EUR 30 million financial aid is the establishment of a supervisory board monitoring the implementation of reforms on Sint Maarten. It is also noted that the European part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands received more funding for education and health care during the COVID-19 epidemic than the Caribbean part. According to a statement by the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, such a move by Sint Maarten came as an unpleasant surprise.
On 1 July 2023 and 19 December 2022, King Willem-Alexander of the Netherlands and then Prime Minister Mark Rutte apologized on behalf of the government to the former colonies, acknowledging the unflattering role of the colonial authorities in the "ugly, painful and shameful" system of slavery. Sint Maarten Prime Minister Silveria E. Jacobs did not accept the apology. Protesters in Curaçao called for discussion of the content of the "penitence" and possible reparations. Marinus Bee, President of the Parliament in Suriname, has previously said that the Kingdom was responsible for the "genocide of the indigenous population, as well as for the exploitation of people of Asian descent" and should begin negotiations for an apology and reparations. In Curaçao, Suzanne Camelia-Römer, former Prime Minister, and Charles Cooper, Minister of Traffic Transportation and Urban Planning, also stressed that the Netherlands still maintained a colonial mentality. Charles Cooper emphasized that his people were "not asking for, but demanding an apology," and that the struggle for freedom that began in 1795 "continues to the present day."
Several Indonesian parliamentarians and public officials have also repeatedly called for monetary compensation from the former metropolis for the damage caused, including the return of cultural property removed by the Dutch from that South-East Asian country.
On 17 February 2022, the Royal Netherlands Institute of Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies (KITLV), together with the Netherlands Institute for Military History (NIMH) and the Institute for War, Holocaust and Genocide Studies (NIOD), presented the results of a joint research programme on "Independence, Decolonization, Violence and War in Indonesia, 1945-1950." The enquiry had been undertaken since 2017 and commissioned by the government. The report provides evidence of the regular use of torture by the Dutch military in suppressing the guerrilla movement in Indonesia, detention of prisoners in inhumane conditions, extrajudicial killings, burning of houses and villages, mass arrests and disregard for civilian casualties. The Kingdom of the Netherlands did not burden itself with the rules of law, justice and ethics, and Dutch judges overlooked cases of rape and murder in Indonesia.
According to historians, the politicians in those years were influenced by the widespread "patriotic" sentiment among the Dutch population, fuelled by a sense of their superiority over the enslaved peoples, as well as the lack of any criticism from the public and the media. Whether such sentiments are a thing of the past is still an open question, not only for the Netherlands, but also for several other former European colonial powers.
There are sporadic instances of neo-Nazism and glorification of Nazism in New Zealand. There have been no cases of deliberate dismantling of monuments to anti-fascist soldiers and victims of the World War II in the period 2023-2024. The New Zealand Government and municipal authorities traditionally do not prevent commemorative events to mark Victory Day and the anniversary of the beginning of the Great Patriotic War.
At the same time, the New Zealand authorities are giving full support to the neo-Nazi regime in Kiev. They are providing “aid packages” worth millions of New Zealand dollars to the Kiev junta. Even more telling, they have extended until June 2025 the stay of their military personnel in Europe to train soldiers of the Ukrainian armed forces, whose ranks include neo-Nazi formations.[1639]
In the same spirit, New Zealand is acting in the UN General Assembly when considering the draft resolution on “Combating the glorification of Nazism, neo-Nazism and other practices that contribute to the escalation of contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance”, submitted annually by Russia and other co-sponsors. In 2022‑2023, its position has changed for the worse – the delegation of this country, in solidarity with other states of the “collective West”, votes against this document (previously it traditionally abstained in the voting).
The absence of a legal ban on the display and distribution of Nazi symbols in the country is a disturbing signal. A case in July 2022 with the sale of items with Nazi paraphernalia on the New Zealand online auction site TradeMe, contrary to the portal's stated policy of not allowing ads for items produced after 1933 and containing swastikas or promoting Nazism, fascism, interracial hatred and racial domination, was illustrative. The appearance on the site of more than a hundred ads for the sale of stamps, postcards, books and posters with swastikas, the emblem of the Third Reich and portraits of Adolf Hitler caused a sharp negative reaction from the Zionist Federation of New Zealand and veteran institutions. However, after their collective complaint to TradeMe, the ads were not removed due to the absence of violation of the law. Representatives of the service undertook only to evaluate the work of the algorithms of the portal's recommendation system in order to avoid unintentional advertising of information about such goods.
In August 2022, a massive swastika-shaped structure made up of building materials was discovered on Pigeon Mountain Hill in Oakland. This discovery caused outrage among local residents. After a complaint to the police, it was dismantled.[1640]
In February 2024, the Jewish Council of New Zealand criticized the placement of a swastika on the roof of a workshop in Waimate (Canterbury region). The Nazi symbol was later removed with police assistance.[1641]
In August 2020, Jewish associations succeeded in obtaining an official ban on honouring former SS soldier W.Huber at the ski resort he founded. A ski run and a café in the Hutt Mountain area were named after him. A commemorative plaque was also placed there.
The desecration of memorials and graves of New Zealand veterans has increased. In June 2023, a section of the Waihi Cemetery, where New Zealand veterans are buried, was vandalized. For example, The New Zealand Herald cites an account from a resident whose World War II veteran grandfather's grave was desecrated.[1642]
In April 2024, the War Memorial to the Fallen of the World Wars I and II in Hatuma settlement, near Vaipukurau, was damaged.[1643]
The problem of the spread of extreme right-wing ideas is becoming increasingly urgent. The right-wing movement in New Zealand is predominantly represented by supporters of white supremacy theories. According to the annual reports of the National Security and Intelligence Service, the agency recognizes this as an urgent challenge to the country's internal security. However, the Service believes that the main source of the threat is not organized groups, but radicalized loners, who are much more difficult to identify and neutralize.
At the same time, as demonstrated by the terrorist attack in Christchurch in March 2019 and confirmed by the conclusion of the Commission of Inquiry in 2020, domestic regulation of extremist entities is not sufficiently effective. The list of organizations banned in New Zealand includes, in addition to the groups recognized as terrorist by UN Security Council resolutions, 22 other foreign entities.[1644] At the same time, according to experts, there are 60 to 70 associations, including local ones, and up to 300 individual activists promoting right-wing and far-right ideas. According to the latest available official data (end of 2021), 216 supporters of radical views are under surveillance by the authorities, 140 of them on national grounds and 76 on religious grounds.
The most prominent neo-Nazi groups are Wargus Christi and Action Zealandia[1645], which promote radical nationalist views on the need to improve the white race for its survival in the face of the “onslaught” of third-country migrant workers in New Zealand society. According to a sociological study[1646], members of these associations communicate with each other mainly online, in closed chat rooms and forums, with an emphasis on self-radicalization. However, it is noted that they are poorly organized and rarely manifest themselves in practical terms. There are cases of distribution of leaflets and posters, attempts by individual members of the groups to acquire weapons, and sporadic attacks by current or former members on non-European persons. It is also noted that senior and experienced members of the groups urge others to refrain from illegal activities in order not to attract too much attention of the authorities.
On a positive note, in April 2023, a special envoy for the “Christchurch Call to Action to Eliminate Terrorist and Violent Extremist Content on the Internet” was established.[1647] The first special envoy (reporting directly to the country's Prime Minister) was appointed as of April 17 former New Zealand Prime Minister J.Ardern. In announcing the government's decision, then Prime Minister C.Hipkins said the position would reflect the country's continued commitment to strengthen the protection of online space from terrorist and violent extremist content.[1648]
Under New Zealand law, offenses motivated by racism and intolerance or adherence to Nazi ideology do not constitute a separate offence. Only once, in 1979, was the provision of the Human Rights Act 1993 on liability[1649] for the purposeful incitement of racial hatred through the dissemination of racially motivated material or public speech applied in practice. Moreover, such cases are not subject to criminal proceedings and are considered by the Commission on Human Rights. The commission of a racially motivated hate crime is also not an aggravating circumstance, although the Sentencing Act allows judges to consider such motives for an unlawful act as grounds for imposing a more severe punishment.
In 2020, in the interest of promoting tolerance in New Zealand society, the Christchurch Commission of Inquiry recommended that the government increase the penalties for hate speech and make it a criminal offense. However, the current Labour cabinet's attempt to pass the bill has so far failed: the “final version” of the document, put forward for parliamentary approval in November 2022, was withdrawn in February 2023 “for revision” amid strong public opposition to the initiative, which was perceived as an attempt to introduce censorship.
The Human Rights Act and the Harmful Digital Communications Act currently provide the regulatory framework for countering hate speech in New Zealand. These acts criminalize public insulting statements and threats against a group of people on the basis of skin colour, racial, ethnic or national origin, when such statements or threats are aimed at inciting enmity or hostility, expressing contempt or ridicule against the specified category of people. It is also punishable to refuse to remove from social networks messages aimed at harassment or containing derogatory personal information about someone. The penalty for this act is a fine of up to NZ$7,000 or imprisonment for up to three months.
In addition, during the course of the inquiry, the Commission engaged extensively with the Muslim community, whose members spoke openly about the existence of racism and discrimination in New Zealand and the fact that they were often mistaken for terrorists and treated accordingly. They also reported fear of being subjected to a hate crime, being the victim of a terrorist attack or being the target of hate speech. In this regard, the Royal Commission emphasized the lack of social cohesion in the country and the need to develop it, in particular by stimulating public debate on the subject.[1650]
Following recommendations received by New Zealand in the 2019 Universal Periodic Review under the UN Human Rights Council, work was launched in August 2021 to prepare a national action plan to combat racism under the auspices of the Ministry of Justice and in collaboration with representatives of New Zealand's[1651] ethnic communities. At the time of writing, the plan had not been adopted.
New Zealand human rights defenders have noted with concern the increasing incidence of racial intolerance in the country, faced by both indigenous Maori and other non-European persons. The New Zealand Human Rights Commission notes that migrants are victims of overt or covert racism on a daily basis, in all spheres and at all levels of society (institutional, interpersonal, within their own ethnic group or race[1652]). The driving forces are not only racial “superiority” and white privilege, but also fear and ignorance, and a general neo-colonialist mindset. A similar situation is unfolding in educational settings: according to a 2022 study by Oakland University, students and pupils are less likely to be prejudiced by teachers, health professionals and the police if they are lighter in skin colour[1653].
New Zealanders also perceive members of the Chinese diaspora as “eternal migrants”, despite their presence in the country for more than 150 years.[1654]
At the present stage, the country is experiencing an unprecedented upsurge in anti-Semitism. There has been an increase in its manifestations in all spheres of life, especially in the number of complaints of domestic anti-Semitism.
Half of the respondents to a survey conducted by the Holocaust Education Center reported that Jewish children have experienced anti-Semitism at school since October 2023. Cases were cited of children being locked in a closet, beaten with a stick, and having a Star of David drawn on their school shirts. Attacks on Jewish institutions and places of worship have been documented. In November 2023, the former Jewish youth movement Habonim Dror center next to a synagogue in Auckland was set on fire, and synagogues across New Zealand were repeatedly vandalized and threatened with bombings.[1655] In November 2023, a synagogue in Christchurch was vandalized twice in a two-week period alone. The windows of Bethel Synagogue were smashed.[1656]
At the same time, intolerance and prejudice against members of the Jewish community had been observed in the country long before the escalation of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The results of the New Zealand Jewish Council's survey “Anti-Semitism in New Zealand” (2021[1657]) are illustrative. 1,017 people took part in the survey. It showed that 63 per cent of respondents held at least one anti-Semitic statement. 17 per cent of respondents said they knew “virtually nothing” about the Holocaust. It found that the younger generation of New Zealanders is significantly behind older people in their knowledge of Holocaust history – with respondents aged 61 to 75 being 4.1 times more likely to have extensive knowledge of the Holocaust compared to people aged 18 to 30. Only 42 per cent knew that 6 million Jews were murdered during World War II. At the same time, 6 per cent of respondents agreed with the statement that “Jews brought the Holocaust upon themselves.”
New Zealand Jewish Council spokeswoman J.Moses said the survey results confirm that some New Zealanders still believe “dangerous myths” about the Jewish people.[1658]
At the same time, the country has seen an increase in Islamophobia. Especially the number of aggressive anti-Semitic and Islamophobic materials on the Internet has increased. The Federation of Islamic Associations of New Zealand stated that it had never before seen such a level of hatred towards the Muslim community on the Internet.[1659]
In the wake of the 2019 attacks on mosques in Christchurch, the need to examine the experiences of discrimination and inclusion of Muslims in New Zealand has become increasingly apparent. According to the first baseline survey on the situation of followers of Islam in New Zealand, conducted in 2023 with funding from the Federation of Islamic Associations of New Zealand and the New Zealand Islamic Think Tank by scholars from Massey University, 87 per cent of Muslims believe there is Islamophobia in the country, and 56 per cent have experienced discrimination. 58 per cent of respondents said their children had been discriminated against at school. More than half of respondents indicated that they were treated with less respect than non-Muslim colleagues. 40 per cent of respondents felt that they were treated unfairly at work. More than 60 per cent indicated that women, particularly those in religious dress, are particularly vulnerable to Islamophobia.[1660]
Since the start of the special military operation of the Russian Federation to demilitarize and denazify Ukraine and protect civilians in Donbass, there have been isolated attempts at discriminatory actions against Russian citizens and compatriots by both local authorities and ordinary citizens, as well as manifestations of domestic Russophobia, which had not been observed before. There were cases of harassment of Russian-speaking children in New Zealand schools[1661], as well as calls to ban the employment of Russian sailors on New Zealand ships. In Auckland, the facade of the Russian Orthodox Church temple was damaged by vandals (covered with red paint).[1662] At the end of March 2022, an unknown person attempted to set fire to the Russian Embassy in Wellington. The Russian Embassy in Wellington had received threatening phone calls a few days earlier.
However, after the first incidents of harassment of Russian citizens, the issue came to the attention of the New Zealand government – monitoring of the civil rights of the Russian-speaking population is carried out by the Ministry of Ethnic Communities.
Due to sanctions imposed by Wellington and other Western countries on Russian banks, Russian compatriots of retirement age were deprived of the opportunity to receive their funds from Russia. However, local authorities continued to report their Russian pensions as income and to deduct the corresponding amount proportionately from their New Zealand social security benefits.
Coexistence between the descendants of colonizers and Maori remains a sensitive issue. According to the 2021 Social Survey, some 93 per cent of Māori respondents have experienced some form of racially motivated intolerance and social injustice.[1663] The reports of the Human Rights Commission, published in February 2023, emphasize[1664] that 180 years of colonial rule in New Zealand have had a profoundly negative effect on indigenous development, as manifested in the more modest wealth and health of Maori and their lower life expectancy.
In December 2023, thousands of protesters took to the streets of New Zealand to express opposition to the new government's policies towards indigenous peoples. The protests coincided with the opening session of the country's 54th parliament, which ended the six-year rule of the center-left Labor Party. The new National Party-led coalition announced its intention to review its policy of “positive discrimination”, changing the names of some departments from Maori to English and removing references to the Treaty of Waitangi[1665] principles from legislation, which angered indigenous people.[1666]
The center-right coalition government of C.Lacson in power is not a stranger to playing the “race card” against the indigenous population of New Zealand. Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister W.Peters (leader of the New Zealand First party) has been particularly successful in this area. In his March 2024 State of the Nation address, he accused the Maori of racism and drew parallels between their struggle for their rights and participation in the co-governance of the country alongside the descendants of European colonists under the provisions of the Treaty of Waitangi and the racist policies of Nazi Germany.
Despite widespread condemnation of his provocative statements by representatives of various social forces, W.Peters refused to make any corrections, on the contrary, doubled his racially charged rhetoric.[1667] The representative of the Holocaust Center of New Zealand B.Kepes called the words of the high-ranking functionary “offensive”, the leader of the opposition Labor Party C.Hipkins criticized them, stressing that the position of the current New Zealand leadership is an attempt to divide the country along racial lines.[1668]
The report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into Abuse in Care[1669], released on 24 July 2024, has horrified the country's residents and the international community. According to the inquiry, between 1950 and 2019, at least 256,000 people (!) were subjected to various forms of abuse in a number of state and religious institutions that took them into care. Most of the victims are children, women and disabled people. It is emphasized that the true number of victims cannot be ascertained, as in many cases data was not recorded, or records and documents on persons in the care of a number of organizations were destroyed in order to cover up the crimes.
The Inquiry highlights the disproportionately high proportion of Indigenous and other Pacific peoples among the victims (44 per cent – 2.5 times their share of the population). Thus, once in care, Maori faced harsher treatment and were humiliated because of their ethnicity and skin colour. They were restricted in their access to knowledge of their specific cultural identity, their ability to learn their culture and to speak indigenous languages. Many indigenous victims have permanently lost touch with their community, culture and language.
The Commission's experts agreed with the Waitangi Tribunal's findings that the guardianship policy was intended to assimilate indigenous people, which in turn violated the Treaty of Waitangi. Against this backdrop, the Bill, which would repeal the rules that require guardianship agencies to be guided by the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi in the way they operate, was of particular concern, given that two thirds of children in social care were Maori children.
The effects of systemic violence and discrimination have left a mark on the fate of victims. Some died while in institutions and many committed suicide. Survivors still bear the burden of the consequences of the abuse, which has had a negative impact on all areas of life.
Judge C.Shaw, who headed the inquiry, described the scale of abuse as a “national disgrace” and called on the New Zealand authorities to familiarize themselves with the report in order to prevent a repetition. In turn, Prime Minister C.Lacson said the report marked a “dark and sad day” in New Zealand's history.
The investigation made 95 recommendations for reparations and 138 other recommendations, much of which require legislative changes. There are also demands to formally apologize to the Prime Minister, the Pope and other heads of churches, to rename streets and infrastructure that bear the names of identified perpetrators, and to reopen criminal investigations into possible infractions.[1670] A formal apology is scheduled for November 2024. However, the pressing issue of material reparations to victims remains unresolved.
Discrimination against New Zealand's indigenous population has been highlighted by UN human rights treaty bodies such as the UN Human Rights Committee (HRCttee)[1671], the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR)[1672], and the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)[1673]. This population has traditionally had disproportionately high unemployment rates compared to other ethnic groups. According to official data for December 2023, the Maori unemployment rate rose to 7.9 per cent (the overall national unemployment rate is 4 per cent).[1674] At the same time, the life expectancy of indigenous people is on average 7 years shorter. This has been highlighted by the HRCttee[1675], CERD[1676], CESCR[1677], CEDAW[1678] and the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)[1679], among others.
Experts attribute this situation to the fact that Maori people are more likely than others to experience difficulties in accessing basic health services. In addition, disparities in the remuneration of Maori health workers persist.[1680] CESCR has also criticized the New Zealand authorities for the fact that indigenous people have the highest rates of chronic illness and disability and statistically account for a disproportionately high rate of suicide and mental health problems.[1681] Meanwhile, the practice of isolating patients in psychiatric hospitals to punish and discipline them is common. Maori are also the most frequently subjected to it.[1682]
The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) also noted the extremely high rate of suicide among indigenous children and young people (between the ages of 10 and 24), noting that men and boys are the most affected. Further to this theme, CRC expressed its concern at the high level of violence, including domestic and sexual violence, faced by indigenous children, and at the limited access to psychological and physical recovery services, as well as to reporting.[1683]
Maori continue to be over-represented in the public care system, where CRC found that they are disproportionately more likely than other children to suffer some form of harm. For this reason, the New Zealand Government was again recommended in 2023 to take action to prevent the placement of minors in institutions, minimize the length of time they spend in institutions, provide Maori with appropriate support, and facilitate the return of these children to their family and community.[1684]
Challenges also arise in the realization of the right to education. International monitoring bodies have noted in this context that Maori and indigenous Pacific students, particularly at secondary and tertiary levels, have lower levels of educational achievement than European children and are more likely to be stigmatized and disciplined in schools.[1685] There has been a decline in native spoken language skills among indigenous people. This is primarily due to the low number of Maori-speaking teachers.[1686]
According to CRC experts, efforts to promote and advance the use and teaching of the Maori language, culture and history in schools should help to address the problem of racism, discrimination, stigmatization and prejudice against indigenous people in New Zealand.[1687]
The high percentage of indigenous people in the prison population is notable. The UN Committee against Torture remains concerned that Maori people, including women and youth, are disproportionately affected by imprisonment, reportedly accounting for about 50 per cent of the total prison population – with Maori making up only 17 per cent of the country's total population. However, access to culturally sensitive legal aid services, including interpretation and translation services, for marginalized people such as Maori and Pacific peoples remains inadequate.[1688]
Maori are far more likely than white New Zealanders to be targeted by the police. In contrast, it is notable that the percentage of indigenous people in the judicial and law enforcement systems is low, at 10 per cent and 11 per cent respectively. The HRCttee also referred to the practice of racial profiling of not only Maori but also people of African descent.[1689]
The UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination noted in August 2017 the lack of progress in implementing the recommendations of the Treaty of Waitangi Constitutional Advisory Council made back in 2013. In addition, the independent Maori initiative Matike Mai Aotearoa has put forward proposals for discussion on a number of constitutional models that have not even been considered by the New Zealand authorities.[1690] At the same time, the need to ensure meaningful participation of Maori in decision-making processes affecting their rights was emphasized in March 2018 by CESCR.[1691]
There have been incidents of desecration of indigenous burials in the country. The vandalism of two headstones at Waikato Military Cemetery in November 2023, where Maori killed in the Battle of Rangiriri (one of the bloodiest battles of the New Zealand Wars, during which Maori fought for their sovereignty and land), was particularly acute. The desecration of the graves occurred just days before the 160th anniversary of the battle.[1692]
In December 2023, indigenous graves in the predominantly Maori part of the cemetery were vandalized. Significantly, it was stones with Maori national ornaments that were destroyed.[1693]
There is no concept of neo-Nazism/Nazism in the Norwegian law. The relevant political and social movements are not prohibited by law.
Oslo has been repeatedly criticized on this basis by the relevant UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), established under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.
However, almost all manifestations of neo-Nazism or Nazism are enshrined in the country's Criminal Code (§§ 77, 185, and 186) and are prosecuted as "hate speech" or "discrimination" based on race, nationality, ethnicity, religion, gender, sexual orientation, etc., which are also considered as aggravating circumstances. This also applies to cases of displaying Nazi symbols. It is not prohibited by law, but its use in the context of "hate speech" against specific groups is punishable by a fine or imprisonment of up to 3 years.
There are no plans to introduce the concept of "race" as such into the Norwegian Law, in particular the Equality and Non-Discrimination Act 2017, as the Norwegian authorities consider that discrimination on the basis of race is already regulated therein as "ethnic discrimination." There are no plans to establish a separate police structure to combat and investigate hate speech cases (the Russian recommendation under the Universal Periodic Review of Norway in the UN Human Rights Council was not accepted in this regard).
The rights to non-discrimination, individual protection, as well as provisions on equality and freedom of belief are enshrined in a separate chapter of the Norwegian Constitution of 1814.
Norway has an extensive network of human rights institutions and a number of national ombudsmen that focus, inter alia, on equality and discrimination prevention.
Discrimination complaints filled out by citizens are processed by the Discrimination Commission. Since 2015, the Norwegian National Institute for Human Rights (Norges Institusjon for Menneskerettigheter; NIM) has been operating under the Storting (Parliament) as an independent national human rights institution.
Unlike many European nations that carry their own Nazi legacy, Norway, due to historical reasons, lacks a fertile ground for fostering National Socialist ideology.
Between 1940 and 1945, Norway experienced Nazi occupation and the collaborationist regime of Vidkun Quisling. Human losses exceeded 10,000 people. Northern Norway, where the Nazis used "scorched earth" tactics during their retreat, was particularly affected.
King Haakon VII delivered a radio address to the Norwegian people in London on the occasion of the liberation of parts of Northern Norway from the Nazis by Soviet troops, saying: "We have already numerous proofs of the friendly and sympathetic attitude of the Government and people of the Soviet Union towards our country, and we are following with admiration the victorious and heroic struggle of the Soviet people against our common enemy."
On 17 October 1945, Einar Gerhardsen, Prime Minister of Norway, sent to Joseph Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union, a thank-you telegram in which he expressed "the warmest congratulations of the Norwegian government and its gratitude for the invaluable assistance of the Red Army in the liberation of Norway from the German yoke." In autumn 1945, Soviet troops left the territory of Norway.
In 1952, a monument to the Soviet soldiers (the so-called Russian Monument — Russemonumentet) who liberated Norway from occupation was erected in Kirkenes. Since 1954 (the 10th anniversary of the liberation of Northern Norway (East Finnmark) by the Red Army), this event has been regularly commemorated in both countries.
On 25 October 2019, King Harald V of Norway called Red Army soldiers heroes of the Kingdom at a ceremony in Kirkenes on the occasion of the 75th anniversary of the liberation of Northern Norway from the Nazis. "We know the losses and sacrifices it required. The many soldiers who took part on the Soviet side are also our heroes," the King emphasized. On behalf of the Russian side, Sergei Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, took part in the commemorative ceremony.
The attitude toward neo-Nazism in Norwegian society is generally negative. Norwegians remain opposed to fascism, and attempts to revise the history of World War II are unpopular. Generally, publications containing distorted interpretations of the history of the World War II are criticized by historians and members of war memorial organizations.
The country's authorities do not allow any glorification of the Nazi movement or former members of Nazi organizations, including SS. Principal non-participation of the authorities in any actions to search for and rebury the remains of Norwegian citizens who fought in the Wehrmacht during World War II is officially emphasized.
The 2017 initiative of the Norwegian Red Cross to open a "place of remembrance" for Norwegian Waffen-SS legionnaires in Norway at the State's expense was not supported by the public and the country's leadership on the pretext that, according to the Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims of 12 August 1949, the authorities are supposedly obliged to facilitate access of relatives of the deceased to their burial sites.
The country does not accept, especially at the official level, the desecration or destruction of monuments to the fighters against Nazism and its victims;[1694] the authorities supported the construction of new monuments until 2022.[1695] Numerous burial sites and monuments to Soviet POWs who died in Nazi concentration camps in Norway (12,678 people) are kept in decent condition at the expense of the Norwegian State, and are restored and modernized, if necessary.
Ceremonies involving local authorities and the public were held regularly, especially on the anniversaries of the Victory over Fascism, near the memorials until spring 2022, to which Russian diplomats were invited. Caring attitude towards Soviet monuments was especially noticeable in Northern Norway, the eastern part of which was liberated by the Red Army in 1944. As mentioned above, the 75th anniversary of this event was solemnly and widely celebrated in October 2019.
In May 2020, for the first time in many years, the Norwegian Foreign Minister took part in a join wreath-laying ceremony with the Russian Ambassador at the monument at the grave of Soviet soldiers in Oslo.
However, proposals to revise the historical events began to emerge in the Norwegian media in spring 2022.
Hans-Jacob Bønå, elected Head of the Finnmark County Council[1696] in autumn 2023, said that the Ukrainian delegation should be invited to the events commemorating the 80th anniversary of the liberation of Northern Norway, while the Russian delegation should not be invited.[1697] Among the arguments in favour of this decision was the point that the commander of the squad that first entered Kirkenes was a senior sergeant born in Soviet Ukraine. The fact that he was a citizen of the Soviet Union and a bearer of Soviet identity was not taken into account in this case.[1698]
In statements by officials on Norway's Liberation and Veterans Day on 8 May, the emphasis is increasingly shifting in favour of praising NATO, Norway's participation in international military operations, including bypassing the United Nations, and calls to "strengthen the transatlantic bond" (with Russia referred to as a "source of threat").
There is a primitivization of military history in Norwegian school textbooks (the role of the Soviet Union is reflected in a "summarized form," only the Battle of Stalingrad and the D-Day are mentioned as "breakthrough" Allied offensives). Liberation of Western Europe by US and UK troops ("brought democracy") is place in opposed to the liberation of Eastern Europe by the Soviet Union (after Fascism was suppressed, "the influence of another totalitarian trend, which threatened democracy, has grown").
Allegations that Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union are equally to blame for the start of World War II are gaining more and more ground in Norway, as does the thesis that Eastern European countries actually lost their independence in post-war years: "the end of the war in Europe was not celebrated until the fall of the Berlin Wall," or "real freedom came after the collapse of the totalitarian Soviet project" (similar ideas are promoted, for example, by the senior management of the Resistance Museum in Oslo).
The severity of the trauma inflicted on the Norwegian people by the occupation is demonstrated by the harsh treatment of collaborators after the war. Up to 2 per cent of the population were subjected to repressions in various forms, one of the highest figures among the countries that went through the stage of post-war "purges." According to various estimates, up to 7,000 Norwegians fought on the Nazis' side, including up to 6,000 people fought on the Soviet-German front as part of SS Viking and Norland divisions, including Norway regiment, SS Ski Jäger Battalion "Norway," and SS Norwegian legion, with losses amounted to about 900 people. After the war, Norwegian SS members were in large part sentenced to various terms of correctional labour and temporarily deprived of their civil rights.
During the entire period of occupation of Norway by the pro-Nazi regime, a high level of employment was maintained in the country. According to various sources, between 200,000 and 500,000 Norwegians worked at the jobs created by Germans. In the early post-war years, the active participation of Norwegians in meeting the Reich's economic needs was not really considered to be disgraceful, but was subsequently concealed for a long time (including by destroying archives indicating the use of POW labour in the construction of key infrastructure projects).
The Norwegian authorities were also ambiguous about the "unofficial" Resistance movement that acted as an alternative to the "official" Milorg organization (Milorg, "Military Organization"), an underground organization run by Norway's government in exile that had left the country together with the Royal family and settled down in London. One of the main reasons behind such sentiments was that the members of "unofficial" Resistance cooperated with the Soviet military. As a result, they were not only not properly rewarded for their input in fighting against fascism, but were often regarded by the post-war authorities as "unreliable elements" and potential "Soviet spies" and persecuted, spied on, and restricted in upward mobility.
It was not until the end of the Cold War that the Norwegian guerrillas were gradually recognized. In 1983, King Olav V laid wreaths at the memorials in the settlements of Kiberg and Berlevåg (Northern Norway) in honour of the guerrillas, and in 1992, the guerrillas were "rehabilitated" by King Harald V, who laid a wreath at the monument in Kiberg, saying: "I am afraid we have unfairly imposed significant personal burdens on individuals in the context of the Cold War, and I respectfully lay a wreath at the monument to the guerrillas." No apologies for the previous persecution were ever made, although many in Norway interpret his words this way.
At the same time, according to law enforcement authorities,[1699] right-wing radical groups embracing the ideas of national and racial exclusivity have periodically emerged in Norway since the 1970s. As a rule, those were short-lived and few in numbers. The most well-known include: "Вооt Boys," "Norwegian Front," "People's Party," "German Army of Norway," "Cells of Armed Aryans," "Terror of White Aryans," "Viking," "Zorn 88," etc. By the mid-1990s, the number of right-wing activists peaked. At that time, according to some estimates, there were about 200 people.
Subsequently, there was a distinct anti-immigrant bias in the right-wing radical environment, which intensified as the influx of refugees and displaced persons from Asia, Africa and the Middle East increased. Islamophobia and migrantphobia underpin the ideology of right-wing radical groups operating in the country, which, despite the authorities' statements rejecting of Nazism, are not outlawed yet.
Currently, right-wing extremists almost never profess "classical" anti-communism, replacing it mainly with anti-Islamic and anti-Semitic rhetoric, as well as criticism of left-wing Norwegian political forces aimed at improving the situation of migrants.
Norwegian neo-Nazis are small and fragmented (up to 70 per cent of right-wing extremist supporters are concentrated in the Oslo region and along the country's southern coast, with less than 10 per cent in Oslo itself).
A profile of an average right-wing extremist is as follows: a male, 30‑40 years old, low level of education, more often from a small town considerably distant from the administrative, cultural, and other centre, burdened with problems in his personal life (single, unemployed) and social vices (alcoholism, drug addiction, criminal record), often with mental disabilities.
In general, law enforcement agencies believe that the process and mechanisms of radicalization of right-wing extremists and Islamists are similar in many respects, with right-wing radicals having a higher average age.
According to law enforcement agencies, the most organized neo-Nazi group is the Norwegian branch of the Nordic Resistance Movement ("Den nordiske motstandsbevegelsen," "Nordic Resistance Movement," NRM), registered in Norway in 2011 (the Head of the local "wing" is a Norwegian national Tommy Olsen[1700]) and managed from Sweden (a country where it is most active). The NRM is also represented in Finland, Denmark and Iceland. The Western press also refers to the NRM as "the leading neo-Nazi force in the Old World."[1701]
The Nordic Resistance Movement is characterized by a strict hierarchy, rigid internal structure with membership fees and an age requirement of 16 years. Its ideology is based on a belief in an "International Jewish conspiracy."
The Organization professes the cult of self-sacrifice and a healthy lifestyle, advocates the creation of a National Socialist State within the borders of the Nordic countries, the purity of the "Nordic race," against "globalist structures" such as NATO, the European Union, and the European Economic Area, and calls for the fight against the "Jewish-Zionist conspiracy" and LGBT. Among its ideas are stopping migration to Scandinavian countries, repatriating people of migrant background, establishing authoritarian rule, and leaving the European Union.[1702]
The NRM members take part in neo-Nazi demonstrations (mostly, in Sweden and Finland; usually, activists from all country branches are involved no matter wherever the demonstrations are held), put up posters and distribute leaflets, arrange joint hikes and training sessions to "make participants healthier" and bring them closer.
There is active campaigning aimed at young people: according to reports on the website of the Norwegian branch of the NRM, its members regularly distribute leaflets and put up posters near high schools calling to join the Organization.
Moreover, activists act publicly, do not conceal their identity, and avoid overtly violent methods of struggle (although not completely).
Similar to political parties, the NRM organizes "educational" and "family-friendly" events and youth summer camps. According to law enforcement assessments, there is an increasing trend of the NRM activity (mainly due to the anti-immigrant factor), which will make the group more assertive in the future.
The Organization often appeals to democratic principles as freedom of expression, assembly and association to legally hold events, demonstrations and disseminate propaganda materials, thereby limiting the law enforcers' ability to counter their actions.
Despite a pretty aggressive narrative (calls to "join the fight," using paramilitary terms when describing the Organization's hierarchy and accusing the authorities of "lying," etc.) and their provocative nature, most NRM campaigns remain within the bounds of law (thus limiting law enforcers' abilities to counter them) and rarely result in court sentences, also due to the lax Norwegian legislation.
According to Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation (NRK), more than 30 members of the Nordic Resistance Movement were detained by police in Oslo during a demonstration on 30 October 2022. Among those arrested are four Norwegian nationals and 30 foreigners. They risked punishment for public order offences and sanctions under migration law.[1703] According to Norwegian police, members of the Organization did not apply to the authorities to hold a demonstration. Several of the demonstrators refused to obey the law enforcers' demands for order.[1704]
They declare any attempts by law enforcement agencies or ideological opponents to disrupt these events as "flagrant violations" of freedom of expression and disrespect for pluralism.
For example, to mark the anniversary of the beginning of the German occupation of Norway on 9 April 2018, activists pinned up banners and leaflets depicting swastikas and the text "We're back!" in several cities. Three NRM members (including Tommy Olsen) that took part in this action in Kristiansand were initially found guilty of inciting hatred by the first-instance court and were fined, but after appealing against the judgment they were acquitted by the second-instance court in 2020. All charges against them were dropped.
According to a rough estimate, the core of the NRM activists in Norway includes 30‑40 people aged between20 and 60 (to compare, there are up to 300 NRM sympathisers in Sweden), most of them are known to law enforcement agencies due to their participation in other groups in the past and have been convicted of various criminal offences.
In August 2019, the most radical faction separated from the NRM due to disagreements over its working methods and established a new organization, Nordic Strength (Nordisk styrke), with Haakon Forwald, the former Head of the Norwegian NRM, among others, as its leader. The Organization advocates a "return to roots," that is, a rejection of legally permissible methods of promoting its ideas. The exact number of members of the new structure is unknown.
With the influx of migrants from non-European countries, there has been an increase in the activity of Islamophobic and anti-Semitic organizations in the Norwegian right-wing extremist environment.
Recently, the Stop Islamisation of Norway (Stopp islamiseringen av Norge, SIAN), which opposes increased migration to Norway, especially from Muslim countries, has been active (it has been active since 2000; its leader is Lars Thorsen[1705]).
SIAN does not disclose the number of its members. While its Facebook group has more than 10,000 subscribers, experts believe that their real number does not exceed 400 people.
SIAN's ideological platform includes combatting the spread of Islam and its ideas in Norway, as this religion, according to the organization's members, is "a political ideology in religious guise and is a threat to the peace and freedom of Western countries." The Organization "rejects" neo-Nazi labels, stating that it distances itself from racism, is committed to democratic and humanistic values, and that its "opponent" are not Muslims, who are themselves "the first victims of Islam," but the political-religious ideology of Islam.
Similar to the NRM, SIAN seeks to "legitimize" its views by appealing to the right to freedom of opinion and expression. The Organization holds demonstrations on a regular basis, primarily in large cities in the south of the country, distributes leaflets, and is actively engaged in informational work in social media.
However, the public and the main political forces in Norway consider SIAN to be a far-right radical organization, and it is often called neo-Nazi in media publications.
Most of the SIAN demonstrations trigger counter-rallies by its opponents, who seek to stop the events from happening in any way possible (for example, they surround the scene and try to roar down SIAN speakers). Periodically, clashes erupt against this backdrop.
Since 2019, SIAN activists have regularly organized public Quran burnings. Several such actions were staged by Lars Thorsen in March-April 2022 in front of Muslim mosques in Oslo and Sandefjord.
In 2019, a similar provocation provoked harsh reactions from Türkiye (Turkish Foreign Ministry published a condemning press release on its website), Iran and Pakistan (two Foreign Ministries summoned the Heads of Norwegian diplomatic missions), as well as a series of rallies in a number of Turkish and Pakistani cities with the burning of Norwegian flags. After that, the authorities were forced to take public steps. Justice Minister Jøran Kallmyr and Norwegian Foreign Ministry State Secretary Jens Frølich Holte "distanced" themselves from SIAN's actions, calling them provocative. Telenor, a Norwegian telecommunications company, which provides mobile communications in Pakistan, also issued a press release condemning the action.
According to the Klassekampen Newspaper of 27 April 2022, the police did not investigate Lars Thorsen stating that "burning the Quran is not a manifestation of hatred against specific people."[1706]
In August 2020, during SIAN actions in Oslo and Bergen, those who opposed the organization (300 to 400 people) organized counter-rallies, which, among other things, saw attempts to attack activists, police officers and police special-purpose vehicles defending them (protesters threw stones and other objects at the vehicles and police officers, with one policeman injured after his face was hit by a stick).
As a result, the police repeatedly used tear gas on SIAN's opponents, with several of them being detained for "inciting riots" and resisting the law enforcement.
However, some politicians (mainly from the opposition) and activists criticized law enforcement officers for "too harsh response" and using tear gas in densely populated areas where the rallies were held.
The last such Quran burning scheduled for February 2023 in front of the Turkish Embassy in Oslo was cancelled by the country's authorities due to "failure to provide an adequate level of security" after the Norwegian Ambassador in Ankara was summoned to the Turkish Foreign Ministry.
Given the recent rise in violence that have accompanied SIAN rallies, a ban on such events in densely populated areas, primarily in residential areas, is on the table.
To add some "democratic legitimacy" to the Organization, SIAN has tried several times to "fit" into the political process by participating in prestigious nationwide political events (for instance, Arendal Week, a series of socio-political and business-oriented seminars, debates and addresses by prominent cultural figures, held annually in August and largely setting the tune for a new political season), but was rejected each time after negative public reaction.
The majority (over 40 per cent) of SIAN sympathizers support the most right-wing of the Norwegian parliamentary parties – the Progress Party, a slightly smaller share (about 30 per cent) – even more radical marginal anti-immigrant parties as Democrats, Independence Party, or Alliance.
Other right-wing extremist groups are mostly marginalized and inactive, the major well-known include: Soldiers of Odin, Pegida, Vigrid, the Norwegian Defence League, the Fatherland Party, Stop the Immigration, White Electoral Alliance, and Norwegian Patriots.
Meanwhile, international ideological movements, such as the "identarists" (the "new right") and "alternative right" are on the rise in Norway, especially among the young people.
Despite national-socialism ideology being unpopular in Norway, the activities of local neo-Nazis are a cause for concern for the authorities. An increase in right-wing extremist sentiments is noted depending on the number of refugees and displaced persons from Muslim countries, as well as evidence of increased cooperation between the neo-Nazi community members in Norway, Sweden, and Finland.
Norwegian law enforcement bodies are particularly concerned by a trend in neo-Nazi and racist ideology to trickle down "to the grassroots level" with individuals being radicalized on the Internet and social media and practically untraceable as they use encrypted messages on closed-off platforms.
The neo-Nazi Anders Breivik, who staged terrorist attacks in Oslo and on the island of Utøya in 2011, the major terrorist attacks in Norway's the history (77 killed, more than 150 injured), protesting against Norwegian authorities' "too lax" migration policy, is a classic example. Prior to the attacks, he circulated by e-mail his 1500-page manifest outlining his views that he kept on actively promulgating during the public trial. The court recognized him as capable of being held accountable and sentenced to 21 years in prison.
After a high profile crime committed by his follower Philip Manshaus, (in August 2019, he shot dead his Chinese-born half-sister on racist grounds and attempted an attack on a mosque in Oslo suburbs; in June 2020, he was sentenced to 21 years in prison and found liable to pay a compensation equivalent to about USD 80,000), a Vidkun Quisling's devotee and wannabe NRM member, Norwegian intelligence agencies view right-wing extremism as one of the main terrorist threats to Norwegian society along with radical Islam (until June 2019, attacks by right-wing radicals were deemed "unlikely").
In its 2023 report,[1707] the Norwegian Police Security Service (PST) that, among other things, is in charge of combating terrorism, notes that certain Norwegians who are affiliated with right-wing extremism chose to participate in the war in Ukraine. As a result, they may not only enhance their weapons capability, but also expand their extremist network and begin to use more violent methods of operation.
In its 2022 report, the PST also pointed out to a likely increase in the number of right-wing extremists, a trend linked to the growing popularity of the ideas they promote, online-available propaganda, socio-economic difficulties and increased isolation amid the pandemic.
The PST has recorded a growing number of Norwegian supporters of right-wing extremist attacks.
In this regard, the country has taken action in line with government plans to combat racism and discrimination on ethnic and religious grounds for 2024‑2027, as well as to combat discrimination and hate speech against Muslims (the previous version of the plan for 2020-2023 has been extended by a year).
One clear example of Norway's toughening approach to right-wing radicals is the detention and deportation of American nationalist Johnson from Norway in November 2019 in the interest of "preventing radicalization of the population," which was planning to deliver a speech at a conference on Human Biodiversity in Oslo hosted by the Scandza Forum, a right-wing extremist organization (based in Bergen) (in July 2017 he had freely attended a similar Scandza Forum event in Norway; had previously expressed sympathies for Anders Breivik).
Despite the increased attention by law enforcement agencies to manifestations of right-wing extremism (since 2015, the number of cases initiated on the grounds of relevant offences has more than tripled), this phenomenon is far from being eradicated.
Although there is an official unacceptance of the neo-Nazi ideology, in practice, the authorities may give concessions to neo-Nazis, showing excessive liberalism. There were cases when the police, in order to "avoid violence," did not prevent unauthorized ultra-right marches but used force against those protesting against them (the "aggressive" behaviour of anti-fascists was regarded as threatening public order).
While declaring the unacceptability of any extremist ideologies, including neo-Nazism, Oslo has consistently refused to support the traditional annual UN General Assembly resolution put forward by the Russian delegation and other co-sponsors entitled "Combating glorification of Nazism, neo-Nazism and other practices that contribute to fuelling contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance." Until 2021, the Norwegian delegation consistently abstained from voting on the resolution at the UN General Assembly, and in 2022-2023 was among the countries that voted "no."[1708]
The Norwegian Foreign Ministry is treating indulgently the unleashed "war" against monuments to Soviet soldiers in Poland, the glorification of the "Forest Brothers" and the mockery of veterans of the Great Patriotic War in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia.
After the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation launched the special military operation (SMO) to denazify and demilitarize Ukraine and protect civilians in the Donbass on 24 February 2022, Norwegian media have regularly published articles attempting to whitewash the Nazis of the Azov battalion and portray them as "true patriots" defending the interests of their country.[1709] The use of Nazi ideology and SS symbols does not bother Norwegian journalists.
In May 2022, 2023, and 2024, the Norwegian authorities withdrew from the traditional joint Victory Day commemorations. There have been accusations in public space of Russia's use of monuments to Soviet soldiers on Norwegian territory for propaganda purposes, in particular to portray Norway as its ally.
Against the background of the events in Ukraine in March 2022, a monument to Soviet soldiers in the Verdal community (central Norway) was desecrated by offenders who wrote "Glory to Ukraine"[1710] on it. Local authorities took the initiative to remove the consequences of the vandals' action.
The free trade of Nazi merchandise (banners, items with swastikas, and Nazi symbols) on finn.no, Norway's largest online shopping platform, which is apparently regarded as historical artefacts with no ideological significance, is not in line with the Government's statements on combating the spread of extremist ideas.
In order to "restore justice," the authorities effectively rehabilitated such phenomenon of the occupation as the "affairs" of a large group of Norwegian women with Hitler's soldiers.
In 2018, Norwegian Prime Minister Erna Solberg formally apologized on behalf of the government for the authorities' post-war persecution of Norwegian women who had relationships with German soldiers during the occupation. Erna Sulberg called such actions "unlawful" and contrary to "the basic principle of the rule of law, according to which no one can be considered a criminal without a trial or tried without the law."
According to Norwegian estimates, about 40,000-50,000 Norwegian women had affairs with Germans, which is about 10 per cent of the nation's total female population aged from 18 to 35. These contacts gave birth to about 10,000-12,000 children.
After the war, the attitude towards these women in society was very negative: their hair was publicly shaved, and they were paraded in the streets in disgrace. Many of them were arrested and put in internment camps for forced labour. A wave of layoffs swept through the country, with suicides taking place. Women who married Germans during the occupation, were deported, mainly to Germany (the practice was kept in place until 1947), for a long time they were not allowed to come back. Besides, the deported individuals were stripped of Norwegian citizenship, which is unique for the nation's history, given that such a practice had never been implemented before or thereafter.
In 2000, the authorities offered an apology to the "war's children" that Norwegian women gave birth from the occupants. In many cases, they were separated from their mothers, handed over to foster families or orphanages, and they also faced biased attitude from the society.
In May 2020, the Norwegian Parliament ignored the appeal of the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation to the parliaments of foreign States to support the initiative to recognize the Victory over Nazism as the world heritage of mankind and the monuments to the fighters against Nazism in all countries as a common world memorial of mankind.
In November 2020, during the preparation for the vote on the Russian resolution "Seventy-fifth anniversary of the end of the Second World War, " Norway was among the States that succeeded in removing the reference to "inadmissibility of desecration or destruction of monuments erected in remembrance of those who fought in that war on the side of the United Nations" from the text of the resolution.
In April 2021, the broadcasting of a four-episode semidocumentary film "Front-line Soldiers" about Norwegians who fought on the Eastern Front on the side of the Axis countries by the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation (NRK) caused a wide resonance. It was produced with the participation of the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Culture and the Norwegian Film Institute. The film tells the story of seven Norwegian members of the SS that fought against the Red Army and Yugoslav partisans, with their narratives about their "military exploits" accompanied by fictional clips "reconstructing" the wartime events. The "front-line soldiers" featured in the film denied participation in the executions of civilians and POWs, claiming that they "defended Norway's interests," fought against "the expansion of Bolshevism, not for Hitler," and spoke with contempt about the Red Army soldiers. Certain historians involved in the film also encouraged "not to condemn, but to try to understand the motives of the front-line soldiers," effectively justifying their joining the Nazi forces by the political context: the prevailing "fear" of communists in pre-war Norway, the "totalitarian regime of Lenin and Stalin," the NKVD "repressions" in Poland, the Soviet-German "partition" of Europe, and deep-rooted anti-Semitic sentiments "in the East."
The release of the film caused a storm of criticism from experts and the Jewish community, even joined by historians involved in the project, arguing that their remarks were "taken out of context." The film makers and NRK were accused of "humanizing" war criminals and Nazi propaganda, "depersonalizing" victims, ignoring evidence of Norwegian complicity in Nazi crimes, lack of critical context, and insufficient attention to uncovering the essence of the Holocaust and Hitler's invasion plans. The NRK disagreed with the accusations, stressing that one of the film's goals was to foster "further debates."
The Norwegian authorities proclaim the respect for human rights, including the right to protection against discrimination as a basic priority of the public policy. Nevertheless, anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, xenophobia, racism, discrimination and related intolerance are not uncommon in the country. There is an increase in the number of statements aimed at inciting hatred or hostility, including those posted on the Internet. This is largely due to the public discontent that is being triggered by the authorities' migration policies.
According to the Centre for Holocaust and Minority Studies (Senter for studier av Holocaust og livssynsminoriteter), the rise of anti-Semitism continues in the country.
According to the Centre's report "Attitudes towards Jews and Muslims in Norway 2022," 9.3 per cent of the population displays what can be said to be marked prejudice against Jews, 14 per cent support the statement "World Jewry is working behind the scenes to promote Jewish interests, " 8 per cent believe that "Jews largely have themselves to blame for being persecuted, " and 14 per cent that "Jews have far too much influence on the global economy."[1711] A negative view of Jews is shared by 36 per cent of Muslim respondents.[1712] And 71 per cent of Jewish respondents have to hide their affiliation for fear of negative attitudes.[1713]
According to a survey conducted by the Centre in January-February 2024, about 11.5 per cent of the country's population have prejudice against Jews, while 8.6 per cent dislike them.[1714]
Norwegian human rights activists and media record a sharp rise in anti-Semitic sentiments against the backdrop of the escalating Palestinian-Israeli conflict. According to the local Jewish human rights NGO Det Mosaiske Trossamfund (DMT), Jews in Norway (about 1,400 people) cannot feel safe. Families face vandalism and threats, children are bullied in schools, and Jews are subjected to hooliganism and provocation.
According to a Norwegian government press release of 4 November 2023, DMT Head Ruth Behar described the current level of Jew-hatred as the highest in Norway since World War II.[1715]
Because of the heightened threat of anti-Semitism on New Year's Eve on 31 December 2023, the authorities decided to temporarily arm police officers. According to a Norwegian police press release of 31 December 2023, there has been an increased threat to Jewish and Israeli targets in Norway. "Although there are no specific threats to Norway, the police chief, taking all circumstances into account, has decided to temporarily arm himself to ensure the best possible preparedness over the New Year's weekend," said Tone Vangen, Director of Emergency Preparedness, in the release.[1716]
Based on the Norwegian historical experience, the authorities continue to give special emphasis to tracking and preventing anti-Semitism. For a long time, the issue of Jew deportation from the country was under taboo. During the occupation, about 50 per cent of Norwegian Jews (760 people) were deported to Nazi concentration camps in Germany and Poland with the assistance of the local police, with 25 people returning to their homeland alive after the war. This fact was brushed under the carpet up until the early 1980s.
In the 21st century, historians and the public grew significantly more interested in the topic of the Holocaust and Norwegian complicity in it, which allowed revealing new facts about persecutions during World War II. For example, Aftenposten newspaper published a series of publications about Vidkun Quisling's role in the extermination of Norwegian Jews in 2019. With references to archival sources, the articles said that Vidkun Quisling was very likely aware of Nazi plans for them, but deliberately took no action in their defence. During the post-war trial, he denied any involvement in the arrests and deportations of Jews to Germany, shifting the blame solely to the Germans, and was acquitted of this count of charges (he was found guilty only of "unpremeditated complicity in murder").
Norway has a government program for combatting anti-Semitism with a focus on preventing these sentiments in schools, social networks and mass media (in particular, experiments are ongoing that seek to detect anti-Semitic sentiments with electronic means). In 2021-2023, another plan was implemented under this programme, which included additional funding for educational activities within the Jewish community, as well as an increased Norwegian contribution to relevant international activities to combat anti-Semitism.
With the official support by the authorities, structures studying the history of the occupation, anti-Semitism in Norway and its current trends have been established and are working actively (the Centre for Holocaust and Minority Studies in Oslo, and the Falstad Centre (war memorial and national human rights centre)). According to the authorities, the measures taken, although slowly, are having an effect: the level of anti-Semitism in Norway is gradually decreasing.
According to the Centre for Holocaust and Minority Studies, Islamophobia remains a serious problem in the country.
According to the Centre's January-February 2024 survey, 31 per cent of Norwegians have strong prejudice and hostility towards Muslims (a figure virtually unchanged from 2022)[1717]. Some 26 per cent of respondents believe Muslims are more violent, while 33 per cent think that "Muslims pose a threat to Norwegian culture."[1718]
According to the results of a survey conducted by the Norwegian Institute for Social Research (Institutt for samfunnsforskning[1719]), 54 per cent of the respondents consider Islam incompatible with the fundamental values of the Norwegian society, 47 per cent are sceptical about Muslims, and 56 per cent negatively treat the idea of entering into marriage with persons professing Islam. These indicators are recorded in the annual Integration Barometer report submitted in June 2022.
Following a rise in Islamophobic sentiment and a series of threats of violence against the Muslim community in anticipation of the end of Ramadan (Eid al-Fitr) and Easter celebrations in 2024, police across the country have been armed by order of the Norwegian authorities.[1720]
On 28 March 2024, Salwan Momika, an Iraqi national and the organizer of the Quran burning in Sweden, was detained after having come to Norway to apply for asylum in order to avoid deportation to his home country (at Iraq's request). The Oslo District Court decided to expel him from Norway back to Sweden. The Norwegian Court said the extradition "will take place as soon as formal and practical arrangements have been fulfilled."[1721]
The Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development, together with the Ministry of Culture and Equality, is responsible for public policy in support of national minorities in Norway. Reportedly, the Norwegian society still harbours negative attitude towards certain nationalities and ethnic groups.
According the NIM reports, indigenous minorities (Sámi) and national minorities (Kvens/Norwegian Finns, Jews, Forest Finns, Roma, and Tater/Romani), especially women and children, often face discrimination.[1722]
On 26 August 2022, the NRK Troms og Finnmark, Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation, referring to NIM's survey "Attitudes towards Sámi and other minorities," stated that 11 per cent of the population in Northern Norway have a negative attitude towards national minorities. This is four times the national average.[1723] The Kvens/Norwegian Finns have difficulties with education in their native language and insufficient media published in it, while the Forest Finns have difficulties with the preservation of their culture in general. For Jews, the main problem is hate speech and other manifestations of anti-Semitism.
According to the NIM survey, Norwegians have the most negative stereotypes of Taters and Roma, who already feel deprived in the housing and labour market and complain about insufficient opportunities to learn their native language. Approximately one third of the population consider many of them criminals (34 per cent and 32 per cent, respectively) and vagabonds (27 per cent and 28 per cent, respectively).[1724]
Similar conclusions were made by human rights defenders from the Centre for Holocaust and Minority Studies,[1725] according to which 46 per cent of Norwegians would not like to have Roma as neighbours, and about 30 per cent would not like having Roma in their circle of friends.[1726]
According to an Aftenposten investigation published on 5 March 2024, the Norwegian police have created an ethnic register of local Roma. It includes 655 people with names, personal numbers, dates of birth, addresses and relationship data, including children and deceased persons.[1727]
According to police spokesmen in the Eastern Police District, the "lists" were compiled on the basis of Norwegian Roma crime data in order to "obtain a general picture of offences." The Data Protection Directorate (Datatilsynet) has initiated a check on the legality of the police action. Bjørn Erik Thon, Gender Equality and Anti-Discrimination Ombud in Norway, has not excluded that the collection of such information is a breach of Section 24 of the Equality and Anti-Discrimination Act 2017 and plans to send a report to the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.[1728]
Law enforcement practice in modern Norway is full of facts of harassment and violations of the rights of the Sámi indigenous people (densely populated within the northern counties of Troms, Finnmark, and Nordland). A number of cases of violations of their rights are directly linked to the effects of Norwegianization politics, including in the area of public health. This issue has been studied for more than 20 years by the Centre for Sámi Health Research as part of the three phases of the SAMINOR project. Sámi women are more likely to be subjected to violence.
In May 2023, the Norwegian Government presented the results of a study showing that 75 per cent (three out of four) of Sámi people face discrimination based on ethnicity, gender and place of residence (41 per cent of them more than once a year). And 95 per cent of Sámi youth experience prejudice against Sámi culture in society at large.
On 1 June 2023, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission appointed by the Norwegian Parliament in 2018, whose mandate is to analyse the consequences of the Norwegianization policy and injustice against Sámi, Kven and Finnish national minorities, and to develop possible "reconciliation" measures, submitted its report in this regard.[1729]
The Commission's practical proposals include maintaining and more effective implementation of the existing support programmes for national minorities, especially in the area of language and cultural preservation (including the establishment of a "Centre for Knowledge, Research, Communication and Reconciliation").
The conclusions of the document are disappointing: the rejection of the Norwegianization policy at the State level did not reverse the consequences of the damage already caused. The continuous process of loss of the language, culture and identity makes the risk of extinction of these ethnic groups high.[1730]
It is equally important that the negative social processes that developed during the period of the Norwegianization politics in relation to national minorities are still reproduced by society. It is noted that Norwegians know virtually nothing about the culture of national minorities living in Norway; a significant part of the population agrees with negative stereotypes about them. Many members of these ethnic groups face discrimination and abuse. There is a negative attitude towards the Sámi in the social networks and mass media, and a high vulnerability of Sámi women to domestic and sexual violence.
As President of the Norwegian Parliament Masud Gharahkhani stated in connection with the presentation of the report, the establishment of the Commission was caused by "the understanding that Norwegian society has failed to cope with the task of protecting indigenous peoples and minorities."[1731]
This picture is complemented by a study by the Norwegian branch of the NGO Amnesty International (Amnesty International Norge), published in September 2023, according to which every fourth comment on Sámi topics on Facebook reflects a negative attitude towards the Sámi (200,000 posts for 2019-2023 were analysed) and spreads established prejudices. Several statements can be openly characterized as hate speech.
The comments circulate negative stereotypes about the Sámi ("uneducated and wild," "prevent progress and development," and "are not indigenous people") and contain racist statements ("we need more power and less Sámi"). The number of such comments increased by 10 per cent in connection with the Sámi protests in spring 2023 against the installation of wind farms in reindeer pasture areas (the so-called "Fosen" case).[1732]
In 2019, the Ministry of Local Government and Modernization of Norway submitted a report on the status of the Sámi language, culture and social life to the Storting for its consideration.[1733]
The document revealed numerous negative trends in the Sámi environment, which the authorities have not yet been able to overcome. Thus, the size of the population in the areas where the Sámi are compactly settled remains relatively stable.[1734] However, the proportion of elderly people is higher in these areas than in the rest of Norway, and Sámi's numbers are mainly supported by the influx of migrants of non-Sámi origin (their number has doubled since 2011). It is estimated that the Sámi population will continue to decline until 2030.
Among the Sámi, especially men, the percentage of people with higher education is lower than the national average. The same goes for secondary education (not all Sámi complete their studies).
There is a high level of violence in Sámi society. According to surveys, up to 45 per cent of the Sámi have ever experienced violence (compared to 29 per cent of the population in the rest of Norway).
The indicators characterizing the level of discrimination of this category of the population in various areas look even worse. Sámi sources indicate a 10‑fold increase compared to discrimination in the Norwegian population (35 per cent versus 3.5 per cent). The Sámi face negative attitude in social networks and mass media.
A separate chapter is dedicated to the state and trends of development of the Sámi language.[1735] There is a weakening of its positions, and its gradual erosion by Norwegian "inclusions." There are few speakers of the Sámi language.
According to the report, the language issue also affects the social sphere: health care, social care, etc. Due to the lack of training of medical staff in the use of professional terminology in the Sámi language, there is a lack of competent diagnosis of diseases even in densely populated Sámi areas.
As for the general situation, the human rights defenders note that, despite the significant efforts made by the authorities to "atone" for the Sámi and national minorities who have become "victims" of the Oslo policy on their assimilation, there have recently been frequent cases of violations of Sámi rights. This is especially noticeable in situations related to the implementation of infrastructure and industrial projects in the territories of their traditional residence, in connection with which members of indigenous peoples regularly express dissatisfaction.
In spring 2023, the Sámi Parliament compiled an overview of cases in which there are disagreements between indigenous people, businesses and the authorities. According to their estimates, there are 39 explicit conflict situations, a list that does not exhaust the full range of potentially sensitive stories. All of them are connected with the growing exploitation of territories in the places of traditional residence and economic activities of the Sámi. The Norwegian Sámi actively use the terms "green colonialism" and "green washing" to refer to climate measures that damage traditional Sámi lifestyles and interests, including exploitation of ancestral lands, extraction of resources and creation of protected nature areas in indigenous areas under the guise of "green transition" and climate rhetoric.
The most resonant cases of Sámi rights violations are connected with the construction of infrastructural and industrial facilities in the territories traditionally inhabited by the Sámi population.
One of the clear examples is the construction of a large complex of wind farms (set in operation in 2021) by Fosen Vind on the Fosen peninsula in Trøndelag (Central Norway),[1736] as a result of which the Sámi reindeer herders lost about one third of the region's traditional winter pastures.
In June 2020, the court of second instance upheld the legality of the construction permits, but ruled that Fosen Vind must pay the Sámi NOK 89 million (USD 8.4 million) in compensation for the loss of grazing areas. Following a lengthy judicial proceeding, the Norwegian Supreme Court ruled in favour of the Sámi in October 2021 (ruled that Sámi rights had been violated in the construction of two of the six wind farms and declared the licences to install the turbines invalid).[1737] However, the court decision did not provide for the demolition of the wind turbines, thus leaving the situation unchanged. In February 2023, the Sámi activists started their protests as a result of which the Government apologized to Sámi people due to "prolonged uncertainty."
A group of indigenous people violently opposing the illegal electricity production in Fosen[1738] filed a complaint with Ecokrim (Norway's Сentral office for the investigation and prosecution of economic and environmental crimes), but the office found no grounds to open a case.
Negotiations with representatives of the companies and the indigenous people have been ongoing since May 2023 and have resulted in agreements between the Sami and the owners of the wind turbines that provide for a number of compensations to the affected party, support for reindeer husbandry and a number of other privileges; no demolition of the wind turbines is planned.
Twenty activists (most of them Sami) who took part in anti-government demonstrations in connection with the Fosen case were fined for blocking the entrances to the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy in Oslo in March 2023, but refused to pay, arguing that the government had provoked the demonstrations when it failed to implement the Supreme Court ruling. As a result, the case went to court. The trial officially began in 2024. The protesters face up to 3 months in prison.
According to Aftenposten, February 5, 2024[1739], Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre was forced to cancel his traditional visit on National Sami Day to a kindergarten in Oslo[1740] where Sami children are educated, because their parents did not want to see him due to their opposition to the state's policy on wind turbines in Fosen.[1741]
According to NIM, the Fosen Vind case highlights the need for a clearer definition of interventions that violate indigenous cultural traditions. To this end, the Government was advised to prepare guidelines on the interpretation and application of Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in Norwegian judicial practice.[1742]
Another notable case is the Norwegian government's decision announced in August 2023 to electrify Equinor's liquefied natural gas (LNG) plant on Melkøya Island. The package, worth a total of 13 billion kroner ($1.2 billion), involves laying power lines through three reindeer herding areas and installing wind turbines to feed the lines in the northern Norwegian province of Finnmark.
Opponents of the project estimate that its implementation could affect up to half of the Sami reindeer herding areas in Norway. The Sami insist that the decision cannot be legally binding without consultation with Samediggi, and that the plans for the development, construction and operation of the facilities in question have not been assessed for their environmental and social impacts. In a resolution following Samediggi's September 2023 plenary session, the Sami Parliament demanded that the decision to electrify the Hammerfest power plant be reversed and that a comprehensive study be conducted on the impact of "energy and industrial development in Finnmark County" on Sami culture and economy.
The Sami in Norway regularly report on violations of their rights on international platforms. As a result of their efforts, the report of the 22nd session of the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (April 2023) calls on the Norwegian authorities to "immediately implement" the Supreme Court's decision with regard to the "Fosen case" and to "urgently address the allegation that hate speech against the Sami on and offline has increased since the decision of the Supreme Court".
At the same time, the silencing of problems is evident at the level of some international organisations – during a visit to Norway in November 2023, the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, K. Abdrakhmanov, stressed that the Norwegian experience could be used "to collect good examples and best practices".
Certain comprehensive measures have been taken to support the languages, cultures and ways of life of the Sami and national minorities.
The Norwegian Constitution (Article 108) was amended on 15 May 2023 to establish the status of the Sami as an "indigenous people".
On 1 July 2021, amendments to the Sami Act came into force, with a separate chapter stipulating that the authorities must consult the Sami Parliament on issues affecting the indigenous people.
On 1 January 2022, the Language Act came into force confirming the status of national minority languages. It should be noted that the status of the Sami languages in relation to Norwegian is already specified in the current legislation. However, this is the first time that they have been given their official, clarified status at national level as a "language of indigenous peoples". The legislation highlights that the Norwegian and Sami languages have the same status. The Kven, Finnish, Gypsy and Romani languages have been officially defined as "national minority languages". The law also defined the Norwegian version of the sign language (as opposed to international sign language) as the "state sign language".
In September 2020, Norway submitted to the Council of Europe the eighth periodic report on the implementation of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages.
Following its review in March 2022, it was recommended that the Norwegian authorities allocate additional funds for the revitalisation and support of endangered minority languages (Kven, Lule Sami, Southern Sami, Roma and Tater); monitor the demand for learning Sami languages at all levels of education, especially pre-school level; and take measures to increase student enrollment in Sami and Kven language programmes.
In January 2023, Norway reported on the progress made in implementing the recommendations. The 9th periodic report is scheduled for 1 July 2025.
In September 2020, Norway also sent the 5th periodic report on the implementation of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities to the Council of Europe.[1743]
Following its visit to Norway on August 23-27, the Council of Europe's Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (AC FCNM) made a number of recommendations, including with regard to the education of Sámi and national minorities.[1744]
In July 2022, the Committee of Ministers called on Norway, inter alia, to take active steps to pursue the historic reconciliation process with regard to the Romani/Tater minority, to elaborate and adopt an action plan to combat antigypsyism, to ensure access to bilingual preschool education for Romani children, to work with the Samediggi to ensure a full set of North Sami textbooks, to regularly update the Action Plan on anti-Semitism, to increase NRK broadcasting in minority languages (especially Romani and Tater), raise awareness among the Norwegian population about the Sami and national minorities living in the country, and provide uninterrupted funding for Kven language kindergartens.
In March 2022, the UN Human Rights Committee reviewed the measures taken by the Norwegian authorities to address the challenges identified in its 2018 concluding observations. Efforts to protect the rights of national minorities, in particular the amendment of the Sami Act and the adoption of an action plan to combat racism and discrimination based on religion and ethnicity, were welcomed.
At the same time, the Committee expressed concern about Norway's reluctance to strengthen the legal framework concerning the rights of Sami reindeer herders and requested further information on steps taken to increase the number of Sami language teachers and the opportunities for learning Sami languages in kindergartens.
Despite the measures taken by the authorities, crimes motivated by national, racial and religious intolerance continued to occur in Norway.
The report entitled Attitudes towards discrimination, equality and hate speech in Norway by the Norwegian Institute for Research on Labor, Trade Union Movement and Public Policy[1745] cites surveys that show that 25% of Norwegians view representatives of certain races as "more cultured", while 39% believe that migrants from Somalia will never become "full-fledged Norwegians". Twenty-two per cent say the same about Swedes, and 16% – about representatives of the black race. Thirty-three per cent of respondents are afraid to walk past a group of people who look Muslim, 35% believe that a woman wearing a hijab cannot count on being treated as an equal. Thirty-eight per cent would not like to have Romani as their neighbors, 16% would not wish to live near Muslims.
According to the February 2024 preliminary report of the UN HRC Working Group of Experts on People of African Descent, various forms of racial discrimination exist in Norway. In particular, it cites racism in the child welfare system (Barnevern) and instances of race-based enforcement of laws.
The conclusions of international experts are confirmed by a study conducted by Proba Research (Proba samfunnsanalyse) on behalf of the Directorate for Children, Youth and Family Affairs (Bufdir), according to which 45% of Norwegians have experienced racism in the past year (most often in the media, schools, sports). Young people of African descent (7 in 10 respondents) and those from the Middle East and Asia (6 in 10) are most likely to experience racism.[1746]
Dagbladet, 31 August 2023, reports that, according to the results of the annual study of the learning environment in Norwegian educational institutions (Elevundersϕkelsen), in 2022-2023 about 58,000 students in grades 1-10 were exposed to bullying and mobbing (11,000 more children than in the previous year).[1747]
Aftenposten, 21 March 2024, refers to the results of a survey among schoolchildren, according to which 10% of schoolchildren in Norway were victims of bullying in 2023 (a 2.3% increase from the previous year). The situation is the most alarming in Troms County, where bullying affects 7.6% of high school students. Mobbing by teachers is most prevalent in Akershus county (4% of upper secondary school students have been victims). The increasing bullying rates are confirmed by the Governor of Oslo and Viken, who received 972 reports of bullying in schools in 2023, almost double the number of reports in 2022.[1748]
Norway's Culture Minister Lubna Jaffery expressed deep concern about the conclusions of the UN experts' report. She noted that, in the autumn of 2023, the government adopted the Action Plan to Combat Racism and Discrimination on Ethnic and Religious Grounds 2024-2027, which included 50 different measures to combat racism in the fields of culture, education and the labour market.[1749]
According to the Oslo Police Directorate's report for 2022, the number of calls to the police related to hate speech increased by 11 per cent compared to 2021; 58 per cent of these calls were related to hate speech on grounds of ethnic origin. Compared to 2021, the number of calls to the Norwegian police regarding hate speech motivated by skin colour increased by 2.2% to 278 in 2022, and hate speech against Muslims increased by 7.4% to 29. The number of complaints regarding ethnic discrimination increased by 75% to 21 over the same period.[1750]
People from ethnic minorities say that the police are more suspicious of them than they are of native Norwegians. According to the Equality and Anti-Discrimination Ombud's report, Controls without Control[1751], of 1,588 high school students surveyed in Oslo, 11% said that in 2021 the police had stopped them on the street to check their identity. Of these, almost 34% were from ethnic minorities. One in five believed that the police had stopped them "because of the colour of their skin".
According to a 2021 study by the Norwegian Media Authority (Medietilsynet), 25 per cent of Norwegians aged 16-20 have experienced online hate during the year.
Such offences are often characterised by local law enforcement agencies as "expressions of freedom of speech". In particular, in May 2022, the case against the imam of the Drummen mosque, Noor Ahmad Noor, who had been publishing anti-Semitic statements in Urdu on Facebook for several years, was closed on this basis.
In January 2020, the Norwegian Supreme Court handed down an unprecedented guilty verdict in a case involving the use of hate speech on social media, with the sentence being a suspended 24-day prison sentence.
According to a survey conducted by Ipsos on behalf of the Norwegian Association of Local and Regional Authorities (KS), four out of ten local politicians have experienced threats, hate speech and hostility in connection with their professional activities (2,245 respondents).[1752]
On June 25, 2022, ahead of a gay pride parade, a 42-year-old Norwegian of Iranian origin, Zaniar Matapour, opened fire in central Oslo on the visitors of London Pub, a popular bar among LGBT supporters (the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation on November 30, 2023 recognised the international LGBT movement as extremist). The attack left 2 people dead, 10 seriously injured and 11 others lightly injured.
The Associated Press (AP) reports that an Oslo court has sentenced Matapour to 30 years in prison for aggravated terrorism. The prosecution said the convict had shown interest in radical ideology for several years and had pledged allegiance to the Islamic State.
According to AP, Matapur's sentence became the harshest in Norwegian judicial practice after changes to the country's terrorism legislation in 2015. It stipulates that a terrorist has the right to apply for parole only after 20 years in prison.[1753]
There have been cases of human rights violations by law enforcement officials in Norway.
The brutal police arrest of three young Norwegian men in Kongsberg in April 2022, when a police officer punched one of them several times in the face, then pinned him to the ground and kneed him in the neck, while beating his friend several times with a police baton, caused a wide public outcry. Meanwhile, the second police officer took the third young man's mobile phone, on which he was recording the police actions, and deleted the recording. After being taken to the police station, the young men were charged with the use of force against representatives of the authorities.[1754] The police officer who had deleted the recording was fined 12,000 kroner (about $1,100). A criminal case was brought against the second law enforcement officer, who was acquitted in June 2023.
Oslo has been criticised for violating the rights and legitimate interests of people in prison.
The 2021 and 2022 NIM reports identified as the most pressing problems in this area: excessive use of solitary confinement and mechanical restraints on prisoners, suicides, inadequate care for persons with physical and mental disabilities, use of coercive measures against them, regular strip searches of pre-trial detainees, delayed trials due to understaffing and underfunding of the judiciary, as well as problems of access to health services for those serving sentences.
In addition, Norwegian human rights defenders draw attention to the fact that the conditions of detention for women are worse than for men. Due to the insufficient number of women's prisons, Norwegian convicts are forced to serve their sentences far away from their homes and relatives, and therefore have no opportunity to see their children (although they are entitled by law to see their children once a week). In comparison to men's prisons, restraint measures, including strapping to beds, are much more common in women's prisons.
On 23 March 2023, NRK, the state broadcaster, reported that most of the complaints related to the women's prison in Bredtveit (east of Oslo; built in 1918). According to Hanne Harlem, Ombudsman for Civil Affairs, the conditions there are "critical and life-threatening". In 2022, the prison recorded 92 incidents of use of punishment cells; staff tied prisoners to their beds for restraint 26 times. Besides, Bredtveit tops the self-harm statistics (2% of prisoners serving time in this prison account for 54% of all such cases) and suicide (72 cases since 2008).
According to Aftenposten, 19 April 2022, the majority of convicted women are held in this prison in groups of several people in small rooms with poor ventilation. Isolation is overused for former drug addicts convicted of violence and for mentally ill prisoners. There is no separate women's doctor in the prison.
According to the same newspaper ("Aftenposten") of 19 May 2022, 9 June 2022 and 28 June 2022, the Governor of Vestfold and Telemark denied M.Evensen free legal aid to appeal the amount of compensation payments due to an erroneous court decision. In 2017, the woman was convicted of "misappropriation of funds" and sentenced to imprisonment because of the Norwegian Labour and Welfare Administration's (NAV) misinterpretation of social benefit legislation. Ms Evensen considers the compensation of 70,000 kroner (about $7,000) for her prosecution and 61 days of imprisonment to be unfair (compensation payments in Norway have not been indexed since 2004). Ms Evensen has no money to pay for her lawyer's fees. She is suffering from cancer and her disability allowance is meager by Norwegian standards. However, there has been no response from the authorities.
Detention conditions in Oslo Prison (one of the largest men's prisons in the country with a capacity of 243 inmates) have been found to be unsatisfactory. Prisoners spend an average of 19 hours a day in isolation in their cells, and 21 hours in some sections of the prison. There is only one shower per 27 inmates. Due to staff shortages, collective punishment in the form of locking in cells is used – on average 2-3 times a week for 1 to 1.5 hours and sometimes for the whole day.[1755]
On 15 July 2022, NRK informed that prisoners suffering from mental disorders are placed for extended periods into punishment cells, strapped to their beds. Psychiatric care is not provided in full, there is no possibility to refer prisoners to psychiatric hospitals for treatment. Since December 2021, 18 attempts by mentally ill prisoners to harm their own health or commit suicide have been registered in the prison.
The Borgarting Court of Appeal upheld a claim brought by three former inmates of Bergen Prison against the State for violation of their rights as a result of regular strip searches. The Court ruled that the prisoners had been subjected to degrading treatment during the strip searches and ordered the Norwegian authorities to pay them NOK 275,000 in compensation. The state plans to appeal the ruling.[1756]
According to Hans-Peter Aasen, state secretary at the Ministry of Justice, the government takes the problem of the use of coercive methods in prisons, including against mentally ill prisoners, seriously. To improve the situation in this area, the authorities allocated 50 million kroner in 2022 and 100 million kroner in 2023.
In her 2021 report, Hanne Harlem, Ombudsman for Civil Affairs, draws attention to the non-observance of the rights of minor children during their detention and arrest. The Ombudsman points to cases of abuse of the arrest procedure by the police, unjustified placement of minors in police station cells (only permitted in exceptional cases), failure to provide detainees with information in a form that is accessible and understandable to them, including in their mother tongue for children who do not speak Norwegian or English.
Due to the large number of migrants (16 per cent of the country's population), the Government places great emphasis on their active integration into Norwegian society. Simultaneously, the authorities are pursuing a fairly strict migration policy, consistently tightening the procedure for obtaining asylum in the country. The Norwegian Ministry of Justice is responsible for this area of work, in which the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Labor and Social Inclusion, the Ministry of Children and Family Affairs, the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration, the police and local authorities participate in the implementation of decisions.
The growth of the Muslim population due to immigration and the rise of anti-immigrant sentiment have led to less favorable public attitudes toward certain religions and a tightening of legislation regulating the sphere of religion. Specifically, in June 2018, the Parliament approved amendments to the 1998 Education Act, which banned the wearing of face-concealing headgear by kindergarten staff and teachers of educational institutions during classes.
While the Norwegian authorities, international structures and NGOs have assessed the human rights situation in the country as relatively unproblematic in recent years, human rights violations in Norway have been recognised by relevant national and international institutions. For example, the authorities have been criticized for failing to respect the rights of refugees in a number of high-profile cases.
In May 2023, Zarina Saidova and her mother were deported from Norway on the grounds that when the mother was granted asylum in 2005, she had misled the immigration authorities by stating that she had come to Norway from Chechnya (in fact, they had come from Kazakhstan). According to the authorities' decision, Saidova's mother was deported to Kazakhstan without the right to enter Norway, and her daughter was banned from entering Norway for five years (the "relaxation" was based on the fact that she was a minor when she entered Norway). According to the defense attorney, the expulsion of Saidova who had lived most of her life in Norway was a "disproportionately harsh decision" and a legal error.[1757]
In 2016, a married couple – husband (68) and wife (63) – as well as their children and grandchildren born in Norway, were deprived of Norwegian citizenship under Section 26 of the Nationality Act (knowingly providing false personal information) because the migration authorities determined that the couple's nationality was Jordanian and not Palestinian, as they had claimed in 1990 when they arrived from Syria and applied for asylum. They became Norwegian citizens in 1997. From 2020, new rules have been in force in Norway, according to which a long period of residence in the country must be taken into account when deciding whether to revoke citizenship. As a result, the children and grandchildren had their Norwegian citizenship restored. For the couple themselves, the Directorate for Immigration (Utlendingsdirektoratet; UDI) continues to insist that they leave Norway. Their lawsuit against UDI is pending in the Oslo City Court.[1758]
The state immigration commission ordered Mustafa Hassan to leave Norway upon reaching the age of 18 on December 28, 2020, because his mother, when requesting asylum in 2008, had incorrectly indicated his country of origin (Palestine instead of Jordan). In July 2021, an Oslo court ruled in Hassan's favour, citing his "close ties" to Norway.
In January 2022, the authorities ordered Amir Hussein Husseinzadeh, a refugee from Iran, to leave Norway (has been in Norway since 2010), despite the fact that while living in Norway he converted from Islam to Christianity, a move that makes his travelling back to Iran unsafe. Between 2018 and 2020, only 35% out of 110 Iranians, who converted from their religion, got asylum in Norway.
Since February 2022, the Norwegian authorities have resumed the deportation of Afghans who were denied asylum in Norway, a practice that was temporarily suspended after the Taliban takeover.
As reported by NRK on 25 January 2022, Norwegian migration authorities obliged Yasin, an asylum seeker from Afghanistan (in Norway since 2015), to leave Norway due to the lack of grounds for refugee status and on the basis that "Afghanistan is a safe country." Yasin's wife and daughter (both of whom have residence permits) remain in Norway. The man and his family belong to the Hazara ethnic group, which is persecuted by the Taliban.[1759]
In March 2022, the UN Human Rights Committee reiterated its recommendation to the Norwegian authorities to amend the Immigration Act to protect asylum seekers from removal from the country.
The Ombudsman for Civil Affairs, Hanne Harlem, criticises the conditions of accommodation in the Trandum temporary detention centre. The most serious complaints were the locking of refugees in rooms (for several hours during the day and at night), temporary removal of their means of communication, regular strip searches, and the unacceptable treatment of persons suffering from mental illness.[1760]
In October 2023, the Borgarting Court of Appeal upheld a claim by an Eritrean asylum seeker against the Norwegian state for violation of her rights at the Trandum refugee detention centre. During her stay at Trandum between August and December 2019, she was strip searched 23 times, regularly locked in a room for long periods (for up to 15 hours). The court ordered that she be paid compensation of NOK 40,000 (about USD 3,700).[1761]
Dagbladet reported on 18 September 2023 that the authorities refused to provide free legal aid to a 40-year-old asylum-seeker from Ethiopia in an appeal against the Norwegian authorities for violation of her rights in the Trandum refugee detention centre. The decision was based on the fact that the woman had already received free legal aid from a public lawyer in a first instance case. She had lost that case.[1762]
Under pressure from a number of parties and humanitarian NGOs who insisted that Norway should take on additional responsibility for hosting refugees, five unaccompanied children with Norwegian citizenship were brought into the country from Syria in June 2019 and two children (one of whom is seriously ill) in January 2020, together with their mother, a Norwegian citizen of Pakistani origin who had joined the Islamic State. However, in the spring of 2020, the Norwegian Ministry of Justice decided not to participate in the redistribution of refugees from Lesbos, Greece, citing the dire situation in the country due to the coronavirus.
In its 2021 report on human rights monitoring in Norway, the Norwegian National Institute for Human Rights (NIM) notes the violation of the rights of unaccompanied refugees aged 15-18 and the existence of "pressure" on the rights of indigenous peoples.[1763]
According to an NRK report of 9 January 2024, inspections by the Board of Health Supervision (Helsetilsyn) of the conditions of detention of unaccompanied young refugees (15-18 years old) in reception and distribution centres in 2023 found that the children did not receive proper care, there was a lack of qualified staff and the child's right to personal integrity was not protected. The Board of Health Supervision claims that it does not have the resources to inspect the remaining refugee reception and distribution centres (there are 59 in the country, currently housing around 600 children). According to Even Eriksen, State Secretary at the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, there will be no increase in funding for inspections due to the limited budget.[1764]
Given that different rules apply to unaccompanied refugee children between the ages of 15 and 18 and refugee children under the age of 15 who are under the care of the Child Protection Services (according to Norwegian law, the responsibility for the care of unaccompanied refugee children between the ages of 15 and 18 is assigned to the Directorate of Immigration, while young refugee children are dealt with by the Directorate of Children, Youth and Family Affairs), the government has been recommended to adopt amendments that give equal rights to refugee children under the age of 15 and those who are older.
A joint investigation by state broadcaster NRC and the Centre for Critical Journalism (SUJO) found that as of December 2022, 432 single young refugee children (the youngest is five years old) were listed as having escaped from foreigners' detention centres and Barnevern care centres in Norway.[1765] The police do not actively search for them "in the vast majority of cases", and police databases contain incomplete information. It is believed that the disappeared children may have fallen into a criminal environment or been victims of human trafficking.[1766]
An unaccompanied 15-year-old refugee girl from Eritrea disappeared from a reception centre for refugee children in Nesseby a few days after her arrival in Norway, the state broadcaster NRK reported on 26 January. Nothing was done to find the missing girl: The police were only called in five days after her disappearance, and after questioning the staff, the case was closed.
On 13 December 2023, NRK reported that the NGO Save the Children had raised an alarm in the media. Due to poor detention conditions and even possible illegal exploitation in Norway of 80 underage refugees who had arrived in the country without parents and were living in the private sector together with people considered unreliable by the police, without proper supervision of their lives by the guardianship authorities.
The NGO Save the Children suggested that it was Ukrainian children who had arrived in Norway since February 2022. As an example, they cited the well-known story of a Ukrainian girl who had arrived in Norway without her parents, living with her aunt and her estranged partner, carrying a gun and, in the words of the Norwegian police, posing a "public danger". Human rights defenders later said that Barnevern's responses to their inquiries, citing an alleged lack of capacity to monitor the living conditions of children not in social institutions, did not stand up to criticism. Even without further explanation from the article's authors, Barnevern's argument seemed unconvincing in the Norwegian context. It is common knowledge that child protection workers can visit any home at their request.
There is no open source data available on Ukrainian refugees who have been victims of trafficking in Norway. In their letter of 12 April 2022, four Norwegian authorities (the Police, the Directorate for Immigration, the Directorate for Children, Youth and Family Affairs and the Directorate for Integration and Diversity) addressed to Norwegian municipalities with specific recommendations on how to prevent such situations among the most vulnerable categories of Ukrainian refugees (single women with children, unaccompanied children), indirectly indicating the likely existence of such a problem in the country.
According to statements in the media by the Ukrainian Embassy and local human rights defenders, there are also problems of illegal exploitation of Ukrainian refugees, including children, and inadequate supervision by the Norwegian guardianship authorities of Ukrainian child refugees in the country without parental care, but this information is hardly ever made public.
There are still serious complaints against the Barnevern care authorities, including the excessive number of child removals and the discriminatory treatment of children of non-Norwegian origin.
Since 2015, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has considered 40 cases regarding Barnevern's practice of removing children from "dysfunctional" families and placing them in foster care. Norway was found guilty in 15 of those. In 2021, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) completed its review of seven cases concerning Barnevern's child removal practices. In six of these cases, Norway was found guilty. All the Barnevern cases related to the violation of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which guarantees respect for personal and family life.
Human rights defenders are also concerned about the continuing practice of placing children of non-Norwegian origin in foster families without regard to language, culture and religious affiliation.
In a report of 27 January 2023, the state broadcaster NRC, citing research by the Arctic University of Norway, Tromsø, stated that the majority of Roma children are placed in non-Roma foster families. Their places of residence are hidden from their biological parents. Children are cut off from the Roma community, national culture and language.[1767]
The sixth monitoring round of the Council of Europe's European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) country report expresses, inter alia, concern about the continuing practice of placing children of non-Norwegian origin in foster care without regard to language, culture and religious affiliation.[1768]
ECRI's conclusions on Norway's implementation of the recommendations of the above-mentioned report[1769], published on 23 June 2002, refer to a number of measures taken by the government in this regard. At the same time, the report states that these measures do not apply to Roma, Tatter and indigenous peoples.[1770]
According to reports from social service workers, there is a critical situation in Norway with regard to slots in the Norwegian Child Welfare services. In their absense, children in urgent need of social protection are left in police station cells and, in the event of an urgent decision to remove them from their families, are forced to spend the night in the visitors' rooms of the social services or are sent to a hotel overnight, accompanied by an inspector and a police officer. The Norwegian Directorate for Children, Youth and Family Affairs (Bufetat) rejected 141 applications for placement in 2023; since the beginning of 2024, 54 applications have been rejected.
On 25 June 2024, NRK state broadcaster reported that a teenager was detained for 4 months in Bjørgvin prison in Bergen during the investigation due to lack of places in Barnevern care facilities. In 2022, there were 27 cases of children in prison custody, 54 in 2023, and 35 in the first half of 2024. According to the Minister for Children and Families, Kjersti Toppe, the Government is committed to increasing the number of places in Barnevern institutions. 150 million kroner (about $15 million) has been allocated for this purpose in 2024. [1771].
According to a journalistic investigation by "Aftenposten", in the last 2.5 years there have been 1,650 "serious incidents" in Norwegian care institutions (these include: death, attempted suicide, abduction, fire, suspected sexual abuse, etc.). In particular, 102 children attempted suicide and 10 children died. The Directorate for Children, Youth and Family Affairs (Bufdir, tasked with monitoring the fulfilment of care institutions' obligations) has conducted an internal investigation into only one death (13-year-old Julianna Castro was found dead in May 2022 after escaping from the institution "Barnevern" in Bergen).[1772]
Domestic and sexual violence is widespread in the country, with children, the elderly and members of the indigenous Sami people being the most vulnerable.
The Aftenposten investigation has shown that forced marriages, family violence and 'negative social control', representing various forms of pressure to conform to family traditions and customs, are widespread among migrants (mainly from Muslim countries) living in Norway.
At the same time, victims of family violence are either afraid to report it or withdraw their police reports under pressure from their families.
After examining 478 district court decisions on domestic and sexual violence between 2020 and 2023, the publication's journalists found that in 27 cases there were clear signs of so-called "honour crimes" with a family and religious background.[1773]
According to the Interdepartmental Expert Group on Negative Social Control and Honour Crimes, there has been an upsurge in honour-related violence in Norway. In 2023, experts received more than 1,100 calls for help. This represents a 30% increase compared to 2022 and a threefold increase compared to 2015. These include complaints of forced marriages, physical violence, moral punishment and other forms of pressure practised mainly in immigrant families from Syria, Iraq, Pakistan and Somalia. Seventy per cent of victims of violence are women.[1774]
According to a 2022 report by the Criminal Police (CRIPOS), 70 per cent of murders in Norway in 2021 were domestic murders, of which 41 per cent had a close relationship with the murderer. 96 per cent of the murderers were men and 55 per cent of the victims were women.
According to a report by the Norwegian Auditor General's Office, submitted on 9 June 2022 to assess the government's efforts to combat domestic violence, in 2021, 3,729 calls for domestic violence were registered by the police, more than 15,100 "signals" of violence against children were received by the guardianship authorities, and about 1,700 Norwegian adults were affected by domestic violence temporarily resided in crisis centres. One in four people killed in Norway is a victim of domestic violence.
According to Minister of Justice and Public Security Emilie Enger Mehl,[1775] the government has taken the report's findings and recommendations very seriously.
The need for the authorities to take active measures to improve the situation as quickly as possible was stated by NIM in its report on the human rights situation in Norway,[1776] as well as in a separate report on the situation of the rights of older people.
Both documents voiced a concern not only regarding violent crime but also forced medical treatment, poor nutrition, drug abuse, restricted access to information and communication services, as well as age discrimination in employment.
According to Amnesty International, despite an increase in the number of rapes reported to the police, only 14.3% of cases are decided in favour of the victim, with the rest being closed due to lack of evidence.
The opposition Labour Party and the Socialist Left Party have repeatedly proposed a law banning non-consensual sex, but it has not received the support of the parliamentary majority. In 2023, the relevant draft law was sent for public hearings and its consideration by the Parliament is expected in the second half of 2024.
In October 2019, a free 24‑hour hotline for victims of violence, supported by Crisis Center Secretariat, an NGO, was opened with funding from the Norwegian Ministry of Justice. In December 2019, the annual Ministry of Justice Award Ceremony for Contribution to Combating Domestic Violence was held at the profile conference in Kristiansand.
On 20 December 2023, the Government presented the Plan for Strengthening the Fight against Violence and Abuse against Children and Family Violence 2024-2028. The Plan includes more than a hundred measures aimed at preventing violence, identifying relevant cases and increasing the protection of vulnerable categories of persons. A significant role in the document is given to preventive police work, investigation and prosecution of offenders, including in relation to offences committed online. A separate chapter of the Plan is devoted to relevant work in the Sami community, including measures to strengthen language training and awareness of Sami culture in the police and support bodies, to establish care institutions for Sami children, and to guarantee equal treatment for Sami victims of violence.
In the recent years, Russophobia and spy-mania are actively promoted in Norwegian society. In line with such approaches, on 12 January 2024, the Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Emergency Situations submitted to Parliament amendments to the Criminal Code, the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Police Act that significantly tighten the relevant legislation and give the Norwegian intelligence services an additional tool to suppress any activity that could be interpreted as benefiting Russia.
The amendments are aimed at introducing into national law provisions on liability for activities in collusion with foreigners aimed at influencing public opinion, "where such activities are likely to harm a significant public interest". Violation of these provisions is punishable by up to 10 years' imprisonment, depending on the nature of the offence, its scale, the use of the offender's official position or his or her significant material gain.
In addition, the proposed amendments to the Criminal Code will significantly expand the ability of intelligence services and law enforcement officers to conduct covert investigations and information gathering methods, as well as prosecute document forgery.
Justice Minister E.E. Mehl pointed to the particular relevance of the amendment package in view of the "Russian trail" in the 2016 US presidential election, the "war in Europe" and the intelligence activities of an "increasingly isolated Russia", which allegedly uses various methods to influence security policy or create conflicts in a number of countries, including Norway.
The legislative changes mentioned are not an exclusive initiative of the current centre-left government of J.G. Strøre. In May 2021, a similar package of amendments was proposed by a right-liberal government, but was not adopted due to criticism from the Norwegian Foreign Ministry and Norwegian judges' and lawyers' associations, citing possible consequences for freedom of expression in the country.
The authorities assure that the previous comments have now been taken into account (the wording regarding "aiding and abetting foreign intelligence", "significant public interest", etc. has been clarified). In addition, the Security Police Service will use covert investigation methods only in cases of gross violations of the Criminal Code and with the authorisation of the Norwegian courts. General control will continue to be exercised by the Parliamentary Commission for the Control of the Intelligence Services.
From September 2022, the counter-intelligence agency collects enhanced data on all air passengers arriving from abroad and leaving the country; from January 2023, it tracks and analyses data from open sources on the Internet, including social media, with the possibility of mass storage for up to 15 years.[1777]
The main acts regulating foreign diasporas in Norway are the Act on the Entry and Residence of Foreigners in Norway of 24 June 1988; the Act on Equality and Prohibition of Discrimination of 16 June 2017, which prohibits discrimination on grounds of race, language, religion, national or social origin, among others; and the Act on Integration through Training, Education and Work of 6 November 2021.
No legislative acts in Norway prejudice the rights of Russian citizens. All foreigners are guaranteed the same rights as Norwegian citizens, except in areas where such restrictions are recognised as natural – participation in elections, military service, etc. Nevertheless, due to the constant fuelling of anti-Russian sentiments, especially in the media, there are instances of the Norwegian authorities and law enforcement agencies being wary of people from Russia.
In general, due to the high standard of living in Norway (the average salary is more than 5 thousand dollars, the state system of social support is developed), the socio-economic situation of our compatriots in this country can be characterised as quite favourable.
According to the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration, 480 Russian citizens have requested asylum in Norway since the beginning of the special military operation.[1778] According to media reports, "new migrants" are mainly families and young people with higher education, predominantly in ICT.
It should be noted that immigrants from Russia do not have the status of a national minority in Norway (only the Kvens, Jews, Forest Finns, Romani and Tater are considered as such by law). The Sami have the status of an indigenous people and their own self-governing body – the Samediggi.
The Norwegian intelligence services advise Norwegians to be "vigilant" in their contacts with Russians, colleagues or neighbors, and to inform the competent authorities of any suspicious activities. There have been cases when Russian nationals were pressured by local counter-intelligence services, who asked about their Russian relatives, contacts with the Embassy and even encouraged them to renounce Russian citizenship.
Norwegian citizens of Russian origin or those having close relatives in Russia, who are in employment or have been called up for military service, are often denied the granting/renewal of "security clearance".[1779]
Russian origin can be grounds for unreasonable searches, detention and deportation.[1780]
The removal of children from the families of Russian citizens living in Norway by the Norwegian guardianship authorities remains an issue of great concern (as of May 2024, the Russian diplomatic missions in Norway had received 24 appeals from Russian citizens regarding the removal of 43 children).
Since the beginning of the special military operation, Norway has taken a strongly anti-Russian stance, providing substantial political, military and financial support to the neo-Nazi regime in Kiev.
The events in Ukraine have led to incidents of Russophobia: harassment and insults, refusal of service, pressure at work, preventing Russian citizens, including those with second citizenship, from participating in international events.[1781] Russian-speaking pupils in local schools have been bullied.[1782] A number of small business owners refused to serve people of Russian origin[1783], and some medical centres refused to make appointments for Russian patients who did not condemn the special military operation.[1784] Norwegian employers are known to have given corrective instructions to employees who held an alternative view. Some Russian citizens have had difficulty finding jobs in Norway because of their nationality.[1785]
Such an approach was strongly condemned by Norwegian officials, who acknowledged that ordinary Russians were "not responsible for starting the war".
With few exceptions, Oslo has consistently followed the EU's restrictive anti-Russian measures. In particular, the Norwegians, referring to "especially strong protection of the freedom of speech in the Constitution", refused to block RT, Sputnik, RTR Planet, Russia 24, TV Center, NTV/NTV World, Rossiya 1, Ren-TV and Channel One Russia even though "these state-controlled media are used for dissemination of disinformation and fake news, deal in propaganda". Norway did not join the ban on Izvestia, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, RIA Novosti and Voice of Europe passed by the EU Council in July 2024.
Vesterland Recreation Park (Songdal municipality, western Norway), with 107 cabins and a small hotel, has refused to receive Russian tourists in connection with the events in Ukraine from 25 February 2022.[1786]
Starting from March 9, 2022, the Enter Tromse hotel network (comprises five small hotels and apartments in the center of the city of Tromsø) refused to accommodate tourists from Russia for the same reasons.[1787]
There have also been cases of assault in public places, harassment and insults, and denial of services to Russian citizens.
Local media and social networks, at the instigation of representatives of the Ukrainian diaspora, promote campaigns against individual Russian compatriots. One case of physical violence against a Russian-speaking citizen has been recorded.[1788] On 14 March 2022, in the Hundorp settlement (Sør-Fron municipality), 12-year-old Maria Falkenhaug, of Latvian origin, was attacked by an unknown person while she was talking to her mother on the phone in Russian. As a result, she sustained severe bruising. The attacker, while running away, was shouting in Norwegian "bloody Russian".[1789]
Ekaterina Klueva, a Russian citizen living in the municipality of Aure and employed as a kindergarten teacher, was invited to a meeting with representatives of the municipal authorities because of her publications on the Ukrainian conflict on her personal Facebook page (the authorities intervened following a complaint from her colleague). The meeting took place on March 15, 2022 at the community council in presence of her lawyer. The conversation was recorded on a voice recording device.[1790]
Following protests against Russophobia outside the Storting (parliament) in Norway on 24 April 2022, Angelina Kivioja, who organised the rally, received insults and threats, including physical violence.[1791]
In May 2022, a social media campaign was unleashed against a Russian national E.Sazonova, 65, and a friend of hers, 70. They were accused of "inciting ethnic hatred". Some Ukrainian Facebook social media communities posted their photos with captions calling to "bully these women and their relatives." The hate campaign was triggered by remarks made by Russian citizens to those attending the anti-Russian rally at the Storting.[1792]
One high-profile incident of denial of medical services to people of Russian origin was recorded. Thor Kvamsdal, a doctor at the Jeloy Fysioterapi clinic in the town of Moss, refused to make an appointment for Elena Kasin, a Russian citizen living in Norway who needed regular injections to relieve pain in her spine. Knowing that Elena Kasin had moved to Norway from Russia, the physical medicine and rehabilitation doctor called her and asked her what she thought about the events in Ukraine and Russian President Vladimir Putin, explaining that he "would not provide services to a patient who did not condemn the war in Ukraine".[1793] When he did not get a clear answer, the doctor told the Russian citizen to "watch the news on TV" and call back later. Commenting on the case of Kasin, Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre told media that "it is unacceptable that Russians are denied medical care in Norway because of the war in Ukraine."
In May 2023, two Russian citizens were refused entry to the Queen Sonja of Norway International Singing Competition.[1794] The official reason was the decision of the directorate not to admit citizens of Russia and Belarus to the event "in solidarity with Ukraine". The restriction affected, among others, holders of dual citizenship.
The violations of the rights of people of Russian origin in Norway in connection with the situation in Ukraine are confirmed in the Oslo Police District report "Hate Crime in Norway" for 2022.[1795] According to the document, since the start of the special military operation, the Norwegian police have received a number of reports regarding unlawful acts committed against Russian citizens, including acts of vandalism and violence, threats, hate speech, refusal to sell goods or services. It was recognised that these acts should be considered as hate crimes if they are motivated by the victim's Russian origin. It was noted, with reference to a notice from the Norwegian Attorney General to the Oslo Police District dated 2 November 2022, that refusal to sell goods or services to Russian citizens on grounds of the sanctions legislation cannot be classified as discrimination under para 186 ("Discrimination") of the Norwegian Penal Code. In addition, para 185 ("Hate Speech") and para 186 of the Criminal Code "may be interpreted restrictively on grounds of freedom of expression", for example, if the act committed against Russians is "a demonstration of one's position on the war or the Russian authorities".
At the same time, Oslo stresses that its response is aimed at the Russian government and not Russian citizens who should not, in any way, be held accountable for the Russian government's actions.[1796]
Against the backdrop of growing Russophobia, the Norwegian Foreign Ministry on Twitter called to welcome Russians living in Norway and to combat hate speech. The government's statement did not go unheeded. After identifying instances of discrimination against Russian students, university and research centers employees, the Ministry of Education and Research sent out memos to educational institutions, where he requested the staff to give special attention to this matter.
In Norway, the government does not make a distinction between compatriot organisations and local communities when these apply for financial aid, and equal support is given to ethnic and cultural, educational, sports, social and other projects.
The arrest of four Russian citizens (V.A. Rustanovich, A.V. Reznichenko, M.V. Yushkov and A.V. Yakunin) in October 2022 for using "drones" on the territory of Norway received particular attention. They were charged with violating paragraph 19 of Regulation No. 1076 of 15 August 2014 "On restrictive measures against actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty, independence and stability of Ukraine" (prohibiting "aircraft" owned or controlled by Russians from landing, taking off or flying over Norway). Two of these cases resulted in convictions for failing to comply with the sanctions laws.[1797]
Thanks to the highly professional work of the lawyers representing A.V.Yakunin, a businessman who also has British citizenship and lives in Italy, the courts of the first and second instances ruled that the use of recreational drones does not fall under restrictive measures. The man was found not guilty, and the other Russian citizens were later released from custody. On 29 June 2023, the Norwegian Supreme Court overturned the previous acquittals and concluded that the ban did apply to quadcopters.
A.V. Yakunin's case was referred to the court of first instance for retrial.[1798] In January 2024, a new court hearing was held, in which A.V. Yakunin was considered only as a Russian citizen. According to the decision of 14 February 2024, the court agreed with the Supreme Court's decision of June 2023 and recognised the existence of a ban on the operation of all types of drones by Russians throughout Norway, including Spitsbergen. However, A.V.Yakunin was released from liability because he "could not have been aware of the restrictive norms of Norwegian legislation". The prosecutor's office intends to appeal against the acquittal verdict.[1799]
At the end of January 2024, the Norwegian Supreme Court refused to hear Vitali Rustanovich's appeal against his conviction by the court of second instance. The Russian citizen stated that he would appeal to the European Court of Human Rights.
On 29 May 2024, additional restrictions imposed by Norway on citizens entering the country from Russia came into force. They will be refused entry to Norway when they cross the border. xceptions will be made in particular for those who enter the country to visit close relatives and for a number of other categories of citizens.[1800] Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov has called the restrictions discriminatory.[1801]
The Polish authorities are actively pursuing a "historical policy" aimed at falsifying the history of World War II in order to improve the country's image. The cause-and-effect relationships and the assessment of the events of that tragic period for all mankind are purposefully distorted to suit the political situation. Theses denying the decisive contribution of the Red Army to the defeat of Hitler's Germany are being disseminated, and efforts are being made to eliminate the Soviet/Russian war memorial heritage in Poland. The task of ousting from public consciousness not only the memory of the role of the Red Army, 600,000 soldiers and officers of which died in the liberation of Poland from the Nazis, but also of the rescue of the Polish people from physical extermination by the Nazis, has been officially proclaimed. In the public information field, Soviet soldiers appear exclusively in a negative light and are unfoundedly accused of committing crimes against civilians and civilian infrastructure facilities out of the context of historical events. At the same time, the idea of a double occupation of Poland – by Nazi and Soviet forces – is promoted. Poland itself is positioned by local propaganda solely as the main victim of "two totalitarianisms". In the media mainstream, Hitler's Germany and the "allied" USSR are held equally responsible for unleashing the war. To this end, the Polish Sejm even adopted a relevant resolution. The coverage of Nazi crimes is selective.
The historical policy based on falsifying facts is actively supported by the leaders of Poland who make corresponding public statements. Similar approaches are also broadcast by the Institute of National Remembrance[1802] (a state institution that is the main promoter of Polish historical policy and the main initiator of the campaign to demolish Soviet monuments in Poland).
Polish state propaganda focuses on 17 September 1939, when the Red Army launched a campaign to liberate Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, rather than the Third Reich's attack on Poland on 1 September 1939. In the Polish version of history, this is portrayed as "a treacherous Soviet attack on Poland", which purportedly led to the final loss of independence and the division of the Polish state.
The distorted historical portrayal has been actively used by Polish propagandists against Russia after its Armed Forces launched a special military operation to denazify and demilitarise Ukraine and protect civilians in Donbass on 24 February 2022. Its primary objective is to persuade the public that Russia/USSR has always been a criminal state.
The explanations of the Russian side about the reasons for launching the special military operation were "refuted" by Polish propaganda by drawing parallels with the events of 17 September 1939 ("attack on independent Poland" in order to seize its "eastern territories"). Poland imposes the thesis that modern Russia pursues a similar goal – to seize Ukrainian lands, destroy Ukrainians, their culture and national identity.
Similarly, the alleged "crimes" committed by the Red Army soldiers against the civilian population of various European countries, including Poland, during the war and the deaths of civilians in Ukrainian cities such as Bucha, Irpen, Kramatorsk and others, are being mythologised. The Russian army is unjustly blamed by the Polish side for these events.
The Polish political elites seek to find grounds to accuse Moscow of "genocide", "war crimes" and "crimes against humanity" in Ukraine. Warsaw welcomed the International Criminal Court's notorious 17 March 2023 decision to issue an arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin over allegations of "kidnapping" Ukrainian children. During the EU summit held on 23 March 2023 in Brussels, the Polish Prime Minister, Mateusz Morawiecki, referred to the Russian evacuation of children from the combat zone as "stealing children".
In particular, Russia's actions to evacuate children from the combat zone were described by Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki, who was in Brussels on 23 March 2023 at the European Union summit, as "stealing children". Following the logic of this politician and those who agree with him, the imminent death of children or other tragedies in this situation would be preferable for them.
Polish political elites deny the existence of Nazism in Ukraine, ignore the facts of crimes committed by the Ukrainian military and radicals, and instead substitute concepts, accusing the Russian side of such actions without evidence. On 22 June 2022, Polish President Andrzej Duda, in an interview with the Latvian LSM TV channel, called "stories about some Nazis, some attacks on Russians and ethnic cleansing in Ukraine" a lie of Russian propaganda and a far-fetched reason to attack a sovereign state.[1803] In September 2022, he repeated these theses while talking to journalists in New York where he arrived to participate in the 77th session of the UN General Assembly, and in October 2022, during an interview with the Italian broadcaster RAI.[1804]
In the context of the special military operation, Warsaw, in the spirit of its falsified historical course, portrays Russia/USSR as an eternally aggressive empire, a source of evil, a "prison of nations" threatening the independence of other countries, especially its neighbours.
On 20 March 2023, during a speech at the University of Heidelberg (Germany), Mateusz Morawiecki said: "Vladimir Putin and all accomplices of Russian aggression are the modern day fascists. As Europeans, we are obliged to oppose Russian fascism."
"It does not matter what Russia is at the moment – Tsarist, Soviet, Putin's.
Russian imperialism has always been the same: criminal, cruel, merciless," Polish President Andrzej Duda said in May 2024 during a commemoration in Monte Cassino, Italy.[1805] "For hundreds of years they have been the same. Great Russianness, imperialism and the oppression of other peoples, their subjugation to themselves, the use of slave labour, murder, exile to the East, the destruction of families, the abduction of children. This is what Ukraine is facing today,"[1806] Duda said in March 2024 at an event dedicated to the "Cursed Soldiers" in Mława (Masovian Voivodeship).
In the two years since the start of the special military operation, Poland, according to Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski, has provided military aid to the Kiev regime worth about EUR 4.5 bln, making it one of the top four (along with the USA, the UK and Germany). Warsaw handed Kiev tanks, BMPs, self-propelled howitzers, UAVs, assault rifles, missiles and ammunition. The Polish mass media quoted Ukrainian sources as saying that up to 90 percent of Western military aid to Ukraine comes through Polish territory.[1807]
In order to whitewash the neo-Nazi regime in Kiev, the Polish authorities are putting pressure on independent Polish journalists. In April 2022, Dawid Warszawski, a columnist for the opposition liberal Polish newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza, published a piece in which he reported that its editorial board demanded that he call the Azov battalion banned in Russia not neo-Nazi, as Warszawski defined it in his articles, but "extreme right-wing" or use some other euphemisms.
Under the banner of combating "Soviet propaganda" and shaping the "correct" history of World War II, a cult of even those "fighters against communism" who were stained by collaboration with the Nazis, war crimes and the killing of civilians is being planted in Poland. It is known, among other things, of commemorative events to mark the formation of the Świętokrzyska Brigade of the National Armed Forces[1808] (among others, such events took place in 2021[1809] and 2022[1810]).
Archival documents provide evidence that fighters of the Polish Armia Krajowa and its individual formations committed numerous murders of Soviet civilians. At the end of October 2022, the Federal Security Service of Russia published new archival documents, including a reference on terrorist acts committed by Polish gangs in the territories of Belarus and Lithuania in 1944 and from January to April 1945. The document, prepared in early May 1945, reports almost 70 terrorist acts and murders of Soviet citizens – not only military, but also representatives of the authorities, heads and workers of enterprises, teachers – committed by Polish militants.[1811]
In Poland, as part of activities aimed at falsifying history, the merits of "underground heroes" – the "cursed" (or "unbroken") soldiers[1812] in achieving freedom and independence of post-war Poland (which became allegedly possible only at the juncture of the 1980s-1990s[1813]) are glorified at the state level. The Day of Remembrance of the "Cursed Soldiers" (as heroes of the "national liberation" struggle) is celebrated on 1 March.
In a message on the occasion of the events commemorating this date in 2024, Polish President Duda wrote: "Today, on the National Day of Remembrance of the "Сursed Soldiers", we honour those who, after the defeat of Hitler's Germany, did not lay down their arms, but continued to resist the new Red occupation."[1814]
On 1 March 2023, in Bydgoszcz (Kuyavian-Pomeranian Voivodeship), a march in memory of the "Cursed Soldiers" organised by nationalists took place in honour of one of them, Romuald Rajs ("Brown"). During the march, participants[1815] chanted slogans such as: "Communists will hang on the trees instead of leaves"; "Once with a sickle, once with a hammer the red bastards will be killed."
Along with honouring Polish fighters from World War II, the authorities also demonstrate their willingness to pay tribute to those figures whose attitude even in Polish society itself is strongly negative. An example is the restoration at public expense of the grave of the members of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army liquidated by the NKVD on Monastery Mountain in Lubaczów County, Subcarpathian Voivodeship, which was carried out a few days before the official visit of Polish President Duda to Ukraine on 11 October 2020. A new plaque appeared on the burial site with the following text in Polish and Ukrainian: "The mass grave of Ukrainians who died in the battle against the Soviet NKVD in the Monastery Woods on the night of 2 to 3 March 1945". In return, Warsaw received permission from Ukraine for Polish experts to carry out exhumation work near Lvov where there are military graves of Poles who died fighting for the city in 1918. Zelenskiy announced this during a joint press conference with Duda in Auschwitz on 27 January 2020.[1816]
In February 2024, civil society organisations reported on plans of the Polish Ministry of Education to adjust the school history curriculum by excluding a number of "inconvenient" issues, including replacing the term "Volhynia Massacre" which describes the mass murder of Poles by Ukrainian collaborators in Volhynia and Eastern Lesser Poland with a term "Polish-Ukrainian conflict". It was also assumed that any mention of the concentration camps Auschwitz, Palmiry, Piaśnica which operated on Polish territory and the camps for children in Łódź, Ponary, Katyn, Mednoye and Kharkov would be removed from the section of the school curriculum devoted to "German and Soviet crimes during World War II". At the same time, it was reported that it was proposed to remove the topic of "Cursed Soldiers" from school textbooks. Information about these ideas was published in the press and on social networks.[1817]
The Polish authorities used the start of Russia's special military operation as a pretext for launching anti-Russian propaganda of unprecedented intensity and mendacity (even by the standards of the country's current politicians) in the media, which, in turn, gave impetus to a rampant Russophobia on an unprecedented scale.
Polish officials do not hide their anti-Russia and anti-Russian sentiment, publicly expressing the need to destroy Russia and abolish Russian culture (this was implemented by refusing to stage and perform works by Russian authors, co-operating with performers from Russia), "derussification" (reducing Poland's dependence on Russia), primarily in the energy sector. Thus, on 30 March 2022, Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki said that Russophobia in this State had become mainstream. On 4 April 2022, Piotr Gliński, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Culture and National Heritage of Poland, called for Russian culture to disappear from the public space. In his opinion, the time of the special military operation is inappropriate for Russian ballet, productions based on Anton Chekhov's and Alexander Pushkin's works, or performances by the Alexandrov Ensemble.[1818]
Since April 2022, Poland has imposed national sanctions on Russian businesses (it is known, inter alia, about the creation of a "sanctions" list of Russian companies and Russian citizens, which, as of January 2024, includes 43 individuals holding Russian citizenship and 68 legal entities linked to Russian capital). Since September 2022, a ban has been introduced at the national level on Russian citizens entering the country for tourism, business, cultural and sporting purposes, including those holding Schengen visas issued by third countries. Warsaw welcomed the suspension of the Agreement between Russia and the European Community on the facilitation of the issuance of visas to the citizens of Russia and the European Union. There are no passenger railway or air services between Russia and Poland.
The Polish authorities also subjected areas related to culture and art to Russophobic attacks. As it was mentioned above, this course was set at the official level. In 2022-2023, there were numerous campaigns to "cancel" performances by Russian musicians, exhibitions or admission of Russian museum exhibits, etc.
In 2024, this campaign has been continued with the involvement of NGOs convenient to the Polish authorities. For example, according to Polish media,[1819] "social media outrage" was allegedly caused by a concert by the Russian pianist Nikolay Khozyainov (who resides in Switzerland) scheduled for 22 February 2024 at the Philharmonic Hall in Warsaw. Natalia Panchenko, a Ukrainian activist and founder of the public movement Euromaidan-Warsaw, who is permanently staying in Poland, appealed to the Philharmonic demanding to cancel the concert.[1820] A protest event in front of the Philharmonic was planned for 22 February.[1821]
In Poland, a spy-mania campaign has been launched. In June 2023, 16 people, mostly citizens of Ukraine and Belarus, as well as one Russian, were detained as part of the "unmasking of the spy network".[1822] They were charged with participation in an organised criminal group and activities in the inteterests of foreign intelligence. In December 2023, the District Court in Lublin[1823] handed down sentences against 14 pleading guilty members of the "spy network" (mostly Ukrainian and Belarusian citizens, as well as Maksim Sergeev, a Russian citizen and a player belonging to the 1st League of the Polish Zaglembe Sosnowiec ice hockey club detained in June 2023[1824]), which, according to the media, the Polish intelligence services have been "exposing" since March 2023[1825]. The Russian citizen was charged with participation in an organised criminal group, as well as activities in the interests of foreign intelligence against Poland. According to media claims, his tasks "included" surveillance of critical infrastructure on the territory of a number of Polish voivodeships. Allegedly, he "worked" for remuneration as part of a "spy network". As a result of the case proceedings, the convicted persons were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment ranging from one to six years, as well as monetary fines. Maksim Sergeev was sentenced to two years and 11 months in prison and a fine of 15,000 zloty (about USD 3,750).[1826]
In February 2024, the District Court in Bialystok sentenced two citizens of Ukraine and Belarus to four years' imprisonment for espionage in favour of Russia. Presumably, both defendants were also involved in the "spy network" case.[1827]
In May 2024, nine people were detained on suspicion of sabotage activities "on the instructions of Russian special services"[1828] (among the detainees were citizens of Ukraine, Belarus and Poland).
The imposition of Russophobic attitudes has impacted Russian athletes who compete for clubs in Poland. Contracts with those who refused to condemn the special military operation and the policies of the Russian leadership were cancelled. Thus, it is known that in March 2022, the Polish hockey club BS Polonia Bytom terminated contracts with five Russian hockey players: D.Babets (who has Kazakh citizenship along with Russian citizenship), K.Kleymenov, E.Rudskiy, V.Polinin and I.Smirnov. The club's management cited the athletes' refusal to take an "unambiguously anti-war stance" as the reason, as well as their "unnecessary anti-Ukrainian activity on social networks", which the club could not agree with. The Bytom town authorities, where the hockey club is located, supported this decision. Two similar incidents occurred the same month. The Polish hockey club Ciarko STS Sanok terminated the contract with its player, A.Mokshantsev, in connection with Russia's "open war" against "the neighbouring country" (the club announced this on its Facebook page). The Polish hockey club GKS Katowice also terminated the contract with Russian hockey player A.Yakimenko under the pretext of "the athlete's lack of unambiguous condemnation of Vladimir Putin's and the Russian Federation's aggression against Ukraine" (the club also published a corresponding announcement on its website).
In April 2023, the Polish Fencing Federation (PZS) reported about its decision to cancel the women's foil World Cup in Poland (it was scheduled for 21‑23 April) due to the rules adopted by the International Fencing Federation (FIE) on 4 April to allow Russian and Belarusian athletes to compete (only those Russian and Belarusian female athletes and staff members who were ready to confirm in writing that they did not support the "war in Ukraine", were not associated with the "Putin regime", the army or special services and were not members of army clubs were allowed to compete under a neutral flag). By doing so, the PZS expressed its "solidarity" with the Ukrainian Fencing Federation in its endeavour to suspend from international competitions Russian athletes who, in their opinion, support the "brutal war in Ukraine" and represent the "Putin regime". On 3 April 2023, the Russian Fencing Federation announced that it would not send its foil fencers to the World Cup stage in Poznan due to unacceptable conditions of participation put forward by the PZS.
The World Youth Wrestling Championships were scheduled to be held in Warsaw from 14 to 20 August 2023. Due to the fact that Poland did not issue visas to Russian athletes (the consideration of the issue lasted from September 2022), the United World Wrestling International Federation decided to reallocate the event to Jordan. In a statement published on the Federation's website, it was noted that official Warsaw was unable to meet the requirements of the organiser, which consisted in ensuring equal participation for all athletes, free from any discrimination based on passport or other criteria.
Polish player of Rubin football club (Kazan) Maciej Rybus is occasionally attacked on Polish social networks and mass media for staying to play in Russia and for participating in the ceremony of laying flowers in memory of Soviet soldiers who died during the Great Patriotic War on 9 May 2024.[1829]
In everyday life, Russians in Poland often face denial of service. This occurs in grocery shops, pharmacies, clinics, dental surgeries, beauty salons, etc.
In the context of a large-scale information war against Russia launched by the Polish authorities after the start of the special military operation to demilitarize and denazify Ukraine, the Polish government censored the Polish segment of the Internet in May 2022. At the initiative of the Internal Security Agency, several Russian and Polish Internet portals were blocked for "spreading pro-Kremlin propaganda" (ria.ru, lenta.ru, pl.sputniknews.com, rt.com, dziennik-polityczny.com, myslpolska.info, wicipolskie.pl, wolnemedia.net, xportal.pl, wrealu.pl,), and banned broadcasting of five Russian channels (Russia Today, RTR‑Planeta, Soyuz TV, Russia 24 and ORT‑1) and one Belarusian channel (Bel‑24).
The Russophobic campaign has impacted the work of Russian diplomatic missions in Poland. As early as on 25 February 2022, the bank accounts of both the Russian Embassy and Trade Representation in Poland were frozen, which is a flagrant violation of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. The financial control authorities and prosecutors' offices in Warsaw justified their decision by citing suspicions of financing of terrorist activities in Poland by Russian foreign missions. On 9 March 2022, the last of the four Russian language and culture centres located in Lublin terminated its operations.
As part of their campaign to rewrite history, the Polish authorities suppress any opposing views. Among others, Russian representatives of social movements, journalists and academics are subjected to harassment and pressure. Ekaterina Tsivilskaya and Anna Smirnova-Tyts, two Russian women who spoke out against the "war on monuments" and were detained and expelled from Poland in May 2018 on charges of participating in a "hybrid war against Poland," remain barred from entering the country. In 2017, Russian historian Dmitry Karnaukhov was expelled, and in 2018 – another two Russian citizens, I.Stolyarchik and O.Rothstein, were expelled (allegedly because they posed a "threat to the security" of the country). At the initiative of the Polish authorities, two Russian political scientists, O.V.Bondarenko and A.A.Martynov have been banned from entering the Schengen countries since late 2017 and early 2018.
In 2021, the Polish authorities extended the Schengen area entry ban (until December 2025) for journalist Leonid Sviridov of the Rossiya Segodnya news agency for "conducting aggressive propaganda and damaging the image of Poland". In addition, in March 2021, VGTRK correspondent Evgeny Reshetnev was banned from entering the country for five years for allegedly carrying out activities "beyond the scope of journalism".
All of this is accompanied by the creation of visa and logistical obstacles for representatives of Russian civil society taking part in relevant events still being organised by the OSCE on the territory of that country.
Poland is one of the countries whose authorities are actively engaged in the "war" against monuments and memorials in honour of Red Army soldiers who died during the liberation of the country from Nazism during World War II. As a rule, the Russian side learns about the destruction of monuments after carrying out an inventory of the memorials. Information is also obtained from news publications. Recently, the Polish media have preferred to keep silent about such incidents, so the list of cases of destruction of monuments of which the Russian side has become aware is far from complete and will be clarified over time.
The Russian Embassy's 2020-2021 inventory of Soviet monuments outside burial grounds in Poland identified 9 new demolitions which occurred in 2019-2021. The destroyed or depersonalised monuments were situated in the villages of Baszków (Wielkopolska Voivodeship), Bincze and Radowo Wielkie (West Pomeranian Voivodeship), Wrocław and Szczynawa (Lower Silesian Voivodeship), Krzanowice (Silesian Voivodeship), the village of Patrzyków (Łódź Voivodeship), Wilkow settlement and Józefów (Lublin Voivodeship) have all experienced unlawful demolition of Soviet monuments.
In addition, in 2021, there were four cases of unlawful demolition of Soviet monuments of which the Russian side became aware. In January, a monument to Soviet soldiers-liberators in Wysokie Mazowiecki (Podlaskie Voivodeship) was dismantled. In April, it became known about the dismantling of the monument of gratitude to the Red Army in Lesko (Podkarpackie Voivodeship) and the monument to the Soviet-Polish brotherhood in arms in Ciechowice Dziedzice (Silesian Voivodeship). The obelisk from the individual grave of the Hero of the Soviet Union Alexander Sinitsyn near the village of Wola-Buchowska (Podkarpackie Voivodeship) disappeared. Seven acts of vandalism were committed against Soviet war graves in Wolyptyn and Rawicz (Wielkopolska Voivodeship), Swidnica, Węzów, and Luban (Lower Silesia Voivodeship), Zambrow (Podlaskie Voivodeship), and Ostrolenka (Mazowieckie Voivodeship).
Since the end of February 2022, the Russophobia spread by the Polish authorities has been reflected in the already active "war" against monuments and memorials in honour of fallen Red Army soldiers. Since the beginning of the special military operation, the number of acts of vandalism on Soviet memorials and graves on Polish territory has increased manifold. As a rule, vandals put Nazi and Ukrainian neo-Nazi symbols, obscene language, and sprayed paint on the monuments. There were 46 instances of vandalism at cemeteries dedicated to Soviet military personnel located in cities and towns throughout the voivodeships: Wielkopolska (Rawicz, Poznan and Gniezno); Świętokrzyskie (Sandomierz); Lubuskie (Żary); Mazowieckie (Warsaw, Radom, Garwolin and Minsk-Mazowiecki); Silesian (Katowice and Chorzów); Lower Silesian (Wrocław, Luban, Wałbrzych, Kąty Wrocławskie, Świdnica and Bolesławiec); Pomeranian (Gdańsk, Żukowo and Tczew); West Pomeranian (Kołobrzeg and Koszalin); Kuyavian-Pomeranian (Głinki (near Toruń) and Brodnica); Małopolskie (Szczucin, Węgrzce, Myslenice and Wadowice); Podkarpackie (Krosno and Melec); Lublin (Flisy and Wilków); Podlaskie (Zambrów and the village of Harasimowicze); Warmińsko-Mazurskie (Elbląg, Lubawa, Ostróda and the village of Wronki Wielkie); Łódz (Łódź, Zgierz and Piotrków Trybunalski) and four acts of vandalism against the monuments (in Olyshtyn, Warmińsko-Mazurskie Voivodeship; Głubczyce, Opolskie Voivodeship; the village of Węgrzce, Małopolskie Voivodeship; and Gliwice, Silesian Voivodeship). Some memorial sites (in Warsaw, Poznań, Wrocław, Tczew, Luban) were repeatedly desecrated. The demolition of a number of monuments (in particular in the settlement of Chrzowice-Folwark, Głubczyce) was video recorded.
At the same time, the Polish authorities stepped up their efforts to destroy memorials in honour of fallen Red Army fighters. They voiced their intentions openly. In March 2022, the chairman of the Institute of National Remembrance (INP), Karol Nawrocki, announced that the INP had a list of 60 memorial sites associated with the commemoration of the Red Army and that the INP would endeavour to eliminate them in cooperation with local authorities.[1830] At a press conference in April 2022, he promised that the INP would vigorously implement the law on "decommunisation" with regard to monuments (outside burial sites).[1831]
Polish local authorities at various levels, both in coordination with the Institute of National Remembrance of Poland and independently, initiate mass demolition of Soviet monuments located outside the burial grounds.
"Decommunisation" of public space in Poland is carried out in accordance with the "Prohibition of the promotion of communism or other totalitarian system" law of 1 April 2016 (with subsequent amendments).[1832] Monuments to Soviet soldiers-liberators are removed as "symbolising communism" or "propagandising this regime". Poland is thus violating its international obligations under the Treaty between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Poland on Friendly and Good-Neighbourly Cooperation of 22 May 1992, the intergovernmental agreements on cooperation in the field of culture, science and education of 25 August 1993 and on burials and places of memory of victims of wars and repression of 22 February 1994.
In 2022, there were at least 18 cases of unlawful demolition of Soviet monuments of which the Russian side became aware (we would like to remind you that in 2021 there were 4 such cases, i.e. a 4.5‑fold increase over one year). There were probably more such incidents, but the Polish media has been silent about such incidents lately. Monuments were demolished in the settlement of Chrzowice-Folwark, Brzeg, Byczyna, and Głubczyce (Opolskie Voivodeship), the village of Garnzarsko (Lower Silesia Voivodeship), the village of Międzyblocze (Wielkopolska Voivodeship), Bialy Bur, the village of Brojce, the settlement of Starogard, Bobolice and Stargard (West Pomeranian Voivodeship), Dąbrowa Górnicza (Silesian Voivodeship), Malbork (Pomeranian Voivodeship), Włodawa (Lublin Voivodeship), the village of Mokre (Świętokrzyskie Voivodeship).
In July 2022, in Terespol (Lublin Voivodeship), a monument on the mass grave of 64 Soviet soldiers who fell in battle against Hitler's invaders in July 1944 was dismantled without the agreement of the Russian side. On 1 September 2022, by decision of the Polish authorities, a monument to the Red Army soldiers who died in World War II, which was located near the Soviet military cemetery in Wałbrzych (Lower Silesia Voivodeship), was dismantled.
In 2023, there were 25 cases of unlawful acts against Russian (Soviet) war graves and memorial sites of which the Russian side became aware. In particular, 13 acts of vandalism were committed at Soviet war gravesites (including in the Warmińsko-Mazurskie Voivodeship (Morąg), Mazowieckie Voivodeship (Warsaw), Lower Silesian Voivodeship (Wrocław), West Pomeranian Voivodeship (Szczecin), Kuyavian-Pomeranian Voivodeship (Labyszyn), Pomeranian Voivodeship (Kartuzy, Żukowo, Kościerzyna), 4 acts of vandalism were committed against monuments not related to burials (in the settlement of Kiezieliny (Olsztyn, Warmińsko-Mazurskie Voivodeship), Szczecin (West Pomeranian Voivodeship), and twice in Rzeszów (Podkarpackie Voivodeship). There were 8 illegal demolitions of Soviet memorial sites and dismantling of their elements.
On 5 May 2023, an obelisk was removed in Głubczyce, Opole Voivodeship, which had been erected in 1945 on the former grave of 676 Soviet soldiers of the 1st Ukrainian Front (according to the Polish Red Cross, the remains of the soldiers were reportedly moved to a different cemetery in 1952). A press conference preceding the demolition was attended by Karol Nawrocki, the INP President, and Adam Siwek, Director of the Office for Commemorating the Struggle and Martyrdom of the INP. Karol Nawrocki called Soviet soldiers "infanticide, murderers and rapists" and said that during the war years there was a struggle between "oppressors" and "evil fought evil". According to him, the monument contradicts history and has no aesthetic merit.
On 8 May 2023, Karol Nawrocki commented on the initiation of a criminal case by the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation over the demolition of a Soviet monument in Głubczyce: "The Russian Federation continues to believe that it should arrange the space of a free and independent Poland. This demonstrates their imperial thinking and shows that the spirit of Soviet communism is still present in the Russian Federation."
The Polish Institute of National Remembrance in May 2023 cited data that since the beginning of 28 February 2022, "Soviet propaganda sites" had been destroyed by Polish efforts in almost a year and a half.
On 3 August 2023, the Monument of Gratitude to the Soviet Liberation Army, erected in the 1960s in the Dąbie district of Szczecin (West Pomeranian Voivodeship), was demolished by the Polish authorities without the agreement of the Russian side with the process recorded on camera. The monument was included in the "List of Sites Commemorating Soviet Defenders of the Fatherland Fallen on the Territory of the Republic of Poland" compiled jointly by the Russian and Polish sides in 1997. A press conference preceding the demolition was attended by Karol Nawrocki, who again insulted the memory of Soviet soldiers and denied their liberating role, the West Pomeranian voivode Zbigniew Bogucki (his speech was in a similar vein), Adam Siwek, and the staff of the Institute's regional office.
In August 2023, it became known that a sculptural object dedicated to the former burgomaster of Terespol (who held this position in the 1930s) was erected in place of the monument on the mass grave of 64 Soviet soldiers killed in 1944, which had been demolished in Terespol (Lublin Voivodeship) in July 2022.
On 10 November 2023, in the settlement of Łubnice (Świętokrzyskie Voivodeship), an obelisk was erected in place of the monument to the Red Army, which had been demolished on 12 October 2023. The obelisk reads: "To the victims of the totalitarianisms of German Nazism and Soviet Communism. The union of these criminal ideologies led to the outbreak of World War II, bringing immeasurable destruction, suffering and death. Gmina Łubnice, Institute of National Remembrance, 2023."
On 15 November 2023, in the settlement of Kieźliny near Olsztyn (Warmian-Masurian Voivodeship), a stone monument in honour of the Hero of the Soviet Union Pyotr Dernov was demolished by decision of the Polish local authorities, agreed with the Institute of National Remembrance and the Warmian-Masurian voivode. Before that, the Polish regional press had discussed the alleged "falsification" of Pyotr Dernov's feat and the necessity to demolish the monument.
The vandals who dismantled elements of the monument to the Red Army soldiers in the settlement of Dębe Wielkie (Masovian Voivodeship) did not hide their deeds but demonstrated the results during a protest rally in front of the Russian Embassy in Warsaw on 17 September 2023 (the anniversary of the beginning of the liberation campaign of the Red Army in Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia in 1939), the footage of which can be found on the Internet.[1833]
In February 2024, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation declared wanted Roman Szelemej, the mayor of Wałbrzych (Lower Silesian Voivodship), by whose order in September 2022 the monument to Soviet soldiers located near the cemetery of Soviet soldiers in this town, was dismantled, as well as Karol Nawrocki and Karol Rabenda, a former deputy state assets minister, who pushed for the removal of the monument to Soviet soldiers in Malbork (Pomeranian Voivodship) and participated in its demolition on 9 May 2022. In May 2024, the Russian Interior Ministry added to the wanted database the current mayor of Malbork, Marek Charzewski, and the former mayor of Brzeg (Opole Voivodeship), Jerzy Wrembiak.[1834]
Between January and May 2024, there were 12 cases of vandalism against Soviet military cemeteries in Poland.
After the start of the special military operation, the Polish side stopped informing Russian foreign missions about the facts of the discovery of the remains of Soviet soldiers and their subsequent reburial. Appeals to the relevant Polish authorities to confirm the Russian side's interest in participating in the reburial ceremonies for the remains of Soviet soldiers who died during World War II in the battles for the liberation of Poland or in German camps on its territory remain unanswered.
Thus, from the late 1990s to the present day, most of the monuments in honour of Soviet soldiers on the territory of Poland have been destroyed: of the 561 monuments included in the "List of Sites Commemorating Soviet Defenders of the Fatherland Fallen on the Territory of the Republic of Poland" compiled jointly with the Polish side in 1997, only a few remained by 2024. However, even these surviving memorials are at risk of destruction.
The Polish authorities have not participated in commemorative ceremonies organised by the Russian foreign missions in Poland at memorials to Soviet soldiers for a long time, but have not yet prevented them from taking place.
The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in its response notes to the Embassy's informing of the intention to hold such events includes the phrase: "in accordance with Art. 117, para. 3 of the Penal Code (PC), public incitement to initiating a war of aggression or public approval of the initiating or waging of such a war is prohibited, at the same time, in accordance with Art. 256, para. 1 of the PC, public propaganda of fascist or other totalitarian state system, as well as incitement to hatred on national, ethnic, racial, religious grounds are prohibited, besides, according to Art. 16, para. 1 of the Act on Special Measures to Counteract the Support of Aggression Against Ukraine of 13 April 2022, the use or propaganda of symbols or names associated with the aggression of the Russian Federation in Ukraine are prohibited. In view of the above, the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not recommend holding the event and expects the Embassy to adhere to the legislation in force in Poland.
On 9 May 2022 and 2023, due to the presence of a pro-Ukrainian hooligan crowd at the Mausoleum of the Soviet Soldiers Cemetery in Warsaw, Russian diplomats were unable to lay wreaths and flowers at the Memorial.
In particular, on 9 May 2022, a wreath-laying ceremony at the Mausoleum of the Soviet Soldiers Cemetery organised by the Russian Embassy in Poland was disrupted by pro-Ukrainian individuals, with the connivance of the Polish authorities. The Russian Ambassador to Poland, Sergey Andreev, and those accompanying him were attacked. Attempts to disrupt a commemorative event organised by the Russian Consulate General on the occasion of Victory Day in the Great Patriotic War occurred in Gdansk.
The situation (though in a different scenario) repeated itself on 9 May 2023 when a group of "activists" from the Euromaidan-Warsaw civic initiative and Ukrainian refugees staged a rally at the Soviet cemetery. The square in front of the central monument was filled with Ukrainian flags, installations, and images of "arrested Putin". One of the architectural elements of the memorial displayed signs of vandalism, including obscene inscriptions with anti-Russian content. The action itself was accompanied by noise effects imitating the sounds of air raids and bombings. The participants held a banner with the slogan: "The presence of the official representative of Russia in this place is an insult to the graves of soldiers who died during World War II" and a caption under the hashtag calling Russia a "terrorist".
When the Russian delegation laid a wreath at the memorial, it was surrounded by a tight cordon of pro-Ukrainian protesters. One of the protesters tied himself to the wreath that the Embassy staff had intended to lay. After the Russian diplomats had left, the protesters tore off a ribbon in the colours of the Russian flag from the wreath and tied it to a mock missile before trampling the wreath. The protesters, addressing the Russian delegation through a loudspeaker, demanded the removal of St. George's ribbons, calling them a symbol of "support for aggression". They called the Ambassador and members of the Russian delegation "fascists" and "murderers", demanded the withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of Ukraine (including Crimea), as well as an end to "bombing and killing people".
These actions are in line with the Polish authorities who make no effort to stop such illegal actions against Russian diplomats. It is known that before 9 May 2023, secretary general of the then ruling national-conservative Law and Justice party, Krzysztof Sobolewski, in order to prevent the Russian Embassy from paying tribute to the fallen Red Army soldiers, "expressed the hope" that the Russian Ambassador would refrain from "provocations", meaning the traditional ceremony in memory of the Soviet soldiers. Similar "hopes" were expressed by the head of the International Policy Bureau at the Chancellery of the President of Poland, Marcin Przydacz.
Relevant attitudes are disseminated in the press and on the Internet. In the interpretation of Polish media, after the beginning of the special military operation, paying tribute to Soviet soldiers on Victory Day "has taken on a different meaning, becoming evidence of support for the Kremlin's policy".
At the same time, on 8 and 9 May 2023, representatives of the Russian Consulates General in Krakow and Poznan laid wreaths without any obstacles at the Soviet memorials in the Rakowice Cemetery in Krakow, the Citadel Park Complex, at the memorial plaque to Marshal of the USSR, honorary citizen of Poznan Vasily Chuikov, under whose command the 8th Guards Army liberated the city in February 1945, and at the Milostowo Cemetery in Poznan.
On 18 February 2024, the Russian Ambassador to Poland Sergey Andreev and the staff of the Russian foreign missions organised a laying of flowers in the town of Pieniężno (Warmian-Masurian Voivodeship) at the place where, on 18 February 1945, Army General Ivan Chernyakhovskiy, twice Hero of the Soviet Union, commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front, was mortally wounded (a monument to the Soviet General was located at this place from the early 1970s to 2015). The ceremony was obstructed by a group of Ukrainians and Poles living in the vicinity of Pieniężno, who shouted insults at the diplomats[1835].
In 2024, on Victory Day, a delegation from the Russian Embassy in Poland was able to hold a wreath-laying ceremony at the Mausoleum of the Soviet Soldiers Cemetery in Warsaw for the first time in three years.
After the start of the special military operation, the Polish side has stopped inviting Russian diplomatic and consular representatives to the events organised by it with the participation of the diplomatic corps, including those commemorating the events of World War II.
This was the case in Gdansk on 8 May 2023, where the city administration held a memorial ceremony dedicated to the townspeople who died at the hands of the Nazis. Unlike representatives of the Consulates General of Germany and Ukraine, the staff of the Russian Consulate General in Gdansk were not invited to it.
Museum institutions also comply with the policies of the Polish authorities. In early August 2022, the administration of the Polish State Museum Auschwitz-Birkenau located on the site of the former Nazi concentration camp in Auschwitz, closed the permanent exhibition "Tragedy.Courage.Liberation" in Block 14 prepared by the Russian Central Museum of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 and aimed at preserving the memory of the atrocities of Nazism and the liberating role of the Red Army. As a pretext, the management of the Polish museum cited the expiry of the operating agreements between Polish and Russian museums at the end of April 2022. However, in fact, for more than two months the Polish side avoided contact on this issue both with its partners from the Russian Museum and with Russian diplomats who were making efforts to resolve the negative situation. After the exhibition was closed, Russian museum workers used it to prepare a multimedia exposition called "Auschwitz.Pravda", which is available for viewing on the museum's website, https://victorumuseum.ru.
In Poland, there are frequent cases of distribution of products with Nazi symbols or publication of Nazi works. For example, in January 2021, the second edition of Hitler's Mein Kampf was published in Poland (the first one was published in the early 1990s) under the guise of an academic edition. This fact caused outrage in Poland. The head of the KURSK Commonwealth, Jerzy Tyc, said in an interview with the Zvezda TV channel that the publication of Hitler's banned autobiography "Mein Kampf" in Poland was a crime and a mockery, stating his organisation's intention to appeal to the competent Polish authorities on this issue. He noted that Poles were eagerly purchasing the book, bragging about it on social media.[1836] The two-volume book contains 5,000 comments by experts and historians.[1837] It is decorated in the colours of Nazi symbols. The entire edition of two thousand copies was sold out almost immediately after it went on sale. After that, the owner of the XXL publishing house, which had prepared the Polish version of the book for printing, said that he was thinking of an additional print run.[1838]
In January 2023, the Polish central newspaper "Rzeczpospolita" reported that the publishing house "3DOM" had released a book entitled "Face to Face". This book contains documented personal conversations of Hitler during 1941‑1944. The newspaper cites the publisher's commentary, in which the publication of such literature is justified by "the lack of positions on the Polish market that would illuminate Hitler's real face and intentions".[1839]
In 2023, Polish media also reported that the fan merchandise store of the football club Resovia Rzeszów[1840] was selling, inter alia, lanyards with a font stylized to the one used by the international neo-Nazi organisation "Blood and Honour" and other items referring to the neo-Nazi movement.
The Polish Penal Code provides for liability for propaganda of "Nazi, communist, fascist or other totalitarian system", "Nazi, communist and fascist ideology", calls for violence to influence political or public life, hatred on national, ethnic, racial or religious grounds (imprisonment for up to three years). The same penalties apply to those who distribute, produce, store, sell, buy, transport, import or present printed matter, records or other items with Nazi, communist, fascist or other totalitarian symbols or content. Yet, these measures do not appear to fully counteract manifestations of racism and racial discrimination.
Given the active Russophobic policy of the Polish leadership and efforts to rewrite history, it is not surprising that radical and nationalist structures continue to operate in the country. According to the media, Polish security services are aware of about 200 "dangerous neo-Nazis". The number of neo-Nazi activists in the country is estimated at about 600‑700 people. According to the Polish non-governmental organisation "Never Again" ("Nigdy Więcej"), there are several thousand admirers of fascism in Poland and more than 10,000 people under the influence of this ideology. A report on right-wing extremism in the EU, published by the European Parliament in May 2022, notes that a distinctive feature of Polish nationalist movements is the presence of a religious (Catholic-nationalist) element.[1841]
There are several dozen nationalist organisations operating in Poland, which maintain links with "kindred" structures in other European countries. Among the largest organisations officially registered in Poland are the National Radical Camp (ONR)[1842], All-Polish Youth and the National Movement (RN).[1843] Their members maintain close contacts with nationalist organisations in Europe and advocate Poland's withdrawal from the EU, the return of Polish society to traditional values, and a tough migration policy.
The ONR activists maintain contacts with Belarusian nationalists promoting the ideas of "common Polish-Belarusian historical heritage" and Polish foundations engaged in popularisation of Polish traditions, culture, history and language in Belarus. The ONR members create communities in social networks where they urge residents of the western regions of Belarus to indicate their Polish origin in all official documents.
There is clear evidence of active cooperation between Polish nationalists and Ukrainian radicals, including their participation in the Kiev Maidan events in 2014[1844] as well as participation of Polish mercenaries in nationalist battalions in the hostilities in Donbass.
In October 2021, Marcin Wiącek, the Polish Commissioner for Human Rights (Ombudsman), expressed concern about instances when the prosecutor's office refused to initiate proceedings for propaganda of a fascist state system. According to the Polish Penal Code, public propaganda of a fascist or other totalitarian state system is punishable by a fine, restriction or imprisonment for up to two years.[1845]
As an example, the Ombudsman cited in particular a case in which Polish law enforcement authorities refused to prosecute the demonstration of a Nazi salute by a participant in a nationalist march on 1 August 2020. The district prosecutor considered that the gesture did not constitute propaganda for fascism, but was a "greeting of Roman soldiers". The court subsequently overturned the decision of the prosecutor.[1846]
At the same time, there are some examples of countering the activities of right-wing radical organisations, including through the efforts of civil society representatives. In February 2021, the Polish Supreme Court ruled on a four‑year trial between members of the ONR and activist R.Kolinski of the Together party[1847], who had opposed the Polish neo-Nazi marches in Elblag. The radicals sued R.Kolinski because he pointed out in his publications that the organisation openly used references to links with a similar pre-war fascist, antisemitic, racist structure. In the end, the radicals' claims against R.Kolinski were rejected by the court. In particular, it was noted that today's ONR "uses the same symbols and name ... as the pre-war organisation, which was openly fascist". It was also stated that the organisation's modern programme called for Poland to be "ethnically homogeneous", which was "an important element of fascist views". On this basis, the court concluded that R.Kolinski was entitled to think so on the basis of the behaviour of the ONR activists, slogans, clothing and symbols they use.[1848] The activist himself, however, considers this only a partial victory, as the courts did not rule on whether the ONR was a fascist organisation or not, but only on whether he had the right to call it such. In his opinion, what is needed in the future is an unambiguous court ruling that recognises the ONR as a fascist organisation and leads to its ban.[1849]
The "Never Again" organization, which cooperates with the Polish online shopping platform Allegro, reported that in 2018-2021 they initiated the removal of more than 12,000 offers[1850] to sell items containing neo‑Nazi symbols, including copies of SS medals, Third Reich flags, items depicting the Celtic cross, belt buckles with the SS insignia and portraits of Hitler.
Nationalist and neo-Nazi public events are organised in Poland. The most famous are the march in memory of Romuald Rajs in Hajnówka (Podlaskie Voivodeship) held in March and the processions organised by nationalists in Jedwabne at the same time as the commemoration of the victims of the Jewish pogrom in 1941. Another regular action of this kind is the Independence March, which is organised by the right-wing nationalist movement of the same name every year on 11 November as part of Poland's Independence Day celebrations. The main action takes place in Warsaw. In addition, similar marches are held in other Polish cities. According to media reports, this march has in recent years become one of the largest gatherings of European far-right forces.[1851]
Since 2023, the march in memory of Romuald Rajs in Hajnówka has not been held in Hajnówka. Since 2016, it was organised by nationalists, and the event provoked protests from descendants of the victims of the "Brown" unit. Having decided to hold the march, its former organisers called for visiting "places of memory" of "Cursed Soldiers" and holding local events.[1852]
In December 2023, after a year-and-a-half-long trial, a court in Hajnówka sentenced one of the organisers of the march in memory of the "Cursed Soldiers" in 2018 to restricted freedom, a fine and community service. The defendant was accused of propaganda of fascism and incitement to hatred on ethnic grounds.[1853]
After the liberal-left forces came to power in Poland in December 2023, the Polish Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Policy in February 2024 prohibited[1854] the subordinate Office for War Veterans and Victims of Oppression from further organising events in memory of the Świętokrzyska Brigade of the National Armed Forces[1855] and one of its commanders, J.Kuras ("Ogne"). The Union of Soldiers of the National Armed Forces supported by other nationalist organisations – the All-Polish Youth and the Independence March – initiated the collection of signatures to protest against this ban to the head of the Polish government.[1856]
Nevertheless, this march had been held before. Thus, it was held on 1 March 2022.[1857] On the same day, in the town of Przemyśl (Subcarpathian Voivodeship), located near the Polish-Ukrainian border, far-right football fans organised "patrols" to "cleanse the town"[1858] of refugees from the Middle East, Asia and Africa arriving from Ukraine. The police reported that three Indian nationals were attacked,[1859] and an Israeli journalist also reported to OKO.press that he had been attacked.
On 11 July in Jedwabne[1860] (Podlaskie Voivodeship), nationalist organisations hold rallies aimed at expressing disagreement with the fact that Poles are responsible for crimes against Jews during World War II. At the 2021 rally, participants carried banners reading "We do not ask forgiveness for Jedwabne". The leader of the Independence March R.Bonkiewicz laid a wreath at the monument to the victims, but in his speech he demanded "truth, investigation and exhumations".[1861] In 2022, during another rally, Polish nationalists carried traditional banners with slogans "Gross lies" and "We do not ask forgiveness for Jedwabne".[1862]
On 10 July 2023, in Jedwabne, representatives of nationalist circles who also deny the involvement of Poles in the pogrom came to a rally in memory of the victims of those events. They held banners with the inscriptions: "We do not ask for forgiveness for Jedwabne – let the perpetrators ask for it", "We demand exhumations! We demand the truth!", "Apologize for crimes against the Polish people!".[1863]
Similar scandals take place during the Independence Day celebrations on 11 November. In 2021, Warsaw hosted the Independence March for the eleventh time. Demonstrators burned the German flag and a portrait of the leader of the opposition liberal Civic Platform (PO)[1864] Donald Tusk.
On 11 November 2022, Polish nationalists held another Independence March, traditionally gathering several hundred participants.[1865] Previously, the march was repeatedly opposed by the capital's mayor, Rafał Trzaskowski, who claimed that the organisations behind it had all "signs of fascism". However, as a rule, his efforts were blocked by the Polish government, as was the case, for example, in 2021.[1866] At the march of nationalists in 2022, violence was largely avoided, but according to the statements of the mayor Rafał Trzaskowski, anti-Ukrainian and anti-European slogans were heard during the event.[1867] According to media reports, the march has become one of the largest gatherings of European far-right forces in recent years.[1868]
On the same day, a "March of Poles" was also organized in Wrocław (Lower Silesia Voivodeship). According to journalists' reports, its participants carried banners with nationalist, mainly anti-Ukrainian slogans.[1869]
In Kalisz (Wielkopolskie Voivodeship), during a similar "Independence March", the police detained three organisers of the march, who burned a copy of the Kalisz Statute, which guaranteed the rights of Jews in the 13th century. On 3 December 2021, all three were released on bail.
On the eve of the commemorative date, in the air of "National Media",[1870] Robert Bonkiewicz, the chairman of the "Independence March" denied the conclusions of historians about the involvement of Poles in the murder of Jews. In his opinion, Poland "is under pressure from Washington", where "Jews have a great influence".[1871]
In October 2022, in Belostok (Podlaskie Voivodeship), a campaign "Orthodox – not Russian" was organized (posters were put up), the aim of which, according to the organizers, was to "protect" Orthodox Poles from the negative perception of the word "Russians", with whom the Orthodox are traditionally identified in Poland. Each photograph on the billboards was accompanied by a text emphasizing the identity of the persons depicted as "Orthodox Poles" ("not Russians") or "Orthodox priests" ("not popes"). The organizers of the campaign said that the presence of Polish Orthodox priests and politicians at events dedicated to the Red Army "is not and should not be considered normal". According to the campaign's initiators, being labelled a "Russian" (who "rapes Ukrainian women" and "kills innocent children") is "the greatest insult" to any "decent" person.[1872]
In addition, measures are being taken in Poland to glorify the above-mentioned commander of the "cursed soldiers", Józef Kuraś. A monument to Józef Kuraś was erected in 2007 in the village of Zakopane.Then President Lech Kaczyński attended the unveiling of this monument.[1873] In addition, Poland issues a whole series of commemorative coins in honour of members of "cursed soldiers" and National Armed Forces. In particular, on 15 March 2023, the People's Bank of Poland presented a commemorative silver coin "Józef Kuraś ‘Fireʼ", which is part of the series "Unbroken Soldiers Cursed by Communists". The obverse of the coin shows the emblematic eagle of the Republic of Poland breaking the prison bars. At the top, the inscription "Republic of Poland" is placed in a circle, the denomination of PLN 10 and 2023 (year of issue) are indicated at the bottom. The reverse of the coin shows Józef Kuraś himself, as well as ribbons with the colours of the Republic of Poland with the symbol of the Fighting Poland, the inscription "We did the right thing" and the dates of birth and death of Józef Kuraś (1915-1947).[1874] Poland's Jewish leaders have criticised the central bank for producing a commemorative coin honouring an underground officer whose unit has been accused of killing Jews. 42 of them signed an open letter declaring that "as historians and representatives of Jewish organisations, we cannot remain silent when the National Bank of Poland… honours Józef Kuraś, a figure whose activities – even taking account of their unique historical context – are far from deserving of veneration". Co-authors of the letter included Chief Polish Rabbi Michael Schudrich; Zygmunt Stępiński, director of POLIN, Poland's main Jewish museum; Sebastian Rejak, head of the American Jewish Committee's Central Europe office; Artur Hofman, president of the Social and Cultural Association of Jews, as well as leading Polish academics specialising in Holocaust history: Barbara Engelking, director of the Polish Center for Holocaust Research, and Jan Grabowski, a professor of history at the University of Ottawa.[1875]
There are high-profile cases of right-wing radicals holding public or political office or otherwise openly participating in the public and political life of the country.
In January 2021, Tomasz Rzymkowski, who had previously been a member of extreme right-wing political parties, was appointed Deputy Minister of Education of Poland. The media reported that Rzymkowski had made "problematic statements" regarding the Holocaust, Jews and other national minorities in Poland.[1876]
On 22 February 2021, the chairman of the Institute of National Remembrance, Jarosław Szarek, announced the resignation of the acting head of the INR Wroclaw branch, Tomasz Greniuch, who had been in office for about two weeks.[1877] According to Polish media reports, Tomasz Greniuch was an activist of the radical nationalist organization "National Radical Camp" in the past. There are photos of Greniuch raising his hand in a Nazi salute.[1878] According to Jarosław Sharek, Tomasz Greniuch "apologized for this act and repeatedly said many years ago that it was a mistake".[1879] Shortly before his resignation, on 11 February 2021, the Israeli consulate in Poland had, via a Twitter post, encouraged Tomasz Greniuch to visit the Auschwitz-Birkenau Museum,[1880] "whose mission is to remind the entire world of the dangers of Nazi ideology".[1881]
Statistics on racist behaviour and the use of the media to spread hate speech conform that national radicals are active in Poland. According to data provided by the Polish National Prosecutor's Office at the request of the Commissioner for Human Rights, 1,658 racially and religiously motivated offences were registered in 2020 (0.15 percent of all criminal cases).[1882] The majority of cases were related to public insult on national, ethnic, racial or religious grounds (580), propaganda of fascist or other totalitarian system or incitement to hatred (354), use of violence or threat of violence on racial and religious grounds (286). According to the prosecutor's office, 622 persons were charged in court, 421 of whom were convicted and 11 of whom were acquitted.
According to the Polish police report, in 2023 there were 272 cases of propaganda of fascism or other totalitarian system, incitement to hatred on ethnic grounds, including 19 cases of making or storing materials with such content.[1883]
The activities of right-wing radicals in Poland have attracted the attention of international human rights bodies. In August 2019, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) expressed particular concern about the activities of racist organizations in Poland.[1884]
And in April 2021, following its consideration of Poland's information on follow-up to recommendations, the Committee expressed concern about the ineffectiveness of the Polish authorities' measures to combat racist speech. As a result of impunity for intolerance, stigmatization, discrimination, or even incitement to violence, CERD found that there is an environment conducive to hate crimes in Poland. The Committee stressed that the information provided by the Polish authorities on the implementation of the recommendations was unsatisfactory and urged Warsaw to include in its next periodic report information on how it ensures the effectiveness of the measures it has taken to combat racist speech and incitement to violence, including measures to ban organizations and parties that promote racial discrimination.[1885]
In January 2020, the Advisory Committee to the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities also noted that a climate of intolerance, racism and xenophobia remains in the country. Additionally, it was reported that representatives of national minorities think local and national authorities have not responded appropriately to words and violent acts committed by extremist groups. They believe that the attitude of the Polish authorities towards a particular ethnic group is determined by Poland's relations with that country.[1886]
In February 2021, the European Commission drew attention to violations committed by Poland in implementing into national law the provisions of EU Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 2008 on combating certain forms and manifestations of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law. In this regard, since 2018 the Commissioner for Human Rights has trice sent proposals to Mateusz Morawiecki, the Polish Prime Minister to develop a comprehensive strategy to counter hate crimes. However, the representative of the Polish government responsible for equality issues responded with a letter setting out the position of the Ministry of Justice, which is that Polish law contains all the necessary guarantees.[1887]
The European Commission against Intolerance and Racism (ECRI), which operates within the Council of Europe, found in 2023 that hate speech is widespread in Poland and most often recorded during election campaigns. The Commission was concerned that following political interference in the work of the prosecutor's office cases against members of right-wing associations supporting the ruling coalition and been charged with incitement to hatred are often dismissed or that extremely lenient sentences are imposed on such persons. ECRI also pointed out that antisemitic and anti‑Muslim statements were recorded in Poland. Among other things, it was noted that statements provoking hatred against Muslims are directed against leaders of the country's Muslim community or are linked to terrorist attacks in other states. Meanwhile, police are reluctant to investigate cases of insults and threats against Muslims, which discourages the collection of reports of such incidents.[1888]
Public statistics from the Polish Ministry of Justice on crimes motivated by racial and other intolerance show that in 2017‑2019, the country experienced an increase in the number of such cases in first instance courts and, consequently, in the number of convictions. Starting in 2020, these numbers begin to decline. At the same time, convictions in cases involving manifestations of hate and racism account for no more than one percent of all court decisions. For example, in 2017, 88 criminal cases were brought for incitement to hatred on national, ethnic, racial or religious grounds (Article 256 § 1 of the Polish Criminal Code), of which 59 cases were sentenced; three criminal cases were brought for dissemination and propaganda of such materials (Article 256 § 2), of which three cases were also sentenced; 92 cases were brought for insult on grounds of national, ethnic, racial or religious affiliation (Article 257), of which 68 cases were sentenced. In 2018, the similar figures were 63 (and 47 sentences), ten (and nine sentences) and 114 cases (and 85 sentences); in 2019 – 59 (36 sentences), eight (seven sentences) and 181 cases (142 sentences); in 2020 – 60 (45 sentences), four (two sentences) and 114 cases (82 sentences); in 2021 – 65 (50 sentences), 41 (39 sentences) and 65 cases (137 sentences).[1889]
Most cases concerned public insult on national, ethnic, racial or religious grounds (580), propaganda of fascist or other totalitarian system or incitement to hatred (354), use of violence or threat of violence on racial and religious grounds (286). According to the prosecutor's office, 622 persons were charged in court, 421 of whom were convicted and 11 of whom were acquitted.
ECRI, citing data provided by the Polish authorities to the relevant OSCE structures, indicated that in 2020, 826 hate crimes were recorded by the police in Poland, where 374 perpetrators were prosecuted and 266 resulted in court convictions. In 2019, 972, 432, and 597 crimes were recorded, respectively, and in 2018 – 1117, 397, and 315 crimes were recorded.[1890]
As of 2019, the Polish National Prosecutor's Office has stopped publishing statistics on crimes motivated by racial and other intolerance. The authorities explain this by the fact that such documents contain information exclusively for internal official use. According to a number of human rights defenders, the decision to stop publishing statistics on racist crimes is intended to conceal the sharp increase in such offences. According to the latest available data provided by the police at the request of the Polish newspaper Rzeczpospolita, 768 hate crimes were reported in 2023, which is 156 fewer than in 2022.[1891] The largest number of crimes – 339 (502 in the previous year) – is qualified under article 257 of the Criminal Code (public insult or violation of the security of a person or a group of persons on national, ethnic, racial or religious grounds). According to a member of the "Never Again" NGO, for many years police has not addressed hate crimes in Poland with due seriousness. In this context, the decrease in the number of such crimes indicates the lack of response of Polish law enforcement agencies rather than the real scale of the problem.
According to a number of human rights organizations, Poland still has a problem of underreporting official statistics on hate crimes. In August 2019, the UN Committee against Torture, citing a report on a survey on the nature and extent of unreported hate crimes prepared by the Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights together with the OSCE, expressed concern about Warsaw's serious underreporting of official statistics on hate crimes and called on Poland to take measures to address this problem and to combat manifestations of discrimination on racial, national and other grounds.[1892]
In 2022, the Polish association of prosecutors "Lex Super Omnia" published a report on the actions of the prosecutor's office with regard to hate crimes in 2016-2022. The report shows that the number of hate crimes has increased since 2016, while the prosecutor's office has "lost the ability" to respond effectively to them. The authors point out that the methodology of combating hate crimes has changed since 2016. In particular, special lectures and conferences for prosecutors are no longer held and instructions are not updated. In addition, investigations were often closed or decisions were made based on recommendations from "above".[1893] At the same time, according to the authors of the report, the prosecutor's career advancement depended on his/her behaviour.
The passivity of the law enforcement agencies is pointed out by the Polish opposition liberal Gazeta Wyborcza. In December 2022, the newspaper's journalists reported on the decision of the district prosecutor's office in Kalisz to stop investigating law enforcement officers who did not prevent participants from shouting antisemitic slogans, including "Death to the Jews", during the "Independence March" on 11 November 2021. The prosecutor's office considered that the march "did not violate the provisions of criminal law" and therefore there was no need to stop it.[1894]
A high level of antisemitism is still recorded in Poland.
The Pew Research Center noted in its 2018 study of Eastern European countries that antisemitic sentiment is quite widespread in Poland. According to polls conducted by the centre, almost one in five Poles (18 percent) did not want Jews as citizens of their country, and about the same number of respondents (20 percent) indicated that they would not like to have Jews as neighbours. Almost a third of Polish residents (30 percent) responded that they would not accept a Jew as a member of their family. At the same time, researchers noted that the views of Polish citizens took more radical forms when it came to Muslims and Roma. Nearly half of Polish respondents reported that they would not want Muslims to be citizens of their country (41 percent of responses), their neighbours (43 percent), or members of their family (55 percent). Similarly, at least three in ten Poles would not accept Roma as their fellow citizens (30 percent), neighbours (38 percent), or family members (49 percent).[1895]
In 2015, the country introduced a new system of hate crime registration by the Polish Ministry of the Interior. The purpose of this was to get an objective picture of hate crime cases. Thus, the statistics include crimes directly identified as hate crimes, as well as other crimes that contain a hate crime component, i.e. an aggravating circumstance of committing an unlawful act against a person or a group of persons on the basis of their national, ethnic, racial, political or religious affiliation. According to the Polish Ministry of the Interior, 130 cases of hate crimes against Jews were reported in 2022 (111 similar crimes in 2021 and 81 in 2020). The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights notes in this regard that between 2015 and 2020 the number of reported antisemitic offenses ranged from 73 incidents in 2017 to 179 cases in 2018. The general trend of reported offenses during this period was a decrease in the number of incidents. However, an increase in such incidents was recorded in 2021 and 2022, which the FRA believes may be due in part to the aforementioned changes in data collection methodology. The agency also cites generalized statistics on manifestations of antisemitism collected by relevant NGOs, including the "Never Again", the Foundation for the Preservation of Jewish Heritage in Poland and the Jewish Community of Warsaw. Difficulties in obtaining up‑to‑date data were also noted. The latest figures collected by the Polish civil society date back to 2021 and amount to 18 incidents, including 12 cases of deliberate damage to the property of Jews and Jewish organizations and six cases of threats.[1896]
ECRI, referring to NGO materials, noted in 2023 that Poland has all the legislative means necessary to counter manifestations of antisemitism. However, these measures are not being taken.[1897]
It should also be noted that the fact that antisemitic attitudes are spreading in the country is even recognized in Polish society. According to data cited in the 2018 study by the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights "Experiences and Perceptions of antisemitism" on the results of a survey on discrimination and hatred towards Jews in the European Union, 89 percent of Polish respondents of Jewish origin consider racism in the country to be "a very big problem". About half the respondents stated that they had experienced antisemitism in some form over the last five years. 70 percent on non-Jewish respondents believed that "Jews have too much power in Poland." However, they recognized that the level of antisemitism has increased significantly over the last five years. At the same time, Poland has the highest level of distrust in the actions of the authorities in this area: 91 percent of respondents considered that the efforts of the Polish authorities to combat antisemitism were insufficient and ineffective.[1898]
2023 FRA survey revealed the following. Poland was among the five EU countries where negative stereotyping that "Jews have too much power" is most prevalent. 35 percent of respondents consider manifestations of hostility towards Jews in public places to be a significant problem. The escalation of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has also affected the perception of the Jewish community in Polish society. 82 percent of those surveyed have faced accusations that Jews use the image of Holocaust victims. And 72 percent of respondents had encountered doubts about "the loyalty of Jews to the state of residence". At the same time, a small number of respondents indicated that their security had been affected by the crisis: 41 percent said that they were not affected by the escalation of the conflict, and another 43 percent said that they had not been affected much by the conflict. The number of Jews who believe that society blames them for Israel's actions in the conflict was also low: 46 percent have not faced such accusations, while 37 percent have sometimes faced such accusations. This is in stark contrast to the statistics on manifestations of antisemitism: citing a study by the NGO "The Czulent Jewish Assosiation", the FRA notes that manifestations of antisemitism in Poland in October 2023 increased by 800 percent in comparison with other months of the same year. Poland was also among the countries with the highest number of respondents who had experienced various manifestations of antisemitism in the year preceding the survey (40 per ent). The percentage of those who were discriminated against because of their belonging to the Jewish community during the same period was also high (28 percent). Poland has the highest rate of those who are thinking of emigrating from the country – 60 percent. The number of Jews who avoid wearing religious symbols or other items indicating their ethnic and religious affiliation is significant: 71 percent of respondents do not do this at least occasionally, and 22 percent do not wear anything like this at all for personal safety reasons.[1899]
A study published in 2023 by the Anti-Defamation League NGO found that 35 percent of the Polish population was antisemitic. Although the antisemitism index showed a decrease in 48 percent in comparison with the 2019 survey,[1900] Poland ranks second in antisemitism in Europe,[1901] with Hungary ranking first. At the same time, 57 percent of Polish respondents believe that Jews talk too much about the Holocaust, and 62 percent believe that Jews are more loyal to Israel than to the country in which they live. 53 percent of respondents tend to believe that Jews have too much influence in business and international financial markets.
Antisemitic rhetoric is recorded in public space. In July 2020, the Commissioner for Human Rights (CHR) Adam Bodnar referred to the chairman of the National Broadcasting and Television Council a request for action against hate speech and antisemitism in the media. The CHR referred to the statement of journalist Rafał Zemkiewicz during the programme "W tyle wizji" in TVP Info on 23 June 2020, who, according to the CHR, placed the responsibility for the Holocaust on the Jews themselves, stating: "... it was not Poles who put Jews in wagons, caught them, escorted them out of the ghettos, but other Jews, the Jewish police, on the basis of lists drawn up by the Jewish Judenrat,[1902] who managed it all."[1903] According to the National Broadcasting and Television Council, Ziemkiewicz's viewpoint did not contravene the law on Broadcasting and Television of 29 December 1992.[1904]
The adoption of amendments to the Polish Code of Administrative Procedure by the Polish Parliament on 24 June 2021 is indicative of the attitude of the Polish authorities to the problem of antisemitism. These amendments provide that a court decision in an administrative case cannot be appealed after 30 years from the date of the decision. The amendment concerns, in particular, proceedings on property lost during and after the war (nationalized or escheat).[1905] The Polish authorities' actions drew criticism from Israel's foreign ministry and also sharpened the debate within the country, once again confirming the existence of strong antisemitic sentiments. On 30 June 2021, the nationalist organization "All-Polish Youth", which does not support the restitution demands of the Polish Jewish community, said on its Twitter page that it held a protest action in front of the Israeli embassy in Poland, throwing construction debris there and placing the inscription "Here is your property" on it.[1906]
In April 2022, the far-right media group Magna Polonia republished an antisemitic book, "Meet the Jew" («Poznaj żyda!»), which describes Jews as a "parasitic tribe". This book, written by Polish publicist and conservative Teodor Jeske-Choiński, was first published in 1912. The nationalist Media Narodowe discussed this book on its YouTube channel with one of the leaders of Magna Polonia, Przemysław Holocher. This is not the first time the Media Narodowe has published such content. Its YouTube channel features more than one video with antisemitic content and relevant titles (e.g., "This Jew Still Hurts Poland," "Ruining the Polish Academy by Jews," etc.)[1907]
It is also noteworthy that such nationalist structures are funded directly by the Polish authorities. For example, Media Narodowe is published by the Polish Independence March Association, which organizes the annual nationalist march of the same name in Warsaw on Independence Day on 11 November. In 2021, the organization received a grant of PLN 1.3 million (equivalent to EUR 280,000) from the "Patriotic Fund" established by the government and overseen by the Ministry of Culture. Media Narodowe also won a grant of PLN 198,000 from the National Institute of Freedom (an organization established by the government in 2017 to help civil society) for the years 2021 and 2022.[1908]
Polish authorities, meanwhile, reject apparent public criticism of their support for nationalist associations. In a statement issued in response to an inquiry by the newspaper Rzeczpospolita about the antisemitic book distributed by Media Narodowe, the Polish Ministry of Culture said that all applications for Patriotic Fund grants are assessed by experts according to the relevant criteria and solely on the basis of the content of the applications themselves.
It should also be noted that such actions of the authorities do not enjoy the support of the entire Polish society. For example, after learning about the funding to the "Independence March" Association, more than 160 public figures in Poland signed an open letter to the Polish Minister of Culture urging him to "stop financing fascism."[1909]
Acts of vandalism against Jewish cemeteries and religious sites also remain in place. In particular, at the end of January, unknown persons painted swastika signs and SS runes on the walls of the Jewish cemetery in Auschwitz, located near the Auschwitz-Birkenau memorial and museum, which was established on the site of the notorious concentration camp.[1910] On 26 June, three teenagers vandalized 67 tombstones at the Jewish cemetery in Bielsko-Biała (Małopolskie Voivodeship). The burning of a copy of the Statute of Kalisz, during a nationalist march in Kalisz on 11 November in honour of Independence Day is one example of antisemitism in action.[1911]
On 27 August 2022, an American citizen, leader of an organisation of aggressive antisemitic provocateurs spreading antisemitism in a number of American states, Jon Minadeo organised an offensive action on the territory of the former Auschwitz-Birkenau concentration camp by taking a photograph with an antisemitic poster and then posting it on his social media account. According to media reports, he was detained. While in Poland, Jon Minadeo also shared videos of himself raising his hand in a Nazi salute and insulting an Asian man.[1912]
In October 2023 in Warsaw, during a demonstration in support of Palestine, a Norwegian medical student from the Faculty of Medicine at the Medical University of Warsaw carried a poster with an image of the Israeli flag thrown in a trash garbage can, which was accompanied by the caption: "Keep the world clean."[1913] She was suspended as a result of the incident, but returned to school in December of that year. In response to a media request, a spokeswoman for the Warsaw University said[1914] the Norwegian was found guilty by a disciplinary commission of insulting the Israeli flag and apologized, but insulting a flag other than the Polish flag is not subject to criminal prosecution.
On 12 December 2023, Grzegorz Braun, a member of the Polish Sejm from the "Confederation",[1915] extinguished Hanukkah candles lit in the lower house of parliament with a fire extinguisher during Hanukkah celebrations. He said that in the Sejm there can be no place for acts of racist, tribal, savage, Talmudic cultism.[1916] The incident was condemned by the Polish president, the marshal (chairman) of the Sejm, the Israeli and US ambassadors to Poland and most Polish politicians. Grzegorz Braun was stripped of his parliamentary immunity, and in April 2024, the Polish prosecutor's office filed charges against him under the article on insulting a group of people on religious grounds.
Xenophobia and intolerance towards migrants are on the rise in Poland. Polish and international human rights NGOs attribute this to the coming to power of the national conservative Law and Justice (PiS) party in October 2015 and its reforms. Sociological research data confirm that these trends exist. According to a survey conducted in February 2021 by the Polish Centre for Public Opinion Research (CBOS)[1917] on Poles' attitudes towards other nationalities and ethnic groups, 42 percent of Poles dislike Roma and 46 percent dislike Arabs. The CBOS highlights the fact that sympathy for Ukrainians, Belarusians, and Jews (43 percent, 47 percent, and 38 percent, respectively) outweighs hatred (26 percent, 17 percent, and 29 percent of respondents express a negative attitude). Compared to March 2020, the level of hostility towards Arabs (by nine percent), Belarusians (by eight percent), Russians and Ukrainians (by seven percent), and Jews (by one percent) has decreased.[1918]
The 2022 report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus "The Most Resonant Cases of Human Rights Violations in Certain Countries of the World" indicates that migrants and asylum seekers are in a discriminatory situation in Poland.[1919]
In the context of the crisis on the Polish-Belarusian border, which began in the summer of 2021, related to attempts by people from the Middle East to enter the EU territory, Warsaw has been criticised by human rights organisations for its categorical unwillingness to let asylum seekers through and to provide them with medical, legal and other assistance. The brutal treatment of refugees by Polish border guards has become public knowledge. From September to November 2021, Polish authorities declared a state of emergency in the border area with Belarus in 183 settlements of Podlaskie and Lubelskie Voivodeships. This area was temporarily closed to public events and visitors who did not live in the emergency area, and photo and video recording of Polish law enforcement officers was forbidden. Representatives of the media, public and humanitarian organizations and independent observers were not allowed to enter the emergency zone. From 1 December 2021 to 30 June 2022, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration of Poland issued an order temporally prohibiting non-residents from staying in the designated areas, but media were allowed to enter under certain conditions.
There are regular media reports about the harsh treatment of people trying to cross the border by Polish border guards. For example, on 8 November 2022, Belorussian border guards found a foreigner at their border who had been beaten up by Polish law enforcers. The individual, who identified himself as a Syrian national, needed medical assistance, warm clothing and shoes. The refugee said that he had been in Poland for three days before he was detained by Polish law enforcement officers and brought to the fence at the border with Belarus. He further stated that Polish security forces forced him through the fence, assaulted him and gassed him. He was abused and told to take off his shoes despite the weather.[1920]
According to the statistics of the human rights organization Border Group, 31 people have died on the Polish-Belarusian border since the beginning of the migration crisis (i.e. since the summer of 2021). In addition, the NGO believes another 185 people went missing in 2022.
At the same time, human rights structures ignore Poland's destructive role in the development of the migration crisis and the excessively harsh attitude of Polish border guards towards illegal migrants. There is no expert assessment of the measures taken by Warsaw to build a wall on the border with Belarus, ostensibly to protect against illegal migration flows, as well as of the destructive environmental consequences that they have already caused and will cause in the future (a significant part of these constructions pass through the Belovezhskaya Forest, the largest primeval relic forest area in Europe).
The Polish authorities were also developing a legal framework that would allow the executive bodies to refuse to accept migrants. The 2013 Law on Foreigners and the 2003 Law on Granting Protection to Foreigners in Poland were both amended by the Polish government in August 2021. Under the renewed laws, if a foreigner crosses the border unlawfully or arrives from a nation where he was not in danger, his claim for refugee status or political asylum may not be taken into consideration. Russian and Belorussian immigrants are also included in this group. In addition, the revisions give the Border Guard the authority to deport migrants immediately if they attempt to enter Polish territory without passing through official checkpoints.
The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) took note of the dire humanitarian situation at the Polish-Belorussian border, the Belorussian-Lithuanian and Belorussian–Latvian borders (it is reported that by the end of 2021, 28,000, 8,000, and 4,000 migrants were not allowed to enter Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia, respectively), as well as of the legislative changes adopted by Warsaw that allow for the expulsion of migrants.[1921] According to the FRA, Poland, along with Croatia, Greece and Hungary, had the highest number of incidents of "pushing out" (or "pushbacks" of) irregular migrants.[1922] In the report for 2023, the FRA, citing data from the International Organisation for Migration, indicated that in 2022, nine migrant deaths were recorded at the Polish-Belarusian border.[1923] In the 2024 report, the Agency says that in 2023, the Doctors Without Borders NGO treated more than 220 people arriving in Poland across the border with Belarus, with 10 percent of those affected being so severe that they needed to be brought to medical facilities.[1924]
Felipe González Morales, the HRC Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, who visited Poland and Belarus in July 2022 to investigate the issue, also drew attention to the difficulties faced by migrants at the Polish border. In his statement following his visit,[1925] he noted that Polish border guards often refouled migrants, preventing them from entering the territory of the country, refusing to consider asylum applications, and excessively using force against refugees. Women and children face similar attitudes. Among other things, Felipe González Morales noted that the refoulement of migrants was carried out by Polish border guards in such a way that it would not be noticed by Belarusian border guards. Time of day and weather conditions were not taken into account. He also pointed out that Polish border guards officially record only the first case of detention and refoulement of illegal migrants. If such persons are repeatedly detained, their detention and deportation are no longer recorded in any way. It is impossible to obtain precise data on the number of migrants and the number of times they were expelled from Polish territory, because one person can be expelled from Polish territory several times.
The Special Rapporteur noted that some migrants remain in the area of the Belorussian-Polish border, which passes through the territory of the Belovezhskaya Pushcha nature reserve, and are subjected to refoulement. In his opinion, the erection of a five-meter high fence with barbed wire by the Polish authorities on the border will not stop migrants from trying to enter Poland, but will only increase the danger for them and aggravate the humanitarian situation in the area between the Polish and Belorussian borders.
The NGO Amnesty International (due to revealed violations of the current legislation of the Russian Federation, its branch in Russia was excluded from the relevant register of the Ministry of Justice of Russia and closed) reported in its publications on Poland for 2022‑2023 that many asylum seekers were forcibly returned back to Belarus by the Polish border service, some of them being forcibly given sedatives in order not to resist.
On 21 February 2023, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) ordered Poland to pay EUR 20,000 to a Chechen family that had been held in a guarded centre for foreigners for more than seven months. The ECtHR ruled that such prolonged detention violates the European Convention on Human Rights.
The problem of migrants at the Polish border was also highlighted by the CoE Group of Experts on Trafficking in Human Beings (GRETA), which, in addition to calling for additional resources to be made available to the Polish border guard, urged Warsaw to review legislation to ensure that when deporting migrants, the possible risks of their involvement in trafficking or re-trafficking upon their return to the country of origin or transit are taken into account. In this regard, it was also recommended that the Polish authorities intensify relevant training for border guards.[1926]
In the summer of 2024, the flow of migrants intensified at the Belorussian-Polish border. According to the Podlaskie Border Guard Regional Unit of the Polish Border Guard, (OSG. is responsible for most of Poland's border with Belarus), there were 7,100 attempted border crossings in May this year, compared to 1,900 in the same month in 2023 and just 913 cases in May 2022. On 12 June 2024, amid the increasing flow of migrants and the worsening crisis on the Belorussian-Polish border, Prime Minister Donald Tusk signed a decree on the introduction of an exclusion zone at a number of sections of the border, which will be set at a distance of 200 metres to two kilometres from the Polish border. No unauthorised persons are allowed in this area. At the same time, it was announced that additional border force units and police officers would be sent to the border. Moreover, a draft law was introduced in the Polish parliament to decriminalise border guards who acted in self-defence or repelled "attacks on the border". The reason for tightening the regime at the border was the case of an attack carried out by a migrant attempting to cross the Polish border from Belarus, who stabbed a Polish border guard (he later died of his wounds). In addition, there were many other similar cases when illegal migrants attacked Polish border guards. Polish Defence Minister Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz even stated that in previous years the Belorussian authorities sent mainly women and children to the border, but now they allegedly send "specialised groups of thugs" who attack officers.[1927]
In this connection, the newly appointed CoE Commissioner for Human Rights, Michael O'Flaherty, in a letter sent in July 2024 to Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, expressed concern over Poland's response to the migration crisis on its border with Belarus. He also criticised the introduction of an exclusion zone on the Polish side of the border as well as plans to soften rules on the use of firearms by officers. He also spoke in the same spirit about the buffer zone that prevents humanitarian organisations, human rights monitors and journalists from accessing migrants. Michael O'Flaherty also raised the issue of forced refoulement of illegal immigrants, pointing out that the practice of sending border crossers back to Belarus, including some who have sought to claim asylum, may violate international law. According to the CoE Commissioner, 7,317 people were "summarily returned to Belarus" only between December 2023 – when Tusk's government came to power – and June this year. He compared the measures taken by the current Polish authorities to those implemented in 2021 by the former government in response to the migration crisis. He noted that such "pushbacks" were previously criticised by O'Flaherty's predecessor as well as the UN's high commissioners for human rights and for refugees. Meanwhile, O'Flaherty also sent a separate letter to Małgorzata Kidawa-Błońska, the speaker of the Senate, the upper house of parliament, which is currently considering a bill approved by the lower-house Sejm that would remove criminal liability for officers who use firearms to defend the border and asked to refrain from adopting this bill. It is indicative that in his official response to this appeal, Polish deputy interior minister Maciej Duszczyk, who has oversight of migration and border policy, actually put the situation with migrants on the Belarusian-Polish border outside international law. In particular, he pointed out that the crisis on the border was allegedly engineered by Belarus, which "combines activities of the state apparatus with those of criminal organisations dealing with smuggling of migrants". In his opinion, this is what "neither international law nor Polish law could have predicted".[1928]
In addition to problems in crossing the border, migrants face discrimination already on the territory of the country. The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance noted, inter alia, that Poland does not have a special housing program for migrants, refugees and persons granted international protection. Many such people are homeless since they do not have sufficient income to rent at market rates.[1929]
In Poland, journalists covering the refugee situation on the country's border have also been harassed. In February 2022, referring to statements by human rights defenders, HRC Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders Mary Lawlor and HRC Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression Irene Khan pointed this out (their call was supported by HRC Special Rapporteur on the rights of migrants Felipe González Morales, as well as by the HRC Working Group on Arbitrary Detention).[1930] Among other things, it was noted that in November 2021, volunteer interpreter Jakub Sypiański was subjected to ill-treatment by Polish soldiers. Journalists Maciej Moskwa and Maciej Nabrdalik experienced a similar incident when they were searched, handcuffed, and had their phone messages and photo equipment examined. Journalists Olivia Kortas and Christoph Kürbel, who were filming a video about the situation of migrants at the border, were also subjected to unjustified harassment by Polish border guards.
In September 2021, two reporters from the French-German ARTE TV channel and a journalist from "France Presse" were detained by police near the Polish-Belorussian border. All of them claimed to have entered the emergency area by mistake. The police took their phones and computers and detained them. The next day the journalists were released.
At the same time, the attitude towards migrants largely depends on their country of origin. The Polish authorities display a brutal attitude towards people from the Middle East and North Africa. In addition to obstacles in crossing the Polish border, those migrants who do enter Polish territory are often held in specialized closed centres for foreigners run by the Polish Border Guard Service. The living conditions there are unsatisfactory.
Attitudes towards European-type refugees are markedly different. In particular, the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, Felipe González Morales, spoke about double standards with respect to refugees. While noting the generally positive situation with the reception of Ukrainian refugees in Poland, the Special Rapporteur nevertheless pointed out the different attitude of the Polish authorities towards Ukrainian citizens and people from other countries, including migrants arriving from Ukraine who had applied for asylum there. The Special Rapporteur could not fail to point out the difference in the organization of refugee reception. For example, it was noted that Ukrainian citizens in Poland were accommodated not in special centres for foreigners, but mainly in private homes of Polish citizens. To receive Ukrainians, Polish authorities deployed primary reception, food and medical care points. They were given free rail and bus travel across Poland and even to neighbouring nations.[1931]
The difference in the treatment of refugees depending on their country of origin was also pointed out by the HRC Special Rapporteur on violence against women, Reem Alsalem, following her visit to Poland in March 2023. In particular, she noted that most non-Ukrainian refugee women and their families were subjected to discriminatory treatment and violence in Poland. According to the Special Rapporteur, such facts reveal clear contradictions in the asylum and protection system for women and girls fleeing persecution and violence. She noted that Poland's obligations under international law, including protection from retaliation and the right to a safe and humane reception, as well as access to effective asylum procedures, should apply to all refugees.[1932]
However, discrimination against this category of refugees has also been increasingly recorded recently. The NGO "Never Again" noted acts of racially motivated violence against black refugees from Ukraine, attempts of extortion and fraud under the pretext of providing assistance, cases of denial of assistance to refugees because of their nationality and religious (Orthodox) affiliation, preventing Ukrainian children from accessing education, as well as cases of organizing xenophobic meetings and demonstrations, including in places of religious worship.[1933] Discriminatory treatment of Ukrainian refugees of Roma origin continue. According to the Polish NGO Fundacja w Stronę Dialogu (Foundation for Dialogue), which works on behalf of the Roma community in Poland, the number of Ukrainian refugees of Roma origin arriving in Poland from Ukraine is estimated at 50,000-70,000 people, most of whom are children. Joanna Talewicz, chairman of the Foundation for Dialogue, notes that refugees of Roma origin were reluctantly accepted in the accommodation centres and were treated as "second-class" refugees. According to her, nothing has changed in this regard in the two years since the beginning of the special military operation. The level of social support for Roma remains lower than for Ukrainian citizens of other nationalities, and they face discrimination in all spheres of life: Health care, education, and the labour market.[1934]
Attacks on Ukrainians on the basis of their nationality have increased. According to official figures,[1935] police have recorded 59 such cases between January and August 2023. One of the most notorious incidents took place in August 2023 in Kamieniec Ząbkowicki (Silesien Voivodeship), where far-right soccer fans armed with clubs, sticks, and machetes attacked two Ukrainians, beat them, and then robbed them. According to police, the motive for the crime was the nationality of the victims.[1936]
The FRA indicated that between February and April 2022, NGOs recorded 82 cases of discrimination against people from Ukraine in Poland, including hate speech and aggression.[1937]
In September 2022, the Central Council of German Sinti and Roma published a report on the situation of Roma refugees from Ukraine in Poland. The authors of the report drew attention to cases of discrimination against Roma from Ukraine exercised by Polish volunteers at the border and in aid centres, Ukrainian refugees in Poland, and representatives of Polish local authorities. For instance, the report cites the example of a deputy of the city council in Przemyśl (Podkarpackie Voivodeship) who posted information on his social media page that Roma from Ukraine were allegedly coming to Poland to receive financial assistance.
The FRA also recognized discriminatory attitudes towards Ukrainian Roma refugees. Among other things, it noted that private citizens refused to host Ukrainian Roma. Moreover, Ukrainian Roma have faced discrimination exercised also their compatriots in the reception and registration centres for refugees.[1938]
Polish nationalist elements are likewise annoyed by the situation with the Ukrainian refugees. Also in September 2022, the nationalist party Confederation of the Polish Crown held a demonstration under the slogan "No to the Ukrainianisation of Poland." According to reports, 200 participants carried banners and flags of Poland. Protest leaders cited the present dangers they feel Poland is currently facing from the large influx of Ukrainian immigrants. The nationalists said that Poland has rules of law that put Ukrainians in a privileged position compared to Poles. The organizers of the demonstration also made a point of highlighting how the Polish government ignores Banderaism's manifestations and Ukrainians' animosity toward Poland and Poles.[1939]
Such accusations seem to be not without reason. On 7 November 2022, it became known that a Ukrainian cuisine restaurant called "Chervona Kalina" was being set up in Krakow to employ refugees from Ukraine. Due to criticism in social networks because of the association of this name with the song of the same name – the unofficial anthem of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA, an extremist organization banned in Russia), the owners changed the name of the establishment to "Ukrainian".[1940]
The situation of Roma continues to be difficult, as they face discrimination in employment, renting housing, access to banking services, as well as in the social and educational spheres (the low attendance of Roma children, especially girls, in primary and secondary schools is particularly frequently mentioned). Three committees have brought up these problems in recent years: the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in 2019, the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities,[1941] and the Committee on the Rights of the Child in September 2021.[1942] In its 2022 report, the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights drew attention to the clashes between Poles and Roma in the village of Melec and also noted that the Roma community in the town of Maszkowice lived in inadequate housing conditions.[1943]
The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance has reported that Polish authorities underreport cases of discrimination against Roma in employment. Roma themselves have little or no idea that discrimination on the basis of nationality is illegal. In addition, about 40 percent of Roma do not know of any institution to which they could turn in case of discrimination. At the same time, ECRI also pointed to problems with Roma settlements. In this regard, like FRA, it cited the example of such a settlement in Maszkowice in Lącko Parish, Lesser Poland Voivodeship. It is a settlement with about 270 inhabitants, consisting of dwellings and farm buildings, most of which are unfit for human living. In general, local authorities demonstrate a reluctance to provide adequate support to improve the housing situation of Roma living there. The measures taken were rather formal in nature: several housing containers were purchased and minor repairs were made to the buildings, which did not improve living conditions. At the same time, the local building control inspector made a number of administrative decisions to demolish for safety reasons some 40 buildings in the settlement that were deemed unauthorized. Since its residents were unable to comply with these decisions, the enforcement proceedings imposed substantial fines of up to PLN 40,000 (about EUR 8,500) on the Roma living there.[1944]
The Commissioner for Human Rights has been focused on the problem of stigmatization of Roma in Poland for several years. In 2023, the Commissioner for Human Rights described discrimination against Roma in Polish prisons on the basis of their origin, with prisoners complaining of unfair treatment by both inmates and prison staff.[1945]
The Portuguese authorities do not take a revisionist approach to the outcome of the Second World War or the glorification of Nazism. However, the current leadership of the country turns a blind eye to the neo-Nazi nature of the Kiev junta and provides it with all possible assistance.
In 2022-2023 Portugal, following general guidelines within the EU, voted in the UN General Assembly against the resolution "Combating glorification of Nazism, neo-Nazism and other practices that contribute to fuelling contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance", introduced annually by the Russian Federation and other co-sponsors (it had previously abstained, like other EU states). Moreover, in 2023, the document, traditionally approved by the Assembly of the Republic on the eve of International Holocaust Remembrance Day (27 January), for the first time does not mention the role of the Red Army in liberating the Auschwitz concentration camp.
In May 2024, V. Zelenskiy and Portuguese Prime Minister L. Montenegro signed a bilateral agreement on security co-operation. Portugal will provide Ukraine with at least 126 million euros in military aid in 2024, including various types of weapons used by Ukrainian Nazis to attack civilians.[1946]
Despite the fact that the Portuguese government has stated that its citizens should not travel to Ukraine under any pretext, Portuguese mercenaries are still sent there. In March 2022, members of the New Social Order and the National Front announced that they were travelling to Ukraine to fight on the side of Ukrainian units with far-right and neo-Nazi ideology. According to independent investigations by the Portuguese media, some of them succeeded in doing so, although they often did not disclose their real names.
In July 2024, R. Chavez, a Portuguese who fought on the side of the Ukrainian armed forces as a member of the neo-Nazi battalion "Carpathian Sich", was liquidated. In November 2022, he executed a Russian prisoner of war, and posed with the body for a photo.[1947]
In 2022, a Portuguese court ruling allowing a well-known neo-Nazi M. Machado, who had been convicted of hate crimes, to travel to Ukraine to join the ranks of local radicals, caused widespread publicity. In March 2022, after not even a week in Ukraine, the neo-Nazi returned to Portugal.[1948] In May 2024, he was sentenced to two years and ten months in prison for inciting hatred and violence on social media against left-wing women in Portugal.[1949]
According to Portuguese law enforcement authorities, a number of extreme right-wing movements and organisations have been active in the country in recent years. These include Group 1143, Aryan Brotherhood, Portuguese Order, National Front, Hammerskins Portugal and National Renewal Party. The New Social Order is the largest and most active.
Portugal Day (10 June) is of particular importance to extreme right-wing movements, as it was celebrated as "Race Day" (por. Dia da Raça) under Salazar's fascist regime.
In June 2022, 21 members of the far-right organisation Hammerskins Portugal were sentenced. They were found guilty of offences motivated by discriminatory attitudes, including racial and religious intolerance. Some of the offences, including attempted murder and causing serious harm to health, were committed 6-7 years ago. Seven of the convicted persons are serving their sentences in penitentiary institutions.
In January 2023, the Office of the Attorney General of the Portuguese Republic convicted a seventeen-year-old Lisbon resident, a member of the international far-right organisation National Guerrilla Movement, of cyberattacking an online event on racism of the Camoes Lyceum, which took place in February 2021. Law enforcement authorities classified the showing of an offensive video to participants in the colloquium, mainly students of African descent, as incitement to hatred and violence on the grounds of race (Article 240 of the Portuguese Penal Code).
In August 2024, YouTube shut down the video channel of the Portuguese ultranationalist Group 1143 for violating its anti-hate speech policy after receiving enquiries about its activities from the New York Times. Earlier in 2024, the group organised anti-migration and anti-Islam rallies, including one in Porto in April – followed in May by two attacks on migrants who were brutally beaten in their homes.[1950]
In 2022, the dissemination of right-wing views among Portuguese law enforcement officials became public. Racist messages calling for violence were found on the social media of nearly six hundred members of the Public Order Police and the National Republican Guard. The Inspectorate-General of the Internal Administration has announced the launch of an investigation into the matter. The Minister of Internal Administration, J.L. Carneiro, during a parliamentary hearing on the subject, denied that far-right elements had deliberately infiltrated the Portuguese security services.[1951]
The 2023 report by the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) documented several cases of racist and xenophobic violence by police officers. The first case involved seven law enforcement officials who beat migrants from Bangladesh, Nepal and Pakistan. At the time of the publication of the FRA study, they were preparing to appear in court. In the second case, which was also scheduled for trial, three police officers were accused of assaulting a woman of African descent, K. Simoinsh, in 2020. The third case also involved physical aggression by two law enforcement officers against a black man. In August 2022, the police launched an investigation into the case.[1952]
The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), which operates within the Council of Europe, highlighted concerns that some law enforcement officials sympathise with extremists and sometimes even join their groups, as early as June 2018.[1953]
Nevertheless, according to recent estimates by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD, May 2023), such investigations are not properly conducted in Portugal and impunity of law enforcement officials remains a widespread problem. The Committee was also concerned about reports of racial profiling, violence and ill-treatment on the grounds of racial intolerance, abuse of authority and excessive use of force against members of ethnic minorities and migrants, in particular Roma, Africans, people of African descent.
Despite the State's efforts to amend article 240 of the Portuguese Penal Code,[1954] the Committee remains concerned that the existing regulation does not fulfil the requirements set out in article 4 of the Convention under its responsibility. Thus, the scope of application of article 240 of the Portuguese Penal Code covers only propaganda activities, while the promotion of or incitement to racial discrimination by public authorities, at both national and local levels, remains outside its scope. Another traditional criticism of the international monitoring body is the low rate of prosecutions and convictions, as well as the lack of statistical data on the outcome of racial discrimination cases under this article.[1955]
The study on discriminatory practices in Portuguese judicial proceedings, launched in 2018 by the Justice Research Centre of the University of Minho (Braga), continues. Judges are being interviewed and the texts of the court decisions are being analysed. As a result of the work carried out, it became evident that in procedural documents they often resort to unflattering and negative characteristics of certain social groups. Some ironic comments are made about members of religious minorities, in particular Muslims. The results of the project, called "Inclusive Courts", are published on a specially created free-access Internet portal.[1956]
At the same time, Portugal declares combat against manifestations of intolerance at the official level. The Constitution of the country, as well as laws No. 134/99 of August 28, 1999 and No. 93/2017 of August 23, 2017, prohibit discrimination on the grounds of race, colour, nationality or ethnic origin. There is a national Commission for Equality and Against Racial Discrimination.
With regard to the assessments of the work of the Commission by independent experts, CERD, while noting the increase in the number of complaints brought before the Commission, expressed concern at the low number of investigations and resulting judgements.[1957]
In practice, cases of discrimination, harassment and violence against ethnic and religious minorities, including people of African descent and Roma, as well as migrants, are frequently reported in Portugal. CERD experts attribute the State's racial stereotyping and intolerance to the country's colonial and slave-owning past.[1958]
This conclusion is confirmed by a Harvard University project that measures the level of racism in a State by testing its inhabitants for prejudice against people of another race, according to which Portugal still has problems in this area today.[1959] At the same time, according to the statistics of the European Social Survey, this state has the highest percentage of the population that believes in the superiority of some races over others in terms of intelligence – 52.9 per cent (European average – 29.2 per cent).[1960]
The Advisory Committee of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (ACFCNM) under the Council of Europe, note that the Portuguese still perceive their society as homogeneous and monolingual. The official authorities, on the one hand, recognize the existence of cultural, religious, linguistic and ethnic diversity which includes a significant number of Roma living for at least five hundred years in the country, as well as the existence of a small community of people who speak the Mirandese language, in Miranda do Douro and the surrounding area. On the other hand, the authorities maintain that there are no national minorities in Portugal. As a result, the contents of the Framework Convention is not brought to the attention of persons who might have an interest in protecting their rights thereunder.[1961]
In January 2023, a group of teenagers attacked a Nepalese national in Olyan. The police detained three students. The President of the Republic, M. Rebelo de Souza, visited the victim immediately after the incident and condemned the "unacceptable act of xenophobia and intolerance". According to the head of state, "there is nothing to justify this inhuman, anti-democratic and criminal behaviour, which cannot be accepted in Portuguese society".[1962]
In November 2023, in Setubal, G. Singh, a migrant from India, was shot in the head on grounds of ethnic hatred by the Guterres brothers, who broke into his home.[1963]
In May 2024, in Porto, a group of migrant workers from Algeria and Venezuela were beaten by radicals who broke into their home. All those involved in the attack have been identified and one of them is in custody. The investigation is ongoing.[1964]
Noteworthy is the growing support among the population for the far-right party "Enough!" (Chega), founded in April 2019.[1965] The head of the party, A. Ventura, does not hesitate to voice racist and even extremist statements.
For example, in October 2021, the politician identified "demographic replacement" as one of the most serious problems for Portugal and the EU, citing the provisions of the "theory of great replacement" as an explanation. In the same vein, one of the points of his party's programme is formulated as follows: "Policies on migration and the admission of foreigners to citizenship, especially in the international context of the current strong pressure of migratory flows on Europe, introduce risks to the survival of the Portuguese as a people with its own identity, as well as to its prosperity and collective security – risks that must be reckoned with".
The AOHR 2022 report cites a case where, during a public election debate, A. Ventura referred to a black family as "bandits", stating that he would never become president of "drug traffickers". The case was subsequently adjudicated and the Portuguese justice system concluded that the human right to personal integrity (moral and physical) limits the right to freedom of opinion and expression.[1966] However, many political analysts now note the attempts of the Enough party to tone down its rhetoric and adopt a more moderate approach.
In April 2023, the first general manifestation of several associations of the Roma community took place to draw the attention of the country's leadership to its problems.[1967] Letras Nómadas, an NGO established in 2013, reported that it considers insufficient the government's measures to address the situation of this group. In particular, processes to ensure access to housing, health care, education and the labour market are slow.[1968] This is confirmed by the AOHR's 2022 report, according to which 96 per cent of Roma live below the poverty line and 62 per cent feel discriminated against.[1969]
Universal and regional human rights monitoring bodies[1970] have repeatedly noted that the Roma community in Portugal faces direct and indirect discrimination in virtually all spheres of life. A large number of its members live in substandard conditions, in informal settlements – huts or tents, often in remote areas with little or no access to drinking water, sewerage, electricity, or transport. In addition, many Roma are not eligible for social housing under the Special Resettlement Program, as applicants were identified on the basis of the 1993 census of informal Roma settlements.[1971] As a result, many of them continue to live in slums or in crowded conditions, with several families living in the same apartment, often with no access to electricity or sanitary and hygienic facilities.[1972] This leads, among other things, to a lower life expectancy among the Roma compared to the rest of the population.[1973]
Such living conditions are one of the reasons why the vast majority of Roma children living in these areas leave school after the fifth grade at the age of only 10-12 years without obtaining professional qualifications.[1974] The Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC)[1975] and ACFCNM[1976] have also expressed concern over the poor school enrolment, while the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) added that dropout and underachievement rates among Roma remained higher.[1977] Many of them are still enrolled in segregated schools or classes and subject to discrimination.
In its 2018 report, ECRI recommended that the authorities ensure compulsory school attendance for Roma children until they reach the age of 18. Reporting on the implementation of this recommendation, the Portuguese authorities provided ECRI with statistics showing that school enrolment rates have increased at all stages of education. The best dynamics was demonstrated by the age group between 13 and 15 years old – pupils studying in forms 7-9: in academic year 2018/2019, their number increased by 4.5 per cent as compared to academic year 2016/2017. The grades of children in this age group also improved.[1978]
However, according to ECRI, enrolment rates for secondary and high school pupils are still low at 18.6 per cent and 2.6 per cent respectively. Hence, the Commission concluded only partial implementation of the previously given recommendation.[1979]
In addition to the above, in 2022, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women expressed concern about the low level of education of Roma girls. Among the reasons why they are forced to drop out of school, experts cited child and/or forced marriage and early pregnancy, which in many cases are ignored by the authorities.[1980]
CESCR's concluding observations express concern about the rights of another vulnerable group of the Portuguese population, Africans and people of African descent, in the field of education. Their failure and dropout rates are also quite high. At the same time, it is noted that reorienting such students towards vocational education may create formal and informal barriers to their access to higher education.[1981] Similar concerns were raised by experts from the UN Human Rights Council Working Group on People of African Descent, which visited Portugal in December 2021.[1982]
They also noted cases of ill-treatment of black citizens by law enforcement officials and racially motivated physical and verbal violence against them.[1983]
The murder of black actor Bruno Cande in July 2020 caused a wide public outcry. The racism-driven crime was committed by a 76-year-old colonial war veteran.
Racist rhetoric is heard from numerous Portuguese football fan clubs and the skinhead movement. In February 2020, Moussa Marega, Malian player of the Porto football club, was forced to leave the pitch during the match due to insults shouted at him by the fans.
Human rights activists note that there are no programs in the country that directly address the issues of people of African descent. Among other things, they express concern that school textbooks may illustrate them in a discriminatory or stereotypical way.[1984]
Some people of African descent were resettled as part of social housing programs that started in the 1990s. However, in practice this led to spatial segregation, as the main construction works took place away from urban centres. All this said, migrants who arrived after the 1990 census that served the basis of these programs, were left behind still living in slums or areas with utterly substandard housing under the constant threat of forced eviction without prior notification, having no possibility to obtain either legal remedies or decent housing from the authorities.[1985]
CESCR is also concerned that the dismantling of social housing and the relocation of people of African descent and their families to the periphery of cities may lead to their exclusion from livelihoods.[1986]
This population group bears the burden of discriminatory attitudes not only in terms of access to education, work or housing. Problems also arise in the areas of health, social security and political participation. According to the concluding observations of CERD, Africans and people of African descent are the most frequent victims of multiple and intersectional discrimination.[1987]
Official Lisbon recognises responsibility for the mistakes of the colonial past[1988], but is in no hurry to take real steps in this area. Despite the position of the President M. Rebela de Sousa that Portugal should pay for the crimes committed during the colonial period, in April 2024 the Portuguese government declared that it refuses to initiate any reparation process.[1989] It is worth emphasising that Portugal sold almost 6 million Africans (!) into slavery, more than any other European colonial power.[1990]
CESCR in March 2023 and CERD in May 2023 noted an increased level of intolerance and hate speech during the reporting period, including on the Internet and in the media, sports and speeches by political and other public figures. These include manifestations of xenophobia, Afrophobia, anti-Gypsyism, anti-Semitism and Islamophobia. At the same time, insults and threats, including threats of physical violence, are received not only against representatives of ethnic minorities themselves, but also against human rights defenders, social activists and journalists involved in efforts to combat racism and racial discrimination.[1991]
Against the backdrop of increasing incidents of anti-Semitism in Portugal, it is noteworthy that the authorities have not reacted adequately. For example, in October 2023, the country's largest synagogue in Porto was vandalised.[1992] In early February 2024, protests triggered by the housing crisis turned into anti-Semitic demonstrations. Anti-Semitic slogans were shouted during the protests, with demonstrators blaming the Jewish population for the economic crisis. The protest was accompanied by posters with anti-Semitic calls to "cleanse the world of Jews".[1993]
The problem of human trafficking remains extremely acute. According to the Internal Security Report, in 2023, 391 people (68 per cent more than the year before) were categorised as "potential victims of human trafficking", of whom more than 300 were Portuguese citizens or foreigners enslaved in the territory of a European state.
Local experts point out that such figures do not always correspond to reality and are often underestimated by several times. In the analysts' presentation, this shows the complete impotence of Portuguese law enforcement and migration authorities.
In 2022, a group of migrants from East Timor (about 600 people) were smuggled into Portugal and forced into slave labour in Lisbon.
In November 2023, a large-scale operation by the Criminal Police attracted public attention with the detention of 28 people accused of labour exploitation of about one hundred immigrants in agriculture in the Alentejo region.[1994]
In October 2023, the Integration, Migration and Asylum Agency (AIMA) was established as a result of the reform of local migration authorities. One of the main objectives of the innovation is to eliminate the bureaucracy of the Portuguese migration system. The functions of the new agency include the control, reception and integration of migrants, as well as the management of migration and asylum policies.
The reform of the competent authorities, which had previously been regularly criticised by the public and expert circles, proved unsuccessful (more than a thousand complaints were filed with the relevant authorities about the work of the Integration, Migration and Asylum Agency, established instead of the Foreigners and Borders Service) and failed to fully ensure the protection of the rights of migrants.
However, human rights monitoring bodies have also pointed to other shortcomings in the field of migrants' rights. In particular, the practice of temporary detention, which is common in European countries, including for unaccompanied minors and families with children, is widespread in Portugal.[1995]
ECRI was concerned that a significant number of children born in Portugal to migrant families do not have permanent residence permits and are at risk of deportation together with their parents. The main reasons for this situation were identified as lack of Portuguese language skills, lack of support in accessing education, problems in the home environment and consequent disadvantage in the labour market, lower incomes and unfavourable conditions for the next generation.[1996]
After the Russian Federation launched a special military operation to demilitarise and denazify Ukraine, discriminatory manifestations against the Russian-speaking population and Russian citizens have been recorded in Portugal.
Publications about "bad Russians" are widely circulated in the media. In contrast, the facts of inappropriate behaviour of refugees from Ukraine are hushed up. Due to the tough Russophobic stance taken by the Portuguese authorities and society, Ukrainian nationalist organisations have felt free to engage in hate speech against Russians on the Internet space.
Discriminatory behaviour against children of Russian origin in schools has been recorded.[1997] In 2022, a school in Albufeira received threats and insults from radical Ukrainians living in the city. On the page of the Russian school someone wrote comments with the following content: "We will skin the children", "It's time to buy an axe, there's plenty of work to do", "It's been a long time since you burned". The school management had to contact the police and set up a patrol at the entrance to the school.[1998]
Ukrainian diplomatic representatives are actively involved in spreading Russophobia. Thus, one of the protest actions in front of the Russian Embassy in Lisbon, organised by the Portuguese branch of Amnesty International on 19 March 2022, was attended by Ukrainian Ambassador I. Ognivets, who, in addition to the standard accusations of "Russian aggression", spoke about the "corrosive influence" of Russian language schools in Portugal. After that, the head of the largest Ukrainian association in the country "Spilka" P. Sadokha published a list of all associations of the Russian diaspora with photos under the guise of warning Ukrainians against joining them. The said publication provoked a wave of insulting posts by Ukrainian nationalists against Russian-speaking activists.
Against this background, cases of refusals to provide services to natives of Russia began to be recorded. There is a case in which our compatriot was informed by a telecom operator that she would no longer be able to use the service of calls to Russia at the tariff that had previously been included in the service. Attempts to contact the support service did not bring any results. There, the Russian woman was told that this was a forced measure in the EU, taken in connection with the situation in Ukraine. It also remained unclear at what price and whether it would be possible in general to make calls to Russia.
In March 2022, Ukrainian nationalist Y. Petko committed a robbery attack on N. Sverlova's shop and threatened her because of her Russian origin.[1999] The judicial authorities sentenced the Ukrainian to 1.5 years' suspended imprisonment and ordered him to pay 750 euros in compensation.[2000]
At the same time, there have been cases of harassment of clergy of the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate: there have been attempts to disrupt divine services, calls for Ukrainians to leave parishes and to withdraw their children from the schools operating there. In October 2022, the rector of the Cathedral in honour of All Saints of the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (Lisbon) was attacked.
A Ukrainian association tried to disrupt a Victory Day event organised by a Portuguese NGO together with Russian compatriots in Lisbon. Representatives of the Ukrainian diaspora staged an unauthorised protest demonstration at the entrance to the club where the "Immortal Regiment" event and a concert of songs of the war years were taking place. The protest ended after law enforcement agencies arrived on the scene.
However, the Portuguese authorities have not prevented the holding of events to celebrate Victory Day. On 5 May 2024, in Albufeira, with the support of the Russian Embassy in Portugal and the representative office of Rossotrudnichestvo, a series of events dedicated to the 79th anniversary of the Victory in the Great Patriotic War took place, including the "Immortal Regiment" action. More than one hundred people attended the events.[2001] The "Immortal Regiment" procession in 2024 also marched through the centre of Lisbon.[2002]
The Romanian authorities are pursuing a systematic course of distorting the historical memory of the war against fascism. There are facts of glorification of Nazism in the country, nationalist views are increasingly supported, and anti‑Semitism and other forms of xenophobia are manifested in the society. In the same vein, the assertion of the equality of communism and fascism is being promoted by the Romanian political establishment.
In this connection, Romania's voting position in the UN General Assembly on the draft resolution "Combating the glorification of Nazism, neo-Nazism and other practices that contribute to the escalation of contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance", introduced by the Russian Federation and other co-sponsors, is not surprising – its delegation voted against the adoption of the document in 2022-2023, although previously (with the exception of 2011) it mostly abstained from voting.
One of the blatant facts of glorification of Nazism in the country is the unveiling on 18 June 2024 in the commune of Farkaşa (Neamţ county) of a bust of General Gheorghe Manoliu with Hitler's cross around his neck, who fought on the side of Nazi Germany in the Great Patriotic War until 1944. What is even more significant is that at the bust unveiling ceremony, the honours to the Nazi henchman were paid by servicemen of the Romanian Armed Forces from the 17th Mountain Troops Battalion "Dragoş Vodă".[2003]
Another monument to a Nazi collaborator, a bust of Mircea Vulcanescu, is located in the Romanian capital in St Stephen's Park. During World War II, Mircea Vulcanescu was deputy finance minister in the pro-Nazi government of the country. On 9 October 1946, he was convicted of war crimes. The war criminal's daughter, backed by nationalist groups, sought her father's rehabilitation, but in 2019 the claim, granted in the court of first instance, was rejected by the Bucharest Court of Appeal.
In early 2023, the results of the vote to demolish the bust were strongly criticized by Romanian human rights organizations. For instance, the Bucharest City Council voted against the resolution according to which the monument was to be dismantled. This resolution was initiated by a councilor from the centre-right National Liberal Party and was not adopted because the majority of council members abstained.[2004]
The head of the Bucharest-based Centre for Monitoring and Countering Anti-Semitism, Maximillian Marco Katz, also criticized the outcome of the vote. "During World War II, Mircea Vulcanescu was part of Marshal Antonescu's government, which passed and implemented anti-Semitic laws and measures that led to the Romanian Holocaust," his statement read.[2005]
Among the defenders of the bust was Antonio Andrusceac, a member of parliament from the far-right Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR) party. Antonio Andrusceac thanked the Bucharest City Council for defending "the cult of its heroes and martyrs".
In April 2024, Romania was sentenced at the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)[2006] for the acquittal by the country's Supreme Court of officers who participated in the 1941 persecution of Jews, including the Iași pogrom, and convicted in 1953 of war crimes and crimes against humanity.
More and more frequent are attempts to conceal the criminal nature of the actions of Romanian collaborators of Nazi Germany, highlighting their "other achievements" in the field of culture and science. On 1 April 2021, on the initiative of the Iași mayor's office, a bust was unveiled to Octavian Goga, the former prime minister (1937-1938), poet and playwright. His government, which included the chief ideologist of Romanian fascism, Alexandru Cuza, pursued a nationalist pro‑fascist course with a pro-Hitlerite orientation in foreign policy. It was Octavian Goga's government that issued a decree depriving Romanian Jews of their citizenship.
In the publications of some local media, the commander of the Legionary Movement unit, Radu Gyr, is often portrayed as a "martyr of the communist prison"[2007], without mentioning his past and the fact that he was recognized as a war criminal (convicted in June 1945 for war crimes).[2008] The cultural institutions of Prahova county held events in 2023-2024 in which Mircea Vulcanescu and Radu Gyr were presented exclusively as victims of the communist regime.[2009] Gogu Puiu[2010], a member of the Legionary Police, is portrayed as an ardent "leader of the anti‑communist resistance in Dobrudja"; he was recruited after 1945 by Western intelligence services to organize anti-government activities in socialist Romania.
On 24 January 2023, Alexandru Florian, director of the Elie Wiesel National Institute for Holocaust Research in Romania, expressed disappointment that Marcel Ciolacu, leader of the Social Democratic Party, the country's largest political force within the ruling coalition, began his public speech at the Little Union celebration in Focşani by quoting the "anti-Semitic philosopher" Petre Țuțea[2011], a member of the Legionary Movement.
Positive developments in the fight against the promotion of the Iron Guard's legacy have been very limited. In 2023, after years of litigation, a plaque with prohibited symbols of the movement was removed from the Bucharest office of the Legionary Movement. In January 2024, the prosecutor's office brought a case against blogger Cătălin Valeriu Dănoiu ("Veghea Patriei") for propaganda of Legionary ideas, as well as for inciting hatred on the grounds of race, ethnicity, nationality and sexual orientation.[2012]
The Romanian public continues to express concern over the recognition by the Sibiu Court ruling of 28 May 2007 of the Democratic Forum of the Germans of Sibiu as the successor of the Group of Ethnic Germans established at the insistence of Nazi Germany, which was banned by King Mihai's Decree No. 485 of 7 October 1944 and ceased to exist. On the basis of the above-mentioned court decision, the Democratic Forum of Germans of Romania (DFDR, representing the German national minority in the Parliament) started restitution of property lost after 1944. 136 real estate properties in Sibiu county have been claimed.[2013] Claims for restitution of 12 properties were granted, compensation was offered for another five, and 61 claims were dismissed[2014]. Local media drew attention to the fact that the re-registration of property in favour of the DFDR in a number of cases was carried out with the support of former DFDR chairman and Sibiu mayor Klaus Iohannis (President of Romania since 2014).[2015]
In June 2021, the Cotidianul newspaper recalled that the decision "recognizing the DFDR as legal successor to a fascist organization" remained in force.[2016] One issue also raised the question of "the need to clarify the relationship between the DFDR and the Group of Ethnic Germans in the light of the combat declared (by the authorities) against anti-Semitism". At the same time, it was noted that historians and media outlets who raised the alarm about the connection between the Forum and the Group were prosecuted following a DFDR lawsuit.[2017] In December 2022, the publication drew attention to "double standards" in the context of the condemnation of the Iron Guard and the simultaneous inaction of the authorities with regard to the DFDR.[2018] Although the DFDR itself is not classified as a radical and extremist organization, the precedent of restitution in its favour of property confiscated from a fascist organization could be used to extend this scheme to former Legionary Movement activists and members of the government of Ion Antonescu. In this context, the Romanian media, for example, noted the attempts by the descendants of the Group of Ethnic Germans' members to return real estate properties forcibly taken from Jews by the Nazis during the regime of Ion Antonescu.[2019]
An open letter by Romanian political scientist and economist Radu Golban concludes: expert analyses carried out by Swiss lawyers show that the decision of Romanian judicial authorities to recognize the DFDR legal succession to the German Ethnic Group is in fact recognition of a Nazi group and a violation of Bucharest's obligations under the peace agreements signed after World War II.
A number of open fans of the legionary movement and war criminals, including dictator Ion Antonescu, entered the Romanian Parliament upon the 2020 elections "under the banner" of the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR) with about 8 per cent of the votes (44 mandates out of 466). They seek to whitewash the crimes of Hitler's Romanian henchmen, masking their brutal acts with slogans of "national liberation struggle" for "saving historical territories" from the Bolsheviks.
AUR Senator Sorin Lavric regularly addresses Parliament with "political declarations" posted on the legislative body's official website to rehabilitate members and supporters of the legionary movement as "victims of the communist regime". Among them are Traian Brăileanu, a prominent member of the Iron Guard Senate and one of its ideologists (8 February 2023)[2020], Gheorghe Jimboiu (22 June 2022)[2021], Constantin Gane (27 April 2022)[2022], Nicolae Călinescu (16 February 2022)[2023], Valeriu Gafencu (24 February 2021)[2024], Constantin Oprișan (10 March 2021)[2025], and Virgil Maxim (24 March 2021)[2026]. Sorin Lavric's panegyrics were awarded to Mircea Vulcănescu, a member of Ion Antonescu's government (3 March 2021)[2027] and Moldovan terrorist Filimon Bodiu[2028] (23 March 2022). In January 2022, Calin Georgescu, AUR honorary chairman, who was nominated by this party for the post of prime minister, stated that Corneliu Codreanu, founder and leader of the Romanian legionary movement, "fought for the human good morals", and also "did good things".[2029]
In March 2020, after vandals poured paint over and painted an outdoor photo exhibition at the Russian Center for Science and Culture in Bucharest dedicated to the liberation of Europe from fascism by Soviet troops[2030], the Action 2012 platform affiliated with AUR praised the vandals on its social media page, accompanying its post with anti-Russian comments. In response to the Embassy's note of protest, police opened a criminal case. However, the perpetrators were not brought to justice.
Legionary movements are also prohibited in the country (organizations that operated in 1927-1941 under the names of Archangel Michael Legion, Iron Guard and All for the Country party) and their modern followers. The production, distribution and public use of their ideas, symbols, as well as the promotion of the cult of recognized war criminals are punishable by imprisonment for a term of three months to six years, and the creation of organizations of a fascist, racist or xenophobic orientation and their support – by imprisonment from three to ten years with deprivation of rights.
Although the punishment introduced for promoting the legionary movement has led to the fact that part of the once officially registered organizations preaching these ideas were forced to curtail or minimize public activity, certain ultra-right structures continue to operate "from the underground", using platforms in social networks.[2031] These include the New Right Party (Noua Dreaptă), registered in 2015, and the Legionary Movement (Mișcarea Legionară), which has no legal status.
Access to the website, news blog and social media pages of the Legionary Movement (leader – Ș.Suru), which freely promotes the works of its "ideological fathers", is not restricted in the country. In 2022, the organization held the conferences "Legionary Movement: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow" (24 June), "How to Become a Member of the Legionary Movement" (23 July), "Nationalism among Romanians" (17 December), and then distributed their recording on the YouTube platform. In a public place, on the building of the movement's Bucharest office there is a sign with the forbidden Iron Guard (Garda de Fier) symbols. Attempts to have it dismantled by the Institute for Studying the Holocaust in Romania, have failed: the prosecutor's office at the Bucharest Court of Appeal closed the case "for the lack of clear evidence" on 20 October 2020, after five years of hearings.[2032] In February 2021, the court of Bucharest Sector 2 upheld the decision.[2033] Attempts to bring the movement to responsibility as a whole have also failed. Despite the use of legionary symbols, uniforms, Nazi salutes by its members, and the events held to cherish the memory of Corneliu Codreanu, founder of the Iron Guard, prosecutors at the Bucharest Court of Appeal recognized it only as "a small group of people with nostalgic inclinations and views".[2034]
On the wave of "solidarity" with Kiev, some representatives of the Romanian historical community made attempts to whitewash Ukrainian nationalists from the OUN-UPA, which is banned in Russia. In May 2022, Manuel Stănescu, an employee at the Institute for Political Studies in the Field of Defense and Military History, published an article in the History journal in the spirit of the Ukrainian-promoted political myth that the OUN-UPA allegedly had to cooperate with the Nazis only for the sake of the fight for independence against Bolshevism. In particular, the author portrays in a positive light Taras Bulba-Borovets, the Nazi founder of the UPA, who massively exterminated Jews (which is not mentioned in the article). He also claims that the OUN "opposed the creation of the Galicia SS division" and restricted itself in anti-Romanian actions due to "very good relations between Romanians and Ukrainians in the northern Bukovina".[2035]
Since 2021, the authorities have intensified efforts to rename geographical and administrative sites named after persons convicted of offences against the Romani and Jewish population. As a result, there is only one street left in Romania in honour of Ion Antonescu – in Bechet, Dolj county. On 15 February 2023, the Senate of the University of Bucharest deprived this associate of Hitler of the title of "honorary doctor".[2036]
At the same time, according to the calculations of the Institute for Studying the Holocaust, sixteen sites named after war criminals still remain in Romania in nine settlements.[2037] Attempts to change the name of a street in Cluj-Napoca named in honour of Radu Gyr have failed time after time.[2038] A street and a technological college in the Romanian capital, a lyceum in Maramureș are named after Mircea Vulcanescu, and a bust in his honour has been erected on one of the squares of Bucharest Sector 2. Attempts to have the college renamed[2039] and the monument removed have met with resistance from the public and some officials.[2040] Moreover, on 29 June 2022, at the initiative of the Bucharest Sector 2 mayor's office, the Metropolitan Municipal Council decided to rename the park named after Marshal of the Soviet Union Fyodor Ivanovich Tolbukhin, a liberator of Romania from the Nazis.[2041]
Books attempting to rehabilitate Ion Antonescu and his entourage are published annually in Romania. In 2020-2021, major Romanian newspapers Adevărul[2042] and Jurnalul National[2043] promoted the books by Holocaust denier Gheorghe Buzatu[2044] "Marshal Antonescu in the Face of History and Romania with and without Antonescu" through their distribution networks, as well as the memoirs of war criminals close to the Romanian dictator published by the Bucharest publishing house Paul Editions: Colonel Gheorghe Magherescu, head of his secretariat ("The Truth about Marshal Antonescu")[2045], General Constantin Pantazzi ("With Marshal till Death")[2046] and Commissar Radu Lecca, who was responsible for the "resolution of the Jewish issue" ("A Conflicting Game: Between the Fuhrer", "the Marshal and the Jews in Romania")[2047]. In particular, the book by Radu Lecca is an attempt to play down his own responsibility and Ion Antonescu's role in the organization of the Holocaust in Romania. In 2022, Gica Manole's Antonescu with Hitler[2048] and Cristian Troncotă's "The Marshal's Secret Man"[2049] about the war criminal Eugen Cristescu, head of Romanian intelligence in 1941-1945, were published. Publisol published and promoted Marcel Dumitru Ciucă's two-volume book "The Process of the Great National Betrayal: Marshal Antonescu in the Face of History"[2050], which attempts to prove the invalidity of the trial of the Romanian dictator.
On 1 June 2021, a memorial service was held for Ion Antonescu[2051] (shown several times on the Vaslui TV local channel) in St. Paraskeva Church in Vaslui, at the initiative of the Cultural League for the Unity of Romanians from Everywhere. The TV channel was fined[2052], and a criminal case was opened against the priests who performed the service.[2053]
Ion Antonescu is portrayed on the wall paintings of Bucharest churches, in particular St. Constantine and St. Helena Church[2054], where this Fuhrer's accomplice is depicted in the positive image of a church warden. His image is also in the church of Mihai Vodă monastery, among the especially revered kings and church hierarchs of Romania.[2055]
As of May 2024, Corneliu Codreanu's work "To My Legionnaires" in English (the annotation describes him as a "national hero")[2056] and a collection of his "circulars"[2057], as well as the book "Wooden Skulls" by Ion Moța, one of the leaders of the Iron Guard[2058], are widely available for free sale in Romanian online shops.
Romanian legislation sets out the components of crimes motivated by hate and racism, and defines various types of punishment for them. In July 2015, Law No. 217 entered into force to amend and supplement 2002 Government Decree No. 31 on prohibition of fascist, racist and xenophobic organizations and symbols, as well as promotion of the cult of persons guilty of crimes against peace and humanity. It defines "Holocaust in the Romanian territory" as "the systematic extermination and destruction of Jews and Roma supported by the Romanian authorities and public institutions on the territories under their control between 1940 and 1944"). The denial, justification of or downplaying consequences of the Holocaust is punishable by imprisonment for up to 3 years or a fine.
Since 2018, Law 157/2018 "On Certain Measures to Prevent and Counter Manifestations of Anti-Semitism" in Romania has introduced penalties of up to 3 years in prison for promoting anti-Semitic symbols and ideas, up to 5 years for disseminating such materials, and up to 10 years – for the establishment and support of relevant organizations.
In January 2022, the Bucharest Police opened a criminal case for the offence under Article 3 of Law 157/2018 (public promotion of anti-Semitic concepts and doctrines) for placing a wreath with an inscription denying the mass extermination of Jews at the Holocaust memorial during official mourning events[2059].
A new National Strategy and Action Plan for Preventing and Combating Anti‑Semitism, Xenophobia, Radicalization and the Use of Hate Speech for 2024-2027 (replacing the 2021-2023 Action Plan) are being developed in the country. A special representative of the government has been appointed to promote the policy of memory, combat anti-Semitism and xenophobia. From the academic year 2023/24, the course "History of the Jews. Holocaust" has become obligatory in school (grades IX-XII) and vocational education programmes.
However, the results of the efforts made by the authorities have not quite met expectations. In January 2022, the MCA Director, Marco Maximillian Katz, noted that he was observing with "increasing concern" the "denigration and denial of the Holocaust at the level of Romania's political leadership class".[2060] In July 2022, the National Institute for Holocaust Research in Romania noted a "poor awareness and lack of understanding of this issue at the level of local authorities, civil servants, judges and structures responsible for the implementation of the law and measures adopted by the Parliament and the Government".[2061]
In January 2022, resonance was caused by an AUR party statement, labelling the Holocaust as a "minor issue" that should not be dignified with in‑depth study in schools.[2062]
It is worth noting that such statements are made in a country in which at least 380,000 Jews were brutally murdered during World War II. The results of a survey on the introduction of the above-mentioned course into the school curriculum are also quite indicative: 52 per cent of those surveyed opposed the decision to make Holocaust studies compulsory.[2063]
Nevertheless, in 2023, AUR leader George Simion revised the party's position on this issue. At a meeting with Israeli Ambassador to Romania Reuven Azar and Israeli politician Yossi Dogan, he recognized the country's responsibility for the Holocaust and condemned manifestations of anti-Semitism.[2064] However, some political analysts see such a dramatic change of views as one of the party's strategic moves before the elections.
According to a survey conducted by the Holocaust Research Institute in 2023 among representatives of the Jewish community in the country, 71 per cent of the respondents noted the persistence of anti-Semitism in Romania, while 41 per cent noted the rise of this phenomenon in society in the last five years.[2065]
It is notable that the first sentence for Holocaust denial was handed down in 2021, almost 20 years after Ordinance 31/2002 was adopted. At the same time, a year later, the sentence of thirteen months in prison, previously imposed on Vasile Zărnescu, colonel (rtd.) of the Romanian Information Service, for the book Holocaustul – gogorița[2066] diabolică, was replaced with a warning.[2067] As stated in March 2022 by Marco Maximillian Katz, head of the MCA, this verdict of the Bucharest Court of Appeal "annulled and made a mockery of" the authorities' progress in combating anti-Semitism.[2068]
Anti-Semitic manifestations and desecration of Jewish cemeteries in the country are systemic:
In 2017, on the night of 23-24 April, several youths overturned and smashed at least ten tombstones at a Jewish cemetery in the capital city.[2069]
In April 2019, many central media outlets reported that more than 70 tombstones and monuments were destroyed in the Jewish cemetery in Huși (Vaslui county).
According to the MCA, in December 2019 and April 2020, unknown persons painted swastika images, Nazi salutes and anti-Semitic inscriptions in the car parking of Unirea central department store in Bucharest.
In June 2021, more than 20 tombstones and monuments were toppled at a Jewish cemetery in Ploiești.[2070] In December 2021, two swastikas were painted on the synagogue in Sighișoara. On 6 January 2022, an act of vandalism was committed against the synagogue in Făgăraș.
The situation of Romania's ethnic minorities raises certain concerns among human rights activists. The policy in the field of ensuring their rights is not comprehensive, and the ways and means to implement it vary in accordance with the situation in particular regions of the country.
The National Council Against Discrimination, which operates under the control of the country's Parliament, recorded 1000 appeals with regard to the acts of discrimination against the Romanians on various grounds in 2023 (988 in 2022). The greatest number of complaints concerned violations of the right to work and choice of profession (389), protection of honour and dignity (194) and the right to education (98). There were complaints of violations of rights on national (96), ethnic (58) and linguistic (13) grounds.
The ethno-cultural rights of the Hungarian national minority, whose representatives are predominantly reside in the counties of Transylvania (1.3 million people or 6.5 per cent of the total population of the country), are systematically infringed.
Moreover, the Romanian authorities continue to persecute Magyars for using the flag of Székelys (Romanian Hungarians) and fine them for playing the Hungarian anthem during public events.
Using the Hungarian language in public institutions in places densely populated by Magyars and receiving secondary and higher education in their mother tongue, formally guaranteed by the law "On Education", are the most acute issues. For instance, with reference to budget expenditure optimization, a policy is being implemented to remove a number of disciplines in the Hungarian language from the curriculum at the University of Medicine and Pharmacy in Târgu Mureș.
Against this background, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) is concerned about the limited accessibility of education in national minority languages due to inadequate budgetary funding. CESCR draws attention to the need to intensify efforts to ensure accessibility of education in national minority languages, including through the allocation of sufficient budgetary resources for this purpose.[2071]
In general, the issues of receiving secondary and higher education in the Hungarian language, as well as the use of the Hungarian language in public institutions in places with a compact Magyar population (the so-called Székely Land) are extremely acute in Romania.
In 2020, Romania's incumbent President Klaus Iohannis was fined 5,000 lei (approximately 1,000 euros) by the National Council for Combating Discrimination (CNCD) "for discrimination and violation of the right to dignity on the basis of ethnicity/nationality". The move followed the head of state's harsh remarks on a bill concerning the autonomy of the Székely Land, which was passed by the Chamber of Deputies (lower house of parliament), but then finally rejected by the Senate (upper house of parliament). Following the passage of this bill in the Chamber of Deputies, in which the Social Democratic Party (PSD) had a majority, the President stated that the PSD wanted to "give Transylvania to the Hungarians" and asked rhetorically, "What did the leader from Budapest promise you in exchange for this agreement?"
The president's remarks caused outrage in Hungary and inside the country. For example, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán said that he had not heard "anything like this coming out of Romania, even during the worst, anti-democratic, troubled periods". The head of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania, Hunor Kelemen, accused Klaus Iohannis of "destroying the idea of rational political dialogue, mocking the Hungarian language and discriminating against the Hungarian minority in Romania".[2072]
A flurry of condemnation was prompted by the controversial gesture of the Romanian prime minister at that time Mihai Tudose, who promised during a television programme in January 2018 to "hang Hungarians involved in the use of Székely flag on the same poles". The National Council for Combating Discrimination issued a warning to the politician in this regard.
In 2021, wide resonance was caused by the unflattering remarks about the Hungarian ethnic group in a statement on television made by former president of Romania, MEP Traian Băsescu. In this regard, the National Council of the Székelys NGO appealed to Romanian authorities with a demand to condemn the politician's hate speech. The National Council for Combating Discrimination did not stand aside either, having examined this episode and imposed a fine of about 1,000 euros on the author of the statement.[2073]
The 2021 report by Miko Imre Legal Aid Service for Minorities, created by the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (DAHR), noted cases of ethnicity-driven violent behavior against Hungarians in Romania: insulting an elderly woman, attacking young people who spoke Hungarian, and discriminating against a kindergarten teacher because of her nationality.[2074] In 2022, members of the Hungarian minority claimed violation of their linguistic rights due to the refusal of the local government to take over Hungarian-language kindergartens built with Budapest funds.[2075]
In February 2021, acts of vandalism were committed against the monument to the Székely Martyrs in Târgu Mureş. In 2021-2022, there were similar actions with regard to Hungarian inscriptions on bilingual tablets with the names of settlements in Transylvania.[2076]
The Hungarian minority was also angered by the anti-Hungarian tone of a comment published in March 2021 on a social network by MP R.Cristescu: "The leaders of the DAHR horde continue to behave like the heirs of Attila the Hun, not caring that they are harming innocent people...".[2077]
There have also been incidents at sport events. In August 2021, during a football match between the Sepsi team from Sfântu Gheorghe, a city that is part of the predominantly Hungarian-populated Romanian county of Covasna, and the Farul team from Constanța, the fans of the latter yelled xenophobic slogan "Hungarians, get out of the country!" The same words were heard during a match between Steaua and Csikszereda (a team from the Romanian county of Harghita, inhabited by Szekely Hungarians).[2078] Similar shouting was observed in December 2021 during the Sepsi/FCSB match, in May 2022 during the Sepsi/FCU match from Craiova, in August 2022 during the Sepsi game against Universitatea from Cluj-Napoca[2079], and at the match between teams from Miercurea Ciuc and Bucharest. In November 2022, during a match between Sepsi and the Petrolul club from Ploiești[2080], shouting turned violent and police intervention was needed to prevent a scuffle.[2081]
In June 2019, inter-ethnic tension was observed at a military cemetery in Valea Uzului (a region predominantly inhabited by the Hungarian national minority): during a clash between representatives of two nationalities, a group of Romanians repeatedly shouted "drive the Hungarians out of the country!" The case was investigated. The local prosecutor recognized the claim as unfounded, stating that the statements were not directed against the entire Hungarian community and were not addressed to a particular minority group. Therefore, they could not be considered as hate speech, even though they were clearly directed against ethnic Hungarians.[2082]
Local authorities often ignore the law requiring bilingual signs in localities with at least twenty per cent of residents belonging to national minorities. In Țigmandru in Mureș county, bilingual signs were removed when the share of the Hungarian population decreased below twenty per cent and have not been reinstated despite the recommendation of the Council of Europe's Advisory Committee of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (ACFCNM). Damage is also done to bilingual signs in the Hungarian language: although perpetrators are usually identified and charged, members of the Hungarian minority criticize the fact that the motive of ethnic intolerance is generally not mentioned as an aggravating circumstance.[2083]
Meanwhile, a number of NGOs in Transylvania maintain close contacts with far-right parties and organizations in Hungary (Jobbik, Hungarian National Guard, etc.) and under their influence advocate extremist and revanchist ideas, including that about the injust Trianon Peace Treaty and its consequences. The Hungarian nationalist Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement has its own cells in Romanian Transylvania.
The situation around the Romanian Union of Ciscarpathian Ruthenians, which is part of the Coordination Council of Organizations of Russian Compatriots Living in Romania, remains tense. According to the president of the Union, Mihai Lauruc, there is ongoing unjustified oppression against the Organization's activists because of their pro-Russian views. There have also been noted cases of inaction on the part of authorities regarding the raiding of property and business assets belonging to Ruthenians. The Union's representatives have also expressed concern that Bucharest encourages forced Ukrainianization of the Ruthenian national minority.
Some complaints have been voiced before Romanian authorities regarding the possibility to receive education (from primary to complete secondary education) in their native language from the Russian-Lipovan Community of Romania and Carpathian Ruthenians. It is reported that Russian‑Lipovan children are only provided with mother tongue teaching as an optional subject, while most national minorities can receive primary school education (grades 1-9) entirely in their mother tongue.
The Romani community in Romania (over 620,000 people, about 3.3 per cent of the population and, according to unofficial data, up to 2 million people) is the most discriminated against of all ethnic minorities on the grounds of nationality. In their concluding observations following the examination of the 6th periodic country report, the CESCR experts reiterate that the Roma population in Romania continues to experience social exclusion, a disproportionately high level of poverty (compared to the rest of the population), and discrimination in all areas of life.[2084]
The main policy-making body for the protection of Roma rights and their social integration is the National Agency for the Roma, established in 1997. Its scope of competence includes monitoring the situation with respect to the observance of the rights of this ethnic group within the framework of the government's strategy[2085], proposing amendments to legislation in this area, controlling the implementation of the provisions of the relevant Romanian and European normative acts, etc. At the same time, the lack of a comprehensive system for collecting data on discrimination against various social and ethnic groups, including the Roma community, and the reluctance of the Romanian authorities to ethnically classify problematic situations from the point of view of the law, make it impossible to fully assess the scale of violations of Roma rights.
Back in 2019, experts from the Council of Europe's European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) noted that anti-Roma sentiment in Romania is "commonplace".[2086] In ECRI's conclusions on Romania's implementation of recommendations subject to interim follow-up (of 2022), the Commission emphasizes that there are still no significant developments in the collection of data on hate crimes, including against Roma.[2087]
The Commission also deplored the delay by Romanian parliamentarians in adopting a professional code of conduct prohibiting any manifestation of racism in speech. The long overdue need for such a step is evidenced, for example, by the following cases of the use of hate speech by public figures.
In 2019, the proceedings on the statement of A.Hobjila, one of the deputy chairmen of the Botoșani county branch of the Save Romania Union party, who declared "the need to get rid of Roma at any cost in the heart of Botoșani city" in the context of its reconstruction, caused a wide public outcry. The remark of the official, basically calling for the forced relocation of Roma, was considered by the CNCD as discriminatory and degrading human dignity, and its author was fined 2,000 euro.
In January 2020, mayor of Târgu Mureş Dorin Florea was heavily criticized by human rights organizations for ethnic hate-inciting speech against the local Roma.[2088]
Former Romanian prime minister, Petre Roman, was also fined 2,000 lei (about 417 U.S. dollars) by the CNCD for his anti-Roma statements on television.[2089]
There is a persisting problem of Roma children attending segregated schools (schools where the majority of students are Roma). Educational segregation affects about one in two Roma children in Romania (51 per cent).[2090] There are also extremely high dropout rates of Romani children from primary and secondary schools.[2091]
In October 2022, a prominent Roma minority activist, Dorin Cioabă, accused the Lucian Blaga University of Sibiu of failing to fulfill the quotas for the admission of Roma applicants and of discriminating against them.[2092]
The community members experience difficulties in obtaining identity documents. In such cases the police issue a residence report on the basis of which applicants may only obtain a provisional identity document. Many also lack documents confirming residence or housing tenure.
Denials of public services, access to health care and social protection systems, and equal employment conditions for Roma are frequent. For instance, in August 2023, the president of the E-Romnja NGO, Carmen Gheorghe, drew attention to a case in which a woman of Roma ethnicity was forced to give birth on the ground in the courtyard of the Urziceni hospital[2093], where she was had not admitted, according to the activist, because of her ethnicity.
In 2019, in Zalău, a Roma woman and her child were beaten with a mop by a minibus driver in an attempt to chase them away from the vehicle, and the emergency services where she sought help responded with insults.[2094] In August 2022, it became known that the Zalău court ordered her to pay a fine of 1,800 lei, and the driver got off with a temporary suspension.[2095]
The UN Committee against Torture (CAT) deplores reports that members of the Romani community are subjected to disproportionate levels of police violence and that investigations into cases of alleged police violence against Roma are often not conducted or superficial.[2096]
In April 2020, a video of the beating of Roma by a law enforcement officer in Bolintin-Vale, Giurgiu county, appeared on social media.[2097]
In 2022, representatives of the Aresel and the Romanian Jesuit Refugee Service reported that Roma refugees arriving from Ukraine also faced discrimination: they were driven away from stands with free food and medicine, forbidden to enter waiting rooms at the Bucharest North Station, requests to take them to a refugee reception center faced negative reaction.[2098] In April 2022, a group of Roma refugees from Ukraine reported that their requests for humanitarian assistance had been denied in Bucharest.[2099]
CESCR also notes the persistence of discrimination against other marginalized groups, namely refugees, asylum-seekers and others. In this regard, CESCR recommended that campaigns should be carried out to raise awareness among vulnerable groups of the ways and mechanisms to file complaints in cases of discrimination.[2100]
Romania still has stereotypically racist attitudes towards people of African descent. This can be illustrated by a remark from the country's Ambassador to Kenya, Dragoș Viorel Țigău, during a meeting of the Eastern European Group at the UN Office in Nairobi on 26 April 2023. Seeing a monkey in the window of the conference room, the Romanian Permanent Representative stated that "the African group has joined us". This provoked a wave of just indignation on the part of diplomats representing the continent, forcing Bucharest to recall Dragoș Viorel Țigău.[2101]
With the start of Russia's special military operation to demilitarize and denazify Ukraine and protect the peaceful population of Donbas, cases of violation of the rights and discrimination of Russians on the basis of nationality and citizenship began to be recorded in Romania. Russian citizens and compatriots living here have become the object of systematic attacks and insults on social networks. In addition to certain manifestations of Russophobia and aggressive behavior when applying for medical services, passing border control, or at schools, there are still problems with servicing Russians in many banking institutions in the country.
Under the pretext of international sanctions, a number of Russian companies, including TMK Group plants and Aeroflot office, were denied the opportunity to manage their own financial resources. This, in turn, put into question the observance of the social and economic rights of employees of these companies, including the right to receive wages. In violation of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, since 28 February 2022, Romania has restricted access to Sputnik Romania and Russia Today information resources on all platforms, including websites, social networks, instant messengers, and mobile apps. On the same day, the National Broadcasting Council undertook to take measures so that "not a single TV channel from the Russian Federation is rebroadcast in Romania", as well as "to monitor the way news programs and talk shows cover topics related to the aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine".
In this regard, in March 2022, the mentioned authority issued fines to the Realitatea Plus TV channel (40,000 lei or 9,300 U.S. dollars) and the Gold FM radio station (50,000 lei or about 11,600 U.S. dollars), as well as warnings to TV channels Nașul TV and B1 TV. Local journalists (e.g. Giorgiana Arsene, correspondent of Sputnik Romania, author of the news blogs Friends of Vladimir Putin and On the First Line (inprimalinie.org), and Vyacheslav Samoshkin, editor of the news website "Vesti iz Rossii" (vestidinrusia.ro), who try to cover the events taking place in Ukraine in a balanced manner and from positions alternative to those of the collective West, become the object of fierce harassment and threats in social networks.
In 2023, there were cases of seizure of driving licenses from Russian citizens when crossing the Romanian state border. Moreover, Romanian border guards justified their decision by doubts about the authenticity of the driving license documents. The main reason for the "invalidity" of the license, according to their assessment, was an allegedly incorrect positioning of watermarks or unclear textual information. It is worth stressing that in most cases the authenticity of the seized licenses was confirmed by employees of the consular department of the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Romania. It is noteworthy that the procedure for returning the seized documents took an unreasonably long time – usually more than six months from the date of the relevant ruling.
Anti-fascist sentiments have been traditionally strong in the Republic of North Macedonia. The country's commitment to the preservation of historical memory can be explained by the fact that today's North Macedonian statehood to a large extent builds on the principles and ideals of the Anti-fascist Assembly for the National Liberation of Macedonia (ASNOM) that was active in 1944‑1945. This is reflected in the preamble to the national constitution, which emphasizes the special role played by ASNOM.[2102]
The country's political establishment states commitment to anti-fascist traditions and demonstrates respect to the leading veterans' organization, the Union of Veterans of the Macedonian National Liberation Anti-Fascist War of 1941‑1944.
The cases of desecration and demolition of monuments to the heroes and victims of the Second World War are on the whole untypical of the North Macedonia. Nevertheless, a number of such cases have been recorded in the town of Tetovo, where ethnic Albanians constitute the majority of population.
In September 2022, unknown vandals damaged the Victory (Revolution) Monument, a memorial in the city centre dedicated to the fallen soldiers of the 1941-1944 Liberation War.[2103] The site was desecrated in 2018 by fans of the Shkëndija soccer club who sprayed graffiti with "Great Albanian" slogans[2104], and in 2021, in the run-up to municipal elections the monument was covered with posters advertising a party belonging to Albanian political bloc Besa (Fidelity), whose candidate Bilal Kasami was subsequently elected mayor of Tetovo.[2105] The city branch of the Union of Liberation War fighters consistently – but to no avail – expressed outrage at the incidents, calling for the perpetrators to be found and punished.
One can cite another symptomatic example from Tetovo: in 2005 the local authorities used reconstruction as a pretext to remove the busts of Todor Cipovski and Goce Stojcevski, two Liberation War heroes killed by Albanian collaborators in 1943, from the city's central square. The busts have never been returned to their place. Before that, the busts had systematically been desecrated. Despite regular appeals of the Union of Liberation War fighters, the permission to install them in the same place or elsewhere has never been granted.[2106]
The veterans' associations were concerned over the repeated theft of the bust of Nevena Georgieva, the Liberation War hero, in the municipality of Kisela Voda (Skopje) in October 2022 (the first case was reported in 2019). The headmistress of the school where the monument to the Macedonian guerrilla fighter is installed admits that the thieves could be guided by political motives.[2107]
In early 2023, the government announced plans to repair and renovate all the Liberation War memorials.
None of the parties and movements that have at least some social or political influence in North Macedonia can be considered extremist or right-wing radical, and none of their programs reflect any racist or xenophobic ideas. To cite but one example, during parliamentary elections of May 2024, the explicitly nationalist Desna party got 0.05 percent of votes (that is, 535 votes in absolute terms).
Neither authorities, nor any political or public organizations of Northern Macedonia obstruct any activities on the occasion of either the Victory Day or other memorable dates connected with the Great Patriotic War. The same is true of displaying Russian/Soviet symbols.
At the same time, the country's officials have had an increasingly notable tendency towards opportunistic interpretation of history.
When the social democrats were in power (2017-2024), and especially after February 2022, when the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation commenced the special military operation to de-Nazify and demilitarize Ukraine and protect the civilians in Donbass, the cult of loyalty to the West, which has been imposed on the country, has become obvious: North Macedonian leadership has started representing history from the Western perspective. The victory over Nazism has been celebrated simultaneously with the Europe Day, and the role of the USSR in defeating Nazism has been overlooked during the annual commemorations.[2108] The same happened in 2024.[2109]
In the context of the special military operation, North Macedonia has adopted pro-Ukrainian position, and the country's leadership has stack to its favourite point that the country has been "on the right side of history".[2110] In particular, Prime Minister Dimitar Kovačevski used this rhetoric in his statements on both the current situation around Ukraine, in which North Macedonia supports the neo-Nazi Kiev regime[2111], and the events of the Second World War.[2112]
On 4 April 2024, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of North Macedonia warned that the encouragement of violence and discrimination for reasons of ethnic origin, religion or race was criminalized under article 407 of the country's Criminal Code, and that law enforcement authorities monitored social media for comments on the events in Ukraine in order to bring violators to justice. Nevertheless, North Macedonian competent authorities fail to respond to the outrageous manifestations of nationalism on the part of Ukrainians.[2113]
In spring 2022, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of North Macedonia referred to the current law and warned citizens about the possible criminal prosecution for "denial of war crimes in Ukraine." Paradoxically, this language may apply, among other things, to refuting fake news distributed by Western and Ukrainian media to discredit Russia and its Armed Forces.
However, so far no cases of discrimination or persecution of Russian citizens and compatriots under such pretexts have been reported in Northern Macedonia.
Ukrainian diaspora organization Lesya Ukrainka Association of Ukrainians in the Republic of North Macedonia headed by Tatyana Urbanovich has been remarkably active. On its Facebook page materials and comments inciting hostility and violence against Russians are posted systemically.[2114]
On 12 June 2022 members of the association held a rally in front of the Russian Embassy, playing a song through loudspeakers. It was a Ukrainian-language remake of the Italian partisan song "Bella ciao", which praised the killing of Russians.
The situation is aggravated by the general attitude of the country's authorities who unconditionally support the Kiev regime and allowed the placement of a table with the inscription "Glory to Ukraine – Glory to heroes" in the city centre of Skopje in September 2022. The slogan had been used by Nazi collaborators from the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) and was subsequently taken over by Ukrainian neo-Nazis.[2115] The ceremony was attended by Goran Gerasimovski, head of the Centar municipality of Skopje.
Head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of North Macedonia Bujar Osmani was repeatedly seen using the Ukrainian nationalist greeting "Glory to Ukraine".[2116] In 2023, he was OSCE Chairman-in-Office, with all the responsibilities that this status entails.
The Country's leading news agencies prefer to disregard the criminal acts committed by the Armed Forces of Ukraine, national battalions and Ukrainian neo-Nazi groups (to cite but one example, they completely ignored the anniversary of the 2014 tragedy in Odessa on 2 May 2022).
Skopje started to provide military and technical assistance to the neo-Nazi Kiev regime.[2117] Furthermore, they used a number of fora, including international ones, to stress the leading positions of the Republic of North Macedonia among the donor States helping Ukraine (estimates vary rating the country as the fourth or fifth per capita contributor to assistance to Ukraine among NATO countries).
In particular, Angela Aggeler, the U.S. Ambassador to North Macedonia, stated in her interview to a local TV channel in February 2024: "North Macedonia is the fourth per capita contributor to assistance to Ukraine and not only in military equipment, but in other assistance as well. And so, we're very grateful to them. And frankly other larger and richer countries have not stepped up in the same way that this country has."[2118]
After the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation started the special military operation the government of North Macedonia, at the suggestion of Foreign Minister Bujar Osmani, recommended that the municipal authorities of Skopje and other cities refrain from participating in the flower laying ceremonies organized by the Embassy of Russia on the occasion of anniversary of the Great Victory.
Early in the morning of 9 May 2022, a provocative inscription "1945 – liberators, 2022 – murderers" and streaks of red paint apparently intended to symbolize blood were left by unknown individuals at the foot of the stela in the municipality of Centar in Skopje dedicated to the memory of anti-Hitler coalition soldiers (installed on the Russian Embassy's initiative in cooperation with the Centar municipality in 2020). Having learned about it a few hours before the wreath-laying ceremony, the Embassy removed the inscription. Two verbal notes requesting to investigate the incident sent by the Russian Embassy to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of North Macedonia (with copies sent to the Minister of Internal Affairs), remained unanswered.
There are no Russian-language mass media in North Macedonia. In February 2022 the Government of North Macedonia recommended cable television companies to cease broadcasting channels established by the Russian Federation or individuals or entities registered in its territories.
The organizations of Russian compatriots have no proper print media. Distribution of Russian periodicals among the members of Russian diaspora is funded from earmarked budget of the Governmental Commission for Russian Compatriots Abroad. In December 2023, the Embassy assisted the Russkiy Mir Foundation in delivering a donation to the Ozarenie (Insight) organization of Russian compatriots, consisting of over 130 books and Russian-language textbooks, and souvenir, information and presentation materials.
On 4 December 2022, the annual country conference was held in Skopje by the Coordination Council and with support of the Russian Embassy, which became the key event for the associations of Russian compatriots. With the support of the Russian Embassy, Russian compatriots took active part in events on the occasion of the anniversary of the Great Victory and the Day of Russian Unity, attended the ceremonies of wreath-laying on the Cosmonautics Day, the Day of the Russian Language, and the Day of Mourning. Russian compatriots' associations have held literary and musical soirees, creative contests, amateur concerts, children's parties and the celebration of Maslenitsa (Carnival).
No cases of prejudiced attitude or direct discrimination against either the citizens of the Russian Federation, or Russian compatriots, were reported in the Republic of North Macedonia in 2023 – first half of 2024. The conflicts involving Russian citizens, that are known to the Russian Embassy are, as a rule, of a domestic nature and relate to intra-family relations.
Until 2022, North Macedonia had pursued the course of the "collective West" and year after year abstained during the UN General Assembly vote on resolution "Combating glorification of Nazism, neo-Nazism and other practices that contribute to fuelling contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance", annually co-sponsored by Russia together with other States. In 2022-2023, the delegation of North Macedonia voted against such document. Every time the voting procedure is accompanied by harsh general criticism and condemnation of North Macedonian authorities' steps in the local media.
At the same time, North Macedonia has been a member of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance since 2021, and supported in January 2022 the German-Israeli UN General Assembly resolution condemning denial of the genocide of Jews during the Second World War. It is symbolic that the first event the country held in its territory as part of its OSCE Chairmanship in 2023 was the conference held in Skopje called "Combating Anti-Semitism in the OSCE Area" (6‑7 February 2023).
There is a widespread phenomenon that the authorities try to counter, xenophobic graffiti. In January 2023, the head of the municipality of Karpoš (Skopje) and the U.S. Ambassador to North Macedonia took part in a public event to clear anti-Semitic wall inscriptions, including swastikas, on the occasion of International Holocaust Remembrance Day.[2119]
Although the country's authorities publicly oppose the ideas of Nazism, neo-Nazism and hate ideology, the Criminal Code of North Macedonia still contains no article criminalizing the glorification of Nazism. A bill to this effect was drafted by the Jewish community as far back as 2018, but is still under consideration by government agencies.
North Macedonian historians are concerned over gradual revision of the approach to teaching the history of the Second World War in schools and downplaying the role of the USSR in the liberation of Europe from Nazism.
North Macedonian Albanians, who deny to consider themselves an ethnic minority (they constitute 24.3 percent of the country's population) for political reasons and claim the status of the country's second largest "community" equal with the Macedonians (who account for 58.4 percent of the population), tend to assess the events and outcomes of the Second World War in different way as compared to Macedonians. This has historical roots, as during the war the ancestors of the North Macedonian Albanians massively collaborated with the Italian and German occupying forces.
This is a vivid illustration of the differences persisting between Macedonians and Albanians.
To justify this inconvenient page of history Albanians most commonly refer to it as "situational cooperation" which allegedly was forced and temporary. They claim it served to liberate them from the neighbouring Slavic peoples' oppression and to unite the "ancestral Albanian lands" under Albanian Kingdom (1939-1944), a puppet State which included the most part of the modern Serbian province of Kosovo and Metohija, west Macedonia and southern regions of Montenegro. The Albanians regard the Balkan protectorate, created by the Axis countries, as the "Greater Albania" project made reality, which allegedly fully justifies their complicity with the aggressor.
Guided by this logic, the majority of North Macedonian Albanians approve the activities of the Balli Kombetar (National Front) anti-communist nationalist movement (it was founded in 1942 in Albania and cooperated with the fascist Italy and Nazi Germany), as well as the 21st Skanderbeg SS division and Vulnetari collaborationist military units composed mainly of Kosovo Albanians.
North Macedonia's Albanians openly honour Nazi collaborators: in 2006 and 2015, the then head of Gostivar municipality Nevzat Bejta (one of the leaders of the Democratic Union for Integration, the key party of the Albanian political bloc in the ruling coalition) authorized the erection of monuments to the most notorious members of the Balli Kombëtar and the Vullnetari Macedonian Albanians – fighters Xhemail Hasani (Xhem Hasa Gostivari) and Achif Krosi Rechani, who served the fascist invaders and led armed raids against Yugoslav partisans in Gostivar, Debar, Kičevo, Tetovo and other areas.
Macedonian diaspora has repeatedly called on Western countries' authorities to condemn this glorification of collaborators in North Macedonia and facilitate the dismantlement of the mentioned monuments, but these calls have remained unheeded.[2120]
In today's North Macedonia, the ideology of Balli Kombetar was taken up, inter alia, by the radical fan group Ballistet supporting the Shkendija football club (Tetovo) and promoting the "Greater Albania"-style nationalism.
The Albanians strive to wiping out the memory of the Second World War in North Macedonia. In August 2023, Kosovo's "Prime Minister" Albin Kurti attended a ceremony in Skopje to rename a street named after the Second Macedonian Brigade, which fought against Wehrmacht units and Bulgarian Nazi collaborators during the war. It was named after Adem Demaçi, whose ideas inspired Albanian nationalist movement in the Yugoslav period.
During the 2024 electoral campaign, the manifestations of Albanian nationalism repeatedly became focus of public attention. One of the most high-profile cases involved Ali Ahmeti, head of the Democratic Union for Integration, chanting the abbreviation of the so-called National Liberation Army of Macedonia during a rally in Skopje in Aril 2024.[2121]
Samuel Sadikario, President of the Holocaust Fund of Macedonian Jews, repeatedly pointed out that qualifying such tendencies as the glorification of Nazism or its supporters in the Albanian community, remained an issue. According to him, the episodes of collaboration with the Nazis are glossed over by Albanian historiographers, who highlight the "national liberation aspect" of their activities.
It should be noted that North Macedonia has been waiting for the EU membership for 17 years. The country's negotiations with Brussels were first blocked by Greece who disagreed about the country's name, then the integration was hindered by Bulgaria due to the two countries' differences as to history, language and identity.[2122]
In this context, the country's obligations under the Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighbourliness and Cooperation it signed with Bulgaria (2017) and the Prespa Agreement it signed with Greece (2018), are fraught with the risk that it will have to revise its textbooks to take into account its neighbours' wishes. The bilateral historical commissions established under the pressure from Sofia and Athens are used to erase the facts of Bulgarians' and Greeks' collaborationism during World War II from textbooks, primarily the occupation of the greater part of modern North Macedonia's territory by Bulgaria.
At the inauguration ceremony in the parliament on 12 May 2024 the president elect of the country Gordana Siljanovska Davkova representing a moderate nationalist party Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for For Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE) referred to the country by its former, rather than constitutional, name1, which brought about rebukes on the part of Brussels, Athens and Sofia. The latter called the president to strictly abide by the international treaties and negotiating conditions.[2123]
Sofia had opposed the admission of the North Macedonia to the EU citing the "infringement of the rights of Bulgarian minority" as a reason. In accordance with the dispute settlement formula, Skopje had to introduce provisions to that effect in its constitution, establishing Bulgarian minority as one of the Reoublic's constituent peoples. To do that, the decision heeded to be approved by a qualifying majority of the members of its Parliament (80 out of 120 members) and the President.
VMRO-DPMNE, which won the parliamentary elections in May 2024, has repeatedly made it clear that they will do "nothing of the kind".[2124]
As the Euronews TV channel reported, as far back as January 2024 the members of parliament representing VMRO-DPMNE, which then was in opposition, denied to support such amendments to the constitution. They believe that such concessions to Bulgaria would jeopardize the very existence of Macedonian nation. The considerable part of population agreed with them.[2125]
Official Sofia also demands a complete rejection of the wording "Bulgarian fascist occupiers", common in Macedonian historiography, which, in its interpretation, contributes to inciting hatred against Bulgarians living in the country.
In order to please Sofia who is blocking Skopje's rapprochement with the European Union, the Zoran Zaev government (2017-2022) authorized the removal of references to the "Bulgarian fascist occupation" from dozens of local monuments to the heroes and victims of the war. In his public speeches Mr. Zaev repeatedly called for this wording to be replaced for the neutral term "administration" that suits the Bulgarians.
In April 2022, amidst the aggravation of such contradictions with Bulgaria, cultural clubs of the Bulgarian national minority were opened in North Macedonia (Bitola and Ohrid) named after Ivan Mihailov (a 20th century political figure who denied the existence of Macedonian nation and was known among Macedonians as a Hitlerite collaborator) and Tsar Boris III (an ally of Nazi Germany, during whose reign Bulgarian troops occupied a large part of present-day North Macedonia and conceded to the Nazi demand to gather and deport Jews from the occupied areas and send them to death).[2126] At the same time, a delegation of the Bulgarian government, headed by then Prime Minister Kiril Petkov, attended the event in Bitola.[2127] Tome Blazevski who headed the Ohrid club said that his organization had not aimed to provoke, but wanted to show respect to the former tsar.[2128]
Jewish community groups of North Macedonia expressed concern over the decision to name the organization after Tsar Boris III. Left groups and nationalist of North Macedonia joined the Jewish community in expressing their indignation at the decision of Bulgarian ethnic association to name itself after a monarch who took part in the Nazi policy during the Second World War[2129].
VMRO-DPMNE announced that it would work for the adoption of legislation preventing the establishment of similar clubs and the use of names connected with fascist past. According to Rasela Mizrahi, member of parliament representing the party, the opening of such clubs is "more than a provocation".[2130]
The opening of the clubs caused an extremely negative reaction on the part of Macedonian public[2131]: hundreds of protesters in Ohrid (in the south of North Macedonia) carried posters saying "No negotiations with fascists" and egged and stoned the premises of the club guarded by the police.[2132]
The protests led to the adoption by Parliament in 2023 of amendments to the Law on Political Parties (2004)[2133] and the Law on Associations and Foundations (2010).[2134] According to them, it is prohibited to use names and abbreviations inciting hatred on the grounds of race, religion, etc., as well as glorifying the ideas of fascism, Nazism and their supporters. This equally applies to previously established organizations, which were ordered to bring their titles into full compliance with the amendments.
This, in turn, has resulted in displeasure in Bulgaria with allegations that their compatriots in North Macedonia are being systematically discriminated against and harassed.
The following incidents fueled the fire.
In May 2022, the Left Forces opposition party filed a lawsuit against L.Gergievsky, chairman of the Mikhailov Cultural Centre, accusing him of inciting ethnic hatred by posting numerous online publications that, according to the party, are offensive to Macedonians.
On 4 June 2022, during a visit to Skopje by Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria Teodora Genchovska, the front door of the club building was set on fire in protest by Mr. Alabakovski, a famous North Macedonian singer, which gave the Bulgarian leaders a reason to declare the continued oppression of compatriots in the neighboring country.
On 19 January 2023, the secretary of the Tsar Boris III Club in Ohrid, H.Pendikov, was beaten.[2135] Bulgaria claims that the attackers' actions were prompted by ethnic hatred. The trial in question is still ongoing.[2136]
Cases of discrimination on both ethnic and political grounds continue to be recorded in the country as a whole.
Since beginning 2024, the attention of the North Macedonian media – against the backdrop of the upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections in April‑May 2024 – is increasingly focused on suspicions of obstruction of the electoral rights of the Macedonian diaspora, allegedly planned in advance by the current ruling coalition: the greater part of ethnic Macedonians living abroad (up to 100 thousand persons according to various assessments) – North Macedonia's citizens sharing primarily anti-government opinions – have been unable to receive new national travel documents (taking into account the change of state name due to the Prespa Agreement of 2018) on time (until 12 February 2024) due to the complexity and length of the passport replacement process (according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of North Macedonia, only about 50 thousand people received them). Thus, among Macedonians who had "left," there was a fear of voting in the territory of North Macedonia (the availability of polling stations outside the country remains uncertain) due to consequences that could come later (not being able to return to their countries of residence as documents are no longer valid.)
A separate problem is the incitement of hatred against a number of ethnic groups, primarily Roma, who are in the most unfortunate situation among national minorities.
Gypsies (Roma, Ashkali, Egyptians) number 53.9 thousand people, or 2.7 percent of the population of North Macedonia, being the third largest national minority after Albanians and Turks. About 95 percent of Roma live in cities with more than half in Skopje, concentrating, as a rule, in the poorest – "ghettoized" – areas. The main places of compact residence are located in the capital Shuto Orizari (the only municipality in the world where the Roma language has official status) as well as in the communities of Bitola, Gostivar, Kocani, Kumanovo, Prilep, Tetovo, Shtip and others.
The living conditions often do not meet minimum sanitary requirements and are characterized by poorly developed infrastructure, overcrowding and lack of access to social services.
Thus, outside Skopje, only 16 percent of Roma households are equipped with indoor sanitary facilities, 50 percent are not connected to the sewerage system, 58 percent have access to tap water only outside the house/apartment, 10 percent are completely deprived of sources of both drinking and tap water. 53 percent of residential premises are affected by dampness. 63 percent of Roma live in permanent buildings, 29.5 percent – in dilapidated or prefabricated buildings, 7.25 percent – in shelters built from scrap materials (metal sheets, cardboard, plastic, polyethylene, etc.). The average Roma household consists of five people. In more than half of them, there is less than 5 sq. meters of living space per family member.
Many Roma do not have identification documents or certificates of ownership of the residential premises they occupy and are deprived of access to education and the employment market.
The amendments to the law on Civil Status Acts adopted in June 2023 received positive feedback from human rights organizations. According to the amendments, persons unregistered at birth (about 700 people), mainly Roma, were to receive national identity documents by the end of 2023.[2137] Minister of Internal Affairs Oliver Spasovski expressed confidence that this measure will have a positive impact on the image of the Republic of North Macedonia.
By 2021, the authorities planned to build 32 residential complexes (1.7 thousand apartments) throughout the country to accommodate vulnerable categories of citizens. Although the experience of recent years shows that Roma get no more than 15 percent of such housing stock.
The low standard of living of the gypsies, begging and garbage collection often make society to treat them with disdain.
The European Commission's 2021 report on Skopje's progress on the Eurotrack notes "limited progress" in the integration of Roma into North Macedonian society, citing rising unemployment rates among the Roma community every year.
The reports of the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights for 2020[2138] and 2023[2139] emphasize several significant anti-discriminatory novelties in the Macedonian legislation. For example, a new law on Primary Education has been adopted, which explicitly prohibits discrimination, encourages inter-ethnic integration and provides for the creation of an institute of educational intermediaries for Roma children from socially disadvantaged segments of the population. Similar institute of mediation for Roma exists in the area of healthcare to facilitate access to medical institutions and services for them.
However, the level of social integration of representatives of Roma communities remains low. The authorities say that pre-school institutions have been attended by about 500 Roma children and 250 Roma students study in higher education establishments.
A clear example of discrimination on ethnic grounds is the decision of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in the case "Elmazova and others v. North Macedonia".[2140] It was determined that for many years more and more Roma children are subject to segregation in the educational process.
In the same spirit is the case "Memedova and others v. North Macedonia"[2141] (October 2023). The ECtHR found that North Macedonia discriminated against four of its citizens of Roma origin on the basis of their nationality and violated their right to free movement.
Resolution of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe (CM/ResCMN(2023)2) on the implementation of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities by North Macedonia of 8 February 2023, calls on the authorities to increase enrolment in pre-school institutions and resolve de facto separate education for Roma. Besides, it points out the need to improve teaching conditions in languages and of the languages of national minorities.[2142]
Besides, the Council of Europe's European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI)[2143], in its latest report, criticizes the school system, which is still "largely segregated" by language (Macedonian and Albanian). Students in both groups are often taught in separate buildings or in shifts. The problem of social marginalization of the Roma community remains unresolved. According to ECRI experts, for example, the unemployment rate among Roma is "significantly higher".
Problems with the legal status of the Bektashi Sufi order remain outstanding. After the collapse of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), their community, which in 2000 was included in the state register of religious organizations, began to function however, with the adoption of a specialized law in 2007, the community failed to undergo re-registration and, in fact, remains outside the legal field.
Ethnic conflicts remain a wide-spread phenomenon in North Macedonia. They are mostly recorded by law enforcement agencies as domestic crimes. Human rights and international organizations, such as the local Helsinki Committee office and OSCE Mission to Skopje, have repeatedly pointed out to this fact in their reports, but the trend is still there despite amendments to the Criminal Code of North Macedonia penalizing hate crimes as a separate offence.
In 2023, the Helsinki Committee documented 1171 cases of hate speech. Of these, 646 were based on ethnicity. It was reported that "hate speech, as a malignant social phenomenon, is increasingly prevalent in public discourse."[2144]
According to statistics from govornaomraza.mk, a portal aggregating complaints about the use of "hate speech" on the Internet, from 2013 to the present, 1,749 such cases have been recorded, of which 875 are based on ethnicity, 66 on skin colour, 46 on religious denomination. Besides, 38 cases of hostility towards representatives of foreign states or international organizations were noted.
A trend common to European countries is becoming characteristic of North Macedonia: an increasing interest in the ideas of the right-wing extremist "subculture" among young people.
"Hate speech" is widespread at sports events, where fans' offensive nationalist slogans often spark a rise in inter-ethnic tensions. As a rule, they are quite mobile, highly active and have a pronounced propensity for violence.
For example, at the match between Shkupi and Vardar in November 2023, Shkupi fans used nationalist slogans such as "Skopje will become the heart of Albania."[2145]
An incident involving the Albanian Shverceri group is illustrative. In November 2019, during its 30th anniversary celebration, members of this group trashed the Macedonian National Theatre, causing noticeable material damage to the building.[2146]
At the same time, radical manifestations are also characteristic of Macedonian supporters. In June 2019, members of the Komiti group, while celebrating the victory of the Vardar handball club at a European tournament, chanted: "Death to the cursed Shqiptars"[2147] "A good Shqiptar is a dead Shqiptar"[2148].
A year earlier, a Komiti activist was murdered. According to human rights organizations, the crime was directly linked to animosity between fan communities. Its coverage on social media was accompanied by a surge of nationalist rhetoric.[2149]
The issue of neo-Nazism manifestations among the new generation is being discussed by the Union of Fighters of the 1941-1945 Macedonian National Liberation War and its successors, the North Macedonia's main veterans' organization. Its representatives emphasize the topicality of this issue, pointing out the need to address and prevent it within the current public youth policy.
Hopes for strengthening control over compliance with the rights of illegal migrants are pinned on the signing in October 2022, of an agreement between North Macedonia and the EU Border and Coast Guard Agency Frontex, which provides for joint patrols of the state border.
According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of North Macedonia, in 2023, about 100 Agency employees have been working on the Greek-North Macedonian section of the state border. The migration problem keeps the country's small security bloc under pressure. According to experts, "supervision" of Western colleagues should exclude incidents related to violations of the rules for treating illegal migrants.
In April 2023, police officers of North Macedonia, in a shootout during an inspection of two cars near the town of Gevgelija on the border with Greece, "accidentally" shot a 23-year-old woman. The incident allegedly happened when the law enforcement officers tried to arrest a suspect in organizing illegal immigration.[2150]
According to human right defenders, the social protection system does not apply to those in the most disadvantaged and vulnerable position: they have limited access to social allowances due to the complicated procedures and criteria of acquisition of rights thereto (at the same time, the amount of these allowances is still inadequate).[2151]
In the first quarter of 2022, the State Commission for Prevention and Protection against Discrimination received 57 complaints from individuals and legal entities. The case of an 11-year-old pupil from Gostivar with Down syndrome received the most publicity: the parents of her classmates, in the form of a petition, demanded that the girl be banned from attending school due to allegedly aggressive behaviour, with which the management of the educational institution initially agreed. The President of the country, Stevo Pendarovski, had to intervene and in February 2022, as a sign of support, he personally brought the child to classes.[2152]
International human rights monitoring mechanisms indicate a significant number of difficulties faced by women in North Macedonia.
There is a disproportionately low level of economic activity and employment among women, in particular representatives of the Roma and Albanian communities, as well as the predominance of women in unskilled/low-paid jobs and positions.[2153]
There are barriers to education for girls belonging to ethnic minority groups. There has been a high rate of girls forced to drop out of school, including primary school. The largest number among them goes to women and girls living in rural areas as well as representatives of the Roma community.[2154]
Violence is common, especially against ethnic minority women. However, not all incidents are registered by the competent authorities. Reporting statistics are understated. This has been pointed out in particular by UN human rights treaty bodies such as the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)[2155] and the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD).[2156]
Child and forced marriage continue to exist, despite laws prohibiting marriage under the age of 16 and restricting marriage for those aged 16 to 18. This problem is especially relevant for women from the Roma and Albanian communities.[2157] Human rights activists note that this practice does not meet the proper response from the authorities.[2158] There is also a continuing tradition of "buying" child brides, mainly affecting girls living in conditions of poverty and social exclusion, especially in remote areas.[2159]
Interfaith relations in the country remain tense. In the everyday sphere, this is expressed, for example, in rejection of the appearance of representatives of another religion.
The demonstrated intolerance due to individuals' belonging to a certain religion is often interspersed with ethnic intolerance.
The number of Russian compatriots in North Macedonia, as estimated, is about 10 thousand people (0.5 percent of the total number of residents.) There has never been an official count of Russians living in the country. However, during the last census in the country, held in September 2021, 303 people identified themselves as ethnic Russians. (in 2002 – 368 people.)
The legal status of Russian citizens in the country is regulated by a number of legal and regulatory acts. The basic document that enshrines the political and civil rights and freedoms of national minorities in the Republic of North Macedonia is the Constitution. The conditions of stay of Russian compatriots in North Macedonia are regulated by the Law on Foreigners of 5 June 2018, as amended and supplemented on 30 July 2021. There are no special legal norms regarding our compatriots in the national legislation, as Russians in North Macedonia are not given the status of a national minority.
There are no official reports published by international organizations, governmental and non-governmental structures on the respect for fundamental human and civil rights and freedoms with regard to our compatriots. At the same time, there are no systemic concerns regarding the protection of the rights and legitimate interests of citizens of the Russian Federation in North Macedonia. As those coming from post-Soviet states share same values, culture, and language, find North Macedonia a comfortable enough environment and are easily integrated. No cases of bias or discrimination against Russian compatriots on the basis of national, ethnic or social grounds were reported in North Macedonia in 2023 – first half of 2024. The Macedonian law enforcement authorities did not initiate criminal proceedings against any Russian citizens.
Since 2010, the Government of North Macedonia has, on an annual basis, unilaterally cancelled visas for Russian citizens entering the country for tourism, business and humanitarian purposes for a period of up to 90 days. In March 2022, the visa-free regime was not extended by the North Macedonian side under the pretext of the launch of the Special Military Operation.
Most Russian compatriots are orthodox. Meeting their spiritual needs had previously been difficult due to the unresolved canonical status of the Macedonian Orthodox Church. By its decision of 5 June 2022, the Serbian Orthodox Church officially granted autocephaly to the Macedonian Orthodox Church, referred to Archdiocese of Ohrid (MOC‑AO), which was recognized by the Russian Orthodox Church on 25 August 2022, allowing its parishioners to participate in worship services. In 2014, former honorary consul of Russia in Bitola Sergey Samsonenko (in December 2023, together with his wife was included in the U.S. sanctions list) started the construction of the church of the Russian Orthodox Church in Skopje, but due to administrative problems it was actually suspended.
In North Macedonia, there are state and non-governmental actors in charge of interaction with national minorities. In 2009, the Agency for community rights realization was established. Its main responsibility is the realization of rights, preservation of the ethnic and cultural identity of peoples who constitute less than 20 percent of the total number of the country's residents, making them part of the cohesive North Macedonian society, ensuring the right to receive education in one's mother tongue, get a job, form associations, etc. In January 2024, the Agency, with active support from the OSCE, drafted the so-called "National Strategy for Development of Inter-culturalism and Social Cohesion for 2024-2026" aimed at creating a cohesive society in the country that would exclude the domination of one community over others.
The Emigration Agency is responsible for protecting the rights of the Macedonian diaspora. This state structure carries out work to support emigrants from Northern Macedonia, aimed at identifying Macedonian communities in other countries and maintaining contact with them, improving the situation of Macedonians abroad and providing them with the necessary legal assistance, implementing measures to preserve national and cultural identity, creating conditions for the return of emigrants and their inclusion in the economic and socio-political life of the country.
Also, the World Macedonian Congress (WMC), a non-governmental organization founded in 1899 in Geneva (Switzerland) as the "Macedonian Parliament in Exile" and officially registered in 1990, supports the Macedonian diaspora. Its goal is to ensure the rights of ethnic Macedonians at the international level and to form an alternative government abroad. Currently, the WMC has little political influence both in Northern Macedonia and beyond. The United Macedonian Diaspora is another international non-governmental organization established in 2004 in the United States, which primarily focuses on promoting the interests of ethnic Macedonians.
Ideas of fascism and neo-Nazism are not popular in the country. The authorities and civil society generally recognize the need to combat the glorification of Nazism, neo-Nazism and other forms of xenophobia and related intolerance. The state maintains a respectful attitude toward the memory of the soldiers-liberators, fulfills its international legal obligations to maintain Soviet war graves and monuments, and regularly allocates funds for their maintenance and repair.
The situation in the field of combating the glorification of Nazism, neo‑Nazism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and other similar practices in Slovakia has not changed significantly from mid-2023 to the first half of 2024.
Official Bratislava strongly opposes a number of radical organizations that seek to whitewash the activities of the leaders of the pro-Nazi Slovak state of World War II, and pursues a policy aimed at suppressing their activities. The official authorities also seek to improve the hostile attitudes of Slovak society toward ethnic minorities, especially Roma, but this work is far from over.
The attitude of Slovak society to the memory of the Deed of the Red Army, which liberated the countries of Europe from Nazism, was clearly manifested in the perception of the dismantling by the authorities of the Prague 6 district of the monument to the USSR Marshal, twice Hero of the Soviet Union Ivan Konev, who commanded the 1st Ukrainian Front from May 1944 until the end of the war. This blasphemous action of the authorities of the Czech Republic capital has had a strong resonance in the Slovak media. In an interview with Sputnik news agency, the former Prime Minister of Slovakia Jan Carnogursky supported the placement of the dismantled monument in Russia, meanwhile he noticed that the public organization he headed, back in December 2019, proposed to purchase a monument from the Prague authorities so that it could be erected in Slovakia.
After the demolition of the monument to Ivan Konev, the Charter 2015 and Slavitsa public organizations in Slovakia launched a flash mob called "Slovak Challenge – I am grateful" with an appeal to the public to publish on the Internet their photographs taken until 9 May at the burial sites of the Red Army soldiers or memorials devoted to them in all liberated countries, including Slovakia and the Czech Republic, in order to recall the Deed of the Red Army. The dismantled Prague monument to Ivan Konev was chosen as the emblem of the project. In addition to personal user accounts, it was proposed to use other social networks and the websites of organizations-authors of the project as sites for placement.
Many media outlets controlled by Western media conglomerates are engaged in falsifying history. Under the pretext of not accepting the special military operation for the denazification and demilitarization of Ukraine and the protection of civilians in Donbas (special military operation), a number of organizations, as well as some municipal authorities, are refusing to hold joint military memorial actions with the Russian Embassy.
In December 2023, when the Resolution on combating glorification of Nazism, neo-Nazism and other practices that contribute to fuelling contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, introduced annually by Russia and other co-sponsors, was considered by the UN General Assembly, the Slovak delegation voted against it, just as in 2022 (while it had always abstained before), as directed by the EU Brussels.[2160]
An amendment to the Act on the Immorality and Illegality of the Communist System, which came into force on 1 December 2020, banned the placement on monuments and memorials of texts, images and symbols that glorify, promote and defend a regime based on Communist ideology or its representatives (does not apply to Soviet symbols on existing monuments, graves and memorials).
On 8 May 2022, Zuzana Čaputová, who served as President of Slovakia, signed a decree awarding posthumously the Order of Ludovit Štúr of the First Class to members of the Slovak anti-communist organization White Legion of the late 1940s and early 1950s A. Puchik, A. Tunega and E. Tesar (executed by decision of the Czechoslovak Supreme Court in 1951). The award was given for "outstanding services in the development of democracy, human rights and freedoms".
However, according to historians, these citizens were active members of youth movements of the clerical-fascist regime of Josef Tiso during World War II and collaborated with the Gestapo during the German occupation. After the victory and up to the time of their arrest, they collected secret information for transfer abroad. Public pressure forced the president to admit that awarding the three "legionnaires" one of the highest state decorations was a mistake, and to promise that that would not happen again.
The Russophobic campaign unleashed by the West after Russia launched the special military operation also affected Slovakia.
There were a number of acts of vandalism against Soviet memorial sites in the country from the beginning of the special military operation until the autumn of 2023 – the monument at the Slavin central war memorial complex in Bratislava, the Soviet Army memorial in Svidnik, Maly Slavin obelisk on the grave of two Red Army soldiers, the burial of Red Army soldiers and the statue of a Soviet soldier in Nova Bošaca in the Grun Trenčín region, the memorial complex Dargovský Pass in Košický Klečenov, the Soviet Army memorial in Sečovce in the Košice region, and three times against the Soviet Army memorial on the Liberators' Square in Košice. On 14 May 2022, a modified Wolfsangel (wolf's hook), which is the emblem of the Ukrainian neo‑Nazi Azov regiment, was painted on the monument to the liberators in Piešťany. Such offenses have previously been extremely rare in Slovakia.
In 2022, on Victory Day, there were provocative events organized with the participation of Ukrainian nationalists. The NPO Peace to Ukraine, with the consent of the Bratislava authorities, held an action entitled "Victims of Ruscism Day", in which the names of Ukrainian citizens who had died in the military actions were read out at Slavin, and an exhibition of photographs depicting Ukrainian cities allegedly destroyed by the Russian army took place throughout the day.
The access to the traditional wreath-laying place, the gates of the monument, was deliberately blocked for the Russian embassy employees by anti-Russian activists early in the morning. Due to that, flowers were laid at the memorial plates on which the names of the Red Army soldiers who died during the liberation of Slovakia are carved. There was also no opportunity to commemorate the liberators for ordinary Slovak citizens, some of whom were embroiled in a conflict with representatives of the mentioned NPO.
Former Slovak Defence Minister Jaroslav Nad' accused[2161] the Slovak Union of Anti-Fascist Fighters of not condemning "Russia's military aggression in Ukraine" and of not expelling from its ranks a veteran who publicly supported Russian President Vladimir Putin and the goals of a special military operation to denazify and demilitarize Ukraine in a Slovak magazine. The politician called for the organization to be stripped of state budget subsidies.
No new cases of vandalism of Soviet memorials or provocative actions have been reported to date. No attempts to prosecute anti-fascist veterans, ban Red Army and USSR symbols, etc. have been recorded in Slovakia.
The coalition government headed by leader of the Direction – Social Democracy (Smer) party Robert Fico, which came to power as a result of parliamentary elections, stated the need to bring "democracy and freedom of speech" back to the country and restore order in agencies that had been established by the previous authorities to suppress the right to a different opinion under the guise of countering disinformation. It opposes the falsification of history and emphasizes the role of the Red Army in the victory over Nazism.
As Croatian political scientist Danijel Vrbota emphasized in a conversation with Izvestia, Fico demonstrated with his election victory that "pro-Russian rhetoric does not lead to electoral defeat". "It is also an indicator that European voters are tired of the Ukrainian conflict and want to deal with other issues, such as the economy," the expert explained[2162].
The head of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Slovak parliament, Marián Kéry, also shares a similar position. In an interview with Izvestiya, he stressed that there is a feeling of tiredness of the Ukrainian conflict in the EU[2163].
In 2024, for the first time since 2019, the Slovak government held official celebrations at the Slavin War Memorial Complex in Bratislava to mark the liberation of the Slovak capital (4 April) and the end of the war in Europe (8 May), attended by the Russian Ambassador at the invitation of Prime Minister Robert Fico.
On 8 May 2024, during the Victory over Fascism Day ceremony at the Slavin Memorial Complex, Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico stressed that it was the Red Army that played the most important role in defeating fascism, winning World War II and liberating Czechoslovakia, stressing that this fact "creates a strong bond between the people of Slovakia and the people of the former USSR and it cannot be changed"[2164].
A report by the local Pravda newspaper (Pravda) noted that applause erupted at the event when the Slovak prime minister spoke about the merits of the Soviet Union's Army, Slovakia's refusal to send military personnel to Ukraine, and his country's sovereign foreign policy[2165].
Speaking at an event marking the Day of Saints Cyril and Methodius, which is a public holiday in Slovakia, Fico said it was necessary to oppose the spread of "absurd liberal and progressivist" ideologies harmful to the country. To counter such views, he said, it was already enshrined in the constitution that marriage was the union of a man and a woman[2166].
It was ahead of the early parliamentary elections in Slovakia in 2023 that Robert Fico visited the monument to the Soldier of the Red Army, which was erected in the town of Zvolen in the central part of the country during the celebration of the next anniversary of the anti-Hitler Slovak National Uprising. In his speech, Robert Fico expressed gratitude to the USSR for liberating Slovakia from Nazism and sharply criticized the Slovak authorities ruling at that time for supporting Ukraine[2167], pointing out that they were afraid to ban Nazi symbols for fear of punishment from the [EU] Brussels and Washington. Robert Fico also called for opposing Nazism and fascism in all its manifestations[2168].
"Western media know about fascists and Nazis in the ranks of the Ukrainian army and openly talk about it, but they do not condemn the right‑wing radical groups in the Ukrainian armed forces. Take the Azov regiment, whose members are obvious fascists. Do you know what they say in Slovakia? The Banderites and others who fight there are just street hooligans on the margins of the society. I have never seen a street hooligan with a machine gun on a tank. But they serve in the army and do terrible things[2169]," the politician added, expressing dissatisfaction with the fact that the West "rolls out the red carpet" in front of such formations. Moreover, those who support the promotion of Nazism are "trampling on the legacy of the Slovak National Uprising"[2170].
Robert Fico also condemned the ban on studying Russian literature imposed in Ukraine and called on the audience to reject manifestations of Russophobia: "Slovakia is a small country, a Slavic country. It is in our vital interest to have good relations with all countries, including Russia [2171]."
According to Robert Fico, the conflict in Ukraine started back in 2014 by "rampant Ukrainian neo-Nazis" and Russia was deceived into believing that NATO would stop expanding. The Slovak prime minister spoke out against Ukraine's membership in NATO and against sending the North Atlantic Alliance's servicemen to Ukraine, which he said would escalate the conflict. "Slovakia is not among the countries that are interested in making an enemy out of Russia[2172]," the politician emphasized. All of these statements were published on YouTube channel Online "Here and Now" (Tu a Teraz).
L'uboš Blaga, his deputy in the party Direction – Social Democracy (SMER), spoke in unison with Robert Fico, stating that "fascism came from the West, but freedom has always come to us from the East"[2173].
Later – in March 2024 – Robert Fico emphasized that it was important for him to visit such places, as it shows his attitude to the current situation and his rejection of the new Iron Curtain policy between Russia and Europe[2174].
The actions of the new Slovak authorities have caused criticism and resistance from the representatives of liberal parliamentary opposition, who lost power (following the election results) and have recently been holding protests. At the demonstrations, protesters are demanding that the government abandon the reforms it has planned. In addition, there are calls for the resignation of the cabinet[2175].
As Croatian political scientist Danijel Vrbota explained in a conversation with the Izvestia newspaper, it was initially clear that Fico would have strained relations[2176] with the liberal opposition, which continues to use rhetoric aimed at fuelling Russophobia, together with mainstream media and NGOs controlled by Western media companies[2177]. In this regard, it is not surprising that Amnesty International NGO accused Robert Fico's government of putting human rights at the very back end of its interests[2178].
On 15 May 2024, after a government session in the town of Handlová, 190 kilometres from Bratislava, there was an assassination attempt on Robert Fico. The police detained the shooter on the spot. Slovak media reported that the assassination attempt was carried out by 71-year-old writer Juraj Cintula, who fired five shots at the prime minister as he approached to greet people near the venue of the government meeting. Fico's condition was critical and he was transported by helicopter to a hospital in Banská Bystrica, from which he was discharged only at the end of May for further recovery.
According to the Interior Ministry, Robert Fico's shooter acted alone and had previously taken part in anti-government protests, but was not linked to radical groups.
The attacker was politically motivated and disagreed with the actions of the country's cabinet, he was also opposed to the halting of arms supplies to Ukraine. He faces between 25 years in prison and life imprisonment.
In an interview with the Belarusian TV channel ONT, Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations Péter Szijjártó said: "We see the events in Slovakia as follows. After Prime Minister Robert Fico's party won the elections and it became quite obvious that the government was following a different course than the previous Liberal government, after it became quite obvious that Prime Minister Robert Fico was pursuing more of a sovereign policy, would be in favour of peace like us, a major hate campaign was launched against him. And it was then, as a result of such hatred, that the assassination attempt took place. Five shots at the Prime Minister in Central Europe at the beginning of the twenty-first century. This is insane. Completely insane!"[2179]. The Hungarian Foreign Minister also added that calls for murder and incitement to hatred cannot be considered part of freedom of speech[2180].
As reported by the RIA Novosti news agency on 2 June 2024 with reference to the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation, the assassination attempt on Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico shows that globalist totalitarian-liberal elites are moving to open political terror against their opponents, and adherents of the "globalist sect" in numerous comments on social networks approve of the crime and call for the elimination of other nationally oriented leaders, in particular Viktor Orban and the President of Serbia Aleksandar Vucic[2181].
According to Oleg Yasinsky (a Soviet and Ukrainian international journalist, independent journalist living in Chile and writing on socio-political topics), in a world of carefully constructed, cultivated and spred madness, it is quite logical that one of the few decent European politicians, Robert Fico, becomes the victim of an assassination attempt. It is even more logical that the assassin is a mature product of this new kind of society, where mass aggressive defective ignorance inevitably mutates into fascism, where the lie of tolerance proclaimed by hypocrites ricochets bullets and missiles at everything that does not fit into the planetary menagerie being built for us. The terrorist who shot Robert Fico is certainly not just a madman (and most likely not even someone's paid agent, which would at least be more rational), but even a "writer" and "intellectual" convinced that he is defending some values in this way. The system will not need paid agents, expensive mercenaries and secret geniuses of espionage, if it manages to decompose the brain and soul of the majority of its own citizens in such a way that they will start shooting everything that does not fit into their democratic chicken brain. And they will look us in the eye and talk about freedom, tolerance and progress without the slightest contradiction. There is no more dangerous creature in the universe than a morally superior moron who thinks he is the master of history. These are the creatures that the world's financial and corporate powers are now betting on, turning new educational and cultural programmes into incubators for their breeding[2182].
Following the attempted assassination of Prime Minister Robert Fico, Slovak police recorded an increase in the number of threats against the country's government members and politicians. According to Slovak police chief Lubomir Solak, politicians from the ruling coalition and representatives of the opposition received threats[2183].
At a press conference on 16 May 2024, Lubomir Solak said that the number of threats on social networks had also increased over the last 24 hours (since the assassination attempt), dozens of such messages had been recorded, and the police were trying to identify people who expressed opinions in support of the act[2184].
No facts of infringement of the rights of Russian citizens and compatriots on ethnic grounds have been noted in Slovakia.
Before the start of the special military operation in Ukraine, human rights issues in Slovakia were discussed mainly in the context of the COVID‑19 pandemic and the situation of the Roma national minority (according to the Slovak Statistical Office it is the second largest in the country – over 105 thousand people or 2 percent of the population, but according to the Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic and the European Union Council it actually numbers around 440 thousand people or about 9 percent of the population), which remains the most acute topic for Slovakia.
Human rights activists blamed the Government of the Slovak Republic for taking insufficient measures against discrimination of representatives of socially important professions, attacked by some citizens during COVID‑19 pandemic, ignoring needs of medical workers, who worked in unfavorable conditions, without sufficient protection against coronavirus infection, for low, inadequate salary for their work.
At the same time, according to the report of the EU Agency for Fundamental Human Rights (FRA) for 2023[2185], Slovakia together with several other EU member states bordering Ukraine (Hungary, Poland and Romania) removed a number of standard COVID-related restrictions for persons arriving from Ukraine.
Slovakia's major pain point is the issue of observing the rights of the Roma ethnic majority. This population group is the most discriminated against on the labour market, in the fields of education, health, crediting, housing provision, as well as in places of public catering, hairdressing shops, religious organizations and public transport[2186]. Because of their situation in the country, Bratislava has been criticized for many years by the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the European Commission, the EU Human Rights Agency, etc.
Human rights activists are concerned about the lack of ownership rights for Roma, the displacement of Roma communities to the outskirts of populated areas and their isolation, causing the formation of mono-ethnic enclaves – "osadas", which are virtually uncontrolled by law enforcement agencies and are often hotbeds of criminal activities.
President of the European Parliament's Committee on Regional Development Younous Omarjee, who visited an informal Roma settlement in Petrovce nad Laborcom in July 2022, confirmed this fact[2187]. He characterized as "a disgrace for Slovakia and disgrace for Europe" the fact that some Roma "lived in medieval conditions".[2188]
According to Amnesty International, in late 2023, a disproportionate number of the Roma were still living in unsafe dwellings with inadequate access to water, sanitation and electricity[2189].
The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) also pointed out the intolerable living conditions of Roma in segregated settlements.[2190]
In 2020, the FRA voiced concern about inadequate protection of Roma people in the face of the coronavirus pandemic. According to the Agency's assessments, discrimination against and persecution of the Roma population has increased in Slovakia as well as several other EU countries under the pretext of combating the spread of COVID‑19[2191].
Above all, it was this ethnic minority that faced violence, discriminatory identity checks, and fines. Dozens of informal Roma enclaves were forcibly quarantined without any legal grounds and under strict police control, NGOs have documented discrimination in Roma access to vaccination. For instance, by August 2021, only 7 percent of the "osada" population had been vaccinated, whereas the national vaccination rate at the time had achieved 43 percent[2192].
Due to government-imposed quarantine and self-isolation regimes, many members of the Roma minority lost their income sources and their minor children (about 70 percent of them) lost access to education, since they could not participate in distance learning for the lack of Internet.
The FRA information materials on the impact of the pandemic on human rights include findings of a survey by the Slovak Education Policy Institute. According to this document, some 50,000 children, mainly from poor localities, many of them inhabited by Roma – did not participate in distance learning at all during the first wave of the pandemic.[2193]
Acute criticism is still related to the segregation of Roma children. The authorities are blamed for the excessively high percentage of Romany minors enrolled in separate classes or special remedial schools. According to statistics, almost 90 percent of pupils in such schools are Roma.
According to the European Commission (EC), which since 2015 has been prosecuting Slovakia for breaching the Race Equality Directive due to unlawful segregation of Roma children in general-education and special schools, in 2022 Slovakia became the country with the highest proportion of Roma segregation in education in Europe — 65 percent of pupils of Roma origin between the ages of 6 and 15 attended schools where Roma predominated among students[2194].
In 2022 and the beginning of 2023, the country's Supreme Court decided for the first time that the Ministry of Education was responsible for segregation at schools in the town Stará Lubovňa and the village of Hermanovce[2195].
But it did not make much difference to the situation. By late 2023, the share of Roma children taught separately from their peers had not reduced: most cases of segregation of Roma children continue to be registered across Eastern Slovakia (Stará Lubovňa, Medzilaborce, Krompachy, etc.).
As for the level of academic performance of Roma children, the statistical data for the country is rather discouraging. According to a joint report by the Slovak Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Education, Roma students are seven to eight times more likely to stay for a second year and eight times less likely to make it to university.
The UN Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights emphasized this issue, pointing, inter alia, to shortcomings in ensuring the right to education in one's native language. For instance, teaching in some languages is offered as an optional course. In addition, amendments to Act No. 29/1984 on the Basic and Secondary School System (Education Act) led to the closure of a number of small educational institutions teaching in minority languages[2196].
In addition to the legislative reforms, Slovakia has adopted a number of strategies and action plans to facilitate the inclusion of Roma children into the education system.
Starting from September 2021, Slovakia has introduced compulsory preschool education for 5-year-old children. This initiative aims to increase the primary school participation of Roma[2197].
Following a thorough examination of these measures and monitoring of the situation on the ground, the European Commission concluded that the legislative reforms undertaken by Slovakia for Roma integration were ineffective[2198].
Due to insufficient consideration of discrimination against Roma children at school and the breach of the 2000 EU Race Equality Directive, the European Commission decided to bring an action against Slovakia before the Court of Justice of the EU[2199].
According to the FRA 2024 report, such an action was filed by the EC in April 2023.[2200] Trials in Slovakia for violations of the rights of Romani children were also referred to in the FRA 2022 report.[2201]
A vivid example of the excessive use of force and cruel treatment by Slovak law enforcement officials against minors was the news widely reported in the national media about the alleged beating by police officers of five Roma minors, who violated the quarantine regime, in the settlement of Krompachy on 27 April 2020.
The situation came to the attention of the Romani Union of Slovakia, the Plenipotentiary of the Government of the Slovak Republic for Roma Communities, and the Slovak National Centre for Human Rights, which called on the Ministry of Interior and the head of the police personally to conduct a thorough investigation of the case.
Slovak President Zuzana Čaputová (held office from 15 June 2019 to 15 June 2024), who has regularly advocated minority rights, and the Council of the Government of the Slovak Republic for Human Rights, National Minorities and Gender Equality also responded to the situation and called for "consistent respect for human rights and freedoms during the national emergency situation".
The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) within the Council of Europe stated that although the investigations into police brutality were not thorough enough yet, Slovakia had managed to put an end to large‑scale police operations in Roma neighborhoods. It was also noted that in the country the use of body-cams was promoted as a means of preventing possible arbitrary acts by the police[2202].
Discriminatory treatment of members of Roma ethnic minority, especially women, in medical institutions has also been reported. The Human Rights Ombudsman and the NGO Civil and Human Rights Advice Center raised the issue of the illegal sterilization of thousands of Romany women and demanded that they be compensated accordingly. The issue was raised at a meeting of representatives of the Roma minority with members of the National Council of the Slovak Republic. This led to an official apology of the government in November 2021, but the compensation mechanism was never implemented.[2203]
It is worth noting that the CESCR, in further work to monitor the implementation of its concluding observations on the outcome of the review of Slovakia's 3rd Periodic Report, has essentially questioned the ability of that country's authorities to effectively investigate involuntary sterilizations of Romany women. Moreover, Bratislava was criticized not only for the extremely vague, lack of crucial specifics nature of the information submitted by Slovakia to the Committee regarding the investigations in 2021, but also for a lack of consistency in the collecting of such data.[2204]
In 2020, the Slovak Academy of Sciences published a representative survey to find out the attitudes of the majority population toward the Romany community. The survey showed that a significant portion of respondents (80 percent) tended to agree with the statement that Romany people in the country undeservedly receive social benefits. It also turned out that nearly two-thirds of respondents held openly negative stereotypes about Roma and only half of those surveyed tended to agree with statements emphasizing the value of Romany culture[2205].
The survey also showed that respondents' assessments were in solidarity with hostile statements by politicians who spoke negatively about the Romany population, in particular about the lack of job skills of most Romani, as well as about the high crime rate in Romany communities.
As a result of society's hostility towards Roma, there are cases of discrimination against them. For instance, in 2017, Ladislav Rač went to a café with his daughter and a friend, who is also Romani, where they were refused service by the staff on the pretext that it was a private club catering exclusively for members with club cards. It later turned out that this argument was just an excuse and that in fact the institution had a well-established practice of refusing to provide services to members of the Roma community. It was not until six years later in 2023 that the court found a violation of the law. The guilty were obliged to apologize and pay compensation for moral harm.[2206]
Claims by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) and NGOs remain relevant for Slovakia regarding police brutality during arrest and detention and manifestations of intolerance, particularly against Roma and Muslims.
In its report on Slovakia for the sixth monitoring cycle, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance found that investigations into the use of force by law enforcement agencies were inadequate.[2207]
In 2021, as a result of proceedings before the ECHR, the government of the Slovak Republic was forced to apologize to six Romani citizens "for their mistreatment during the police raid in Moldava nad Bodvou".
In June 2022, the ECHR published a judgement on the settlement of the case, with the Government of the Slovak Republic undertaking to pay financial compensation. However, the perpetrators were never punished and the necessary measures to prevent and solve similar problems in the future were not taken.[2208]
In February 2023, the media reported on the ECHR's recognition of a violation of the rights of six Roma who had been subjected to police violence in 2009 at the Košice police station, where they had been brought, allegedly on suspicion of theft.
State and local authorities are trying to focus on tackling the Roma problem. In April 2021, a new comprehensive Roma Equality and Inclusion Strategy to 2030 was adopted (the previous one was valid in 2012-2020). The Government has an Ombudsman for Roma Issues, and numerous programmes are being implemented aimed at involving and integrating members of this ethnic minority into the public environment.
One of the most striking examples is the project of the "Horehronie" multifunctional centre in the village of Valaská-Piesok (Central Slovakia Region), where opportunities have been created for education, training, employment, participation in sports and cultural events for the Roma people and other socially disadvantaged groups.
In settlements with large Roma communities, special "Roma civil patrols" have been introduced to monitor public order together with the local police. Special medical stations were opened in Roma enclaves.
Every year, significant financial resources are allocated to implement projects in this area, including from European funds: according to the Plenipotentiary for Roma Communities Jan Hero, for the next few years, EU funds have allocated about 907 million euros to address the Roma issue.[2209]
However, no dramatic change has been achieved so far. According to the monitoring of the Roma Inclusion Strategy conducted by the Slovak Interior Ministry, in 2019 the former government of Peter Pellegrini put into practice only 26 measures of the 121 contained in the document to support this population group.
The 2023 FRA Report[2210] indicates that the Office of Ombudsman for Roma Issues set up monitoring teams at borders to prevent any unequal treatment of people of Roma origin coming from the territory of Ukraine.[2211]
There are problems with the transition of five-year-old children, most of whom are Roma children, to compulsory schooling. It is noted that, despite the adoption of the Recovery and Resilience Plan and other measures taken by the authorities to integrate Roma children into society, as described in the Slovak National Strategy for Roma Children 2021-2030, the situation is in fact worrying. Kindergartens do not have sufficient capacity, there is still a shortage of staff, the quality of preschool education is low, and segregation of Roma children continues to be a problem.
It should be noted that Roma are not the only nation whose rights are violated on the Slovak territory.
The Slovak authorities also selectively violate the right to private property with regard to national minorities living in the territory of the State.
In the context of the decision taken to confiscate the property of Russian citizens on the inherently unlawful EU sanctions lists, it is worth drawing attention to a similar situation faced by ethnic Hungarians and Germans.
According to Amnesty International, refugees and migrants also faced inhuman treatment by the police in 2023[2212].
Starting from 2018, a significant national initiative is carried out in Slovakia to increase the availability of aid for crime victims. In 2019, eight points of contact were established in different regions across the country. Victims can obtain specialist aid, including psychological assistance, legal guidance, and social and economic advice.[2213]
The Concluding Observations on the fourth periodic report of Slovakia, published by the UN Committee against Torture in 2023, point to the absence of a definition of torture in national legislation. It is also noted that penalties for the crime of torture may be limited to two years' imprisonment and that the provision of the Criminal Code criminalizing torture does not explicitly state that no exceptional circumstances whatsoever may be invoked as a justification for torture. It was recommended that the Government of Slovakia amend its national legislation in accordance with the provisions of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment[2214].
The Committee also pointed out the imperfections in the process of detention, including of minors, as well as in the treatment of detainees. In particular, such persons do not always have actual access to free legal aid, in some cases this possibility is provided only upon arrival in court or after their detention. Police officers are present during the initial medical examinations of detainees, as a result of which the confidentiality of information on the results of the examinations is not adequately ensured. Detainees are given insufficient information about their rights and are not allowed to inform a family member or a third person of their detention if the investigator considers that this may interfere with criminal proceedings. Minor suspects are held in inappropriate conditions and interrogated in the absence of their parents, lawyer or other authorized person.
The UN Committee against Torture also points to poor prison conditions (insufficient cell space, lack of natural light, poor air circulation, etc.), strip searches of prisoners, which amount to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. The Committee also highlights the lack of qualified medical staff, including psychologists and psychiatrists, which results in limited access to mental health care for prisoners.
The main body for detecting and investigating cases of human trafficking in Slovakia is the National Unit for Combating Illegal Migration (Úrad hraničnej a cudzineckej polície P PZ), which co-operates with Interpol, Europol, police officers abroad and with police services of other countries in detection and investigation activities[2215].
According to the Ministry of Interior of the Republic, 39 people were recognized as victims of human trafficking in 2023, and criminal prosecutions were initiated in 20 cases. The suspects were charged in 12 cases.
As of the end of May 2024, the police have recorded eight cases this year that qualify as human trafficking[2216].
There were 58 victims in 2022: 23 men and 35 women, most of whom were girls, the youngest being eight years old. By 30 September 2021, 36 such cases had been identified in the country. One-third of them are girls aged 12 to 17, who are most often sold into sexual slavery (the target countries are Great Britain, Ireland, Germany, Czech Republic, Austria) or become victims of forced marriage "in accordance with Romany traditions" (more than 15 such cases have been recorded by the Ministry since 2015).
Illegal adoption of a child as well as attempted organ removal were recorded for the first time within the framework of combating human trafficking in 2021[2217].
With the growing number of cases of human trafficking in Slovakia, the most frequent victims of such offences are Roma.
In order to comprehensively analyze and address this problem, Slovakia implemented the National Programme for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings from 2019 to 2023. According to the Slovak National Centre for Human Rights, the Programme included 30 persons in 2023 (45 in 2017), mostly Roma from the Eastern Slovakia Region.
Despite the government of the Slovak Republic seeking to pay special attention to measures to improve the living conditions of the most vulnerable groups (minors, women, the elderly, persons with disabilities), some problems in social and economic sphere persist. Gender equality has not yet been achieved, despite the measures taken by the authorities in this area. There is still a fairly high level of violence against women, including harassment and domestic violence.
The UN Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), in its concluding observations following the examination of Slovakia's seventh periodic report, circulated on 31 May 2023, made a number of observations in the area of protection and promotion of women's rights[2218]. The Committee is particularly concerned about the high degree of hate speech that targets Roma women and women politicians.
Since the end of February 2022, the human rights situation in the Slovak Republic has been viewed mainly in the context of Russia's special military operation to demilitarize and denazify Ukraine and protect the civilian population of Donbas. In fact, the country introduced censorship under the pretext of countering disinformation: the only channel of Russian television broadcast in this country, Channel One, has been switched off. Any criticism of the authorities or support for Russia is met with persecution.
In Slovakia, the Cyber Security Act was passed, allowing authorized bodies to block "harmful" content on the Internet. In 2022, based on this law, the Slovak National Security Authority blocked online news portals such as "Hlavne spravy," "Armadny magazin," "Hlavny dennik," and "Infovojna" regarded as pro-Russian by local politicians and the media. The portals resumed their activities in the second half of 2022, when their 'penalty' period had expired.
In March 2023, the Slovak Council for Media Services (supervisory authority in the field) initiated administrative proceedings against the news TV Channel TAZ and Radio Frontinus in relation to "a possible biased interpretation presented in journalist programmes".
In the case of the former, the programme that had raised questions was "Takto?! " dedicated to the "conflict in Ukraine" featuring an interview given to journalist A.Zhitna by American Professor of Economy Jeffrey Sachs, who had spoken out against arms supplies to Ukraine and emphasized the importance of peace talks. The video of the economist's commentary was promptly removed from the source. This was followed by A.Zhitna's publication in Facebook stating that the TV channel's administration had fired her for this incident.[2219] The channel denies this information. Member of the National Council (parliament) of the Slovak Republic Marian Kery spoke in support of the journalist who had faced sanctions.[2220]
As for Radio Frontinus, it made the mistake of inviting a pro-Russian opposition politician L. Blaga to participate in a discussion.[2221]
Migration policy, for the rigidity of which Slovakia has traditionally been criticized, has been adjusted.
In May 2021, the Center for Ethnic and Cultural Studies published a study that noted a deteriorating trend in public attitudes toward migrants in the Slovak Republic.
According to the study, the majority of those surveyed feel that foreigners contribute to crime (65 percent) and insecurity (62 percent), and many of those polled have bad attitudes about "refugees from Syria" (68 percent) and "Muslim families" (64 percent). The document states that this situation is the result of the spread of hatred against minorities[2222].
In 2021 Bratislava accepted only 29 out of 370 applications for asylum, declared its readiness to receive only ten citizens evacuated from Afghanistan, and joined the demands to protect European borders in connection with the situation on the Polish-Belarusian border.
However, between the end of February and the end of December 2022, some 95,000 Ukrainian citizens were granted temporary asylum on Slovak territory, according to published figures. The state has allocated around 5 million euros for their accommodation (in the form of payments to local administrations and individuals who have agreed to host refugees). Problems with their rights are not often discussed here, although reports have begun to emerge concerning the difficulties Ukrainians face, for example, in finding work.
The register of political parties and movements on the website of the Slovak Interior Ministry[2223] includes an official record of the People's Party "Our Slovakia" (ĽSNS), whose representatives have been repeatedly found to promote extremist ideas with elements of racial hatred against Roma and migrants. The party is also notorious for its statements on Holocaust denial, its positive assessment of the activities of the leader (from 1939 to 1945) of the Slovak clerical-fascist state during World War II, Jozef Tiso, who deported tens of thousands of Slovak Jews to Nazi death camps and, after the end of World War II, was sentenced to death by hanging for high treason[2224]. The leaders of the ĽSNS have been repeatedly brought to court for their radical statements.
For instance, law enforcement authorities repeatedly detained the leader of the ĽSNS, Marian Kotleba, for chanting nationalist slogans during mass events, but in no case the charges have been brought against him. In 2014, he was elected for one term as the Chairman of the Bansko-Bystrica region. During the 2016 elections, the L'SNS passed to the National Council (Parliament) of the Slovakia, having gained about 9 percent of the vote. In the spring of 2018, in response to the appeal of the Prosecutor General of the SR, Jaromir Ciznar, the Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic recognized the activities of the L'SNS as not being contrary to the law. In the presidential election on 16 March 2019, Marian Kotleba took the 4th place (10.4 percent of the vote).
In the 23 March 2024 presidential election, out of nine candidates, Marian Kotleba came 8th out of nine candidates (0.56 percent of the vote), being among the six contenders who failed to get more than 3 percent of the vote[2225].
Following the parliamentary elections in February 2020, the party received 7.97 percent of the vote, thus securing 17 parliamentary mandates (out of 150) and once again forming a full parliamentary faction in the National Council.
In public and political circles in Slovakia, the L'SNS is explicitly called Nazi and regarded as disreputable. Nevertheless, for a long time it was able to keep a significant part of its voters providing 6-10 percent of the vote. Ratings fell dramatically after the party split and some MPs left the party in the spring of 2021. Following the September 2023 elections, the L'SNS failed to enter parliament.
The Concept of Countering Radicalization and Extremism until 2024 and related documents[2226] note that local right- and left-wing forces remain few and fragmented, and religious extremism is not recorded. Nevertheless, it is taken into account that the geographical location of the country may attract persons linked to international Islamist groups involved in terrorist activities as a safe haven or planning ground for terrorist attacks in other countries.
There is an obvious significant growth of hate speech in Slovakia in recent years and the decline in the level of public debate, which is a fertile ground for deepening manifestations of extremism, especially on social networks. It is clear that extremist groups are trying to influence society through hobby clubs, in which military personnel are also involved. Radicals capable of individual terrorist action also pose a danger.
Local pseudopatriotic associations of extremist and nationalist nature number about 2,000 people, are highly organized, and effectively use legal forms of work through the creation of public associations (Slovak Public, New Free Slovakia, Slovak Youth Union, etc.). They put an emphasis on social media in their propaganda work.
Law enforcement agencies actively use modern information technology to automatically analyze Internet traffic to identify and curb manifestations of religious intolerance and calls for extremism.
To counter the spread of extremist ideas among the younger generation, specialized agencies are stepping up explanatory work among children and young people, including by expanding the program for teaching the history of World War II in secondary school. The state-supported NGO "Slovak Union of anti-Nazi fighters" is doing a lot of work in this area with the support of the National Ministry of Education.
The legal basis for combating neo-Nazism, racism and racial discrimination is the Criminal Code of Slovakia. The list of extremist crimes is contained in Article 140A. They include, in perticular: acts related to the creation, support and propaganda of movements whose actions are directed against fundamental rights and freedoms; the production, possession and distribution of extremist materials; denial of Holocaust and criminal political regimes and crimes against humanity; oppression of certain nationalities and races; incitement to national and racial hatred; apartheid and discrimination against certain groups of citizens (Articles 421-424).
In addition, the perpetrator's hatred of the victim based on the victim's actual or perceived belonging to a particular race, nation, national or ethnic group, as defined by special motives (Article 140), is considered an aggravating circumstance requiring a harsher punishment. At the same time, the absence in Slovak criminal legislation of criteria of nationality and language among the characteristics of potential victims of racist behaviour and racial discrimination has been the subject of criticism by the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance[2227].
In addition, the Anti-Discrimination Act is implemented. However, in ECRI's opinion, the act is not properly applied because the Slovak National Centre for Human Rights, mandated to monitor its implementation, does not fully comply with the Paris Principles relating to the establishment and functioning of national human rights institutions approved by the UN General Assembly resolution and lacks the necessary independence[2228].
According to the SR Interior Ministry report on extremism approved by the government on 9 November 2022, right-wing extremism dominates in Slovakia with 97 percent of all cases. Hate speech was reported against Roma (43.1 percent), Jews (27.7 percent – a fivefold increase compared to 2019), migrants, including people of colour (12.7 percent), and Muslims (55 percent), with a significant increase among secondary school students. The dissemination of extremist ideology, conspiracy theories and disinformation, according to the Slovak Information Service, is increasingly carried out via the Internet and social networks, especially Facebook.
There were 68 racially motivated extremism offences in 2022 (38 in 2021, 115 in 2020, 85 in 2019, 159 in 2018), about half of them online and on social media. The average clearance rate for such criminal cases is about 35‑40 percent (compared to about 35‑37 percent in 2020[2229]).
Since 2017, the investigation of criminal cases related to organized crime, corruption, abuse of power, terrorism and extremism has been entrusted to the Office of the Special Prosecutor, whose staff has been markedly expanded by government decision, as well as to the Special Criminal Court. The Ministry of Justice of the SR has established an expert Council for Social and Human Sciences dealing with extremism. Its absence used to be an obstacle to a thorough detection of the relevant criminal offences. The new body works in two thematic areas: political extremism and religious extremism.
Since the end of 2023, numerous protests have been taking place in the country as a reaction to the Fico-led government's initiative for a major reform of the criminal law. This involves the elimination of the Special Prosecutor's Office and the reduction of penalties for certain economic and property offences.
The main organizers of the protests are the three parties that are represented in parliament but are not part of the government coalition.
According to the opposition, the amendments to the criminal law could negatively affect the efficiency of justice and provoke an increase in crime in Slovakia, while the proposal to close the Special Prosecutor's Office is due to the fact that the government wants to stop the investigation of politically sensitive cases.
Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico has repeatedly stated that he will not give up the idea of closing the Special Prosecutor's Office, because this agency has repeatedly violated human rights during investigations and simply changing its head (from 2021 – Daniel Lipšic), who is guided in his activities by political motives, would not be enough.
In early February 2024, the opposition held protests with anti-government slogans in 19 cities in Slovakia, including Bratislava. This initiative was also supported by some civic activists, holding rallies in 11 other Slovak cities. Such rallies were held abroad as well: in Prague, Krakow, Paris, Oslo and five other different cities outside Slovakia.
The European Commission and the U.S. Embassy in Slovakia have "requested" that the Slovak government not rush to close the Special Prosecutor's Office, pointing out that such sweeping changes require careful analysis[2230].
The activities of far-right associations are kept in the field of view of the Slovak Information Service and the Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic. In particular, the Slovak Ministry of Interior has had a Crime Prevention Directorate in place since 2012. It has formed a so-called group to monitor Internet resources in order to identify calls for extremist or terrorist activity. The law enforcement agency has signed a contract with Altamira Company to develop a special software product that can analyze content in automatic mode. This IT tool was later improved to recognize manifestations of religious intolerance and calls to extremism in the Internet space of States bordering Slovakia.
In 2017, a national counter-terrorism unit was established. It consists of four branches (Bratislava, West, Center and East) and supplements the center for extremism monitoring. Employees of this special police unit also actively monitor extremist organizations throughout the Internet space.
Commenting on this, Robert Fico, who also served as Prime Minister in those years, said: "A new wave of fascism has risen not only in Europe but also in Slovakia. We neglected the lessons of history, no one expected that fascism could return... In parliament and regional authorities we can meet people who use the fascist salute. Every day we see people who try to redefine the Holocaust and the results of World War II"[2231].
In order to debunk myths and refute false information regarding minorities, the "Anti-Hate" website was created within the framework of the project of the SR Ministry of Interior titled "Effective Monitoring, Investigation and Suppression of Violent Extremism in Cyberspace"[2232].
Educational activities and programs aimed at preventing manifestations of anti-Semitism, racism and extremism, as well as the radicalization of society, are also carried out by the Holocaust Museum in Sered established within the framework of the Slovak National Museum.
The issue of racial intolerance, especially among radical youth, is occasionally raised in the Slovak media. This usually occurs in connection with hate crimes committed.
One such high-profile case was the murder of a Filipino national, Henry Acorda, in the centre of the Slovak capital in June 2018. Found guilty of a criminal offence, the far-right Slovak national was sentenced to six years in prison. The prosecutor's appeal requesting a tougher sentence was rejected by the court.
The issue of racism in Slovak society has been noted by international monitoring bodies.
In particular, experts of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination[2233] and the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child[2234] expressed concern about persistent and growing hate speech in the media and on the Internet, the use of racist political discourse among politicians against ethnic minorities, including Roma, Muslims and non-citizens. Proceedings in racial discrimination cases continue to be excessively long, a circumstance that negatively affects victims' effective access to justice[2235].
It has been noticed that victims of hate crimes frequently fail to notify state authorities about the incident, in part because they do not trust the police[2236].
The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights noted with concern the general atmosphere of hostility towards migrants that persists in the country and the numerous instances of hate speech against this background. According to Committee experts, this atmosphere contributes to the erosion of tolerance in society and leads to violations of the rights of minorities and vulnerable groups. The CESCR also criticizes Slovakia for ineffective judicial protection for victims of racial discrimination, especially Roma, migrants, and asylum seekers.[2237]
In its sixth report on combating intolerance and racial discrimination in Slovakia, published in December 2020, ECRI noted an increasing trend in the use of hate speech directed against certain groups, such as Jews, Muslims, migrants, Roma and people of African descent. The situation is exacerbated by the fact that the media, both traditional and electronic, overrepresent negative information about this segment of the population, which prevents the creation of a positive image of these categories of people. Very little hate content is removed from the Internet.[2238]
Often, discrimination on the basis of citizenship is addressed by the state bodies of the Slovak Republic themselves. For example, in July 2022 the Ministry of Interior of Slovakia deported I.M.Kovasev and O.D.Marganiya, citizens of the Russian Federation, from the country on the accusation of the local intelligence services that the above mentioned persons posed a threat to the national security. Deportation cases are currently brought before the courts of the Slovak Republic. I.M.Kovasev won the case in the court of first instance in Bratislava, which allowed him to return to the country.
In Reporters Without Borders international organization's press freedom ranking published in May 2023, Slovakia occupied the 17th place out of 180 countries in the world (in 2022 it was 27th, in 2021 it was 35th and in 2020 it was 33rd).[2239]
As noted, the positive changes were due to the government's reforms, relatively healthy economic situation in the sector, and "increased resistance to Russian propaganda" following the change of the director of Slovakia's public radio and television broadcaster . More significant "progress" is constrained by the absence of a verdict for the perpetrator of the high-profile murder in February 2018 of Ján Kuciak, a Slovak journalist and editor of the popular online news portal www.aktuality.sk, and his acquaintance [2240].
Given the fact that, as mentioned above, with the start of the Russian special military operation, strict censorship was introduced in Slovakia and the only channel of the Russian television broadcast in the country, Channel One, was switched off, such exaggerated assessments of Bratislava's "success" in ensuring freedom of the press look at least inappropriate.
The policy of the Slovenian authorities to diminish the role of the USSR in World War II and to falsify history does not resonate with the Slovenian society that, for most part, preserves and honours the memory of the soldiers who fell fighting the Nazi occupiers.
Officials in Ljubljana overtly support the neo-Nazi Kiev regime. Since 2022, it has supplied weapons and military equipment to the Armed Forces of Ukraine that, among others, include supporters of neo-Nazi views who use the military supplies from the "collective West" to strike on civilians who opposed the arbitrary actions started by Ukrainian junta after the coup d’etat in 2014. Moreover, in July 2024, Prime Minister of Slovenia Robert Golob signed a ten-year security agreement with Vladimir Zelensky. Under the agreement, Ljubljana is obliged to explore all options to continue providing security and defence support to Ukraine.[2241] However, we should mention that these steps of the Slovenian authorities are ambiguously perceived by the citizens. This is seen in the public opinion polls that show that Slovenes understand the causes of the special military operation to demilitarize and de-Nazify Ukraine, as well as to protect civilians in Donbas, and are among the EU nations least supporting the "war in Ukraine".[2242]
Despite the pressure from the political leadership, Slovenia sees a widespread public rejection of attempts to falsify history. Veteran organizations carry significant weight in the country. The largest one among them is UVAPLS–Union of Veterans' Associations in Support of the Values of the People's Liberation Struggle in Slovenia 1941–1945. It is listed as having more than 40,000 members.[2243] Among them, there are both veterans of the anti-Nazi resistance (several hundred people) and those from next generations. Their goal is to preserve historical and cultural heritage of the partisan movement and to prevent the justification of the crimes of fascism and Nazism and further proliferation of the corresponding ideology in the modern world. UVAPLS, together with other public associations with the focus on preserving military memory, is a member of the Coordination Committee of Veteran and Patriotic Organizations of Slovenia, which plays a significant role in the socio-political life of the country.
Under the Ivan Janša administration (in power since March 2020 until April 2022), due to its intensified Russophobic policy against the background of the developments around Ukraine, the pressure on the veteran organizations intensified. In early March 2022, the Slovenian Ministry of Defence sent a circular letter to local veterans' organizations recommending that they refrain from inviting official representatives or citizens of the Russian Federation to war memorial events. The failure to comply with this condition, according to the document, provided for the automatic refusal of the Slovenian Armed Forced to participate in the events.
After the center-left coalition led by Prime Minister Robert Golob won the parliamentary elections in April 2022, stance of the Slovenian government, unfriendly towards Russia, in general remained unchanged.
Nevertheless, the perennial tradition to hold military memorial events dedicated to the developments of the XX century remains unchanged.
For example, major events in memory of Soviet soldiers who fell in the fight against the Nazi occupiers were held with the participation of staff of the Russian diplomatic mission, representatives of Slovenian veteran organizations and local residents, in Ljubljana at the monument to the Sons of Russia and the Soviet Union who died on Slovenian land during the First and Second World Wars, dedicated to Victory Day on May 9 (annually) and Memorial Day on November 1 (annually), in Trnovo Memorial Park (July 2022[2244], February 2023[2245], February 2024), in the cemetery of Brežinj village (May 2023[2246]) and others.
On a positive note, Slovenia, together with the other five former Yugoslav republics, had agreed to restore the barracks at the Nazi death camp of Auschwitz-Birkenau, where 20,000 deported Yugoslav residents had been sent to during the Second World War. The agreement was reached after 14 years of negotiations between Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia and Slovenia. Restoration works in Block 17 includes the establishment of a joint permanent exhibit dedicated to the Holocaust in former Yugoslavia, during which some 66,000 out of the country's 80,000 Jews were murdered. "This historic agreement fills a void, an absence of memory at the very site where these horrors unfolded," said UNESCO director-general Audrey Azoulay.[2247]
A significant contribution to the preservation of historical memory of the events of the war years and the decisive role of Russia in the defeat of Nazism is made by the activities of the Maribor WWII International Research Centre, located in the building of Hitler's former "death camp" for Soviet prisoners of war, where thousands of Red Army soldiers were tortured by the Nazis during the war. It regularly hosts thematic international conferences, film screenings, and excursions for schoolchildren. Recent events include international conferences (together with the Department for External Economic and International Relations of Moscow) organized as a Maribor – Israel – Sofia – Minsk – Moscow video conference "Countering the falsification of history, patriotic education, volunteer initiatives – topical areas of support for Russian-speaking youth abroad" (May 2023), "Red Army in Prekmurje. To the 80th anniversary of the liberation of north-eastern Slovenia" (December 2023), "Stalag XVIII D. 5000 Steps to Immortality" (Krasnogorsk branch of the Museum of Victory, April 2024),[2248] the exhibitions "Break out of Oblivion" (December 2022), based on archival materials about the concentration camp Stalag XVIII-D, and "Survive in Spite!" (January 2023), timed to coincide with International Holocaust Remembrance Day and the anniversary of the liberation of the Auschwitz death camp by the Red Army. At the opening of the latter event, prepared in cooperation with the Victory Museum, a video message of Director of the Museum, Deputy Deputy President of the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation Alexander Shkolnik was shown. A series of round tables, press conferences with the participation of concentration camp survivors, meetings with veterans, screenings of Soviet newsreels, round tables for students, etc., timed to coincide with the International Day of Liberation of Nazi Concentration Camp Prisoners (April 2023) and Victory Day (May 2023 and 2024) was organized.
At the same time, there are forces in Slovenia openly sympathetic to Slovenian collaborationist anti-communist military-police formations established under the auspices of the Nazi Reich ("home guards") and Fascist Italy ("armed anti-communist militia"). However, their political followers of are making every effort to whitewash Nazi accomplices, to declare all those who died in battles with anti-fascist partisans as "victims of revolutionary violence," and some of them even as "true fighters for the Catholic faith."
Attempts of the right-wing forces to ban the symbols of the Slovenian anti‑fascist movement (and, indirectly, the USSR and the Red Army) in the 1990s and in 2005-2008 were unsuccessful.
For example, in 2012–2013 the right-wing government adopted a decision (later overturned) to ban the use of the red star as a symbol of the anti‑fascist resistance of Slovenes during World War II at official ceremonies (these restrictions did not apply to Russian/Soviet monuments and events) and did not allow representatives of veteran organizations with partisan banners to attend Statehood Day celebrations on 25 June 2012.
In 2021, on the eve of the celebration of the 30th anniversary of Slovenia's independence, the center-right government of Janez Janša once again openly declared that the presence of standards with the five-pointed star was unacceptable, as a result of which the event was boycotted by UVAPLS and a number of other veteran organizations, as well as some left-wing politicians.
Besides, since 2009, representatives of the right-wing forces have made unsuccessful attempts to pass through parliament a document "in support" of the European Parliament resolution on European conscience and totalitarianism. In 2009, the Slovenian State Assembly "took note of the text of this document." The latest, also unsuccessful, attempt to adopt a parliamentary declaration of similar content at the national level was made by Slovenian right-wing parties in June 2022.[2249] Slovenian MEPs supported the European Parliament resolution "On the importance of preserving historical memory for the future of Europe" and appealed to the Slovenian State Assembly (Parliament) to adopt its provisions as a guide to action.
The previously little-known decision of the Supreme Court of Slovenia to overturn the death sentence passed in 1946 on General Leon Rupnik, a Slovenian collaborator who led the "Slovenian Home Guard," was widely publicized in 2020. The conviction of the Nazi collaborator was overturned on grounds of alleged "procedural defects in the 1946 military trial."[2250] The Simon Wiesenthal Center protested Rupnik's rehabilitation. "This shameful decision constitutes a shocking distortion of the history of the Holocaust and a horrific insult to Rupnik's many victims and their families," the center's Eastern Europe director, Efraim Zuroff, wrote in his letter to Ambassador of Slovenia to Israel.[2251] An appeal against this decision of the Slovenian Supreme Court to the Slovenian Constitutional Court was filed by a number of individuals and organizations, including UVAPLS, the Ljubljana City Council, and the Jewish Community of Slovenia. In November 2020, the Constitutional Court ruled to temporarily suspend the decision to annul Leon Rupnik's sentence. A new judicial investigation into the case of Leon Rupnik was also suspended and then recognized impossible, due to the death of the defendant, as a result of which it would have been possible to rehabilitate him in court.
In 2020‑2021, the central authorities, sticking to revisionist approaches to the history of World War II, officially organized wreath-layings to the monuments to the fighters of collaborationist Slovenian national army (officially existed from January to May 1945, one part of it was under Wehrmacht's command, while the other served under SS[2252]) in Zale, a memorial in Ljubljana.[2253] At the same time, national veteran organizations were outraged by the refusal of the then Prime Minister Janez Janša to lay wreaths in memory of the fallen anti-Nazi partisans during the memorial ceremony held on 2 November 2021, on the occasion of the annual Memorial Day.
Under the center-left, the open demonstration of historical revisionism on the part of the country's state leadership ceased, giving way to general debates about the importance of democratic values promoted by the West and a complete silence on the contribution of the USSR and Russia to the victory over fascism.
The pseudo-scientific historical work of a right-wing politician, the mayor of the municipality of Radenci Roman Leljak, who made a documentary in 2018 and published a book "The Myth of Jasenovac," is noteworthy. In his works, referring to alleged archival documents, he tried to expose "propagandistic manipulation" of the number of victims in the Croatian death camp Jasenovac, created in 1941 by the fascist Ustasa regime and the German occupation administration for the genocide of Serbs, Jews and Roma. The Slovenian expert community, media and civil society representatives strongly condemned Leljak's attempt to rehabilitate Nazism. Croatia perceived Leljak's actions as revanchism and mockery of the memory of the victims of genocide and banned him from entering the country.
The results of the vote on the European Parliament (EP) resolution on recognizing the 1932-1933 famine in Ukraine as a "genocide" are in the same line of activities to falsify history and substitute historical facts to please Western curators. For example, out of 90 members of the Slovenian State Assembly (Parliament), 67 people voted in favour of the document. The resolution, adopted by the EP on 15 December 2022, states that "the famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine was caused by a deliberate policy of the Soviet regime" and uses the term "a genocide against the Ukrainian people."[2254] The adoption of this "resolution" is of blatantly propagandistic character—it imposes a distorted perception of the historic past. This biased document glosses over the fact that the famine of that time affected the entire Soviet Union, mainly the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, while in Ukraine itself "areas with predominantly Russian population"–Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnepropetrovsk and Odessa regions–were affected more.[2255]
During the 78th session of the UN General Assembly in 2023, the Slovenian delegation, in line with the common position of the EU countries, yet again voted against the resolution "Combating glorification of Nazism, neo‑Nazism and other practices that contribute to fuelling contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance" (it had traditionally abstained from voting until 2022).
There are cases of desecration of monuments to anti-Nazi partisans who fought against the Italian and German invaders during World War II in Slovenia. For example, in early September 2021 in Ljubljana, a monument to the 24 hostages – victims of shootings carried out by the Nazi occupiers on 13 October 1942 as a response to the murder of the political activist and collaborator Marko Natlačen was vandalized.[2256] On the night of 3 July 2019, six different monuments commemorating the heroes and victims of the Yugoslav People's Liberation War during World War II were desecrated in different parts of the capital. This act of vandalism was condemned by the President of Slovenia and representatives of the Slovenian Ministry of Culture.[2257]
In January 2021 in Ljubljana, unidentified hooligans damaged the Eternal Flame gas burner installed at the monument in the Žale memorial complex to the Sons of Russia and the Soviet Union who died in Slovenia during World War I and World War II. The city authorities of the Slovenian capital, who publicly defend objective approaches to the history of World War II and the joint struggle of the peoples of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia against Nazism, promptly took measures to fully restore the memorial.[2258]
The neo-Nazi groups in Slovenia are generally marginal. They are not officially associated with any influential political forces. Scattered radical associations include "Here is Slovenia," "Headhunters," "Autonomous Nationalists of Slovenia," and the "Slovenian Identity Generations," the local branch of the pan-European right-wing youth movement, as well as others. There are also followers of the European neo-Nazi organization "Blood and Honour" in the country. In recent years, they have all been using predominantly social media to promote their ideas and keep in touch. Shielding themselves with pseudo-patriotic slogans, these organizations oppose migrants, Muslims, Roma, immigrants from the former republics of Yugoslavia.
The problem of the existence of radical nationalist forces in the country attracted special attention in 2024 by the extremist group Slovenian Defensive Guard, which first published a video on social networks with a "migrant tied to a shameful pole" and on 7 June 2024 held an unsanctioned rally in the center of Ljubljana under anti-migrant slogans, attended by about 50 people who hid their faces.[2259]
In response, in July 2024, the center-left government coalition initiated in the parliament amendments to the law "On the Maintenance of Public Order," which would impose administrative, and possibly criminal, liability for "actions to glorify and justify Nazism and fascism." This legislation is scheduled to be debated in the second half of 2024.[2260]
Despite the fact that Slovenia adopted legislative acts prohibiting racially motivated discriminatory hate speech, racist and xenophobic language against persons belonging to minorities, as well as migrants, refugees and Roma was noticed in public statements of some politicians. The UN Human Rights Committee, among other things, pointed this out.[2261]
Experts of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), which operates within the Council of Europe, have criticized the fact that the normative regulation of criminalization of the use of hate speech has a number of serious shortcomings. First, as stated in Slovenia's Criminal Code, Article 297 (1), the commission of this offense must be done "in such a manner that the law and public order may be endangered or violated, or by force, threats, profanity, or verbal abuse." Second, the 2013 legal opinion of the Office of the Slovenian Attorney General states that the conditions defined in the article must be met cumulatively rather than alternatively, and that a causal link between hate speech and a specific danger to public order is a mandatory requirement.
In 2021, in evaluating Slovenia's implementation of the recommendations subject to interim monitoring, ECRI noted with interest the creation of a working group within the Slovenia's Office of the State Prosecutor General which aims, among other things, to harmonize the various practices of prosecuting those who have resorted to hate speech. Moreover, the Commission welcomed the July 4, 2019 decision of the Supreme Court of Slovenia that interpreted Article 297 of the national penal code more broadly. It implies, in particular, that the aforementioned requirements for culpability should be viewed as alternatives and that the offender's behaviour need not necessarily pose a particular threat to public policy in the eyes of the court. Subsequently, in light of this decision, the relevant instructions were sent to law enforcement agencies from the Slovenia's Office of the State Prosecutor General. Nevertheless, the experts noted with concern that the proposal to formally and fully align the previous legal opinion with the new court decision was rejected by the prosecutor's office. In practice, however, nothing has changed significantly: despite the significant increase in the number of hate speech cases before the police, the number of indictments prepared by prosecutors remains relatively small.[2262]
In addition, an omission is the lack of an effective remedy in the event that the prosecutor rejects the victim's complaint or makes a decision to refuse to initiate criminal proceedings. In 2005, the Ljubljana Higher Court stated that an individual has no right to initiate prosecution himself if the case concerns incitement to hatred and violence. In 2013, Slovenia's Office of the State Prosecutor General determined in a legal opinion that in cases where hate speech is directed against a community or group as a whole, individuals belonging to such a community or group cannot be considered victims.
Among ECRI's repeated recommendations to the Slovenian authorities is to organize the collection of disaggregated data for the purpose of combating racial discrimination. In 2021, the experts were forced to note that there had been no progress in this area either: at the time of the Commission's concluding observations, there were no plans to adopt legislation that would ensure such collection while respecting the principles of confidentiality, informed consent and voluntary self-identification.[2263]
Amendments to the Mass Media Act have been prepared (currently in the process of approval), including those defining a way to protect public interests if the media publish materials inciting hatred, including measures to eliminate violations: immediate removal of illegal content and sanctions for media outlets failing to comply with the law.
On a positive note, amendments to the Criminal Code (Law KZ‑1J, adopted by the National Assembly on 27 January 2023) should be noted. According to the amendments, the commission of a crime motivated by racial hatred and xenophobia in all its manifestations qualifies as an aggravating circumstance.
ECRI has also noted manifestations of religious intolerance in the country.[2264] As an example, vandals attacked the construction site of the country's first Islamic centre and mosque in Ljubljana – in 2016, unidentified persons threw pig heads at the construction site of the building.
Opponents of the project (mostly right-wing politicians and followers of radical ideas) twice tried to prevent the construction of the Muslim complex in 2004 and 2009, demanding a referendum, but the Constitutional Court rejected these requests both times.
It is noteworthy that until the completion of the above-mentioned complex in 2020, there was not a single mosque in the country – until then, Muslims performed services and ceremonies in rented premises and gymnasiums, despite the fact that the Muslim community is the second largest religious group in the country (after Christians).
In February 2021, the then Prime Minister Janez Janša was criticized by the country’s Muslim community for insulting the Muslim holy scripture. The post, which he shared on his social media account, claimed that "the Quran is the only book that has caused so many deaths, gave rise to pain, violence, poverty and social degradation." For its part, the Islamic Association of Slovenia strongly condemned the prime minister's position.[2265]
In May 2021, three Muslim graves in the cemetery in Domžale were desecrated. According to media, an unknown perpetrator doused the graves with red fluid and scattered pieces of meat on them.[2266]
There is an ongoing discussion in the human rights community about the wearing of the hijab in health care facilities. The Ministry of Health is requested to create a suitable regulation that will systematically control the question of whether medical professionals nationwide are prohibited from wearing the hijab or have the option to do so.[2267]
Some Christian shrines were also desecrated. In January 2021, unidentified persons intentionally damaged unique wall murals in the Church of St. Nicholas in Ljubljana.[2268]
Anti-Semitic views find support, and discriminatory manifestations against the Jewish community are not uncommon, especially given its small number. In April 2024, a delegation from the World Jewish Congress (WJC) visited the country amid a surge in anti-Semitism. During the visit, the delegation, consisting of WEC representatives from 11 countries, met with top officials, diplomats and representatives of the Slovenian government. Following the visit, the delegation noted the generally constructive nature of the interaction with Slovenian representatives.[2269]
The Constitution of Slovenia mentions three national minorities – Hungarian, Italian (Article 64) and Roma (Article 65). The essence of the problems related to the situation and rights of national minorities is that a certain set of rights is recognized only for autochthonous national minorities (which, according to the Slovenian Constitution, are Hungarians and Italians). Slovenia ratified the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities in 1998 and still applies its provisions to persons of Hungarian, Italian and Roma origin. Nevertheless, there are a number of shortcomings in its practical implementation.
Radio and television broadcasts include programs in Hungarian, Italian and Romani, the duration and frequency of broadcasts in Hungarian and Romani have been assessed by the experts of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (ACFCNM) as insufficient. Moreover, the Committee has indicated that the languages of other national communities should also be heard on television and radio, and information about them should be included in broadcast programs in order to promote social cohesion and better understanding.[2270]
Despite requests for official recognition by the German-speaking ethnic group as well as the Albanian, Bosnian, Croatian, Macedonian, Montenegrin and Serbian national communities, they have been denied national minority status and protection by the authorities year after year.[2271]
One of the most pressing human rights problems in Slovenia, as assessed by international human rights monitoring mechanisms, remains the situation of the Roma community numbering from seven to twelve thousand people. Article 65 of the Slovenian Constitution, the Act on the Roma Community in the Republic of Slovenia (2007), the Act on Local Self-Government (2009), under which the Roma participate in the public administration process at the municipal level, define the status and special rights of the Roma. The Government adopts a National Program in support of Roma (the latest one for 2021-2030). There were also institutional structures, such as the Council of the Roma Community of Slovenia and the Commission for the Protection of Roma Rights, composed of representatives of the Roma community, municipalities, and public authorities. Despite all this, Ljubljana has not yet been able to make significant progress in improving the situation of Roma.
The Human Rights Ombudsman P.Svetina, in the Report on the Human Rights Situation in Slovenia 2022, reiterated the need for more active cooperation between the state and local authorities in addressing the situation of Roma. In doing so, the Ombudsman points to problems related to the legalization of Roma settlements.[2272]
In 2021, the Ombudsman succeeded in getting the government to instruct municipalities to adopt detailed sector programs and measures in accordance with the Act on the Roma Community in the Republic of Slovenia. At the same time, the Ministry of Education, Science and Sports amended the relevant regulations and approved the introduction of the position of Roma assistant in kindergartens, elementary school and elementary schools with an adapted program in the next school year.
School attendance by Romani children remains low. Despite increased government efforts to enrol Romani children in preschool institutions, enrolment is very low.
Roma children are disproportionately represented (in relation to the share in the general population) in specialized schools for students with mental disorders. The prevention of segregation in schools was officially stipulated in the 2004 Strategy for Roma Education and Upbringing, and a year earlier the creation of classes composed exclusively of members of this national minority was prohibited.
The issue of housing and material living conditions is particularly acute. The majority of the Romani population lives in deplorable conditions and faces obstacles limiting their access to education, employment and health care.[2273]
In May 2022, the ACFCNM found that since 2017, the number of Roma settlements in Slovenia without electricity, water supply and sewerage has not decreased. Inadequate housing conditions slow down the process of integration of this group into society and have a devastating impact on the quality of life of its individuals.[2274] For example, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) was concerned in March 2023 about the poor state of health of Roma women, which, according to experts, is linked, inter alia, to socio-economic factors, such as unhealthy living conditions, low levels of education and poverty.[2275]
The UN Committee against Torture (CAT) notes the prevalence of child and/or forced marriages in the Romani community and the high rate of early pregnancy among Romani women. In this regard, the lack of convictions for forced marriages is questionable, despite the fact that this act is criminalized under article 132a of the Slovenian Criminal Code.[2276]
Both international (Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Council of Europe, etc.) and national human rights organizations criticized the amendments to the Aliens Act adopted in January 2017 (Article 10a "Complex migration crisis," Article 10b "Measures taken in the course of the complex migration crisis") which allows the Parliament to close the border for migrants for a period of 6 months with the possibility of extension in case of a threat to national security.
On 28 March 2023, the National Assembly of Slovenia adopted amendments to the Employment and Work of Aliens Act to simplify the procedure for hiring workers from non‑EU countries. However, the amendments did not enter into force until November 2023, since they had been vetoed by the National Council in April 2023. Pursuant to the law, additional discussion and a second vote were held to override the veto. For example, in November 2023, members of the Slovenian National Assembly (lower house of Parliament) yet again voted in favour of amendments to the Aliens Act which provide that the period when a foreigner is entitled to reunification with his or her family shall be reduced from two years to one year. In addition, the condition for extending residence permit to family members of foreign workers will be changed from A1 level language skills to the so-called "survival level" which, in turn, consists in the ability to communicate in different everyday situations.[2277]
Shortcomings in ensuring the rights of migrants and asylum-seekers are widely highlighted in the CAT Concluding Observations issued on 7 December 2023. The overcrowding in the Ljubljana and Logatec accommodation centers for applicants for international protection as well as the poor material conditions in these facilities have been noted. A number of steps taken by the authorities to alleviate this situation are also mentioned.
Experts express concern that, despite the legal prohibition of refoulement (Article 72 of the 2011 Aliens Act), there are cases of pushbacks and refoulement based on bilateral readmission agreements, notably those recorded between mid‑2018 and the end of 2021, that facilitated "informal return" within 72 hours and without sufficient safeguards against potential refoulement of people who had entered the country irregularly and had not yet expressed an intention to seek asylum.[2278]
While taking into account the 2023 Regulation providing for the proper treatment, accommodation and care of unaccompanied minors, the experts criticize the lack of adequate shelters for this category of migrants in the country, as well as their placement in refugee centres or student hostels where they are not provided with care that takes into account their individual needs.
CAT continues to emphasize the inadmissibility of detaining minors in a centre for foreigners. In this regard, an inconsistency is pointed out between Article 76(4), Article 82(3) of the Aliens Act (which, under certain circumstances, allow for the detention of children in such centres) and Article 84(2) of the International Protection Act, which provides for a strict prohibition of such detention. For example, in 2022, there were 172 children and 67 unaccompanied children, including one victim of trafficking in the refugee reception centre in Postojna.[2279]
The 2020 report of the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), citing information from the Human Rights Ombudsman in Slovenia, states that there is a practice of forced return to Croatia, without any procedural guarantees, of people detained at the border of the state who have not applied or have not been able to apply for refugee recognition.[2280]
Since the Robert Golob government came to power, the situation, according to various NGOs, has improved. The dismantling of fences on the border with Croatia continues.
The ECRI also praised Slovenian society’s response to acts of intolerance and incitement to hatred, especially those directed against immigrants and asylum seekers. Thus, in 2017, the municipality of Nova Gorica, in response to the distribution of stickers containing offensive slogans addressed to refugees, issued an order to remove them immediately. In May 2018, about one hundred people marched peacefully in Ljubljana against the use of hate speech in the election campaign for early legislative elections.[2281] In March 2023, the Government of Slovenia established an independent advisory body, the Strategic Council for the Prevention of Hate Speech, which, in July 2023, developed and published relevant recommendations addressed to the government and public authorities, as well as to educational institutions, media, NGOs, and social media users.[2282] The problem remains relevant, especially during election campaigns, including the European Parliament elections[2283] in June 2024.
The problem with the "erased," the citizens of the former Yugoslavia who had a permanent registration in Slovenia but were removed from the list of permanent residents in February 1992 under the Aliens Act, is still present on the human rights agenda. Amendments to the country's legislation adopted in 2010 made it possible to restore the status of 12,000 people who fell into this category. In total, according to Slovenian human rights defenders, there are more than 25,600 such persons.[2284]
In 2012, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), while reviewing the complaint of a group of the "removed" (Kuric and Others v. Slovenia), found that Slovenia had violated the prohibition of discrimination in the enjoyment of rights guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as well as the rights to protection of private and family life and to effective legal assistance. The ECtHR ordered the Slovenian government to develop and approve a scheme for the payment of compensation to the "removed" within one year.
Following the decisions of the ECtHR and the Slovenian Constitutional Court, the relevant law has entered into force since 18 June 2014. Over the entire period, more than EUR 15.5 million in compensation has been paid.
Public apologies to the "removed" were made by the President of the Slovenian Parliament in 2017 and by the President of Slovenia in 2022.[2285]
At the same time, these groups in Slovenia are still facing great challenges, including housing problems, the amount of compensation, the legal status of the next of kin, etc. In particular, Slovenia was recommended to expand the scope of the law, adopted in 2010, regulating the status of the "removed" persons to cover the children born outside the country, provide the "removed" persons with the possibility to recover their legal status without administrative restrictions, ensure full reparation, as well as access to education, professional training and employment. The annual report of the Slovenian Ombudsman for 2022 also points to the continued relevance of the problem of the "removed."[2286]
The US authorities continue trying to reconfigure public thinking by rewriting the history of the Second World War and its results. As a rule, American authorities focus on the role of the United States and its Western allies in defeating Nazism while neglecting the USSR's substantial role in defeating Hitler's Germany.[2287] They would rather not discuss the Red Army's role in liberating prisoners from Auschwitz and other concentration camps.[2288]
In order to preserve a unipolar world and suppress the anti-colonial movement in the countries of the Global South, without neglecting the ideas of racial, ethnic, cultural and economic superiority, depriving entire peoples of the prospects for independent and cultural and civilizational development, the United States, together with Great Britain, which once were together with the Soviet Union at the head of the anti-Hitler coalition, are now openly cultivating modern neo-Nazism. The anti-Semitism of the "classical" fascism of the 1930s and 1940s in Europe is being replaced by Russophobia, migrantophobia and Islamophobia.
The USA engages a wide range of terrorist groups around the world, who are tightly controlled by intelligence agencies and work together with private military companies (PMCs). This has been and is still the case in the US military-occupied Syrian territories, where odious groups such as Maghawir al-Saura operate under the guise of "moderate opposition". Other radical Islamist groups also operate under the cover of the US occupation forces in Syria.
Washington's tradition of turning to war criminals goes back decades. After World War II many German Nazis and Italian fascists were integrated with American consent (including CIA direct support) into the US power and scientific structures, as well as into the governmental circles of the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy.
Similar processes took place in other European countries as well. At Americans' suit, a number of Hitler's generals were promoted to high posts in the Bundeswehr and NATO structures. Abwehr, Gestapo and other Nazi structures were of considerable help in readjusting Western intelligence agencies to work during the Cold War.
Americans took the captured Japanese General Ishii Shiro, known for his criminal experiments in testing the effects of viruses, bacteria, radiation and chemicals on living people in occupied China, to the USA and tasked him with developing biological weapons in exchange for guaranteed immunity from prosecution as a war criminal.
In pursuit of the elusive goals of destroying the Russian world, splitting Russia into pieces, exterminating its peoples and eventually simply wiping it off the political map of the world, the United States is unceremoniously imposing neo-Nazi ideology on Europeans.
Together with its European allies, the United States is actively using militant nationalism and neo-Nazism in all its manifestations as one of the instruments of the new phase of the global confrontation between the West and Russia. They are labelling Nazism/neo-Nazism, as well as fascism, to create an enemy image for any anti-liberal and conservative forces that are in favour of developing constructive relations with Russia, which they see as the last "bastion of tradition".
Through foreign non-profit NGOs and international organizations under its control, the United States is promoting scenarios of "dismantling"/"decolonisation" of the Russian Federation as a sovereign state and creating on its territory quasi-states from outside on a mono-national basis with the subsequent genocide of the population and artificial reduction of its number.
The Americans and NGOs under their control actively support far-right and neo-Nazi movements in the former Soviet Union and Europe, calling their members "freedom fighters" and their idols among Nazi collaborators – "leaders of national liberation movements".
Ukraine has become yet another will-less victim of the obsessive and aggressive American policy. Having supported the coup d'état in 2014, the United States and its satellites have done everything for the emergence of a neo-Nazi, terrorist state in the centre of Europe and have thrown Ukraine on the rampage against Russia.
After the coup d'état, the US continued almost openly the work to "ensure Ukraine's defence and security", taking full control of its security agencies and constantly stepping up arms supplies to Kiev.
At that, the Nazi ideology and its adherents' embedding in the AFU command structure and public administration were crucial to the consolidation of military power against Russia.
Nationalists from volunteer battalions, who received generous targeted financial assistance, amounting to billions of dollars, became the mainstay in this task. In 2016-2022 (before the special military operation of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (SMO) began on 24 February 2022), Azov alone received about USD 78 million through legal channels despite the Congressional ban to finance this criminal organization.
On 10 June 2024, The Washington Post reported, citing the US State Department that the Biden administration had lifted a ban imposed years ago on the supply of arms to the Ukrainian nationalist battalion of Azov.[2289] The US State Department specified in particular that after Ukraine's 12th Special Forces Azov Brigade had been tested for compliance with the criteria of the Leahy Act by the State Department (the "Leahy Law" prevents US military assistance from going to foreign units suspected of neo-Nazism and found to have committed major human rights violations[2290]), "no evidence" of such violations were found.[2291] At the same time, the State Department spokesman declined to say when exactly the ban was lifted and whether the Azov fighters had received American weapons.[2292]
It should be noted that informally the US had been trying to ban Azov from using American weapons since 2015, but such a ban was only officially imposed in 2018, when Washington recognised that some of the battalion's founders held racist, xenophobic and ultra-nationalist views, and a number of UN human rights experts accused the group of humanitarian violations.[2293]
Back in 2023, The Washington Post quoted a State Department source as admitting that the rule had no practical effect. Congressman Paul Gosar said then that the ban was lifted after Azov fighters were included in the armed forces and National Guard of Ukraine, and also with their participation separate armed formations were created.[2294]
It is notable that the neo-Nazi terror in Ukraine, deployed immediately after the coup d'état, rested on the US long-standing experience in cooperation with terrorists and extremists.
The brainwashing of Banderist groups outside Ukraine (mainly in Canada) was initiated by the United States shortly after 1945. Since the late 1980s, the USA purposefully supported Russophobes and chauvinists and reinforced such sentiments in the Ukrainian ruling circles. "Schools for young politicians" that taught "colour revolutions" by US methodology manuals actively worked under the control of Western NGOs. They not only taught their students about the strategy and tactics of coups d'état, but also fostered aggressive Russophobia. CIA-funded training camps were set up in Ukraine and Eastern Europe where fighters from far-right and neo-Nazi organizations were trained under the guidance of NATO instructors to become perpetrators of terror in Ukraine.
In parallel, Washington launched a campaign to whitewash the Ukrainian Nazism and collaborators of Nazi Germany who were chosen as its leaders. It is notable that the United States (and since 2022 their allies from a number of EU states and some other countries as well) vote against when adopting the UN General Assembly resolution "Combating the glorification of Nazism, neo-Nazism and other practices that contribute to fuelling contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance".
By "feeding" new Nazis and providing arms to those who, forgetting the postulates of the international law, want to make the whole world live according to bandit notions, the United States and other former allies of the USSR from the Second World War are, in fact, acting with more cynicism and scope than Hitler and his accomplices in the 1930s and 1940s. All this is crudely interspersed with lamentations about "helping the weak" calls for the "restoration of democracy" and threats of a full-scale conflict with Russia.
The Russophobia propagated by the US government has had a negative impact on people of Russian origin (the United States is home to one of the largest Russian expatriate communities, with over 2.8 million people, or 0.8 per cent of the total population, according to the 2020 census).
Thus, throughout 2021, about 300 Russian nationals who are permanent residents of the United States were persecuted by the American special services on far-fetched grounds, in reckless violation of their legal right to a national cultural identity and to freely maintain ties with Russia. As a result, some members of the Coordinating Council of the Organization of Russian Compatriots of the USA, including its Chair Elena Branson and Executive Secretary Sergey Gladysh, had to leave the country. In view of the situation, the Coordinating Council of the Organization of Russian Compatriots of the USA decided on 18 November 2021 to suspend its activities. In a statement, the Coordinating Council of the Organization of Russian Compatriots of the USA noted that the US authorities had created unacceptable conditions for the organization to continue its work aimed at consolidating the community, promoting the Russian language and holding commemorative events.
Russian citizens were subjected to searches, interrogations and psychological pressure, and their documents and personal belongings, including electronic devices, were seized. These actions were carried out under the pretext of investigating the activities of the Coordinating Council of the Organization of Russian Compatriots of the USA without registering it as a foreign agent in the United States. Earlier, in the 2020 US presidential election run-up, attempts had been made to threaten Russian citizens for "staying in touch" with the Russian Embassy and consular offices in the United States.
Russia has repeatedly reminded the US authorities that it is unacceptable to put pressure on Russian citizens and interfere with their right to maintain ties with their historical homeland.
After the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation started a special military operation to denazify and demilitarize Ukraine and protect civilians in Donbass on 24 February 2022, Washington has stepped up efforts to spread Russophobia actively promoted by US media and official rhetoric.
The White House, the State Department, and lawmakers have accused Russia of pursuing an "aggressive" and "expansionist" foreign policy, meddling in American domestic affairs, violating human rights, and supporting "authoritarian regimes" all over the world.
For example, Republican Senator Lindsey Graham has repeatedly made harsh statements about Russia. He advocated for the assassination of President Vladimir Putin, among others, and also called the deaths of Russians "the best money" they've ever spent.[2295] Commenting on Graham statement, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said that the senator "has something to compare it to", while such "investments" in the 20th century have led to the Holocaust and World War II.[2296]
At the instigation of the US authorities a campaign to "cancel everything Russian", has been orchestrated and has even surpassed the fanatical anti-communist campaign of the McCarthy years.
Owners of shops and restaurants, who used in the names of their businesses the word "Russian", or included Russian specialties in the menu, were one of the first to face everyday aggression. It was demonstrated mostly through petty hooliganism – insulting graffiti on walls and shop-windows, negative comments on websites, and anonymous threatening telephone calls. It was enough to spread fear among restaurant owners. Thus, Varda M., owner of The Russian House restaurant in Austin, Texas, decided to rename her restaurant as simply "The House".
Svetlana Savchits, who immigrated to the United States from Ukraine in 1993 and owns the Sveta restaurant in Manhattan, New York, received dozens of threats and insults every day. She often had to call the police to report the abuse. Because of the harassment, Svetlana has changed the style of her cuisine to general Eastern European.
Igor Kochin, president of the Russian Youth of America, confirmed the rise of Russophobia in the United States in an interview with FAN. According to Kochin, negative attitudes are becoming more pronounced, even though "no Russians allowed" signs have not yet been put up in food and drink venues and "we do not employ Russians" has not yet been included in job advertisements. In particular, Igor Kochin noted that Russian children were being pressured and bullied at school, while Russian adults were losing their jobs and were increasingly losing their source of income. Discrimination is prosecuted by law in the USA; however it is quite problematic to prove the fact of harassment based on national origin.
Because of so much negativity, many expatriates, even those who have achieved great success abroad, began to think about returning to Russia. In this regard, experts are increasingly drawing parallels with antisemitism, as a result of the upsurge in which many members of the Jewish population in Europe and America are also considering emigration. Not only the Anti-Russian narrative in the American society affects the attitude towards people of Russian origin in the workplace, but also breaks up families. There have been reports of Americans no longer talking to their Russian spouses, speaking with them or even letting them into the home.[2297]
The fact that Russian scientists had been excluded from US projects in several cases raised concerns among the local scientific community (for example in joint Arctic research projects). Things went so far that Congressman, a member of the Democratic Party, Eric Swalwell called for "Russians to be kicked out of US universities".[2298] The Educational Commission for Foreign Medical Graduates (ECFMG) has refused to certify Russian doctors. US oncology associations prompted OncoAlert, a global network of oncology professionals, to expel Russia from its membership. The NGO Space Foundation changed the name of its first manned space flight annual event from Yuri's Night to Celebration of Space.
Activists from the Russian-speaking diaspora are persecuted. Those compatriots who remain loyal to Russia are threatened with criminal prosecution for allegedly violating the Foreign Agents Registration Act adopted as early as in 1938.
Russians and Russian speakers face highly aggressive attitude by some aggressively disposed members of the US Ukrainian community. Out of fear of being attacked, Russians, similar to Jews in a number of European countries, avoid speaking their native tongue in public places. The US police staff's tolerance of facts of discrimination against Russian speakers was reported. Our compatriots fear that this will mostly affect events held in support of Russia. Even before, nationalists used to approach pro-Russian activists in an attempt to prevent their events from being held. They even entered into confrontation with police. However, our compatriots believe that one cannot expect protection from US law enforcement agencies any longer.
Even the slightest relation to Russia May trigger physical violence. An example of this May be the attack on the American blogger, Brooklyn resident, by his Ukrainian neighbour. It was provoked by the fact that the man carelessly unfolded in the street the flag of the "Somali" division – a present mailed to him by his subscriber from the Donetsk People's Republic. For this, he suffered a blow on the face that chipped his tooth. The attacker pursued him for several blocks shouting racist insults. Charges have been already brought against him, including those of committing a hate crime, and a restraining court order against approaching the blogger has been issued. The latter actually has both Russian and Ukrainian origins.[2299]
Many Russian speakers have faced harassment at work. They are often threatened, including personally, and suffer physical abuse from the hostile Ukrainian diaspora (for instance, for singing Russian patriotic songs).
The popular Rubic.us website published its readers' stories of discrimination incidents they had faced. Cases of harassment and aggression in respect of Russian children at schools, biased attitude towards and fault-finding with persons of Russian descent at work, especially on the part of company owners of Ukrainian origin, have also been reported. The number of insults online and in social media has considerably increased.[2300]
There have been attempts to substitute Russian culture with Ukrainian one. For example, the substitution of Petr Tchaikovsky's "Marche Slave" for Modest Mussorgsky's "Great Gate of Kiev" in the repertory of the University of South Carolina Symphony Orchestra, and the launch of Ukrainian language courses to replace Russian language courses rather than add to the list of foreign languages taught in a number of US universities.
Art historians and the management of Metropolitan Museum in New York labelled Ivan Aivazovsky[2301], Arkhip Quingi[2302], and Ilya Repin[2303] as Ukrainian artists (though Aivazovsky was later recognized as an Armenian). Many in the US cultural community welcomed the new Russophobic trend. They likewise approved the re-labelling of Edgar Degas's "Russian Dancer" as "Dancer in Ukrainian Dress".[2304]
Concerts and exhibitions featuring Russian performers were cancelled across the USA (including annual Pushkin evening readings held in New York). Pieces by masters of Russian classical music were removed from theatre and concert programmes.
On 24 February 2022, the management of Carnegie Hall announced that the world-renowned Russian conductor Valery Gergiev would not lead the Vienna Philharmonic Orchestra at three concerts. The performance of Russian pianist Denis Matsuev in a concert scheduled for 25 February 2022 was also cancelled.[2305] Simultaneously, Russian cultural figures and athletes are exacted to publicly denounce "Russia's policy in Ukraine".
The US authorities are persistently seeking disqualification of Russian athletes, coaches and referees from international competitions.
On 6 April 2022, the Boston Athletic Association, a non-profit association claiming promotion of healthy lifestyles as its primary purpose, announced its decision to deny Russian and Belorussian athletes – residents of the two countries – participation in the annual Boston marathon. However, non-residents are allowed to compete irrespective of their nationality. Until further notice, the organization refused to accept any sign of athletes' relation to Russia and Belarus, including the use of their national flags.[2306]
The new leader of the US Olympic and Paralympic Committee (USOPC) Gene Sykes in his open letter published on 2 February 2023 by Associated Press said that the USA favoured the return of Russian athletes to international competition if it is possible to ensure only neutral athletes who are "clean" are welcome to compete.[2307]
On 5 August 2024, RIA Novosti, citing the press service of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, reported that the United States might launch the next stage of a campaign to isolate our country in world sport with a series of publications about doping abuses. The plan is to smear Russian athletes in the "most Russian" sports – figure skating, synchronised swimming and rhythmic gymnastics. The aim of publishing compromising materials is to convince fans around the world that Russia's success in these sports is the result of the use of banned drugs. "This time, a series of "high-profile investigative publications" about allegedly revealed doping abuses in Russian top-level sports are being prepared," reported the agency.[2308]
In July 2022, the US Department of Justice put the independent non-profit organization "Center for Support and Development of Public Initiative – Creative Diplomacy" and personally its president Natalia Burlinova on the sanctions list, claiming that they "had acted or purported to act for or on behalf, directly or indirectly, of the Government of the Russian Federation" in violation of local foreign agents legislation.
In April 2023, US law enforcement authorities brought criminal charges against Natalia Burlinova for attempting to "recruit" American scientists and researchers to travel to Russia within the Meeting Russia programme, and the FBI officially put her on a wanted list. The activist was further put on the list of the notorious Mirotvorets website as "a person to be immediately detained and handed over to the law enforcement agencies of Ukraine or NATO countries."
Such aggressive steps by the US authorities are yet another example of the blatant and rough pressure of the West exerted on the expert, scientific and academic community.
In May 2023, the Chapel dedicated to the Iveron Icon of the Mother of God in Washington was vandalized when the perpetrators poured paint over the fresco of St. John of Shanghai and the walls).[2309] Commenting on the vandals' attack, the Ambassador of the Russian Federation to the United States, Anatoly Antonov, said: "The church was ransacked. Doors and windows were broken, icons defaced, and murals painted over. Many resting places of Russian believers were vandalized."[2310]
Urging the American authorities to stop encouraging neo-Nazism and discrimination, Anatoly Antonov in the Telegram channel of the Russian diplomatic mission said that the US authorities not only do not prevent the erasure of anything related to Russia, but they themselves are trying to stir up hysteria in every possible way.[2311] The head of the diplomatic mission added that the local press ignored Victory Day. Apparently, it has to do with a reluctance to mention the decisive contribution of the Red Army to the defeat of fascism.[2312]
The propaganda of Russophobia and its visible manifestations come to complete absurdity. After the onset of the Russian special military operation, many shops, cafes, health centres, dry cleaners and other public places in the USA began putting stickers with the Ukrainian flag at the entrance. Their employees often explain to Russian clients that by doing so they just avoid unnecessary discussions.
The US authorities have set out to work to erase all historical memory of fruitful cooperation between our countries and peoples during the Second World War. In 2024 – for the third year in a row- the Russian Embassy has been banned from taking part in the traditional wreath-laying ceremony at the Spirit of the Elbe marker at Arlington National Cemetery in Washington dedicated to the historic meeting of Soviet and American troops on the Elbe River on 25 April 1945.[2313] This meeting became one of the symbols of the defeat of the Nazis. In those years, the USSR and the USA had different ideas about the world order, but they managed to forget their differences for the sake of eradicating fascism.
US WWII veterans, who had planned to participate in the 2022 and 2023 Victory Parade in Moscow, were virtually forbidden to do it by the local authorities.[2314]
Washington enthusiastically resorts to the "false flag" tactic against Russia and Russians. This includes, first and foremost, providing large-scale military aid to the regime in Kiev and exerting pressure on NATO allies to make them take similar steps. Besides, sovereign states are overtly pressed in attempt to create a relevant negative image of the Russian Federation on the international scene.
As mentioned above, Washington has consistently voted against Russia's yearly UN General Assembly resolution to condemn the glorification of Nazism. According to American representatives, the glorification of Nazism and any other hate speech is an exercise of the right to freedom of expression ("freedom of speech") and assembly, which contravenes, among other things, Washington's obligations under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, including its Article 4 (the US reservation to this article was qualified by the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) as incompatible with the object and purpose of this international treaty in the meaning of Article 19 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties). In this regard, the serious rise of racism within the country is not surprising.
Washington started to propagate hostile rhetoric, accusing Russia of abusing history and "distorting and misappropriating" the Holocaust, as well as encouraging antisemitic ideas. Such "conclusions" are contained, for example, in the 2023 annual Report on International Religious Freedom: Russia[2315] and are also regularly voiced in statements by Ellen Germain, Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues[2316], members of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe of the US Congress (Helsinki Commission)[2317], and others.
Since 2022, the Joe Biden administration has promoted views about the "fascist" nature of Russian authorities with the help of political specialists and the press. The words of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov that Zelensky has in fact betrayed the memory of his Jewish ancestors by approving the annihilation of the peaceful population of Donbass, are perceived by the Americans as an example of antisemitism. The letter Z becoming a symbol of the SMO is compared to swastika. They highlight the nation's support for far-right organizations and views (Partizan, Katehon, the works of Aleksandr Dugin, the websites Geopolitika.ru and Tsargrad TV), as well as their connections to German neo-Nazis. Particularly, this served as the foundation for the statement issued on 23 June 2022, by Michael Carpenter, the United States Permanent Representative to the OSCE.[2318]
The American press frequently publishes articles alleging that "Kremlin propaganda" is purposefully inciting to manifest racism and right-wing extremism in the country. Links to Russian official media and content from the social network VKontakte are supposedly provided by "influencers" in an effort to stir up xenophobic feelings in the country (a related "study" was carried out by the University of Washington).[2319]
"Historical" works aimed at falsifying history and shifting the emphasis on the "crimes" of the Soviet Union under the leadership of "Soviet dictator Stalin" are published. For example, in 2021, Jonathan Brunstedt, an assistant professor of History at Texas A&M University, published the book "The Soviet Myth of World War II: Patriotic Memory and the Russian Question in the USSR." The author's main thesis is that when evaluating the results of the Great Patriotic War, Soviet leaders promoted the idea of "Russian nationalism" and "Russocentrism".
Similar revisionist goals are pursued by the pseudo-historical work "Stalin's War: A New History of World War II" by Sean McMeekin, published in April 2021. The American Conservative rightly points out how well this review fits into a culture where it is popular to despise Russia.[2320]
Materials along the same lines have also been published in the media. They include two articles published in the Washington Times: Whitewashing Culpability, by Herman Pirchner Jr., on 14 August 2020 and Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact: a Bad Deal, 80 Years Ago, by Victor Davis Hanson, on 15 August 2020, both of which attempted to lay the blame for the outbreak of the Second World War equally on Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. American journalists, following the example of their Baltic colleagues, do this by using techniques that have become "traditional": one-sided interpretations of the political and military realities of the pre-war period and distortions of historical events. [2321]
Articles revealing unsightly facts about the history of US cooperation with the Nazis are rather an exception. One example is a 2021 article on Medium, which claimed that the German economy during World War II provided huge opportunities for US business. Especially for those companies that supported Nazi Germany, including Ford, IBM, and Standard Oil. According to the website, brewminate.com and Coca-Cola can be added to this list.
CNN reports that the United States tainted itself with cooperation with the Nazis, thus doing a "deal with the devil".[2322] After the Second World War, about 120 scientists from the Third Reich worked on NASA's rocket programmes. Many collaborators had friendly relations with high-ranking officials and even US presidents. US logic is evident: in the fight against the Communists, they say, the end justified the means.
Crude attempts to misrepresent the outcomes of World War II and the crucial role the USSR in defeating Nazism persisted in the United States even under Donald Trump. For example, on the eve of 9 May 2020, the Trump administration posted a video on its official page on Instagram recording Trump laying a wreath at the World War II Memorial, accompanied by the video with the caption "On 8 May 1945, the USA and Great Britain defeated Nazism". This publication is contrary to the statement adopted on 25 April 2020 by President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin and US President Donald Trump commemorating the 75th anniversary of the meeting of soldiers of the USSR and the United States on the Elbe.[2323]
At the same time, it should be noted that there are some precedents of contemporary American officials, including at the highest level, recognizing the Soviet Union's contribution to the Victory.
Certain US diplomatic missions have also been involved in efforts to distort history. For example, the US Embassy in Hungary has begun selecting projects and programmes with the common theme of "Remembering World War II and its Aftermath – The Long Walk to Freedom." According to a document published on the website of the US Embassy, American and Hungarian organizations and individuals are required to "carefully follow the instructions" when preparing an application for participation. Among other things, the US side demands that the authors of the projects focus on stories that would describe "cruelty and collaboration in the midst of the Holocaust and World War II, as well as under the tyranny of the Soviet Union."[2324]
On 22 July 2024, Irish journalist Chay Bowes in social network X (former Twitter) pointed out that the West has tried to dismember and subdue Russia for centuries fearing its immense power. He also stressed that Ukraine was just another corridor to attempt it yet again, and it has failed yet again.[2325]
Commenting on the situation on the YouTube channel "US Tour of Duty", retired US Marine Corps Intelligence Officer Scott Ritter noted that a de facto Nazi regime had been established in Ukraine, encouraging strikes against civilians in Donbass.[2326] Notably, in August 2024, Scott Ritter's home was searched by FBI agents and his passport had been taken from him earlier, thus depriving him of the ability to move around the world.
In social network X, US presidential candidate Robert Kennedy Jr. called the shelling of the beach in Sevastopol on 23 June 2024 by the Armed Forces of Ukraine using American ATACMS missiles terrorism and an act of war against Russian civilians.[2327] "The word to describe it is terrorism. This is an act of war on the part of the United States against Russian civilians," he wrote on the social network.[2328]
During the NATO summit (Washington, 9-11 July 2024), the Turkish side accused the head of the White House of racism and double standards, comparing Biden's support for Ukraine and indifference to the war in Gaza. In particular, Numan Kurtulmus, speaker of the Turkish parliament said: "It's a kind of racism because if you don't accept Palestinian victims as equal to the Ukrainian victims, it means you want to create a kind of hierarchy within humanity. It's unacceptable."[2329]
On 19 September 2023, members of the US Council on Foreign Relations Bruce Hoffman and Jacob Ware published on the Foreign Affairs magazine website an article "American Hatred Goes Global" saying that the United States became a leading exporter of white supremacist terrorism. The spread of homegrown American conspiracy theories, beliefs in racial superiority, antigovernment extremism, and other manifestations of hate and intolerance has become such a problem that some countries have designated both American groups and citizens as foreign terrorists.[2330]
In 2022, 26 Nazi monuments were documented in the United States. According to experts, such monuments can be found in Illinois, Ohio, Alabama, Florida, New Jersey, New York State, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Wisconsin.[2331] The authorities continue to believe that condemning a memorial to Lithuanian Nazi henchman Adolfas Ramanauskas-Vanagas in the Chicago suburbs (on private land) in 2019 is unnecessary. The American media skirt this shameful fact. Criticism from the Simon Wiesenthal Center is ignored.[2332]
Such a position of the United States is not conducive to improving the situation inside the country where systemic racism and police impunity continue to flourish. National minorities find themselves victims of discrimination and social inequality. Immigrants and prisoners, including minors, face continuous oppression of their liberties. Journalists do not feel safe and become victims of attacks. Alternative views are subject to censorship in mass and social media. These deep-rooted problems are regularly pointed out by human rights activists and international organizations.
According to the China Society for Human Rights Studies' Report on Human Rights Violations in the United States in 2023, published on 29 May 2024, the United States has long pursued hegemonism, practiced power politics, and abused force and unilateral sanctions. Continuous delivery of weapons such as cluster munitions to other countries exacerbates regional tensions and armed conflicts, resulting in a large number of civilian casualties and severe humanitarian crises. Extensive "proxy forces" operations undermine social stability and violate the human rights of other nations. Deep-rooted racism persists in the United States, with cases of severe racial discrimination.[2333]
The report of the UN Human Rights Committee published in November 2023, which contains concluding remarks and recommendations at the outcome of the review of the US periodic report on the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, focuses, inter alia, on the lack of significant progress in implementing the Covenant by the United States. In particular, the document notes the lack of positive moves in addressing significant deficiencies in the criminal legal system (racial disparities in sentencing, the death penalty, and use of police violence). Concern is expressed, inter alia, over the violation of the rights of immigrants and indigenous peoples (lack of protection of indigenous lands and sacred places and restricted interpretation of the principle of free, prior and informed consent).[2334]
According to the report by Pew Research Center issued in November 2020, there is an exceptional political divide in such important areas as racial justice, law enforcement, etc. in the United States.
Report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus for 2023 on the most resonant cases of human rights violations in certain countries of the world with reference to the above mentioned report of the NGO Amnesty International states that the American authorities continued to severely limit access to shelters on the American-Mexican border; border control employees carried out unnecessary and illegal deportation of almost 1.5 million refugees and migrants on the border between the United States and Mexico; people were expulsed on a mass scale without getting access to sheltering procedures. Thirty Muslim men continue to be arbitrarily and indefinitely detained by US military in the notorious detention facility at the US Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in violation of the international law. The authorities have not made significant progress in closing this facility, despite the Biden administration's stated intention to do so. The government failed to take necessary measures to oversee the police activities and its accountability, as it was promised by the US administration in response to the nation-wide protests against the police violence. Black people are disproportionately affected by police use of deadly force; the federal government's program to track the annual number of such deaths has not been completed.[2335]
In 2021, the US Congress did not take any enactments on access to guns; the government's inability to protect people from constant gun violence continues to violate their rights, including the right to life, personal security and freedom from discrimination.[2336]
Guided by the principle of extraterritoriality of American justice, the United States "prey" on citizens of sovereign states around the world by blatantly violating corresponding international legal bilateral agreements, inter alia taking no notice of the norms of national legislation of these states. Upon the requests from the US law enforcement, an unacceptable practice of arrest of the Russian citizens in the third countries runs on. About 80 such cases have been registered since 2008.
The most resonant examples are arrests of Viktor Bout (Thailand, 2008), Konstantin Yaroshenko (Liberia, 2010), Roman Seleznev (the Maldives, 2014) who were not only arrested but kidnapped and forcedly deported to the United States as well as Alexander Vinnik (Greece, 2017).
Based on the unlawful application of the principle of extraterritoriality of the American justice, Russians were arrested in Germany (Denis Kaznacheev – in 2020), Georgia (Оleg Tishchenko – in 2018), the Dominican Republic (Аleksei Panin – in 2013), Israel (Аleksei Burkov – in -2015), Spain (Dmitry Belorossov – in 2013; Vadim Polyakov – in 2014; Pyotr Levashov and Stanislav Lisov – in 2017), Italy (Alexander Korshunov – in 2019), Costa-Rica (Мaxim Chukharev – in 2013), Latvia (Yuri Martyshev – in 2017), Lithuania (Dmitry Ustinov – in 2013), the Netherlands (Dmitry Smilyanets and Vladimir Drinkman – in 2012; Denis Dubnikov[2337] – in 2021), Finland (Maxim Senakh – in 2015 and Mira Terada – in 2018), the Czech Republic (Yevgeny Nikulin – in 2016), Switzerland (Vladislav Zdorovenin – in 2011 and Vladislav Klyushin – in 2021), Republic of Korea (Vladimir Dunaev – in 2021) and a number of other states.
In 2020, Andrei Pakhtusov was extradited to the United States from Spain. In 2021, Mr Klyushin was extradited to the United States from Switzerland (sentenced to 9 years in prison in 2023). In 2022, Greece extradited Mr Vinnik and Thailand – Mr Ukrainsky. In these conditions, Russian diplomats are doing everything in their power to help their compatriots.
On 17 October 2022, at the request of the American Ministry of Justice two Russian nationals – Yuri Orekhov and Artyom Uss were detained in Germany and Italy, correspondingly[2338], to be further extradited to the United States on charges of evading sanctions, oil smuggling and organizing a money laundering scheme.[2339] According to the official representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry Maria Zakharova, what happened demonstrates the continuation of "a large-scale campaign launched by Washington to capture Russians against whom there are "claims", for their subsequent guaranteed condemnation by the American punitive justice system to long terms of imprisonment."[2340]
In 2023, Vadim Konoshchenok (transferred to the Americans from Estonia), Sergei Makinin (from the Dominican Republic), Maxim Marchenko (from the Republic of Fiji), Ruslan Nurullin (from the Kingdom of Morocco), and Artur Petrov (the US Ministry of Justice seeks his extradition from the Republic of Cyprus) fell victims of the "hunt" by local special services for Russians abroad.
The Americans are "hunting" not only Russians, but also citizens of other countries, who are often held without trial or investigation in the notorious "secret prisons" of the CIA (their existence was recognized by George W. Bush Jr. back in 2006), where they are subjected to torture and humiliation.[2341]
Expert community is extremely alarmed by the spread of extremist ideology in the United States. Its unprecedented popularity surge in American society was noted in the report "The Year in Hate and Extremism", prepared by the influential US NGO "Southern Poverty Law Centre" in 2021.[2342]
Senior American officials and legislators are increasingly drawing attention to the urgency of the problem.
According to expert studies, there are 1,430 "hate groups" in the United States nowadays[2343] (for comparison, there were 1,225 in 2023, 773 in 2022)[2344], 109 of which adhere to "white nationalist" ideas (98 in 2023)[2345]. They include the notorious Ku Klux Klan, neo-Nazis, skinheads, anti-immigrant and Islamophobic groups.
They are primarily based in Califormia (117), Florida (114), Texas (97), Pensilvania (78), New York (63), and Ohio (50). The activities of radicals are carefully coordinated and sealed off – messages are exchanged in closed groups on social networks using end-to-end encryption technology.
Experts say the number of such associations has increased due to the more open and frequent use of extremist ideas by politicians. According to surveys, about 29 per cent of all Americans personally know someone in their circle who adheres to the "white supremacy" idea.[2346]
Throughout 2021, individual "hate groups" have grown rapidly and gained access to the political "mainstream", their influence has also increased.
It should be noted that the various extreme right-wing groups that began the fight against pogroms and vandalism of black activists have become even more popular after a series of controversial cases of activism by one of the most powerful social movements in the United States called BLM; Black Lives Matter.
The story of this movement began more than 10 years ago with social media posts: several Afro-American activists began using the hashtag #BlackLivesMatter in posts about black oppression in the United States.
The occasion was the case of Afro-American teenager Trayvon Martin, who was fatally wounded in a 2012 fight with white patrolman George Zimmerman. As a result of the investigation, the law enforcement officer was acquitted – the judges acknowledged that he had committed all his actions in self-defence during the scuffle. Human rights activists were dissatisfied with the verdict and organized the first protests under the slogans "No justice" and "Equal rights for all". Zimmerman's supporters argued that it was about discouraging crime, not a manifestation of racism and discrimination against the blacks.
However, it was on 17 July 2014 during street demonstrations over the Eric Garner incident that the black advocacy movement gained widespread notoriety and mass appeal. A police officer used a chokehold against a black man suspected of illegally selling cigarettes by the piece on a New York City street who resisted arrest. The police did not react immediately to Garner's cries of "I can't breathe", and the detainee lost consciousness (as it turned out later, he suffered from bronchial asthma). The doctors arrived and took him to the district hospital, but Garner could not be saved. The doctors were dismissed, the police officers were reprimanded, but no charges were brought against them.
This sparked protests from supporters of the Afro-American advocacy movement. Opal Tometi, co-founder of the Black Lives Matter movement, characterised the situation in the country as follows: "The system is filled with all sorts of inequalities and injustices. Hidden bias and just outright racism are embedded in the way policing is done in this country. After all, if you think about it, it was founded as a patrol to control slaves".[2347]
Protest sentiment intensified just a month later in a similar incident in Ferguson: a police officer shot Michael Brown, an 18-year-old Afro-American, during an arrest.
As a result, leaders of the Black Lives Matter movement declared their goal to combat police violence and excessive police presence in black-populated neighbourhoods. Later, the movement began to speak out against other manifestations of racism (lower income levels of Afro-Americans compared to the white population, the worsening economic situation of black people during the pandemic, etc.).
In other words, BLM supporters are talking about systemic racism in the USA, where one's place in society is determined precisely by the colour of one's skin. The leaders of the movement are convinced that the stereotype against the blacks persists in society, as they are the ones most often suspected of crimes by the police officers who are ready to use harsher measures against them, including weapons.
Co-founder of the Black Lives Matter movement Patrisse Khan-Cullors noted in particular that "Afro-Americans lived in poorer neighbourhoods and experienced problems with schools, transport infrastructure, earning opportunities, and the inability to advance in their careers". "The BLM is our call to action. It is a tool to reimagine a world in which black people could freely exist," she thus explained the purpose of creating the movement.
At the same time, according to some experts, such prejudices are not always supported by statistics. "Some studies have concluded that minorities are disproportionately targeted (by police), and others reach the opposite conclusion. However, lethal use of force is more common among whites than blacks", expert in criminology Daniel Nagin said.[2348]
Initially – and the BLM still emphasises this – the movement practised only peaceful methods of struggle. Activists helped the blacks register to vote and navigate candidates' electoral programmes, supported emerging Afro-American artists and writers, and raised funds for those perceived to be affected by racism. To draw attention to the problem of police violence, protesters held "die-in" rallies: portraying themselves as dead in the streets of cities.
However, in the early years of BLM's activities, they also committed acts of vandalism. For example, monuments to US history figures, whom the activists considered racist, were doused with red paint and inscribed with the words "Black lives matter".
It is worth noting that the BLM originated at a time when the United States was led by the first black president, Barack Obama. Nevertheless, activists did not believe that under his rule the situation had changed for the better for the blacks. On the contrary, police violence against the blacks increased during this time. Activist Feminista Jones noted in this regard: "A black president hasn't much changed the general picture. At least Barack Obama has become an example that people can still accept an African American as a leader".
As early as the mid-2010s, big companies such as Amazon, Microsoft, Intel, and Unilever began sympathising the BLM movement and provided them with financial support.
During the 2016 presidential election, the Democratic Party addressed BLM issues, but it did not help their candidate Hillary Clinton get elected. Later, BLM activists began to criticise Republican President Donald Trump for not paying attention to black issues.
The BLM movement gained widespread international fame in 2020, becoming nearly the most powerful social movement in the United States, after another incident – with George Floyd. As in the case of Eric Garner six years earlier, a chokehold was used against an African American suspect who tried to resist police. Police officer Derek Chauvin put his knee on his neck and did not react to the detainee's words that he could not breathe. As a result, he lost consciousness and could not be saved at the hospital.
Subsequently, it became known that George Floyd was under the influence of drugs. Anatomical pathologist Dr. Andrew Baker who had examined the body of George Floyd said that if Mr. Floyd had been found dead at home alone with no other apparent causes, it could have been acceptable to determine that Mr. Floyd died of an overdose because of the relatively high levels of methamphetamines and opioid drug fentanyl found in his blood.[2349]
Before the full details were known, a wave of protests was sparked by the incident itself.[2350] The protests surpassed anything that had gone before and covered up to half of the counties in the country. The New York Times reported that on 3 July 2020, 26 million people had participated in demonstrations over the death of George Floyd.[2351] It's estimated that in the couple of months after the George Floyd incident, there have been more than 4,700 demonstrations, or an average of 140 per day.[2352]
Despite their declared intentions to fight police brutality and racial discrimination by peaceful means, BLM activists organized pogroms. The protests were unprecedented in terms of both scale and volume of rampages, arson and looting. The value of insured property damage reached USD 1 billion. This provoked increased hatred, violence and further division in American society.
The authorities began to rename streets in cities in honour of the BLM, and artists painted walls with quotes by George Floyd and symbols associated with the movement. Nevertheless, there was no unequivocal support for the BLM movement among the American population. As protests have intensified in June 2020, the Black Lives Matter movement was supported by two-thirds of Americans, but by September the approval rate has already dropped to 55 per cent.
During the aforementioned protests, vandalism of monuments received the most attention. Initially – even before 2020 – there was a campaign in the US to demolish monuments to Confederate generals. Later, not only military commanders and heroes of the southern states were under attack, but also the Founding Fathers of the United States, including Thomas Jefferson and George Washington, because they were all rich plantation and slave owners. It even came to the point of taking down statues of Christopher Columbus who "had initiated slavery" and was accused of colonialism, exploitation and genocide of the indigenous peoples of America.
Other movements have self-organized in opposition to the BLM. A similar phrase – "All Lives Matter" – was a vivid response. The supporters of this movement stressed that everyone, regardless of skin colour, could face police brutality. Similar slogans have been made even by those who were sympathetic to the BLM but tried to show that one form of discrimination should not be replaced by another.
Critics of the BLM stressed that police officers themselves had recently been subjected to frequent violence and discrimination. Back in December 2014, for example, a black man inflicted incompatible injuries on two police officers in New York City. This was the starting point of another BLM movement, "Blue Lives Matter". "Blue" is the name given to police officers in the United States. "When I was going to work yesterday my children cried and asked me not to go. (...) They (BLM supporters) are terrorists. They hate me. They detest my uniform," New Jersey police officer Sara Erwin said.
It is noteworthy that the movement in defence of police officers has achieved some results. The state of Louisiana passed a law that made assaulting police officers a hate crime.
As time went on, the BLM became increasingly controversial. Its new "icons" seemed even more controversial than asthma sufferer Eric Garner, teenager Michael Brown and drug-addicted George Floyd. In June 2020, Rayshard Brooks was fatally wounded, but before that, he had attacked police officers himself, trying to shoot them with their own service weapons.
The consequences of BLM activities are controversial. Even for many African Americans, it has become obvious that BLM actions do not protect their rights, but cause even more hatred in society. As a result, the blacks began voting for the Republican Party which criticises the radical movement.
It should be noted that information about the movement relevant financial scandals periodically appeared in the media. Already during the 2020 protests, it became clear that millions of dollars were raised for the Black Lives Matter Foundation, a nonprofit that was entirely unassociated with the Black Lives Matter movement. The fraudsters merely used a popular name.
Details about the machinations of BLM executives soon came to light. The New York Post reported on 10 April 2021 that one of the movement's leaders, Patrisse Khan-Cullors, turned out to be a large owner of real estate – in prestigious areas of Los Angeles with predominantly white population. She owned several houses with a total value of almost USD 5 million.[2353] The investigation into this case was described by the activist as a continuation of the "tradition of terror by the ideologues of white supremacy". Around the same time, another BLM leader Shalomyah Bowers became a suspect in the embezzlement of USD 10 million from the organization's accounts.[2354]
Foreign experts record a sharp decline in public interest in the Black Lives Matter movement. Following the surge in attention to racism in 2020, Kehinde Andrews, a professor of Black Studies at Birmingham City University, said: "we are back to where we were before". Kehinde Andrews concludes that, at the moment, racial injustice has even escalated and citizen reactions to BLM activities or statements have become negative because, by raising the topic of inequality over and over again, the movement is supposedly distracting the world from more important issues.[2355]
Thus, if earlier American corporations supported the movement and turned a blind eye to the related protests of workers, now they oppose similar actions in solidarity with the residents of the Gaza Strip who have suffered from the Israeli military. Google has fired more than 50 of its employees over participation in the rallies, with its CEO Sundar Pichai saying that such actions are unacceptable as they hinder business.
The pursuit of racial equity has prompted many organizations to create specialist racial equity posts and invest heavily in it. However, over the past two years, a large number of companies have reduced funding for "diversity, equity and inclusion" programmes or abandoned them altogether. Often this was done as a result of lawsuits by conservatives.[2356]
Amid the 2020 anti-racial protests and calls to defund the police, a number of cities and states have considerably cut their law enforcement budgets. However, police reforms are now being rolled back under the "protect the police" Republican slogan. Such cities as Denver, Dallas, Los Angeles, and New York, – restored and even increased police funding in response to surging violent crime.[2357]
Assessing the current situation around the Black Lives Matter movement, experts note a significant increase in the number of negative assessments, showing that such organizations split the country, lead to the aggravation of conflicts in society, and in general are a tool for money laundering and manipulation.[2358]
Observers paid particular attention to the fact that the movement's leadership had virtually ignored the murder of 23-year-old black US Air Force pilot Roger Fortson by a white sheriff's deputy in his own flat on 3 May 2024.
Right-wing extremism is identified in the US National Security Strategy as a serious threat to domestic stability.[2359] President Biden constantly speaks of the danger posed to democratic institutions by the proponents of racial, ethnic, political and religious hatred.
Human rights activists are seriously concerned about the activities of such odious organizations as the Base, Feuerkrieg Division and Atomwaffen Division, as well as the right-wing radical structures Proud Boys and Oath Keepers. The last two became the object of close attention of law enforcement officers due to their evident involvement in the "attack on the Capitol" of 6 January 2021 and promoting Donald Trump's rhetoric about a "stolen victory" in the 2020 presidential election.
The most significant development has occurred in the Proud Boys organization, which is believed to be the first step in attracting new members into organizations based on misanthropic ideas. According to a 2021 study by Die Zeit German weekly newspaper, the influence of this organization is so great that many neo-Nazis who are not part of this structure are guided by its leader James Mason.[2360] In addition, the structure has expanded its activities to the UK, Germany, Canada and Baltic States. It is stated that as of mid-2019, 35 Americans have travelled from the United States to Ukraine to participate in combat operations.[2361]
72 active chapters nationwide were documented in 2021, up from 43 the year before. The growth in the number of cells is particularly significant, given the fact that at least 40 of its members were charged with involvement in the storming of the US Capitol. According to a research by VICE News reporter Tess Owen, the Proud Boys attended at least 114 public events in 2021.
As part of the criminal investigation into the 6 January 2021 events, law enforcement officers carried out a series of ostentatious arrests of extreme conservative leaders. Thus, the former Oath Keepers leader Steward Rhodes and the Proud Boys ex-chairman Enrique Tarrio were charged with attempting to overthrow government by armed means, which ensues up to 20 years in prison.[2362]
As for neo-Nazis, the most famous groups are Aryan Nations, National Socialist Movement, National Socialist Resistance Front, Nationalist Social Club/NSC-131, 2119 Blood and Soil Crew, Aryan Freedom Network, Blood Tribe, Dixieland Nationalists, NatSoc Florida, Order of the Black Sun, Vinland Rebels, National Alliance, Church of Aryanity/Order of the Western, Knights Templar, Patriotic Socialist Front, American Futurist, NS Publications, Vanguard News Network, Third Reich Books, Patriotic Dissent Books, Empire State Stormers, and Church of Ben Klassen.
Many extremist ideologies now need neither organization nor membership in it to be spread. Numerous websites and forums allow individuals to receive and disseminate information on hate ideologies without becoming a member of any extremist association.[2363]
The amount of ideological material spread by extremists has been increasing over recent years. The Anti-Defamation League tracked a near-doubling of white supremacist propaganda materials in 2020 compared to the previous year: they registered over 5,000 racist messages, antisemitic comments and other manifestations of hatred.[2364] It is clear that the real figures are much bigger. The most active in spreading propaganda were Patriot Front, New Jersey European Heritage Association and Nationalist Social Club (92 per cent of all activities).[2365]
New structures are emerging to glorify Nazism and deny the Holocaust. Thus, in 2019, Iron Youth and Folksfront were established. In July 2020, members of the disbanded Atomwaffen Division announced the creation of a new organization called the National Socialist Order.
Many radical organizations claim to participate in the political life of the country, including American Freedom Party, Racial Nationalist Party of America, American Identity Movement, and the Proud Boys.[2366]
By virtue of the First Amendment to the US Constitution, which protects free speech (freedom of expression), such organizations feel able to act with impunity. In the United States, neo-Nazi demonstrations and Marches generally take place with a police presence – but they see their main function as preventing any unacceptable disorder resulting from clashes between extremists and their opponents and intervene in the most extreme cases, when it is often too late.
Recently, the attention of human rights defenders was drawn to the spread of racist and neo-Nazi ideology among US military. According to the Guardian, A neo-Nazi Clockwork Crew club counts several current and former members of the United States military as its members.[2367] Lance corporal machine gunner and former Marine Corps staff sergeant are part of the Clockwork Crew; the second was booted from the service for stealing large quantities of ammunition, according to the group's social media posts, as well as law enforcement sources.[2368]
The Clockwork Crew, formerly known as Crew 562, was founded in 2021. The key roles are played by active-duty and veterans of the US armed forces willing to engage in public confrontations. In addition to the United States, Clockwork Crew's reach has also briefly extended to Eastern Europe, where it has roughly a dozen members.[2369] According to the Guardian, the group has considerable overlap with other California active clubs, as well as with the Golden State Skinheads, a more "traditional" skinhead gang of whom some members stabbed several anti-fascist protesters at a chaotic 2016 clash outside the state capitol in Sacramento.[2370]
Reports on high-profile crimes committed by US servicemen being followers of racist ideologies and members of radical groups have been repeatedly covered by the media.[2371] The problem is aggravated by the fact that membership in nationalist or racist organizations is not prohibited by law for US servicemen. In February 2020, at a hearing in the Congress US defence officials said that membership in a nationalist group "is not prohibited", but "active participation" in the group could lead to an administrative discharge.[2372] However, they refrained from giving exact data on how many US military have been administratively discharged for this.[2373]
On 14 May 2021, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) released the "Strategic Intelligence Assessment and Data on Domestic Terrorism" report that acknowledges the growing activity of right extremists in recent years. It notes, in particular, the top threat comes from racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists, specifically those who advocate for the superiority of the white race. The report also notes the rise in the number of lone offenders who are not members of radical groups. According to the document, 2019 is the most lethal year for domestic extremist assaults over the recent quarter of a century: of the 32 killings in five separate attacks 24 were committed by white supremacists. [2374]
It is remarkable that the authors of the report, correctly noting new trends in the spread of extremist ideology, try to artificially highlight the "external influence" factor in this phenomenon and accuse foreign States in allegedly "malicious activity to deepen the divide" in the United States.
Despite the threat posed by right-wing radicalism pointed out to by US authorities, in reality, double standards are commonly applied to such organizations. Thus, a number of US experts and lawmakers earlier suggested addressing the danger posed by neo-Nazi groups in Ukraine who commit crimes with impunity and keep in touch with US-based extremist groups, e.g. Atomwaffen Division. There are well known high-profile crimes committed by US military espousing racist ideology and being members of radical groups.
Despite all this, the US listed the Russian Imperial Movement (RIM) as a terrorist group. Experts questioned this decision due to the lack of information about this organization and its ties with foreign groups. Meanwhile, infamous Ukraine-based nationalist groups, such as the Right Sector, Azov Battalion and C14, whose members have reportedly perpetrated acts of violence, were not included in the Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) list.
The United States faces rise in racism, xenophobia, antisemitism, Islamophobia, as well as other forms of similar discrimination and related intolerance. This remains a weakness in Washington's policy, which has been repeatedly pointed out by international systems of human rights monitoring and civil rights NGOs.
It is worth noting that racism and racial discrimination have now become systemic in America, plaguing all spheres of life. Social inequality is most pronounced for ethnic and racial minorities. According to the US Department of Housing and Urban Development, the number of homeless people in the country reached a record high of 650,000 in 2023. The number of people living in shelters, on the streets, in tents, or in cars increased by 12 per cent nationally compared to 2022. Meanwhile, 40 per cent of the homeless in the US are of African American descent. Also, there has been a significant increase in Hispanic homelessness.[2375]
Experts at the National Alliance to End Homelessness consider the influx of migrants to be one of the drivers of poverty. According to the experts, American authorities should facilitate job search for migrants and accelerate the processing of asylum applications, as well as provide more support in housing rental, in order to address the problem.[2376]
In November 2023, the UN Human Rights Committee's Report on Human Rights Violations in the United States in 2023 stated that American criminal justice system was harsher on ethnic minorities than on whites. Blacks were more likely to be sentenced to death and receive harsher sentences.[2377]
The United Nations Human Rights Council's Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, Ashwini K.P., in a statement following her first visit to the United States (31 October – 14 November 2023),[2378] presented evidences received from racially marginalized groups of systematic discrimination in health care, education, migration, access to housing, employment, and social security. Ms Ashwini K.P. also pointed out to the persistence of high levels of residential segregation by race, political and legal discrimination in access to housing, and abuses in the criminal justice system.[2379]
For example, according to BBC, the gap between homeownership rates among whites and Blacks in the US is the biggest in 120 years.[2380] Most Black homeowners often face higher mortgage interest rates than whites, regardless of their income.[2381]
The studies by the University of Chicago and the University of Notre Dame also show that the poverty rate among Black Americans has increased by 3.1 per cent. According to USA Today, in the first quarter of 2020, the homeownership rate among whites was 73.7 per cent, while only 44 per cent of African Americans in the country owned a home. According to ABC News, 15.7 per cent of Hispanic Americans lived in poverty in 2019, more than double the rate compared to white Americans.[2382]
The China Society for Human Rights Studies' 2022 report on Human Rights Violations in the United States emphasizes housing discrimination based on race, colour, nationality or ethnic origin.[2383] For instance, 19.4 per cent of black applicants for mortgages were turned down in 2021 as compared to 10.8 per cent of white applicants, according to real estate firm Zillow.
In January 2021, 24 million American citizens reported food shortages due to lack of livelihood, which is 5 million more than the August 2020 figures. 45 per cent of families with insufficient food supply belong to the low‑income population. At the same time, two-thirds of them are African Americans and immigrants from Central and Latin America.[2384]
On 4 March 2024, during the 55th session of the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, presented a global update to the Human Rights Council, highlighting the disproportionate number of people of African descent killed while interacting with the police.[2385]
A rise in racism is also indicated in the China Society for Human Rights Studies (CSHRS) 2022 and 2023 reports on human rights violations in the United States.[2386] Among other things, it found that between 2020 and 2022, the number of hate crimes based on racial bias in the United States increased dramatically.[2387] Citing UN experts, it is highlighted that racism against African-Americans permeates the law enforcement and criminal justice systems in the United States. Due to significant racial discrimination in health care, Black women have a maternal mortality rate nearly three times higher than white women. Nearly 60 per cent of Asians say they face racial discrimination. Also the so-called "China Initiative" which targets Chinese scientists has far-reaching consequences. Racist ideology is prevalent in many areas such as social media, music, and gaming, and permeates across borders, making the United States world's major source of an extreme form of racism and causing concerns among many countries.[2388] There are data from an April 2023 report published by the Council on American-Islamic Relations, which found that a total of 5,156 complaints of anti-Muslim discrimination, mostly employment and education related, were received in 2022. Moreover, the number of education-related complaints increased by 63per cent as compared to 2021.[2389]
The UN Human Rights Committee also noted that racism in the US is still present in the form of racial profiling, police killings, and numerous human rights violations. Ethnic minorities in the US face systematic, persistent, and pervasive racial discrimination, while racist ideology permeates American society and spreads to the international community.[2390]
In annual reports on rights and freedoms published in early 2022[2391] and January 2023[2392], human rights activists from the Human Rights Watch (HRW), a biased NGO recognized undesirable in the Russian Federation, noted that the United States continue to struggle with racism, abuses in prisons, migration law, and police brutality.
The political rhetoric often plays on racist tropes relating to the trafficking in enslaved Africans, the history of lynching, derogatory assessments, exploitation of people of African descent, and violence against them.[2393]
At the same time, the problem of systemic racism has increasingly been used as an element of internal political struggle. It is not uncommon for violence and intimidation to follow elections in the US On August 4, 2022, the Global Project Against Hate and Extremism (GPAHE) released a paper titled "Americans' Fears Suppressing Participation in Democracy,"[2394] stating that 40per cent of African Americans and 37 per cent of Latinos are extremely concerned about being denied the opportunity to vote. Groups such as the notorious Ku Klux Klan had historically prevented African Americans from voting with beating, lynching, and murder, thus instilling a sense of fear that persists to this day.[2395]
It is noteworthy that, despite the "harassment" of conservatives, authorities prefer to ignore the left-wing radicals who have carried out pogroms across the country during Marches for racial justice.[2396] The Democrat supporters' actions were interpreted solely as manifestations of the freedom of expression and peaceful assembly guaranteed by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. This is despite the fact that the riots caused at least 1 billion USD in material damage to the property of American citizens.[2397]
In contrast, law enforcement officials did not investigate the killing of an unarmed American woman, Ashli Babbitt, who broke into the Congress building on 6 January 2021.
The issue of race relations in the United States is becoming more prominent in the context of the 2024 and 2020 elections. To attract voters, the United States administration and the entire party of Democrats have made combating all forms of intolerance a priority. Speaking in Washington, D.C., at the May 2023 graduation ceremony at Howard University, Biden emphasized that the ideology of "white supremacy" is the most serious "terrorist threat." Biden called it a "stark reality" that racism has long "torn apart" the United States, noting that "this battle is never really over".[2398]
According to Zachary Petrizzo, a reporter for the US online edition The Daily Beast, who is part of the White House press pool, there was a protest during Biden's speech. The 12 demonstrators expressed their "dissatisfaction with the president and a number of other issues," including the president's neglect of African-Americans.[2399]
Citing the August 2022 findings of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination that the US is not fully meeting its obligations to combat racism, experts from the Human Rights Watch indicated the need to implement the CERD recommendation calling on Washington to establish a commission to study the legacy of slavery and reparations proposals.[2400]
Back in 2020, the Governor of California Gavin Newsom convened a special commission tasked with calculating the final amount of reparations for 170 years of racial oppression. Its findings outlined a rough estimate of 800 billion USD, which amounts to 500,000 USD to each of California's 1.8 million African-Americans. Such a sum amounts to two annual budgets of the state, which already ranks among the five major debtors in the United States with its 362.87 billion USD debt that makes up 120.5per cent of California's GDP, or 19.5 thousand USD in debt per one African-American resident of the state.[2401] Nevertheless, California started paying reparations to its African-American citizens on US Independence Day on 4 July 2024. However, the reparations amounted to 12 million USD, which is significantly less than the previously announced amounts.[2402]
The Californian initiative is not a unique case. There are several other similar initiatives in the states run by Democratic Party representatives (e.g., Massachusetts, New York, and Michigan). The left-wing faction of the Democratic Party has previously put forward a proposal for a one-time payment of 350,000 USD to every black citizen of the United States, which would total 14 trillion USD, twice the entire 2024 expenditure side of the budget of the United States.
However, there also were less generous proposals. During her 2024 presidential campaign Marianne Williamson, who was nominated from the Democrats and did not receive a single delegate vote, insisted on the total amount of "at least 1 trillion dollars".[2403]
Notably, these initiatives are not some spontaneous manifestations of remorse or a struggle for votes of the Blacks. A theoretical basis was created specifically for these initiatives. Reparations for centuries of slavery were first discussed in the late 1980s (the H.R.-40 initiative of Congressman John James Conyers), when the so-called Critical race theory/CRT, created in the 1960s, was introduced into the public debate.
Despite legal equality, the socioeconomic problems that African Americans had accumulated over three and a half centuries had not been eliminated. The efforts made by Richard Nixon (the "Family Assistance Plan") and Ronald Reagan (within the framework of Reaganomics),with their relative effectiveness being reduced by the crises of the 2000s.
The idea of reparations was brought back to life in the mid-2010s. In 2014, The Atlantic magazine published an article titled "The Case for Reparations", which revived the H.R.-40 initiative and called the payment of reparations for the years of slavery a symbol of "America's maturing".
In 2003, the US Supreme Court allowed universities to take race and ethnicity into account when admitting students, while giving preference to minorities. The ruling was in effect until 2023, when it was canceled by the newly composed court. Since then, however, the so-called "affirmative action" has been legalized and put into practice, thus spreading as a corporate strategy Diversity, Equity, Inclusion/DEI. According to its creators, DEI eliminated the "underrepresentation" of discriminated groups.[2404]
After Donald Trump took office, the New York Times ran an editorial in August 2019 announcing the launch of the so-called "1619 Project," named after the year the first African slaves arrived in Virginia. 1619 Project suggests that the entire history of the United States should be viewed through the prism of the oppression of minorities, primarily Indians and Blacks.
According to historians of the 1619 Project, the creation of the United States was only possible because of the racist aspirations of the colonists. By that time, the British Empire was having an active discussion about the abolition of slavery. However, the rich planters didn't want to give it up, so they started a revolution against King George III. Following this logic, the US Declaration of Independence was not a liberating document, but rather a repressive one. Because of the Declaration, slavery in the US lasted much longer than in the British Empire and was abolished only in 1865, during the Civil War.
Even after the abolition of slavery, it still existed in the Southern states in the form of racial segregation. It was abolished only when the Civil Rights Act was adopted in 1964. Therefore, the historians of the 1619 Project conclude that the US has been a democracy for less than 60 years.
In this context, the New York Times suggested to "rethink" the American history, a new version of which would place "the consequences of slavery and the contributions of Black Americans in the heart of the story". Dean Baquet, the New York Times editor-in-chief, who had been pushing a racial agenda in the US media for years, came up with the initiative. A year after 1619 Project, he directed that "Black" be capitalized in all materials and "white" be left lowercase because "no one in the newspaper's editorial staff had ever argued that the word should be spelled differently".
Since 2021, 1619 Project has won two Pulitzer Prizes and has been actively implemented for teaching in schools in Democratic states.
The discussions of the racial agenda took place in the general context of the American "culture wars" and were followed by such events as the death of George Floyd and the riots of the Black Lives Matter movement. Arguments about objective economic inequality have been mixed with the Biden administration's persistent attempts to introduce "critical racial theory" into school curricula through courses on "getting rid of white supremacy" and the "race-conscious" policies of major corporations, in the course of which all derivatives of the word "white" have been removed from product names. Books like "White Fragility," which effectively accused white Americans of thought crime because they "subconsciously admit their racist views even as they deny accusations of it," became bestsellers. At the same time, more than 40 Columbus monuments across the country were torn down or desecrated as "symbols of genocide."[2405]
Following the events in Charlottesville, where right-wingers from across the country came to save a monument to General Robert E. Lee, dozens of neo-Nazi groups such as the Order of the Black Sun, the American Freedom Party and the 14 Firsts became active.[2406]
However, the issue remained unresolved. In 30 years of discussions about racism and reparations, the wealth gap between white US citizens and African Americans has hardly changed. The gap in the value of Black and white families' assets was only getting larger. According to Brookings Institution, the wealth gap in 1983 was 123,910 USD, 172,000 USD in 2017, and 214,970 USD in 2022.[2407]
At the same time, while violent crime in the US declined, the number of offenses based on racial intolerance continued to rise. According to the FBI, this motive remains the most common in overall hate crime statistics.[2408] Thus, even greater mutual hostility between the two camps of American society has been the only result of the struggle against "systemic racism", which, some experts believe, was the ultimate goal of this whole campaign.[2409]
Since the aforementioned spate of riots organized by the Black Lives Matter movement in 2020, the process of rewriting of America's own history by liberals has accelerated dramatically.
In 2020-2021, new educational standards for teaching the nation's history, including race-related topics, were being introduced in schools across the United States. Later on, the teaching of "critical racial theory" was opposed by common Americans and influential politicians. Many educational institutions have returned symbols previously removed as incorrect.[2410] In particular, the board of a Pennsylvania school voted to restore its Native American warrior logo.[2411] Harvard, Yale, and other prominent universities have resumed the practice of standardized testing in student recruitment. This practice was canceled on two grounds: to avoid face-to-face interviews during a pandemic and to end allegedly age-old economic inequalities.[2412] The decision to put the names of Civil War heroes who fought on the side of the South back into the names of two schools was widely discussed in the US media.[2413] Thus, the trend that emerged in 2020 to remove Confederate symbols from US institutions was disrupted.[2414]
In 2024, America's Independence Day, celebrated annually on the 4th of July, which until recently was the most important and most apolitical holiday uniting all Americans regardless of their views, has fallen under revision. The Declaration of Independence itself was increasingly being accused of being "based on a lie". It was supposedly based on human rights, yet it did not take into account the rights of Black slaves or Native Americans, i.e. Indian tribes.
By contrast, Republican states are trying to preserve the patriotic teaching of their history. The first step in this direction was taken by Florida. This issue divides the US even more, to a point where even the approach to its own history varies greatly from state to state.
Experts condemn particular US states' laws prohibiting school curricula that accurately depict historical racial practices in the country. According to the CSHRS Human Rights Violations in the United States in 2023 report published on 29 May 2024, an increasing number of states, along with Texas, Florida, Missouri, Utah and South Carolina, have passed laws prohibiting public schools from using educational materials and books that touch upon topics such as race, history, or gender.[2415]
The human rights defenders declare that one of their goals is to ensure, as far as possible, the implementation by local authorities of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. First of all, in the field of education and culture, recall the call of CERD, the UN human rights treaty body that monitors compliance with this international treaty, to take effective measures to include chapters on the history of peoples of African descent in textbooks. Encourage the creation and distribution of printed materials on this subject as well.
Experts keep noting an increase in the number of racially, nationally and religiously motivated crimes in the United States, which is fostered by the widespread presence of extremist and neo-Nazi groups in the country. The FBI released its annual report on hate crimes in October 2023. It showed that there were 11,634 hate crimes in the US committed due to various forms of animosity (11,288 in 2022, 10,530 in 2021, 7,759 in 2020, and 8,302[2416] in 2019).) The majority of them (59.1per cent) were motivated by rejection based on race (targeting mainly Blacks), ethnicity, or country of origin. At the same time, there was a 25 per cent increase in antisemitic attacks[2417].
It should be noted that a number of experts have expressed doubts regarding the accuracy and completeness of the provided data. The low number of law enforcement organizations that took part in the reporting is the cause.[2418]
In 12 years, attacks on African Americans have increased from 1,930 to 2,755 per year, and on people of Asian descent from 158 to 274. There were 773 attacks on whites.[2419] Hate crimes have increased in the twenty largest cities. Increases in New York and Los Angeles have been 18 per cent and 20 per cent, respectively. African Americans remained the most common victims, accounting for 63.2 per cent of all cases. They are followed by Hispanics at 13.4 per cent.
According to the NGO Stop AAPI Crime, between 19 March 2020 and 30 June 2021 9,081 such incidents were documented (of which 4,548 took place in 2020 and 4,533 in the first half of 2021). The majority (63.7 per cent) was insults, 16.5 per cent were intentional avoidance, 13.7 per cent were physical attacks, 11 per cent were workplace discrimination, denial of service, etc., and 8.3 per cent were cases of insults on the Internet. A significant portion of occurrences happened in public places (31.6 per cent) and in offices (30.1 per cent) Women made up the majority, i.e. 63.3 per cent, of all victims.[2420]
The 2022 US report by the China Society for Human Rights Studies also makes reference to a study by the non-profit organization Stop AAPI Crime, which discovered that between 19 March 2020 and 32 March 2022, it received reports of over 11,500 hate-motivated crimes.[2421] According to an opinion poll, 32 per cent of African Americans and 21 per cent of Asian Americans live in fear of racially-motivated attacks.[2422]
According to data released 27 June 2023 by the office of the Attorney General of California, the number of hate crimes targeting Blacks increased by 27.1 per cent, rising from 513 incidents in 2021 to 652 incidents in 2022.[2423]
According to human rights activist Arisha Hatch, violence against Black girls and women has always been underreported, leaving the loved ones of countless victims of state-sanctioned killings without justice.[2424] According to researchers studying institutionalized racism, Black women constitute one of the most vulnerable groups in the country.[2425]
It should be noted that in 2020, following the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, there was a large increase in the number of incidents in which Asian Americans were assaulted or insulted in public places, refused admittance to shops, business centres or public transport.
California State University, San Bernardino, reports that crimes against people of Asian descent rose by 224 per cent in 2022 compared to 2021.
The unprecedented level of hate crimes against the Asian community in the US is also cited in a study by the Center for the Study of Hate and Extremism, which found a 339 per cent increase in crimes against people of Asian descent in 2021 compared to 2020.
These grim figures are complemented (and the upward trend is confirmed) by Voice of America, which reported that violent crimes against Asians in 2020 increased by 150 per cent compared to 2019.[2426] There was a sharp increase in New York, from 30 to 133 incidents, and in San Francisco there were 60 incidents, compared with 9 the previous year.
American media outlets such as CNN, Houston Public Media, and the Chicago Sun Times reported numerous cases of Asians being attacked in a number of American cities while law enforcement officials failed to take any action[2427].
Human rights groups have pointed to an increase in hate speech against minorities against a backdrop of rising white nationalism and an increase in violent crime across the country. Thus, according to a report by the Anti-Defamation League, the number of massacres associated with right-wing extremism (primarily the idea of white supremacy) increased dramatically in the country[2428].
The high-profile murders of Asian women in Atlanta, Georgia, in March 2021 sparked an outpouring of public outrage: an armed white guy drove a car among spas, shooting female personnel and visitors.
In July 2023, a "racially motivated" 14-year-old white boy in Massachusetts attempted to drown an African-American boy. Other white boys present at the time of the incident referred to the victim as "George Floyd".[2429]
One of the USA's largest racially-motivated mass shootings in 2022 is considered to be the May 14 attack on a supermarket in Buffalo, New York, in which an 18-year-old killed 10 people. The shooter had previously published a "manifesto" setting out his white-supremacist views. The text is full of intolerant statements, including claims that immigrants and Black people were "replacing" whites.
On 26 August 2023, on the 60th anniversary of the "March on Washington" (during which Martin Luther King gave his famous speech), another mass shooting incident occurred at a shopping mall located in one of the "Black neighbourhoods" of Jacksonville, Florida. Three African American men fell victim to 21-year-old Jacksonville resident Ryan Christopher Palmeter, who was armed with a rifle and a handgun. The rifle had a swastika painted on it.[2430]
A short time after special services arrived on the scene, the shooter committed suicide. Police consider the incident a racially motivated hate crime, as the shooter's behaviour suggests that he intentionally targeted victims based on their skin colour.[2431]
The already heated debate in American society was escalated with this latest racially motivated incident. Immediately after the incident, President Biden stated that Americans "should refuse to live in a country where Black families walking to the store or Black pupils going to schools live in fear of being shot because of the colour of their skin"[2432].
Against this background, Vice President Kamala Harris, emphasizing that the country was living in a "hate epidemic," reported that federal agencies were treating what happened as an act of "domestic violent extremism". The domestic violent extremism (in some cases the word "terrorism" is used) is the legal definition enshrined in the infamous 2001 Patriot Act and later documents adopted after the 9/11 attacks that severely restricted the rights of Americans. A 2020 Department of Homeland Security circular identifies "supporters of white supremacy" as the primary source of the threat of "domestic terrorism"[2433].
Former chair of the Committee on Homeland Security Bennie Gordon Thompson stated that racially motivated attacks, including the Jacksonville shooting, are part of a growing trend of violence against Black communities[2434]. Over the past few years, the shooting statistics in the US have been on the rise, with the Jacksonville incident becoming the 24th shooting in 2023. However, the White House does not respond as quickly and decisively in all cases.
Racial profiling by the police is an acute problem in the United States. According to the Washington Post, as of 18 March 2024, African Americans, who make up about 14 per cent of the US population, are the most frequent victims of police violence. The death rate of Black Americans at the hands of police officers (1,512 deaths per 42 million people) is more than twice as high as the death rate of white Americans (2,890 deaths per 197 million people).[2435]
When investigating cases involving the excess use of force by law enforcement officers, researchers from the Human Rights Watch have often found that the US law enforcement bodies refuse them access to the relevant information. As of 31 December 2021, 1,141 people were killed by police in 2021, more than in previous years. Statistically, African Americans are three times more likely to be killed by police officers than white Americans.[2436]
According to analysts, 1 in 1,000 black men and boys can expect to die at the hands of law enforcement officers over the course of their lives. The chances of being killed by police peaked between the ages of 20 and 35.[2437] ABC news also stated that, according to statistics, black citizens of the United States are victims of such accidents 2.5 times more often than whites.[2438] The "second highest" number of deaths was in the Hispanic community.[2439]
According to the Business Insider news portal, between February 2015 and March 2021, police shot dead at least 50 Black women whose names appear in police reports and news outlets, although the actual death toll May be even higher[2440].
The above-mentioned murder of George Floyd, a Black American, during his arrest on 25 May 2020 in Minneapolis[2441] by white police officers and the following protests across the country highlighted the systemic problems of racism in the USA, both against African-Americans and other racial and national minorities.
An obvious evidence of the emergent situation in the United States was the Urgent Debate called for by the African Group and held on 17 July 2020 during the resumed 43rd session of the Human Rights Council, which was devoted to the human rights violations, systemic racism, police brutality and violence against peaceful protests, during which the actions of the US leadership were criticized.
The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), established in accordance with the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, in respect of mass protests against racism in the United States, used its Early Warning and Urgent Action Procedures,[2442] and, on 12 June 2020, published a special statement. It highlighted a systemic problem of racial profiling, the brutality and excessive use of force by law enforcement officials against persons belonging to racial and ethnic minorities, including unarmed individuals.[2443]
The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights also addressed the situation in the United States. In a statement on June 3, 2020, then-High Commissioner Michele Bachelet urged Washington to act swiftly to address inequality and to strongly reject the structural racism damaging American society.
The serious threat posed by racism and abuses of power by the police drew attention of the special procedures of the Human Rights Council (HRC). In particular, with respect to protests in the United States, on 5 June 2020, Special Procedures of the UN HRC published a joint statement condemning the modern "racial terror" and urging the US leaders to reform the law enforcement system.
The killing of George Floyd was by no means an isolated incident involving excessive use of force by law enforcement officers against African Americans. Other high-profile cases of gratuitous use of lethal force by police officers include the following.
According to 18 July 2024 USA Today report, police used violence against a 36-year-old Black woman, Sonya Massey, 36, from Illinois. On 6 July 2024, she called police to report robbery. The two officers who arrived at Massey's home searched the neighbourhood but found nothing suspicious. According to prosecutors, police officer Sean Grayson aggressively yelled at Sonya Massey, a single mother, and then shot her directly in the face. The police officer is to be tried on charges of murder, assault with a deadly weapon under aggravating circumstances, and abuse of office[2444].
On 12 October 2019, police officer Aaron Dean, responding to a call, shot and killed Atatiana Jefferson in her own home in Fort Worth, Texas.[2445] The neighbours of the latter reported to the police of the opened door to her apartment and noises sounding as gunfire. Body camera footage showed that the deceased was at home with her young nephew playing videogames. A law enforcement officer shot to kill immediately after giving a warning, giving his victim no chance of surviving.
On 28 January 2020, William Green, who had been taken into custody on suspicion of drunk driving, was shot dead while handcuffed by a police officer in Temple Hills, Maryland.[2446] The detainee, who was in the front seat of the patrol car and not resisting, was shot multiple times by the law enforcement officer.
On 1 September 2020, an African American cyclist was shot dead by police in Los Angeles, allegedly violating traffic rules. After the suspect was stopped, a scuffle ensued in which he was shot and killed.
On 11 April 2021, a female police officer killed Daunte Wright during a traffic stop[2447] in Brooklyn Center, Minnesota. The policewoman reportedly intended to deploy her taser but accidentally shot the young man instead.
On 20 April 2021, a law enforcement officer fatally shot 16-year-old Ma'Khia Bryant after a call alleging assault with a knife in Columbus, Ohio.[2448] The incident happened within minutes of the verdict in George Floyd's killing by police. Police officer Derek Chauvin was found guilty of all charges.
A deputy police chief shot and killed an African-American man named Andrew Brown Jr. on 21 April 2021 in Elizabeth City, North Carolina.[2449] This incident triggered widespread rioting in the city, and in response the authorities declared a curfew.
On 3January 2023, Keenan Anderson, a 31-year-old African American man from Los Angeles, was suspected of being involved in a traffic accident. During the arrest, police officers tasered him six times, causing him to suffer a heart attack and die at the hospital.[2450]
Four days later, on 7 January 2023, in Memphis, Tennessee, a 29-year-old unarmed African American man, Tyre Nichols, fell victim to police brutality. Five Black police officers pulled him over "for reckless driving." They used a taser, pepper spray, and beat him with their feet, fists, and batons[2451]. The man died on 10 January 2023 at St. Francis Hospital. Nichols' family explained that his neck was broken and he suffered cardiac arrest during his arrest by police officers; death was caused by kidney failure and cardiac arrest. Investigators stated that they were "unable to confirm" that Tyre Nichols was driving recklessly[2452].
Memphis city officials released three videos of local police officers' violent arrest of Tyre Nichols[2453]. This was followed by protests in Memphis, also in New York, Washington, D.C. and other cities. The police officers were charged with second-degree murder[2454]. The Memphis government and US authorities heavily criticized the actions of the law enforcers. President Joe Biden stated that the case is "yet another painful reminder of the deep fear and trauma, pain and exhaustion that American people of colour experience every single day." In this context, the president has demanded that Congress expedite the George Floyd Justice in Policing Act[2455], which is designed to reduce police misconduct by officers of the department[2456].
According to the China Society for Human Rights Studies' 2023 report on Human Rights Violations in the United States, the deaths of Anderson and Nichols as a result of police violence caused serious concern to UN experts. The experts emphasized that in both cases the use of force by police officers violated international norms protecting the right to life and prohibiting torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, as well as the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials and the Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials[2457].
In August 2023, in Ohio, two police officers shot dead a 21-year-old pregnant Black woman, Ta'Kiya Young, as she sat in her car in a parking lot outside a grocery store. She was charged with theft and demanded to get out of the car. However, the woman did not obey and tried to flee the scene, causing the police to open fire. After that, Ta'Kiya Young's car crashed into the store building. Both the woman and her child were later found to be dead[2458].
On 17 October 2023, a deputy sheriff in Georgia shot dead Leonard Allen Cure, a 53-year-old Black man who had spent more than 16 years in a Florida prison on a wrongful conviction[2459]. The Georgia sheriff's deputy stopped Cure's car as he was driving on I-95 near the Florida border. Cure got out of his car at the law enforcement officer's request and was initially cooperative, but got aggressive when he was told he was being arrested. As a result, the sheriff first used a taser and baton to restrain him, and then pulled out a gun and shot Cure as he kept resisting[2460]. The wounding resulted in the man's death[2461].
At the same time, experts note that the responsibility of law enforcement in the USA for unlawful and unreasonably harsh actions against alleged offenders and prisoners is very rare. According to ABC News, there were only 16 convictions in such cases between 2004 and 2020. The most recent high-profile verdict was the sentencing of D. Chauvin, the killer of African American G. Floyd, to 22 and half years in prison in 2021.[2462]
Another case of prosecution was noted in May 2021, when law enforcement officer B. Palkowitz was sentenced to 6 years in prison for excessive use of force against the African American man he arrested, F. Baker. During his arrest, F. Baker was beaten and a police officer let a service dog down on him, although he offered no resistance.[2463]
A contentious discussion about the need for a systemic solution to the issue of racial intolerance in the United States erupted after a jury found Kyle Rittenhouse not guilty of shooting and killing two people in Kenosha, Wisconsin, during protests over the shooting of Jacob Blake, who happens to be black.[2464]
The United Nations Human Rights Council Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, Ashwini K.P., following her first visit to the United States[2465] pointed out serious deficiencies in America's human rights enforcement and called for more effective measures by the United States, emphasizing that the country is at a critical point in confronting racial discrimination[2466]. She noted that "the murders of George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, and many others, the disparate impact of COVID-19 (on racial minorities), and the massive protests for racial justice in 2020 have revealed some of the realities of persistent systemic racism to the mass consciousness of Americans." There is a pressing need for greater efforts[2467].
From 24 April to 5 May 2023, a delegation from the UN International Independent Expert Mechanism to Advance Racial Justice and Equality in Law Enforcement made an official visit to the United States[2468]. The follow up report, released on 26 September 2023, found that here is systemic racism against people of African descent that permeates American police forces and the criminal justice system[2469].
The document identifies racial discrimination in the US as the legacy of slavery, the slave trade, and the 100 years of legal apartheid after slavery was abolished. Today, racism still exists in the country. It takes the form of racial profiling, police killings, and many other human rights violations. Black people in America are three times more likely to be killed by police than whites. They are also 4.5 times more likely to be incarcerated. Out of more than a thousand police killings each year, only ten cases (about 1 per cent) result in charges against police officers. The conclusion is that unless there is a change in the rules of engagement in the US, in accordance with the principles of international law, there will be no justice[2470].
Following the visit, one of the Mechanism's experts, Tracy Keesee, described as "not new" and "unacceptable" the fact that in all the cities visited, there were "dozens of heartbreaking accounts of victims not seeking justice or reparations". The expert emphasized that this was "a systemic problem requiring a systemic response". She pointed to the need for all parties, including the police and trade unions, to come together to combat widespread impunity. Referring to concerns expressed during the Mechanism's expert meetings with police officers that the mental health of officers was affected not only by excessive workloads but also by racism and racial discrimination in police stations, Keesee concluded that law enforcement officers could only be expected to show respect for the rights of others if these principles were applied in their own environment[2471].
The authors of the report call on police agencies to address systemic racism against Black law enforcement officers as well as issues of white supremacist ideology within these agencies. The report makes 30 recommendations for the US and all of its jurisdictions, including the nation's more than 18,000 police departments.
Notably, the report's authors also highlighted several positive examples of best practices at the local level. They also urged the current administration to use these best practices to combat systemic racism in other parts of the country.
Data collected by the FBI showed that firearms were used in 21 per cent of violent assaults and 60 per cent of murders. Approximately 8,500 hate crimes per year against national, religious and other minorities are committed with the use of firearms.[2472]
Another issue linked with gun violence is that, at times, American law enforcement officers resort to the use of force and firearms as well as other weapons or to brutal treatment even if there is no real and immediate threat to their lives by suspects. Racial profiling is closely linked with this problem since police abuse of power disproportionately impacts non-white members of US society. African Americans often suffer from the use of firearms.
Amnesty International has come to the disturbing finding that more than half of the country's dead (58.5 per cent) are African-Americans,[2473] after examining the latest available official data on gun deaths.
At the same time, a number of experts note that members of ethnic minorities in America themselves take part in the shootings. According to the NGO Gun Violence Action Fund, African Americans between the ages of 15 and 34 commit 37 per cent of homicides.[2474] Human rights treaty bodies of the United Nations have long pointed out the seriousness of this problem. The Human Rights Committee and CERD expressed special concern with the United States' high number of gun-related fatalities and injuries as well as the disproportionate toll that these occurrences take on women, children, and people of colour who are ethnic minorities. The UN HRC also pointed out "the discriminatory effect of the 'Stand Your Ground' laws," which, in the opinion of the Committee, were "used to circumvent the limits of legitimate self-defense in violation of the State party's duty to protect life."[2475]
The systemic abuses by US intelligence agencies, which engage in widespread mass surveillance of citizens, also show signs of racial profiling. According to experts, about 25 per cent of the 18,000 US police departments have access to such data.[2476] "Over half of all American adults are" in a driver's license database that are searched using facial recognition.
The use of face recognition technology (FRT) is a good example of the systemic bias. In a number of states, such a system includes not only suspects of typical criminal offenses but also individuals suspected of breaching immigration laws. Human rights activists have frequently emphasized the shortcomings of such systems as well as their discrimination against people who identify as racial or religious minorities, particularly African Americans.[2477]
Amnesty International (AI) experts have urged the New York Police Department to stop utilizing facial recognition technology (FRT) video cameras to discriminate against racial and ethnic minorities.[2478]
More than 7,000 volunteers participating in a global campaign called Ban the Scan helped rights activists identify more than 25 000 FRT-enabled CCTV cameras in the city. AI researchers later compared their findings with the statistics on arrests and demographic data. They consequently discovered that the Bronx, Brooklyn, and Queens had the most number of such devices installed out of all five boroughs in New York City[2479] since those are the places where police enforcement personnel are most likely to stop and search African Americans and Hispanics.[2480]
Commenting on the results of the research, Dr. Matt Mahmoudi, expert on artificial intelligence and human rights at Amnesty International, noted that the police's indiscriminate use of such identification systems is in effect a digital version of the stop and frisk policy,[2481] which constitutes an infringement of citizens' right to privacy, free assembly and equality, and facilitates police discrimination against non-white citizens.[2482]
Jumaane Williams, the Public Advocate for New York City agrees with Amnesty International's views. He has pointed out that community representatives and activists have for a long time been observing how law enforcement bodies are biased against ethnic minorities, and how the frequent malfunctioning of face-recognition software leads to wrongful arrests.[2483]
In July 2020, a similar incident occurred again in Detroit, Michigan. Michael Oliver, a Black man, was arrested for allegedly reaching into a person's car, grabbing a mobile phone and damaging it. "Facial recognition flagged" him as a possible suspect. However, the perpetrator, captured on the footage, did not look like Michael Oliver, as the latter had tattoos on his arms unlike the person in the video. After a more detailed comparison of M. Oliver's images with the real perpetrator, the police concluded that the misidentification.[2484]
Human rights activists also found out that, in addition to law enforcement agencies, recognition systems are also used by certain companies. In particular, owners of rental properties were tracking their African-American tenants. From 2018 to 2019, residents of the Black majority complex "successfully resisted attempts at installing" such equipment in their apartment buildings. They had initially learned about the plan in the fall of 2018 by accident ("as a result of chaotic mail delivery"). "By collaborating with civil society, legal, technology and media organizations," the residents' pushback received significant attention. And by November 2019, "Nelson Management announced that they would not be pursuing the installation of facial recognition cameras in the apartment complex."[2485]
Institutional Islamophobia also occurs in the country, with 50 extremist anti-Islamic organizations and 61 antisemitic organizations operating.[2486] Many cases of attacks on mosques and synagogues and their congregations have been documented.
In a speech before the US Senate, US Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro Mayorkas stated that against the backdrop of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the number of reports of threats against Jewish, Muslim, and Arab-American communities and institutions is increasing, as well as the number of cases of antisemitism in the country.[2487]
In his words, President Biden has made no secret of the Judeophobic sentiments in the USA, including neo-Nazi expressions of swastikas on automobiles, attacks on synagogues, and Holocaust denial.[2488]
A more than 400 per cent increase in antisemitic incidents in 2023 has been reported by US Jewish communities[2489], which, according to opinion polls, are under constant fear of crimes being committed against them. 63 per cent of respondents either experienced or witnessed racially motivated crimes in the last five years. 56 per cent heard antisemitic comments, slurs or threats, while 9 per cent of respondents were physically or verbally attacked.[2490]
According to the non-governmental organization Anti-Defamation League (ADL), there were 3,291 antisemitic incidents (assaults, harassment and vandalism) in the US between 7 October 2023 and 7 January 2024 alone. Comparatively, according to expert estimates, in 2022 there were 3,697 incidents (a 360 per cent increase), 2,717 episodes in 2021 and 2,024 incidents in 2020. The figure given (3,291 incidents) is the highest indicator since 1979, when the ADL began tracking anti-Jewish incidents.[2491]
Attacks on Jewish facilities, such as synagogues and community centers, rose by 61 per cent; incidents at schools rose by 106 per cent; and incidents on college campuses rose by 21 per cent. There were 14 per cent more acts of vandalism and 167 per cent more attacks on individuals motivated by antisemitism.
On 6 January 2021 (storming of the Capitol by far-right allies of Donald Trump[2492]), there were rioters sporting neo-Nazi emblems, including a man wearing a hoodie that read "Camp Auschwitz" and another wearing a T-shirt that read "6MWE" ("6 Million Wasn't Enough").[2493]
On 6 February 2020, four extremists operating in Seattle, Tampa, Houston and Phoenix were arrested on charges of conspiracy to endanger the lives of journalists and nongovernmental organization activists. The affected persons were Jewish Americans and African Americans. Images of Nazi swastikas, weapons and Molotov cocktails were sent to them by mail.
During the Israeli-HAMAS conflict in May 2021 there was a significant spike in the number of antisemitic attacks, with 222 such incidents in May 2021, compared with 127 in May 2020, an increase of 148 per cent. Hundreds of anti-Israeli protests took place in dozens of cities across the country. Of the 387 assaults on Jews documented in two major cities, New York and Los Angeles, 297 occurred after May 10, when the conflict officially began. Law enforcement officers intensified patrols in Orthodox Jewish neighbourhoods.
Antisemitic incidents included an attack by a group of people carrying Palestinian flags on Jews dining outside in Los Angeles, aggression against Orthodox Jews in New York, and the desecration of a synagogue in Alaska with Nazi symbols. Pro-Palestinian protests and acts of vandalism in synagogues were also reported in Arizona, Illinois, Florida and new York, as well as in salt lake city, where an unknown person painted a swastika on the door of the synagogue.[2494]
On 31 March 2021, a Jewish family with a young child was attacked by gunfire in New York City, and on February 24, 2021, a memorial to the victims of the Jewish genocide was vandalized in Oklahoma.[2495]
Another incident occurred in Florida on March 26, 2021. A car belonging to a Holocaust survivor was marked with two swastikas.[2496]
In January 2021, journalists from CBS television reported that there had been more than 2,100 incidents since 2016, in which members of the diaspora were assaulted or insulted, or in which their property was vandalized.[2497] A gunman held hostages at a Jewish community in Colleyville, Texas, on January 15.[2498]
According to a 12 November 2023 Fox Television Channel report, unknown vandals sprayed antisemitic graffiti on the headstones of a Jewish cemetery in Cleveland, Ohio.[2499] The vandals painted swastikas with red spray paint on several monuments. In turn, the Jewish Federation of Cleveland called the desecration of graves utterly disgusting. "Desecrating the memory of our Elders is a cowardly act that confirms the well-known fact that hatred for the Jewish community here and around the world is now at an unprecedented level that has not been seen in generations," said the organization's press office on "X" social media.[2500]
It is known that brochures were distributed in many states informing them that all measures to combat the coronavirus were being taken in the interests of Jews. Every Aspect of the COVID Agenda is Jewish.[2501] The Judophobic publications and statements of American rapper Ye (formerly known as Kanye West), for example, the image of the Star of David together with the swastika, gained a wide resonance.[2502] A meeting between Trump and Nicholas Fuentes, a follower of the white supremacy theory, also triggered a scandal.[2503] Basketball player Kyrie Irving offended the public when he shared a link to an antisemitic film on social media.[2504]
But when members of the Ukrainian neo-Nazi battalion "Azov" visited Stanford University along with former US Ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul, the United States handled it calmly.[2505]
An independent, interdepartmental working group headed by the NSC has been formed to create a national antisemitism strategy.[2506] A plan to counter anti-Semitism was submitted in May 2023.[2507] According to Deborah Lipstadt, the US Special Representative for Monitoring and Combating Antisemitism, it is alarming that American society as a whole is not aware of the problem.[2508]
In his statements, Mr. Biden urges not to forget and not to repeat the history of the Holocaust.[2509] At the same time, the American authorities have no reaction to the monuments to Nazis and their collaborators[2510] (including monuments to Bandera, Vlasov and Shukhevych in New York) erected in the country. The authorities also ignore the actions of Ukronazis in front of the White House in support of the terrorist group Azov, in which R. Kashpura participated.[2511] Moreover, the authorities also do not prevent neo-Nazi Marches on the streets of American cities. Among the most odious cases are Marches by adherents of white supremacy with Nazi symbols and anti-Jewish slogans in Madison (Wisconsin)[2512], Nashville (Tennessee)[2513], Orlando (Florida)[2514] and Toledo (Ohio).[2515]
As the American troop withdrawal from Afghanistan accelerated back in 2021, experts expressed concern over neo-Nazis admiring the Afghan Taliban ideology for antisemitism, homophobia and severe restrictions on women's freedom, with a view to provoke an "inevitable race war" that would lead to the creation of a whites-only state in North America and Europe[2516].
According to Guardian, the rise of Islamophobia and anti-Arabian sentiments in the US became unprecedented in the context of Palestinian-Israeli conflict[2517]. There has also been a sharp uptick in hate speech and attacks against Muslims in the United States amid the aggravation of Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The scale of protests in the universities' campuses has also became larger[2518].
According to a report of Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), Muslim civil rights protection organization has received in overall 1283 requests of assistance and reports on discrimination from 7 October to 4 November 2023. It means that the anti-Arabic sentiments demonstrate a growth of 216 per cent compared to previous year[2519].
In November 2023, the White House reacted under protest by announcing the development of a first ever national strategy to counter Islamophobia[2520].
CAIR reported considerable increase of the number of complaints from the side of US Muslim community with regards to ethnicity and religion-based mistreatment[2521]. Over 8000 complaints have been received (6700 in 2022).
In October 2023, the 71-year-old owner of a house in the US state of Illinois, where a family of Palestinian refugees lived, stabbed a six‑year‑old boy 26 times motivated by Islamophobia, xenophobia and all forms of hatred. The child died in hospital. His 32-year-old mother was also seriously injured. The man tried to strangle her, then stab her to death with the words: "You Muslims must die!". He has been charged with a murder motivated by intolerance.
The sheriff's office later explained that "the suspect targeted both victims because they were Muslim and because of the ongoing conflict in the Middle East involving Hamas and the Israelis."[2522]
Despite the declared concern for overcoming hatred in society, the practical actions of the authorities are at odds with their words. This is especially evident in attitudes toward immigrants. Politicians on the right blame illegal immigration for the rise in crime and the abuse of drugs[2523]. In their opinion, the influx of illegal migrants, who "rushed" to the United States thanks to the easing of border policy of the Biden administration, affects ordinary Americans, who are in fear of new gangsters, who have begun to organize groups on the basis of nationality[2524]. According to a new Pew Research Center report on the US-Mexico border, 57 per cent of Americans believe that the large number of migrants seeking to enter the country leads to an increase in crime. In other words, most people in the US now attribute crime to the recent increase in immigration[2525].
The US authorities take unprecedently tough measures to "resolve" the immigration crisis, whose objective is to return the foreigners to neighbouring countries, where they must await until their applications for entry into the country are examined. The steady tightening of migration policy is of serious concern to the human rights community.
Detained illegal migrants, including minors, are frequently housed in unhygienic facilities that lack basic sanitation standards[2526]. Non-citizens have been refused health care services, according to human rights organizations and researchers[2527]. The programme of mass deportations persisted under President J.Biden, including the employment of the accelerated removal mechanism under the pretext of quarantine requirements related to the COVID-19 pandemic[2528].
Pro-Republican governors Ron De Santis (Florida), Douglas Ducey (Arizona), and Greg Abbott (Texas), have taken measures to send people who do not have legal status in the US to liberal areas, even to Vice President Kamala Harris' residence[2529]. Conservative voters are in favour of such strategies.
The practice of artificially created queues at southern border crossings has continued, endangering the lives of thousands of migrants and refugees forced to violate US law and cross the border at inappropriate locations. The impact of the programme on children of asylum seekers and border crossers was particularly negative.
US authorities often separated families seeking asylum in the United States once they crossed the US-Mexico border. According to the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) (NGO), minors were routinely separated from their families[2530]. They were then transferred to various immigration facilities. There are over 2,500 recorded cases involving such children. In addition. 1,033 of them were under the age of ten when they were detained, including 185 under five[2531]. According to the organization, as of August 2020, 678 children have been separated by the authorities under the pretext of "parental criminal records". The NGO filed 400 legal actions against the US authorities aimed at blocking the removal of migrants, including children, seeking asylum at the border[2532].
"The Washington Post" reported on an incident in which 10-year-old asylum-seeker W.Obregon was deported to Mexico by authorities and then kidnapped by unknown assailants. Reporters are convinced that there are thousands of such incidents[2533].
The Remain in Mexico (RMX) programme introduced by the US administration in January 2019, which required asylum applicants to stay in Mexico while they awaited court decisions on their applications, was much criticized by human rights groups. The policy was alleged to have led to large-scale violations of fundamental freedoms. Almost 70,000 people seeking asylum in the United States had to wait in Mexican border towns[2534]. Many migrants became victims of crimes including sexual exploitation and human trafficking[2535].
Experts also criticized the living conditions of migrants – in tent cities or overcrowded "barracks" type rooms, in premises without heating and access to basic hygiene products. Frozen foods, including expired ones[2536], were in the diet. Among other problems, analysts note unemployment and the criminal situation. There are known cases of refugees settling in religious buildings and places of worship. The children of migrants were not allowed to attend the education institutions. Inadequate measures have not been taken against the spread of serious infectious diseases, including HIV.
Since March 2020, the US Department of Homeland Security has been deporting migrants based on rules introduced by the United States Department of Health and Human Services and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, empowered by Article 42 of the US Code of Federal Regulations. Human Rights First (HRF) has investigated at least 8,705 assaults on or kidnappings of persons whose asylum applications have been refused based on Title 42 or other regulations restricting the right to asylum. Many of these people, both individuals and families, are living in poor conditions which are exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic and by the lack of basic healthcare and adequate nutrition.
Since January 2021, the United States has expelled nearly 25,000 Haitians (including children), as well as asylum-seekers, to Haiti without access to the asylum process, despite growing political instability and violence in this state.
Direct deportations under Section 42 also persisted as of the end of February 2022 to nations such as El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. Under Trump administration the United States entered into Asylum Cooperative Agreements (ACA) with Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras, and the Biden administration subsequently withdrew from and terminated these agreements. The US government expelled at least 945 asylum-seekers to Guatemala under the ACA without a remedy. The agreements with El Salvador and Honduras were never implemented.
Leading US medical experts have repeatedly concluded that asylum restrictions had no public health justification and threatened the health and safety of migrants. While asylum-seekers are not allowed to seek protection along the border, including at ports of entry, vaccinated tourists and other visitors with visas have been allowed to enter the United States through southern border ports since November 2021. These facts highlight the discriminatory nature of asylum-seekers' situation[2537].
The policy of not allowing migrants and refugees from Mexico into the United States has been repeatedly challenged in local courts as contrary to the principles of humanity. Although one of the federal instances has ruled that such measures are illegal[2538], the US Supreme Court subsequently rejected that ruling[2539].
In April 2020, over 120 organizations (including human rights ones) urged the US Department of Homeland Security in a letter to halt expulsions at the nation's southern border. The appeal further emphasizes that the processing of asylum-seekers' applications did not follow the international law. The bare minimum requirements for the defense of children's rights were also broken. Reportedly, "at least 400 children – from Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and Mexico" – had already been expelled to Mexico. As a result, minors were placed at risk of trafficking. Many were unaccompanied or in the care of adults who were not related to the children.
Human rights activists point out that the COVID-19 pandemic has only exacerbated the situation. The victims were mainly from Latin American countries. This group's death rate was 38.4 per cent, far greater than that of the white race[2540]. For African Americans[2541], it was 27.9 per cent respectively. In particular, the administration of migrant detention centres showed disregard for the people who were there, their medical care, and their living conditions. Results of the joint study, conducted by Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) and Harvard Medical School, showed that the number of people per month who tested positive for COVID-19 in ICE detention between March and August 2020 was from 5.7 to 21.8 times higher than the case rate of the US general population during that same time. Interviews with immigrants who had been detained at 22 different ICE facilities revealed that measures to prevent the spread of COVID-19 had often not been complied with, and living conditions at these centres had put detainees at risk of catching the disease. Respondents were unable to maintain a social distance because the detention facilities were overcrowded, and did not have access to soap or sanitizer. Many of those who became infected had to wait up to 25 days before they could see a doctor[2542].
Cases of abuse of authority in migrant detention centres have reached such proportions that they have become known to the media. The conditions of detention in local deportation centres have become the subject of constant lawsuits and appeals by numerous NGOs to the leadership of the federal migration service and its subdivisions in certain states. Migrants themselves have turned to NGOs such as Americans for Immigrant Justice (AI Justice), Freedom for Immigrants (FFI), and many others for help, complaining of beatings, unsanitary conditions, lack of medical care, and cruelty by the officials of the detention centres. At the same time, those who seek help are often deported by the same detention centres.
For example, lawsuits have been pending for over a decade against the MacKlenie centre, Florida, details of horrible conditions in which emerged in the media after numerous complaints from community groups. However, in 2022, after another inspection, the centre was positively assessed and continued its work.
In February 2021, human rights organizations again sent a coalition letter to the US Department of Homeland Security urging the latter to reject the use of expedited removal and immigration detention; as such policies violated the international law and US treaty obligations. The human rights defenders expressed grave concerns with the expedited removal process[2543].
In May 2021, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) urged the US to "restore access to asylum for people whose lives depend on it." Despite his promises to mitigate the harsh policies of the Trump administration in relation to asylum seekers at the Mexican border, Joe Biden is continuing with the deportations, despite the fact that this policy is putting children at risk, splitting up families and illegally jeopardizing the safety of asylum seekers, including Black asylum seekers, who are at risk of violence in Mexico[2544].
In December 2021, following a court ruling, which is currently being appealed against, expulsions of migrants and refugees under the RMX policy began again. In December 2021, dozens of members of the US Congress signed a letter criticizing the government's renewal of expulsions under the RMX program, and called on it to reverse its decision to extend the scope of the RMX to refugees of other nationalities. The Administration stated that it would use the RMX program to expel people who could not be removed under Title 42.
The Department of Homeland Security is now able to prohibit, send back, or deport an even broader spectrum of migrants and asylum-seekers to Mexico by combining the RMX policy and Title 42. The NGO Human Rights First has monitored at least 1,544 publicly reported cases of kidnapping, murder, torture, rape, and other violent acts on persons returned to Mexico in the two years since the Trump administration introduced RMX. At least two asylum seekers who were sent back to Mexico under the RMX policy were subsequently killed.
On 8 August 2022, the US Department of Homeland Security announced the end of the Remain in Mexico strategy initiated by the previous administration[2545]. The first flight to Morelia, a city in central Mexico took off on 30 January 2024 carrying more than 100 Mexicans[2546].
It should be noted that the migration crisis at the US-Mexico border began in 2021 when the number of undocumented migrants trying to enter the US skyrocketed. For fiscal year 2021, there were a then-record 1.73 million border crossing attempts, for fiscal 2022 there were already 2.76 million, and for 2023 there were more than 2.8 million[2547].
US analysts cite various reasons for this crisis – in particular, the plight of Central American countries, especially aggravated during the coronavirus pandemic (most migrants travel to the US from Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and Venezuela). However, a graph of the increase in the migration flow, cited by the BBC with reference to official US statistics, clearly shows a correlation with the change of the US President: the numbers skyrocketed exactly after J.Biden's inauguration[2548].
December 2023 marked a new monthly record: more than 300,000 new undocumented migrants crossed the US-Mexico border[2549].
In this situation, the main opponent of the federal government's policy was the government of the state of Texas, which has the longest border with Mexico. In 2021, Texas Governor G.Abbott announced the launch of Operation Lone Star. It is conducted by the local National Guard, an armed force under the authority of the state rather than the federal government, and is aimed at curbing illegal migration, drug trafficking (particularly fentanyl importation) and human trafficking. Thousands of troops are involved in this operation (at its peak, the number was as high as 10,000)[2550].
In addition to apprehending migrants (about half a million people have been apprehended in total over the course of the operation), the Texas National Guard physically counteracts the migrant flow by erecting a barbed-wire fence and pushing violators back across the border.
In addition, the military practiced car chases of migrants, in which 74 people were killed. Texas authorities are regularly criticized by both the federal government and civil rights activists for such actions[2551].
At the same time, the measures taken to combat irregular migration have yielded results. For example, according to US Customs and Border Protection, by March 2022, the number of illegal border crossings between Texas and Mexico had increased just 9 per cent over 2021, from 109,456 to 119,053[2552]. At the same time, Arizona, California and New Mexico – three other states that share a border with Mexico – saw a combined 62 per cent increase. In July 2022, Texas even saw a 17 per cent decrease in this indicator. True, it had already increased by 41 per cent in December 2022 (which was still less than other border states, which saw a 63 per cent increase)[2553].
Another measure practiced by the Texas authorities is sending migrants who have expressed their desire to do so on bus flights to "sanctuary cities" (this is the name given in the United States to cities whose authorities have refused to restrict migration). This has led to a migration crisis in "sanctuary cities" such as New York, Washington and Chicago and attempts by their authorities to deal with the influx of migrants[2554].
On 11 January 2024, the migration crisis that has been brewing for years at the US-Mexico border erupted into a direct confrontation between the federal government and the state of Texas[2555] when the Texas National Guard took control of Shelby Park on the banks of the Rio Grande border river and denied access to federal US Border Patrol agents. This led to an exchange of harsh statements: for example, the US Department of Homeland Security demanded that Border Patrol agents be restored access to the area, to which Texas Governor Abbott refused and promised to continue to "protect the sovereignty of the state"[2556].
The confrontation has spilled over into the judicial arena as well.
After the US President Biden's administration appealed to the Supreme Court, the latter ruled to remove the fence at the 48-kilometer-long border section, but Texas National Guardsmen do not allow federal patrols to the border.
On 25 January 2024, almost all states with Republican governors (a total of 25 states, excluding only Vermont) came out in support of Texas Governor G.Abbott and Texas' constitutional right to self-defense[2557], and some of them, such as Oklahoma and Florida, decided to send their own national guard forces to help Texans. Donald Trump called for this as well. Governor Abbott's actions were also supported by the Speaker of the US House of Representatives, Republican M. Johnson. Meanwhile, lower house members of Congress from Texas, Democrats J. Castro and G. Casar (both of Mexican descent), have come out on the opposite side, calling on President J. Biden to bring the Texas National Guard under federal control[2558].
On 30 January 2024, the attorneys general of 26 Republican states sent a letter to J. Biden that also supported Texas Governor Gov. Abbott's right to defend the border with Mexico on his own. According to Fox News TV, the message sent to the White House noted that the massive influx of refugees was a "coordinated attack on the border". "This is an invasion, and the states should be able to defend themselves against invasion," the letter from the Republican attorneys general emphasized[2559].
The Texas governor's actions were supported by a majority of average Americans. According to a Rasmussen Reports poll, 69 per cent of respondents said they support Texas' immigration policy, while only 27 per cent opposed the erection of a barbed wire fence on the US-Mexico border[2560].
In an interview with CBS News, US Border Patrol chief Jason Owens said that the agency recorded one million apprehensions of migrants along the US-Mexico border in the 2024 fiscal year, which started in October 2023. His agency is on track to record two million apprehensions by the time the fiscal year ends. In doing so, he emphasized that border security is an important part of national security, stating the following: "If we don't know who gets into our country, we don't know their intentions. It's a threat, and they're exploiting our vulnerability." Among the measures aimed at toughening immigration policies and reducing the number of migrants crossing the US southern border illegally, Owens named imprisonment, expulsion and a ban on entry[2561].
D. Trump made the topic of combating illegal migration to the US and the need to restore order on the southern border with Mexico central to his election campaign (immigration was the largest political driving force of Trump's campaign in 2016 as well). He criticizes J.Biden for the "preferential treatment" for migrants, who by the tens of thousands have begun to flood major American cities (since Biden took office, the US authorities have let a record 2.3 million illegal immigrants into the country through the US-Mexico border[2562]). "On my first day back in the White House, I will rescind the entire open borders policy of the J. Biden administration, stop the invasion of our southern border and begin the largest domestic deportation operation in American history," Trump said at a campaign event in Iowa in December 2023[2563]. He also announced his plans to close the border and begin mass deportations of undocumented migrants on 4 February 2024, in an interview with Fox News Channel[2564].
Representatives of profile international organizations highly criticize the policy of US authorities in this area. For example, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk said that the US border enforcement actions violated fundamental human rights and could provoke a global migration crisis[2565]. The Chinese Society for the Study of Human Rights report, "Human Rights Violations in the United States in 2023," shows that the United States, a country that has historically and currently benefited from immigration, faces serious problems of exclusion and discrimination against immigrants. The practice of exclusion and discrimination against immigrants is deeply rooted in the US institutional structure, from the infamous Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 to the internationally condemned "Muslim Ban" of 2017. Today, the immigration issue has become a tool for party gain and political blame shifting, with politicians ignoring the individual rights and welfare of immigrants. Immigration policy is simplified to an "if you support it, we oppose it" stance, which ultimately becomes a political show to manipulate voters. The immigration crisis has led to a vicious cycle, with immigrants and children being arrested on a large scale, being trafficked and exploited. The hypocrisy of political polarization and the hypocritical nature of human rights in the US is evident in the immigration issue[2566].
On 11 June 2024, a number of media outlets reported that US Border Patrol agents in the state of California – where San Diego is the busiest border crossing point for illegal migrants, especially from non-US countries – were ordered to deport adult migrants from Russia, Georgia, Moldova, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan from the United States. For natives of other states (more than 100) there are solutions to migration issues through the courts[2567]. As the Fox News Channel reported, citing US Customs and Border Protection, they will not be granted asylum[2568].
According to border guards, more than 10,000 migrants crossed the southern border on two days – 8 and 9 June 2024. Since October 2023, the services have counted more than 27,000 Chinese who have crossed the border, as well as citizens of Brazil, Ecuador and Peru. According to the guards of order, many people use the services of illegal carriers who place advertisements on social networks. Identification is hampered by forged documents and false statements about the country of origin[2569].
Earlier – on 4 June 2024 – President J.Biden announced that no new asylum applications would be considered until the number of illegal border crossings dropped to 2,500. The total number of entries will be limited to 1.8 million asylum seekers per year[2570].
Tens of thousands of migrants from countries like China and Venezuela May be exempt from the J. Biden administration's new "tough" restrictions because their home countries refuse to take them back. They don't fall within the 2,500 cases a month that the White House wants to limit themselves to[2571].
Hundreds of thousands more migrants have already been authorized to enter the US through the CBP One ("CBP One") application, totalling more than 529,000 by the end of June 2024. The programme began operating in January 2023. In addition, Washington lets about 360,000 more migrants into the country each year through a mass parole scheme that allows Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans and Venezuelans to fly directly to America[2572].
In an interview with The Post, border guards compared the White House's efforts to resolve the situation to "trying to fill the holes in the Titanic with chewing gum," and called Biden's migration policy the most loyal in American history. Some law enforcement officials believe it will take years to fully implement the new rules and return illegal migrants to their countries[2573].
The record for immigration detentions was set in 2023, with more than 3.2 million cases. In 2022, this figure amounted to more than 2.7 million people. Over 2 million illegal migrants were apprehended in 2024[2574].
American Civil Liberties Union researchers criticized the Biden administration for supporting and financing private immigration centres and prisons violating the rights and liberties of asylum seekers[2575]. As human rights activists have found out, immigration detention system has expanded during the presidency of Donald Trump, who had allowed private prison corporations such as GEO Group, Corrections Corporation of America (CoreCivic), LaSalle Corrections, and Management and Training Corporation (МТС) taking under control the most part of immigration prisons. The detainees are mainly people arrested at the border, having illegally entered the US territory; and foreign citizens who are to be deported by the government because they "threaten national security".
From a legal point of view, the presence of immigrants in the institutions of the above-mentioned companies is of civil and not criminal nature. However, according to human rights experts, the conditions in immigration prisons are practically the same as in penal institutions.
As a candidate, President Biden promised to stop the use of private prison companies for detention of asylum seekers. The Biden administration issued an executive order in January 2021 directing the Department of Justice to phase out its contracts with private prison companies. However, it notably excluded ICE detention from the order. Since then, the number of immigrants detained by ICE – and revenues for the abovementioned private prison companies – have only increased. As of July 2023, 90.8 per cent of people detained in ICE custody by US Immigration and Customs Enforcement each day are held in detention facilities owned or operated by private prison corporations.
The contracts concluded with Immigration and Customs Enforcement bring considerable income to those corporations. In 2022, the GEO Group made 1.05 billion USD in revenue from ICE contracts alone, or 43.9 per cent of its total revenue (2.4 billion USD). Corrections Corporation of America earned similarly, generating 552.2 million USD in 2022 through this collaboration – 30 per cent of its overall income.
To achieve these indicators, companies save up on almost everything. The ICE personnel clean and cook much worse. Immigrants are often denied necessary medical assistance. The situation with psychological support is no better: it May be that there is only one part-time psychologist working for an entire prison. Such situation leads not only to suicide but also to outbreaks of violence which occur 30 per cent more often within the ICE than in federal prisons. At the same time, unarmed guards having only a radio set and receiving minimum salary after three-week training are not capable of coping with such outbreaks.
Biden Administration did not close the detention centres which oversight bodies recommended to close for inhumane conditions and risks to the security of asylum seekers.
For example, the ICE leadership refused to eliminate the Estancia immigration prison belonging to CoreCivic in New Mexico even despite the official demand of the Department of Homeland Security's Office of Inspector General (OIG) calling for the immediate removal of all detainees and even after the suicide of Brazilian citizen Kesley Vial just a few months later[2576].
Another death incident occurred at the immigration centre in Louisiana, run by GEO, where an asylum-seeker from Nicaragua Ernesto Rocha-Cuadra died after suffering a heart attack. He had submitted dozens of grievances alleging that he was refused medical care, denied legal assistance and was subject to systemic violent treatment[2577].
Attempts by governors to close private immigration centres and prisons also failed. In 2021, New Jersey's Governor Phil Murphy signed into law a bill which bans private facilities to enter into or renew contracts with US Immigration and Customs Enforcement to detain immigrants.
Since the law's passage, the three facilities operated by New Jersey counties (Bergen, Essex, and Hudson) stopped housing detainees for ICE. The last remaining centre is located in Elizabeth and is operated by Corrections Corporation of America, whose contract was set to expire on 31 August 2023. Before the contract expired, the company filed a lawsuit in February to challenge the regulation, arguing that it violates the Supremacy Clause[2578] of the United States Constitution, which states that state law cannot conflict with federal law.
The Biden administration filed a statement of interest, thus supporting the penitentiary corporation's claims having noted that the act intrudes on the federal government's ability to use private contractors to detain non-citizens.
New Jersey district court has finally ruled in favour of the federal government and CoreCivic by declaring state law to be contrary to the US Constitution. Numerous declarations by human rights activists about violations of immigrants' rights in this facility have been ignored.
Governor Murphy has appealed the judge's decision to the Third Circuit. In the meantime, ICE has renewed its contract with CoreCivic for the Elizabeth Detention Center, at a cost to taxpayers of 19.9 million USD for the next year[2579].
According to the American Civil Liberties Union, the Biden administration can reverse course on immigration detention. It should dramatically reduce the number of people in ICE detention, invest in alternatives to detention, and stop allowing private prison companies from profiting by the billions of dollars each year off the suffering of immigrants in detention.
Official statistics show that the rate of imprisonment has nearly quadrupled (or increased by 70 per cent) over the past 40 years, with the number of convicted Americans breaking the 2.3 million mark[2580]. Another 4.5 million people have been sentenced on probation or released on parole. This results in serious prison overcrowding. Human rights NGOs have also drawn attention to the increasing number of women in prison in some states[2581].
Abuse of power and inhuman treatment of convicts by prison staff is regularly reported. Prisoners are often subjected to torture and humiliating treatment. Inhuman treatment of convicts is expressed, inter alia, in the limited medical care and poor sanitary conditions of detention.
Solitary confinement measures constitute a particular challenge. Many convicts are placed in solitary confinement cells in violation of the legal periods of confinement. Prisoners subject to this measure are placed in Special Housing Units (SHUs). The reason for a tougher regime may be serious misconduct that has endangered the health and safety of other prisoners and/or prison staff.
"What happened to me is called 'solitary confinement' – a form of imprisonment in which prisoners spend 22 to 24 hours a day alone in their cell. (...) I was not a bearded terrorist with a Kalashnikov rifle who was caught in the mountains of Kandahar. I wasn't sentenced to life imprisonment or death penalty. At the time, I was just a Russian citizen under investigation for communicating with American politicians and public figures about peace building between Russia and the United States, who had just earned a master's degree in political science and was working as an assistant professor in the Department of Management at American University's Business School. But the conditions of my detention were the same as for terrorists and murderers, namely: twenty-two hours of solitary confinement no bigger than the interior of a regular minivan. (...) My lawyers, like the whole of Russia, tried to change the conditions of my solitary confinement, recognized by the international community as inhumane. (...) My lawyers tried in vain to object, demanding to provide evidence of the charges against me. But the prosecutor's office loudly outraged against such an outrage – do worthy gentlemen need to humiliate themselves by studying some papers. The prosecutor's word of honour is real proof of guilt! The prosecution even presented a witness to the court who, based on his rich life experience and knowledge of how "Russians always work," said that if I were to go under house arrest, I would definitely be dragged into their possession by the diplomats of the Russian Embassy. This was enough for the judge to be imbued in a few minutes with an understanding of the immorality of my personality and to understand the working methods of Russian diplomats. (...) The CCB or Central Cell Block of the American capital, (...) is, simply put, a slammer, where people are held until a decision is made to transfer them to a detention centre or release them on bail pending the outcome of the investigation. (...) They take there not only the citizens who have been indicted, but also all those scum of human society from whom the streets of Washington are cleansed so that they do not spoil the appetite of tourists and locals eating hamburgers and drinking Coca-Cola. The CCB in a country that has defeated racial prejudice is for the most part filled, of course, with a black population, and of both genders. (...) It is a series of endless cells no more than half a meter wide and two meters long in basement corridors, filled with the terrible sounds and smells of people going through drug withdrawal, suffering from mental disorders, sometimes drunk. A country is characterized by the way it treats prisoners. (...)They needed new methods to influence "that stubborn Russian". Then the prison administration came up with new measures – "for my safety", as it was explained to my lawyers and the Russian consuls, I was assigned a warden who sat day and night in a chair on the threshold of my cell at arm's length from the toilet with a large journal in which all my actions were recorded. (...) The large restroom had a huge, floor-length mirror directly across from the toilet. After pushing me inside, Michelle bravely walked in behind me...the process of publicly copulating is a great method of humiliating human dignity. That very toilet was the beginning of a "wonderful" new world for me, in which I would not be allowed to urinate alone for many months to come and would be regularly stripped and forced to wander around like that in front of the wardens. Such methods were sidely used in Nazy Germany's concentration camps. (...) It was unbearably painful to walk, the skin on my ankles was increasingly "peeled off" by the leg irons, and blood persistently flowed down them. (...) I'll probably never have kids. The constant cold of concrete and iron did its job. To this day, even the best doctors in Russia really can't guarantee that I will ever be able to have a baby. (...) Meanwhile, the US has signed and ratified the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. (...) International experts have characterized solitary confinement as psychological torture. A 1977 Council of Europe study showed that prolonged imprisonment with a strict regime of isolation of prisoners leads to what has been called "isolation syndrome," which included emotional, cognitive, social and somatic disorders," shares her experiences as a former prisoner of American prisons, now Deputy of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation M.Butina in her book "Prison Diary"[2582].
Roman Seleznev, who returned to his homeland on 1 August 2024, as a result of the prisoner exchange between Russia, Belarus and Western countries, told the following in an interview with the Izvestia newspaper on 4 August 2024, about his experiences in American prisons (he spent a total of ten years in prison): "The hardest part was being in a maximum security prison in Georgia, in Atlanta. I was thrown in there to put pressure on me. They wanted me to tell them some secrets I don't know at all. They sent some shady individuals to me to get me talking. (...) They thought I was some kind of super hacker working for the FSB. They wanted confirmation from me that I was working for the FSB inside an organized group. I don't even understand what specific information they wanted to get. But I interrupted all conversations, and then they began to openly send people with knives who threatened to kill me. Then other people would come in and say: "We're your friends and we'll help you with that." I refused and, roughly speaking, had to fight both. I was the only Russian there. (...) I was ordered to deliver food to the prisoners. Everyone was happy, but one said that I didn't put a bun in it. I gave him another one. He refused, and that's when I got angry and threw the bun on the floor. He said: "I'll come in the morning and kill you", he said. "Feel free to come. You know which cell I'm in", I replied. And then in the morning I hear him running toward me, but tripping over another prisoner. A knife fight started and he stabbed another prisoner. I got lucky that day, but I had to fight sometimes. I am not much of a fighter, sure, but they thought that since I am Russian, then I must be from special forces. (...) For over a dozen of times in a disciplinary cell for no reason whatsoever. They put me in the punishment cell, sometimes put me together with psychos who would wake me up at night, saying "Let's play chess" or something of the kind. (...) In Atlanta I was groundlessly accused of being a terrorist. I said: "I am not a terrorist, I myself was a victim of a terrorist attack in Morroco, my head was injured". But to them every Russian is an enemy[2583].
During R. Seleznev's short visits of his father, he had to think over every word. "We chatted about the weather, about nature, because they bugged everything and used it against me. For example, if he said that someone was sending me greetings, I could be put in the punishment cell on the grounds that it was a cipher and that, therefore, I was preparing to escape. They woke me up every two hours around the clock, even at night, to check in. They were making sure that I didn't escape. Monsters"[2584].
R.Seleznev told the following about his detention and trial: "...I flew to the Maldives with my fiance and her child. When we were about to return from the Maldives, there were American Secret Service agents waiting for us at the airport. They said they have permission to arrest me. They did not let me read the order. I was rounded up, handcuffed, stuffed into a private jet and flown without trial to Guam, the nearest US territory. Then I was taken to Hawaii, from there to California, and then to Seattle, Washington. (...) I was not shown any documents at the time of my arrest. They said I was being arrested under an Interpol red notice. I was arrested on 5 July. And when the Interpol red tag was presented in the new court, it was for July 6. So they issued this red notice after I was arrested. (…)
There was a trial in Seattle that lasted a very long time. For 2.5 years, approximately. I struggled trying to prove my innocence. But there was complete injustice. Witnesses who didn't know me personally said I May have stolen something. But when asked if they had seen me, they replied that they had not. How is that possible? They didn't invite a single witness who knew me personally. My defense counsel was very bad, "leaked" the whole trial and did not even stand up, did not make remarks. (...) That was supposed to be the best defense lawyer of the state of Washington. As it turned out, he was working for the state. So they have been told to convict me. At that moment I was aware that this was not an equal fight. (...) I did not plead guilty. They offered me a deal for 18 years. So, if I pleaded guilty, I could have been sentenced to 18 years, but the judge had the final say anyway. But I did not want to plead guilty for the crime I had not committed. They told me: "If you don't confess – you are getting a life sentence". There was absolutely no choice. Either I'd be killed there or wheeled around all 50 states and condemned for centuries to come. In the end, I was sentenced for 27 years. I thought I wouldn't make it through"[2585].
According to Equal Justice Initiative (EJI), an NGO, more than 60,000 prisoners are in solitary confinement in the United States as of November 2020. Human rights defenders find the situation with convict Tyquine Lee, who was held in solitary confinement in a state prison in Virginia for more than 600 days, egregious. His case is further complicated by the fact that the inmate has a history of severe mental health issues. According to his mother, Tyquine Lee was subjected to merciless abuse in the solitary confinement cell, and, ultimately, his mental and physical health was severely deteriorated. His weight had dropped below 45 kilograms and he was practically unable to speak[2586].
The situation in Virginia is noteworthy, where Valerie Slater, executive director of Rise for Youth, a group that advocates for teens in the juvenile justice system, and other experts have documented cases of racial discrimination in the juvenile criminal justice system.
The report by the Joint Legislative Audit and Review Commission (JLARC) of Virginia found that black youths were 2.5 times as likely over the past decade to be placed in the juvenile justice system. The report recommends introducing more training requirements aimed at combating the racial disparity issue. However, according to Valerie Slater, the issue called for a more systematic study.
A report by a delegation of the UN International Independent Expert Mechanism on Advancing Racial Justice and Equality in the Law Enforcement Context[2587], published on 26 September 2023, following a visit to the United States (24 April to 5 May 2023), cites cases of children of African descent being sentenced to life imprisonment and pregnant women in prison being chained during childbirth. There were also cases of the prolonged detention of individuals in solitary confinement for ten years. The authors of the report note that some African Americans are denied the right to vote even after serving their sentences, and others are forced into forced labour in "plantation" prisons, which constitutes a modern form of slavery[2588].
The UN Mechanism has condemned not only the general overuse of incarceration and criminal supervision in the United States, but also the "appalling overrepresentation of people of African Descent" among those subjected to these measures. Describing the testimonies and figures received by members of the Mechanism during their visit to the United States as "the worst part of a racist criminal justice system that erodes all efforts towards addressing systemic racism," Juan Mendez emphasized that the report's findings "point to the critical need for comprehensive reform."
Until relatively recently, of particular concern was the situation of Russian citizens Konstantin Yaroshenko and Viktor Bout, who were illegally sentenced to long terms of imprisonment and who were exchanged in 2022 for Americans Trevor Reed and Brittney Griner.
Konstantin Yaroshenko was held in Danberry Prison, Connecticut, until his release in April 2022. The conditions of detention in the facility do not stand up to criticism. For example, the Russian was kept in an overcrowded prison cell for several dozen inmates. Despite Konstantin Yaroshenko's severe chronic illnesses, he did not receive adequate medical care, and for several years he was denied dental prosthetics. Despite dozens of cases of COVID‑19 in prison, all individuals were given only one medical mask per week. However, Coronavirus testing came very late, only after many prisoners had died.
Russian R.Seleznev, who was serving a long prison sentence before being returned to his homeland as a result of the prisoner exchange between Russia and the United States on 1 August 2024, was not in the best situation either. Numerous appeals of human rights activists (Human Rights Watch, Sentencing Project, Amnesty International, recommendations of the Federal Bureau of Prisons to release the compatriot on humanitarian grounds have long been ignored by the US authorities, despite the fact that R. Seleznev was convicted of a non-violent crime and has a number of serious chronic diseases. He was not provided with the necessary medical care, requests to transfer him to another penitentiary institution where a comprehensive examination could be carried out were not considered.
All of these vivid examples clearly demonstrate the repressive nature of American justice. The rights of Russian citizens are constantly being violated: they are regularly placed in a punishment cell without reason, denied medical care and necessary medicines, not to mention extremely poor nutrition. Undoubtedly, all of this has a negative impact on both the physical and mental health of our compatriots.
In general, it should be noted that, as of 1 November 2023, there are some 100 Russian citizens in US penitentiaries that the Russian Embassy in Washington knows about. Unfortunately, there are no precise statistics on how many Russians are in the US prisons and detention centres.
The lack of such information on the number of imprisoned compatriots can be explained by the fact that the US authorities are far from always notified of their detention or release from custody. Numerous appeals by the Russian Embassy to the US Department of State to provide comprehensive data on all Russian citizens in detention are ignored.
As practice shows, most of Russian compatriots are charged with non‑violent crimes (cyber fraud, immigration violations, money laundering, theft, etc.). Russian citizens, once in the hands of American justice, are usually subjected to prejudice on the part of law enforcement agencies and courts. They are subjected to psychological pressure. The well-known situation with M.Butina is yet another confirmation of this.
Washington continues its attempts to put pressure on Russia by blatantly "preying on" its compatriots. It is increasingly using accusations of circumventing illegitimate anti-Russian restrictions as a pretext.
Once in the hands of the US justice system, Russian citizens usually face a biased attitude on the part of investigative agencies and courts. They are subjected to psychological pressure. Using various methods, including direct threats, they try to induce Russian compatriots to confess guilt and accept a plea deal, mostly on far-fetched charges, and if they refuse to cooperate, they are sentenced to significant prison terms.
According to the US Department of Justice, on 13 February 2024, a court in New York charged Kristina Puzyreva, a Russian-Canadian citizen, with conspiracy to launder money from scheme to send arms to sanctioned entities in Russia. The young woman pleaded guilty: she allegedly supplied components for drones, missile systems, and other weapons in violation of export control and sanctions laws. The shipped items were allegedly later found in the zone of the special military operation. Kristina Puzyreva faces up to 20 years' imprisonment[2589].
In October 2023, Nikolay Goltsov, a Russian-Canadian national, and Salimdjon Nasriddinov, a Russian-Tajik national, were also charged in this case (with conspiracy to conduct financial transactions with the proceeds of illegal activities: procurement and trafficking to Russia of components used in unmanned aerial vehicles and guided missile systems, as well as other military technologies; components were allegedly purchased by firms on the sanctions lists, parts were allegedly found in electronic reconnaissance equipment used by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in the context of the Special Military Operation). The legal basis for the charge is violation of US law as it relates to export restrictions regarding, among other things, the export from the United States of advanced "dual-use" technologies.
The legal basis for the charge is violation of US law as it relates to export restrictions regarding, among other things, the export from the United States of advanced "dual-use" technologies. As the coronavirus infection spread, the plight of Russians held in penitentiary institutions became even worse. Despite dozens of COVID-19 cases, which US prison authorities tried to hush up, each prisoner was given only one medical mask per week and rarely received qualified medical care. Testing for the coronavirus was done in exceptional cases and very late, mostly only after cellmates had already died.
Protecting the rights and legitimate interests of Russian prisoners has always been a priority of the Russian Embassy in the United States. Special attention is paid to the health and living conditions of Russian citizens in prisons. Regular contact is maintained with Russian citizens by telephone and via an electronic messaging system. Most of them receive weekly news bulletins based on the Russian media, as well as Russian-language periodicals and books.
The Embassy has had no difficulty in obtaining consular access to the detainees. In 2023, members of the Embassy staff visited A.Vinnik, V.Dunaev, G.Kavzharadze, V.Kliushin, V.Konoshchenok, A.Legkodymov, D.Ukrainski, P.Krasilnikov and I.Nagaev to provide them with certificates of return to Russia.
On 1 August 2024, the largest prisoner exchange in the history of Moscow-Washington relations took place at Ankara airport: 24 people became its participants at once (a total of 26 people are listed in the exchange lists, but 2 of them are children, family members of other defendants). The Russian side handed over 16 people to the US side (this group included US citizens, dual citizens and Russians), and the US and other Western countries handed over 8 people (with two minors – 10, all of them Russian citizens)[2590].
Vadim Konoschenok (charged with data collection on behalf of the FSB and smuggling of dual-use technology), Vladislav Klushin (serving a sentence from 2023 on cyber fraud charges) and Roman Seleznev (charged with cyber fraud) have returned to Russia from the United States[2591].
The list of those transferred to the United States includes Paul Whelan, Kevin Leak, Evan Gershkovich, Demuri Voronin, Vladimir Kara-Murza, Alsu Kurmasheva, Lilia Chanysheva, Vadim Ostanin, Ksenia Fadeeva, Sasha Skochilenko, Ilya Yashin, Andrei Pivovarov, and Oleg Orlov[2592].
Prior to that, the largest prisoner exchange between Moscow and Washington in the post-Cold War period took place in 2010, when ten rogue agents were returned to Russia and four Russians convicted of cooperating with Western intelligence were released from Russian prisons[2593].
The US authorities continue to cover up cases of torture, inhuman or other degrading treatment of detainees at the notorious Guantánamo Bay special prison. As of 2023, the US was still detaining 30 of the nearly 800 men and boys it brought to Guantánamo Bay between 2002 and 2008. As of 2008, charges were still not brought against 27 remaining of them. Many lack adequate medical care and even access to their medical records. The military commission system created to prosecute suspects at Guantánamo is fundamentally flawed[2594].
Agnès Callamard, French human rights activist and Secretary General at the British NGO Amnesty International, emphasized in an interview that "Very few of these men have ever been charged with a crime, and absolutely none has faced a fair trial"[2595].
There was a high-profile statement by Fionnuala Ní Aoláin[2596], Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Human Rights Council on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, issued on 26 June 2023 following her visit to the penitentiary. The official called on the US to close the detention facility at the US Naval Station Guantánamo Bay, where "systematic arbitrariness" prevails. Expressed serious concern about the continued detention of 30 men and the conditions of their stay in the special isolation ward. She drew attention to the insecurity, suffering and anxiety of all prisoners without exception[2597]. In her view, the current conditions at Guantánamo constitute circumstances that fall within the definition of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under international law.
Patrick Hamilton[2598], the International Committee of the Red Cross' (ICRC) head of delegation for the United States and Canada, criticized the US authorities on 21 April 2023. Following his visit to the detention facility, the ICRC noted that detainees held in prison at the US Naval Station Guantánamo Bay in Cuba should be able to have more contact with their families, and receive access to adequate health care.
As report prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus in 2022 on the Most High-Profile Human Rights Violations in Certain Countries of the World states, the US authorities do not comply with the principle of fair trial and procedures[2599]. And the example of Guantánamo is a clear illustration. The accused are deprived of basic rights[2600], including to judicial protection. In August 2020, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (Judge N. Rao) ruled that the US Constitution's Fifth Amendment[2601] right to access to justice and due process does not extend to Guantánamo detainees. The five prisoners accused of planning the 9/11 attacks have not yet been brought to trial.
Numerous cases of torture and ill-treatment of prisoners at Guantánamo, including sleep deprivation, exposure to noise, simulated drowning, have been repeatedly reported by leading US publications ("The New York Times" and "The Los Angeles Times"). These facts were acknowledged, including by former CIA psychologist James Mitchell, who was involved in developing "enhanced interrogation techniques"[2602], and the judge of the military judicial commission Col. Douglas K.Watkins[2603].
For example, the latter reports torture and other degrading interrogation methods used against Indonesian citizen Majid Khan and several other accused. Such defective practices are in flagrant violation of the US Constitution and its international legal obligations[2604]. In 2019, due to physical and psychological abuse for years, prisoner Sharqawi al Hadj[2605] attempted suicide.
According to Fox News and "The New York Times", nine prisoners have died at Guantánamo over the past eight years, several of them under puzzling circumstances[2606]. For example, one of the most publicized cases was the death of Yemeni national Adnan Latif[2607]. In February 2021, Ibrahim Idris, a former inmate of this special prison, died at the age of 60 in Sudan. "The New York Times" attributed his death to medical complications he had from Guantánamo[2608].
Professor Sondra Crosby at Boston University believes that the prison system is unable to meet the minimum needs of prisoners for treatment and maintenance of a normal level of health. Often the needs of inmates who have suffered torture and other ill-treatment are simply ignored by the military administration of the institution[2609].
Human rights organizations have regularly called for closing the prison. The Centre for Victims of Torture (CVT), Human Rights First and National Religious Campaign against Torture demand that the prison be immediately closed down. To this end, they presented a programme of recommendations[2610]. Amnesty International called on the US government to end human rights abuses in Guantánamo Bay and to comply strictly with its international legal obligations to end torture and other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment[2611]. In January 2021, the UN Human Rights Council special procedures required the closure of the Guantánamo Bay detention centre and the transfer of detainees' cases to civilian courts. Experts noted that the very existence of the prison is incompatible with Washington's obligations under international law[2612].
The intention to close this prison was announced more than a decade ago by former Head of the White House Barack Obama. He stated that he planned to finalize the process within a year. Joe Biden said the same thing during his 2020 election campaign. Such plans were subsequently and repeatedly confirmed by the Head of the Pentagon Lloyd Austin, Secretary of State Antony Blinken and National Security Council (NSC) spokesperson Emily Horne.
However, according to a number of US experts, the correctional facility will continue to exist largely due to political and legal obstacles[2613]. The strategy to close the prison is expected to focus initially on reducing the number of prisoners by repatriating them or finding other countries to accept them. Specific timelines for the closure of the special prison are currently unknown[2614].
The Biden administration is currently attempting to reduce the number of detainees held at Guantánamo Bay as part of a broader effort to close the facility. On 9 March 2023, for example, the Pentagon announced the repatriation of Saudi Arabian detainee Ghassan Al Sharbi. On 23 February 2023, two "inmates" Abdul Rabbani and Mohammed Rabbani were transferred to Pakistan. On 2 February 2023, the "high-value" detainee Majid Khan was released from prison and sent to Belize.
The United States remains the only Western country whose legislation includes provisions for the capital punishment. The death penalty is provided for in the laws of 27 states and at the federal level. However, five of these states currently have a moratorium in place[2615].
In 2003, a de facto moratorium on federal executions was introduced. However, in July 2020, the practice of capital punishment was resumed by decision of the Supreme Court[2616].
More than 8,500 people have been sentenced to death in the United States since the 1970s. In the mid‑1990s, the number of annual death sentences peaked at over 300 per year. In the past 25 years, that number has declined by more than 80 per cent and has remained near a record low since 2015. In 2022, there were 11 executions[2617]. In the first 6 months of 2023 – 13 executions[2618].
According to US's Death Penalty Information Center (DPIC), which has been keeping statistics since the reintroduction of the death penalty in 1976, 1,582 people had been executed in the country as of 3 January 2024, most of them by lethal injection (1,402), with hanging and execution by firing squad (3 cases each) being the least common methods. In 2023, 24 executions were carried out; the highest number of death sentences – 98 – was in 1999. Texas ranks first among the states in the number of people executed, at 586. There are currently 2,333 people awaiting execution in the US, the most in California (665). 196 people sentenced to capital punishment since 1973 have had their cases reviewed and have been acquitted[2619].
The number of supporters of the death penalty in the United States is gradually declining, according to the latest Gallup poll conducted in October 2023. For example, 53 per cent of Americans believe that execution is acceptable for someone convicted of murder. In 2022, 55 per cent of respondents held this view; in 1994, the figure was 80 per cent. At the same time, for the first time since 2000, a majority of Americans (50 per cent) say the death penalty is applied unfairly, 39 per cent believe that executions are not carried out often enough and 28 per cent say that they are carried out often enough. Opinions vary, including those based on political preferences: among Republicans, the proportion in favour of capital punishment for murder reaches 81 per cent, 51 per cent among independents, and 32 per cent among Democrats[2620].
Over the past decade, several US Supreme Court rulings have limited the scope of use of the death penalty. The Court struck down the death penalty for the mentally retarded under the precedent of Atkins v. Virginia («Atkins v. Virginia, 2002) and the juvenile cases of Roper v. Simmons (Roper v. Simmons," 2005) offenders – each ruling states that the execution of such individuals is unconstitutional.
According to the Death Penalty Information Centre, the majority of those sentenced to capital punishment are African Americans, Latin Americans or representatives of other ethnic minorities[2621]. Specifically, as the NGO noted, African Americans account for 34.1 per cent of all convictions. At times, innocent people are sentenced to death due to mistakes made during trial proceedings and other factors. The NGO Amnesty International has found that 156 persons sentenced to death were found to be innocent. In addition, capital punishment was applied disproportionately against people belonging to national minorities.
In June 2021, the media learnt that the authorities of Arizona had purchased toxic chemicals for use in gas chambers. People were outraged by the fact that such toxic chemicals had been used by the Nazis during the Holocaust.[2622]
In view of the accelerated implementation of death penalties, which many experts linked to the change of administration, a group of Democratic Senators, headed by Elizabeth Warren (Massachusetts), requested, on 22 December 2020, that Michael E. Horowitz, Inspector General of the US Department of Justice (DOJ), launch an investigation into the resumption of federal executions by the current administration. According to the senators, such a move was at odds with the law enforcement practice established in this area.[2623]
It is noteworthy that the international community has repeatedly condemned capital punishment for criminals in the United States. Alabama inmate Kenneth Smith was nevertheless put to death by nitrogen hypoxia.[2624] The 58-year-old man, convicted of the 1988 murder-for-hire of preacher's wife Elizabeth Sennett, was executed by nitrogen hypoxia in Atmore.
It was noted that on 25 January 2024, starting at 7:58 p.m. local time, Kenneth Smith "shook and convulsed" at least for two minutes. While immobilized, the inmate was able to lift his head off the surface of the gurney, then dropped it. His pronounced time of death was 8:25 p.m.[2625]
The American authorities resorted to a previously unused method of execution because of the physiological characteristics of the inmate. In November 2022, the United States attempted to execute Kenneth Smith by standard lethal injection, but they failed to find a suitable vein in which to insert the needle. It is symptomatic that Alabama allowed the death penalty to be carried out with pure nitrogen in 2018 due to a shortage of drugs used for lethal injections. This method of execution is also legal in Mississippi and Oklahoma, but the two states have never used it.
Prosecutors claim that this method is similar to euthanasia practiced around the world, including in some European countries – once the gas is applied, the person quickly and painlessly loses consciousness and then goes into cardiac arrest. However, Kenneth Smith's lawyers insisted that Alabama authorities did not have the necessary equipment to carry out this type of execution. They believe that the oversized mask could let in enough oxygen to make the defendant suffer and suffocate while still conscious. In addition, the lawyers stressed that a second attempt at execution could amount to excessive punishment. The US Supreme Court denied the petitions in this regard.[2626]
Volker Türk, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, expressed deep regret over the execution of a prisoner by nitrogen gas in Alabama. In a special statement, he drew attention to "serious concerns that this novel and untested method of suffocation May amount to torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment." Volker Türk emphasized that "the death penalty is inconsistent with the fundamental right to life," urging all States "to put in place a moratorium on its use as a step towards universal abolition."[2627]
The EU also condemned Smith's execution, stating in a press release that the death penalty "is a violation of the right to life and the ultimate denial of human dignity" and that the use of this punishment is unacceptable in any circumstances. In its statement, Brussels also expressed concern about an increase in the number of executions in the US in 2023.[2628]
A number of human rights organizations, including Human Rights Watch, questioned the legitimacy of using such an inhumane method of capital punishment against convicts.[2629]
Under the slogan of the "global war on terrorism", the US has consistently pursued indiscriminate use of military force abroad. As is widely known, the US military machine has never been stopped by civilian victims, the number of which continues to rise. Such actions have been criticized by international human rights entities and non-governmental organizations.
The "bloodiest" US aggression after 1945 was the Vietnam War. In 1965-1975, a total of three million tons of bombs (200 kilograms per each North Vietnamese) were dropped on the country. Laos and Cambodia were hit. The number of bombs dropped on Laos alone was greater than that on Nazi Germany. The number of Vietnamese killed by US troops could be as high as two million. If we take into account US operations against Cambodia and Laos related to the hostilities in Vietnam, the total number of victims could exceed four million.
American war crimes against civilians during the Vietnam War are well known. For example, American soldiers killed 500 civilians in the village of My Lai in 1968. The prisoners of war were tortured and executed. In addition, in Vietnam, the Americans carried out an ecocide by spraying the jungle with the highly toxic defoliant Agent Orange in an attempt to deprive guerrillas of shelter. The result was irreparable damage to the health of some three million Vietnamese (including about one million cases of congenital mutations). US servicemen also suffered from chemical poisoning by poisons and mutagens, affecting their health and that of their children.
The US military operation against Yugoslavia in 1999 caused the largest humanitarian disaster in Europe since 1945. The total weight of munitions used was 21,000 tons (equivalent to four atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima). Over 2,000 civilians were killed, and over 6,000 wounded. The bombings pushed 20 per cent of the population below the poverty line, caused economic losses of up to USD 100 billion and enormous environmental damage – Serbia still has an abnormally high incidence of cancer and birth defects – the US and its allies widely used uranium munitions that enhanced the performance of bombs and shells.
The "global war on terrorism" has led to a steady increase in civilian victims. According to the American Brown University project, during Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001, more than 66,000 civilians were killed in Afghanistan and Pakistan, including some 150 reporters and 500 employees of human rights and humanitarian NGOs. During Operation Desert Storm, up to 150,000 Iraqi civilians were killed by US-led coalition forces. The next aggression against Iraq in 2003 resulted in up to 500,000 civilian deaths (during the active phase of combat operations until 2011). If we count the subsequent outbursts of violence associated with the presence of Americans in the country, the figure rises to 700,000‑750,000 people.
In February 2020, the US Central Command stopped publishing statistics on those killed in military operations abroad. Human rights organizations emphasize that military commanders often report only the killing of "terrorists", ignoring the killing of civilians. Moreover, the military leadership has so far failed to establish an effective mechanism for impartial investigation into civilian deaths, and to ensure access to legal remedy and reparation for the victims and injured.
Human rights defenders say that the US Defense Department's 2020 figure on 23 civilian deaths caused by military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, Yemen and Nigeria is far below the actual total.[2630] According to a number of NGOs, including Airwars, the figure is rather at least 102 people killed over the previous year.[2631] Amnesty International also notes that figures contained in the Pentagon's report on civilian deaths in 2019 are skewed.[2632]
Human rights organizations point out that statistics on civilian deaths were published in April 2020 for the first time since 2007, when the US operation in Somalia began.[2633]
In July 2021, Joe Biden announced the adoption of a strategy to combat terrorism abroad. On 29 August 2021, when most US soldiers were withdrawn from Afghanistan and regional bases were closed, the problem became evident, according to experts. According to the Bureau of Investigative Journalism (BIJ), US strikes in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen, from 2002 to 2020, killed between 10,000 and 17,000 people. Of these, between 800 and 1,750 are thought to have been civilians.[2634]
Criticism by non-governmental and international organizations, such as Amnesty International and the United Nations peaked during Obama's first term, when he authorized airstrikes on undeclared military targets 10 times more often than George W.Bush. However, all this did not stop the Norwegian Nobel Committee from awarding Barack Obama the 2009 Peace Prize.
The most visible surge in strikes took place in Pakistan, where, at some point, civilian deaths reached 10 per cent of the total death toll. Between 2011 and 2013, the Obama administration implemented a "near certainty" standard of no civilian casualties, which supposedly drastically reduced civilian deaths in Pakistan. Before the policy implementation, the Obama administration carried out 263 strikes resulting in 607 civilian deaths. After the adoption of the "near certainty" standard, 167 strikes were launched that killed 90 civilians.
However, in 2017, US President Donald Trump relaxed Obama's restrictive targeting protocol in favour of a more permissive "reasonable" certainty standard for civilian causalities, initially adopted by the Bush administration, and as a result, the frequency of bombings using both unmanned and manned aerial vehicles increased significantly.[2635] The Costs of War notes that from 2017 through 2020, civilian deaths rose more than threefold. The December 2019 report shows that airstrikes using both manned and unmanned vehicles killed more than 700 civilians. Experts emphasize that this is the record number since the beginning of the Afghan campaign in 2001.[2636]
President Joe Biden ordered a review of US strikes and imposition of temporary limits, similar to Obama's "near certainty" standard. But even in this case, the researchers feared that failure to implement such a standard will continue to impose direct and largely avoidable risks on civilians during US strikes abroad.[2637]
According to a 2022 Pew Research Center survey of 12,000 working US-based journalists, six-in-ten (57 per cent) are extremely concerned about press freedom restrictions in the country, and just one-in-five have low levels of concern about the future of press freedoms in the United States.[2638]
According to human rights activists, between 1 July 2022 and 30 June 2023, there were 29 attacks on press workers in the US (for comparison: 59 arrests and 144 attacks on journalists were recorded in 2021, 143 and 450 in 2020, 9 and 40 in 2019, respectively). Protests and mass events of a political nature remain among the most dangerous scenes of work.
Journalists have repeatedly become victims of unlawful actions by law enforcers and special services. These include the use of physical force and means of restraint, illegal detentions, searches and confiscation of equipment, as well as demands to disclose sources of information.
At least 12 journalists in the United States were arrested or faced dubious charges in 2023, among them two journalists in Alabama who were charged with felonies for "publishing" and a reporter in Illinois who was cited for asking city employees "too many questions".[2639]
The US Press Freedom Tracker reports that, on 23 April 2022, photojournalist Jessica Rogers was arrested in San Clemente, California, while documenting police actions during the dismantling of a homeless encampment. Her professional equipment was seized.[2640]
On 15 February 2023, News Nation reporter Evan Lambert was arrested in East Palestine, Ohio, during a press conference with Governor Mike DeWine about the aftermath of a train derailment involving highly toxic chemicals.[2641]
On 8 May 2023, photojournalist Stephanie Keith was arrested in New York, while documenting a candlelight vigil for a homeless man who died in the city subway.[2642]
Throughout the year, at least 30 journalists and news organizations were summoned into courtrooms to identify their source or turn over reporting materials. In at least one instance, a refusal to comply led to criminal charges.
Ishani Desai, a reporter for The Bakersfield Californian, received numerous subpoenas after her jailhouse interview of 26 February 2023 with Sebastian Parra – a witness to, and later charged with, the murder of inmate Robert Pernell Roberts – had been published. On 10 May 2023, a court order was issued to seize other unpublished material on the subject from the newspaper.[2643]
At an international roundtable in Lugansk, on 31 January, with journalists from France, Italy, the Netherlands, Peru, Spain and the United States, US-based journalist Fiorella Mayorca said: "My principle is this: when I write a story about a country, I go there and see what happens in reality. In order to come to Russia, I had to go through lots of challenges – that's what my country is all about. And to come back, I have to go through the same things again."[2644]
While in Moscow, Tucker Carlson, American journalist and former Fox News host, officially announced, on 6 February 2024, an interview with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Even before it was published, it had caused a wave of negative reaction in the Western, including American, media.
For example, the Washington Post published several articles on this topic criticizing the journalist. "Carlson has often echoed Kremlin propaganda about Russia's war with Ukraine, criticizing Vladimir Zelensky and opposing US military aid to Ukraine," says one of the newspaper's notes.[2645]
As analysts say, yet another line of attack on Tucker Carlson in the Western media included attempts to accuse him of having sympathy towards Russia's leadership. The Washington Post, for example, recalled in one of its articles that, as early as in 2019, the journalist had said he would root for Russia in a potential war with Ukraine, called the conflict that erupted a mere "border dispute", and frequently dismissed criticism of Putin over the years.[2646]
Hillary Clinton, former US Secretary of State and Donald Trump's rival in the 2016 presidential election, also commented on Tucker Carlson's interview. On MSNBC, she called Tucker Carlson a "useful idiot" who "parrots Vladimir Putin's pack of lies about Ukraine."[2647]
The Biden administration also reacted to the news of the forthcoming release of the interview. "I won't get ahead of an interview that hasn't happened yet... I don't think we need another interview with Vladimir Putin to – to understand his brutality", White House National Security Council coordinator for strategic communications, John Kirby, told the journalists.[2648]
It should be noted that in the West there were also other assessments of Tucker Carlson's interview. Thus, retired US Army Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Davis criticized those who are trying to discredit T. Carlson for his decision to talk to Vladimir Putin. In his opinion, this interview is very important, including for Western audiences who have a vague or distorted view of the Russian president and his position.[2649]
Mike Tracey, a columnist for the American weekly news magazine Newsweek, wrote that at a time when relations between Washington and Moscow are not at their best, any respected journalist, if given the opportunity, should not hesitate to interview Vladimir Putin. "But it is tiresome and unbearably stupid to suggest that Carlson, simply because he came to Russia with the intention of interviewing Putin, should be found guilty of treason. This is probably the most hackneyed slander in the current American political lexicon," the author of the article emphasizes.[2650]
However, as experts note, M. Tracey's publication is rather an exception. By the rest, the major Western media were unanimous in their condemnation of Tucker Carlson.[2651]
Discussions continue in the United States on the need to reform the Section 23 of the Communications Decency Act, which exempts online platforms from responsibility for moderating user content. The management of popular social networks continues to enjoy absolute impunity in the media space, censoring statements by public figures, politicians and heads of state that are deemed "inconsistent with company standards." Despite repeated statements by administration officials about plans to put an end to the permissiveness of the "digital giants," there has been no significant progress in this direction. Moreover, Washington is actively using the technological capabilities of media companies to put pressure on geopolitical adversaries, primarily Russia and China. In March 2022, Meta and Google announced the blocking of Russian media accounts.[2652] Netflix, a streaming service that openly promotes the LGBT agenda, including among children, through movies and cartoons, refused to broadcast the programs of 20 Russian TV channels.
In recent years, Russian journalists on assignment in the United States have repeatedly fallen victim to cruel and unjustified actions by law enforcement officials, faced bans on broadcasting on US territory, restrictions on access to official events and blocked bank accounts. The process of issuing work visas has been complicated.
For example, during the dispersal of demonstrators in Minneapolis, Minnesota, on 30 May 2020, the police sprayed tear gas in the face of Mikhail Turgiev, a journalist of the "Rossiya Segodnya" news agency. This happened despite the fact that he showed the law enforcement officers a press card. Footage taken at the scene shows that the Russian national identified himself loudly and clearly, did not resist and had the necessary markings on his clothing.
Another incident took place on the night of 22 July 2020 in Portland, Oregon. Channel One correspondent Yulia Olkhovskaya and operator Vyacheslav Arkhipov were assaulted by law enforcement officers while covering the riots in the wake of the murder of George Floyd. The "guardians of law and order" injured the Russian nationals and damaged their professional equipment, breaking a video camera and a mobile phone. The incident occurred after the compatriots reported their affiliation to the press. The US media remained silent about the incident. In total, more than 30 journalists were injured as a result of misconduct by law enforcement officers and special services in the city of Portland while covering the protest events.[2653]
On 29 October 2020, in Philadelphia (Pennsylvania), a film crew of Channel One was robbed. Correspondent Georgi Olisashvili was injured and operator Maksim Kataev suffered a concussion, several bruises and scratches. The assailants broke into the Russian citizens' car and stole a bag containing personal belongings and money, as well as a video camera. According to journalists, local law enforcers showed absolute indifference and complete disinterest in investigating the incident.
On 15 October 2020, at the airport of New York City, Federal Customs and Border Guard Service officers subjected RT channel journalist Konstantin Rozhkov to hours-long interrogation. The Russian citizen arrived in the US to shoot a documentary about America on the eve of the presidential elections. He came under scrutiny because he was going to report on the current events in the country and because he was an employee of RT, which is listed as a foreign agent in the United States. The officers demanded that the reporter provide access to all his electronic storage devices and provide explanations for his publicly available personal data, including his Sputnik V vaccination, as well as correspondence relating to his journalistic activities. This clearly went beyond normal public security procedures.
On 23 October 2020, Dmitry Zlodorev, an employee of the "Rossiya Segodnya" news agency, was subjected to a half-hour telephone interrogation by a representative of the Baltimore office of the FBI. The Russian citizen was demanded to provide information about his professional contacts with CSIS and the Russian House office in Washington.
In July 2020, video hosting YouTube blocked the accounts of the TV channel Tsargrad and the Two-Headed Eagle history society. The formal reason given was "violation of the platform's terms of service and export laws". In March 2021, the service also restricted access to Russian journalist Andrei Kondrashev's film titled Crimea. Way Home, and in September 2020 – to Alexander Rogatkin's film Beslan, on the pretext that they contained material that could frighten or shock users.
The State Department failed to respond to any of the Russian Ambassador's messages calling for a full investigation into each of these incidents, for the guilty to be prosecuted and measures to be taken to protect media workers.
The resonant case of WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange, who is accused by the United States "Themis" of violating espionage legislation, remains in the focus of attention of the public and human rights activists. Assange has been prosecuted since 2010 after he published a video of the shooting of civilians by the US military in Iraq, as well as diplomatic cables from US embassies (cablegate).
Both events stirred the world. The telegrams contained a lot of unpleasant information about the US attitude toward different countries, world leaders, nuclear disarmament, the war against terrorism, the problems of the Guantanamo prison, etc. Many of them were immediately published by newspapers such as El País, Le Monde, Der Spiegel, The Guardian and The New York Times.
J. Assange had challenged for a long time the decision of the British authorities to extradite him to the United States, where he faced a life sentence. Experts note the highly politicized nature of the process. The American Civil Liberties Union, Human Rights Watch, Knight First Amendment Institute, and the Committee to Protect Journalists have appealed to the US Secretary of Justice to stop the prosecution of the activist.[2654] Against this background, there is widespread discussion of the surveillance organized by the United States intelligence services with the help of a Spanish private security company of J. Assange during his stay at the Embassy of Ecuador in London, as well as the CIA's plans to kidnap and poison him. Observers draw attention to reports in the Spanish press that the Spanish National High Court has summoned former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and former director of the National Centre for Counterintelligence and Security William Evanina to testify in this regard.[2655]
According to the Russian news agency Regnum, on 26 June 2024, J. Assange signed a deal with the US Department of Justice to partially plead guilty to one count of violating the confidentiality of personal data, received 5 years and was officially released on the time already served. One of the conditions of the deal was the destruction of information gathered by WikiLeaks.[2656]
Despite the US authorities' declared commitment to freedom of speech, in reality the US journalists are under severe censorship. Major media corporations and the professional community itself are also exerting pressure on reporters at the behest of the authorities, forcing journalists to resort to self-censorship, i.e. to deliberately distort or silence information. The dissemination of information that does not correspond to the content of the guidelines issued by the authorities is equated with a violation of professional ethics and threatens severe consequences, ranging from dismissal or banishment from the profession for life to criminal proceedings. Journalists are often prosecuted under completely far‑fetched or fabricated pretexts such as "ties to Russian authorities" simply for trying to convey balanced information to their audience. In addition, Washington is exerting increased pressure on media outlets in partner countries, forcing them to impose even stricter censorship (including by coordinating significant news with US Embassy officials).
As the experience of the SMO has shown, Washington actively involves its controlled media and IT companies who, using all possible means, obstruct bringing the Russian approaches and objective points of view on the events around Ukraine to the attention of the international community. Thus, the US digital giants censor all information, including statements by current politicians and heads of State, that they deem "undesirable", up to the complete exclusion of the Russian position from the media landscape. All of this is happening upon direct recommendation or with the tacit consent of the authorities. Both Russian media and common persons who publish content reflecting the pro-Russian positions fall under repressions in the Internet: Western Internet platforms block Russian sources of information, including mass media and accounts of State bodies on streaming platforms and in social media.
Since April 2020, Roskomnadzor (the Federal Service for Supervision in the Sphere of Telecom, Information Technologies and Mass Communications) has identified 60 instances of discrimination against videos posted by the Russian media outlets as well as public and sports organizations or activists on YouTube. Restrictions on Russian media resources were drastically tightened in late February 2022.
According to Roskomnadzor agency, in the first month alone since the start of the special military operation, more than 80 cases of officially confirmed restrictions related to censorship of Russian journalists, political and public figures and organizations, as well as individual programs by foreign platforms (36 on YouTube, 18 on Facebook, 13 on Instagram, 9 on Twitter) have been registered. The accounts or content of the Rossiya Segodnya (Russia Today) and Sputnik news agencies, the Rossiya 24, Zvezda, RBC, NTV, TNT, REN TV, Izvestia, Channel Five, Russkoe Radio, Tsargrad and other TV channels were blocked. Channel One, Rossiya 1, Kultura, RIA Novosti also fell under the restrictions. The video hosting platform's administration claims that the content disseminated by the TV channels, including on the special operation, "violates its policy".
Alongside these restrictions, the YouTube administration and moderators seem not to object to the spread of propaganda by extremist organizations, first of all by the Right Sector and the Azov nationalist unit banned in Russia. In fact, YouTube has become one of the key platforms to spread fakes about the special military operation in Ukraine and discredit the Russian Armed Forces. According to Roskomnadzor, more than 12,000 such materials are posted on the platform.
Incidents related to marking of information published as unreliable, marking of state control, exclusion from the list of recommendations, as well as limiting access to downloading Russian media applications have been recorded.
It is noteworthy that at the same time a number of American media outlets broadcasting internationally – Voice of America (VOA), Radio Liberty/Free Europe (Radio Liberty), Real Time – are quite officially financed by the US, being part of the United States government's Global Media Agency, which does not conceal the fact that its activities are "aimed at strategic regions key to the US foreign policy", i.e. are unambiguously controlled by state interests.
In late February 2022, Google barred Russian official media from posting advertisements on its platforms. In early March, its management also announced that Google Play users in Russia would not be able to renew paid subscriptions or install paid applications due to payment system decisions.
Meta, which owns a number of social networks, actively resorts to censorship. These resources restrict the dissemination of content from Russian media and public figures, as well as ordinary citizens, containing the Russian position. At the same time, in late February and March 2022, calls "to kill Russians," possible ways of killing and making explosives, and other related content, were actively spread on these platforms. The moderators ignored user complaints about such explicit dissemination of hate ideology.
On 11 March 2022, a letter from Meta's internal mailing was made public. It revealed that the company would temporarily allow Facebook and Instagram in some countries to refrain from blocking calls to users to resort to violence against Russians, including military servicemen. It was also noted that the social networks will not remove calls for the death of the presidents of Russia and Belarus.
After the fact of applying double standards to Russian citizens had been identified, Meta attempted to repair the situation. However, its statement only once again confirmed the racist approaches to publications. In particular, it stated that users would be allowed to call on bringing "death to Russian occupiers" but at the same time the platform administration would block calls to violence against Russian civilians. The company also noted that they would continue banning publications on ways and means of killing people.
Furthermore, Meta failed to comply with the Russian government's lawful demand to delete such dangerous materials. On 21 March 2022, Meta was recognized as an extremist organization by the Russian court and prohibited on the Russian territory.
Restricting the access of its own population to information does not always take the form of a direct ban, but much more often examples of hidden censorship can be seen in the United States. For example, with the beginning of the special military operation, a number of US journalists and news agencies have aborted their work in Russia. The official pretext was the adoption of a law on responsibility for discrediting the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Nevertheless, Bloomberg News suspended "news gathering in Russia," i.e., fact gathering on the ground; CBS and ABC stopped "broadcasting from Russia," i.e., also curtailed their work on the ground. In fact, this decision closed the direct channel of communication between the US and Russian societies, thus depriving US citizens of receiving information alternative to that spread by the US government.
It is noteworthy that organizations involved in protecting reporters' rights and promoting freedom of speech disagree on the issue of safety for journalists in the US media environment. For example, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists, in 2019, 30 members of the press in the US were prosecuted on charges of dissemination of "false information".[2657] The US Department of Justice initiated investigations into the activities of representatives of the Washington Post, New York Times, and CNN.
At the same time, Freedom House, a human rights organization loyal to official Washington, in its annual report on freedom of the press in the world, categorized the United States as one of the countries that protect freedom of expression at a high level. European organizations that monitor the state of affairs with freedom of expression in the world, or, more precisely, form "correct" ratings, have a similar position. For example, according to the NGO Reporters without Borders for 2023, the United States improved its performance in the annual ranking, moving up to the 45th place out of 180.[2658] Nevertheless, human rights activists cannot ignore a number of problems that can be traced back to US professional journalistic communities.
The same organization notes that the reality of freedom of expression in the United States gives a very contradictory impression. The First Amendment to the American Constitution guarantees freedom of speech and expression. Neo‑Nazis and other groups promoting extremist and xenophobic ideologies feel quite free in the United States under the umbrella of this provision. At the same time, the overall level of "infringement of journalists' rights" in the country has increased. More often than not, media representatives were subjected to unjustified arrests and even violence.
The practice of discrediting their reputation is used, including the posting of "compromising" information about employees of news agencies and periodicals on the Internet. Thus, according to the NGO US Freedom Tracker, in 2019, such messages were published in the official accounts of the United States leadership regarding representatives of "The New York Times", NBC, and CNN. In March 2019, a "leak" of classified information revealed that the US government allegedly maintains a "closed database" that includes all journalists working in the United States.[2659]
It should be noted that persecution of dissenters has been widespread in the United States since the Cold War. At that time, the authorities actively fought against supporters of leftist ideas (e.g., the infamous McCarthyism campaign). Now a new phase of the "witch hunt" is in fact underway in America. According to the estimates of international human rights organizations, there are now about 100 political prisoners in US jails, not counting the Guantanamo prisoners.[2660] Among them are fighters for the independence of the US Virgin Islands, activists for racial equality and Native American rights.
One of the leaders of the American Indian civil rights movement, Leonard Peltier, has been in prison since 1975 and is still imprisoned – according to some reports, more than 500 public figures and prominent personalities from the world of science and art (Mother Teresa, Dalai Lama, Dustin Hoffman, Sting, Yoko Ono, Nelson Mandela, etc.) have spoken out in favour of his release. He was denied parole in 2010, and the next hearing in the case was planned for July 2024, when political prisoner L. Peltier, who has been nominated six times for the Nobel Peace Prize, was 79 years old.
In October 2023, the Florida authorities ordered all public universities to cease the activities of the Students for Justice in Palestine, which has over 200 chapters in the United States. The reason was their views on the situation in Palestine. State and university officials made false accusations of "terrorism" against the students. This decision violates the rights to freedom of speech and association enshrined in the First Amendment to the US Constitution.[2661]
According to the 2023 report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus on the most resonant human rights violations in certain countries,[2662] former US Congresswoman from the State of Hawaii Tulsi Gabbard, speaking on 9 February 2023 at a hearing of a special subcommittee of the House of Representatives Legal Committee,[2663] stated: "Unfortunately, we live in a culture of fear where many Americans are afraid to speak freely, to express their opinions, to engage in open dialogue and debate. They fear losing their jobs, being cancelled, or being charged with a crime." This fear is generated by the government, through its people in the mainstream media and major IT companies, arrogating to itself the sole authority, "backed by the deadliest forces on earth, capable of striking down anyone they deem a threat..., to decide what is true and what is false, what is information and what is disinformation."
To prove her point, Gabbard said that Meta CEO Mark Zuckerberg admitted that Facebook had restricted the distribution of a "New York Post" article about Hunter Biden's laptop after talking to the FBI.[2664] Twitter, which did the same, recently apologized, admitting its mistake. The convenient interactions between White House officials, the FBI, and large IT companies are well documented. As a result, private companies, unconstrained by the First Amendment, are doing the dirty work of censorship that those in government have no legal right to do themselves."
Gabbard also said that 644 Twitter accounts, including her own, that FBI and CIA officials believed were allegedly linked to "Russian online influence activities" were actually anti-establishment voices from various segments of the US political spectrum.
Since the beginning of 2024, the fight against dissidents and "enemy spies" among undergraduate, graduate students and professors from "countries dangerous to the security of the United States" has affected one of the most popular American states for foreign students – Florida. Local universities are banned from hiring teachers, researchers and considering applications from undergraduate and graduate students from seven countries: China, Russia, Iran, Syria, Cuba, Venezuela and North Korea (although there have never been students from North Korea in America). State universities are also prohibited from entering into partnership and exchange agreements with universities in these countries, with China and its citizens being the main victims of such restrictions.[2665]
Despite the objections of teachers and university administrators in Florida, who argue that this seriously reduces their competitiveness, the state has already passed a law that prohibits the admission of undergraduate and graduate students, as well as hiring employees from the above-mentioned countries. This law was approved unanimously in the local Congress, and talented graduate students and researchers, even those who have previously studied at Florida universities, will be forced to move to other states or will no longer consider the US as a potential place to receive a quality education.[2666]
The leadership of the state of Florida has identified 12 universities that are also prohibited from receiving money to pay for students' education. At the same time, such restrictions do not apply to those who are already living in the United States for one reason or another. However, university employees are prohibited from dealing with these students and faculty members, hiring them to work on campus, even though many of these students have been studying in Florida for years.
According to the Florida Department of Education, the most students from this "enemy seven" are from China and Iran. They apply more often than others to study in America. More than 700 students from "banned countries" are studying at the University of Florida alone.
It should be noted that back in 2018, the "China Initiative" (in fact, anti-China) was adopted at the level of the US Congress, according to which universities themselves were required to investigate the links of Chinese undergraduate and graduate students studying or planning to study in the United States with the Chinese Communist Party. There have been several instances where Chinese students have been denied visas or had their documents cancelled for this very reason when they had already applied to study at a US university.
In 2022, this initiative was cancelled as "racist in its content". And it was not only Chinese undergraduate and graduate students (including, incidentally, those of American origin) who protested against its introduction into the practice of American universities, but also natives of other Asian countries wishing to study in the United States.
Now in Florida universities when accepting documents, the commission is obliged to check the possible connection of the student and his parents with a foreign country or state structures (for example, the student's father serves in the Chinese or Russian army). The stated goal is to protect the country and the state of Florida from alleged potential spies.
Similar measures will apply from the beginning of 2024 to American students who, for one reason or another, have previously lived abroad for more than three years. In this case, usually all documents submitted by students are sent by the university to state law enforcement agencies, which are directly subordinate to the governor's office.
US universities must now monitor and report to law enforcement agencies on both faculty and graduate students travelling abroad. This applies not only to the participation of the entire student body in conferences, but also to their leisure or tourist trips. And this is especially true for those who dared to visit one of the seven countries mentioned above.
And this is especially true for those who dared to visit one of the seven countries mentioned above. Since all university administrators in Florida are unwilling to violate state laws in order not to lose their jobs and studies, there are no indulgences for anyone in this expulsion of the unwanted.
As a result, the same Chinese and Iranians are already looking for options to continue their research and studies in universities in other US states. In fact, the only way out for them now is to either leave Florida and its universities altogether, or to abandon their studies in the America that once so actively attracted them,[2667] replacing it with other countries where they can get no less quality education.
In January‑February 2024, the story about Chinese students who were interrogated while crossing the US border at Washington's Dulles Airport received wide publicity.[2668] Under the pretext of protecting national security interests, American law enforcement officers "tortured" the students for a long time with questions about their "political activities" and the nature of their scientific research, and offered to provide "information about the Chinese government" in exchange for their "release". Upon refusal, the Americans cancelled the students' visas, banned their entry into the country, and forcibly deported them.[2669]
According to the Chinese Foreign Ministry, since the end of November 2023, at least 8 Chinese students with valid entry documents have been subjected to such interrogations at Dulles Airport alone and subsequently expelled to their home country without justification. At the same time, airport security officials blatantly induced their "victims" to co-operate (i.e., in effect, recruited) during the "verification measures".
Beijing characterized such actions on the part of American law enforcement agencies as a violation of the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese citizens and an obstacle to interstate cultural contacts. Such discriminatory steps run counter to the San Francisco agreements between the leaders of China and the United States on the promotion and expansion of educational, student, youth, cultural, sports and business exchanges.
In this context, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin noted in a briefing for reporters on 31 January 2024 that the US likes to portray itself as an open and inclusive country with academic freedom where "science knows no boundaries," but politicizes academic research and uses it as a weapon, and overly broadly interprets the concept of national security to pressure and abuse Chinese students.[2670] According to Wang Wenbin, such actions undermine the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese citizens and basic human rights, cause a "chilling effect" and darken the atmosphere of humanitarian exchanges between China and the United States.[2671]
As the media and human rights organizations routinely point out, indigenous people continue to be among the most socially disadvantaged Americans and the targets of racism.
Some 574 indigenous peoples are federally recognized under US law; more than 500 tribes do not have this status.[2672] In general terms, we are talking about 4‑7 million community members.[2673] Their interaction with the central authorities is generally regulated on the basis of separate bilateral agreements (there are about 370 such treaties).[2674] Human rights organizations often criticize these documents for being archaic, adhering to a colonial concept and declarative in nature.[2675]
According to estimates by the American Civil Liberties Union Montana, the literacy rate of the Aboriginal population remains one of the lowest among all ethnic groups living in the United States. Children from Indian families are more likely to be victims of educational discrimination. Youth between the ages of 15 and 24 have suicide rates comparable to those of combat veterans[2676].
Over 20 per cent of Alaska's indigenous population lives below the poverty line. According to several experts, Native American peoples face socio-economic inequality and a marked income gap. Only 15 per cent of them have a bachelor's degree or higher.[2677] Such indicators lead to the following negative social consequences: crime, alcoholism, high unemployment (11.1 per cent as of January 2022)[2678] and suicides (50.9 cases per 100,000 people, which is four times the national average (or 700 per cent higher)).
The current US law contains a number of requirements that in practice discriminate against members of Native American communities. Among such examples is the lack of residence addresses of Indians living on reservations, due to which they face denial of registration as voters. In addition, the long distance between polling stations and their places of residence affects the exercise of indigenous peoples' voting rights. Hence, many members of indigenous communities refuse to take part in elections.
In 2016, Arizona passed laws limiting ballot collection and out‑of‑precinct voting. This created significant barriers to voting for residents of rural Native American communities. Approximately 90 per cent of the state's counties assign voters to a particular precinct based on their home address. Meanwhile, traditional community boundaries often do not coincide with State-established precinct boundaries. Combined with the location of communities in remote areas with dirt roads that become impassable during November elections, lack of Internet and cell phone coverage abound on reservation, and insufficient transportation, the new rule has made it much more difficult for residents of rural communities to access basic government services. At the same time, the decision to criminalize ballot collection adds one more hurdle for Native voters who could carry ballots for friends and family.[2679]
The Democratic National Committee and voters addressed to federal court in 2016 to overturn the new provisions of the law. They argued that the ban on ballot collection was the result of intentional discrimination by the state legislature and a violation of the Constitution, which prohibits states from denying the right to vote on the basis of race. However, Native voters were unable to assert their rights. On 1 July 2021, the US Supreme Court released its decision in Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee, which upheld two voting policies in Arizona.
Human rights organizations have pointed out that there were not enough consultations with indigenous peoples on matters of interest to their communities. Lengthy legal proceedings and high costs of litigation can also negatively impact Native American communities that try to defend their rights. There were noted problems related to protection of the sacred places of indigenous peoples against desecration, contamination and destruction as a result of extractive industries, tourism and toxic dumping. The problem of accessibility to such places for indigenous peoples themselves is also acute. These issues have been raised with concern by human rights treaty bodies, in particular the UN Human Rights Committee and the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.
The main violation of the rights of the autochthonous population is still related to the land development of their ancestral habitats, which results in the depletion of environmental and economic resources and the destruction of sacred sites and cultural objects. At the same time, local tribes are essentially excluded from the decision-making process when approving business projects. They are formally consulted. In addition, the US Congress May at any time exercise its power[2680] to deprive them of their rights by cancelling the above-mentioned treaties.
Against this background, Biden's team has emphasized its focus on addressing the problems of the aboriginal population and improving their socio-economic situation. Thus, for the third year in a row, the United States has held national summits of indigenous peoples to discuss the urgent needs of autochthons. The last one was held in December 2023.
Emphasis is placed on harmonizing standards for federal agencies to consult with tribes on various projects affecting their rights and freedoms. Thus, according to the Presidential Memorandum of 30 November 2022, each ministry is to establish a contact group to engage with communities, determine the need for and timing of notification of the launch of the "conciliation" procedure and response (as a rule, at least 30 days in advance).
Emphasis is also placed on substantial investment (compared to previous administrations) to improve the quality of life of indigenous peoples. A total of 32 billion USD has been allocated for this purpose under the American Rescue Plan programs (US National Economic Stimulus Act). Among the main objectives are: improving infrastructure, combating climate change, keeping communities safe, and funding reservation health services.
At the same time, at the legislative level (within the framework of the Violence Against Women Act), the competence of tribal courts has been expanded in terms of conducting proceedings against non-autochthonous persons suspected of child abuse, trafficking for sexual exploitation, and attacks on law enforcement officers on tribal lands.
The administration is actively promoting steps to protect sacred sites of Aboriginal people in the course of implementation of the US Antiquities Act of 1906. These include the creation of new national monuments: Camp Hale (Colorado); Spirit Mountain, known as Avi Kwa Amoeb (Nevada); Baaj Nwaavjoo-Itah Kukweni (Arizona); and the signing of some 190 new tribal co‑management agreements for indigenous territories.[2681]
While acknowledging the administration's positive developments in addressing a number of indigenous issues in the United States, human rights organizations call on the American authorities to continue to address injustices and violations of the rights of autochthonous peoples. The main proposals and recommendations are summarized as follows.
Expand US international civil liberties commitments. In particular, ratify the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the 1989 International Labour Organization Convention 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the 2007 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. In addition, the domestic procedures necessary for entry into force of the 1966 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the 2002 Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment, the 2007 International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance must be signed and implemented.
US based NGOs, such as Cultural Survival, consider it important to develop a national action plan to implement the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, based on the Outcome Document of the World Conference on Indigenous Peoples of 22 September 2014. It also notes the need to comply with US regulations to protect tribal children and preferentially educate them in indigenous communities in order to preserve traditional ways of life.[2682]
The establishment of a commission to study and evaluate the federal government's handling of Indian residential schools remains a painful issue. In the US, from 1869 to the 1960s, there was a practice of forcibly removing indigenous children from their families and placing them in institutions for re-education and identity deprivation.[2683] In general terms, the abuses of power (based on the example of the autochthonous people of Minnesota) are clearly reflected in the April 2023 report of the TRUTH Human Rights Project.[2684]
Following the traditional democratic priority of human rights issues in the electoral agenda, the Biden administration reported on the work done on the high-profile proceedings on the abuses of American authorities against Indians, Alaska Natives and Hawaiians.
In this context, on 31 July 2024, the US Department of the Interior presented to the public the final report with the results of the investigation initiated in June 2021 on the abuses of the autochthonous population of the United States by the US authorities between 1819 and 1969. The document is complemented by an interim report on this topic published in May 2022 with concrete evidence of genocide of the autochthonous population by the US government.
The collection, systematization and analysis of archival materials (more than 103 million pages), as well as experience-sharing meetings with officials and community leaders from Australia, Canada and New Zealand, were led by Deputy Chief of Interior Bryan Newland, who is from the Ojibwe tribe. The document recognizes the US government's responsibility for operating Indian Residential Schools (IRS) for forced assimilation (including conversion to Catholicism, banning the use of native language and traditional dress). It states that Indian, Alaska Native and Hawaiian children have been separated from their families, abused and mistreated for decades in federally controlled IRS (some 417 facilities in 37 states). Experts estimate that the operations of such schools cost the treasury 23 billion USD in the current inflation-adjusted equivalent. Seventy-four burials were found on the grounds of educational institutions, indicating 973 (possibly more) juvenile deaths out of a total of 18,624. It is noted that the numbers could actually be much higher. Searches for new burial sites and interviews with eyewitnesses continue.
It is concluded that the current problems of indigenous peoples, such as mental disorders, drug addiction, alcoholism and low productivity, are the result of abuses that have taken place (the system of punishment of "offenders", living in overcrowded conditions, systematic malnutrition, lack of medical care, etc.).
The report makes eight recommendations to the federal government to remedy the situation – making amends for the deliberate destruction of autochthonous culture and way of life, taking over their habitats and plundering resources. In particular, the US government is pointed to the need to formally acknowledge and apologize for its role in organizing Indian residential schools, to fund programs to further study and address the negative consequences of the policies pursued against ethnic minorities, and to return to them the territories where IRS used to be located. It is also proposed to establish a national memorial to commemorate indigenous victims and to identify and repatriate the remains of deceased minors for burial on tribal lands.
The Department of Interior noted the increased attention of Biden's team to this issue and the Administration's efforts to restore justice to indigenous peoples. In this context, the Ministry informed about the operation of a historical route called "The Road of Healing" along the former boarding school sites and the implementation of a project to interview and document the oral testimonies of IRS pupils. The preparation of a 10-year strategy for the development of autochthonous mother tongues by the end of 2024 was also announced.
A special point of the public activists is to resolve the issue of release from prison of Leonard Peltier,[2685] already mentioned above, a representative of aborigines, who was convicted for the murder of two FBI officers on the Pine Ridge Reservation (South Dakota) in 1975. Many legal experts agree that the case against the tribal resident was wrongly filed. Native Americans tend to view him as a political prisoner.[2686]
In terms of the environmental agenda, human rights activists are proceeding from the need for strict adherence to the principle of "tribal sovereignty". In their view, economic activities in indigenous peoples' places of residence (including energy and infrastructure) should be carried out after proper (rather than declared) consultation with them, as well as their free, prior and informed consent to such projects. Profile NGOs note the relevance of further work on US mining and minerals law reform.[2687]
The land issue remains unresolved. Between 1887 and 1934, the United States authorities seized 90 million acres (36 million hectares) – more than 2/3 of all the land belonging to the Indian reservations – from the indigenous population on a free-of-charge basis and in violation of previous agreements. Although in 1934 the Roosevelt administration launched a process to buy back plots of land for the autochthonous peoples of the United States, to date less than 8 per cent of the previously confiscated areas have been compensated.
It is estimated that indigenous peoples in the United States have lost 98.9 per cent of their historic land base since European settlers began colonizing the continent. Over 42 per cent of tribes currently have no federally or state recognized land, and the modern sites still owned by tribes are on average 2.6 per cent of the size of their presumed historic area.
The researchers note that the near-total loss of tribal lands has forced indigenous peoples to live in areas that are, on average, more susceptible to global warming risks such as extreme heat and reduced precipitation. The Mojave Tribe (living along the Colorado River), for example, experiences extreme heat an average of 62 more days per year than on historic lands. Nearly half of the tribes live in areas with increased wildfire risk.
Mining poses a threat to the health of the indigenous population living near or in areas with the relevant facilities, and negatively affects the existing ecosystem in the area where they live.[2688] At the same time, the effects are still felt after the work is completed. In 2015, for example, the abandoned Gold King mine spilled arsenic, lead and other metals into the lands of the Yute and Navajo tribes and contaminated them. In total, there are more than 160,000 abandoned mines in the western United States that pose a risk to indigenous peoples.[2689]
Indians' rights to fish wealth are protected by a number of treaties with the central authorities,[2690] which are not fully implemented in practice. For example, an open-pit mine in Idaho's Salmon River Mountains plans to mine gold and antimony for solar cell power supplies.[2691] According to the Perpetua Corporation, the proposed works would have "disproportionately high and adverse impacts" on the local ecosystem by diverting water flows and contaminating them with mercury and other harmful substances. These activities May destroy up to 20 per cent of salmon and trout. For the Nez Perce and many other indigenous peoples in the region, these resources are not only a source of subsistence, but are also used in religious ceremonies.
In general terms, the United States has a history of approving permits for business projects that have obvious negative impacts on indigenous peoples and do not take their views into account. These include, for example, the Dakota Access,[2692] Keystone XL,[2693] and Line 3[2694] pipelines.
The Kuchin people (Alaska) are also opposed to oil production plans in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. The main claim is that the construction of infrastructure threatens to affect the population of reindeer (caribou), the meat of which is the basis of the local population's diet. The Biden administration suspended projects in the area in 2021.
In March 2023, the US authorities approved a project allowing the US energy corporation ConocoPhillips to drill oil wells in the north-western territories of Alaska – only in three areas. In a comment on the ruling, ConocoPhillips noted that the wells would produce up to 180,000 barrels of oil per day. The project is expected to generate between 8 billion and 17 billion USD in new revenue for the federal government, the state of Alaska and communities in the North Slope region. Eco-activists oppose the project and insist that drilling in Alaska would be a climate disaster and contradict the administration's clean energy transition policy.
In the Inyo Mountains in Death Valley, California, K2 Gold Corporation plans to build an open cyanide heap leaching pit for gold mining.[2695] Indigenous people in the region, including the Shoshone Tribe, are opposed to development, road building in deer migration areas, hunting, gathering edible and medicinal plants, and ceremonies.
In Alaska, the Ambler Road project aims to build infrastructure for copper and zinc mines in the northwest region of the state.[2696] The implementation of this initiative has the potential to pollute local water and wetlands, disappearance of flora and fauna used for subsistence. Chiefs of the Tanana, Huslia, Allakaket, Alatna, and Evansville tribes have filed a class action lawsuit against the US government for implementing the program without proper consultation with the autochthonous population. The Department of the Interior requested that the permits remain in effect. In February 2023, however, the Allakaket and Huslia tribal councils dropped their claims.[2697] Nevertheless, the judicial process continues. The central authorities are consulting with the tribes. Additional assessments by environmentalists have been requested.[2698]
A significant proportion of developments affect lands of significant religious or sacred significance to indigenous peoples, particularly in the south-western United States. In the ancestral lands of the Tohono-O'odham, Pascua Yaqui and Hopi tribes in Arizona, Hudbay Minerals is developing the Rosemont Mine (an open pit gold mine in the Santa Ritas Mountains).[2699]
These lands contain burial grounds, sacred sites and critical resources for the tribes such as water, fish and game. Affected indigenous people have sued to stop the development of the project, which would desecrate sacred lands, block waterways and harm wildlife.[2700] They managed to win the lawsuit.[2701] However, another lawsuit to stop development in the region was dismissed in June 2022, allowing the company to continue its operations.[2702] If completed, Rosemont will be one of the largest mines in the US, leaving a 1.6-km-wide crater and 2 billion tons of mining waste behind.[2703]
Northwest of the Rosemont mine in Arizona is the Big Sandy River Valley, where a lithium mine is also slated to open.[2704] This mine threatens the Hualapai tribe's sacred hot spring, known as Ha'Kamwe and reflected in local folklore.[2705] Indigenous peoples make extensive use of the land, including gathering native plants from riverbanks.
Another controversial project in Arizona is the Resolution copper mine on Chichil Bildagotil, sacred land for the San Carlos Apache tribe.[2706] The territory was protected in 1955 by President D. Eisenhower from mining projects. Under the Obama administration, the "land swap" law repealed this ban, opening the territory to mining operation.[2707] The Resolution copper mine, jointly owned by Rio Tinto and BHP Billiton, could supply up to a quarter of US copper demand.
Apache Stronghold, a non-profit indigenous organization, sued to stop the mine, saying the mine violated their religious rights and the 1852 Santa Fe Treaty.[2708] On 24 June 2022, a US court dismissed Apache's lawsuit against Oak Flat, noting that the transfer of land to mining companies does not force the Apache to abandon their religion, nor does it threaten their habitat.[2709] However, human rights activists fear the mine will leave a three-kilometre-wide crater, destroying sacred sites where Apache peoples pray and perform religious rituals.[2710]
Plans to build a large telescope on top of Mount Mauna Kea, Hawaii, considered a sacred site for the island's indigenous people, have been widely publicized. The construction site has been blocked twice by local demonstrators (2014-2015 and 2019). Currently, the project implementation is "frozen".
There is information on the use of exploitative labour practices and other abuses against indigenous workers in infrastructure projects.[2711]
There is yet another problem. There is also another problem. These temporary workers often fail to comply with local laws, attacking indigenous women and girls.[2712] For example, after the discovery of oil fields in the Bakken Formation in North Dakota in 2006, the region experienced an influx of workers and a sharp increase in violence against the autochthonous population.[2713]
In general, despite the progress declared by the democratic administration in improving the socio-economic situation of the indigenous population, problems remain. A significant part of them is related to the non-observance of tribal rights during the implementation of infrastructure and energy projects in the places of their homes.
By now it is quite obvious that the regime in power in Kiev is an openly Nazi one, following in all its ideological inspirations from Nazi Germany and committing countless gross and systematic violations of human rights in all spheres of public life.
As has been repeatedly noted, neo-Nazism has been practiced in Ukraine at an accelerated pace for a long time, practically since "independence". And starting from 2014, when nationalists seized power in Kiev as a result of an unconstitutional armed coup d'état orchestrated by the West, violations of fundamental human rights and freedoms in Ukraine, and especially the glorification of Nazism, have become widespread and systemic. With the active encouragement of Western handlers, authorities make efforts to shape a society based on Nazi ideas. To that end, Kiev has been consistently conducting aggressive neo‑Nazi propaganda, accompanied by rewriting the history of the Great Patriotic and Second World War. Glorification of Nazism, its promotion into all spheres of public life, systemic suppression of human rights, opposition and dissent, as well as the fight against everything connected with Russia, have become a targeted government policy in Ukraine. Along with this, the country is consistently pursuing a course towards forced Ukrainization of all spheres of public life and accelerated assimilation of national minorities.
Distorted interpretations of historical events are being instilled, which belittle the USSR role in and contribution to the victory over Nazism and are aimed at destroying the historical memory of the Ukrainian people about episodes of that war. Ukraine's public policy and active steps by authorities at all levels to whitewash and glorify Nazism and World War II Nazi Ukrainian collaborators and their various formations who cooperated with Hitlerite invaders under the guise of "national liberation movement", contribute to the cultivation of a nationalist attitude among the broad layers of Ukranian society. Particular attention is given to a wide range of measures to provide public support for movements glorifying Nazi criminals and collaborators.
Annual torchlight processions to honour the Nazi criminal Stepan Bandera have been legalized in the country. The birthdays of this collaborator and another criminal Roman Shukhevich are marked as public holidays. Celebrations of such anniversaries and other similar "memorable dates" of other Ukrainian nationalists who have stained themselves with mass murder of civilians are enshrined in law in Ukraine. The SS Division "Galicia" is held in high esteem. Much is done under this "brand": from issuing stamps and holding thematic exhibitions to decisions by a number of city councils to use the banner of this Nazi association on an equal foot with the state flag.
Former SS members are also honoured in every possible way, up to granting them the Hero of Ukraine title. Monuments are erected to these "figures" and they are solemnly reburied. Laws have been adopted that not just equalize Great Patriotic War veterans and former Nazi and collaborationist unit members, but also provide the latter with significant benefits to the detriment of the former. Books glorifying the Nazis and their memoirs are published. The Nazis glorified in Ukrainian schools through various forms of "patriotic education" of children and youth.
The hateful ideology began to be scaled up after the bloody putsch of 2014, when extremists penetrated all levels of power in the country. Extremist nationalist organizations, in particular the Right Sector and Svoboda, the ideological successors of Ukrainian nationalists known for their collaboration with the Nazis and mass murder of USSR civilians during the Great Patriotic War, acted as the moving force behind all this.
Instead of forming a national unity coalition government, as the agreement of 21 February 2014 between President Victor Yanukovich and leaders of the then opposition envisaged, the forces that seized power in Kiev announced a "government of victors"; one of its first steps was an attempt to abolish the status of the Russian language in Ukraine, which only contributed to the tension upsurge in the country. Those who did not accept the coup and called for autonomy and federalization were labelled "separatists" and "terrorists" by the new authorities, who began to use force against the former, declaring a so-called "anti-terrorist operation" (ATO) in April 2014. They shelled the Russian-speaking east of Ukraine from heavy weapons, and used combat aircraft against peaceful cities.
The terrible crimes of that period are still horrifying, the most brutal one being the burning alive of 48 people in the Odessa House of Trade Unions on 2 May 2014. No one is going to investigate them in Ukraine.[2714] All this only confirms the Nazi nature of the regime that set up in Kiev.
In addition to Ukraine's regular armed forces, the ATO status implied engaging irregular "volunteer battalions" whose atrocities even the international organizations and structures patronizing Kiev, including the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), could not remain silent about; this fact convincingly demonstrates the intentions of the Kiev authorities in respect of Donbass.
However, the accusations of "terrorism" against Donbass residents used by Kiev as a pretext for launching the ATO turned out to be a fake. This was confirmed by the International Court of Justice ruling of 31 January 2024 on Ukraine's claim against the Russian Federation; it refused to recognize the Donbass republics as "terrorist organizations" and Russia as a "sponsor of terrorism". Thus, Kiev's actions against the LPR and DPR were illegitimate from the very beginning. The same ruling rejected Kiev regime's speculations about alleged "racial discrimination" in Crimea, which were disseminated by international organizations alongside with pro-Western NGOs. In doing so, the Court repeatedly doubted their conclusions with no sufficient evidence to support them.
As some researchers rightly note, the Kiev regime underwent a political mutation in 2022. The conditions it created as a result of the imposition of martial law allowed it to build a tough authoritarian governance system, featured by an absolute monopoly on power, extrajudicial punishments, allout censorship and government propaganda, the de facto elimination of independent media and political opposition, an active search for traitors, fictitious Russian spies and saboteurs. By the way, traitors are already being sought in Western countries that support Zelenskiy's criminal regime and where population and part of the political circles are gradually becoming inclined to revise their approaches to the situation in Ukraine.
The current regime in that country has essentially degenerated into a neo‑Nazi dictatorship, having adopted the ideology and practices of Ukrainian radical nationalists.
It needs a state of war and a widest range of repressive measures as simultaneously the only and safest way to preserve its dominance. It exists as long as a high degree of escalation is maintained in society, armed confrontation with an external enemy continues. For this purpose, massive Western, primarily military, assistance is provided thereto. For such a regime, the end of war would be tantamount to the end of existence.
Operating in this paradigm, Kiev pursues a comprehensive discriminatory policy towards the Russian-speaking population and representatives of national minorities. Everything Russian – language, culture, printed matter of any kind, mass media – is banned in the country. Education in Russian, its study in any form is also banned. Literature, teaching and scientific material in Russian have been removed from the educational process. Even interpersonal communication in the Russian language is banned at school. The renaming of country's topographic objects that are somehow connected with Russia, the Soviet Union and now even the Russian Empire, has reached enormous proportions. A mass campaign has been launched to destroy monuments to Russian and Soviet figures of science and culture, historical figures.
Kiev's campaign against the canonical Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) has reached a completely new level of cynicism and hypocrisy. On 20 August 2024, the Verkhovnaya Rada adopted a law providing for a possible total ban on the UOC, which gave impetus to a new round of persecution of its clergy and parishioners, efforts to seize churches, monasteries, and other church property, including Orthodox shrines. These actions only confirm the determination of Zelenskiy's clique to retain power at any cost; in this case, there is a clear intention to turn the civil war into a religious one. Experts pointed out to this danger already back in 2023. Thus, Ukrainian political scientist Konstantin Bondarenko noted that the religious conflict that was flaring up in the country is a very dangerous phenomenon that would be difficult to extinguish. "Religious and interfaith wars are the most brutal ones. And God forbid that we get to the point where we start to sort things out between various Orthodox movements; for it will be quite difficult to stop this and achieve some kind of interfaith peace," he explained. According to him, such a confrontation could last for decades and centuries.[2715]
The degrading human rights situation in Ukraine shows in many things. The right to freedom and personal immunity is regularly violated, numerous cases of illegal arrests and subsequent detention, torture, intimidation, inhuman and cruel treatment, aimed primarily at forcing detainees to confess guilt, have been recorded in the country.[2716]
The persecution of political opponents, independent journalists and media companies, and members of civil society organizations undesirable to the authorities has taken on an unprecedented scale, usually accompanied by references to the need to combat "Russian aggression" and "separatism". Russian-speaking residents of Ukraine are subject to the greatest degree of persecution.
The Kiev authorities actively employ members of radical nationalist structures who often break the law but remain unpunished for their short work. Often, right-wing radicals freely intimidate and attack people on trial, their lawyers, and put pressure on members of the judiciary.
The Kiev regime's attitude towards the people of Donbass is clearly indicative of its Nazi approaches. First of all, hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian citizens, including the elderly, women and children, died and suffered in the south-eastern Ukraine in an internal armed conflict unleashed by Kiev ten years ago. The severe restrictions introduced by the Ukrainian authorities, posed serious life-threatening risks to citizens living in the areas of hostilities. They had to daily overcome significant difficulties in accessing basic services such as social benefits, water supply, heating and health care. Kiev's military actions resulted in residential areas falling into disrepair, and there was a lack of legal protection and compensation mechanisms for the inhabitants of Donbass.
The following well-known statements of Ukrainian leaders can serve convincing evidence of such Kiev's Nazi-style approach: in the summer of 2014 Arseniy Yatsenyuk, the former Prime Minister, called the Donbass militias "subhumans" (similar to the Nazi Untermenschen) and the current President Vladimir Zelenskiy, speaking about citizens of his country against whom he imposed sanctions, stated that not all people are people, some are simply "species".
The UN Human Rights Committee (HRC) pointed out in November 2021 that the people of Donbass do not enjoy the same level of human rights as individuals in the Kiev-controlled Ukraine (its concluding observations were published in February 2022).[2717] According to the Committee, the differences included difficulties encountered by individuals in Donbass when seeking the issuance of birth certificates, which required a prior court decision. The need to intensify efforts to protect civilians, in particular children, under military conditions, including demining, was also highlighted. The HRC also noted with concern the severe restrictions imposed on civilians at the checkpoints during the COVID-19 pandemic. The Committee highlighted the issue of restrictions on the rights of internally displaced persons (IDPs) noting with concern the multifaceted discrimination they face (with regard to their political rights, in particular opportunity to vote). This circumstance, in HRC opinion, hampers their reintegration into society. In this regard, the Kiev regime was recommended to facilitate the procedure for the registration of the actual residence of IDPs and encourage them to exercise their right to vote.
The problem of corruption, which is deeply rooted in the Ukrainian state, persists. The measures declared by authorities to combat it, including the establishment of relevant specialized structures, are ineffective in practice. The situation in this area was pointed out with concern by Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky, Independent Expert of the UN Human Rights Council on the effects of foreign debt and other related international financial obligations of States on the full enjoyment of human rights, following his mission to Ukraine in May 2018.[2718] The extent of corruption was also highlighted by the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in April 2014[2719] and the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women in February 2017. According to CEDAW experts, corruption, unemployment growth, the decline in standards of living, and the ongoing crisis create favourable conditions for widespread human trafficking.[2720]
The growing corruption issue is also facilitated by the Kiev regime's efforts to step up the forced mobilization of citizens, necessitated by high losses in the Ukrainian army. On 16 April 2024, Vladimir Zelenskiy signed a bill on further stiffening the mobilization adopted on 11 April 2024 by the Verkhovnaya Rada, into law.[2721] The Ukrainian authorities do not hesitate to use the most illegal and inhumane methods in enforcing the mobilization. A common scheme implies taking citizens who are detained by the police for having refused to collect a call-up order or present an identity document, to the military registration and enlistment office rather than to a police station. Ukrainian citizens seek to leave the country or otherwise avoid mobilization or joining the ranks of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, using various corruption schemes. As practice shows, even after paying a lot of money, Ukrainians often end up not at liberty, but in the hands of military commissars. In particular, it is known that border guards hand out call-up orders to draft-aged men whom they manage to detain at attempting to cross the border via the Tisza River, a popular, though dangerous migration route. Videos confirming the violent detentions of Ukrainian citizens by the military and police are multiplying on social networks. Meanwhile, Ukrainians' rejection of military commissariats increases sharply (the indicative name "man-catchers" is in wide circulation with the media). Cases of popular reprisals against military commissariat employees have become more frequent, there are numerous arsons of military commissariat vehicles and damage to their other property. A large number of videos of protests against forced mobilization are also posted on the Internet. Cases are often when participants in the action succeded in freeing their detainees.
International human rights monitoring structures have recorded numerous cases of illegal detention, torture, intimidation, ill-treatment, sexual violence, including those aimed at forcing confession or cooperation. In November 2021, the UN Human Rights Committee expressed concern over acts of torture and ill-treatment reportedly continuing to be perpetrated by law enforcement authorities, as well as over the limited number of convictions handed down despite the high numbers of complaints lodged.[2722]
Since the launch by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation of a special military operation to denazify and demilitarize Ukraine and protect the civilian population of Donbass, the neo-Nazi regime in Kiev has definitively ceased even formal attempts to create the appearance of maintaining law and order and respecting human rights in the country.
The authorities uncontrollably distribute weapons to anyone willing, which are used primarily by criminal elements. Criminals, including those convicted of serious criminal offences, are being released from prisons, in particular, former military officers Sergey Torbin (convicted for the murder of Kherson activist Ekaterina Gandzyuk), Dmitriy Balaboukh (convicted for the murder of a civilian during the Donbass conflict), Simon Semenchenko, former Verkhovnaya Rada deputy and commander of the Donbass battalion, and Ruslan Onishchenko, former commander of the Tornado battalion (convicted for torture, rape and incitement to suicide). As a result, Kiev and other major Ukrainian cities have seen a surge in banditry, looting, armed attacks and murders, and the self-appointed territorial defence units are engaged in robbery instead of protecting fellow citizens.
Chaos and lawlessness have spread in the country. People are detained, interrogated and searched by radicals at the slightest suspicion. As a result, civilians face the risk of being killed on the spurious pretexts of belonging to allegedly numerous "subversive groups" and "collaborators". Numerous images of Nazi illegal massacres and abuse of civilians have been published on the Internet.
Right-wing militant groups use civilians as "human shields" with the authorities' tacit permission. Even the Amnesty International materials note this. The research entitled Ukraine: military endangering civilians by locating forces in residential areas – new research[2723] prepared by this NGO underlines that Ukraine's armed forces violate international humanitarian law (IHL) as they turne civilian objects into military targets. It is noted that the Ukrainian military locate bases and weapons systems mainly in residential houses and major civilian infrastructure facilities – schools and hospitals. At the same time, most international human rights structures, including those of the UN and the OSCE, deliberately keep silent about these facts. A striking example is the hyperactivity of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights on this track; contrary to its mandate, the Office has established a "conveyor belt" release of so-called reports on IHL violations in the context of the SMO. These reports, except unfounded accusations against the Russian military, make essential attempts to whitewash the criminal Kiev regime, whose armed forces are committing mass crimes that lead to violations of international human rights and humanitarian law.
The problem of trafficking in human beings and children in Ukraine in 2022, or, more precisely, in human organs for transplantation, should be mentioned separately. After the start of the SMO, the media reported a sharp upsurge of this trade which is a highly profitable "business" in the country in 2022 (the previous peak of such illegal activities was observed in 2014-2015). This problem was also pointed out by international organizations, including the OSCE, which noted in 2014 that bodies of people with removed internal organs, most likely victims of transplantologists, were found in mass graves in battle areas. Relevent information was published, inter alia, by the Tsargrad television channel.[2724] Recently, Ukrainian resources have increasingly voiced the opinion that hostilities are being used for "black transplantology," and that the Ukrainian state is covering up the process. Experts also note that while the Kiev regime was preparing for an offensive against the Donbass Republics already, the Verkhovnaya Rada began to urgently consider bills aimed at simplifying the activities of transplantologists in the country to the maximum, and in 2022 law-making in this area became even more active. At the end of 2021, deputies from the Servant of the People presidential party initiated and passed through the Verkhovnaya Rada a law according to which a Ukrainian can become donor under a simplified procedure. The need to notarize the written consent of the donor or, in case of his/her death, his/her next of kin, for organ transplantation has been cancelled. On 14 April 2022, the Verkhovnaya Rada adopted a new law on transplantation, according to which this activity is exempt from VAT, which actually creates prerequisites for the easiest possible export of human organs from Ukraine.[2725] In July 2024, a group of "black transplantologists" was uncovered in Ukraine, with high-ranking officials from Zelenskiy's entourage directly involved. The organizers of a criminal scheme are suspected of illegally extracting human organs and cells. According to media reports, at least ten doctors from the Heart Institute, Volyn Regional Clinical Hospital, and Central Kiev City Clinical Hospital were detained in the case. Mr. Zagriychuk is one of the defendants in the case; he was Deputy Minister of Health of Ukraine in 2019-2020, and then starrted working as head of transplantation and surgery of abdominal organs at the Heart Institute. It is he and his wife who are called people close to Zelenskiy. It is noted that the criminal case was opened due to inter-clan showdowns in the Ukrainian political establishment. Otherwise, Ukraine would have continued to pretend that black transplantology is allegedly "Russian propaganda". Moreover, the facts that have come to light are clearly just the tip of the criminal iceberg. As is rightly noted, the materials that have been published in recent years about entire cemeteries of civilians with removed organs in Donbass and about the practice of "disassembling" wounded Ukrainian servicemen for the sake of organs ordered by clients from the West have taken on new colors. It is suggested that in this case, Kiev law enforcers have only touched on the small part of a huge scheme of organ forced removal and sale abroad. Judging by expert testimonials, the West uncovered also an insignificant part of such crimes in the Balkans "to calm the public" only; they want to do something similar now in Ukraine.[2726] Anyway, this case confirms that the Kosovo Liberation Army, whose members are known to have been stained for cooperating with "black transplantologists," has found "worthy" followers in Ukraine.
It is possible that Russian servicemen taken hostage could also fall into such illegal trade, as they are already being held in appalling conditions and subjected to torture and other forms of inhuman and cruel treatment. International monitoring mechanisms also corroborate such inhumane treatment of Russian servicemen.[2727]
There is no question of the Ukrainian authorities bringing those responsible for many of these crimes to justice. The relevant international organizations, such as the Council of Europe, the OSCE and several United Nations bodies, pass over this in silence. Furthermore, thanks to the efforts of these organizations, Ukraine is getting away from international control in this area. This exclusive right has been granted to official Kiev by the collective West, which is already influencing the UN Secretariat and several other UN entities. All this gives the Zelenskiy regime a sense of total impunity and at the same time seriously damages the reputation of UN bodies.
We would like to recall once again that Ukraine's gradual removal from the monitoring of the UN human rights treaty bodies began in 2011, i.e. when Kiev reported to most of the treaty committees for the last time. Already in February 2022, this process was legalised when, using Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Ukrainian regime declared itself free from obligations under a wide range of articles of this document.
There have also been examples of the special procedures of the UN Human Rights Council covering up the Kiev regime in an absolutely blatant manner. In particular, following her visit to Ukraine in the fall of 2023, the UN HRC Special Rapporteur on Torture, Alice Gill Edwards, described the situation with torture in Ukraine as "not causing concern" and the efforts of the authorities to prevent it as "impressive".
Furthermore, in 2022, due to the declaration of martial law in the country, Kiev officially announced that Ukraine temporarily suspended the fulfilment of its obligations under a number of articles of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Since that time, Ukraine has regularly extended the martial law regime, reported it to international structures, and confirmed or modified the terms of its participation in international human rights treaties in this regard. In light of the above, a number of provisions of international treaties remain officially suspended by Ukraine to date, including Articles 12 (on the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose a place of residence), 17 (on interference with privacy and family life), 19 (on freedom of expression), 21 (on the right to peaceful assembly) and 25 (on participation in public affairs and elections) of the Covenant, and Articles 8 (right to respect for private and family life), 10 (freedom of expression), and 11 (freedom of assembly and association) of the Convention, as well as Articles 1 (protection of property), 2 (right to education), 3 (right to free elections) of the Additional Protocol to the Convention and Article 2 (freedom of movement) of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention.
Nevertheless, several international human rights organizations and mechanisms continue to demonstrate their commitment to the objective implementation of their mandate and point to human rights violations in Ukraine. Such materials, which are not abundant, are cited in this section of the report when describing the relevant human rights violation incidents.
It should be noted that the numerous reports of crimes committed with unprecedented cruelty by Ukrainian neo-Nazi groups and foreign mercenaries against Russian servicemen are not included in this document. An assessment of these criminal acts by present-day neo-Nazis in Ukraine, who have fully demonstrated their loyalty to the hateful ideas and tactics of the German fascists and local collaborators from the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA)[2728] during the Great Patriotic War, is being made by the Russian competent authorities as part of the investigation of numerous criminal cases concerning these heinous crimes. Russian civil society organisations and all concerned individuals are also making considerable efforts to uncover the truth about the real face of the Ukrainian authorities and the national radicals they are covering up. Information on crimes will be included in separate analytical reports.
In Russia, crimes against civilians in the Donbass and Ukraine committed by the Kiev military and political leadership, nationalists and Ukrainian security forces since 2014 are recorded and investigated by the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation. As of 5 March 2024, some 4,500 criminal cases have already been initiated. Such crimes include genocide, terrorism, abuse of civilians, use of prohibited means and methods in armed conflict, murder, intentional destruction and damage to property (articles 205, 356, 105 and 167 of the Russian Criminal Code) and others. The persons involved include 980 individuals, including representatives of the AFU high command and commanders of military units who gave criminal orders to shell civilians and civilian infrastructure. More than 200 of them are wanted. A total of 250 criminal cases have been investigated and over 280 Ukrainian servicemen have been sentenced to 8 to 29 years' imprisonment and life imprisonment.[2729] Other criminal cases are still pending. The Investigative Committee is investigating and giving a legal assessment of the actions of all persons involved in the offences committed.
Efforts to collect, systematise and make public information on the crimes committed by the Kiev regime are also being undertaken by the Ambassador at Large in charge of this issue, a special post established in 2023 within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. This position is held by Rodion Miroshnik.
As we can see, it is precisely the servile willingness of the current Ukrainian leadership to destroy the history and memory of its country's true, not fictitious, past to the detriment of the interests of its people, denying everything connected with Russia, that is the reason why overseas curators turn a blind eye to the neo-Nazi nature of the Kiev regime. History is replete with examples of the West's nurturing of overtly racist and Nazi regimes. Their fate is well-known. It is tempting to draw a parallel with the way Western countries treated Hitler's regime on the eve of World War II. The policy of appeasement led to the bloodiest war in the history of mankind. Fortunately for the present generations, that war ended in the Victory of the countries of the anti‑Hitler coalition. The idea that such events must not happen again has become a fundamental principle of the UN Charter.
With respect to Kiev's efforts to glorify Nazism, it is worth highlighting several policy areas in the Kiev regime's activities aimed at spreading neo‑Nazi ideologies and practices in the country.
Ukraine is pursuing a policy of falsifying history and whitewashing Nazi criminals and fascist henchmen at the State level. For these purposes, the Kiev regime has established a legal and regulatory framework.
In April 2015, the Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine adopted a set of "decommunisation laws". In particular, the set includes the law "On the Condemnation of the Communist and National Socialist (Nazi) Regimes and Prohibition of Propaganda of Their Symbols", "On Access to Archives of Repressive Bodies of the Communist Totalitarian Regime of 1917-1991", "On the Day of Remembrance and Victory over Nazism in the Second World War of 1939-1945" and "On the Legal Status and Honouring of the Memory of the Fighters for the Independence of Ukraine in the 20th Century".
These documents ban Soviet symbols, condemn the communist regime and disclose the archives of the Soviet special services, and recognise fighters of Ukrainian military nationalist groups of World War II – the OUN and the UPA[2730] – and their leaders – OUN leader Stepan Bandera and UPA commander-in-chief Roman-Taras Shukhevych, who served in the Third Reich units ("Nachtigall" Battalion, 201st Ukrainian Schutzmannschaft Battalion) – as fighters for independence.
Furthermore, these laws criminalise the negative assessment of the activities by these structures, as well as the production, distribution and public use of symbols of the "communist totalitarian regime".
The "decommunisation" laws include such aspects as granting benefits to former members of nationalist armed groups and banning the use of Soviet symbols and insignia of the Red Army. In May 2017, the Code of Ukraine on Administrative Offences was amended to prohibit the public use, wearing or display of St. George (Guards) ribbon or pictures of it.
In line with the provisions of the law "On the Legal Status and Honouring of the Memory of the Fighters for the Independence of Ukraine in the 20th Century" on 30 January 2018, Lvov Regional Council decided to use the flag of the OUN‑UPA on an equal basis with the state flag of Ukraine. Similar decisions were taken by the Volyn Regional Council, city councils in Ternopol, Kiev, and several other cities.[2731]
In December 2018, the country adopted a law amending the law "On the Status of the War Veterans, Guarantees of Their Social Protection" (No. 2640‑VIII), which essentially equated collaborators as "participants in the struggle for Ukraine's independence in the 20th century" and veterans who fought on the side of the anti-Hitler coalition.[2732]
On 20 June 2023, Zelenskiy signed a law on payment of pensions to "Soviet era political prisoners", including former Bandera and UPA fighters. Funds for the new payments will be taken from the cancelled pensions for Soviet figures and holders of Soviet awards and titles.
In 2023, Victory Day celebrations on 9 May were finally replaced at the official level by a day of reconciliation similar to European countries. On 8 May 2023, Zelenskiy signed a decree stipulating that from this year 9 May is celebrated as Europe Day in Ukraine instead of the Day of Victory over Nazism in World War II.
A major example of Kiev's State policy aimed at "preserving national memory" is the resolutions adopted on an annual basis by the Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine, which include the commemoration of memorable dates and anniversaries of Ukrainian Nazi collaborators. In addition, back in 2018, the Verkhovnaya Rada approved the OUN nationalists' slogan "Glory to Ukraine! – Glory to Heroes!", which copies the well-known Nazi salute.
In 2019, the anniversaries of the following Nazi collaborators were included in the calendar of commemorative dates and anniversaries for 2020 by the Verkhovnaya Rada resolution: Vladimir Kubiyovych (a rabid supporter of cooperation with the Germans and the initiator of the SS Division "Galicia"), Ivan Poltavets-Ostryanitsa (head of the Ukrainian National Cossack Movement (UNAKOR), which included auxiliary police units that took part in the massacres of Jews in Volyn, Zhitomir, Vinnitsa, and Belaya Tserkov), Vasiliy Levkovich (member of the Ukrainian auxiliary police in Dubno, then commander of the Bug Military District within the UPA, who was convicted in 1947 by the Military Tribunal of the Interior Ministry troops, Kiev Oblast), Ulas Samchuk (OUN activist and editor-in-chief of the pro-Nazi Volyn newspaper in Rovno who published articles calling for killing Jews), Vasiliy Sidor (member of the OUN and UPA, centurion within the "Nachtigall" Battalion, which took part in punitive operations; after the war, until his death in 1949, he actively participated in underground activities and served as deputy chief commander of the UPA). The calendar also has the names of Andrey Melnik (head of the OUN Board who openly collaborated with Nazis, head of the Ukrainian National Rada in Kiev during the war, organiser of the Ukrainian auxiliary police units, and organiser of mass killings of Jews), Kirill Osmak (member of the OUN, one of the leaders of the Ukrainian National Rada in Kiev led by Andrey Melnik), Yaroslav Starukh (member of the OUN Board and an organiser of Jewish pogroms), Vasiliy Galas (one of OUN leaders who was in charge of an underground OUN network in Western Ukraine, organiser of Jewish pogroms in the Ternopol Oblast and mass killings of Poles), as well as nationalists, in particular, Maxim Zheleznyak (head of the Kolivshchyna who was involved in the mass killings of Jews in Uman in the 18th century). In many cases these individuals are mentioned simply as public figures (for example, "historian and geographer" Vladimir Kubiyovich, "political and military figure" Yaroslav Starukh, and "writer, publicist and journalist" Ulas Samchuk, without indicating their association with the nationalists of Nazis. State funding is allocated for commemorative events to honour these "figures". The Ministry of Education and Science has been instructed to conduct lessons and awareness raising events. Commemorative coins and postage stamps in honour of these individuals will be issued.
The Resolution of the Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine of 16 December 2020 on the celebration of memorable dates and anniversaries in 2021 provided for state-level celebrations of anniversaries of the following persons: Sergey Timoshenko (Minister of the Ukrainian People's Republic who engaged in the construction of Wehrmacht military facilities in Poland), Leonid Perfetskiy (veteran of the SS Division "Galicia"), Nikolay Kapustyanskiy (deputy head of the Melnik‑led OUN wing, who engaged in forming auxiliary Ukrainian units for the Nazis), Vladimir Shchigelskiy (UPA member, Nazi war criminal; commandant of the Ukrainian auxiliary police who participated in the mass extermination of Jews and Poles; executed in post-war Poland for aiding and abetting the Nazis), Dmitriy Klyachkovskiy (one of the organizers of the Volyn Massacre – the mass murder of tens of thousands of peaceful Poles, including women and children, by UPA units in 1943‑1944), Ivan Litvinenko (Nazi collaborator, participant in the Holocaust), Osip Dyakiv (OUN member, liquidated by Soviet security forces) and Rostislav Voloshin (OUN and UPA member, Nazi collaborator, head of the regional government in Rovno, who was complicit in the extermination of more than 20,000 Jews in that city).[2733]
On 17 December 2021, the Verkhovnaya Rada adopted a resolution on the celebration of memorable dates and anniversaries in 2022-2023. According to the document, the celebrations include the 80th anniversary of the creation of the UPA and the 110th anniversary of Stepan Bandera's associate Yaroslav Stetsko (who wrote to Hitler in July 1941 after the Nazi occupation of Lvov the following: "Your Excellency! Filled with sincere gratitude and admiration for your heroic army which has covered itself with unfading glory on the battlefields against the worst enemy of Europe – Moscow Bolshevism, we send you, the Great Führer, on behalf of the entire Ukrainian people and its Government which is established in the liberated Lemberg [Lvov], heartfelt congratulations and wishes to crown this struggle with landslide victory ..."); 130th anniversary of SS "Galicia" Division member, Porfiriy Silenko-Kravets, who was awarded the "Iron Cross" by the Nazis for his service in its ranks[2734]; and 130th anniversary of "geologist and geographer" Yuriy Polianskiy, who was the burgomaster of Lvov under the Nazis and was directly involved in mass killings of Lvov Jews, murder of Polish intellectuals, pogroms and looting; 100th anniversary of the birth of Fyodor Vorobets, OUN member and one of UPA agents, Nazi collaborator who arrived in the territory of the Ukrainian SSR together with the Germans in 1941, etc.[2735]
On 21 December 2023, the Verkhovnaya Rada adopted another resolution on the celebration of anniversaries and commemorations in 2024-2025[2736]. According to the document, it is planned to mark the anniversaries of many OUN and UPA figures at the state level, including Darya Husyak (personal contact of Roman Shukhevich), Evgeny Shtender (UPA centurion), Stepan Frasulyak (UPA lieutenant colonel who led the training of the organization's fighters), Stepan Lenkavskiy (Stepan Bandera's successor as leader of the OUN, author of the "10 Commandments of the Ukrainian Nationalist", who lived in Germany after World War II), Mikhail Zelenchuk (UPA militant), etc.
As a follow-up to such resolutions of the Verkhovnaya Rada, the authorities of Ukrainian regions adopt their own regulatory acts.
On 24 December 2019, the Lvov Regional Council adopted a resolution to allocate public funds in 2020 for commemorative events in honour of a OUN leader Andrey Melnik, an Ilya Lipa, a supporter of the ideas of Ukrainian nationalism, and his son Yuriy Lipa, a nationalist ideologist.
On 27 February 2020, the Kiev City Council adopted a resolution proposed by Yuriy Sirotiuk, a member of the Svoboda party, on the celebration of memorial dates and anniversaries in Kiev in honour of the collaborators. The persons honoured included Vladimir Kubiyovich, Ivan Poltavets-Ostryanitsa, Vasiliy Levkovich, Ulas Samchuk, Vasiliy Sidor, Yuriy Lipa, Vasiliy Galas and Andrey Melnik.[2737]
In this regard, it should be noted that Ukraine has a large number of monuments, memorial plaques and other sites glorifying these and many other similar Nazi collaborators. Many streets are named after Ukrainian collaborators, including during the active process of changing topographic names associated with Russia.[2738] A very detailed list of sites commemorating Ukrainian collaborators, including those who participated in the mass murder of Jews, Russians, Roma and other civilians, women, children and the elderly, is available on the website of The Forward, a project dedicated to the study of monuments honouring Nazi collaborators in a number of countries around the world.[2739]
Other bills aimed at glorifying Nazism are also being introduced in the Ukrainian legislature. Thus, on 21 September 2020, representatives of the Voice and the Servant of the People parliamentary factions, and Oksana Savchuk, a member of the Svoboda party, proposed an initiative to submit a draft resolution to the Verkhovnaya Rada to commemorate the 80th anniversary of the adoption of the "Act of Restoration of the Ukrainian State" in Lvov on 30 June 1941, right after the start of the Nazi occupation of Western Ukraine In particular, it stated that "the restored Ukrainian State will closely cooperate with National Socialist Great Germany, which under the leadership of its Leader Adolf Hitler is building a new order in Europe and in the world[2740]".
Ukrainian officials have repeatedly and explicitly expressed support for Nazi figures and proclaimed Nazi ideas aimed primarily at the destruction of Russians. For instance, in September 2018, the former speaker of the Verkhovnaya Rada, Andrey Parubiy, in a live broadcast on the ICTV TV channel, called Adolf Hitler "the greatest person who practiced direct democracy".[2741] Earlier, Parubiy was accused in absentia by the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation of committing atrocity crimes on the territory of Donbass, and the Russian Interior Ministry has put the criminal on a wanted list.
The activities of the Ukrainian consul in Hamburg, Vasiliy Marushchynets, who actively posted xenophobic and racist texts in social media and justified Nazism and antisemitism, caused a wide resonance in the media. Additionally, he made public pictures of himself holding a Bandera flag and a cake, designed as Mein Kampf by Hitler that his co-workers had given him for his 60th birthday. In May 2018, Vasiliy Marushchynets was dismissed from his post, but in early November 2019, the media reported that Ukrainian courts had ruled that his dismissal was unlawful.[2742]
On 3 May 2019, Aleksandr Nakonechny, mayor of Karlovka, Poltava Oblast, published photos of him wearing a Nazi uniform on Facebook.[2743]
October 2019 saw a high-profile incident involving Alexey Goncharuk, the then Prime Minister of Ukraine, who attended a concert of the band Sekira Peruna against which a criminal case was opened in 2018 for glorifying Adolf Hitler, Rudolf Hess and Waffen SS forces. The concert was attended by Ukrainian neo-Nazis and organized by Andrey Medvedko, who had been detained for murdering writer and journalist Oles Buzina but released together with the other potential perpetrator, Denis Polishchuk, under the neo-Nazis' pressure. Alexey Goncharuk welcomed the gathered "veterans" of the so-called anti-terrorist operation (ATO) from the stage. Later, he confirmed his participation in the neo-Nazi coven on Facebook, explaining that he wanted to "congratulate veterans and talk about sore"[2744].
The tone of the Nazi-like statements was set by the country's leadership – in an interview published on 5 August 2021, President Zelenskiy advised Russians to get out of Ukraine.
On 17 March 2022, the head of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine, Sergey Deineko, posted a post on his Facebook page in which he called for the murder of Russian women and children. The post was later deleted[2745].
On 8 March 2022, Alexander Turchinov, the former acting president of Ukraine, chairman of the Verkhovnaya Rada, and secretary of the NSDC of Ukraine, urged people to "kill Russians wherever possible, not only in Ukraine but also outside of it – on the territory of Russia" on his VKontakte page.[2746]
On 1 July 2022, Andrey Melnik, then Ukraine's Ambassador to Germany, stated that Bandera was a "freedom fighter" and had nothing to do with the mass murder of Jews and Poles. His words caused outrage not only in Poland but also in Germany, and were criticized by Felix Klein, Federal Government Commissioner for Jewish Life in Germany and the Fight against Antisemitism, as well as by the Israeli Embassy in Berlin.
"We are trying to kill as many of them as possible. The more Russians we kill now, the less our children will have to kill. That's it" said Ukrainian ambassador to Kazakhstan, Petr Vrublevskiy (returned to Kiev), to the media on 22 August 2022.
"The time for cold rage has come. With an entirely clear conscience, we now have a full moral right to kill these subhumans anywhere in the world, indefinitely, and in the greatest number conceivable", spoke in the same vein earlier, Boris Filatov, Mayor of Dnepr (Dnepropetrovsk).
"The most important experience we had and the one which we have practiced almost like a religion is that Russians and any other enemies must be killed, just killed, and most importantly, we should not be afraid to do it"[2747], said on 15 December 2022 in an interview with The Economist Valery Zaluzhny, the Commander-in-Chief of Ukraine's Armed Forces, who after his resignation from the post of the AFU was expected to become Ukraine's ambassador to the UK.
In December 2022, Igor Klimenko, head of the national police, called Russian-speaking residents of the Donbass "people poisoned by Russian propaganda" and "the main problem of this region".[2748]
On 1 January 2023, the Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine, in its official X account, made a post glorifying Stepan Bandera, which also contained his quotes. After condemnation by Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki, who stated that there would be no leniency for those who refuse to admit that the terrible genocide was something unimaginable and make a full atonement, a full confession of guilt, the post was deleted.[2749]
On 18 May 2023, Mikhail Podolyak, advisor to the head of the Office of the President, wrote the following on his X page: "Yes, Ukraine hates you [Russians]. We will persecute you. Always and everywhere. Ukraine will get each of you, and it doesn't matter how exactly – legally or physically".[2750]
On 15 June 2023, he also stated on the air of an all-Ukrainian telethon that "there is one plan: to move forward as tough as possible with maximum killing of Russians".
On 14 July 2023, the then Commander-in-Chief of the Ukraine's Armed Forces, Valery Zaluzhny, in an interview with The Washington Post, which provided a platform for this rabid nationalist and Russophobe, noted that "the problem is all ours, so it is up to us to decide how to kill our enemy. In a war, you can and must kill them in their territory. If our partners are afraid to use their weapons, we will kill with our own. But only as many as necessary".[2751]
It should be noted that such steps by Ukrainian representatives attracted the attention of the international community, as was the case with the above-mentioned statement of Melnik.
Back in 2016, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination expressed its concern about the increasing frequency of racist hate speech and discriminatory statements in public discourse in Ukraine, including in speeches by public and political figures, in the media, particularly the Internet, and during rallies, mainly directed against minorities.[2752]
The spread of neo-Nazism and the activities of radical groups in Ukraine have been highlighted by both NGOs and foreign politicians.
Earlier, in November 2020, the "Centre for Countering Digital Hate" (CCDH) NGO presented a report in which Ukraine was named as one of the centers of dissemination of neo-Nazi ideology.[2753]
A group of French senators, following a visit to Kiev in May 2021, issued a statement that the activity of neo-Nazi forces in Ukraine cannot but cause concern. As the senators explained, in the midst of a fair as part of the Kiev Day celebrations in the centre of the capital, they unexpectedly came across a pavilion where members of the neo-Nazi Azov battalion[2754] were teaching children how to assemble and disassemble weapons. The pavilion was also used to sign up volunteers to fight in Donbass and featured an improvised shooting range. As part of the "performance", Ukrainian radicals offered young people to shoot at a paper image of the Kremlin.
Nearby, stalls were selling identity cards of Nazi soldiers from the Second World War, swastikas and other attributes. Senator Nathalie Goulet, who personally witnessed all this, sent a parliamentary enquiry to the French Foreign Ministry. After that, the SBU launched an investigation against this group of French senators.[2755] The French Foreign Ministry, however, did not see anything alarming in this situation and in its reply to Goulet's enquiry noted that "there are neo-Nazi groups in Ukraine", but their popularity "does not exceed the European average".[2756] If this is true, and the "average level" of neo-Nazi popularity in Europe has reached the Ukrainian level, then Europe itself, including France and its foreign policy establishment, needs to think seriously about its bleak future.
Thus, with the tacit approval of the "collective West," Ukraine ignores the concerns of the international community and continues to actively promote neo‑Nazi ideology. In Ukraine, it is not uncommon for officials at various levels to organize events and public actions glorifying Hitler's Germany, the German Nazis and their collaborators. The Verkhovnaya Rada leadership organized a thematic exhibition in July 2018 to mark the "77th anniversary of the Act on the Restoration of the Ukrainian State," which was passed on 30 June 1941, and which established a protectorate dependent on the Nazis in Galicia and laid the foundation for this entity's cooperation with Nazi Germany. The exhibition was dedicated to the activities of OUN leaders Stepan Bandera and Y.Stetsko, Roman Shukhevych, commander of "Nachtigall" battalion and UPA during the initial period of the Great Patriotic War.[2757]
In February 2019, following outrage from nationalist forces over an incident during a law enforcement dispersal of a nationalist rally on Kontraktova Square in Kiev, during which a police officer shouted "Get down, Bandera!", the National Police leadership launched a flashmob "I am a Banderite" on their social media pages. The head of the National Police Sergey Knyazev and the head of the Patrol Police Department Yevgeniy Zhukov published this phrase on their Facebook page.
In March 2019, Chief of the General Staff of the AFU Viktor Muzhenko approved new patches for the brigades of the ground forces. A chevron of red and black color with the image of a skull and the inscription "Ukraine or Death" was approved for the servicemen of the 72nd mechanized brigade named after the Black Zaporozhets of the Land Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. These patches bear a visual resemblance to the patches of the SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf".[2758]
In June 2020, V.Mikolayenko, mayor of then Ukrainian Kherson[2759], congratulated the local residents on an anniversary of the "Act of Restoration of Ukrainian Statehood" promulgated by the OUN collaborationists in Lvov in 1941. The Act committed to "work closely with the National Socialist Greater Germany, under the leadership of its leader Adolf Hitler, which is forming a new order in Europe and the world and is helping the Ukrainian People to free itself from Moscovite occupation". Posters showing a reproduction of the issue of the OUN newspaper, Independent Ukraine, for 10 July 1941, and citing the text of the above law, were displayed around the city.[2760]
In 2022, it became known that Nazi ideas were widespread not only among the volunteer formations, of which neo-Nazis formed the backbone, but also among the Ukrainian military. Members of the Ukrainian army not only have widespread Nazi symbols on their tattoos, but they also openly wear chevrons with Nazi symbols and slogans, and often full copies of the chevrons used by Nazis and their accomplices during the Great Patriotic War.
Specifically, there were media reports that militants from Azov[2761], Aidar[2762], and other nationalist units, captured by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, wear swastikas, chevrons and symbols of the Nazi battalions of the Waffen-SS, have relevant tattoos and openly read and propagate A.Hitler's book "Mein Kampf"[2763].
Recently, Nazi symbols on Ukrainian servicemen have become more frequent even in the field of view of Western media.
For example, in August 2024, I.Piannierelli, a journalist of the Italian state broadcaster Rai News 24, produced a report on the Ukrainian army, in which he interviewed a Ukrainian wearing a cap with the symbols of the SS division "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler". The reporter later apologized: "I deeply regret that I gave the floor, even if only for a few seconds, to a Ukrainian soldier who was wearing a patch with Nazi symbols...," he said. The opinion that such facts either point to the incompetence of the journalist or that there are so many Nazis in the Ukrainian armed forces that it is difficult for even pro-Ukrainian propaganda media working to complete an order to make a report without showing Nazi symbols[2764] is quite justified. Retired US Army Lieutenant Colonel E.Rasmussen, commenting on the mentioned interview of the AFU fighter, said that accusations of Nazism against Ukraine were not groundless, as Nazi symbols are found everywhere despite bans introduced in European countries.[2765] He said it is also related to the support the CIA gave to Nazi formations and their followers to help them leave war zones after World War II. Earlier, the journalist I. Pianerelli filmed stories with relevant content about an obviously staged provocation in Bucha, for which the West blames Russia, and about a dead neo-Nazi from the Right Sector.
In May 2024, the German authorities expelled seven Ukrainian military officers who were training under the Bundeswehr program because of their use of right-wing extremist symbols.[2766]
Ukrainian government representatives have also been seen using Nazi insignia. President V.Zelenskiy, for one, illustrated his Victory Day greetings to the public on 9 May 2022 (posted in his Telegram account), with a photograph showing a Ukrainian soldier with the SS Totenkopf emblem on his chest. After the scandal erupted, the picture was promptly removed from the post. However, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence did not take down a comparable image of a soldier with the logo of the SS-Panzerdivision "Totenkopf".
On 1 January of each year, torchlight processions are held in Kiev and other Ukrainian cities to mark the birthday of OUN leader S.Bandera. They are accompanied by the shouting of nationalist slogans and the display of Nazi salutes and symbols. On 1 January 2021, the nationalists organized torch marches as usual in honour of S.Bandera in major Ukrainian cities. The Ukrainian media noted a decrease in the number of participants in the radicals' actions, which was seen as a decline in public support for the nationalists. At the same time, these gatherings are also held unopposed during the presidency of V.Zelenskiy, who is not hiding the fact that he follows the policy of his predecessor, P.Poroshenko.[2767]
Another torchlight procession was held in Kiev on 1 January 2022. The march was led by activists of the nationalist party All-Ukrainian Union "Svoboda" and other extreme right-wing radical organizations, as well as representatives of the schismatic "Orthodox Church of Ukraine" (OCU). The procession's main poster featured the Kremlin in flames, with Bandera's face in the background. The protesters also brought a placard calling for "Nuremberg‑2 over Moscow-Judean Communism" and shouted nationalist and xenophobic slogans.
The nationalist march was condemned by the embassies of Israel and Belarus in Ukraine, as well as the German Foreign Ministry.[2768] On 3 January 2022, Dmitriy Yarosh (former leader of the right-wing radical organization Right Sector) published a Facebook post in which he called Israeli Ambassador to Kiev Mikhail Brodskiy a "Kremlin influence agent" and called for the expulsion of "such 'diplomats' from Ukraine". Eduard Dolinskiy, Director of the Ukrainian Jewish Committee, described Yarosh's statement as "an anti-Semitic message", defining it as "a Judophobic division of Jews into good and bad: a good Jew must love his killers. The Jew who does not like Bandera and Shukhevych is an enemy and an agent of the Kremlin, he must be driven away".
On 1 January 2023, ceremonies commemorating the 114th anniversary of the birth of Bandera were held in the western regions of Ukraine. The traditional torchlight procession in Kiev was canceled due to curfew and other restrictions on public mass events.[2769]
On 1 January 2024, a commemorative march in honour of Stepan Bandera, a Nazi, was held in Odessa.
One organization playing a key role in the propagation of neo-Nazism is the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory (UINM). Under its previous director, Vladimir Viatrovych, known for his Russophobic and nationalist views, the UINM was active in a number of different areas, including lobbying for laws promoting the glorification of Fascist accomplices and honouring the memory of members of the Ukrainian "liberation movement", publishing "patriotic" literature and methodological recommendations for secondary and higher educational institutions, and organizing various events and festivals on the same subject with the participation of veterans from the UPA, fighters from the so-called anti-terrorist operation in South-East Ukraine (ATO), and Ukrainian "pro-banderite" historians, including the Bandershtat festival, dedicated to the Nazi collaborators. It was – and remains – very persistent in feeding the public with propaganda promoting such figures as S.Petliura, Y.Konovalets, S.Bandera, R.Shukhevych, Y.Stetsko and A.Melnik as model citizens. Thus, at the start of the year 2017, the Institute unveiled its propaganda project "UPA: Response of the Unconquered People," timed to coincide with the 75th anniversary of this criminal organization's establishment. Despite the fact that more than 70 percent of UPA officers were former Nazi henchmen – fighters in collaborationist groups – and its commanders were members of the Schutzmannschaft, auxiliary police forces until 1943, the UINM leadership characterized it as an anti-Nazi entity. According to the UINM report for 2018, events (photo exhibitions, lectures, and seminars) aimed at popularizing the activities of UPA fighters were held in educational institutions, military units, and state institutions as part of the project "UPA: Response of the Unconquered People". For propaganda purposes, the UINM also released a board game glorifying members of the Bandera underground.[2770] In July 2019, the Ukrainian Ministry of Education recommended the game for use in schools.[2771]
The Institute recreates "insurgent awards," which are granted to "participants in the Ukrainian liberation movement" and relatives of deceased "liberators". The UINM also organized an exhibition at the Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine titled "The Ukrainian Army: 1917-1921," a set of events defined by official Ukrainian historiography as the people's battle for political self-determination and the foundation of statehood.
In December 2019, with the change of management team, there has been no real change in the organization's direction under the new leadership. The new director of UINM, Anton Drobovych, recorded a video in 2020 on the eve of 9 May, timed to both the 75th anniversary of the defeat of Nazism and the Day of Memory and Reconciliation, which was observed on 8 May.[2772] In this video, in addition to the attempts traditionally made by the current Ukrainian authorities to present Ukrainian collaborators as fighters against Nazism, although the facts of their cooperation are undeniably confirmed, the director of the UINP actually equalized the Day of Remembrance and Reconciliation and the Victory Day over Nazism in World War II.[2773]
In particular, the manual states that the "100,000-strong UPA" fought alongside the Allies against Nazism, despite the fact that, according to official data, in "the best of its times", the number of participants of this formation amounted to 35 thousand people.[2774]
In its similar information materials on celebrating the Day of Remembrance and Reconciliation on 8 May (but not the Victory Day on 9 May), published in 2022 and 2023 and positioned, among other things, as guidelines for teachers, the UINM went even further and blamed the Soviet Union for starting World War II[2775] together with Nazi Germany which directly contradicts the verdicts of the Nuremberg Trials.
In September 2021, D.Getmantsev, head of committee of the Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine and people's deputy representing the governing party "Servant of the People", acknowledged in his interview to the Ukrainian Public TV that the UINM "took part in commemoration on Nazis", stating that he meant glorification of soldiers of the Waffen SS Division "Galicia".[2776]
In this context, a notable situation is a case of whether or not to recognize the emblems of the Waffen SS division "Galicia" as Nazi in Ukrainian court and the UINM's prohibition to propagate back. In 2017, N.Myasnikova, a Kiev citizen, disputed in court the concept advocated by then-UINM Director V.Viatrovych that the Waffen SS Division "Galicia" and its emblems were not Nazi because the division belonged to SS troops rather than general SS divisions and was utilized largely as a combat unit. The claimant filed an appeal with the court asking it to recognize the UINM's and its leader's efforts to interpret paragraph 5 of part 1 of Article 1 of the Law of Ukraine, which is titled "On condemning the communist and national socialist (Nazi) totalitarian regimes in Ukraine and banning the promotion of their insignia" as illegal. It describes the Waffen SS Division "Galicia"'s official insignia of the national-socialist (Nazi) totalitarian state and forbids the use of the 14th Waffen Grenadier Division of the SS (1st Galician) insignia in propaganda, taking into account any name changes that have occurred since. The plaintiff also requested the court to order the UNIM to retract its statements concerning the insignia of the Waffen-SS Division "Galicia".[2777]
On 27 May 2020, the Kiev District Administrative Court concluded that the UNIM has no right to distribute the statement made by its leader, and ordered it "abstain from doing anything to disseminate" the insignia. However, the court only upheld the plaintiff's suit in part, rejecting other parts. Radical Ukrainian nationalists from Right Sector, the National Corps, Sokol (the Youth wing of the Svoboda party), and Tradition and Order organized a fire show in front of the court during the hearing, and the judge and N.Myasnikova's lawyer both received threats by SMS on the day before the court's decision was issued.[2778]
On 23 September 2020, regarding the decision on the claim of UINM, the Sixth Administrative Appeals Court of Kiev overturned an earlier ruling of the District Administrative Court in which it had, in effect, classified the insignia of the Waffen-SS Division "Galicia" as Nazi symbols. On 6 December 2022, on this issue, the Supreme Court of Ukraine ruled that the decision of the appellate court was lawful. Therefore, the symbols of the Waffen SS Division "Galicia" are no longer considered Nazi in Ukraine.[2779]
This decision contradicts the verdict of the Nuremberg Trials, which recognized the SS troops, which included Waffen SS Division "Galicia", as a criminal organization. During the Great Patriotic War, its members participated in punitive actions, killed Soviet soldiers and civilians, put down uprisings in Warsaw and Slovakia, and fought against Yugoslav partisans.
Kiev implemented a "new" policy of patriotic education for young people based on militant Russophobia, instilling the ideology of nationalism and xenophobia in the younger generations, and praising Ukrainian Nazi accomplices posing as members of the national liberation movement after the nationalist forces took control of Ukraine as a result of an armed coup d'état in February 2014 and the outbreak of military conflict in Donbass. It is based on the national-patriotic education strategy for 2020-2025 that the government is implementing and that President Poroshenko approved in May 2019.
According to this document, young Ukrainians' development of "value orientations and civic consciousness" should be based on "examples of the heroic struggle for the establishment of sovereignty and the ideals of freedom and unity," passed down from the Cossacks, the Sich Streltsy, the Ukrainian and Western Ukrainian People's Republics, participants in the anti-Bolshevik uprisings, the Karpatskaya Sich units, the UPA, and the dissident movement.
Distorted interpretations of historical events are aimed at growth of a nationalistic mood among the population, especially young people. The so‑called new national idea of Ukraine, which is founded on propaganda of hatred against the Russian people and Russia, is practically the only lens through which information is presented in school textbooks. The Russian state is portrayed throughout history as the invader and brutal executioner, while Ukraine itself is shown as the sufferer. Books with such material are also published for the very young: soon following the events on the Maidan in 2014, Ukrainian historian Oleg Vitvitskiy published a new "patriotic" alphabet for children.
Educational literature was likewise changed to reflect the official narrative of history. Facts indicating that the Ukrainian nationalists were collaborators were removed from it. For example, the Ministry of Education and Science demanded the recall of history textbooks for 10th and 11th grades, which contain information about the cooperation of Roman Shukhevych and the "Roland" and "Nachtigall" battalions with the Nazi German army during World War II.[2780]
The policy of honouring the Nazis and their collaborators is beginning to have a negative impact on a considerable portion of Ukrainians, as indicated by sociological monitoring data, among other things. According to a sociological survey conducted by the "Democratic Initiatives" Foundation, the majority of Ukrainians (52 percent) celebrate the Victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War on 9 May. At the same time, 56 percent of respondents already agree that both Nazi Germany and the USSR are responsible for unleashing the bloodiest conflict in the history of mankind. It is worth noting that only 32.2 percent of those surveyed chose the option that the war was World War II, not the Great Patriotic War, and was won by the anti-Hitler coalition. Nearly 40 percent of survey participants agree with the current situation, in which Memorial Day and Reconciliation Day are both recognized as national holidays.[2781]
Furthermore, the Ukrainian government actively recruits right-wing radical and ultra-nationalist parties and organizations to engage in "patriotic work" among youth, giving each group state funding.
The Ministry of Youth and Sports of Ukraine (previously the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports of Ukraine) allots a sizable amount of money each year to support "military-patriotic youth-educational" projects, such as festivals, contests, congresses, camps, military-field games, and other events that glorify Nazi collaborators Stepan Bandera, Roman Shukhevych, and others while instilling anti-Russian sentiment.
For example, during the annual all-Ukrainian children's and youth game "Jura" (Falcon), children aged 6 to 17, by analogy with the structure of the UPA, unite in "swarms" and "kurins", which are named after the "historical struggle for independence" ("insurgents", "Azovtsy", "Aydarovtsy", "named after Roman Shukhevych", etc.).
Since 2007, the "All-Ukrainian Youth Movement National Alliance" has held an annual "Festival of the Ukrainian spirit "Bandershtat" in Lutsk, Volyn region, with the cooperation of the Kiev authorities. The goal of the event, according to the organizers, is to "immortalize the image of Bandera as a national symbol".
For several years in seven regions of Ukraine there has been a network of children's camps of the organization "Youth Corps" (Junkor), which educates children in an openly neo-Nazi spirit.
Children and teenagers in these camps are taught military discipline, tactics, assembly/disassembly of combat weapons, as well as ideological lessons in the direction of radical nationalism. The educators in these institutions are former members of the Azov battalion. The morning in such camps begins with a formation and a "Ukrainian nationalist prayer". At the beginning of the shift, each child is given a wooden assault rifle, and older children are given mock-ups of "real" weapons in the form of a laser-firing sniper rifle.[2782]
In 2018, the state granted the All-Ukrainian Union Svoboda and C14 subsidies totaling more than one million hryvnias for the implementation of programs aimed at "patriotic education of young people". A youth military camp named Khorunzhy ("cornet") after Nazi collaborator Taras Borovets and numerous other similar initiatives received state funding in 2019. In the summer of 2019, the "Banderstat" festival was held in Lutsk in honour of the ideologist of Ukrainian nationalism Dmitriy Dontsov was held in Melitopol, and the "Paths of Taras Borovets" festival was held in Olevsk.
In December 2019, the Law on State Recognition and Support of The Plast National Scout Organization of Ukraine was adopted by the Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine. In fact, the document sets the stage for the group to be taken under the wing of the state, similar to the infamous Hitler Youth, in order to subject children to deliberate ideological brainwashing. To understand what such indoctrination can lead to, it is enough to remember that practically all UPA commanders (Stepan Bandera, Roman Shukhevych, Vasiliy Kuk and others) were at one time members of Ukrainian Plast.[2783]
Also in December 2019, the Ministry of Culture, Youth, and Sports of Ukraine allocated again funding for a number of "military patriotic projects for the education of the youth" in 2020 in the amount of 20 million hryvnias, including 2 million hryvnias to the Plast scout organization, which openly declares itself a successor of the Bandera's organization (including 770,000 hryvnias to support its military patriotic camps, 450,000 hryvnias to hold all-Ukrainian games, and 500,000 hryvnias to organize the cultural identity festival "Plastun Day"); 440,000 hryvnias for the Banderstadt Ukrainian spirit festival of "ideological and patriotic nature"; 350,000 hryvnias for the Youth Nationalist Congress to promote the Ukrainian nationalism as part of the "Camp Season 2020" action centered around the military field game "Gurby and Antonovtsy" dedicated to the UPA battle against the NKVD troops in the Ternopol Region; 485,000 hryvnias to organize a military-patriotic game "Jura"; over 250,000 hryvnias for the Ukrainian Youth Union (supports the rehabilitation of Simon Petlyura, Stepan Bandera, and Roman Shukhevich) for holding the Ukrainian World Congress, organizing history events (180,000 hryvnias) and Zagrada children's camps (95,000 hryvnias), whose participants visit memorable places of the UPA; 300,000 hryvnias to hold military and history events "Under the Shelter of the Trident" in Boryas (Kiev Region); 560,000 hryvnias to the Ukrainian Reserve Army for the "Unizh Smithery" and "Rebel Heart" patriotic sport camps for the children of fighters in south-eastern Ukraine; 250,000 hryvnias to the All-Ukrainian Association of Military History Organizations for holding competitions at one of the military bases.
In January 2020, the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sport of Ukraine announced the winners of a prize for children's and youth projects funded from the 2020 national budget.[2784] A total of 8 million hryvnias (more than 20 million rubles) was allocated for such projects. This is almost half of all the funding provided by the ministry to support children's and youth organizations.[2785] For example, Plast received 2.7 million hryvnias for the organization of summer camps and thematic forums. As much as 400,000 hryvnias were allocated to the Youth Nationalist Congress for a series of training courses – "The Free Man's Course" and "The Course of a Young Banderite". The National Alliance received 200,000 hryvnias for the organization of the All-Ukrainian Field Game "Victory", which has been held since 2006. One hundred and twenty thousand hryvnias were allocated to the "Educational Assembly" affiliated to the radical group "C14" for the action "Proud of the Ukrainians". Two hundred thousand hryvnias were allocated to the Falcon of Freedom, the youth wing of the Svoboda all-Ukrainian union, for holding the Patriot Games in the Ternopol Region. In addition, funding was provided for the True History of Ukraine all-Ukrainian campaign and the festival of social advertising organized by Ukrainian people's youth. In addition, many of these organizations or affiliated groups received funding from the state budget for "national patriotic education", as well as direct funding for their activities from both the state and local government budgets.[2786]
In March 2021, the Ministry of Youth and Sport of Ukraine (reorganized in March 2020) allocated a new budget of 8 million hryvnias for "military patriotic youth educational" projects. Specifically, 350,000 hryvnias were allocated for holding the All-Ukrainian festival "Zashkov" in honour of the OUN leader Yevgeniy Konovalets in the Lvov Region; 185,000 hryvnias for the All-Ukrainian camp "Khorunzhy" in the Volyn Region, where children are educated in the spirit of the OUN-UPA; 1.2 million hryvnias for activities "to honour the heroes of the Ukrainian people's struggle for independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine"; 3 million hryvnias for educational activities in general, with this budget item also covering nationalist organizations or their affiliates.[2787]
In January 2022, the Ukrainian Ministry of Youth and Sport allocated 9 million hryvnias for the implementation of "national patriotic education" projects. Plast was given a budget of 1.7 million hryvnias to organize various "military-patriotic field camps". The Youth Nationalist Congress received 715,000 hrryvnias for the same purpose. The Youth Corps, a branch of the far-right National Corps party, was allocated 240,000 hryvnias for the organization of the All-Ukrainian Igor Beloshitskiy Contest (named after the eponymous Azov fighter, who was killed near Mariupol in 2014), and 100,000 hryvnias for the School of National Patriotic Education, named after Elena Stepaniv, who fought in the ranks of the Austro-Hungarian Armed Forces in World War I. The Student Brotherhood of Volyn received 270,000 hryvnias to hold the event "On the paths of the UPA"[2788].
In 2023, the Ukrainian Ministry of Youth and Sport allocated budgetary funds of 4.6 million hryvnias for the implementation of "national patriotic education" projects. Plast received a quarter of all the money – 1 million 145 thousand hryvnias to organize national patriotic and military patriotic summer camps, including those "aimed at acquiring the necessary knowledge and skills in the field of security and defence of Ukraine". The Young People's Rukh all-Ukrainian public organization was allocated 515 thousand hryvnias for the same purpose, the Nationalist Youth Congress – 300 thousand hryvnias. Two hundred and sixty thousand hryvnias were allocated to the Organization for the Protection of the Rights of Youth and Religious Communities for the arrangement of a training camp "Army – the shield of statehood". The organization Zov Yara received 75 thousand hryvnias to hold a winter walk in honour of Yuriy Gorlis-Gorskiy (Ukrainian nationalist, officer in the UNR army, during the Great Patriotic War he was actively involved in collaborationist activities in Kiev, headed a secret Abwehr group that identified Soviet underground fighters).
In 2024, the budget funding for such activities doubled and reached 9 million hryvnias. Traditionally, over 1.1 million hryvnias was received by Plast, 916,000 hryvnias – by the Young People's Movement of Ukraine. As much as 788,000 hryvnias were allocated for the actions of Ukrainian volunteer corps Right Sector, headed by Taras Bobanich, who had participated in the Ukrainian punitive operation in Donbass since 2014 and was liquidated by the Russian Armed Forces in 2022. Organizations in western regions of Ukraine received more than 410,000 hryvnias for actions aimed at glorifying the UPA.
Kiev's efforts to organize financial support for radical nationalists at the state expense did not go unnoticed. In July 2019, the Ukrainian government was accused of secretly funding far-right extremist groups under the guise of educational programmes. According to a Bellingcat investigation, the Ukrainian government provided the funding through a "national patriotic education" programme for young people. The materials suggest that such grants were used to increase the influence of nationalists and attract new supporters.[2789]
In March 2020, the acting Minister of Education and Science Lubomyra Mandziy was at the centre of a scandal. It became known that, in 2018, the acting Minister of Education Mandziy, who was the head of the Department of Education at the Lvov Region Administration, was involved in the organization of a drawing competition among schoolchildren on the theme of the Galichina SS division and Ukrainian volunteers in its ranks. The assignment was to draw "an SS member or Reichsfuhrer Heinrich Himmler meeting with his division personnel". The award ceremony was scheduled for 28 April 2020, to coincide with the march commemorating the 75th anniversary of the Waffen-SS division. In addition to the march and the drawing competition, there was a weapons exhibition. After public outrage, Mandziy gave her comments to journalists where she tried to deny her participation, saying that the Ministry of Education "had only informed schools about the competition".[2790]
Children have long been recruited into the AFU and nationalist groups, and fighters from the neo-Nazi Azov battalion (proscribed as a terrorist organization in the Russian Federation) have indoctrinated them to hate everything Russian. They took over the Pilgrim orphanage in the then Ukrainian Mariupol. Long-term military training of the orphanage residents, severe penalties for any misbehaviour, and exhausting physical training exercises made up the mentoring aspect of the Azov men. Particular attention was paid to hand-to-hand combat, girls received mostly sniper training. At the same time, the trainees were indoctrinated with Russophobic views, anti-Semitism and the glorification of Nazi Germany.
This topic did not go unnoticed in newspapers in the West.[2791]
The Ukrainian authorities also continue to build monuments and make memorial plaques in honour of the OUN and UIA fighters, and to bestow honours upon the living former Nazis. According to a survey on monuments to fascists, Nazis and Nazi collaborators in various countries, by the American newspaperThe Forward, Ukraine has the highest number of such monuments in the world.[2792] In December 2022, 50 monuments to Stepan Bandera alone were erected in different regions of the country, and more than 500 streets, lanes and avenues across Ukraine were named after him.
The biggest ultranationalist marches are timed to coincide with the date of the founding of the UPA and the birthday of Stepan Bandera. Radicals who attend such rallies use hate speech, especially against Russians. They also engage in all kinds of provocative actions.
On 29 January 2020, Mikhail Mulik, former vigilante and member of the Waffen-SS Galichina Division, was buried with honours on the Avenue of Glory in Ivano-Frankovsk, in the presence of regional officials and representatives of the church. Many of the attendees wore Nazi uniforms.[2793] According to Ukrainian media, Mikhail Mulik was the chairman of the regional brotherhood of Galichina Division members and honourary citizen of Ivano-Frankovsk.[2794]
On 22 March 2020, the Lvov authorities officially celebrated the 95th anniversary of the birth of Roman Matsuk, the Unterscharführer of the Galichina Waffen-SS division, by presenting him with a portrait of himself as a young man in a Nazi uniform.[2795]
In April 2020, in Kalush, Ivano-Frankovsk Region, the brotherhood of the warriors from the Galichina Waffen-SS Division presented Vasiliy Nakonechniy, a veteran of the division, with an award in a solemn ceremony. These "merit badges" are being presented to all the surviving members of the SS. When he was presented with the award, the 95-year-old reflexively raised his arm in the Nazi salute. In May 2018, he was made an honourary citizen of Kalush.[2796]
On 23 May 2020, on the occasion of Heroes' Day[2797], all UPA veterans and their widows living in the Lvov Region received a one-off payment from the regional budget. In total, 989 people received such payments.[2798]
On 21 June 2020, the press service of the Lvov City Council reported that Mayor Andrey Sadovoi had sent greetings to Olga Ilkiv, the former communications officer of UPA leader Roman Shukhevich, on the occasion of her 100th birthday. In the message, he said that the city and regional authorities had jointly bought an apartment in Lvov for Olga Ilkiv to express their appreciation for her services to the state and to mark the 78th anniversary of the UPA.[2799]
On 18 July 2020, with the support of the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory (UINP), a memorial cross to UPA Cornet General Ivan Treiko was erected in the forest between the villages of Gorodnitsa, Zhitomir Region, and Storozhev, Rovno Region. The dedication ceremony was attended by representatives of the local government, public activists and a representative of the UINP.[2800]
In August 2020 in Kiev, the Petlyura litter pick day was held in "commemoration" of the fighters of the 1st Bogdan Khmelnitskiy Ukrainian Regiment, buried on Zamkovaya Mountain.
On 19 August 2020, a memorial plaque in honour of Yuriy Lipa was placed on the building of a district library in Yavorov in the Lvov Region.[2801]
On 30 August 2020, a monument to Kuzma Brichka, a Nazi collaborator, member of the Polesian Sich and the UPA, who had participated in the mass murder of civilians of Polish and Jewish origin, was solemnly unveiled in Karpilovka, Chernigov Region.[2802]
On 5 October 2020, Alexander Derkach, a UPA veteran, who had been involved in a mass murder of Jewish and Polish inhabitants in the Rovno Region, was buried with war honours and a guard of honour in Dubrovka, Zhitomir Region.[2803]
On 13 October 2020, the authorities in Lutsk organized the third "For Ukraine! For Her Freedom!" national song competition, which was held on-line only. On the same day an exhibition dedicated to Stepan Bandera and Roman Shukhevich was held in Vinnitsa.
On 14 October 2020 in Kiev, radicals from Svoboda, Right Sector and the National Corps held their traditional march to mark the 78th anniversary of UPA. The demonstrators carried glass jars with pictures of Anatoly Shariy, Viktor Medvedchuk and other civil activists and opposition politicians imitating severed heads. They chanted slogans about organizing "legal" prosecution of Ukrainian citizens for "pro‑Russian" activities, revoking the licenses of 112‑Ukraine, NewsOne, ZIK, NASH, Inter and Kiev Live and canceling the ceasefire in the Donbass for Ukrainian military.
On the same day in Lvov, Maxim Kozitskiy, the vice-chairman of the Lvov regional council, took part in a ceremony in which participants laid flowers on the graves of UPA fighters, read funeral prayers and marched in Ukrainian nationalist regalia.[2804] In Vinnitsa an exhibition organized by the Ukrainian Institute for National Memory was opened. Called Against Goliath, it was dedicated to the leaders of the UIA, including Stepan Bandera and Roman Shukhevich.
On 12 November 2020, the Lvov Historical Museum, with the support of the Lvov City Council, held a ceremony at which the relatives of OUN and UIA fighters were awarded medals for military service and for special contribution to the development of the OUN Resistance Army.
On 20 January 2021 in Poltava, a national competition to design a monument to Simon Petlyura was announced.[2805]
On 29 January 2021, as in previous years, Readings from Bandera were held in Kiev with the backing of the local city council.
In February 2021, a former member of the Waffen-SS Galichinaa Division I.Fialka was buried with honours in Stryi (Lvov Region). The mayor of the city and members of nationalist structures were present at the event.
On 16 February 2021, the Lvov Regional Council formally asked Vladimir Zelenskiy, the president, to restore the honour of Hero of Ukraine to Stepan Bandera. The deputies also decided to declare 2021 the Year of Yevgeniy Konovalets (the OUN leader).[2806] The deputies of the Ivano-Frankovsk city council also proposed that former Galichinaan fighter Mikhail Mulik be awarded the title of Hero of Ukraine.
On 5 March 2021, the deputies of the Ternopol City Council supported the initiative of the mayor, Sergey Nadal, to name the city's stadium, where the Ukrainian Cup final will be held, after Roman Shukhevich. Joel Lion, the Ambassador of Israel to Ukraine, called on the authorities to reverse the decision. In turn, a spokesman for the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry backed the local authorities, saying that "preserving national memory is one of the priorities of state policy" and that such news should be commented on by historians, not diplomats.[2807]
The initiative was taken by the Lvov Regional Council, which on 16 March 2021 proposed to the federal government that the Arena Lvov be renamed Stepan Bandera Arena Lvov. The stadium was to host the first qualifying matches for the 2022 World Cup. The initiative came from Petr Poroshenko's European Solidarity party.[2808]
On 28 April 2021, radicals marched for the first time in Kiev to commemorate the formation of the SS Galichinaana Division. Nazi symbols were used during the march. The radicals were accompanied by police officers, who blocked the traffic on many of Kiev's central streets. According to Ruslan Bortnik, the head of the Ukrainian Institute of Politics, the march was partly funded by the Kiev City Council, although it claimed that this had been done by mistake. Before that date, demonstrations to honour the Waffen-SS Galichinana Division had been mainly restricted to Lvov and other cities in Western Ukraine. According to experts, the march could have been an act of provocation, given that it took place just before 9 May, while the fact that the Kiev authorities did nothing could be explained by the threat of pressure from the increasingly influential right-wing groups.[2809]
On 2 May 2021, members of the National Corps held rallies in Lvov and Ternopol as an act of glorification of the fighters of the Waffen-SS Galichinana Division. The participants of the events also used Nazi symbols.
On 22 May 2021, a solemn ceremony to bury the remains of UIA fighters took place in Strelki, Lvov Oblast. The event was attended by Oleg Duda, leader of the European Solidarity Party faction in the Lvov Regional Council.
In mid-June 2021, Orest Vaskul, chairman of the Kiev regional brotherhood of OUN-UPA Veterans, former member of the Waffen-SS Galichina Division and former head of the OUN, was buried in Kiev in a solemn ceremony at the Golden-Domed Monastery of St Michael, which belongs to the OCU. The ceremony was held in accordance with the official funeral rites of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and included a guard of honour from the Bogdan Khmelnitskiy Independent Presidential Regiment. It was attended by Sergey Kvit, former Minister of Education, Vladimir Vyatrovich, former head of the UINP, and others.[2810]
On 25 July 2021, the remains of the thugs of the Waffen-SS Galichina Division, liquidated by the Soviet troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front in 1944 during the Battle of Brody, will be reburied with honours in Chervonoye (Lvov region).
In July 2021 it became known that in Novomirgorod (Kirovograd Region) a children's team called "Hitlerites" took part in street basketball competitions during the city day.[2811]
On 10 August 2021, the 100th birthday of UPA lieutenant and Ukrainian auxiliary police commander Vladimir Shigelskiy – who had actively participated in the killing of Jewes and Poles during the Second World War – was celebrated in Lvov. He was executed in Poland in 1949 for aiding the Nazis, war crimes and the mass murder of civilians.
On 18 August 2021 the celebration of the 110th anniversary of E.Grabets, a member of the OUN and the UIA, who served as commandant of the Ukrainian auxiliary police in Rivne and was directly involved in the mass murder of about 30,000 Jews in the city, took place in Litin (Vinnitsa Region). In addition to the memorial procession along the street named after him and the laying of flowers at the memorial plaque, a round table was held at the local history museum, which resulted in a recommendation to the local authorities to name the Litin sports complex after Yemelyan Grabets.[2812]
Late August 2020, a monument to Kuzma Brichka, a Nazi collaborator, who, as a member of the Polesian Sich and the UPA, had participated in the mass murder of Jews, Soviet soldiers and partisans[2813], was solemnly unveiled in Karpilovka, Chernigov Region.[2814]
In September 2021, the plans were revealed to install a memorial sign dedicated to a high-ranking member of the OUN Vladimir Bagaziy, as part of One Stone, One Life[2815] project. Bagaziy organized the Ukrainian auxiliary police, later he was appointed by the Nazis burgomaster of Kiev. This was reported by the head of the Ukrainian Jewish Committee, Eduard Dolinskiy, who noted in particular that Vladimir Bagazy had been directly involved in the extermination of Jews in Kiev.
According to the media, the collaborationist's name and photo appeared on an interactive map of the project's official website, which contained addresses where the memorial stones would be installed and the names of those to be commemorated. Vladimir Bagaziy's biography published on the said website did not mention his involvement in the shootings of Jews during the occupation of Kiev.[2816] The German Foreign Ministry in reply to the relevant RT query stated that "the controversy regarding the personality of Vladimir Bagaziy" had been taken into account and that there were no plans to establish a memorial sign in his honour. The German Foreign Ministry stressed that it took the claims of Vladimir Bagaziy's involvement in Holocaust seriously and therefore, in cooperation with the Ukrainian Centre for Holocaust Studies and other specialists, would "look into this person's biography".[2817] As of 12 October 2021, Vladimir Bagaziy's biography was removed from the project website. Nor did the check carried out in April 2024 find his name on the site.
On 7 October 2021, a solemn ceremony of the reburial of UPA fighters was held near the village of Sokolovka (Lvov Oblast).
On 19 October 2021, the "memorial cross" made in 2009 to commemorate Stepan Bandera's 100th birthday was unveiled. Back in 2009, no permission to erect the monument was granted. This time, the city authorities did not mind this initiative on the part of the nationalists.
On 11 January 2022, the book entitled "Ukrainian Junkerschafts" dedicated to the Waffen-SS Division "Galicia" was presented in one of the libraries in Nikolayev (Lvov Oblast). The event was attended by a man wearing the Nazi uniform, a cap with an aquila and a skull with crossbones, and an equipment belt.[2818]
On 4 February 2022, during the European Futsal Championship semi-final between the Russian and Ukrainian national teams, Ukrainian fans chanted nationalist and Russophobic slogans, including "Ukraine above all", "Who doesn't jump is a Muscovite" etc.
On 5 February 2022, the ninth Bandera Readings devoted to the 80th anniversary of the UPA were organized by the nationalist Svoboda all-Ukrainian union in Kiev. The conference was presided by one of the Svoboda leaders, former member of the Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine Yuriy Sirotyuk. The organizers claim that the readings are an "intellectual forum" held under the aegis of Stepan Bandera's ideas. The event commemorated the UPA's 80th anniversary. In his speech at the event, the leader of the C14 (also known as S14) far‑right group (recently operating under such names as Foundation for the Future, or Society of the Future), pointed out, among other things, that nationalists "were having fun fighting and killing". He also threatened that if radicals came to power, Ukraine might attack European countries, in particular Hungary.
The same day, a "march of unity" was organized by the National Corps and other nationalist parties and movements in Kharkov. The participants brought along OUN‑UPA flags and chanted nationalist slogans as they marched.
On 14 October 2022, Vladimir Zelenskiy awarded 99-year-old Miroslav Simchich, UPA commander of a "sotnya" (a unit of one hundred men) and war criminal who had organized and participated in mass killings of Poles during World War II, the title of Hero of Ukraine and decorated him with the the Order of the Gold Star.[2819] After the war, the Polish court convicted him for the extermination of the residents of the predominantly Polish-populated village of Pisten in the Ivano-Frankovsk Oblast. On 22 October 2021, members of the Lvov Regional Council appealed to the President of Ukraine to grant the former Nazi a honourary title.[2820]
On 8 November 2022, a renovated monument to Mikhail Moskalyuk, also known as "Spartan", a UPA sotnya commander, who took part in the punitive operations of "Nachtigall" battalion and fought against the Soviet partisans in Ukrainian Schutzmannschaft Battalion 201 ("Ukrainian Legion"), was unveiled in the village of Ivanovtsy, Ivano-Frankovsk Oblast.
On 30 November 2022, in the village of Ledykhov, Ternopol Oblast, the remains of ten UPA members were solemnly reburied; they were killed in 1944 in battles against the Red Army and NKVD troops who were liberating the western regions of the Ukrainian SSR from the nationalist underground and Nazi accomplices.
In December 2022, at the Naguevichi State Historical and Cultural Reserve in the Lvov Oblast, a Christmas creche was arranged, which featured a statue of OUN leader Stepan Bandera installed among the traditional biblical figures.[2821]
On 10 December 2022, Roman Shukhevich's son Yuriy Shukhevich, who had headed the right-wing radical party UNA-UNSO[2822] in 1990-1994, was buried in Lvov with military honours.
On 21 December 2022, to commemorate the 80th anniversary of the UPA, the Ternopol Regional Council decided to erect a monument to Roman Shukhevych, who had been involved in the massacre of Poles and Jews in western Ukraine.[2823]
On 14 February 2023, President Zelenskiy issued a decree naming the 10th Separate Mountain Assault Brigade of the AFU "Edelweiss": the same name was given to the 1st Mountain Infantry Division of Nazi Germany.[2824]
On 29 and 30 March 2023, nation-wide events were held to commemorate the 150th anniversary of Nikolay Mikhnovskiy, ideologist of Ukrainian nationalism and author of the slogan "Ukraine for the Ukrainians" and called for killing the Poles, Russians and Jews, whom he had considered enemies of the Ukrainian people.[2825]
On 8 May 2023, on the eve of the Day of the Victory over Nazism (which is no longer celebrated in Ukraine), the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory held an exhibition for the cadets of the Kharkov National Internal Affairs University temporarily located in Vinnitsa under the title "UPA: Response of the Unconquered People", dedicated to the organization, many members of which had served in armed units of the Third Reich.[2826]
On 14 June 2023, a series of history lectures dedicated to Yevgeniy Konovalets, leader of the OUN, was organized at the Maidan Museum in Kiev.[2827]
On 22 September 2023, Vladimir Zelenskiy, during his visit to Ottawa, joined Canadian MPs and the country's leadership in a standing ovation to Yaroslav Gunko (Hunka), a veteran of the SS Division "Galicia", who was invited to a meeting of the House of Commons. Following a public outrage, when Jewish organizations and representatives of Russia, Poland and Germany condemned the incident, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau made an official apology, and Canadian Parliament Speaker Anthony Rota resigned.[2828] Kiev did not apologize for the incident, though. Moreover, in February 2024, the Ternopol Regional Council awarded Yaroslav Gunko the insignia of honour "For Merits to the Land of Ternopol" named after Yaroslav Stetsko.
Just to remind, Yaroslav Gunko was put on the international wanted list by Russia, and a request for the extradition of the former SS officer involved in the murder of at least 500 Soviet civilians was sent to the Canadian authorities. However, Ottawa refused to extradite him, violating the principle of the inevitability of punishment. Gunko was included in the Interpol database at Russia's insistence.
On 1 October 2023, Vladimir Zelenskiy signed a decree to give one of the AFU battalions the name of Yevgeniy Konovalets, the OUN leader who had actively collaborated with the German Nazis.[2829]
On 24 January 2024, the Verkhovtsevo (Dnepropetrovsk Oblast) city council decided that the streets named after world-known Russian scientists Ivan Pavlov and Kliment Timiryazev be renamed after Nazi collaborationists Stepan Bandera and Roman Shukhevich.[2830]
On 6 March 2024 it became known that a street in Nikopol had been renamed after Petr Dyachenko, a war criminal, former chief of staff of the Polish Sich under the command of Ataman Taras Bulba-Borovets and organizer of the Ukrainian Self-Defence Legion in Chelm Land (31st SD Battalion in German documents, which was later incorporated into the SS Division "Galicia"). The city mayor, Alexander Sayuk, claimed he had been 'unaware' of the inconvenient facts in the track record of the Nazi collaborationist and gave the following comments: "There was a renaming process, and a commission was working on it; first there was a public discussion on street names, and only afterwards they were changed. As for the fact that the street was renamed in honour of someone who had been awarded the Iron Cross by Hitler, I don't know, I don't have that information; you have to ask the commission, they were in charge of that. I'm a city head, I'm not an expert in history. There is nothing I can say or comment as regards those historical references".[2831]
In late March 2024, Ukraine's largest bookstore chain Kniharnya E and some other bookshops began selling two-volume memoirs by Croatian fascist and ally of Hitler Ante Pavelić. Head of the Ukrainian Jewish Committee Eduard Dolinskiy pointed to this fact saying that Pavelić had led the Croatian puppet government, which had collaborated with the Nazi Germany in 1941-1945 and perpetrated mass killings of Jews, Serbs and Roma. However, the book summary contains no references to Pavelić's Nazi past; nor does the book itself mention the fact. Eduard Dolinskiy believes that the bookstore chain is in fact "involved in whitewashing of Nazi crimes and Holocaust denial"[2832].
Well aware of the support of the official authorities and their own impunity, right-wing radicals in Ukraine are actively using violence and bullying techniques against political opponents, civil society activists, human rights defenders, journalists, as well as exerting pressure on the authorities in order to push for decisions that benefit them.
On 4 May 2020, in Kharkov, radicals from the National Corps, National Vigilantes, and Democratic Axe groups organized a rally against the appointment of Evegeny Gritskov, deputy head of the Kharkov regional administration, head of the coordination council on national and patriotic education. The pretext was a photo taken in 2015 showing Evgeny Gritskov together with Mikhail Dobkin, former governor of the Kharkov Oblast, with the red banner. On 6 May, Evgeny Gritskov resigned as the head of the coordination council.
On 23 May 2020, radicals from the National Corps stormed the office of the party "Opposition Platform – For Life", which seeks to resist the glorification of Nazism and xenophobia. The nationalists tried to set fire to the office, threw flares and smoke bombs into the windows, and doused the building with paint. With the connivance of the police, who had blocked the office's guards, the radicals attacked the organization's employees.[2833]
In mid-June 2020, in Kiev, Dnepropetrovsk, Lvov, Kharkov and Chernovtsy, mass protests were organized by nationalists against the consideration by the Verkhovnaya Rada of a draft law on introducing changes to the laws on the use of national minority languages in the education process. The document provided for postponing the restrictions and extending the transition period for the use of the Russian language as a language of instruction. During the protests, the radicals behaved aggressively and desecrated Russian sate symbols; a number of clashes with the police were reported. The nationalists were supported by local parliamentarians from certain regions. In particular, the Lvov regional council, which had already demonstrated its nationalist position on numerous occasions, in its petition to president Vladimir Zelenskiy stated that everyone who would vote in favour of the document prepared by Maxim Buzhanskiy, a Verkhovnaya Rada member from the Sluga Naroda party, would be listed among "collaborationists" and "traitors to Ukraine".[2834]
On 4 February 2021, members of Ukrainian far-right groups attempted to break into the building of NASH TV channel in Kiev, demanding that it be shut down because of what they saw as supporting pro-Russian views. In clashes with the right-wing radicals, the police used tear gas and detained a few people.
On 22 February 2021, the far-right organization "Tradition and Order" attacked left-wing activists in Odessa who participated in protests against the rise in utility rates. The attackers used tear gas and threatened the protesters with sharp weapons.[2835]
On 28 February 2021, members of the National Corps attacked businessman and politician Viktor Vikarchuk, who was running for the 2020 local elections for the Khmelnitskiy city and regional council on behalf of the Opposition Platform – For Life party, and poured Viride nitens over him.[2836]
In April 2021, nationalists from Freikorps demanded that Natalia Semeykina, a lecturer at the Kharkov State Academy of Culture, be fired for her critical comments about the authorities and the assessment of the conflict in Donbass on social media, accusing her of disseminating "Russian propaganda". The Academy's administration supported the position of the radicals. Vice-Rector Yuriy Loshkov said that Semeykina had discredited the title of a lecturer with her words, and "if that was really her point of view, and those were her beliefs, then she certainly had no place as a lecturer and a Ukrainian teacher". Semeykina was later entered in the database of the extremist website Myrotvorets.[2837]
On 7 May 2021, in Kharkov, far right activists destroyed the Victory Day campaign banners of the party "Opposition Platform – For Life", which read "Fascism shall not pass".[2838]
On 9 May 2021, during Victory Day celebrations in Kiev, nationalists started a fight with members of the Anti-fascist Committee of Ukraine, tearing red ribbons from their hands and trampling flowers.
On 7 July 2021, in Kiev, right-wing radical activist Aleksey Svinarenko and members of his National Resistance group attacked people who had come to a rally under Belarusian flags. They used tear gas. In his Telegram channel, Aleksey Svinarenko, apparently no longer fearing the reaction of Ukrainian law enforcement agencies, openly stated that he had "attacked Belarusian anti-fascists".
On 23 July 2021, right-wing radicals in Kharkov tore a T-shirt off a member of Shariy's Party and beat him up. This information was disseminated in far-right publications.[2839]
On 30 October 2021, right-wing radicals attacked the camera crew of the NASH TV Channel in Sumy. They beat a cameraman and a reporter in front of the police, and destroyed their equipment.[2840]
In November 2021, a wave of riots swept through the bars and clubs of the Podol district in Kiev. On 6 November, far-right activists from the Foundation for the Future, the Ukrainian Flag, and the National Resistance attacked the famous Khviloviy bar in Podol, blocking the entrance to the inner yard of the bar. They chanted racist slogans, painted NS-WP (NS – National Socialism, WP – White Power) on the walls, threw firecrackers, smoke bombs, flour and eggs at the bar staff. On 10 November, extremists from Centuria left an inscription reading "YAKARTA VIENIE" on the walls of the bar, apparently referring to the mass killings of supporters of the Indonesian Communist Party in 1965-1966, when between half a million and a million people were killed. On 16 November, the club "SHOOM" was attacked and the inscription "Death to the leftists" was left on its doors. On 26 November, members of the right-wing Foundation for the Future, National Resistance and Centuria broke into the bar "Khvyljovy", smashing windows and furniture, spraying tear gas, beating customers and guards with truncheons and chanting "white power" and other racist and homophobic slogans.[2841]
On 27 November 2021, in Korosten (Zhitomir Oblast), radicals attacked the NASH TV channel crew, who were interviewing Mayor Moskalenko. The journalist was punched in the face while reporting.[2842]
On 11 December 2021, "patriotic activists" in Nikolayev tried to prevent the journalists of the NASH TV channel from filming a tour of a museum exhibition dedicated to the occupation and liberation of the city during the Great Patriotic War. Chasing the camera crew, one of the radicals said that if they were out on the front lines, he would have "shot their heads off".[2843]
On 18 December 2021, representatives of the National Corps disrupted a congress of the Opposition Platform – For Life Party in Poltava. A fight broke out between the right-wing radicals and the security guards at the entrance to the congress; tear gas was used.[2844]
On 1 February 2022 in Kiev, right-wing activists protested outside the NASH TV channel headquaters, burning flares, chanting "Russian, surrender!" and calling to "hang Nashists" (referring to the staff of the NASH TV channel).
In February 2022, radicals in Odessa threatened the owner of the restaurant "Oblaka", in which a concert of Russian rapper Basta (Vassily Vakulenko) was to take place. Right Sector member Demyan Ganul, one of the organizers and perpetrators of the assault of the House of Trade Unions in Odessa on 2 May 2014, wrote on his page in Facebook: "The concert is to take place at the restaurant "Oblaka" owned by Andrey Zarichanskiy. If Andrey has a brain and upholds a pro-Ukrainian position, he will cancel the occupier's concert. If not, his business will be in serious trouble – Oblaka is not Zarichanski's only establishment. Vakulenko will come and go, and you will have to live in this city!" Demyan Ganula then posted a photo of himself with a submachine gun on social media, as well as a video of people in military uniform with submachine guns. The concert was canceled.[2845]
There have also been cases of radicals organizing actions against legislative initiatives they did not like or court rulings with regard to their supporters. For instance, the leader of the far-right group C14, Yevgeniy Karas, and members of Dmitriy Korchinskiy's Brotherhood party attended the Pecherskiy District Court trial of one of the two young people who had poured Viride nitens on the monument to General Nikolay Vatutin in Mariinskiy Park (Kiev) on the night of 10 February. The prosecutor demanded that the defendant be kept custody during the investigation. But Judge Olesya Batrin ruled that he be released on bail to a Verkhovnaya Rada member Mikhail Bondar.[2846] According to human rights activists, the nationalists appeared in the courtroom to put pressure on the judge. There had already been a number of incidents before when radicals had behaved aggressively in courtrooms, demanding the release of their comrades.
Another similar incident occurred in mid-June 2020 in Kiev, outside the court building, where Sergey Sternenko, a member of a nationalist group, was tried for manslaughter committed in May 2018 in Odessa. Radicals attacked journalists from Strana.UA and Shariy.Net, as well as ZIK and NewsOne TV channels, who were covering the trial. The nationalists also stormed the courtroom, provoked a fight with the police, lit flares and set off firecrackers in an attempt to put pressure on the court. In all cases the police removed the journalists from the courtroom without giving explanation, which led to further attacks. After trying to interview the accused, journalist Aminov was threatened with a "visit from the Anti-Terrorist Forces, who would teach him to love Ukraine". None of the attackers were arrested. Moreover, according to Strana.ua, the police later apologized for beating the 'activists' and promised to punish those responsible.[2847]
On 20 July 2021, in Kiev, about 40 extremists from the Society of the Future, National Corps, National Resistance, Alternative, Tradition and Order, Right Youth and Unknown Patriot attempted to disrupt a hearing in the Court of Appeal on a complaint by Belarusian anti-fascist Alexei Bolenkov against the SBU decision to expel him from Ukraine. Right-wing radicals also attacked left-wing activists who had gathered to support Alexey Bolenkov outside the court building.[2848]
Since the beginning of the special military operation by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation to demilitarize and de-Nazify Ukraine on 24 February 2022, many representatives of Ukrainian far-right organizations have been involved in hostilities in the east of the country.[2849] Their crimes have taken on an entirely different scale, evolving from unlawful acts of violence to the killings of civilians in the territories occupied by the Kiev regime, as well as the torture, ill-treatment and murder of captured Russian servicemen.
Accustomed to total impunity, members of Nazi battalions continue to commit crimes against their fellow citizens. On 29 September 2023, militants of the Kraken Unit (comprising former officers of the Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine, part of the Azov battalion banned in Russia) used weapons to seize a fixed check-point in Kharkov because the police and military officers on duty at the point tried to inspect the members of the nationalist battalion.[2850]
Amid efforts to exonerate the Nazis and their accomplices, attempts are being made to denigrate the Red Army soldiers, even to the point of holding them responsible for the crimes committed by the Nazis. For example, there was an attempt to misrepresent the tragedy that occurred in March 1943 in the village of Koryukovka in the Chernigov region, where the Nazis almost completely annihilated the local population in a punitive action. On the 75th anniversary of the massacre, the Ukrainian media portrayed the events in such a way as to put the blame on the partisans, who had allegedly provoked the Nazis to commit atrocities.
In recent years, nationalists and right-wing radicals, with the tacit support of the Ukrainian authorities, got used to disrupting events commemorating the Victory Day in the Great Patriotic War and other significant dates, as well as anti-fascists' events. There has usually been no action taken against the threats targeting anti-fascist activists. The Ukrainian law enforcement authorities have failed to suppress the offences, let alone bringing those responsible to justice, instead allowing the radicals to escape and "isolating" the victims. The actions of the nationalists were usually qualified as hooliganism, regardless of the motives and nature of their behaviour. At the same time, law enforcers made cases on the facts of displaying Soviet symbols. Experts regarded such actions by the authorities as an attempt to intimidate activists, to create an atmosphere for them when they would be uncomfortable to speak about the fact that their relatives fought in the ranks of the Red Army.
In 2018 and 2019, on the Victory Day in Kiev, nationalists in clothes with Nazi symbols attacked Elena Berezhnaya, the director of the Institute for Legal Policy and Social Protection, who had organized the commemorations. Instead of suppressing the radicals' actions, the police arrested the victim.[2851]
In February 2020, the then Ukrainian foreign minister Vadim Pristayko declared that Ukraine would not celebrate the Victory Day on 9 May.[2852] During his visit to Poland in January 2020, Vladimir Zelenskiy blamed the Soviet Union for the outbreak of World War II.[2853]
Nevertheless, on 9 May 2020, the day of the 75th anniversary of the Victory over Nazi Germany, people in Ukraine took to the streets to honour the memory of the Red Army soldiers, including their fathers and grandfathers. Ukrainian nationalists organized a number of blasphemous actions. In Odessa, they interrupted a motor rally, instigated fights and hindered celebrations of the 75th anniversary of the Victory. The radicals also marched carrying the portraits of Nazi accomplices from the OUN-UPA and other similar organizations as well as insignia of the Nazi Waffen-SS "Galicia" Division.[2854] In Lvov, young neo-Nazis organized a rally on the Hill of Glory, during which they displayed Nazi symbols and played the recording in the style of Nazi occupiers' communications, while residents were laying flowers at the tombs of soldiers who had died in the war. The Ukrainian authorities were completely oblivious to all of such incidents.[2855] In Kharkov, activists from the Freikorps[2856], ATO Veterans Union, Right Sector and Veterans' League for the Defence of Ukraine hung banners from three bridges, each bearing the provocative slogan saying "Thank you, Granddad, for squashing the Muscovite nit" (original, "Дякую діду за те, що давив московську гниду").[2857]
In 2021, the memorial events to mark the Victory Day once again became the scene of fights and attacks carried out by radicals. Nationalists attacked a reporter from RT Ruptly news video agency after he had interviewed passers-by in a Ukrainian city about their attitudes towards the Victory Day. On Avenue of the Unknown Sailor in Odessa, a fight broke out right in front of a camera operator of Strana.ua Agency when nationalists tried to wrestle a portrait of Georgy K. Zhukov with the Saint George's ribbon attached to it from a woman who was holding it. The police did not try to arrest the attackers, but instead took the victim to the police station. Also in Odessa, police officers arrested a 63‑year‑old man who had come to Shevchenko Park wearing the Saint George's ribbon.[2858] On 10 May 2021, the press service of the police of Odessa Oblast reported the initiation of criminal proceedings against a resident of the city who wore a forage cap with Soviet symbols during the celebration of the Victory Day.
On 9 May 2022, in Kiev, the official events to mark the Victory Day were cancelled due to martial law. However, people were able to come to the Park of Glory privately to lay flowers at the tomb of the Unknown Soldier. There were far fewer people in the Park of Glory than in previous years. On 9 May, in Odessa and in Kiev-controlled Zaporozhye, a 24‑hour curfew, which lasted from 10 p.m. of 8 May until 5 a.m. of 10 May, was declared.
As noted above, on 8 May 2023, Vladimir Zelenskiy signed a decree according to which Ukraine celebrates Europe Day instead of the Day of Victory over Nazism in World War II on 9 May. These actions alter completely the meaning of the Day of Victory over Nazism and prevent from celebrating this great day in the country.
Despite all this, on 9 May 2024, Ukrainians brought flowers to the Eternal Flame in Kiev's Park of Glory and in other cities, as it was before.[2859] The police, in its turn, did not prevent the retirees wearing WWII-era Soviet uniforms to lay floral tributes. As many as two administrative protocols were drawn up in the capital for carrying Soviet symbols. In Ternopol, a 1947-year-born man wearing the Saint George's ribbon on his clothes was detained.[2860]
While honouring Nazi accomplices and discrediting retrospectively the Red Army soldiers, the Ukrainian authorities do their utmost to demolish monuments to the Soviet soldiers-liberators. In addition to the local authorities, right-wing radicals are also involved in the "war" against monuments to the Red Army soldiers and victims of the tragic events of World War II, including those related to the Holocaust. Until 2022, Ukrainian law enforcement officers recorded and documented such cases in a unified register of prejudicial inquiries, yet the participants of these blasphemous actions had not been prosecuted.
In February 2020, in Odessa, nationalists removed the memorial plaque with a bas-relief of Marshal Georgy K. Zhukov from the wall of the Odessa Ilya I. Mechnikov National University dormitory. In the post-war years, the headquarters of the Odessa Military District, led by Zhukov in 1946-1948, was located therein. This bas-relief of the great Soviet commander was the last one left in the city. It was the University administration that had authorized these actions.[2861]
The same month, in Odessa, vandals desecrated a memorial honouring the liberation of the city, located on April 10th Square[2862]; while in Kiev, two young men desecrated a monument to Nikolay F. Vatutin in Mariinskiy Park by dousing it with brilliant green solution.[2863] The monument to Nikolay F. Vatutin is installed above the general's grave. The media initially reported that the police opened a criminal case under Article 297.3 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (vandalizing a grave or other burial place or a corpse).[2864] However, later, when the police detained only one vandal, he was charged with an offense under Article 296.2 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (hooliganism committed by a group of persons).[2865]
In March 2020, unknown people damaged a monument to a Soviet soldier in the village of Nyrkov, Ternopol Oblast, by chipping off his head and part of his arm. The law enforcement authorities opened criminal proceedings under Article 297.2 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.
In May 2020, in Slavyansk, on the eve of the anniversary of the Victory, nationalists desecrated a monument in Shelkovichny Park by painting a figure of the Soviet soldier next to the Victory Banner in the colours of the OUN flag. A monument installed on the mass grave of the soldiers who died liberating Ukraine from Nazi invaders was also damaged.[2866]
On 19-20 May 2020, in Kharkov, the monument to Georgy K. Zhukov was repeatedly attacked, i.e. the unknown doused it with red paint for two nights in a row.[2867]
On 12 January 2021, in Kherson, some unknown persons desecrated the mass grave of soldiers-liberators of the times of the Great Patriotic War. The vandals smashed and fell to the ground 17 monuments in the memorial cemetery of this city.
On 13 January 2021, in the village of Yareski, Poltava Oblast, radicals desecrated a monument to Soviet soldiers who died in the Great Patriotic War and also damaged the foot of the monument.
On 23 March 2021 in Cherkasy, nationalists desecrated and damaged the memorial complex to internationalist soldiers on Shevchenko Boulevard.
On the night of 9 May 2021, in Novy Razdol and Sudovaya Vishnya (Lvov Oblast), vandals damaged monuments to the Red Army soldiers.
Before July 2021, in Lvov, the Monument of Military Glory of the Armed Forces of the USSR was demolished. The statues to a Soviet soldier and to the Motherland were the last to be dismantled. According to the media, all parts of the monument were sent to the Territory of Terror Museum. The authorities planned to create a square in memory of Ukrainian heroes on the site of the former monument.[2868] The Monument of Glory of the Soviet Armed Forces was installed in Lvov's Central Park of Culture and Recreation in 1970. It was an ensemble of a 30‑metre high stele, a massive wall with figures of Soviet army soldiers and two central sculptures symbolising a soldier and Motherland.
On 18 August 2021, the authorities of Drogobych (Lvov Oblast) initiated the dismantling of the Eternal Flame memorial installed on the mass grave of the Red Army soldiers who died liberating Western Ukraine from the Nazis.
On 30 September 2021, in Kolomyia (Ivano-Frankovsk Oblast), a monument was demolished from the mass grave of Red Army soldiers by local authorities. Several tombstones with the names of the buried were broken.
On 19 October 2021, in Vladimir, Volyn Oblast, on the central avenue of the Lodomirskoe Cemetery, nationalists desecrated and damaged a monument on the mass grave of Soviet soldiers. Earlier on the same avenue, vandals desecrated the monument on the mass grave of soldiers who died during the World War I.[2869]
On 22 October 2021, in Poltava, vandals smashed a memorial plaque in honour of Hero of the Soviet Union Filipp Kiva.
On 25-27 October 2021, by decision of the Executive Committee of Lvov Municipal Council, the central element of the Field of Mars memorial-burial ground – a large-scale replica of the Order of the Patriotic War – was dismantled under the pretext of "renovation, renewal and rethinking of the space around the Lychakov Military Cemetery".
On 2 November 2021, the monument to the soldiers killed in the Great Patriotic War was desecrated and the granite monument to the Cheka soldiers of the 227th NKVD regiment, who died while defending Kiev, was demolished in Dergachi (Kharkov Oblast).
On 5 November 2021, in Zubra (Lvov Oblast), extremists from the Society of the Future (S14) group damaged the memorial at the burial site of Soviet soldiers.
On the night of 15 March 2022, in Fontanka near Odessa, malefactors destroyed the monument to the Cheka soldiers who defended the city from Nazi invaders in 1941.
On 11 April 2022, in Mukachevo (Zakarpatye Oblast), the monument to the T‑34 Soviet tank was dismantled. On the same day, in Stryi (Lvov Oblast), the stele to the Soviet soldier was dismantled using special equipment.
On 14 April 2022, in Ternopol, the monument to the Soviet pilots built in the shape of the MIG‑17 plane that was located at the entrance to the National Renaissance Park on the "Eastern" massive, was dismantled.
On 16 April 2022, in Zdolbunov (Rovno Oblast), the monument to Hero of the Soviet Union, partisan Nikolay T. Prikhodko, was bulldozed.
On 17 April 2022, in Kharkov, militants from the Kraken armed formation demolished the monument to Soviet commander Georgy K. Zhukov.
On 19 April 2022, in Mukachevo (Zakarpatye Oblast), an obelisk of glory in honour of soldiers who died during the Great Patriotic War was dismantled in compliance following the decision of the Executive Committee on Dismantlement of Historical and Monumental Art Monuments. According to the local authorities, those buried in the graves will be reburied.
On the same day, a monument to the Soviet Soldier was demolished in Kremenets (Ternopol Oblast).
On 21 April 2022, in Chernigov, Ukrainian vandals destroyed a monument to Hero of the Soviet Union Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya. On the same day, the Eternal Flame memorial was dismantled in the park in Drogobych (Lvov Oblast).
On 29 April 2022, in Rovno, a monument erected on the grave of a division commander Mikhail M. Bogomolov, a hero of the Civil War, was demolished. In addition, the plaques with the names of the Heroes of the Great Patriotic War were destroyed in the city.
In May 2022, in Dnepr (Dnepropetrovsk), a campaign was launched to destroy sites linked to the Soviet past. Among the first to be dismantled was the Zhukov Square stele on Victory Boulevard. A total of 13 monuments fell under demolition.
In the same month, in Zaporozhye, a monument to Soviet pilots – a pedestal-mounted La‑5 fighter plane, which took part in air battles of the Great Patriotic War, was demolished on Shevchenko Boulevard.
On 4 May 2022, in Rovno, the monument to the legendary Soviet intelligence officer, Hero of the Soviet Union Nikolay I. Kuznetsov, who personally eliminated 11 generals and high-ranking officials of the Nazi occupation administration during the war, was demolished.
On 5 May 2022, the authorities of Zhitomir removed the T‑34 tank from the pedestal of the monument erected in honour of the Red Army soldiers on Victory Square.[2870]
On 8 May 2022, in Dolgoye village (Zakarpatye Oblast), a monument to 14‑year‑old Soviet pioneer-hero, partisan scout Valya Kotik was demolished. On the same day in Uzhgorod, local authorities decided to demolish the monument to the Soldier-Liberator.
On 9 May 2022, the news came that the local authorities decided to demolish the Red Army in Combat sculpture in Chernovtsy. The Chernovtsy Municipal Council responded to such a brutalization of the memory by saying that there was no room for Soviet rubbish in our beautiful city. Meanwhile, in Rovno, the burial stone was removed from the tomb of the Red Army Division Commander Mikhail M. Bogomolov. Both demolitions were covered by the Ukrainian TV channels. Later on, the monument to legendary Soviet Secret Service Officer, Hero of the Soviet Union Nikolay I. Kuznetsov was dismantled in the city.[2871]
On 13 May 2022, in Chervonograd (Lvov Oblast), a monument to the Soviet soldier was dismantled from the Eternal Flame memorial complex.
On 18 May 2022, in Pustomyty (Lvov Oblast) a monument to the Red Army soldiers who liberated the city from the Nazis was demolished.
On 19 May 2022, the Verkhovina Rural Council, Lvov Oblast, decided to demolish monuments to the Red Army soldiers in the villages of Verkhovina, Iltsy, Verkhny Yasenov and Krasnik.
On 20 May 2022, the Lvov Oblast administration initiated the demolition of all monuments to the Red Army soldiers, who liberated the Oblast from the Nazi invaders, on its territory.
On 30 May 2022, in Brovary, Kiev Oblast, the dismantling of three Soviet memorial sites in Victory Park began. A monument to Soviet MiG‑15 fighter jet, which was also produced in Ukraine, is among them.
At the same time, in Svalyava (Zakarpatye Oblast), a star from the monument to the Soviet soldiers was dismantled. In Zaleshchiki (Ternopol Oblast), the monument to the Soviet tank soldiers was destroyed. In Zbarazhski district, Ternopol Oblast, the monument to the partisans who fought under the lead of legendary Sidor Kovpak was demolished. In the village of Iltsy, Verkhovina district, Ivano-Frankovsk Oblast, the monument to the Soviet soldier was destroyed. In Borislav (Lvov Oblast), the local authorities decided to dismantle the monument to the Soviet soldier. In Rakhov (Zakarpatye Oblast), vandals doused the monument in honour of the Red Army soldiers with red paint. After a few days, the monument was demolished. In Rovno, the monument to the Budyonny cavalrymen was destroyed. In Yasinya (Zakarpatye Oblast), the monument dedicated to the Soviet soldier was also destroyed. In Kapustyany (Khmelnitskiy Oblast), the bust of Nikolay F. Vatutin was dismantled.
The Russian Federation keeps a close watch on these processes. In May 2022, the new historical section entitled "In the Grip of the Criminal Oblivion" was launched on the website of the Defence Ministry to commemorate those fallen while defending our Fatherland based on the historical documents from the Central Military Archive and documentation of the Defence Ministry of Russia.[2872] It contains the information on the Red Army battles in the Western cities of Ukraine as well as on the Red Army soldiers who did or died in those battles. The section also includes evidence on the recent followers of Bandera and Nazi occupants barbarously destroying, with support from government, the historical memory of our people.[2873]
On 2 June 2022, in Odessa, a monument, erected in front of School No. 56 on Tenistaya Street, representing 52‑K Soviet anti-aircraft gun that was used to defend the city from the Nazis during World War II was demolished. In addition, in early June, in Mazurovo, Krivoozersk urban community, Nikolayev Oblast, the monument to Vasiliy I. Chapayev was demolished and the Soviet order replica was dismantled. In Naroditskaya urban community, Zhitomir Oblast, Soviet symbols were stripped from the plaque with the names of the Red Army soldiers. In Karlovka, Poltava Oblast, the mosaic with sickle and hammer was dismantled. In Rovno, the bust of Gulya Koroleva, Soviet actress and sanitary instructor during the Great Patriotic War, was dismantled. In Korsun, Cherkasy Oblast, memorial plaques with the names of the Heroes of the Soviet Union were dismantled.
On 3 June 2022, in Krivoy Rog (Dnepropetrovsk Oblast), vandals taped up the memorial plaque to Nikolay F. Vatutin with an information leaflet in honour of Roman Shukhevich. Also, the street sign (Nikolay Vatutin Street) was taped up with a leaflet saying "Roman Shukhevich Street".
On the same day, in Rovno, the monument to the Red Army soldiers was dismantled.
In June 2022, in Buzhsk (Lvov Oblast), the monument to the Soviet soldier was demolished. In Chernovtsy, vandals doused the monument to those who liberated Bukovina from Nazi invaders with red paint, calling this action an "art installation". In Glukhov (Sumy Oblast), Soviet symbols were dismantled from the memorial to the Red Army soldiers. In June, the monuments to the Red Army soldiers who died liberating Ukraine from the Nazis were also demolished in Rava-Russkaya (Lvov Oblast), Berezhany (Ternopol Oblast), Torgovitsa (Zakarpatye Oblast), Zhdeneevo urban community of Zakarpattia Oblast, Shumsk (Ternopol Oblast), Borislav (Lvov Oblast), Urezh (Lvov Oblast), Gukalevtsy (Ternopol Oblast), Rozhnyatov (Ivano-Frankovsk Oblast). In Kiev, memorial plaques to Nikolay Gastello, Sidor Kovpak, Feodora Pushina, Pavel Ribalko and Ivan Sergienko were dismantled.
In Lvov, near the Medical University, the plaque was dismantled from the monument to military medics who worked during the Great Patriotic War.
In Kamenets-Podolskiy, Khmelnitskiy Oblast, a Soviet T‑34 tank was dismantled from its pedestal.
In Uzhgorod, the second memorial plaque to Ivan Ankudinov, the Great Patriotic War veteran and the Hero of the Soviet Union, was dismantled.
In Kropovnitskiy (former Kirovograd), the memorial plaque to Semyon Budyonny was removed.
In Privolna urban community, Volyn Oblast, a monument to the Cheka Members was dismantled.
In Podobna, Cherkassy Oblast, the bust of Nikolay A. Shchors was demolished.
In Rovno, the pedestal of the monument to the participant of World War I and the Russian Civil War Oleko Dundich was dismantled. Earlier, vandals had damaged the monument by ripping off the sculpture's head. Then the remains of Oleko Dundich were reburied – they were transferred from the city centre to the local cemetery.
On 10 August 2022, the Executive Committee of Chernovtsy Municipal Council decided to dismantle some of the Soviet monuments in the city centre, including the mass grave of Red Army generals and officers, the monument entitled "Warrior with a Machine Gun" and Guards Lieutenant Nikitin's T‑34 tank, and relocate them to Odessa Street.[2874]
On 19 August 2022, in Lvov, the local Municipal Council decided to dig out and transfer the remains of the Soviet soldiers, who had died during the Great Patriotic War and had been buried at the Field of Mars military memorial.
On 19 October 2022, in Nikolayev, after a failed attempt to demolish it, they blew up the monument to the police officers of the Nikolayev Oblast who had died in the Great Patriotic War while on duty.
On 3 November 2022, in Nikolayev, the unknown detonated the Motherland obelisk, which was located in Mourning Mother Square as part of the mass grave memorial.
On 9 November 2022, in Uzhgorod, the Ukraine for the Liberators monument, a state cultural heritage site, was barbarically destroyed. The monument in the form of a bronze statue of a soldier with a rifle and a banner was erected in 1970 on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the Victory in the Great Patriotic War.[2875]
On 26 November 2022, it was announced that in Khmelnitskiy, at the intersection of Svobody and Proskurovskaya streets, the Soviet monument to the T‑34 tank had been dismantled. The tank was erected in 1967 in honour of the military units that liberated the city from the Nazi invaders. In a social media post, Mayor Simchishin wrote that the tank was in its own way "a unique historical exhibit that no longer existed", so it would be a museum piece that would remind of the "occupation past".[2876]
On 16 December 2022, in Dnepr (former Dnepropetrovsk), a monument to pioneer Volodya Dubinin, who was a member of a partisan detachment near Kerch during the Great Patriotic War, was demolished.
On 25 December 2022, the monuments to two Soviet generals of the Great Patriotic War –Vatutin and Alexey I. Zygin – were splashed with red paint in Poltava. Both died during the war on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR. In July 2023, the monument to General Nikolay F. Vatutin was demolished. On 27 July 2023, Irina Gerashchenko, member of the Verkhovnaya Rada from the European Solidarity Party, published photos on her Telegram channel showing that the monument to General Vatutin had already been stacked on the platform of a lorry together with the demolished monument to the poet Alexander Pushkin.[2877]
In January 2023, the monument to Hero of the Soviet Union Alexander M. Matrosov was dismantled in Dnepr and the Soviet T‑34 tank, erected in honour of General Yefim G. Pushkin, the defender of the city, was removed from its pedestal.[2878] Also removed were a sign commemorating students and teachers who died during the Great Patriotic War in the city of Uman, Cherkassy Oblast; a monument to Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya in the city of Novovolynsk, Volyn Oblast; a memorial plaque to Soviet soldier Vladimir D. Pachulya and Heroes of the Soviet Union Stepan V. Artamonov in Izium, Kharkov Oblast, Serafim I. Zemlyanov in the town of Kolomye, Ivano-Frankovsk Oblast, a memorial plaque to Marshal Georgy K. Zhukov in Izium, Kharkov Oblast, and a portrait sculpture of Hero of the Soviet Union Nikolay F. Gastello in Trapovka, Odessa Oblast. At the Hill of Glory memorial in Uzhgorod, the image of a Soviet soldier was dismantled and all the Soviet stars on the concrete graves were plastered over. In Mostiska, Lvov Oblast, it was decided to move the cemetery of Soviet soldiers from the centre of the town to the outskirts.[2879]
In February 2023, the bust of Hero of the Soviet Union General Nikolay F. Vatutin in the village of Getmanovka, Kharkov Oblast, the monuments to Heroes of the Soviet Union Valery P. Chkalov and Nikolay F. Vatutin in Kiev, and the Soviet star on the eternal flame in the centre of the town of Beregovo, Zakarpatye Oblast, were dismantled.
In March 2023, wall carvings and monuments to the Soviet soldier, were dismantled in the town of Turka, the settlements of Medenichi, Strelki, Sulyatichi, Popovka and Opory in Lvov Oblast, in the villages of Stanishovka, Kiev Oblast, Dolina, Ivano-Frankovsk Oblast, Turya Paseka, Turyi Remety and Turitsa in the Zakarpatye Oblast, a stained glass window depicting Soviet soldiers in Uzhgorod, and a bust of Hero of the Soviet Union Vasiliy Sidorov in Kostopol, Rovno Oblast.
In April 2023, monuments to Soviet soldiers and officers who died during the Great Patriotic War were dismantled or damaged in Velyatino village, Zakarpatye Oblast, Vladimir, Volyn Oblast, Voloshcha, Malnov, Beregovoye, Krasnoye, Lvov Oblast, Nadvornaya, Ivano-Frankovsk Oblast. In Podgaytsy, Ternopol Oblast, it was decided to exhume the bodies of Soviet soldiers in order to move the monument to Soviet soldiers, i.e. Hero of the Soviet Union, Major Yakov N. Toporkov and Captain Mikhail V. Zubkov.[2880] Later that month, the news came about two more monuments to Soviet soldiers being dismantled in Motisskiy district, Lvov Oblast, i.e. the monument to the Soviet Soldier which was part of the memorial complex in Malnov and a stature to a mourning woman on the cemetery of the Soviet soldiers in Mostiska.[2881]
In May 2023, monuments and memorial plaques commemorating the feat of arms of Soviet soldiers and people in the Great Patriotic War were demolished in Kharkov, Putivl, Sumy Oblast, the village of Velyky Khodachkov, Ternopol Oblast, and more than dozen of villages and towns in Zakarpatye Oblast, as well as two dozens of settlements in the Lvov Oblast. In the town of Svalyava, Yasinya and Dolgoe villages, Zakarpatye Oblast, it was decided to remove the memorial graves, exhume the remains of the Red Army soldiers and transfer them to the cemetery.[2882]
On 8 May 2023, the Eternal Flame, a symbol of the eternal memory of the soldiers who fell in the Great Patriotic War, was extinguished in Poltava.[2883]
On 14 June 2023, monuments to the heroes of the Great Patriotic War were reportedly demolished in the village of Shchirets, the villages of Bolotnya and Velykoe Kolodno in the Lvov Oblast. Two monuments were demolished in the villages of Selets and Tysmenichany in the Ivano-Frankovsk Oblast. In two other villages in the same region – Maidan and Pavlovka – references to the Great Patriotic War have been completely erased from monuments. One monument was destroyed in each of the settlements of Velikie Gai, Ternopol Oblast, and Velyatino, Zakarpatye Oblast. In addition, plans to demolish another monument with reburial of Soviet soldiers who were killed during the Great Patriotic War were announced in Rakhov, Zakarpatye Oblast.[2884]
On 21 June 2023, on the eve of the anniversary of Hitler's Germany's attack on the Soviet Union, the destruction of monuments to Red Army soldiers in the villages of Zhukov, Remezovtsy and Polyany in the Zolochevski district, Lvov Oblast, became known.[2885]
On 23 June 2023, a monument to Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya was demolished in Kiev. At the same time, Ukrainian social networks began to spread the message that it was time to demolish the monuments to the writers Pushkin and Bulgakov, to Nikolay A. Shchors, head of a Red Army division during the Civil War, as well as General Mikhail P. Kirponos, hero of the Soviet Union.[2886]
On another anniversary of beginning of the Great Patriotic War, monuments to Red Army soldiers were destroyed in western Ukraine in the villages of Varyazh, Staroe Selo, Stenyatin, Peretoki and Chishki, Lvov Oblast, and Ushomir, Zhitomir Oblast.[2887]
On 29 June 2023, two monuments to Red Army soldiers were destroyed in the villages of Kavskoe and Lisyatichi, Lvov Oblast. On this occasion, head of the regional military administration Maksim Kozitskiy announced his intention to "set the Lvov Oblast totally clear of the traces of Soviet propaganda".[2888]
In July 2023, around 30 monuments to Red Army fighters were demolished in the Lvov Oblast alone. On 15 July, Mayor of Lvov Andrei Sadovy announced that the monument to the Soviet liberators in Vinniki had been demolished.[2889] On 16 July, a monument to Red Army soldiers was demolished in the village of Podorozhnoe, Stryi district.[2890] On 17 July, monuments in the villages of Buyanov, Lipovtsy, Lopushanka, Pomoryany[2891], as well as Zavodskoye and Podgaichiki were destroyed.[2892] On 19 July, memorials to Red Army soldiers in the villages of Veliky Luben, Gliniany, Kutishche, Mikhailevichi and Palikorovy were destroyed.[2893] On 20 July, monuments to Red Army soldiers in the villages of Krinitsa, Solonskoe and Fusov were destroyed.[2894] On 21 July, reports appeared online of the demolition of monuments to Soviet soldiers in nine other towns in the region (Brody, Orechovchik, Podkamen, Ponikovitsa, Rudniki, Semiginov, Skelevka, Sukhovolya and Yazlovchik).[2895] On 25 July, two monuments to Red Army soldiers in the villages of Pogortsy and Suslov, Lvov Region, were removed. The monuments were destroyed and taken away piece by piece.[2896]
In the Lvov Oblast, there is an extremely dynamic demolition of monuments to Soviet soldiers who liberated Ukrainian soil from Nazism. In July 2023, Deputy Head of the Lvov Oblast Administration Andrey Godik informed that for six months of decommunisation, about 100 Soviet-time monuments had been dismantled.[2897]
In August 2023, the coat of arms of the USSR was removed from the shield of the "Motherland" Monument, erected in 1981 on the territory of the National Museum of the History of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 in Kiev. The Ukrainian trident was installed in its place.[2898]
Besides, only in the Lvov Oblast, we know of the demolition, in that very month, of monuments dedicated to the Red Army in the villages of Zaborye, Oglyadov, Pavlov, Rechki, Staroe Selo, in the town of Chervonograd and in the village of Mezhirechye[2899], as well as in the villages of Grushatichi and Mizhenets in Sambordky district, in the villages of Baluchin, Nizy, Domashev and Spas[2900], as well as in Dolinyany and Ugry; plus, the monument to the Motherland was dismantled in the village of Vorokhta, Ivano-Frankovsk Oblast.[2901]
On 29 August 2023, it was announced that the monument erected in Shevchenko Park in honour of the Heroes of the Soviet Union Major General Fyodor Bobrov and Colonel Lavrenty Voloshyn and other officers of the Red Army had been demolished by decision of the Chernovtsy city authorities. The graves were moved to another place. The decision to rebury the remains of Soviet soldiers and demolish the monument was taken in April 2023. According to Mayor Roman Klichuk, it was the last Soviet monument in the regional centre.[2902]
On 6 September 2023, it emerged that monuments to Soviet soldiers in the towns of Dobrosin, Veliky Luben, Magerov and in the village of Koropuzh, Lvov Oblast, had been demolished.[2903]
On 26 October 2023, the monument to Soviet general, Hero of the Soviet Union, Mikhail P. Kipronos, who was in command of the city's defence from Nazi invaders in 1941, was dismantled in Kiev.[2904]
Beginning of November 2023, in Svalyava, Zakarpatye Oblast, bodies of Soviet soldiers, partisans and underground fighters buried under the Monument to the Fallen Soldiers-Liberators Memorial Complex were exhumed as part of the destruction campaign.[2905]
On 9 and 14 November, monuments to Soviet soldier in the villages of Sredny Berezov and Tekucha, Ivano-Frankovsk Oblast, were demolished by representatives of the Zakarpatye Right Sector.[2906]
On 9 December 2023, the monument to Commander of the Ukrainian Red Guard rebel formations, head of the Civil War Red Army division, Nikolay A. Shchors was demolished in Kiev.[2907]
On 14 December 2023, a seven-meter high monument to Soviet soldiers who fought during the Great Patriotic War was dismantled in the village of Pererosl, Ivano-Frankovsk Oblast. There were also the names of people who died in the fight against UPA nationalists on it.[2908]
On 16 December 2023, information was made public about the destruction of the monument erected to commemorate the crew of the "Tarashchanets" Soviet armoured train in the Darnitskiy district of Kiev. This monument was located at the burial site of the crew who defended the Darnitskiy railway junction from the soldiers of the White Army during the Civil War. The first monument was erected as far back as 1939 but destroyed by Nazis in 1941‑1943 during the occupation of Kiev. The renewed monument was installed in 1974.[2909]
On 29 December 2023, it became known about the destruction of two monuments to Soviet soldiers in the villages of Zarechovo and Simerki, Perechin urban community, Uzhgorod district, Zakarpatye Oblast.[2910]
On 30 January 2024, head of the Lvov regional military administration Maxim Kozitskiy wrote on his own account on the Telegram social network that local authorities destroyed all monuments to soldiers who fought against Nazism in the region, and 312 such structures were demolished in 2023 alone.
On 19 February 2024, information appeared about the scheduled dismantling of the monument to the Soviet soldier in the village of Golgocha, Ternopol Oblast.[2911]
On 12 April 2024, in Kovel, Volyn Oblast, a monument to Soviet artillerists who liberated the Ukrainian SSR from Hitler's troops in the days of the Great Patriotic War was demolished.[2912]
On 26 April 2024, in Rovno, the Monument of Eternal Glory, which was erected on the 40th anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War, was demolished. The eight-meter high composition, located on the Hill of Glory, consisted of three bronze figures, i.e. a soldier, a partisan and a girl. According to city's acting mayor Viktor Shakirzyan, they will be sold for scrap metal, and the proceeds will be used to purchase drones for the Ukrainian Armed Forces.[2913]
On 7 May 2024, in Kanev, Cherkassy Oblast, the bust of one of the organizers and leaders of the "Molodaya Gvardiya" (Young Guard) underground anti-fascist Komsomol organization, Hero of the Soviet Union (posthumously) Oleg V. Koshevoy was dismantled.[2914]
On 9 May 2024, on the day of anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War, vandals in Ivano-Frankovsk spilled red paint over the monument in honour of the liberation of the city from Nazi occupiers[2915], and the bust of Hero of the Soviet Union Viktor A. Chaldaev was covered with drawings on the Alley of Fame in the Old Park of Ternopol.[2916]
On 10 May 2024, in Nikopol, Dnepropetrovsk Oblast, a monument to a city-born Hero of the Soviet Union (posthumously) Vladimir M. Usov, commander of the 3rd border outpost of the 86th August border detachment of the Belarusian border district, who died heroically on 22 June 1941 while defending the State Border of the USSR from Nazi invaders, was dismantled.[2917]
On 11 May 2024, it was reported that in the city of Kamenskoe, Dnepropetrovsk Oblast, the memorial plaque to Hero of the Soviet Union Josef K. Sachko was dismantled.[2918]
On 19 August 2024, in Kharkov, memorial plaques to marshals of the Soviet Union Ivan S. Konev and Rodion Y. Malinovskiy, the troops of which fought to liberate the Kharkov Oblast from Nazi invaders, were destroyed.[2919] Rodion Y. Malinovskiy commanded the troops that took part in the battles for Kharkov and the Kharkov region in 1942 and 1943. Troops under the command of Ivan S. Konev liberated Kharkov in August 1943.
Earlier, a memorial plaque to those who fought against fascism was demolished in the city, despite the fact that it was in Ukrainian. The authorities explained that this happened due to the Soviet Star being depicted on it.[2920]
At the same time, there are individual examples of residents of Ukrainian towns denying demolishing Soviet monuments. This mostly happens in rural areas. Monuments are usually erected on mass graves where the soldiers who fought for the specific village or town are buried. They often include local soldiers who were conscripted partisans (in 1943-1944). Their relatives still reside in the village. An example which is illustrative of that is what happened in Smykov on 12 December 2023, when some vehicles were brought to the village to demolish the monument to Red Army soldiers. The village head, whose father was buried there, did not permit it and protected the monument to Soviet soldiers by hiding it behind his back.[2921]
On 22 April 2023, residents of Lisichevo, Zakarpatye Oblast, refused to demolish the monument to Soviet soldiers who died in the days of the Great Patriotic War. They said that the "monument was to commemorate their fellow villagers and not some Soviet soldier", and therefore, the demolition of the monument would depreciate their heroic deeds during the war time and their lives per se.[2922]
There were also cases of monuments being already demolished according to the documents but continuing to be alive and well in reality. Examples are three monuments in Chervonograd district, Lvov Oblast.[2923]
On 1 December 2023, for instance, mass media reported that residents of Kinashev and Zagorye-Kukolnitskoe, Ivano-Frankovsk Oblast, refused to dismantle monuments to Soviet soldiers. The villagers convened a meeting to vote against the monument demolition. It was noted that the monuments had names of victims of the OUN and UPA but the inscription saying "They died by the hands of the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists" was effaced of the monument.[2924]
The Ukrainian radicals attacked not only memorials honouring the Red Army soldiers who fought the Nazis and Ukrainian nationalists, but also monuments dedicated to the representatives of Russian culture and great figures of the Russian Empire.
It should be noted that the fight against monuments in Ukraine began long before the 2014 coup, when the "struggle" entered its most acute and active phase, apart from the current one. As early as the 1990s, the country began extensively demolish monuments to Lenin. In the first decade after the collapse of the USSR, more than 2,000 such monuments were destroyed in Ukraine, mainly in its western part. Then, at the turn of the 1990s and 2000s, more than 600 Lenin monuments were dismantled in the western and central regions, and in 2005-2008, more than 600 monuments were removed, mainly in the central parts of the country. Another round of demolitions in 2013-2014 began with an attack by "activists" of the so-called Euromaidan on the Lenin monument in Bessarabskaya Square. In total, 552 monuments were destroyed.[2925]
The launch of the "decommunisation" process by the then President Petr Poroshenko on 15 May 2015 meant to get rid of all communist monuments except those dedicated to the Great Patriotic War, triggering a new series of demolitions. In less than two years, on 16 January 2017, the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory (UINM) announced that 1320 Lenin monuments had been removed.
Besides demolishing monuments, the "decommunisation" from the outset meant, above all, that settlements and streets would be renamed, and memorial signs and images associated with the Soviet past dismantled.
According to official records, in six years (from 2015 to 2021) 52,000 place names were changed, 987 villages, towns and cities renamed and more than 2,500 Soviet-era monuments taken down.
In particular, two regional capitals have been renamed. Dnepropetrovsk was changed to Dnipro, although opinion polls showed that 90 percent of the city's residents were against the renaming. Another "communist" regional centre, Kirovograd, has been renamed in honour of the playwright Marko Kropivnitskiy, who "became famous" for refusing to translate his works into Russian. In this case, the majority of the city's residents (70 percent) also opposed the renaming. Opposition party deputies tried to challenge this decision, but on 25 January 2021 the court refused to consider their claim.[2926]
More and more often, toponyms began to be renamed in honour of Nazi collaborators, Holocaust perpetrators and terrorists. For example, in November 2019, the Kiev City Council renamed two streets in honour of Nazi collaborators Ivan Pavlenko, commander of the SS auxiliary police 109th battalion, and Neil Hasevich, an OUN activist, organiser and participant in the mass murders of Jews, Ukrainians, Belarusians, including women and children, in the cities of Belaya Tserkov, Vinnitsa, Zhitomir, as well as in Belarus. Head of the Ukrainian Jewish Committee Eduard Dolinskiy expressed outrage at these blasphemous acts.[2927] Later in October, the Kiev City Council also decided to rename a street in honour of Amina Okuyeva, a sniper and spokeswoman for the Dzhokhar Dudayev Battalion, a paramilitary unit that fought on the side of Ukrainian armed forces in Donbass.[2928]
In February 2021 the Kiev City Council was reportedly preparing an appeal against a Kiev District Administrative Court ruling to cancel the city authorities' decision to rename Moskovskiy Avenue as Stepan Bandera Avenue, and General Vatutin Avenue as Roman Shukhevych Avenue.[2929] The Sixth Administrative Appeals Court ruled that renaming lawful in April 2021.[2930]
Thus, already back in 2021, a number of city streets were renamed in honour of Nazi collaborators through the efforts of Kiev city authorities. As noted above, General Vatutin Avenue was renamed to Roman Shukhevych Avenue, Moskovskiy Avenue to Stepan Bandera Avenue, Druzhby Narodov Boulevard to Nikolay Mikhnovskiy (one of the main ideologists of Ukrainian nationalism, author of the chauvinistic slogan "Ukraine for Ukrainians!") Boulevard, and Marshal Malinovskiy Street was renamed to honour the so-called "heroes" of the Azov battalion, a modern-day Ukrainian neo-Nazi paramilitary unit.
In May 2021 the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory drew up a list of 26 Kiev sites that remained to be decommunised. These included the USSR crest on the shield of Motherland monument, the equestrian monument to Nikolay Shchors on Shevchenko Boulevard, the sculptures of workers under the Friendship of Peoples Arch, and the bust of Vladimir Lenin at Teatralnaya metro station.[2931] As of late December 2023, the sculpture of workers was demolished, the USSR emblem on the shield of Motherland monument replaced by the Ukrainian "trident", and the monument to Nikolay Shchors demolished.
The Verkhovnaya Rada provoked a new wave of renaming in 2022 by starting to consider a draft law banning geographical names related to Russia, its history and prominent figures. On 29 December 2022, the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory and Ministry of Culture reported that 7,652 place names across the country had been changed over the past year as part of "derussification (decolonisation)".[2932]
In Kiev alone, the names of 237 streets, squares, avenues and boulevards were changed in 2022.[2933]
In January 2023, the Ukrainian authorities continued their "derussification", introducing a bill to the Verkhovnaya Rada to legalise the fight against "hundreds of Pushkin Street names" and "reduce the influence of Russian narratives". This was announced by Minister of Culture Alexander Tkachenko on 4 January. The bill is designed to allow the Ukrainian authorities to quickly rename streets with Russian names and demolish monuments to Russian figures.[2934]
This law passed by the Verkhovnaya Rada on 21 March 2023 under the title On Condemnation and Prohibition of Propaganda of Russian Imperial Policy in Ukraine and Decolonisation of Toponymics, entered into force on 27 July 2023.
Within six months from that date, by 27 January 2024, local governments and military administrations were required to rid public space of "symbols of the Russian world": remove monuments and memorial signs, rename streets etc. If they failed to do so, then powers would be transferred to regional military administrations until 27 July 2024.
On 3 August 2023, the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory published the first list of 183 places to be renamed in accordance with the adopted law.
In December 2023, the authorities of Nikopol, Dnepropetrovsk oblast, in an effort to get rid of the USSR legacy and any reminders of Russia, set a kind of "record". They renamed almost 50 streets and lanes, which is every eighth street of the city. The old names were replaced by toponyms associated with Ukrainian figures. In particular, the street named after Field Marshal Mikhail I. Kutuzov turned into Stepan Bandera (leader of the OUN, a terrorist organization banned in Russia) street, Hero of the Soviet Union Oleg V. Koshevoy street – O. Olzhych (another OUN figure) street, artist Victor M. Vasnetsov street – Panteleymon Kulish (Ukrainian ethnographer and poet) street, and Fyodor I. Tyutchev street – Cherkasskaya street.[2935]
The renaming is happening at a very fast pace. According to the interim results published by some Ukrainian regions at the end of January 2024, 2028 toponymic objects have been renamed in Poltava Oblast alone since 2022, and another 772 objects still have to be renamed.[2936]
In late July 2024, Oleg Keeper, head of the Odessa Regional Military Administration, signed an order to rename 84 toponyms in Odessa. In particular, Pushkinskaya Street should become Italian, Paustovskiy Street – 28th Brigade, Army Street – Nezavisimosti, Bunin – Nina Strokata (Ukrainian dissident movement activist). Isaac Babel Street to be renamed after D. Ivanov, Ilya Ilf and Eugene Petrov street after the Glodans, and Dumskaya square should become Birzhevaya square.[2937] Odessa Mayor Gennady Trukhanov spoke out against this initiative, emphasizing that neither he nor City Council has anything to do with it. He also said that the city authorities are forced to take all measures provided by law to cancel the renaming and preserve the historical and cultural heritage of Odessa. Mr. Keeper sharply responded to mayor's criticism in his social network account, saying: "If anyone really wants to walk along the streets with imperial/ Soviet names – there is Moscow or Ufa, but not the Ukrainian Odessa. This will not happen in Odessa". He called the city "a Ukrainian place" that was allegedly "created, built and developed by Ukrainians".[2938] It is noteworthy that back in 2022, Odessa Mayor Gennady Trukhanov himself came up with an initiative to rename all streets whose names refer to Russia in memory of Ukrainian nationalists killed in Donbass. Among those mentioned were Novomoskovskaya, Borodinskaya, Kurskaya, Voronezhskaya, Chapaev and other streets.[2939]
Activists note that the full-scale war waged by the Ukrainian authorities against public symbols, monuments and names associated with Russia, the October Revolution, Soviet history or leftist ideology, requires a lot of money. Thus, according to Mr. Goldarb, leader of the Union of Left Forces of Ukraine – For New Socialism party, one sign with a new street name for one house costs 1000 hryvnas (about 25 euros). If you multiply this by tens (and sometimes hundreds) of houses on one street, you'll get a fairly significant amount for this street alone. The respective cost increases taking into account the tens of thousands of streets as well as over 1000 cities and villages renamed throughout the country. In addition, there are many other components of expenses. They include the need to replace documents, seals and stamps, and entrance signs for all institutions and enterprises. New road signs, location and highway markings throughout Ukraine are needed. Moreover, many institutions throughout the country need to be provided with new maps and atlases. And the entire current campaign of renaming and demolishing monuments throughout the country, according to the most conservative estimates, has cost more than one billion euros.[2940]
There are examples when in certain locations, residents or authorities opposed the demolition of monuments and renaming of streets associated with Russia or the USSR. For example, in April 2022, the Kharkov administration refused to support a public appeal to demolish the bust of Alexander S. Pushkin and move it to a city museum. The Kharkov Department of Culture reported that this monument was entered on the State Register of Immovable Monuments of Ukraine as a monumental art piece of national significance. Herewith, Mr. Pavlenko, director of the department, emphasized that demolishing or simply moving the bust is beyond his competence.[2941] In February 2023, the authorities of Kamenskoye (Dnepropetrovsk Oblast) where Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee was born, announced that they were refusing to demolish the monument erected in his honour. The authorities, referring to a lack of funds for dismantling and the difficult situation in the country, said that demolishing the bust of Leonid I. Brezhnev would be considered after the situation normalized.[2942] Yet later – on 27 July2023 – the monument was demolished.[2943]
According to Mr. Cherny, deputy chairman of the agricultural cooperative (village of Letava, Khmelnytskiy Oblast), when the Maidan began in Kiev, unknown people came to the village. They demanded the monument to Vladimir I. Lenin which stood in the centre of the village be removed. Local residents brought a crane, carefully dismantled the monument and took it to the grain storage facility, and by 1 May, when everything had settled down, they returned it to its place.[2944]
Kiev attacked not only sculptures of political figures, but also religious symbols. On 25 May 2014, a monument to Vladimir the Great, the Baptist of Kievan Rus, was desecrated and damaged on the embankment near Pochtovaya square in Kiev. Perpetrators were not found. In March 2017, Kiev's oldest sculptural monument to this historical figure (erected in 1853) was also attacked. Unknown assailants poured red paint on the statue of Prince Vladimir.[2945]
A personal war on the great Russian poet Alexander Pushkin declared by the fighters against the "Russian past", was a 2022 trend, since Russian literature is allegedly a conductor of imperial ideas, and Pushkin's poem Poltava negatively portrayed hetman Ivan Mazepa, who betrayed Peter the Great making a bolt to the Swedes. By the end of 2022, around 30 monuments to the Russian poet have been dismantled across Ukraine in the previous 11 months alone.[2946] In some cases, the situation reached the point of absurdity. The local authorities of Pushkino (Zakarpatye Oblast) considered renaming the village after the monument to the great poet had been destructed.[2947]
On 3 February 2022, in Poltava, the monument to the Russian commander Alexander Suvorov was demolished. The the pretext for such actions was that the monument was "not a monument to history, art, culture, architecture, urban planning, science and technology" and had "elements of Soviet propaganda".
The monument originally stood in the courtyard of the Kiev Suvorov Military School (renamed to Ivan Bogun Military High School in 1992). In January 2019, the monument was dismantled following the initiative of the High Schools' directorate and with the support of the Deputy Prime Minister Vyacheslav Kirilenko, as well as the head of the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory Vladimir Vyatrovich. Later, the Alexander Suvorov monument was relocated as an exhibit to the Poltava Museum of Heavy Bomber Aviation, a division of the National Museum of Military History.
On 7 April 2022, a bust of Alexander Pushkin was dismantled in Mukachevo (Transcarpathian region); also a memorial plaque was removed from the school that bore his name. The decision was made by the local authorities.
On 9 April 2022, the Ternopol authorities decided to dismantle a monument to Alexander Pushkin. In justifying this decision, Mayor Nadal stated that "everything Russian should be dismantled, including the monument to the Russian writer".
On 10 April 2022, the monument to the Russian poet was dismantled by decision of the Uzhgorod authorities.
On 29 April 2022, the monument to writer Maxim Gorky in the Nikolay Leontovich Central Park was demolished in Vinnitsa.
On 30 April 2022 in Cherkassy, the authorities decided to burn off with a blowtorch the inscription on the monument to Bogdan Khmelnitskiy calling for a reunification of Ukraine with Russia, which had been there for years.
On the same day in Chernigov, the 119th Territorial Defence Brigade demolished a 121-year-old monument to Alexander Pushkin in one of the city's parks.
On 1 May 2022 in Sumy, it was reported that the monument to the Sumy hussars had been destroyed. The reason why radicals did so was that the hussars had represented the Imperial Russian Army.
On the same day in Odessa, the plaque "Glory to the Russian Arms" was removed from the 1904 monument. The plate was on a trophy cannon removed from a British warship during the Crimean War (1853-1856).
On 7 May 2022, in Korosten (Zhitomir Oblast), the so-called activists threw a Soviet monument to Komsomol members on the ground, which the local authorities had previously renamed as "the monument to Youth of Korosten in the 20th Century".
On 10 May 2022 in the city of Dnepr (former Dnepropetrovsk) on Sobornaya Square, a monument to Komsomol members, a guy and a girl who planted a tree, was dismantled. The inscription on the monument reads: "Legends will tell you what we were like".
On 11 May 2022, the authorities decided to disassemble the Three Sisters monument in Chernigov Region erected in August 1975 at the junction of the borders of the Chernigov, Gomel and Bryansk Regions in honour of the friendship between the peoples of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. By order of the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy of Ukraine from 30 June 2023, the monument was removed from state registration, which clears the way for its dismantling.
On 16 May 2022, a bust of Maxim Gorky was dismantled in the village of Leventsovka, Poltava region. It was relocated to the Soviet Period Park in Putivl. Furthermore, the work of the Maxim Gorky Museum in Manuylovka was suspended by the decision of the executive committee of the Kozelshchyna village council, Kremenchuk District.
In mid-May, in Kegychevka, Kharkov Region, it was reported that yet another monument to Maxim Gorky had been demolished. In Kharkov, a monument to the Russian Prince Alexander Nevskiy, erected near an Orthodox church named in honour of this revered Orthodox saint, was also destroyed.
On 19 May 2022, the authorities of Pereyaslavl, Kiev Region, decided to demolish the monument honouring the reunification with Russia.
On 21 May 2022 in Nikolayev, a monument to Alexander Pushkin installed in a square on the corner of Pushkinskaya and Naberezhnaya Streets, was removed from its pedestal.
In late May 2022, in Aleksandria, Kirovograd Region, the Maxim Gorky School and Dnepropetrovsk Highway were renamed. At the same time, dismantling the bust of Maxim Gorky was being considered. The monument to the famous writer was also demolished in Golozubentsy, Khmelnitskiy Region, while in Karlovka, Poltava Region, a bust to the Soviet state official Nikolay Podgorny, a native of Poltava region, was dismantled. In Dnepr (former Dnepropetrovsk), a monument and memorial plaques erected in honour of the famous Soviet doctor Nikolay Semashko were demolished.
In the same period of time, a number of memorial sites were attacked by vandals. In Kharkov, the bust of Yevdokim Shcherbinin, the head of Sloboda Ukraine Governorate, was doused with paint. On 29 May the monument honouring Alexander Suvorov in Izmail (Odessa Region) was also doused with red paint.
The surviving monuments to the world's communist figures in Ukraine have also been targeted in a so-called fight against Russian and Soviet heritage. Thus, in late May 2022 in Khotyn, Chernovtsy Region, a bust of Karl Marx, whose fundamental works are still part of the curriculum in many universities all around the world, was demolished.
On 2 May 2022 in Chernigov, the monument to Alexander Pushkin was destroyed by the territorial defence soldiers.
On 18 May 2022 in the village of Kegichevka in the south of the Kharkov Region, the major local attraction, a monument to Maxim Gorky, was demolished.[2948]
On 3 June 2022, a memorial plaque to Leo Tolstoy was dismantled in Kiev.
In June 2022, the Khmelnitskiy Regional Council decided to demolish the monument to the famous writer Nikolay Ostrovskiy in Shepetovka.
On 29 June 2022, in Boiarka, Kiev Region, the monument to Nikolay Ostrovskiy was dismantled.
On 13 August 2022, an excavator smashed and demolished a monument to Maxim Gorky in Alexandria, Kirovograd Region.
On 15 August 2022, a memorial plaque to Kiev-born Russian writer Mikhail Bulgakov was removed from the facade of the Taras Shevchenko National University of Kiev.
On 11 October 2022, the oldest monument to Alexander Pushkin, erected in front of the National Transport University in 1899, was dismantled in Kiev.
On 30 October 2022, insulting inscriptions were left on the monument to the Russian Empress Catherine II in Odessa, calling on Mayor Trukhanov to demolish the monument. On 2 November 2022, offenders put a red bag over the monument, wrapped a rope with a noose around its hand, and then doused the pedestal with red paint.
On 7 November 2022 unknown persons hung noose from the monument to Commander Alexander Suvorov in Odessa. On 8 November 2022, it was marked with the inscription "наступний" (nastupniy, translated from Ukrainian as "next").
The monument to the writer Nikolay Gogol in Kharkov was barricaded with sandbags on 10 November 2022. Previously a bust of Alexander Pushkin was dismantled on the city's Poetry Square. Before dismantling, the bust was also barricaded with sandbags, and then torn down.[2949]
On 10 November 2022, in Odessa, unknown persons graffitied the monument to Alexander Pushkin, installed on the street named after him. The word "геть" (get', translated from Ukrainian as "out") was written on all sides of the monument.[2950]
On 11 November 2022, a monument to Alexander Pushkin installed at the end of the 19th century, was demolished in the centre of Zhitomir. The head of the city administration, Sergey Sukhomlin, said that in the future the monument might be placed in a museum or offered to Russia in exchange for Ukrainian prisoners of war.[2951]
On the same day, it became known that the busts of writer Maxim Gorky, scientist Dmitriy Mendeleev, poet Alexander Pushkin, and scientist Mikhail Lomonosov at the Universitet metro station in Kiev had been covered with boards (in total, there were busts of eight prominent figures of science and culture in the station's central hall opened in 1960). Nearby is Taras Shevchenko National University of Kiev.[2952]
On 13 November 2022, a bust of the writer was dismantled in Odessa on the territory of the Maxim Gorky sanatorium. The decision was made by the sanatorium administration.[2953]
On 17 November 2022, the monument to Alexander Pushkin was dismantled in Chernovtsy, which was announced by the City Council on its page in social networks in quite an ironic tone: "Do you know that there used to be two monuments to "Pushkin, the great Russian poet" in Chernovtsy? Used to, as we have already dismantled one. Dismantling the second is a matter of time".[2954]
On 18 November 2022, the monument to Alexander Pushkin was desecrated again in Odessa. A yellow bag was put on the head of the bronze statue and wrapped with duct tape, the figure itself was all covered in paint; the vandals also wrote the word "occupant" at the monument's pedestal.[2955]
On 21 November 2022, the bust of Alexander Pushkin was torn down in Kremenchug. The Kremenchug Newspaper reported that the monument would be placed in a museum.[2956]
On 25 November 2022 in Poltava, inscriptions in white and black paint appeared on the monument to Alexander Pushkin, which is located in Berezovy Square. Alexander Mamay, Head of the Poltava City Council, stated that the inscriptions on the monument would be washed away after the Council session.[2957]
On 29 November 2022, a memorial plaque in honour of Alexander Pushkin was torn down in Nikolayev, as was reported by the head of the Department of Culture and Cultural Heritage Protection of Nikolayev City Council, Yuriy Lyubarov, in his profile on the social network.[2958]
On 30 November 2022, the Odessa City Council decided to dismantle the monuments to Russian Empress Catherine II and Russian commander Alexander Suvorov.[2959]
It is worth noting that Italian activists called to save the monument to Russian Empress Catherine II from dismantlement. The author of the petition at change.org website is the journalist and publicist Marco Baratto, who believes that the monument should be preserved. The journalist called Catherine II one of the most important women of the Enlightenment and suggested that instead of demolishing the monument, it should be taken to Milan or Naples, where the Enlightenment culture is extremely popular.[2960]
On 30 November 2022, a monument to Alexander Pushkin was demolished in Ananyev, Odessa Region.[2961]
On 1 December 2022 in Izmail, Odessa Region, a monument to Alexander Suvorov made in the early 20th century in honour of the 120th anniversary of the conquest of the Izmail fortress by Russian troops under the command of the great commander, was dismantled and moved from the central avenue to the museum.
On the same day, a monument to Soviet writer Nikolay Ostrovskiy was demolished in Shepetovka, Khmelnitskiy Region.
On 6 December 2022, along with the decision of the Supreme Court of Ukraine not to recognize the symbols of the SS Division "Galicia" as Nazi, the Dnepr mayor Borys Filatov (infamous for his phrase "we'll hang them later") announced the demolition of the monuments to Alexander Pushkin, Mikhail Lomonosov and Maxim Gorky.[2962]
On 10 December 2022, monuments to Pushkin and Suvorov were dismantled in Tulchin, Vinnytsia Region. The monuments are planned to be scrapped and the proceeds transferred to the AFU.
In December 2022, there were other cases of "fighting" against monuments to Pushkin all over the country. On 23 December, the last monument to the poet was demolished in Chernovtsy. The first monument was destroyed back in November 2022.[2963] On 27 December in the same city, a bust of Alexander Pushkin was removed from the facade of the Chernovtsy Academic Regional Ukrainian Music and Drama Theatre.[2964] On 30 December, a monument to Alexander Pushkin, located in the city park, was demolished in Kramatorsk; only the pedestal was left of it.[2965] On 31 December in Kiev, vandals sprayed paint on Ukraine's largest monument to the poet, located in the Pushkin Park in Shulyavka district. The sculptures were painted with "Demolish", "Monument to Cultural Expansion" and "Executioner" inscriptions.[2966]
On 29 December 2022, the monument to Alexander Suvorov and the monument to the Founders of Odessa dedicated to Catherine II and her associates were demolished in Odessa.
On 3 January 2023, busts to Alexander Suvorov in Podvornoye, Chernovtsy Region, and Grushka, Khmelnytskiy Region, were demolished.
On 4 January 2023, a monument to Nikolay Ostrovskiy was dismantled in Kharkov. Shortly before the demolition, vandals wrote the word "кат" (kat, translated from Ukrainian as "executioner") on the monument's pedestal.[2967]
On the night of 5 January 2023, in Nikolayev, the monument to Alexander Suvorov was destroyed. It was erected in 2010 to the 280th anniversary of the birth of the outstanding commander near the building of the Department of Military Training of the Nikolayev National University named after Vasyl Sukhomlinskiy. The monument was decorated with a gilded cannon and cannonballs.[2968]
On 5 January 2023, the monument to Alexander Suvorov was dismantled in Nikolayev.[2969] Another five monuments to the Russian commander were demolished in Odessa Oblast in January 2023.
On 6 January 2023, in Dnepr (former Dnepropetrovsk), a monument to Russian scientist Mikhail Lomonosov, located on Dmitriy Yavornitskiy Avenue, was demolished.[2970]
On 11 January 2023, the monument to Alexander Suvorov in Davydov Brod, Kherson Oblast, was dismantled.
On 13 January 2023, the monument to Alexander Suvorov in Suvorovo, Odessa Region, was demolished. The village itself was also renamed "according to the results of an electronic survey of residents".
On 16 January 2023, the bust of Alexander Pushkin near school No. 76 in Zaporozhye was demolished.[2971]
On 20 January 2023, the monument to Alexander Suvorov in Trapovka, Odessa Region, was torn down.
On 24 January 2023, the monument to Alexander Suvorov in Oksamitnoye, Odessa Oblast, was demolished.
On 25 January 2023, the monument to Alexander Suvorov in Lyubopol, Odessa Oblast, was dismantled.
On 8 February 2023, a monument to pilot Valery Chkalov was demolished in Kiev.[2972]
On 14 February 2023, in Petrovka, Belgorod-Dnistrovskiy district, the last monument to Alexander Suvorov in Odessa Oblast was dismantled.[2973] Three more monuments to this great military figure were demolished in February 2023 in Vinnitsa Oblast, one each in Chernovtsy, Khmelnitskiy, Kirovograd and Dnepropetrovsk Oblast.
On 17 February 2023, the monument to Alexander Pushkin in the village of Belenchenkovka, Poltava Oblast, was demolished.[2974]
On 24 February 2023, a memorial plaque to scientist Mikhail Lomonosov was dismantled from the wall of the Kiev-Mogila Academy in Kiev.[2975]
On 1 March 2023, in Veseliy Podol, Poltava Oblast, a monument to Ivan Michurin, the outstanding Russian biologist and practitioner of selection, was demolished.[2976]
In March 2023, a monument to the famous cosmonaut Yuriy Gagarin was dismantled in Kiev.[2977]
On 17 March 2023, a monument to Maxim Gorky was demolished in the village of Serednyaki, Poltava Oblast, on the initiative of the local branch of the UINM.[2978]
On 27 March 2023, in Odessa, the memorial plaque to Alexander Suvorov was destroyed in Odessa.[2979]
On 29 March 2023 in Kalush, Ivano-Frankovsk Oblast, a bust of the Russian scientist who discovered the periodic law of chemical elements, Dmitriy Mendeleev, was demolished.[2980]
In May 2023, the monument to Alexander Pushkin in Olgopol, Vinnitsa Oblast, was demolished.
On 8 May 2023, a monument to the city's founder, Prince Grigory Potemkin, was demolished in Nikolayev.[2981]
On 16 May 2023, two busts of Maxim Gorky were dismantled in Poltava Oblast.
On 25 May 2023, a monument to the fighters for Soviet power was demolished in Svyatilovka, Poltava Oblast. The demolition was initiated by the Poltava branch of the UINM.[2982]
On 6 June 2023, a monument to Alexander Pushkin in Zheltye Vody, Dnepropetrovsk Oblast, was demolished.[2983]
On 8 June 2023, a monument to Alexander Pushkin in Glukhov, Sumy Oblast, was destroyed.[2984]
On 17 June 2023 in Vinogradov, Zakarpatye Oblast, a bust of the outstanding Soviet educator and writer Anton Makarenko, the author of the "Pedagogical Poem", who dealt with the problems of education in a team, was demolished. He carried out the first experience in pedagogical practice of mass re-education of delinquent children.[2985]
On 19 June, 2023, a bust of the first Soviet cosmonaut Yuriy Gagarin was demolished in Kiev. The granite bust was installed in the courtyard of the Centre for Technical Creativity and Vocational Guidance of School Youth of Darnitsa district in the late 1960s after Gagarin's arrival in Kiev in April 1966.[2986]
On 26 June 2023, a monument to Maxim Gorky was dismantled in Verkhnyaya Manuylovka, Poltava Oblast. The Gorky Museum previously operating in the village was reprofiled. This was the last monument to the writer in the region. Previously, monuments to Gorky in Reshetilovka, Leventsovka, Kryachkovka, Zagrebelie and Serednyaki were dismantled.[2987]
On 5 July, 2023, the image of the world-famous Russian composer Petr Tchaikovskiy was dismantled from the facade of the music school in Uzhgorod.[2988]
On 27 July 2023, the monument to Alexander Pushkin was dismantled in Poltava.[2989]
On 17 August 2023, the last monument to Alexander Pushkin in Poltava Oblast was demolished in the city of Lubny.[2990]
On 20 August, 2023, a bust of Russian and Soviet biologist Ivan Michurin was destroyed in Mikhnovtsy village, Lubenskiy district, Poltava Oblast.[2991]
On 11 September 2023, in Cherkasy, a monument erected in Soborny Park on the 60th anniversary of the Great October Revolution in honour of the workers of state security and law who had fallen on duty was demolished.[2992]
On 11 September 2023, the Poltava City Council announced its plans to destroy the monument erected to commemorate the deeds of the city residents under the leadership of the commandant of the Poltava fortress, Colonel Alexey Kelin, during the Battle of Poltava in 1709. This monument has been a visiting card of the city for many years now.[2993]
On 14 September 2023, the memorial plaque to Alexander Pushkin was dismantled in Kiev on Grushevskiy Street.
On 15 November 2023, the largest monument to the Russian poet in Ukraine was dismantled in Kiev near Ivan Bagryaniy Park (former Pushkin Park). The monument was erected in 1962 and had the status of a monument of monumental art of national importance.[2994]
On 12 January 2024, the bas-relief to Alexander Pushkin, the last image of the poet in the city, was dismantled from the Pushkinskaya metro station in Kharkov.[2995]
On 3 April 2024 in Krivoy Rog, Dnepropetrovsk Oblast, the monument to Maxim Gorky, installed next to school No. 71, was torn down.[2996]
In early May 2024, a monument in honour of the Pereiaslav Agreement, located under the Arch of Freedom of the Ukrainian People (formerly Peoples' Friendship Arch), was destroyed in Kiev. The Peoples' Friendship Arch itself was excluded from the register of immovable monuments by the Ukrainian Ministry of Culture and Information Policy as having lost the status of a historical monument.[2997]
On 17 May 2024, a monument to Maxim Gorky was demolished in Pokrovsk on the temporarily occupied by the Zelenskiy regime territory of the DNR.[2998]
In the light of the special military operation carried out by the Russian Federation to denazify, demilitarize Ukraine and protect civilians in Donbas, there is an increasing tendency in the Western media and NGOs to whitewash the Ukrainian neo-Nazis, who are commonly presented as fighters for freedom and independence of a "democratic" country, fighting the "aggression of a dictatorial regime".
American IT companies are providing significant assistance to Kiev. It is well-known that administration and moderators of YouTube do not object to dissemination of information by extremist organizations, first of all by the Right Sector and by the Azov nationalistic formations (recognized as extremist and banned in Russia). In fact, YouTube became one of the key platforms disseminating fake news about the special military operation in Ukraine, thus attempting to discredit Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.
Censorship is actively applied by Meta (recognized as extremist and banned in Russia), which owns Facebook and Twitter. These resources also actively disseminated calls to "kill Russians", manuals on how to kill and make explosives, as well as other similar content since late February – early March 2022. The moderators ignored user complaints about the dissemination of this explicitly hate ideology. At the same time, Russian media content, as well as posts by public figures and common people with pro-Russian position sharing objective opinion on the events in Ukraine, were banned.
Meta attempted to rectify the situation after the publication of the company's internal correspondence revealed the practice of applying double standards to Russian citizens. However, the company's statement only reaffirmed its racist approach to publishing. In particular, it stated that users would be allowed to call for the "death of the Russian occupiers".
After Twitter changed ownership, general public began to learn that the former management actively used censorship to manipulate public opinion. The new owner Elon Musk has taken a number of steps to increase the popularity of the platform and restore credibility to the network. Among other things, Twitter's internal documents, which are regularly published, confirm that the social network not only banned people's accounts, but also long practiced shadow banning. Shadow banning makes the posts of undesirable users invisible to other users, even through a search query. The users themselves were not informed of the ban. Instead, they saw that their accounts were never blocked, but their postings received minimum views.
Nevertheless, many international Internet resources help to hide materials testifying to the crimes of the Kiev regime from public attention. In December 2022, it became known that Wikipedia removed the English version of the article about the Angel Alley memorial erected in Donetsk in memory of children killed by Ukrainian Armed Forces' shelling. The article is still available in Russian, Ukrainian and seven other languages. However, the media noticed "false information" there.[2999] Moreover, the Ukrainian version of this article shifts the emphasis to these children being killed "during the invasion and occupation of Donetsk and Donetsk Oblast by Russia," leaving out any mention of shelling by the AFU. There are also similar "inaccuracies" in other language versions as well.
There are also many other records of efforts taken to whitewash Ukrainian neo-Nazis. For instance, in February 2023, Meta management removed the Ukrainian nationalist formation Azov from its list of dangerous organizations, thus giving this extremist structure the ability to openly run social media, including promoting violence and its criminal methods of warfare. Azov militants have never concealed their actions and intentions. On the contrary, they publicly emphasized their adherence to the ideas of Nazism and hatred on national and ethnic grounds. In this context, Meta's actions only serve as yet another confirmation of the fact that the "collective West" (with Meta strictly obeying to Western, or rather American policies, despite the global nature of the company's activities), is using misanthropic ideas in an attempt to secure its dominance, thus contradicting its own previously proclaimed democratic values.
It should also be noted that the Ukrainian authorities have previously been seen attempting to edit publications on the Internet in order to conceal the true picture of what is happening in Ukraine, as well as in the Russian Crimea and later incorporated into the Russian Federation Kherson Oblast, Zaporozhye Oblast, DPR and LPR. Thus, in April 2020, the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry announced the launch of a campaign to correct Wikipedia articles, in particular, regarding "Russian aggression", as well as articles about Crimea, Donbas, integration with the European Union and NATO. Although the stated goal of the Ukrainian diplomats was to fill the online encyclopaedia with supposedly unbiased information about the country, in reality it turned into a blatant attempt to edit a free information resource with the help of state agencies and distort facts to suit the current political objectives of Kiev and its Western curators, justifying such actions by referring to the "people's opinion".[3000]
At the same time, even in the Western media there are publications that directly refer to the Nazi nature of right-wing radical organizations in Ukraine,[3001] which are artificially portrayed as "independence fighters". Such publications draw particular attention to the fact that before the start of the special military operation by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, many Western media have been pointing to the Nazi component of radical Ukrainian formations and their glorification of Nazi collaborators, Stepan Bandera and Roman Shukhevich. After February 2022, however, such a view is being carefully removed from the Western public space. At the same time, it is rightly noted in the above-mentioned articles that the Russian leadership's explanation of the reasons for the special military operation largely coincides with what was previously published in objective articles by Western journalists, who acknowledged the presence of neo-Nazism in Ukraine.
Another vivid illustration of the collective West's efforts to whitewash the crimes of the Kiev authorities is the report by Amnesty International, which acknowledges the facts of war crimes committed by the AFU against civilians, in particular the use of civilians as "human shields". In effect, the international organization has confirmed the true nature of the Kiev regime, which uses terrorist tactics. In order to minimize the damage, Western countries launched a campaign to divert attention from this shameful fact, presenting an almost united front. In response to the accusations made by the Kiev authorities, the human rights activists had to apologize, then arranged a review of the study, but did not completely retract their words.
In addition, it should be noted that Ukrainian neo-Nazi groups are closely linked to right-wing radical and extremist groups in Europe and the United States (see the relevant sections of the report). There are close links between these groups. Nationalists from abroad regularly travelled to Ukraine, where they trained in Ukrainian nationalist formations and combat positions of the Ukrainian military in Donbass. There is the well-known case of former American serviceman Craig Lang, who had been involved in hostilities in Ukraine on the side of nationalist battalions since 2015 and, after returning to the United States, shot a married couple dead.[3002]
Information about other Americans and Europeans involved in the hostilities in Donbass also emerged in the public space. For example, news media company, Buzz Feed News, reported on more than 40 American citizens, and the September 2019 report published by The Soufan Centre, "White Supremacy Extremism: the transnational rise of the violent white supremacist movement", noted that 3,879 foreigners had been trained during the hostilities in Donbass at that time. The participation of foreign fighters from European countries and the United States in the ranks of the Azov nationalist battalion (recognized as a terrorist organization in the Russian Federation) is described in a detailed article about neo-Nazi activities of the Die Zeit newspaper.[3003]
The canonical Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC),[3004] the country's largest religious denomination with the largest number of believers, has come under attack from the Russophobic regime in Kiev. The Kiev authorities have been waging an aggressive struggle against it for many years with the aim of completely pushing it out of the religious field of the country. The Kiev regime, following the path of imposing neo-liberal values, has long been hesitating to directly outlaw the canonical institution that stands for traditional values. However, the Kiev regime has continued to take action against the UOC.
A large-scale information campaign has been launched against UOC clergy, aimed at discrediting its priests in the eyes of the laity and portraying them as "collaborators of the enemy". Slanderous rumours are spread about parish priests and archpriests, numerous fake news is posted on social networks alleging that church hierarchs assist the Russian Armed Forces. On a daily basis, the Ukrainian police and SBU are making allegations about the storage of weapons, ammunition and provisions for the "aggressor" in UOC churches. Based on such "arguments", Ukrainian politicians and officials are calling for the UOC to be banned and deprived of its property. Many cases have been recorded of violent seizure of churches belonging to the canonical Church and their subsequent "transfer" to the schismatic structure created by the Kiev regime. For example, the monograph prepared with the assistance of the Russian Association for the Defence of Religious Freedom "Chronicle of the "Black Decade". Religious Persecution in Ukraine 2014‑2023",[3005] with references to media publications, noted that, between 2019 and 2021, about 500 parishes of the UOC were illegally re-registered in favour of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, and 144 churches were seized by the schismatics. In April 2021, the former head of the State Committee for Nationalities and Religions of Ukraine, Yuriy Reshetnikov, said that the Ukrainian authorities ignored over one million appeals of UOC believers.
The Kiev regime has already taken certain legislative steps in this respect. Five draft laws directed against the UOC have been registered in the Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine in 2022. Draft law No. 7204 of 22 March 2022, proposed by Oksana Savchuk, member of the Svoboda nationalist party, provided, in particular, for a direct ban on the activities of church structures affiliated with the Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine and for nationalization of all their property. Those religious communities who wished to avoid restrictions were provided with 14 days to "change their jurisdiction". Draft law No. 7213 was put forward on 26 March 2022 by an inter-faction group of parliamentarians who support the schismatic OCU. It provided for the introduction of a "ban on the activities of religious organizations that form part of the structure (are part of) of a religious organization (association), whose governing centre (administration) is located outside Ukraine in a state that is recognized by law as having carried out military aggression against Ukraine and/or temporarily occupied part of the territory of Ukraine".
On 23 November 2022, the European Solidarity Party introduced draft law No. 8221 "On strengthening national security in the field of freedom of conscience and the activities of religious organizations". The text of the document contains a provision that any organization or community that positions itself as an Orthodox one must structure its activities in canonical and organizational matters "taking into account the Tomos" and be subordinate to the OCU. In other words, the draft law aims to secure for the schismatic structure the exclusive right to be called "Orthodox" and a de facto monopoly on Orthodox worship in the country.
On 5 December 2022, the Ukrainian parliament registered draft law No. 8262 "On improving the legal regulation of the activities of religious organizations", which is paired with draft law No. 8221 and also directed against the UOC. It was co-authored by 24 deputies from the pro-presidential party, Servant of the People, and European Solidarity Party. The document envisaged a significant simplification of the procedure for transferring not only communities, but also dioceses and monasteries of the UOC to the OCU, and for them to change their jurisdiction. The possibility of registering OCU communities at the address of the existing UOC communities, in their churches, monasteries or other premises, has been envisaged. In essence, it implied the legalization of the raids on canonical parishes by schismatics, which they had been seeking since 2019. In addition, the draft law provided the basis for future decisions by the authorities to terminate lease agreements with religious organizations "associated with Russia," followed by the eviction of all monastic and ordinary UOC communities from state and communal property.
On 19 January 2023, the Ukrainian government submitted to the Verkhovnaya Rada draft law No. 8371 "On amendments to Ukrainian law on the activities of religious organizations in Ukraine", which prohibits in the country "the activities of religious organizations, whose governing centre (administration) is located in a state that is carrying out armed aggression against Ukraine". The document envisages a significant simplification of the procedure for the legal prohibition of the UOC.[3006]
On 19 October 2023, deputies of the Verkhovnaya Rada adopted, in the first reading, draft law No. 8371 of 19 January 2023, providing for a total ban of the UOC. The document states that if the Ukrainian authorities conclude that the canonical church is affiliated with the Russian Orthodox Church, it can be closed and its property confiscated.
On 20 August 2024, the Verkhovnaya Rada passed a law banning the canonical UOC. The draft law was supported by 265 out of 450 MPs. The law will come into force 30 days after its publication. UOC communities have nine months to sever all ties with the Russian Orthodox Church. It allows Ukrainian courts to liquidate UOC parishes and transfer them to other religious organizations, mainly the schismatic OCU. This law contradicts the Ukrainian Constitution, Article 35 of which guarantees the right to freedom of world view and religion. According to media reports, the law was personally lobbied for by Vladimir Zelenskiy, who said its adoption would "strengthen the spiritual independence" of Ukrainians and "deprive Moscow of the last opportunities to restrict their freedom".[3007] Through this move, the Kiev regime has once again confirmed its dictatorial nature and its willingness to disregard the faith of millions of citizens in favour of its political ambitions.
It is also known that members of the Verkhovnaya Rada were blackmailed into supporting this scandalous initiative. In June 2024, after the failure of the first attempt to pass the said law (due to lack of votes), Piotr Poroshenko started a new collection of signatures for its consideration. And in July 2024, Irina Gerashchenko, Rada deputy and active member of Poroshenko's party, threatened to disclose the names of all those unwilling to support the draft law, declaring that they were "justifying Russian aggression".
Also illustrative is the support expressed for this law by the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organizations. For example, the ban was approved by the head of the schismatic OCU, the head of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, a Roman Catholic bishop and the chief rabbi of Kiev and Ukraine. In doing so, the organization disregarded its own charter, which states that all its decisions are to be taken only by consensus, by agreement of the leaders or authorized representatives of all the religious organizations that are its members. And the representatives of the canonical church, which is part of the council, were not even invited to the meeting which took the above-mentioned decision to support the ban of the UOC.[3008]
Apart from the formalities, in a number of cities and regions (Lvov, Chernovtsy, Konotop in the Sumy Oblast, the Kiev, Zhitomir, Rovno, Khmelnitskiy Oblasts, etc.) local authorities have already banned the activities of the UOC without waiting for the adoption of the law by the country's parliament.
The Ukrainian authorities began to show their intention to eliminate the UOC simultaneously with the start of the discussion of the relevant legislative initiative in the Verkhovnaya Rada in 2023. Basically, the Kiev regime was paving the way for the ban of the UOC in advance. On 1 February 2023, State Service of Ukraine for Ethnopolitics and Freedom of Conscience published the results of a religious expert examination of the charter of the UOC. As expected, the document stated that there was an ecclesiastical and canonical connection between the UOC and the Russian Orthodox Church. According to the conclusion of this body, the current activity or inactivity of the highest bodies of church power and administration of the UOC indicates that the UOC continues to be in a relationship of subordination to the ROC. The UOC called these findings "gross manipulation and an attempt to violate the right to freedom of religion,"[3009] and on 27 July 2023, representatives of the UOC filed a lawsuit to challenge the findings of the examination.
On 15 May 2023, the Kiev District Administrative Court ruled that the UOC had not severed its ties with the Russian Orthodox Church and formed part of it, which could constitute grounds for banning the UOC if such a decision was upheld by higher courts. On 26 June 2023, the State Service of Ukraine for Ethnopolitics and Freedom of Conscience posted on its website a list of explanations that the UOC had to provide to prove its separateness from the Russian Orthodox Church. However, experts note that any such explanations by the UOC will not make the Ukrainian government agencies ready to lift the restrictions imposed on the canonical church.[3010]
Another reason for persecution of the UOC was the issue of the use of the church calendar. In 2022-2023 in Ukraine, the issue of celebrating Orthodox holidays according to the New Julian or Gregorian calendar (New Style) was increasingly raised in the public space. Back in 2020-2021, the leader of the OCU, Metropolitan Epiphanius (Dumenko), advocated celebrating Christmas on 25 December together with Europe, rather than on 7 January, "with the Russian world". At that time, according to sociologists, the majority of Ukrainians did not support such a transition. So, in 2019, the Ukrainian sociological group Rating reported that only one in four (25 percent) Ukrainians support the idea of moving the celebration of Christmas from 7 January to 25 December, while 64 percent of citizens spoke out against.
Since 2022, the topic of the transition to the new style has become increasingly covered in the Ukrainian media space, under the pretext of fighting the Russian world and distancing from the Russian Orthodox Church, and has become another tool of information and ideological warfare. Representatives of the OCU called the old style, for example, an instrument of subjugation used by the Russian Orthodox Church, the style by which "Muscals" live, while describing the transition to the new style as "a blow to the Russian world".
The Ukrainian authorities began to actively promote the issue of the transition of churches to the new style, thus interfering in church affairs. In December 2022, a survey on when Ukrainians want to celebrate Christmas was carried out through the official application for public services, Diya.[3011]
On 28 June 2023, Vladimir Zelenskiy submitted to the Verkhovnaya Rada a draft law that abolished the celebration of Christmas on 7 January in the country, calling the Julian calendar "Russian ideology". It finally came into force on 28 July 2023 after being signed by Vladimir Zelenskiy, which legalized the "calendar reform". Metropolitan Kliment (Vecherya), chairman of the Synodal Information and Education Department of the UOC, said, in connection with this innovation, that the UOC would continue to celebrate Christmas on 7 January[3012] and that the decision to change the calendar had been taken due to political rather ecclesiastical reasons.[3013]
Public statements by Ukrainian politicians confirm Kiev's Russophobic course and its deliberate actions that put canonical Orthodoxy in a discriminatory position. Thus, Mikhail Podolyak, advisor to the head of the Ukrainian president's office, said, on 30 March 2023, that only the OCU should remain in Ukraine, and the UOC "will gradually leave for Russian cities". Aleksey Danilov, secretary of the National Security and Defence Council, made harsh statements against the UOC, calling the existence of the UOC in the country a "special operation of the Russian Federation", calling the actions of its priests irrelevant to the Lord God and welcoming the demolition of churches of this confession.[3014] On 15 July 2024, former President Piotr Poroshenko published on his Facebook account a congratulatory message on the 1036th anniversary of the Baptism of Rus', calling the canonical church "a dark force that is against the faith" and promising to "engage in battle" with it. He also said that "today, the issue of passing a law banning the Russian pseudo-church FSB's body, that masquerades as the UOC‑MP, is more pressing than ever".
A notable role in the offensive against the UOC is assigned to organized groups of national radicals who raid churches and property of the canonical church. All this is accompanied by physical violence against its clergy and parishioners, desecration of holy places and other illegal actions that go unpunished. With the connivance of the Ukrainian authorities, the UOC parishes become targets of numerous "independent" looters and rioters, who justify their raider attacks by citing the fight against "occupiers" and their "spiritual proxies". Video footage of these protests is being circulated on Ukraine's social networks with a call to follow these examples.
At the same time, with unofficial approval from the Ukrainian authorities, "regular participants" in the so-called campaigns against the "Moscow" Church, as the Ukrainian propaganda calls the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, are involved in state-sponsored persecution of UOC priests. As a rule, they are responsible for putting pressure on priests through various provocations. The attacks are carried out with the full connivance of the Ukrainian law enforcement agencies.
The following examples of Ukrainian radicals' engagement in the seizure of UOC churches can be given.
On 3 February 2022, the management of the public historical and architectural conservancy site "Khotyn Fortress" refused to renew the agreement with the UOC community on the use of the local church which Orthodox believers had restored from ruins on their own, and closed it. These actions resulted from the brutal pressure by Right Sector militants, demanding the church to be turned over to the OCU.
Numerous fakes about "saboteur priests" were circulated on social networks. As a result, the UOC Kiev Metropolis had to refute the disinformation that law enforcement officers had allegedly detained a priest in Kiev, along with a 38-year-old man suspected of espionage. Disinformation was also spread that a group of saboteurs had allegedly been discovered in the monastery of St. Mary Magdalene in Belaya Tserkov, two of whom were killed during arrest.
It was not until March 2022 that several cases of the kidnapping of priests of the canonical church came to light. On 9 March, Archimandrite Titus (Drachuk), father superior of the Dukonya Holy Trinity Monastery in the Ivano-Frankovsk diocese, and a novice monk disappeared. A few days later they were found in the Chernovtsy Oblast. It emerged that they were kidnapped, interrogated with violence, and then forbidden, under pain of death, not only to hold services in the Ivano-Frankovsk Oblast, but also live there. On 16 March, Archimandrite Laurus (Berezovskoy), father superior of the church in the village of Ivanovka in the Zhitomir Oblast, was attacked. As of summer 2023, his whereabouts were still unknown; it is highly likely that he had been killed. On the same day, a local priest, father Gennady Batenko, was kidnapped in the village of Tomashovka, Fastovskiy district, Kiev Oblast. On 22 March, priest Sergey Tarasov was killed by SBU officers.[3015] He had been previously charged with treason. On 28 March, in Smela, Cherkassy Oblast, during a divine service in the Church of the Intercession, hieromonk Vasiliy was kidnapped by armed men.
In March 2022, at least six cases of attacks on churches and clergy of the UOC were recorded in the Vinnitsa Oblast alone. On 6 March, in the village of Malye Krushlintsi, radicals broke into the church during a divine service, desecrated the altar, beat up the priest and dragged him outside. On 12 March, in the village of Lavrovka, Vinnytsa Oblast, OCU supporters tried to throw the priest and parishioners out during a divine service, threatening them with physical violence. The police who arrived at the site closed and sealed the church. However, a few days later it was reopened, but for OCU supporters. On 13 March, in the village of Sosnovka, the schismatics forced the chairman of the parish council to open the church, allegedly to check for weapons. Then the village headman forcibly took away the keys to the church and handed them over to OCU supporters. On the same day in Penkovka village radicals sawed off the locks and seized the local church. Church utensils and liturgical books belonging to the community were thrown out of the window into the street. On 19 March, in Mizyakovskie Khutora village, members of the so‑called territorial defence blocked the passage to the church, did not let the priest and parishioners in, threatening them with death. On 20 March, the same people seized the church in the neighbouring village of Pereorki. While in the village of Bolshiye Krushlintsy, local supporters tried to take away the keys to the church from the Orthodox priest, threatened to disrupt the church service and demanded to transfer it to the schismatic organization.
In the Ivano-Frankovsk Oblast, schismatics helped by territorial defence fighters, seized the St. Nicholas Church in Kalush, the Anna Conception Church in Verkhovina, and the Church of the Blessed Virgin Mary's Icon "Pantanassa" in the village of Tseniava. The Church of the Intercession on Markova Hill in the village of Golovy was closed, and the chapel in the village of Shkindovskiy Grun was sealed. Residents of the monastery of the St. Michael the Archangel in Babianka village were evicted.
On 3 April 2022, in Dolyna (Ivano-Frankovsk Oblast), the UOC church in honour of John the Baptist was closed after a search by law enforcement officers.
On 8 April 2022, the clergy and the faithful of the Ivano-Frankovsk diocese of the OCU published an appeal to the President of Ukraine, in connection with the pressure and threats to which the priests and parishioners were subjected by the authorities and supporters of the UOC. The faithful noted that, on 4 April 2022, Ruslan Martsinkiv, mayor of Ivano-Frankovsk, announced to the citizens that the religious community of the Cathedral of the Nativity of Christ had allegedly "voluntarily" changed the church affiliation, and called on the citizens to "help the community to transfer to another church jurisdiction". The parishioners perceived this call for "help" as coercive pressure on the religious community to change allegiance and threat to seize the church if this was not done.
On 10 April 2022, OCU members, together with armed men, seized the UOC Dormition Church in the village of Mykhalcha, Chernovtsy Oblast.
On 14 April 2022, a group of armed men led by "hierarch of the OCU", Alexander Drabinko, seized the church of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary in the village of Kruglik, Kiev Oblast. The attackers broke down the door and announced the "voluntary" transition of the UOC religious community to OCU jurisdiction.
On 28 April 2022, the Trinity Church of the UOC in the village of Perenyatin in the Rovno Oblast was seized. The building itself was sealed, and radicals threatened to kill the priest. On 10 May, the local authorities turned the church over to the OCU.
In early May 2022, Vsevolod Pekarskiy, head of the Dubna military administration, gave the keys from the earlier sealed UOC church to the supporters of the OCU in the village of Perenyatin. In the village of Palchy of the Volyn Oblast, "activists" sawed padlocks off the Intercession Church and handed them over to schismatics, and in the village of Ozero of the same Oblast, parishioners of the UOC were "converted" to the OCU while they were praying in the church.
On 21 May 2022, schismatics from the OCU, with the support of the police and territorial defence forces, seized the church of the Nativity of the Blessed Virgin Mary in Ivankov, Kiev Oblast, and the church in the village of Belashov, Rovno Oblast. The takeover was accompanied by clashes instigated by OCU supporters.
On 26 May 2022, the St. John the Evangelist church in Fursy village, Kiev Oblast, was reported to have been seized. OCU supporters physically assaulted father superior of the church, protoiereus Andrey Mukha, and UOC parishioners. The father superior said that, after the impending provocations had become known, the church community officially appealed, on behalf of the parish assembly, to the territorial community chairman, Ministry of the Interior and the SBU to prevent illegal actions, seizure of property and interference in the affairs of the church community. However, the authorities have failed to act.
On 30 May 2022, supporters of the OCU, led by men in priest's robes, attempted to seize the church of Faithful Saint Prince Aleksandr Nevskiy in the village of Tsarevka in Zhytomir Oblast. The clergy and parishioners managed to defend their church.
Besides using violence and intimidation, radicals, together with members of the OCU, often perpetrate acts of vandalism and organize provocations against churches and priests of the canonical church.
On 9 May 2022, in the village of Dorogostai, Rovno Oblast, unknown persons spilled animal blood on the yard, fence, crosses and the church of Spiridon of Trimiphun.
On 22 May 2022, Archpriest Vladimir Mandzyuk, rector of the Resurrection Church in the city of Stryi, Lvov Oblast, was sprayed with green dye into his face during the service.
On 23 May 2022, it became known that a crowd of aggressive supporters of the OCU, threatening parishioners and a UOC priest, had arbitrarily replaced the locks in the church of St. Archdeacon Stephen in the village of Cherniatin (Vinnitsa Oblast). The seizure began during a Sunday service performed by the canonical church. At first the schismatics interfered with the service; then they became aggressive, shouted slogans and threats. Then the supporters of the OCU held a "vote" in favour of passing the church to OCU and arbitrarily closed the church with their locks. None of the real parishioners of the temple took part in the vote.
On 29 May 2022, OCU supporters came for Sunday service in the UOC parishes in Lvov, Volyn, Rovno, Zhitomir and Kiev Oblasts to disrupt the prayers of Orthodox believers. During a service in the St. Vladimir church in Lvov, several "activists" disrupted the service, humiliated and insulted the worshipers. Supporters of the OCU also stormed the St. Michael's Church in Ozhyshche, Volyn Oblast, during the service and demanded that the church be given to them. They were very aggressive, attacking believers.
In May 2022 alone, the UOC church of Holy Equal-to-the-Apostles Prince Vladimir in Lvov was vandalized several times. On 1 May, radicals tried to disrupt a service, and on 8 May, unknown persons poured foam on the door of the church and painted offensive words on the walls. On 14 May, vandals tried to set the church on fire and desecrated its walls again with inscriptions. On 25 May, unknown persons again painted offensive words on the church. On 28 May, vandals again desecrated the church with offensive inscriptions and scratched crosses out.
In the late May 2022, Metropolitan Onufry of Kiev, the head of UOC, said that from February to May 2022 more than 40 UOC churches in Ukraine were seized. According to him, both Ukrainian officials and local governments participated in the seizure of church property. About 50 UOC communities were forced to pass under the control of the OCU.[3016]
On 14 June 2022 an unidentified group attacked the home of Father Petr Monastyrskiy, rector of the UOC Pokrovskiy Church in Novozhyvotov (Vinnytsa Oblast). Vandals showered stones on the priest's house, breaking the windows.
On the night of 19-20 June 2022, a fire broke out in the Lvov Church of Holy Equal-to-the-Apostles Prince Vladimir in the Lvov-Sykhov neighborhood, as a result of arson.
According to Ukrainian sources, since former Ukrainian President Poroshenko received the tomos on autocephaly from Patriarch Bartholomew of Constantinople up to the end of 2023, more than 1.500 communities have "passed" (i.e. forcibly) under the "jurisdiction" of the OCU.[3017]
Since November 2022, the SSU has tightened its anti-UOC action to the utmost. "Counterintelligence activities" began in UOC churches and monasteries, aimed at intimidating the worshipers. According to the media, the SSU searched 19 UOC facilities in the Transcarpathian, Chernovtsy, Rovno, Volyn, Nikolayev, Sumy, Lvov and Zhitomir Oblasts and the Kiev-controlled part of the Kherson Oblast. In total, more than 100 UOC organisations were searched. In particular, searches were conducted in the Church of the Intercession and the Cathedral of the Elevation of the Holy Cross in Uzhgorod, Holy Trinity Church in Lvov, Holy Basil Cathedral in the village of Ovruch, Zhytomir Oblast, and Holy Dormition Monastery in Rovno Oblast.[3018] Ukrainian security forces have repeatedly conducted searches on the territory of Kiev-Pechersk Lavra.
During such "activities," intelligence officers interrogated clergy and monks and also looked for supposedly "subversive pro-Russian literature," including Moscow Patriarch's Easter messages which are transmitted to all dioceses of the Moscow Patriarchate.
In early December, Vladimir Zelenskiy implemented the National Security and Defence Council's decision on restrictive measures and sanctions against the cannonical church, effectively imposing a total ban on it and provoking another wave of persecution against the YOC.
In mid-December 2022, service documents of the SSU office in the Kherson Oblast published in the media confirmed that Ukrainian security forces had been working to intimidate UOC priests for several years after the 2014 coup. They threatened the latter with criminal prosecution and tried to instill their understanding of "patriotism". In particular, it is known about similar "preventive measures" in the Holy Spirit Cathedral and St Catherine's Cathedral in Kherson in January and April 2016. Under the pretext of checking the vigilance of the church staff, an SSU officer visited churches and intimidated their clergy, threatening to apply articles of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, which provide for punishment for crimes against national security. He said that the intimidation of the clergy was aimed at "forming the sense of responsibility for one's actions". Along with this, he gave examples of the "heroism" of a number of Kherson residents who participated in punitive operations in Donbass in order to "instill a sense of patriotism" in the priests. To intimidate the UOC clergy, he told them about "the SSU successful fight against separatism and other anti-constitutional activities of certain groups and individuals in the Kherson Oblast". In addition, "for the purpose of reasonable learning" he left packages imitating explosive devices at the St Catherine's and the Holy Spirit Cathedrals.[3019]
The number of forceful seizures of UOC churches increased almost 20 times in 2022. A report by the UOC administrator, Metropolitan Anthony, noted that the number of raider seizures of UOC churches and illegal re‑registration of its parishes increased manifold in 2022. In particular, 129 such seizures of UOC churches were recorded, including 93 cases of preparation for forced change of subordination of UOC parishes, 74 decisions of local authorities to ban the activities of UOC religious organisations, 84 cases of re‑registration of parishes by regional administrations, 31 passing under OCU control of parishes with abbots and 13 cases without abbots, ten acts of vandalism.[3020]
At the same time, the mass creation of new parishes in the OCU has led to a serious staff shortage in this structure, and there is just a small number of parishioners visiting its churches.[3021]
In his interview on the Ukrainian "1+1" TV YouTube channel, published on 21 December 2022, head of the SSU Vayl Malyuk stated that the Service had opened 50 criminal cases against UOC priests. He especially emphasized the need to "clean out this entire enemy environment of "moles in robes".[3022] Fifty-five UOC priests, including 14 bishops, became defendants in these criminal cases.[3023]
According to the head of the legal service of the canonical UOC, there were about 300 raider seizures of UOC congregations in 2023. According to the State Service for Ethnopolitics and Freedom of Conscience of Ukraine, the SSU has been conducting criminal prosecutions against nearly a hundred priests of the UOC since February 2022, including 16 metropolitans. 19 hierarchs of the canonical church were stripped of Ukrainian citizenship. By mid‑2024, schismatics from the OCU have seized about 700 temples of the canonical church. The largest number of seizures took place in 2023. 386 churches: 164 in Kiev Oblast, 155 in Khmelnytskiy Oblast and 75 in Vinnytsa Oblast were seized. From December 2023 to April 2024, their number grew by 96 churches. Most UOC churches remain in the south-eastern regions of Ukraine. Less are left in in Lvov and Ivano-Frankovsk Oblasts. In total, more than 1,500 churches of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church have been forcibly passed under the OCU control since 2019.[3024]
In April 2024, the mass media quoted the head of the SSU, Vasyl Malyuk, who said that 23 priests of the UOC were arrested in Ukraine, 37 clergymen were suspected, and criminal proceedings were initiated against more than 80 priests of the canonical church. According to Malyuk, religious figures are mostly charged with such offences as incitement of inter-religious discord and treason.[3025]
Nineteen UOC bishops were deprived of Ukrainian citizenship, which is prohibited by the country's Constitution. Among them are Metropolitans of: Tulchin and Bratslav, Jonathan (Eletskykh); Chernovtsy and Bukovina, Meletiy (Yegorenko); Dnepropetrovsk and Pavlograd, Iriney (Seredniy); the abbot of the Holy Dormition Svyatogorsk Lavra, Metropolitan Arseniy (Yakovenko); Metropolitan of Khust and Vinogradov, Mark (Petrovtsev); Archbishops of Bucha, Panteleimon (Bashchuk), and of Artsyzsk, Viktor (Bykov), etc. On 11 April 2023, a petition appeared on the website of Zelenskiy's Office demanding that primate of the UOC Metropolitan Onuphry be deprived of Ukrainian citizenship.
Metropolitan of Vyshgorod, Pavel (Lebed), abbot of the Kiev-Pechersk Lavra; Metropolitan Joseph (Maslennikov); Metropolitan of Boryspol and Brovary, Antony (Pakanich), manager of affairs of the UOC; and Metropolitan of Chernovirtsy and Bukovina, Meletiy (Ygorenko), chairman of the Department for External Church Relations of the UOC are among many priests of the UOC who fell under the repressions of the Kiev regime.
On 21 January 2023, the Ukrainian National Security and Defence Council imposed sanctions against two dozen Russian religious figures.
Repression against priests and parishes of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church has intensified amid preparations for the adoption of the notorious law on the complete ban of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. According to media reports, the SSU arrested and searched journalists working in media outlets of churches or affiliated with churches – the Union of Orthodox Journalists, Pervy Kazatskiy, as well as human rights defenders and public activists, including representatives of the NGO Miryane and the Legal Defence Centre of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.
Four Orthodox journalists – Vladimir Bobechko, Valery Stupnitskiy, Andrey Ovcharenko and Archpriest Sergey Chertilin – were arrested. Several other Orthodox public figures have been charged with offences of varying degrees of gravity, including those carrying life imprisonment sentences. At the same time, the SSU press service cynically reported that a special operation had been carried out to "eradicate the largest agent network in Ukraine since the beginning of the full-scale invasion". Ukrainian security services accused those arrested of working for the "aggressor", maintaining relations with the Russian security services, treason and participation in a criminal group. However, according to the lawyers of the detained Orthodox activists, the real reason is that they were reporting the truth about the crimes of the Kiev regime and nationalists under its control against the followers of the canonical UOC. In particular, it was reported that representatives of the schismatic church of Ukraine arranged the seizure of the Church of the Nativity of the Virgin Mary of the canonical church in Volyn Oblast. Orthodox journalists also reported on the arrests and persecution of clergy. Among such facts is that the SSU detained the archpriest of the Khust diocese of the canonical church in the Transcarpathian Oblast, Father John, and his lawyer Nikolay Krail. After these and many other miserable stories depicting harassment of canonical Orthodox Christians were published, the Ukrainian security services arrested the journalists.[3026]
The documentary "Empty Churches of Ukraine: What is happening to the seized churches of the UOC' was another reason for the persecution of Orthodox journalists by the Kiev authorities. The film shows that the churches that the OCU took away from the UOC believers are standing empty: Ukrainians do not go to pray in the seized churches. It turns out that "seized churches are of no use to anyone – not even to those who seized them".[3027] This film only confirms the opinion expressed by experts about the lack of both personnel and parishioners in the OCU.[3028]
In early June 2024, the SSU sent letters to diocesan bishops of the UOC, demanding that the hierarchs of the canonical church provide data on all churches and property under the jurisdiction of diocesan administrations and the personal data of all persons responsible for their custody. They were also ordered to provide information on religious organisations run by the diocese.[3029]
On 4 June 2024, the SSU reported that it had blocked a channel for distributing "anti-Ukrainian literature" in church shops of the canonical UOC in four cities of the country – Uzhgorod, Zhytomir, Nikolayev and Kiev.[3030] Among the seized products were publications that allegedly promoted religious intolerance and justified the Russian special military operation.
Attempts to seize church property and monastery buildings were another area where the Ukrainian authorities took repressive measures against the canonical church. Zelenskiy's regime continues its efforts to establish control over the country's main sanctuary, a UNESCO World Heritage Site – the Kiev-Pechersk Lavra. In early 2023, the Ministry of Culture of Ukraine terminated the lease for a part of the buildings of the Kiev-Pechersk Lavra with the UOC. Then the clergy of the canonical church were not allowed into these premises for the Christmas service. Representatives of the OCU were ostentatiously brought in instead.
Since March 2023, the monks have been under regular pressure exercised by the Ukrainian security forces. In early July 2023 the Ministry of Culture demanded that the monks vacate five buildings of the Lower Lavra which is under the canonical UOC jurisdiction. In case of refusal, representatives of the ministry threatened to replace the locks and seal the buildings.
On 10 August 2023, a Kiev economic court satisfied the claim of the National Kiev-Pechersk Historical and Cultural Site "to remove obstacles to the use of property," thus legalizing the eviction of monks from their place of permanent residence.[3031]
On 11 August 2023, Ukrainian security forces cordoned the Lavra off, blocking the entrance for believers and pilgrims, and a Ministry of Culture commission sealed several buildings. Two days earlier, on 9 August, the Lavra's representatives were denied a counterclaim against the National Site to declare illegal the unilateral termination of the agreement on the use of the monastery.[3032]
On 12 September 2023, the Ministry of Culture of Ukraine announced that it had passed 13 objects out of about 40 buildings on the territory of the monastery under the control of the authorities.[3033]
On 20 May 2023, Ukraine's acting minister of culture Rostislav Karandeev threatened to use force to evict UOC monks from the territory of the Lower Lavra because, according to him, they live there illegally. The monks of the canonical church were given a one-month deadline to do so voluntarily.[3034]
On 15 August 2024 it became known that the directorate of the Kiev-Pechersk Historical and Cultural Site sealed the Church of the Life-bearing Spring in Lavra, closing the believers' access to the shrine. The general director of the Site, Maxim Ostapenko, explained the sealing of the temple by the fact that the temple is allegedly "state property". At the same time, he said that the Site had "unilaterally terminated" the contract with the UOC monastery.[3035]
The Kiev regime is also acting out rapaciously against another large UOC monastery – the Holy Dormition Pochaev Lavra.
In May 2023, the Ternopol region prosecutor's office opened a criminal case on mismanagement of the lands of the Holy Dormition Pochaev Lavra, and a Ministry of Culture commission was sent there. The pretext was that the monks allegedly used an area of over a 1,000 square meters without permission, and removed the top layer of agricultural land. The Ukrainian authorities did not hide their aggressive intentions. Head of the Ternopol regional council Mikhail Golovko stated in March 2023 that he would demand the agreement with the UOC on the land use by the monastery be terminated. Meanwhile, the 50‑year lease agreement was concluded in 2003. The reason for the termination could be a far-fetched accusation of violation of its contractual obligations by the canonical church. Actions taken by the Ukrainian authorities prove this desire. Along with the government, the schismatic OCU and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC) also aspire to get to the Pochaev Lavra.[3036]
On 19 August 2023, the Ternopol Oblast authorities banned a religious procession to the Pochaev Lavra to honour the Dormition of the Virgin Mary allegedly "for security reasons". The procession was blocked in three regions: Ternopol, Khmelnitskiy and Rovno. At the cathedral of Kamenets-Podolskiy (Khmelnitskiy Oblast), where believers gathered, parishioners and clergy were met by police. The security forces also tried to serve men of military age.[3037]
On 17 April 2024, the Ternopol city council decided to deprive the UOC of the land in the city. As a result, the Ternopol diocese of the UOC lost control over the site where the Cathedral of the canonical church is located. In the same month, the Ukrainian Ministry of Culture and Strategic Communications set up a commission to check the use of facilities in Pochaev Lavra.[3038] In November 2023, the SSU conducted searches at the monastery. On 5 June 2024, it became known that a commission of the Ministry of Culture and Strategic Communications of Ukraine started its work in Pochaev Lavra with the support of the SSU.[3039] According to experts, these actions indicate the beginning of the seizure of this monastery and its property.
The Kiev regime makes efforts to seize other monasteries of the UOC, trying to make these actions appear legal. On 5 July 2024, on the appeal of the National Architecture-Historical Reserve "Ancient Chernigov", the economic court of appeal in Kiev adopted a ruling according to which the management of the Chernigov diocese of the canonical UOC does not have the right to be on the territory of the Yeletskiy monastery, and obliged the clergy to leave it. In autumn 2023, a commission of the Ukrainian Ministry of Culture announced that it began to pass the objects of the Reserve "Ancient Chernigov", which included temples that were in the use of the canonical church, under the state's control.[3040] In March 2024, the acting director general of the Reserve, Vladimir Khomich, demanded that the UOC vacate the Trinity and Yeletskiy monasteries, as well as the Transfiguration Cathedral in Chernigov.[3041]
As part of the Kiev regime's actions to seize monasteries belonging to the UOC, efforts have been made to seize Orthodox shrines, including relics of saints and items of church decoration, which the current authorities of the country, who are voluntarily selling off their history, regard as artifacts whose value is determined not by history and tradition but by their auction value. In June 2023, the media reported that the Ukrainian authorities had agreed with UNESCO to transfer ancient icons and relics of saints from the Kiev-Pechersk Lavra to museums in Europe "for their preservation". It is known that the most ancient Byzantine icons were smuggled out of the country, allegedly with the mediation of the above-mentioned United Nations agency and the Swiss NGO International Alliance for the Protection of Cultural Heritage in Conflict Zones, and exhibited in the Louvre Museum in Paris. It was then reported that arrangements had been made for the transfer of relics of Orthodox saints from Lavra. The Ukrainian Ministry of Culture called them just "exhibits". It was assumed that the ancient Orthodox art objects stolen with the consent of the Kiev regime could be used as a means of payment for Western arms supplies.[3042] In this situation, a lot of questions are addressed not at Kiev – we all know what it is, it is bound to stand the history trial. However, what will Paris do when everything is over and it will have to give an account for its wrongful actions, including indulging in persecution of believers and clergymen?
In an attempt to somehow ward off the criticism of the international community, in November 2023, the director of the National Reserve "Kiev‑Pechersk Lavra", Maxim Ostapenko, told journalists: "The Ministry of Culture, together with specialists from various areas, will carry out an expert examination and check these shrines for authenticity. We want that there are no accusations against us that we are keeping the wrong shrines, or that shrines have been stolen". On 31 March 2024, a representative of the Ukrainian Ministry of Culture, Marianna Tomin supported this policy by announcing the ministry's plans to conduct an inventory of the relics of the Kiev‑Pechersk Monks located in the Lavra's caves, which she called "unburied remains of saints". There are plans to invite anthropologists, military chaplains and archaeologists, she said. The situation is aggravated by the fact that the clergy of the UOC are not allowed to participate in these actions, because according to the provisions of the Ukrainian legislation on military chaplains, adopted in December 2021, priests of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church are forbidden to be chaplains. Only priests of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church or schismatics from the OCU may be chaplains. Accordingly, it is they who are authorised to conduct this "examination of the unburied remains" of Orthodox saints. Representatives of both confessions have previously repeatedly stated that "wrong" remains – i.e. relics of "Russian saints" – rest in the Kiev‑Pechersk Lavra. Since several "wrong" saints have been excluded from the OCU menologium, experts believe that it is quite likely that the relics of saints who do not meet Ukrainian criteria of patriotism will be taken out of Lavra.[3043]
Such precedents have already taken place. On 5 October 2023, the Ministry of Culture and Strategic Communications of Ukraine confiscated relics of three saints from the Chernigov Holy Trinity Cathedral of the UOC: of the St Theodosius, St Philaret and St Lawrence of Chernigov. For now, there is no information whether the relics are still in the Holy Trinity Cathedral, nor is it known whether they were damaged by the Ukrainian ministry during the unexpected seizure of the cathedral and afterwards. The National Architecture-Historical Reserve "Ancient Chernigov" does not have any documents on the "inventory" of relics of St. Philaret and St. Lawrence.[3044]
An article published in October 2023 in the Romanian Patriarchate's publication "Basilica" with the title "Ukraine is ready to offer Romanians the relics of St Theodora in exchange for the remains of national heroes" also point to the fact that the Ukrainian authorities are considering the possibility of using the relics of Orthodox saints as a "bargaining chip".[3045] This article mentions unofficial agreements between the governments of Romania and Ukraine to search for the relics of Saint Theodora of Sihla, which, as Romanian researchers suggest, may be in the Kiev-Pechersk Lavra, in order to exchange them for the remains of hetmans Philip Orlik and Ivan Mazepa, buried on the territory of Romania.
The Kiev regime has unleashed criminal persecution of UOC priests, while cynically claiming that there is allegedly no religious persecution in the country, and all that the state requires from the canonical UOC is to cut ties with Russia. Amid efforts to seize the Kiev-Pechersk Lavra, its vicar, Metropolitan Pavel (Lebed) of Vyshgorod and Chernobyl, was charged with "denial of aggression by Russia". In mid-July 2023, he was placed in a detention centre and released on 7 August 2023, after posting bail (almost $1 million, which was raised with the involvement of more than a thousand people).[3046] The criminal case against the Metropolitan is still open. On 21 August 2024, the court once again extended the clergyman's measure of restraint in the form of bail; the hearing on the merits of the case was postponed. During the court session, Metropolitan Pavel became ill and was hospitalized. The clergyman's lawyer Archpriest Nikita Chekman drew attention to the inappropriate behaviour of journalists of the channels "1+1", "Suspilne" and a number of others, who, despite the requests of the clergyman's defenders and guards to leave the room, continued to film the process of providing medical care to the priest.[3047]
Repressions against other hierarchs and clerics of the UOC also began. Metropolitan Theodosius (Snegirev) of Cherkasy, Metropolitan Ioasaph (Guben), former Metropolitan of Kirovograd and Novomirgorod and now Metropolitan of Vasylkov, Metropolitan Jonathan (Eletskikh) of Tulchyn and Bratslav, Pavel (Lebed) of Vyshgorod, and others were subjected to criminal prosecution on charges of "inciting religious hatred" starting from 2022.
On 7 July 2023, the SSU detained a UOC cleric, rector of the St. Archangel Michael Church in Borodyanka (Kiev Oblast) archpriest Victor Talko, on suspicion of assisting the evacuation of local residents to Belarus. Criminal proceedings have been launched against him on suspicion of "collaborationist activity". The priest faces up to 5 years in prison.[3048]
In September 2023, a case was brought to court against Metropolitan Longin, the rector of the Ascension Banchen Monastery (UOC), in connection with the initiation of a criminal case against him under Article 161 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (incitement of interreligious hatred)[3049] because of his "disparaging" statements against the schismatic OCU. Metropolitan Longin is the founder and head of the orphanage at the monastery in the village of Molnitsa in Chernovtsy Oblast, where more than 400 orphans are under his care. For his many years of charitable work the clergyman was awarded the title of Hero of Ukraine in 2008. On 22 January 2024, he was beaten in his own home.[3050]
On 12 January 2024, the SBU charged Metropolitan Vasiliy (Povoroznyuk) of Lugansk and Alchevsk of the UOC in absentia with the charge that the hierarch "was present in the Kremlin at the ceremony of signing agreements on the admission of the Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics, Zaporozhye and Kherson oblasts to Russia".[3051]
In February 2024, the Archdeacon of the Kiev-Pechersk Lavra Pavlo (Muzychuk) was persecuted, accused of justifying "the armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine" and imprisoned in a pre-trial detention centre. The Solomenskiy District Court of Kiev released him on bail in the amount of 121,000 hryvnias, with the mandatory wearing of an electronic bracelet. Archdeacon Pavel is known as an active defender of canonical Orthodox faith in Ukraine, opposing the illegal deprivation of the rights of believers to use the temples of the Kiev-Pechersk Lavra and the eviction of monks from the monastery.[3052]
Metropolitan Theodosius (Snegirev) was arrested in April 2024 on charges of inciting inter-confessional discord (Article 161 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine). The clergyman was subsequently charged with four more absurd charges, including religious discrimination. Before the next court hearing on his case in Cherkasy, Ukrainian activists staged an action of disgustingly immoral content: they spread on the ground in front of the narrow passage to the courthouse a Russian flag with a printed portrait of Patriarch Kirill. Metropolitan Theodosius refused to tread on them and asked them to remove the flag. But under the onslaught of nationalists, he still had to walk to the courthouse.[3053] On 8 July 2024 he had a heart attack.[3054] Relatives and loved ones are sure that this was the result of pressure to which the clergyman was subjected by the SBU.
On 12 April 2024, the deputy head of the Department for External Church Relations of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, Archpriest Nikolay Danylevych, was searched.[3055] The SBU accused him of justifying the Russian special military operation and inciting religious discord.
Since 24 April 2024, Metropolitan Arseniy (Yakovenko), the vicar of the Holy Assumption Svyatogorsk Lavra, remains under arrest, and his detention has been extended once again until October. The reason for the persecution was a sermon he delivered in 2018, during which he publicized the truth that in 2014 the Ukrainian armed forces shelled Slavyansk. Metropolitan Arseniy himself has been in Donetsk Oblast since the beginning of the conflict. It is also known that he was tortured: the elderly man with health problems was driven daily from Dnepropetrovsk pre-trial detention centre to Slavyansk and back for at least 15 hours round trip without water and food. On 9 July 2024, during the regular hearing of the case against him, despite the defence's motion and the abnormal heat in the room, the judge did not allow Metropolitan Arseniy to be taken out of the glass box to sit next to his defence counsel.[3056] This torture forced Right Reverend Arseniy to ask the court to allow him to participate via video link, or at least not to schedule hearings on two consecutive days. But the court, whose impartiality is clearly not in question, refused to stop this ill-treatment.[3057]
Metropolitan Luke (Kovalenko) of Zaporozhye and Melitopol was also subjected to repression by the Kiev regime. He became Zelenskiy's personal enemy when he demanded the removal of blasphemous plots of the "Kvartal 95" studio, which contained jokes about how much one should pay for humiliating and attacking priests. On 1 May 2024, the SBU searched his home.[3058] Metropolitan Luke is accused of "publicly and actively lobbying the position of the Russian Orthodox Church"; he is also suspected of "anti-Ukrainian activities".[3059]
The first conviction of a UOC clergyman was handed down in May 2023. The Leninskiy District Court of Kirovohrad sentenced Metropolitan Ioasaph (Guben) and the secretary of the diocese Roman Kondratyuk to three years. The priests were found guilty of "inciting religious discord".[3060]
On 7 August 2023, the head of the Tulchyn diocese of the UOC, Metropolitan Ionafan (Yeletskikh), was sentenced to five years in prison "for publicly justifying the armed aggression against Ukraine". On 11 August, Vinnitsa prosecutor's office expressed its displeasure with the fact that instead of six years, the hierarch was sentenced to five years in prison.[3061]
On 13 February 2024, a court in Dnepropetrovsk Oblast sentenced the rector of the church of the local diocese of the UOC to five years in prison in a case of justification of Russian aggression.[3062]
The already routine actions of schismatics to seize churches by force and destroy them also continued. Including the seizure of the Church of the Apostles Peter and Paul in the village of Horov, Rovno Oblast, on 6 June 2023, the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary in the village of Uladovka, Vinnitsa Oblast, on 20 June 2023, the Archangel Michael in the village of Belogorodka, Kiev Oblast, on 25 June 2023, the icon of the Mother of God "Neopalimaya Kupina" on 9 July 2023, and St. Paraskeva in the town of Neteshyn, Khmelnytskiy Oblast, on 27 July 2023.
On 21 August 2023, in the village of Khalyavyn in Chernigov Oblast the Holy Trinity Church of the UOC almost completely burned down due to arson. A canister with remains of gasoline was found at the scene.[3063]
On 22 August 2023, Khmelnytskiy diocese of the UOC reported that activists of the OCU seized two temples of the canonical church in Khmelnytskiy Oblast – St. Nicholas Church in the village of Mytintsy and St.John the Theologian Church in the village of Volitsa. Even the will of the rectors and active parishioners – members of religious communities of the UOC to remain under the aegis the UOC failed to prevent the seizure of the church.[3064]
On 4 September 2023, police broke into the Holy Epiphaniy Nunnery in Ternopol Oblast. The reason behind this was the end of the term of the lease agreement. The regional authorities expectedly did not renew it and decided to close the monastery and evict the nuns.[3065]
In early January 2024, there was a forceful seizure of the Kazan Church of the UOC in the town of Ladyzhyn in Vinnitsa Oblast. During the seizure, raiders from among the followers of the OCU beat the priest and parishioners.[3066]
On the night of 10 January 2024, in the village of Lesniki in Kiev Oblast, perpetrators cut the locks and seized the Church of the Transfiguration of the Lord.
On 10 January 2024, supporters of the OCU seized the UOC Church in Honour of the Kazan Icon of the Mother of God in the village of Pishcha in Volyn Oblast. During the seizure, the raiders broke down the door of the ancient church, which had been built in 1801 – a monument of national importance.[3067]
On 14 January 2024, representatives of the OCU, with the assistance of the authorities, seized the Holy Protection Church of the UOC in the village of Chepelevka in Khmelnytskiy Oblast. Besides "athletic" men, the deputy of Khmelnytskiy district council A.Chernievich and deputies of Krasilov city council took part in this seizure.
On 22-23 January 2024, attempts to seize the church in honour of the Nativity of the Blessed Virgin Mary in the city of Kamne-Kashirskiy in Volyn Oblast were recorded. The UOC believers managed to defend it.[3068]
On 27 January 2024, after a church service in the UOC church in the village of Pecheskoye in Khmelnytskiy Oblast, local supporters of the OCU took possession of the church premises in the absence of police officers. They pushed the rector Archpriest Mykhailo Furman and Archpriest Vitaly Duntz, dean of Krasilov district, out of the church.
On 26 May 2024, supporters of the schismatic OCU with the assistance of the police seized the UOC church in honour of Dmitriy Solunskiy, located in the village of Berezov in Khmelnytskiy Oblast. Law enforcers pushed the UOC believers away from the entrance to the church, while representatives of the schismatic OCU broke down the doors and entered the church.[3069]
On 31 May 2024, the cathedral church of the UOC in the town of Korsun-Shevchenkovskiy in Cherkasy Oblast – the Cathedral of Our Savior – was seized. The seizure was led by one of the heads of the local SBU department.[3070]
On 20 June 2024, supporters of the OCU seized the St. George's Church of the canonical church in Irpen, Kiev Oblast.[3071]
On 11 July 2024 another raider seizure of the UOC church took place – followers of the schismatic church, with the support of Ukrainian law enforcers, seized the Church of the Nativity of the Blessed Virgin Mary in the village of Rudnya, Kiev Oblast. Previously, the religious community refused to change the jurisdiction of the church, but back in the spring, unknown persons, who had nothing to do with the parish, organized a meeting on behalf of the parishioners and illegally transferred the church to the structure of the OCU. At the same time, a week before that, parishioners of the UOC held a gathering, where they confirmed their intention to remain in the canonical church. The decision was signed by 600 people.[3072]
In 2023, a new tactic of Ukrainian law enforcement agencies against believers of the canonical church was recorded. On 1 August, in the town of Horodenka, Ivano-Frankovsk Oblast, for the first time police dispersed UOC believers who had gathered for prayer in a private house, since previously all UOC churches in the region had been transferred to the OCU or closed by the authorities. The legal department of the UOC appealed to the specialized state structures of Ukraine with a demand to stop unlawful actions on the part of officials.[3073]
Kiev's persecution of the canonical church has come to the attention of international human rights monitoring mechanisms. In November 2021, the Human Rights Committee expressed concern. In particular, the Committee mentioned incidents of aggression, intimidation and vandalism in churches related to the process of reorganization of churches and religious communities from under the aegis of the UOC to under that of the OCU. The Human Rights Committee also referred to the inaction of the Ukrainian police in such incidents and the lack of information on the investigation of offenses.[3074]
In the OHCHR report on the human rights situation in Ukraine for the period from 1 August 2022 to 31 January 2023, in connection with the above described draft laws restricting the activities of the UOC, it is noted that, due to vague legal terminology and lack of sufficient justification the norms of these draft laws cannot be considered as legally prescribed and necessary within the meaning of Article 18(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. With regard to the searches conducted by the SBU in the structures of the UOC in late 2022, it is noted that the United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine is concerned that overall influence of "the actions of the state directed against the UOC may be discriminatory".[3075]
An addendum to the regular report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, published by the OHCHR on 16 June 2023, from 1 February to 30 April 2023 an increased number of cases of violence by the Ukrainian authorities against members and supporters of the UOC was noted, as well as the banning of its activities by several regional councils, and searches of UOC premises by Ukrainian law enforcement officials. With this in mind, concern is expressed that the cumulative impact of the actions of the Ukrainian authorities against the UOC may be discriminatory.
In addition, the report notes that in April 2023, the United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine documented a spike in hate speech and several incidents of violence against the UOC and its clergy. This included reports that discriminatory rhetoric and open calls for violence against UOC clergy and supporters were used by Ukrainian government officials, bloggers and opinion leaders. In addition, law enforcement failed to effectively address incidents of hate speech against the UOC.
In early 2024, the human rights organization Public Advocacy at the international revel recognized the violation of the rights of the UOC and that the Ukrainian authorities pursue a systematic policy of discrimination against this religious denomination and restrict the rights of its hierarchs and believers.[3076] This statement was made after the publication of the joint request of the Special Rapporteurs of the United Nations Human Rights Council on freedom of religion or belief, on the rights of minorities and on the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association regarding violations of the rights of believers of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church[3077] recorded in Ukraine and the response of the Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations Office and other international organizations in Geneva to this request on 29 January 2024. In their request, the special procedures of the HRC expressed concern about the persecution of the UOC and its believers, which, according to the Special Rapporteurs, is related to the lawful and peaceful exercise of the rights of the UOC believers to freedom of religion or belief, freedom of expression and freedom of association, enshrined in articles 18, 19 and 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Among other things, the request pointed to the fact that one of the hierarchs of the UOC had been served with suspicion of incitement to religious hatred and that his home had been searched, as well as to the fact that another hierarch of the Church had been sentenced to a real prison term. The Special Rapporteurs also drew attention to the decisions of Ukrainian courts encouraging the authorities to confiscate the Kiev‑Pechersk Lavra used by the UOC, and to the numerous searches conducted by Ukrainian security forces in monasteries, offices, educational institutions and other premises of the UOC in November 2022. They also noted with concern the increasing number of manifestations of hatred and incitement to violence against believers and clergy of the UOC in some areas of Ukraine, especially in the western regions.
Public Defence human rights organization said that despite the fact that violations committed against the believers of the UOC in 2022‑2023 and earlier periods are obvious, the response of the Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the UN Office and other international organizations to the Special Rapporteurs of the Human Rights Council was incomplete and in a number of points contained unreliable information.[3078]
The World Council of Churches also stated that the current version of the draft law violates international norms of freedom of religion and may divide Ukrainian society.[3079] The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, while presenting the report on Ukraine to the UN Human Rights Council on 19 December 2023, pointed out that such actions of the Ukrainian authorities threaten freedom of religion and do not comply with the norms of international law.[3080]
In addition, lawyer Robert Amsterdam from Amsterdam & Partners appealed to US President Joe Biden, British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen to persuade Zelenskiy not to ban the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. In his letter to the mentioned politicians, the lawyer assessed the proposed ban of the UOC as "an overly punitive attack that will cause serious harm to Orthodox Ukrainians".[3081]
The lawyer himself claimed a campaign of misinformation and intimidation against him. In particular, a number of Ukrainian mass media spread information that he allegedly worked on behalf of Patriarch Kirill and the Russian Orthodox Church. In a published statement, Robert Amsterdam said that such an allegation has all the hallmarks of "aggressive disinformation with the purpose of intimidation and threats during consultations with his client in Kiev". He also emphasized that during his consultations with representatives of the UOC in the Ukrainian capital he had documented "numerous cases of harassment and false statements," among them searches at the home of a UOC clergyman that took place the morning after his meeting with his lawyer.[3082]
At the same time, Romanian MEP Maria Grapini sent a written request to the European Commission about the violation of the religious rights of the Romanian minority in Ukraine.[3083]
Moreover, experts point out that many major pro-Western NGOs, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and Freedom House, have not reported on violations of religious freedom in Ukraine, although they have documented similar violations in other countries (with some exception of Human Rights Watch, which reported on the aggression against UOC priests and SBU searches only in 2019[3084]).
Since Ukraine gained its independence, the authorities have pursued a policy of forced Ukrainization of all spheres of public life and the assimilation of all ethnic groups living in the country in order to create a mono-ethnic state. These processes accelerated noticeably after the 2014 coup d'état. At the same time, Kiev's policy toward different national communities has taken a differential character, which contradicts the Constitution of Ukraine, which guarantees equal rights and freedoms for all citizens.
Legally, Crimean Tatars, Krymchaks and Karaites are in a privileged position in Ukraine, now constituting no more than 0.1 percent of the population, according to the most optimistic estimates in Kiev. However, these privileges were legalized quite recently: the Law on the Indigenous Peoples of Ukraine[3085] was adopted in July 2021 in the interests of these groups. It stipulates their right to study in their native language, to establish their own educational institutions and mass media, and also guarantees them protection from assimilation (other national minorities were not granted this privilege).
As for other nationalities, the Kiev regime has pursued a consistent policy of adopting laws aimed at ensuring the dominant role of the Ukrainian language and restricting, with varying degrees of severity, the opportunities for the use of other languages in the public sphere. The Russian language, which is the mother tongue of millions of Ukrainians – not only ethnic Russians, but also Belarusians, Ukrainians, Armenians, Jews, Greeks and representatives of other nationalities – is subjected to the greatest repression. Therefore, the rights of the Russian and Russian-speaking population have been most restricted, as the Kiev regime's efforts have led to a step-by-step legislative restriction of the linguistic rights of ethnic Russians and numerous Russian-speaking representatives of other nationalities.
For example, in 2017, the law "On Education"[3086] was adopted, which provides for the transition of Ukrainian educational institutions to the state language from 2020. At the same time, teaching in minority languages was only allowed in preschools and elementary schools.
According to the opinion of the Council of Europe's Venice Commission,[3087] many provisions of this Law are discriminatory. The PACE resolution on the Protection and Promotion of Regional and Minority Languages in Europe also criticizes it.[3088] In particular, the author of the report on the topic of the resolution, Hungarian MP Rózsa Hoffman said: "I firmly believe that in enacting the new legislation, the country failed to meet its international obligations and Council of Europe standards". In December 2018, the then OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, Lamberto Zannier from Italy, stressed that Ukraine "must remain a space for all nationalities with different languages, which they should have the right to use".[3089]
In April 2019, the Law on Ensuring the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as the State Language was adopted,[3090] which enshrined the use of the Ukrainian language in all spheres of public life, except for private communication and religious ceremonies. Accordingly, any attempts to introduce an official policy involving multilingualism are deemed actions geared toward effecting violent changes, or toppling the constitutional order.
One of the prerequisites for the Law was a decision made by the Constitutional Court of Ukraine in February 2018 that recognized the Law on the Principles of State Language Policy[3091], according to which Russian was a regional language in certain regions of the country (in 13 out of 24 regions), as unconstitutional. Later, prompted by some "language activists", Ukrainian courts deprived Russian of its regional status in these areas.
In compliance with the Law on Ensuring the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as the State Language, the Office of the Commissioner for the Protection of the Official Language and the National Commission on Ukrainian Language Standards have been established in 2019 to monitor the implementation of the laws on language. The Office of the Commissioner performs indeed functions of a repressive mechanism, since its responsibilities include monitoring compliance with the requirements outlined in language legislation, including conducting official investigations and making proposals on the imposition of disciplinary or administrative penalties on people or organizations who are in breach of the laws on language. In 2022, its powers expanded as a legal provision imposing liability for debasing or disparaging the Ukrainian language came into effect. The introduced system of fines is of an impressive amount from 200 to 400 minimum wages.
On 21 June 2019, a group of 51 MPs of the Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine filed a submission to the Constitutional Court of Ukraine (CCU) raising the issue of the constitutionality of the Law on Ensuring the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as the State Language with regard to the restrictions it imposes on the right of citizens to use and protect their native language and the right to develop the linguistic identity of indigenous peoples and national minorities of Ukraine.[3092] As one of the initiators of the appeal to the court, Vadim Novinskiy noted that instead of regulating public relations in the field of language policy in a multinational state, this law pitted and opposed Ukrainian- and Russian-speaking citizens against each other.[3093] On 14 July 2021, the CCU issued a ruling in which it recognized the law on the state language as compliant with the Constitution.[3094]
In addition to the Russian language, the languages of other national communities, particularly the Hungarian language, were also affected. In December 2020, in response to a petition filed by the Ukrainian Prosecutor General Taras Kremin, Commissioner for the Protection of the Official Language, all decisions issued by the Beregovskiy and Vinogradovskiy district councils in Transcarpathia on the functioning of regional languages were deemed illegal and rescinded.[3095]
Since the adoption of the Law on Ensuring the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as a State Language, its provisions have gradually come into force.
Article 32 thereof, which defines the state language as the language of advertising in Ukraine, has been in force since 16 January 2020. The exceptions are the same as in other areas: print media and advertisements may be published in one of the EU languages. The corresponding amendments have been introduced to the law on Advertising.
On 16 July 2020, further provisions of the Law came into force which introduced the Ukrainian language into the scientific sphere. The new requirements allow for the use of official EU languages, besides Ukrainian, to publish scientific works; however, such publications should necessarily contain an abstract in Ukrainian. Since that time, dissertations, monographs and abstracts should be in Ukrainian or English. The same languages are used both for the academic defence and for the holding of public scientific events.
On 16 January 2021, Article 30 of the law came into force, which provided for a complete transition of the service sector to the state language.
Since 16 July 2021, a new stage of Ukrainization of all spheres of public life has been launched in the country. It involves the entry into force of Articles 23 and 26 of the language law, according to which all cultural and mass events should be held in the Ukrainian language, including theatrical performances, concerts, and show programs. The production of posters, advertising posters in foreign languages is not allowed, except for the names of authors, performers or names of performance groups. Information stands, audio-video guides, booklets, and labels on exhibit items in museums, galleries, and exhibition halls should be in the state language. Movies in other languages shown on television or in cinemas are subject to compulsory dubbing into Ukrainian. As for book publishing houses, they are required to publish at least 50 percent of the total annual circulation of books in Ukrainian. Tourism and guided tours have also fallen under Ukrainization. In parallel, mandatory Ukrainian language proficiency certification for candidates applying for civil service positions has been introduced.
On 16 January 2022, a new provision of the language law concerning the media sphere came into force in Ukraine. Starting from January 2022, nationwide print media are required to issue a mandatory Ukrainian copy of issues published in a non-state language (for regional media, the same regulation will come into force in July 2024). Russian-language content is available only as an additional option. In July 2024, the quota for TV and radio programs and movies in Ukrainian will be increased to 90 percent for national TV channels and 80 percent for regional channels (earlier 75 and 60 percent, respectively).
The law prohibits advertising in the press in any language other than Ukrainian. Exceptions are made for English, the official languages of the EU, and indigenous languages. In this connection, the Opposition Platform – For Life political party (since March 2022, along with the other 17 (as of February 2023) political parties in Ukraine, has been banned) issued a statement where it called the destruction of Russian language print media discrimination and humiliation of millions of Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine. The party noted that the introduced norm will make it unprofitable to publish media in Russian and impossible for Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine to receive information in their native language.
Starting from 16 July 2022, in accordance with the latest regulations of the language law that came into force, all websites and social media pages of state authorities, local self-government bodies, businesses, institutions and organizations registered in Ukraine should have the Ukrainian-language version loaded by default. All items with installed computer programs should come with a Ukrainian-language interface. Also, from this day on, individuals may be fined for using the Russian language if its use is deemed to violate the provisions of the aforementioned law.
It is worth noting that due to a sharp backlash from several European countries, primarily Hungary, to the discriminatory provisions of the Law on Education, a provision was included in the Law on Ensuring the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as the State Language stating that members of national minorities whose languages are official in the European Union have the right to continue their general secondary education in their native language until 1 September 2023 if they have started receiving general secondary education before 1 September 2018.
In June 2023, the Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine approved a bill extending this period for another year, i.e. until 1 September 2024.[3096] However, other national minorities remained outside the scope of application of the new norms. Thus, the Russian language has been subjected to double discrimination (simultaneously in relation to the state language and the official languages of the EU), which has already been pointed out by the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe,[3097] responding to the contradiction between the language law and Ukraine's international obligations, and also voicing fears that the law may create inter-ethnic tension in society. The Commission's assessments and recommendations were supported by OHCHR.[3098]
The next step towards establishing a monoethnic language regime in a multinational state was the adoption of the Law on Complete High School Education on 16 January 2020.[3099] The document introduced three teaching models which depend upon the language spoken by the students. Provision was made for teaching Ukraine's indigenous peoples (which in Ukrainian law refers to the Crimean Tatars, Krymchaks, and Karaites) in their native languages during the entire period of their studies. Representatives from national minorities whose languages are official languages in the European Union have the opportunity to study in those languages during their first four years in school, after which the number of disciplines taught in Ukrainian will gradually increase from 20 percent up to 60 percent by the ninth grade. For all other students, the percentage of classes taught in the state language should range from 80 percent to 100 percent by the fifth grade.
On 8 December 2023, the Law on Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine Concerning the Consideration of the Expert Assessment of the Council of Europe and its Bodies on the Rights of National Minorities (Communities) in Specific Spheres which directly restricts the rights of ethnic Russians was adopted by the Verkhovnaya Rada and signed by Vladimir Zelenskiy on the same day. However, it provides some preferences for national minorities speaking the EU official languages.
The above listed regulatory acts are aimed at total Ukrainization and provide for a complete transition of all national public spheres, namely education, science, service sector, advertising, and mass media, to the state language, as well as an introduction of strict language quotas on radio, TV, etc.
The restrictions introduced are mainly aimed at the suppression of the Russian language and ethnic Russians, but also have touched upon other ethnic groups, including the Hungarian one.
It is also worth saying that as a result of a number of the laws adopted, including the laws on Education, on General Secondary Education and on Ensuring the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as the State Language, the Russian language was subjected to triple discrimination in the Ukrainian state: in relation to the state language, official EU languages and indigenous languages.
As a result of the policy carried out by the Kiev authorities since 2020 and aimed at "squeezing" the Russian language, Russian schools in Ukraine de facto ceased to exist, and since September 2022, Ukrainian school curricula no longer provide for teaching subjects in Russian or studying Russian either as an obligatory or optional course.
The report published by the State Language Protection Commissioner, Taras Kremin, on 30 April 2024 states that there are only three schools in Ukraine where the Russian language is taught as a subject. Over the last two years a number of pupils studying Russian has diminished from 454.8 thousand to 768 children.[3100]
In addition, the oppressed status of the Russian language (defined as "a minority language being a state (official) language of the country recognised by the Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine as an aggressor-state or an occupant-state") is clearly specified in the Law on National Minorities (Communities) of Ukraine (of 2022 as amended on 21 September and 8 December 2023 in response to the critics by the Venetian Commission). Although there was an earlier suggestion to include a clause on the return of certain rights to the Russian language into the legislation five years after the end of the martial law, the amendments adopted in December 2023 (the Law on Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine Concerning the Consideration of the Expert Assessment of the Council of Europe and its Bodies on the Rights of National Minorities (Communities) in Specific Spheres) made the restrictions of unlimited duration. Therefore, the adopted legislation established a total discrimination of the Russian language in Ukraine.
It is indicative that the Ukrainian authorities were not ready for the implementation of these restrictive innovations. Before this comprehensive transfer to the Ukrainian language in education, the late June 2020 was marked by a centralized valuation of the inventory of school library stocks to furnish all educational institutions with student books in the country. However, the resources found were not enough to implement the requirements of the law. According to pupils' parents, schools were unable to provide children with textbooks, so it was recommended that they purchase them at their own expense.[3101]
The 2020/2021 school year demonstrated that the implementation of the law was carried out following the most rigid scenario with the situation being aggravated in certain regions by the local authorities. For example, in Lvov, the Ukrainization of Russian Lyceum No. 45, one of the most prestigious educational institutions in the city where about 1,000 children of different ethnicities studied, was presented as a special "achievement". Being active in promoting the Russian language education, the school director was forced to resign to give his post to a person advocating the renunciation of the Russian language and having no previous ties with the lyceum.
In order to "squeeze out" the Russian language, the forces of "civil society" (often radical organizations) were also involved, who, with the indulgence of the authorities, organized various aggressive actions against teachers who continued to use the Russian language. In March 2020, nationalists engaged into the bullying of the teachers of the lyceum in Lvov. The teachers were accused of the "propaganda of the Russian world" and "Russification of the Ukrainian children".[3102] The same happened to the Honoured Teacher of Ukraine Pavel Viktor. In April 2020, nationalists launched an aggressive campaign against him because he had created video lessons of physics in Russian.[3103]
In November 2020, under the pressure from the University's management, professor of the National Technical University "Dneprovskaya Politekhnika" (Dnepr/Dnepropetrovsk) Valery Gromov was forced to resign after a student formally complained about him lecturing in Russian.[3104]
In general, the Ukrainian government's education policy has led to a decrease in the number of Russian-language schools in the country since 2013, from 1,275 to 25 in the 2021/2022 academic year.
In 2022, the process of "squeezing" the Russian language out of the sphere of education was completed in Ukraine: the curriculum for secondary schools for the academic year 2022/2023 no longer provides for teaching subjects in Russian or studying Russian either as an obligatory or optional course. All literary works by Russian and Soviet (with the exception of Ukrainian) authors have been removed from the literature programmes of Ukrainian schools.[3105] The Ukrainian Ministry of Culture and Information Policy developed recommendations to exclude Russian literature which may be considered propaganda from library funds. These works, according to representatives of the Ministry, "will be sent to waste paper for the printing of Ukrainian books". In 2022, about 11 million books in Russian were written off or destroyed in the framework of the "derussification" programme.[3106] In 2023, this process continued. In October 2023, over 400 thousand units of books in Russian and publications of Russian authors were removed from the libraries in the Kiev Oblast.[3107]
Repressions have also been launched against Russian-speaking teachers. On 7 February 2022, Kiev schools (lyceum No. 303 and school No. 152) fired two teachers for using the Russian language in class. The dismissals occurred after the auditing conducted in the two educational institutions by the office of Commissioner for the Protection of the State Language Taras Kremin. The teachers were admonished before dismissals.
The Ukrainian authorities are actively conducting the policy aimed at prohibiting any public use of the Russian language. On 9 February 2022, Commissioner for the Protection of the State Language Taras Kremin addressed the mayors of a number of Ukrainian cities with a demand to dismantle the outdoor advertising, signboards and signs installed in violation of the language law. The corresponding message was published on the Taras Kremin's Facebook page. In particular, it mentioned the letters being sent to the heads of Kiev, Kharkov, Odessa, Dnepr (Dnepropetrovsk), Zaporozhye, Nikolayev, Kherson, Sumy, Poltava. Chernigov, Cherkassy, Chernovtsy, Kropivnitskiy (former Kirovograd), Uzhgorod, Kremenchug, Beregovo, Mariupol, Kramatorsk, Bakhmut (former Artemovsk) and Krivoy Rog, as well as to the chiefs of Volnovakhskaya, Slavyanskaya, Severodonetskaya and Lisichanskaya urban military and civilian administrations.
In April 2022, Taras Kremin publicly called for abolition of teaching in the Russian language in all educational institutions of the country since 1 September 2023.[3108] He suggested replacing the Russian language by other subjects, such as the history of Ukraine or the English language, and until this, he proposed that before the start of each Russian language lesson, teachers explained to Russian-speaking children that their native language was, by definition, the language of the aggressor, which was shameful to speak. Taras Kremin also said that the foreign literature program should be revised, since it places a significant emphasis on the study of the works of Russian writers. On 11 April 2022, he called for getting rid of the Russian names of settlements while supporting the idea by the slogan "Ukraine for Ukrainians".[3109] Moreover, in October 2023, he said that pupils and teachers during breaks between lessons should also speak only in Ukrainian.[3110]
The Kiev authorities are not limiting themselves to the exclusion of the Russian language from education and scientific life. In mid-December 2022, the Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine adopted in first reading the draft law No. 7633 on prohibiting the use of "Russian sources of information" in education, which imposes a ban on the use of Russian-language literature in science and education. The document introduced amendments to the Law on Education, which stipulate that Ukrainian educational programmes cannot contain references to literature and information sources published on the territory of the country in the state language by citizens or legal entities of the Russian Federation. Similar changes are envisaged in the Law on Scientific and Scientific-Technical Activity". All this is being introduced for the sake of "protecting Ukraine's educational and information space from the influence of Russian imperialism".[3111] In fact, this means a complete ban on scientific literature published in Russian, on the territory of Russia or by Russian citizens. Sources in the Russian language may no longer be used in schools, universities or when carrying out scientific work.
Previously introduced by the Ukrainian authorities' obstacles to the import of Russian book products (in the form of refusal to issue relevant licenses) have already led to negative consequences. According to Strana.UA (a Ukrainian online newspaper), between November 2019 and 8 July 2020, not a single Russian publication was imported into Ukraine, and not a single license was issued. Not only fiction but also specialised literature was restricted, resulting in shortages. The shortage of up-to-date scientific works on virology became particularly acute during the pandemic.[3112]
On 14 March 2022, the Television and Radio Broadcasting Committee of Ukraine announced a ban on the import and distribution of all publishing products from Russia, inter alia, "to prevent Russia's cultural and informational influence on Ukrainians".[3113]
In addition, in June 2022, laws were passed prohibiting the import and distribution of books and other publishing products from Russia and Belarus, and the publication and sale of books authored by Russian citizens.
Since 2017, there has been a ban restricting access from Ukrainian territory to 468 Russian sites and social networking platforms, including Yandex, Mail.ru, VKontakte, and Odnoklassniki, as well as software products from 1C, Kaspersky Lab, and Doctor Web. In September 2020, the secretary of the National Security and Defence Council Aleksei Danilov said that the Ukrainian security services intended to track and register users of the above-mentioned social networks.[3114]
In accordance with the Law on Cinematography[3115], Ukraine is not allowed to show films and TV series about Russian security forces, as well as Russian TV and cinema productions created after 2014.
Despite the bans, printed material is still sold on the territory of Ukraine. To eliminate it, the Kiev authorities directly follow the practice of Nazy Germany. On 26 April 2024, the Ministry of Culture reported that it had identified on Ukrainian trading platforms and removed almost 700 titles of books from Russia and Belarus which were prohibited for sale.[3116] At the same time, book sellers were warned about the inadmissibility of violating the requirements of Ukrainian legislation in the publishing business.
In June 2022, the Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine adopted the laws prohibiting public singing of Russian songs and their use on radio and TV. In addition, laws were passed prohibiting the import and distribution of books and other publishing products from the Russian Federation and Belarus, and the publication and sale of books authored by Russian citizens (the laws came into force in June 2023).
On 7 October 2022, the Law on Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine on Support of National Musical Productions and Restriction of Public Usage of Music by an Aggressor State[3117] came into force; it bans the broadcasting of Russian music on television, radio and in public places, as well as the touring of performers from Russia.
The Law on Media, which entered into force in March 2023, restricts language quotas – since January 2024; the percentage of programmes and films broadcast in Ukrainian on national and regional TV channels must be from 75 to 90 percent, while for local TV channels it must be from 60 to 80 percent. According to the amendments introduced by the Law on Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine Concerning the Consideration of the Expert Assessment of the Council of Europe and its Bodies on the Rights of National Minorities (Communities) in Specific Spheres on 8 December 2023, for television and radio broadcasters which, in addition to the state language, broadcast in indigenous or minority languages which are official languages of the European Union or to which the provisions of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages apply, this threshold is reduced to 30 percent. At the same time, the Law explicitly states that these provisions do not apply to the Russian language.
It should be noted that even before the adoption of this law, nationalists had been actively involved in the fight against the public singing of Russian songs and, in general, against the use of the Russian language in everyday life. For example, since the beginning of 2021, unofficial associations – "language activists"[3118], consisting mainly of young people that are radical towards the Russian language have become active in Lvov.[3119] In the city, they conducted a number of relevant actions. For example, "language activists" demanded that the administration of "Puzata Khata" stopped broadcasting Russian music in the establishment and sent a complaint to the head office of the chain of establishments. Such "actors" provoked a conflict in the city centre with the entertainer, who played Russian music. Another clash took place in the "AzArt" hookah café between the "activist blogger", Andreyev, and one of the café owners. Andreyev demanded in a form of an ultimatum that the owner turned off the Russian music which was playing in the place. The owner refused and Andreyev was forced to leave. The blogger published a critical post on social media after this and appealed to the city administration to check the café.
The pressure on citizens who use the Russian language in everyday life was not limited to formal measures. For example, on 5 March 2021, nationalists assaulted two street musicians who were performing songs in Russian in Lvov. The local police did not respond to this illegal attack as they should have done.[3120]
There have also been cases of discrimination against Russian-speaking customers in a number of food service establishments, especially in Western Ukraine. For example, the administration of the New York Street Pizza cafe in Chernovtsy displayed a crossed-out image of a pig painted in Russian flag colours on its entrance. In response to the journalists' appeals, the cafe administrator said: "Such visitors refuse to communicate in an English foreign language and in Ukrainian. And we, on principle, do not communicate in Russian. It's our language policy".[3121]
On 30 May 2022, a video filmed in Lvov appeared on the Internet showing a volunteer refusing to provide the UN humanitarian aid to refugees from the eastern part of Ukraine because they spoke Russian. When asked, the volunteer told the women that he did not understand them and demanded that they address him in Ukrainian. A nearby police officer pointed out to the refugees that it was forbidden to film the volunteer and, in response to their indignation, threatened to take the outraged women to the police station.
On 2 June 2023, a minor from Odessa singing Viktor Tsoy songs in Russian was detained in Lvov on the application of N.Pipa, an MP from the "Golos" party, who called the police. After the detention, he was sent from the police station to a shelter institution for minors in Lvov, where he spent a week because his disabled mother could not come and pick him up in person. [3122] In connection with this scandal, the head of the state agency for art under the Ukrainian Culture Ministry, O.Rossoshanskaya, officially said that the "mova" law does not prohibit public performance of V.Tsoy's songs in Ukraine.
A similar conflict took place in Odessa in August 2024. The scandal around street musicians performing songs on Deribasovskaya Street was provoked by blogger Y.Karavadzhak. The reason was the fact that they were performing songs in Russian. The mass media reported that the initiator of the scandal Y.Karavadzhak, who forbade the musicians to perform Russian-language songs, shoots explicit videos for one of the relevant Internet portals. During this work she communicates with her clientele in Russian. [3123]
According to statements made by Ukrainian officials, the authorities are purposefully pursuing a policy of total elimination of the Russian-speaking space in Ukraine. In particular, the Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine A.Danilov openly stated that "the Russian language should disappear altogether" in Ukraine.[3124]
As practice shows, even the use of radical nationalists and persons close to them does not help the work of the repressive body. Language Ombudsman T.Kremen admitted that the institution under his control relies on denunciations from "responsible patriotically-minded citizens" in its work. According to the ombudsman at a press conference in early May 2024, Russian is ubiquitous on the streets of Ukrainian cities. "We ask local authorities to go out to the people, walk the streets and look themselves at the signs, adverts, at such an "overpopulation" of the Russian language as we see on the streets of many of our cities – from Odessa to Kharkov. We need to put an end to this," he said. Kremen added that representatives of his office cannot "independently go round every street, every alley and every state institution" and rely only on those who write complaints.[3125]
Moreover, Ukrainian officials deny the Russian population the very right to exist on Ukrainian territory. In November 2023, Deputy Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration O.Stefanishina stated that there is "no Russian minority in the country, it does not exist".[3126] Subsequently, this view was supported by the speaker of the Verkhovnaya Rada R.Stefanchuk.
Some Ukrainian officials have also been harassed for using the Russian language. On 13 January 2023, Kharkov Mayor I.Terekhov sued the language ombudsman T.Kremen for repeatedly fining him for using the Russian language. Previously, in November 2022, he had been fined for using a non‑state language while speaking on the Ukrainian national telethon. At the same time, he was given a warning for the fact that the social pages of the mayor of Kharkov are in Russian. In response, I.Terekhov said that he would continue to use Russian in his communication with Kharkov citizens, as it is spoken by 80 percent of the citizens.
Meanwhile, the data from a sociological survey conducted by the Kiev International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) in February 2020 showed that 33 percent of respondents believe that the state should provide all Russian-speaking citizens throughout Ukraine with the right to receive their school education in Russian all over the country. 40 percent of the respondents consider that the Russian-speaking population should have that right in those regions where the majority of the population so wishes, but not throughout all Ukraine. Another 24 percent of respondents consider the state should not support such a right. In addition, 37 percent of respondents believe that the state should provide Russian-speaking citizens throughout Ukraine with the right to communicate with government officials in Russian, while another 31 percent believe this should apply in those regions where the majority of the population wants this, but not throughout all of Ukraine, and 28 percent of respondents believe that the state should not support such a right.[3127]
Furthermore, according to the results of another KIIS survey conducted in April 2020, 48.8 percent of respondents believe that the Russian language is part of Ukraine's historical heritage, and should be developed[3128].
Against this background, it is obvious that all the above-mentioned laws adopted by the Kiev regime are directed against the Russian language and their purpose is to narrow its use. The following examples may be provided. In October 2020, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine approved the Concept of the State Target Social Program of National-Patriotic Education until 2025[3129], which published the data of a sociological survey showing that less than half of the country's population – only 46 percent – uses the Ukrainian language in family and household communication. It is noted that this indicator corresponds to zero in Donbass. This situation is qualified by the Ukrainian authorities as "threatening".[3130]
This demonstrates that, contrary to what the Kiev authorities claim, the underlying goal of legal management of the language field in Ukraine is not at all the popularization and development of the Ukrainian language, but a forced change in the linguistic identity of non-Ukrainian-speaking citizens living in the country.
This set of legislative measures, aimed at the gradual squeezing of the Russian language out of public life, contradicts both national legislation and Ukraine's international obligations. In particular, the policy of Ukrainianization conflicts with Article 10 of the Constitution of Ukraine, which guarantees free development, use and protection of Russian and other languages of national minorities of Ukraine; with Article 22, which states that the content and scope of existing rights and freedoms may not be restricted when new laws are adopted or when existing documents are amended; and with Article 53, which states the right of national minorities to study in their native language.
The provisions of the above acts contradict Ukraine's obligations under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Council of Europe's Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and a number of soft law acts: The UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, the Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the OSCE, the Concluding Document of the Vienna OSCE Meeting, and The Hague Declaration on the Rights of National Minorities to Education.
It should be noted that all measures aimed at squeezing the Russian language out of public life of Ukraine were adopted, as indicated above, despite critics from the international human rights structures. The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities and the OHCHR have expressed their comments about the discriminatory legislative measures taken by the Ukrainian authorities. It is also worth highlighting the opinion delivered by the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe regarding the law "On Education" (December 2017)[3131], which confirmed the existence of discriminatory provisions in the document, and regarding the Law "On the functioning of the Ukrainian language as the official language" (December 2019)[3132], which pointed out the inconsistencies between its provisions and Ukraine's international obligations. The Commission's assessments and recommendations were supported by OHCHR.[3133]
In addition to the elimination of the Russian language from all facets of Ukrainian society, there have been ongoing initiatives to spread hostility toward Russian citizens and the Russian culture as a whole. Such activities were not only not condemned or responded to by the authorities, but were also undertaken by the Ukrainian leadership itself. For example, President V.Zelenskiy, in an interview published on 5 August 2021[3134], advised Russians to get out of Ukraine.
Hatred to Russians was openly propagandized on national and regional television channels. Russophobic remarks and calls for the murder of Russians were frequently broadcast. For example, the official advertisement of the program of Ukrainian journalist Y.Sokolova on "Channel 5" stated as follows: "Turn on 5! Moskals are pissed off!" In August 2022, on NTA television, she said that Russians should not be taken prisoners, they should be killed as much as possible, adding that she wanted "all of them to be exterminated as quickly as possible".
Journalist and TV host and former media director of the television channel "ZIK" O.Drozdov repeatedly publicly insulted Russian-speaking citizens and claimed that the Russian language for Ukraine is not only foreign, but also "aggressive-occupying and threatening". He also branded individuals who live in the nation and speak Russian "the pledge of war" and that they should "disappear as a species". In November 2022, O.Lakunova, a member of the Ukrainian Armed Forces who returned from captivity in an exchange, declared that "the entire Russian population must be exterminated". Moreover, she urged that even children should not be spared.
Similar Nazi attitudes towards Russian-speaking residents of Ukraine are also demonstrated by government officials. In September 2023, a Russian-speaking resident of Odessa wanted to transfer her child to home schooling, but faced racist behaviour on the part of a child welfare official. The reason for the insults was the fact that the applicant spoke Russian. The official demanded to speak to her only in Ukrainian and stated that those who spoke Russian were enemies of Ukraine and therefore had no rights. At the same time, she herself spoke not in Ukrainian, but in "surzhik", making gross mistakes.[3135]
In these and other cases we are not even talking about the mental adequacy of the above-mentioned and similar characters, but about the policy of the authorities, who allow such hate speech in public space and, moreover, do not condemn it. Similar statements by official Ukrainian figures themselves are also quoted in the text of the report.
Russophobia spreads unhindered on the Internet and social networks. By now, many different publications, pictures, collages have been published that contain not just derogatory attitudes toward Russians, but that directly dehumanize them. This includes such negative comparisons as "Coloradas," "Vatniks," and "Orcs". Materials justifying and calling for the murder of Russians are being actively distributed.
Non-governmental organizations defending the interests of the Russian-speaking population of Ukraine have repeatedly sent appeals to European regional and international structures, including the Council of Europe and the OSCE, to ensure the rights of the Russian-speaking community. However, there was no adequate reaction. According to NGOs, the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities K.Abdrakhmanov did not meet with members of Russian communities or heads of Russian-language human rights organizations during his official visit to Ukraine in September 2021. Similarly, the meeting of Marija Pejčinović Burić, Secretary General of the Council of Europe, with Russian-speaking human rights activists was not organized.[3136] The specialized structures of the European Union, to which the current Ukraine is so keen to be admitted, blatantly ignore the dismal human rights situation in that country.
The position of our compatriots in Ukraine has recently substantially deteriorated due to the unprecedented Russophobic hysteria generated by the Kiev-controlled media. Ukrainian officials make serious efforts in this area. So, in response to the fraudulent staged-up action in Bucha, Culture Minister A.Tkachenko stated in an interview with 1+1 TV channel that "there is no mention of good Russians, as there are no good Russians" and urged people to fight them all over the world. The advisor to the President of Ukraine A.Geraschenko called on in the social media "to find and punish" all civilians who cooperated with the Russian military servicemen in the Kiev Oblast. B.Filatov, the mayor of Dnepropetrovsk (Dnepr) known for his hate of all Russian, advocated on Facebook to "kill Russians all over the world and in large numbers". The secretary of the National Security and Defence Council, A.Danilov, called the Russians "rats" and "swine dogs" ("schweinehund"), and called for "poisoning them" and "destroying them by all means".
By 2021, Russian journalists have been de facto deprived of the right to pursue their activities in Ukraine. They are not allowed to events designated for the media, conducted by the state governmental institutions. Their accreditation requests are not taken into consideration. In 2021, the Kiev office of TASS was closed due to sanctions restrictions introduced against it.
Russian compatriots continue to face a challenging scenario as their rights and liberties are frequently abused. In recent years, Russian-speaking activists have continuously faced violation of their rights to the integrity of person, dwelling, property; they have been intimidated and subjected to pressure by law enforcement authorities, intelligence services and nationalist groups.
In December 2018, SSU officers searched the premises of members of the Russian-speaking community in Poltava. The coordinator of the All-Ukrainian Coordinating Council of Russian Compatriot Organizations, Sergey Provatorov (who also heads Russkoye Sodruzhestvo (Russian Commonwealth) association), had his Pushkin medal confiscated.
Investigative activities were conducted in respect of the historian Yu.Pogoda (a well-known researcher of the Northern War period), poet and publicist V.Shestakov (head of the Poltava Oblast Russian Community). Criminal proceedings were brought against them under Article 110 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine ("attempts on territorial integrity").
In May 2019, the SSU conducted a search of the head of the Zakarpatye regional association "Rus" V.Saltykov. Mobile communication devices and personal computer equipment were seized.
The arrest (in August 2020) on suspicion of treason (which is subject to a punishment in the form of imprisonment for a period of 12 to 15 years with confiscation of property) by the SSU officers of a Russian language and literature teacher, head of the non-government organization Russian National Community "Rusich", a distinguished teacher with long-term experience, T.Kuzmich, who is widely known for her active work to promote the Russian language in Ukraine, has caused great public outcry. The Ukrainian security services accused her of the fact that during her stay in Crimea she allegedly "was involved by the FSS of Russia in espionage activities, transferred materials for conducting subversion activities in the Kherson Oblast and all over Ukraine" and that she was also involved in "creation of a spy network". It is worth noting that T.Kuzmich has paid regular visits to the peninsula since 2008 within the framework of her professional duties for taking part in the Great Russian Word Festival. The measure of restraint chosen for her was remand in custody, however in the beginning of October 2020 she was released on bail.
From the start of the special military operation to denazify and demilitarize Ukraine and protect the civilian population of Donbass, the MFA of Russia received applications from over five thousand Russian citizens staying in Ukraine. In most of the cases, these letters contained requests to inform about safe ways of evacuation from Ukraine to Russia and other countries. Many of our fellow citizens point to the violence unleashed in Ukrainian cities by members of the so-called Territory Defence Forces and others who obtained firearms through uncontrolled distribution and to the violation of their rights by the Kiev regime.
Among those kept prisoners by Ukrainian authorities were over a hundred Russian sailors in the ports of Odessa and Izmail, as well as foreign citizens – students from other countries attending Ukrainian colleges and crew members of maritime vessels. They were treated inappropriately and were subjected to physical abuse. The Russian sailors were released in several exchanges, the last of which did not take place until mid-October 2022. One of the sailors, unfortunately, did not live to see his release. Also detained by the Kiev authorities were truck drivers who were caught by the special military operation at the Ukrainian border.
The Kiev regime's officials are taking steps to limit our citizens' liberties. The National Bank of Ukraine became one of the first among such bodies who prohibited to the credit institutions in the country to perform any currency operations using the Russian rouble. This step made by the regulator left thousands of persons in the country without means of subsistence.
On 1 March 2022, all mobile operators in Ukraine banned communication for phones with Russian numbers.[3137]
The private property rights of Russians are also violated. The Ukrainian law "On the Main Principles of Compulsory Seizure of Property in Ukraine of the Russian Federation and its Residents"[3138] went into effect on 7 March 2022. The law allows for the extrajudicial seizure of movable and immovable property, money, bank deposits, and other items by the decision of the National Security and Defence Council, which was implemented by presidential decree, without providing any sort of compensation.
The decision to halt processing of Russian citizen applications for immigration and residency permits during the duration of martial law was made by the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers on 2 November 2022.[3139]
On 30 December 2022, V.Zelenskiy signed Law No. 8224 "On National Minorities (Communities) of Ukraine", adopted by the Verkhovnaya Rada on 13 December 2022, according to which for ethnic Russians, or as they are veiled in the text – "who identify their membership by ethnic origin with the state recognized in Ukraine and/or international organizations as the state-terrorist (aggressor-state)", for the duration of martial law in Ukraine and for six months after its lifting, virtually all rights and freedoms are restricted, including the right to peaceful assembly, to receive funding, to establish consultative bodies under local administrations, and the right to participate in international activities.
The provisions of this law were criticized in the report of the Venice Commission of 12 June 2023, therefore, in order to remove obstacles to European integration, on 21 September 2023 and on 8 December 2023, the Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine voted to amend the law on national minorities. At the same time, these amendments do not imply any real expansion of the rights and freedoms of Ukraine's national minorities, and even impose additional restrictions on Russian-speaking citizens.[3140]
This finding is confirmed in an OHCHR report published on 27 March 2024, which states that the Law on National Minorities (Communities) of Ukraine discriminates against those who speak languages that are not official in EU countries, in particular Russian, Armenian and Romani. The report also calls on the Kiev authorities to lift bans on peaceful gatherings of people identifying themselves as ethnic Russians.[3141]
The whole spectrum of xenophobia is characteristic of modern Ukraine. Anti-Semitic incidents significantly increased as a result of widespread campaigns to glorify Ukrainian Nazi collaborators who organized and took part in the slaughter of the Jewish population of the country during World War II.
It went so far as to directly borrow the methods used by the Nazis (which the Ukrainian authorities began to demonstrate widely in 2022). The incident against the Jewish community in Kolomyya is illustrative in this respect. On 11 February 2020, the head of the local Jewish community, Y.Zalitsker, received a letter from the Ivano-Frankovsk regional subdivision of the National Police, requesting him to provide them with a complete list of all Jewish residents, including students, with their addresses and contact details. This demand was explained as being part of the fight against organized crime.[3142]
According to a survey conducted by the Anti-Defamation League, Ukraine is the second most anti-Semitic country in Europe. In 2016, 32 percent of Ukrainians admitted to being intolerant of Jews, and by 2019 the proportion was 46 percent.[3143] At the same time, the position of the US non-governmental organization towards Ukraine has recently softened. According to the 2023 monitoring data, the level of anti-Semitism was 29 percent.[3144] Moreover, in March 2022, the organization began to justify the neo-Nazi Kiev regime having published an interview with D.Fishman, professor of Jewish history at the Jewish Theological Seminary, where he said that neo-Nazis in Ukraine were a small and very marginal group with no political influence and they didn't attack Jews.[3145]
The Kantor Centre's report on the state of anti-Semitism around the world confirms that in 2020, in Ukraine, there were recorded more anti-Semitic incidents than in previous years.[3146]
The United Jewish Community of Ukraine's 2020 report on anti-Semitism[3147] mentions, among other things, attacks on synagogues in Vinnitsa and Mariupol, as well as an attempted arson of a synagogue in Kherson, which occurred on 20 April 2020. As the investigation into the latter incident revealed, the perpetrators espoused Nazi ideology and attempted to set fire to a synagogue building to celebrate the anniversary of Hitler's birthday.
On 19 January 2020, a memorial sign commemorating the 15,000 Jews exterminated in the Holocaust was desecrated in Krivoy Rog, in the Dnepropetrovsk Oblast.
On 20 February 2020, an unidentified man in camouflage broke into the synagogue in Vinnitsa and attacked a member of the congregation, shouting "beat the Jews!"
On 15 June 2020, an announcement was circulated on the Internet, including Facebook about the First all-Ukrainian Contemporary Music Contest Festival "Gonta Fest," named after Ivan Gonta, organizer of the Massacre of Uman.[3148]
On 11 September 2020, a sign in Ukrainian/Hebrew appeared in the Kozerog Cafe in Uman, Cherkasy Oblast, stating that "Hasidim are not served/Hasidim are not allowed in".
On the night of 24-25 October 2020, unknown persons desecrated the Lament for the Unborn monument installed in memory of the Holocaust victims in Melitopol, Zaporozhye Oblast.
In December 2020, employees of the Southeast Interregional Department of the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory used images with antisemitic content in their presentation materials.
In 2021, the total number of antisemitic incidents was slightly higher than in 2020. At the same time, there was an increase in the number of antisemitic vandalism cases, which peaked during Hanukkah celebrations in late November and early December 2021. At that time, six Hanukkiahs and the Holocaust memorial in Lisichansk were damaged as a result of antisemitic vandalism.[3149]
The manifestations of antisemitism in Ukraine in 2021 include: vandalism of a memorial sign installed on the site of a former ghetto in Khmelnytskiy, destruction of a memorial to the Holocaust victims in the village of Novy Pikov, Kalynivskiy district, Vinnytskaya Oblast, and distribution of xenophobic flyers in Lvov by the Galician Youth Organization (May); desecration and destruction of ten tombstones at the Radvanka Jewish cemetery in Uzhgorod (June); threats by nationalists against Hasidim visiting Uman to celebrate the Jewish New Year (September); insulting inscriptions and swastikas on an information stand near the Jewish cemetery in Boguslav, Kiev Oblast, and on the gates of a synagogue in Nikolayev, removal of a historical Yiddish inscription on a residential building in Lvov (October); and another music festival "Let's Repeat Koliivshchyna"[3150] in Kiev (also in October). In late 2021, there were also antisemitic incidents, which the perpetrators organized in connection with the Jewish holiday of Hanukkah in Rovno. According to the United Jewish Community of Ukraine, vandals damaged hanukkiahs in Dnepr (Dnepropertrovsk) on 29 November and in Kiev on 30 November. On 4 December, a hanukkiah in Rovno was damaged.[3151]
Considerable public outcry was caused by the statements made by Yuriy Vakhotskiy, deputy mayor of Shepetovka (Khmelnytskaya Oblast), in September 2021, saying that the tragedy of Babi Yar is "God's punishment to the Jews for the Holodomor," and the statements by Alexander Sholovey, Head of the Khmelnitskiy branch of the All-Ukrainian Union "Batkivshchyna" ("Fatherland"), who said that the more he watches the Hanukkah celebration, "the better he understands Hitler".
Moreover, on 7 February 2021, the Centre of Educational Literature published the book "Jews or Zhyds" by Zinoviy Knysh, Nazi collaborator and OUN activist. Zinovy Knysh was directly involved in organizing the Jewish pogroms and led the antisemitic Ukrainian Central Committee.[3152]
On 18 January 2022, in Lisichansk, another antisemitic act of vandalism was recorded. Unknown persons destroyed a memorial to Jewish victims of World War II in Lisichansk located at the city Green Grove cemetery. This was the second destruction of the monument. After the first, which occurred in December 2021, the monument was rebuilt with donations from concerned citizens.
On 28 January 2022, a similar attack occurred in Dnepr (Dnepropetrovsk): unknown persons destroyed the lamps at the monument to the Holocaust victims in the Gagarin Park and covered the memorial with paint. Igor Romanov, Director of the Jewish Community of the Dnepropetrovsk Oblast, noted in this regard that this was not the first act of vandalism, and due to the lack of video surveillance cameras, previous desecrations of memorials had also gone unpunished. According to him, such criminal acts are held either in connection with Jewish holidays or Holocaust-related mourning dates, including the International Holocaust Remembrance Day.[3153]
In early February 2022, the Centre for Contemporary Art in Ivano-Frankovsk hosted an exhibition of antisemitic paintings by the Ukrainian artist Roman Bonchuk as part of the Precursor exhibition. One of them was titled "A Jew with a Pig". The second depicted a monster in a black hat, with a Torah scroll presented in place of the meat in the shawarma machine. Following complaints from the United Jewish Community of Ukraine, these 'masterpieces' were removed on 6 February.
On 31 March 2022, Igor Perelman, Director of the Jewish Community in Ivano-Frankovsk, was attacked and stabbed three times while handing out lunches to persons in need in Ivano-Frankovsk. Physical violence was accompanied by antisemitic remarks in front of numerous witnesses.[3154]
On 16 May 2022, vandals in Khmelnitskiy drew a swastika on the Jewish Community Centre "Tehiya".[3155]
On 26 July 2022, Mikhail Kovalchuk, former deputy of the Kiev City Council and Head of the National-Patriotic Movement of Ukraine, published an antisemitic post on his Facebook webpage in which, inter alia, he claimed that "orthodox Jews practice ritual murder of people".[3156]
On 29 September 2022 (on the Babi Yar Memorial Day), the OKKO gas station near Yavorov, Lvov Oblast, refused to serve Hasids on the basis of their nationality and religion.[3157]
On 4 October 2022, a group of young people in Ivano-Frankovsk destroyed a part of the fence at the oldest cemetery in the city, tearing down the Star of David.
On 26 December 2022, graffiti appeared in Uzhgorod with antisemitic writings and a call to kill Jews.[3158]
On 14 February 2023, unknown people threw paint on the recently restored monument to Paul Celan, Jewish poet.[3159]
On 11 April 2023, the United Jewish Community of Ukraine reported that antisemitic inscriptions were systematically appearing in Mirgorod, Poltava Oblast.[3160]
On 23 June 2023, an old Jewish cemetery was desecrated in Khorol, Poltava Oblast.[3161]
On 28 July 2023, heavy machinery was used to destroy the territory of the old Jewish cemetery in Ovruch, Zhitomir Oblast.[3162]
In August 2023, a 15-year-old teenager from Radomyshl, Zhitomir Oblast, committed several acts of vandalism and antisemitism with encouragement of a National Socialist-inspired Telegram community, which also consisted of users from Vinnitsa, Dnepr (Dnepropetrovsk), Ivano-Frankovsk, and Lvov. The perpetrator desecrated a memorial complex commemorating Jewish children killed during World War II and the house of a local Jewish female resident, drawing swastikas and insulting inscriptions on them. He also painted Nazi symbols on steles honouring those who fought against Nazism.[3163]
On 26 October 2023, synagogues in Nikolayev and in two other Ukrainian cities were covered with red paint.[3164]
On 15 December 2023, a Hanukkiah set up by members of the city's Jewish community to celebrate Hanukkah was overturned by unknown persons in Kremenchug, Poltava Oblast.[3165]
On 19 December 2023, Europe's largest Hanukkiah installed on Independence Square was desecrated by an unknown person in Kiev, which posted a video of his offense in social networks.[3166]
On 26 January 2024, on the eve of the International Holocaust Remembrance Day, vandals destroyed a memorial to Holocaust victims in the village of Sosnovoye (former Ludvipol), Rovno Oblast, where the Nazis shot more than 1,000 prisoners of the local ghetto in 1942.[3167]
On 25 February 2024, a memorial sign dedicated to the Holocaust victims killed by the Nazis in the Stalag 23 camp in Lvov was painted with the inscription "death to the Jews".[3168]
On 12 April 2024, a man drew a swastika on the building of a Jewish canteen near the pilgrimage quarter of Bratslav Hasidic Jews in Uman, Cherkasy Oblast.[3169]
Antisemitic attitudes among certain groups are also maintained by the Ukrainian authorities, who are actively trying to rewrite the history of the Great Patriotic War and use such falsifications to rehabilitate Nazi criminals by distorting the real facts about the Holocaust in Ukraine and the role of Ukrainian nationalists in it. After the 2014 coup d'état, Ukrainian politicians (as well as their Western mentors, in particular the US Embassy in Kiev) stopped mentioning even in statements on the anniversaries of the tragedy that Ukrainian nationalists, including members of the OUN, organized and executed these brutal massacres. Referring to the tragic events in Babi Yar and the fact that the Soviet Union allegedly 'did not notice the tragedy' became a separate element of the 'oratorical skills' of such authors, including Vladimir Zelenskiy and people close to him. Meanwhile, Ukrainian politicians began to "torpedo" the project to build a memorial complex in Babi Yar, citing the alleged involvement of Russian businessmen in financing the project. Such an attitude of the Kiev regime with regard to the Babi Yar tragedy is not surprising: recalling this tragedy raises many uncomfortable questions for the authorities. On the one hand, the Ukrainian collaborators committed a crime by playing a role in the tragedy. On the other hand, it is undeniable evidence that it was the Red Army that stopped the Nazi machine of mass murder by liberating Kiev. Therefore, this situation clearly demonstrates that the ideological ancestors of the Kiev regime are criminals and murderers, and that the Soviet authorities and Red Army soldiers who are now "banned" are genuine heroes. Thus, it is not surprising to hear the news of October 2023 that the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory planned to hold an official discussion at the Kiev History Museum on the 82nd anniversary of the mass shooting of Jews at Babi Yar (11 October) on the topic "Is Babi Yar needed after Bucha?" The event's philosophy was to find out whether it was worth remembering the tragedy of the 20th century against the backdrop of the current conflict. However, as the Palestinian-Israeli conflict escalated on 7 October 2023, the idea was abandoned.[3170]
The sharp increase in pressure on Russians and Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine in 2022 did not mean that all the problems of other national minorities in the country were solved. The languages of other national communities, particularly Hungarian, were also subjected to the forced Ukrainianization. In December 2020, following the appeal of Taras Kremen, Commissioner for the Protection of Official Languages, to the Ukrainian Prosecutor General, all decisions of the Beregovskiy and Vinogradovskiy district councils, Zakarpatye Oblast, on the functioning of regional languages were declared illegal and revoked.[3171]
Budapest and Bucharest still have serious concerns about the continuing infringement of the rights of compatriots in Ukraine. They note that Kiev has not abandoned its attempts to assimilate the Hungarian and Romanian communities and continues its policy of depriving them of the opportunity to use their native language "outside the home" and receive education in it. It is no coincidence that in January 2023 the Hungarian and Romanian Ombudsmen for Human Rights announced their plans to visit Ukraine in the near future in order to find out at the site to what extent Law No. 8224 on National Minorities (Communities) adopted by the Verkhovnaya Rada on 13 December 2022 actually meets the task of protecting their rights.
The dismantling of the Turul sculpture in Mukachevo's Palanok Castle (Zakarpatye Oblast) on 13 October 2022, which was replaced by a Ukrainian trident, was a blatant violation by the Ukrainian authorities of the Hungarian community's right to preserve its cultural identity, as stated in the Law.
The Kiev regime exerted brutal pressure on the Hungarian community living in the Zakarpatye Oblast. At the end of 2020, armed Ukrainian Special Forces searched Laszio Brenzovich's residence and the headquarters of the Transcarpathian Hungarian Cultural Society for signs of separatist activity. The pretext for the raids was the fact that the Hungarian national anthem had been performed in a meeting of the organization. According to members of the Society, such things have also happened before at ceremonial events where no decisions are made, but no one paid attention to it. The organization believes that the actions of the Ukrainian Special Forces, which are founded on baseless political accusations, are aimed at preventing Hungarian organizations from carrying out their activities and intimidating the Transcarpathian Hungarians and their leaders.[3172]
The administrative changes taking place in the country also pose a threat to the interests of ethnic minorities. Thus, on 17 July 2020, the Verkhovnaya Rada decided to enlarge Beregov district where Hungarians accounted for 76 percent of the population. According to Josip Borto, deputy head of the Zakarpatye Regional Council and MP of the Party of Hungarians of Ukraine, the percentage of the Hungarian minority decreased to 43 percent after the expansion of its territory by adding Vinogradov district. A similar situation can be observed in all the areas across Zakarpatye Oblast, which were densely populated by this nationality. Thus, after the enlargement of Uzhgorod district, Hungarians accounted for only 13 percent of the total population instead of 33 percent, and in Mukachevo district – 4 percent instead of 12 percent.[3173]
On 8 December 2023, Kiev adopted the Law on Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine Concerning the Consideration of the Expert Assessment of the Council of Europe and its Bodies on the Rights of National Minorities (Communities) in Certain Spheres under pressure from European institutions, which secured a number of rights for minorities whose languages are official languages of the EU. In particular, this includes the right to basic and specialized secondary education in mother tongue, except for subjects related to the study of the Ukrainian language, Ukrainian literature and history of Ukraine, as well as the defence of Ukraine, which are taught in the state language; to higher education in mother tongue in private educational institutions provided that the state language is studied as a separate academic discipline; waiving the requirement to publish at least 50 percent of book titles in the state language for publishing products in minority languages, which are official languages of the EU; the reduction of quotas of up to 30 percent of the total length of programmes and broadcasts in the state language for TV and radio broadcasters working in the languages of national minorities; the dissemination of election campaign materials, as well as indoor and outdoor advertising (for settlements where national minorities traditionally reside or constitute a significant part of the population), made in the respective languages of national minorities with mandatory duplication in the state language, etc.
However, the measures taken have not been satisfactory to Budapest, which believes that they are not adequate and "do not bring the restoration of the rights of Transcarpathian Hungarians any closer to the pre‑2015 status quo". The Hungarian side continues to demand legislative safeguards of the rights of the Hungarian national minority to use their mother tongue outside of special lessons, secondary school final exams to be permanently organized in Hungarian, the organization of exams in the subjects of Hungarian grammar and literature, the celebration of national holidays or the use of symbols associated with them, the establishment of cultural and educational institutions for national minorities, and representation of national minorities in Parliament.
Budapest's ongoing dialog with Kiev on this issue has not yet resulted in a solution acceptable to both sides.
Members of the Romanian community also claim that their rights have been violated as a result of the language and administrative reforms carried out by the Ukrainian authorities. The redrawing of the borders of the districts densely populated by members of this minority resulted in the creation of new administrative-territorial units in which the Romanians account for about 10 percent of the total population. For them, this means loss of representation in the country's parliament and its decrease in local councils, as well as forced assimilation in violation of Ukraine's international obligations.[3174]
The fact that the majority of persons belonging to ethnic or national minorities in Ukraine are at risk of discrimination and stigmatization has been pointed out by international human rights monitoring mechanisms. Among others, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination noted that radical right-wing organizations operating in the country, such as the Right Sector, the Azov Civilian Corps and the Social National Assembly, promote activities that amount to incitement to racial hatred and racist propaganda.[3175] There have been numerous instances of intolerance propaganda on the Internet. Racist and antisemitic content is posted on specific websites promoting a nationalist agenda.[3176] Ukraine's human rights organizations have noted an increase in cases of xenophobia and aggression against foreigners in law-enforcement agencies. Detention, arrests and document checks based on a person's race and ethnicity are still widespread.
The CERD expressed its concern at reports of a rise in racist hate speech and discriminatory statements in the public discourse, at rallies, including by public and political figures, in the media and on the Internet, directed mainly against minorities.[3177]
In November 2021, the Human Rights Committee indicated that hate speech is widespread in the country, and hate crimes against minorities are frequently committed by members of right-wing organizations. These minority groups included Roma, Hungarians, Crimean Tatars, etc.[3178]
Human rights defenders have recorded dozens of instances of intolerant and/or aggressive conduct against persons belonging to minorities or holding alternative political views in Ukraine. They are particularly concerned about illegal actions by the members of radical nationalist organizations (S14, Right Sector, Tradition and Order, National Corps, National Vigilantes, OUN, etc.). Their violent actions are almost entirely ignored by Ukraine's law enforcement bodies. The right-wing radicals make no attempt to hide the fact that their activities are closely coordinated with the SSU and Interior Ministry. Moreover, Ukrainian officials are involved in the persecution of this national minority.[3179]
There are still stereotypes and prejudices against Roma. Members of this community often become victims of aggression, up to its most extreme manifestations – physical attacks and murders.[3180]
International human rights organizations and bodies have noted that the Ukrainian justice system barely responds to attacks on the Roma community by nationalists.[3181]
For more detailed information on the facts of persecution of Roma in Ukraine, see the joint report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation on the human rights situation in individual countries.
Even deputies of non-European appearance have been subjected to attacks by nationalists. On 13 August 2021, Jean Beleniuk (his father is Rwandan, his mother is Ukrainian), a Verkhovnaya Rada deputy from the "Servant of the People" party, was insulted in Kiev by two radicals who called him a "black monkey" and suggested that he "go back to Africa".
The international community was shocked by the manifestations of racism against Asian and African nationals in Ukraine reported in February-March 2022.These included the beating of students from India for their country's refusal to vote against Russia in the UN General Assembly; rude treatment of Africans wishing to leave Ukraine; negative attitude towards Chinese citizens, etc.
Many testimonies of victims who had been subjected to racial discrimination while trying to leave the country with Ukrainians were published in the media. In particular, there is a clearly visible pattern of people of African and Asian descent being prevented from boarding trains or buses, being taken out of vehicles, and being held in separate queues at border checkpoints.
Concern about the situation of African citizens in Ukraine was expressed by the African Union in its statement of 28 February 2022, noting that the "singling out" of Africans and unacceptable dissimilar treatment of them were shockingly racist.
Ukrainian authorities have openly exerted pressure on the media, interfering in the work of those media outlets whose editorial policy and opinions contradict the position of official Kiev. The independent work of journalists is being restricted and attempts are being made to tighten censorship. Intelligence services often interfere in the activities of the media and public organizations that hold alternative views to the official position.[3182] Criminal prosecution remains a common means of exerting pressure on dissenting journalists by the Kiev regime. Repeated searches were conducted in the editorial offices of news agencies. Like in many other spheres, those journalists who have in any way demonstrated their sympathies for the "Russian world" and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church are the first to be persecuted. Any attempts by journalists to publicize information that differs from the official point of view trigger accusations by Kiev officials of "distorting reality" and violating Ukrainian law. It is not surprising that the level of aggression against media workers remains high. There have been repeated cases of right-wing radical "activists" blocking television channels undesirable to Kiev and just cases of neo‑Nazis attacking media workers.
There are also cases of Russophobia in the media sphere. On 31 March 2023, the Law "On Media," aimed against the representatives of the media deemed unwanted by the authorities, came into effect. The ban to publish "materials containing popularization or propaganda of the bodies of the aggressor-state," as well as "false materials" (the criteria for such materials are very vague), provided by the law, virtually introduces a total control over the media[3183] and allows for extra-judicial blocking of any media outlet and an effective ban to publish any, even neutral, information about Russia. Besides, the law reinforces language quotas: since January 2024, the share of the Ukrainian language on the national TV has had to be 90 percent rather than 75 percent.
More details about the suppression of the media activities in Ukraine is to be found in the Joint Report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus "Human Rights Situation in Certain Countries".
While the Ukrainian authorities are trying to gain full control over the law-abiding media offering an alternative view of the situation in the country, the notorious Myrotvorets website, which blatantly violates citizens' right to privacy, operates in the country without any hindrance. The website publishes illegally collected personal data of Ukrainian citizens and foreigners who are considered to be "separatists" or "enemies of Ukraine," including reporters, politicians, celebrities and even Russian diplomats.
Ukrainian special services and radical nationalist structures actively use the said web resource to exert psychological pressure on those who they accuse of "separatism and high treason". People who found themselves in the Myrotvorets data base automatically become targets of persecution from the local special services and aggressive actions of national radicals. The most outrageous case involved the publication of personal data, including the home address, of writer Oles Buzina and journalist Pavel Sheremet. Shortly after the publication of this information on the website, they were killed. Ukrainian radicals were accused of the involvement in their assassinations many times, however, despite numerous calls from the international community; these cases are not being investigated.
The Italian journalist Andrea Rocchelli, the former MP from the Party of Regions Oleg Kalashnikov, the militiaman Roman Dyumaev, the Russian journalist Darya Dugina were also killed, as well as many others. Ukrainian public figures deemed inconvenient were illegally persecuted as well. Many of them, as, for example, the supreme ataman of the Vernoye kazachestvo (loyal kozakdom) organization Alexey Selivanov, had to leave Ukraine for fear of their lives. After a person from the "black list" dies, his profile states "eliminated". This was also the case with the Italian businessman and politician Silvio Berlusconi.
In many other similar cases, when people, for example, the media representatives, were included in the base of the Myrotvorets extremist website, their bank accouns were frozen because they were included in the list of the "enemies of Ukraine". It is also known that in May 2016, Governor of the National Bank of Ukraine Valeria Gontareva signed a letter addressed to Ukrainian organizations and enterprises recommending using the Mirotvorets website to obtain data necessary to "combat abuses in the financial sector and terrorism financing". Moreover, the fact that Ukrainian courts use information on Mirotvorets at all stages of judicial proceedings as an evidentiary foundation, was pointed out by the Uspishna Varta NGO that discovered more than 100 court decisions on criminal cases with reasonings citing materials from the Mirotvorets website.[3184]
Mirotvorets editor-in-chief Roman Zaitsev, in his interview with the Fakty Ukrainian newspaper on 14 March 2021, made it clear that this web resource was supported by the Ukrainian authorities (ministries of foreign affairs, internal affairs and defence, the SBU, border services), as well as foreign (Western) intelligence agencies.
To date, more than 240,000 people are listed in the Myrotvorets database, of which about 75 thousand are Russians. Among other things, the personal information of 300 minors was published on the website. In October 2021, a 12-year-old resident of Lugansk Faina Savenkova, who allegedly "poses a threat to the national security of Ukraine," was included in the Myrotvorets database. The reason thereof was her open appeal to the members of the UN Security Council on the Children's Day where she drew attention to the situation of children in Donbass.
In January 2022, Myrotvorets announced the opening of a new activity track – the fight against unscrupulous law enforcement officers who allegedly fabricate criminal cases. However, the website administrators included in this category only those investigators and prosecutors who conducted criminal proceedings against ATO veterans and members of nationalist battalions, as well as against MP Sofia Fedina who made extremist statements.
International human rights mechanisms have brought attention to the issues caused by the operation of this notorious Internet resource. In November 2021, the UN Human Rights Committee pointed out the lack of information about the results of criminal investigations into the operation of the controversial Myrotvorets website. What it meant was disclosure of personal data of thousands of Ukrainians and other people allegedly linked to "armed groups" or labeled "terrorists" by the web resource.[3185] The HRCttee attached great importance to this issue. It is suggested, among other things, by the fact that the recommendation to ensure the right to privacy, including in the context of the Myrotvorets website, was listed by the Committee as an issue to be reported on within a year.
Not only do the Kiev authorities glorify Nazism and its accomplices during the Great Patriotic War, but they also put into practice many ideas of the Nazi regime. In the spirit of the best Nazi examples, they are waging a campaign to purge political circles of undesirable figures and forces that oppose the biased domestic and foreign policy and create competition to the ruling circles. To accomplish these aims, they are actively using the country's intelligence services and judicial system. The main reason for persecution is an independent view on the situation in Ukraine that either is different to the official interpretation of the Kiev regime or contains criticism. Russian-speaking public figures are often subject to such unwarranted persecution. The allegations of "working for Russia" are widespread. Such an allegation can be tailored to almost any type of the person's occupation.
Moreover, the Kiev regime generates new lists of "enemies of Ukraine," one of which is Bakterii Russkogo Mira (Bacteria of the Russian World), a recently launched Internet resource. It lists European citizens and organizations that allegedly support the Russian Federation and its policy in different ways. Among others, it listed Russian compatriots and their organizations. Notably, in order to make it to this proscription, it is enough for one not to condemn Russia or to comment positively on something Russian. The website belongs to the Texty organization (texty.org.ua) and records 1,300 people and 900 organizations from 19 Eurepean countries. The organization is financed by George Soros's foundation. It is clear that "the new Myrotvorets," as well as its prototype, will be used to threaten people listed on the website, to persecute people for dissenting views and to intentionally spread hatred between the peoples.
Politically-motivated cases against the unwanted are launched by the Ukrainian authorities under Articles 109 – 114‑2, 258 – 258‑6, 260, 261, 437 – 442 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, including crimes against national security (Articles 109–114-2), crimes against public safety (Articles 258–258-6, 260, 261; as a rule, these articles were applied to militiamen and citizens of DPR and LNR), criminal offenses against peace, security of mankind and international legal order (Articles 437–4423; cases directly connected to hostilities). Besides, there are cases launched for criminal offenses related to the disclosure of state secrets; illegal crossing of the state border; avoidance of mobilization (Articles 328, 330, 332, 335–337 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine); military offenses (disobedience, absence without leave from a military unit, desertion under Articles 402–403, 407 – 409, 422, 427, 429 – 431of the Criminal Code of Ukraine); spread of the communist or Nazi symbols or propaganda; justification, recognition as legitimate or denial of the Russian Federation's armed aggression against Ukraine; glorification of its participants (Article 436 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine).[3186]
In reality, the same provisions of the Ukrainian criminal legislation are used by the Ukrainian authorities to persecute those with dissident views or who said positive things about Russia. As of 15 February 2024, the Prosecutor General's Office of Ukraine reported the launch of 16345 criminal cases on suspicion of committing crimes against national security, including trespass against territorial integrity and inviolability of Ukraine (Article 110 of the Criminal Code) – 3,473 cases; high treason (Article 111 of the Criminal Code) – 3,081 cases; collaboration (Article 111‑1 of the Criminal Code) – 7,286 cases; assistance to the "aggressor state" (Article 111‑2 of the Criminal Code) – 1,081 cases; sabotage (Article 113 of the Criminal Code) – 97 cases.
According to the 2022-2023 report of the Prosecutor General's Office of Ukraine, 195,776 criminal cases under the articles related to the military conflict had been launched. 74,302 cases out of them were launched for political dissent. In 16,571 cases, notifications of suspicion were issued, while in 12,793 cases were brought to court with a charging document.[3187]
A lot of such cases are launched against the residents of the eastern regions of Ukraine. Within two ears, more than 3,000 cases under the Article 111 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine ("high treason") were launched (mostly in the Kharkov and Kiev Oblasts, as well as in the Donetsk, Zaporozhskaya and Kherson Oblasts occupied by Kiev). Besides, residents of the above-mentioned regions, some of which temporarily returned under the UAF's control, come under Articles "collaboration" (111‑1) and "assistance to the aggressor state" (111‑2).[3188] Human rights activists note that these statistical data do not include missing persons and victims of enforced disappearance. Meanwhile, the fact that such people do exist is recognized by some political and public activists in Ukraine. However, the Kiev authorities restrain from covering this neglected issue in the media.
It comes to the point that Ukrainian pensioners who liked posts on Odnoklassniki, VKontakte and other social networks receive jail time. For supporting pro-Russian posts, they face up to 5 years in prison – the same as for theft, murder or rape. From March to September 2022, 99 such verdicts were pronounced, and from October 2022 to September 2023 – another 176 verdicts.[3189]
Public figures and human rights defenders, mainly those who advocate for the rights of Russians in Ukraine and speak out in favour of constructive relations with Russia, have also been subjected to persecution due to fake allegations. An illustrative example is the case of Elena Berezhnaya, a well-known Ukrainian public activist, who is actively defending the rights of the Russian-speaking population and national minorities of Ukraine. Her regular appearances at the UN, OSCE, and other international organizations most likely became one of the main reasons for her persecution from the Ukrainian security services. On 16 March 2022, Elena Berezhnaya was detained by the SBU under the pretext that she was suspected of high treason and has been kept in a pre‑trial detention facility since. Several human rights activists have drawn attention to her case. She herself has also written to the Council of Europe and the OSCE. However, there have been no changes and the activist has still, for more than two years, been kept in detention and tortured.
People who were detained under such charges are kept in terrible conditions and are tortured. According to journalist Nikita Schmelev, who himself was a victim of unwarranted criminal persecution for an article telling that members of the Territorial Defence Forces kill civilians, the main reason for detaining people is their attempts to express their opinion that differ from the official narrative of the Ukrainian authorities. Any critical statement against the Ukrainian authorities – in the social networks, in the media, even during a conversation on a street, in the public transport–immediately makes a Ukrainian person an "enemy of the motherland", a "separatist" or a "collaborationist". The majority of those who were accused of treason or assistance to the aggressive war, according to the SBU investigators, prosecutors and judges, shared information directly with soldiers or citizens of the Russian Federation. This "secret" information was found in open sources on the Internet, which was also stated in the indictment. Almost every person detained under "political" articles was severely beaten during the detention. The conditions for "political" detainees were different from those of criminals, i.e. much worse: small cells did not have the most basic everyday objects. The prison staff ill-treated and, among other things, tortured them. The scale of such illegal detentions is quite large. According to Nikita Schmelev, he shared the cell with five more people who were arrested for similar reasons. Meanwhile, many more such detainees were kept in the pre-trial detention centre; only in one building, where "separatists" were kept, there were 172 people.[3190]
In the spring of 2022, there were numerous cases of persecution of public figures in Ukraine who dared to express their independent judgments about the situation in the country and to support the canonical Ukrainian Orthodox Church. For example, in March 2022, Yan Taksiur, a writer, satirist, publicist and TV host, was detained. The reason was the satirist's literary works that allegedly "undermined the sovereignty of the state." Yan Taksiur was kept in a pre‑trial detention facility, despite the fact that he had serious health issues. A few months later he was released on bail.
In June 2022, Mikhail Pogrebinskiy, a well-known Ukrainian political scientist, was charged in absentia with high treason. He was accused of "repeatedly participating in TV programs and talk shows as an "expert" and pushing threadbare Russian narratives aimed at destabilizing the socio-political situation in the country". Earlier, in March 2022, Pogrebinskiy's apartment was searched.
The media also reported detentions of activist Alexander Gorbenko; political scientist and journalist Dimitry Dzhangirov; political scientist Yuriy Dudkin, who took part in live broadcasts of the channels 112‑Ukraine, NewsOne, and ZIK, which were closed by the Kiev regime; politicians and anti-fascists, brothers Mikhail and Alexander Kononovych; political scientist and blogger Gleb Lyashenko; anti-fascist activist Alexander Mayevskiy (he managed to escape during the burning of the Trade Unions House in Odessa on 2 May 2014); communist and anti-fascist Alexander Matyushenko; journalist of the NewsOne and NASH TV channels Max Nazarov; head of the public organization "Slavic Movement "Russia Revived" Alexander Tarnashinskiy; lawyer Dimitriy Tikhonenkov, who advocated for anti-maidan acrivists; journalist Yuriy Tkachev; professor in Nikolayev Law Institute Sergey Shubin and many others.[3191]
The list of political detainees whose fate causes special concerns include Dmitriy Marunich, an energy expert and commentator (detained by the SBU in April 2022; his current whereabouts remain unknown); Alexander Karevin, a historian and publicist from Kiev, an author of book on general history of the Slavic peoples (captured by the SBU on 9 March 2022 in his own apartment, what happened to him is still known); Oleg Novikov, a former MP, a disabled person, an Antimaidan activist (detained by the SBU in April 2022, his current whereabouts remains unknown); Victor Shestakov, the leader of the Russian community in the Poltava Oblast, a writer and journalist (detained by the SBU in July 2023, currently in a pre-trial detention facility).
On 29 July 2024, the SBU reported the detention of "six pro‑Russian Internet propagandists," without, however, naming them. One of the detainees was presented by the special service as a "pseudo-expert" and an "author in several pro-Kremlin publications," who "falsifies historical facts about the establishment and the development of the Ukrainian statehood in his pseudo-scientific works".[3192] Later, it turned out that it was Oleg Vusatyuk, a PhD, a public expert from Kiev National Institute on International Security, who also led the public organization "Ukrainian Academy of Russian Studies" for many years.[3193] [3194] The subject matter of his articles was corresponding. For example, the Russian journal "Svobodnaya mysl" (Free thought) published his article entitled "War for historical memory. How we can stop "zeroing" of the Great Patriotic War" (issue 3/2020).[3195]
Some public figures were convicted. For example, in May 2022, Alexander Matyushenko was sentenced to three years in prison on charges of "trespass against the territorial integrity of Ukraine".[3196] In November 2023, Sergey Shubin, Head of the Department for Humanities in Nikolayev Law Institute, who had been detained by the SBU in June 2022, was sentenced to 15 years in prison.
Jail sentences are given to elderly people, among others, which mean life sentences for them, given their age. For example, in January 2024, Yuriy Chernyshev, an 82-year-old Afghanistan veteran, a holder of the Order of the Red Star, a writer and a journalist, was sentenced to 15 years in prison.
After the start of the special military operation, the SBU, using methods of criminals and terrorists, began to persecute and intimidate local Ukrainian deputies and officials who accepted humanitarian cargoes from Russia or negotiated with the Russian military to organize corridors for evacuating civilians. On 1 March 2022, Vladimir Struk, Mayor of Kremennaya, was kidnapped by men in military uniform. Two days later, his body was discovered bearing signs of torture. On 7 March 2022, Yuriy Prilipko, Mayor of Gostomel, was found dead. He negotiated with the Russian military to establish a humanitarian corridor for civilians. On 24 March 2022, Gennady Macegora, Mayor of Kupyansk, published a video calling on Zelenskiy and his administration to release his daughter, who had been kidnapped by SBU agents to put pressure on the official. The media also reported the detention of Alexander Brukhanov, Mayor of Yuzhnoye, Alexander Zamiraylo, a Cherkasy City Council member from the "Opposition Platform – For Life" party, Ilya Karamalikov, a Kherson City Council member, Vladimir Klimenko, a Mariupol City Council member, Igor Kolesnikov, a politician, Eduard Konovalov, Mayor of Stary Saltov, Victor Ladukha, Mayor of Buryn, Andrey Lazurenko, a member of Solonitsevka village council of the Kharkov Oblast.
In 2023, the Kiev regime continued to cleanse the political space of alternative opinions. On 25 July 2023, the SBU accused of treason Evgueny Muraev, a former member of the Verkhovnaya Rada, leader of the now prohibited "Nashi" party.[3197] The same month a case against another former MP, Vadim Rabinovich, was launched. He was arrested in absentia.[3198]
Ukrainian security agencies started to actively persecute civilians as well, primarily Russian-speaking. A significant number of criminal cases is processed because the accused allegedly worked for the Russian security services. However, there are cases when the people are persecuted for attracting public attention to undue behaviour of the Ukrainian soldiers. For example, in early April 2024, in Kharkov, the SBU detained a 54-year-old headmistress of School 38 who publically complained about UAF militants using drugs on the territory of an educational institution. The woman published photos in social networks depicting used syringes scattered by the militants on the school premises and empty packagings for drug addicts, collected by janitors, and thus criticizing the "defenders". A few days after, the teacher was detained, given a "serious talk" and launched a criminal case against.[3199]
At the same time, information about the arrests of six former employees of Ukraine's design institutes (they often become suspects in working for Russia) came to be known. According to the so-called "investigation," they designed scientific and research documentation to modernize Russian nuclear plants, namely the Kursk, Rostov, Novovoronezh and Balakovo plants, at the request of Rosatom Russian state company. The detained ostensibly were to help connect the Zaporozhskaya power plant to the Russian energy system as well.[3200]
It is not unusual when representatives of the Ukrainian security services directly tell the detainees that the reason for their arrest is the intention to exchange them for Ukrainian soldiers who surrendered to the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.
The Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights in the Russian Federation Tatiana Moskalkova considers about 700 complaints about illegal criminal prosecution in Ukraine for pro-Russian position.
In October 2023, during the discussion of an annual OHCHR report on Ukraine at the meeting of the UN Human Rights Council, the UN Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights Nada Al-Nashif noted that the authorities on the territory under Kiev's control launched almost 6,000 criminal cases for collaboration and that the number of such cases continues to grow. The OHCHR expressed its concern in this regard.[3201]
Numerous detentions of dissenters in Ukraine came in sight of the Western press as well. For example, there was a publication on the topic in the British newspaper "Guardian" on 3 February 2024.[3202] Among other things, it specified that over the last years the SBU launched more that 8,100 criminal cases against Ukrainians for cooperation with Russia. It also noted that those convicted under these articles are kept in separate prisons and in isolation from other prisoners. Many people interviewed by the newspaper said that they were pressured to sign the confession. We also cannot but note that although this publication acknowledged persecution of the opposition and ordinary people of dissenting views in Ukraine, however, the material was compiled as a description of "traitors and collaborationists" and used the corresponding negative language without expressing any sympathy to people (even their colleagues, fellow journalists) who fell victims of the crimes of the Kiev regime.
Official Helsinki has a fairly balanced attitude to issues related to the history of the Second World War. There have been no attempts by the Finnish authorities to question its outcome in general. Revanchist associations promoting the idea of returning to Finland the land lost after the Second World War remain marginalized and do not enjoy any noticeable support in the Finnish society.
At the same time, noteworthy is the discussion started after Finland's decision to join NATO on possible revision of the international legal status of the Aland Islands, in particular, there have been speculations regarding the refusal of the demilitarized status of the Archipelago, as well as statements about "undesirability" of the presence of the Russian Consulate there. However, that would contradict the provisions of the 1940 USSR–Finland Agreement on the Aland Islands and the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty. A campaign to collect signatures in support of a so-called citizens' initiative to close the Russian Consulate on the Aland Islands in Finland was instigated, but failed to garner the required 50,000 signatures for submission to the Finnish Parliament. Currently, according to the decision of the Joint Committee on Foreign and Security Policy of President and the Finnish Government, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland is conducting a legal review of Finland's international obligations to ensure the Russian consular presence on the Aland Islands. In November 2023, the Parliament of Finland adopted the report of the Finnish Foreign Ministry stating the country's commitment to fulfil its obligations, including maintaining the demilitarized status of the Aland Islands and maintaining of the Russian Consulate there.
Following the shared confrontation policy of the EU and the "collective West," in 2022 and in 2023 Finland voted against the resolution "Combating glorification of Nazism, neo-Nazism and other practices that contribute to fuelling contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance," which is adopted annually at the initiative of Russia and other co-sponsors in the framework of the UN Assembley and condemns various manifestations of whitewashing Nazism and its henchmen. This policy looks all the more ignoble as it contradicts the internal policy of the Finnish authorities.
Finland's current position of refusing to condemn the glorification of Nazism also calls into question the very attitude of its current authorities towards the country's role in Nazi Germany's aggression against the Soviet Union. On 1 August 2024, the Supreme Court of the Republic of Karelia, on the application of the prosecutor of that Russian region, recognised the actions of the Nazi invaders, the occupation authorities and the Finnish troops on the territory of Karelia during the Great Patriotic War as genocide and war crimes. By the court's decision, the crimes committed by the Nazi invaders, occupation authorities and Finnish troops on the territory of the Republic of Karelia during the Great Patriotic War from 1941 to 1944 against at least 86 thousand Soviet citizens, who were members of the civilian population and prisoners of war serving in the Red Army (the Armed Forces of the USSR), were recognised as "war crimes and crimes against humanity as defined in the Charter of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal of 8 August 1945 <...> genocide of national, ethnic and racial groups constituting the population of the USSR, the peoples of the Soviet Union".
A considerable amount of evidence was considered during the trial, including archival documents, criminal case files, and witness testimony. According to the Russian Prosecutor General's Office, during the period of occupation "the Finns set up more than 100 concentration and labour camps for the civilian population and Soviet prisoners of war in the republic". Already by the end of 1941 there were more than 20 thousand people in them, mostly women, old people and children, the number of whom in April 1942 reached almost 24 thousand. Later on, the total number of prisoners held in concentration camps fluctuated between 15,000 and 18,000, which was about 20 percent of the total population under occupation. During the Finnish occupation only in Petrozavodsk concentration camps "more than seven thousand prisoners died". In total, 8,028 civilians were killed and tortured, and more than 18,000 Soviet prisoners of war died in Finnish and German camps.[3203]
Finnish legislation does not explicitly prohibit Nazi, neo-Nazi or any other radical ideology, and Nazi symbols are not banned by law. However, the authorities still combat such phenomena within the framework of existing legal provisions. In particular, such cases may be qualified in Finland as "incitement to ethnic hatred" (paragraphs 10 and 10 (a) of Chapter 11 of the Criminal Code), although experts recognize that the threshold for the application of the relevant articles for the purposes of criminal prosecution is quite high.
The presence of swastika in the symbols of some Finnish Air Force units is still noteworthy. The debate on this topic took place once again in June 2022, on the occasion of the celebration of the Flag Day of the Finnish Air Forces. In response to criticism, the military stress that the symbol has a long history and began to be used by the Finnish Air Force in 1918, long before Hitler came to power in Germany. In addition, the symbol can still be found on one of the country's highest State decorations, the Cross of Liberty (Vapaudenristi), which, in particular, is depicted on the Standard of the President of Finland.
During the summer of 2023, a number of scandals erupted, causing the first major crisis of the newly formed Finnish government. They were related to members of the Finnish government from the right-wing populist and anti-immigrant Finns Party. Thus, Finnish Minister of Economic Affairs Vilhelm Junnila resigned after only 11 days in office. The information campaign against Vilhelm Junnila was based on the facts of his systematic links with extreme right-wing movements.[3204] During his previous parliamentary term (2019-2023), he repeatedly tried to lobby for additional State funding for the NGO Brotherly Aid, a union of veterans of the Finnish volunteer unit that fought in the Waffen-SS and their relatives. Vilhelm Junnila was also reminded of his 2019 parliamentary enquiry in which he recommended that the Government promote abortion in African countries in order to curb overpopulation and the climate carbon footprint of "undeveloped societies."
In the past, Riikka Purra, Minister of Finance in the rank of Deputy Prime Minister and Head of the Finns Party, made openly racist statements about national minorities, (later she was forced to apologize for her 15‑year‑old statements on social media – comments in a derogatory tone against immigrants, assuming the possibility of violence against them, etc.),[3205] as well as the successor of V. Junnila, V. Rüdman (his disparaging remarks about migrants in his correspondence on social networks came into the public eye).[3206] Both, however, kept their ministerial seats despite the opposition's insistent demands for their resignation. Finnish ex-President (before 1 March, 2024) Niinistö did not ignore the situation either, calling on the Government to clearly indicate "zero tolerance towards racism," which would be "a good signal, including to the outside world."
The scandals provoked a broad public debate on the situation of racism in Finland. 26 Islamic associations and organisations published a joint appeal to the government demanding that it condemn hate speech more actively and take concrete action to eradicate racist thinking in the country.[3207] Migrants who had travelled to Finland from various countries began to speak out about their personal experiences of racism in their daily lives and workplaces.[3208] Large‑scale protest demonstrations were organised.[3209] The Finnish press drew attention to sociological studies showing that Finland is perceived by people from African countries as one of the most racist countries in the European Union.[3210]
On the brink of a crisis, the current Government had responded to public demand by drafting and adopting a statement on measures to promote equality, equity and non-discrimination in Finnish society,[3211] which included such steps as launching a Government-led campaign to combat racism involving labour market associations and civil society organizations, strengthening the relevant dialogue with NGOs, strengthening the preventive work of law enforcement agencies, proposing to criminalize Holocaust denial, etc. Although there are useful initiatives among the proposed measures, the statement received mixed reactions[3212] from interest groups, and the opposition strongly criticised the document,[3213] expressing doubts about the Cabinet's intention to implement it.
The right-wing radical movement in Finland is generally poorly organized, and experts estimate the total number of its active members at several hundred. Until recently, the largest right-wing organization in Finland has been the neo-Nazi Nordic Resistance Movement (Pohjoismainen Vastarintaliike, also known as the NRM), which shared openly neo-Nazi views and defended them, including by violent means. After the Supreme Court finally banned the activities of the movement in 2020, there are no major right-wing radical organizations left in Finland. However, some right-wing radical groups and initiatives continue to exist.
Of the current structures, the most prominent is the "Soldiers of Odin," which has assigned itself the mission of "patrolling the streets" and is opposed to "uncontrolled immigration, Islamisation, the EU and globalization." Despite its radical attitudes, the organization is officially listed in the Finnish NGO register, has cells in 34 municipalities and periodically participates in rallies where it publicly presents its "values." In addition, the Blue-and-Black Movement (Sinimusta Liike), which is making active efforts to enter the political arena, has attracted public attention. In particular, this structure, which makes no secret of the closeness of its ideological base to classical fascism, obtained registration with the Finnish authorities as a political party in 2022, and in April 2023 took part in Parliamentary elections (88 candidates in four constituencies), where it hoped to win at least one parliamentary mandate (it lost the election with less than 0.1 percent of the vote). In addition, still active is the Towards Freedom! movement (Kohti vapautta), whose members essentially continue the work of the banned Nordic Resistance Movement, but under a different label. There are also less structured nationalist movements that form around specific events, usually on Finland's Independence Day on 6 December.
A separate group consists of organizations that advocate stricter migration policies. Examples include protest movement Close the Borders! (Rajat kiinni!) and political party Finnish People First (Suomen Kansa Ensin), created by its former members and registered in 2018.
The Finnish authorities do not take actions against organizations fighting neo-Nazism – like right-wing radicals, anti-fascists freely participate in demonstrations as long as they act within the legal framework.
There were no restrictions on activists organizing Victory Day events. In the area of preserving the memory of servicemen who died in World War II, the 1992 bilateral intergovernmental agreement regulating responsibility for the maintenance of Soviet war graves in Finland and Finnish war graves in Russia remains in force. The Finnish authorities continue to fully observe their obligations under this document.
With regard to acts of vandalism, misconduct of this kind against Soviet/Russian war memorial sites has not been widespread in Finland. In 2022‑2024 several episodes of the kind were reported. In May 2022, on the eve of the Victory Day, perpetrators desecrated several memorial tombstones in Kirkkonummi, by spraying them with coloured paint. The tombstones were promptly cleaned and the offence was reported to the local police, who opened an investigation into the incident. In February 2023, the burial place of Soviet soldiers in the Kivikko cemetery in the Helsinki suburb of Malmi was vandalised twice. Offensive inscriptions were written and the monument was set on fire, causing substantial damage. Criminal proceedings were instituted in connection with the vandalism. In November of the same year, perpetrators smeared with dark paint several inscription plates on an obelisk at the burial place of Soviet soldiers in Kivilannummi (a suburb of Salo) and wrote the text "Glory to Ukraine" in Latin letters on its edge. The Finnish authorities assumed the financial costs of tidying up the monument. On 9 May 2024, unknown persons once again poured red paint on the memorial sign at the burial site in the Kivikko cemetery. Employees of the Russian Embassy in Finland eliminated the consequences of the vandalism, but on 24 May 2024, the monument was again sprayed with paint and a swastika was drawn on it. The police have launched an investigation into the incident.
Despite Finland's increased attention to the human rights agenda and its image as a "model country" in this field, official Helsinki still has unresolved human rights problems. Among other things, there are numerous difficulties in countering manifestations of racism and racial discrimination among law enforcement officials. There have been repeated cases of ethnic profiling in public order policing. In 2021, in fact, the police publicly admitted to the press[3214] that in 2013-2017 they had purposefully tracked the movement of Roma in the metropolitan area. On 8 September 2022, the Supreme Administrative Court convicted those Helsinki police officers who in 2016 had stopped two black women in the street as part of street prostitution monitoring:[3215] the Court qualified the police officers' actions as discriminatory because they were found to have had no other reason to conduct the check other than the ethnicity of the passers-by.
The presence of persons with racist attitudes among Finnish law enforcement officers has been confirmed in a number of internal checks. At the beginning of 2022, the Helsinki Police Department dismissed an officer who had corresponded inappropriately about minorities with a colleague.[3216] Earlier, in 2021, two law enforcement officers in the capital were fired due to similar behaviour. Such incidents have been recorded in other police departments in Finland.
Universal and regional human rights mechanisms (in particular CESCR and the HRCttee, as well as ECRI) have drawn attention to cases of racial or ethnic profiling among Finnish police officers. The need to combat racial profiling in law enforcement agencies as well as manifestations of hatred and discrimination was one of the frequent recommendations for Finland during the Universal Periodic Review under the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) in November 2022.[3217]
It should also be noted that the Finnish authorities recognise the increasing right-wing extremist sentiment in society. This has been emphasised by the Finnish Security Police, SUPO, in particular in its annual report. Such ideas have also spread among law enforcement officials. An investigation in 2020-2022 revealed a group of right-wing radicals in the Finnish Police. As a result, three officers were dismissed, two of whom were suspected of preparing to commit an offence.
The Finnish society in general is wary of immigrants on a domestic level (as pointed out by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in 2017),[3218] and employment and self-fulfilment opportunities for foreigners, especially those of non-European origin, are traditionally worse than for Finnish citizens. In particular, Russian-speaking residents of Finland, as well as other foreigners, have faced negative attitudes toward them, including on the basis of language or origin, as the results of relevant surveys showed.
The UN Committee against Torture in May 2024 expressed concern about the significant number of hate crimes and racist prejudice, which, according to its data, continues to increase. The Committee indicated that only a small number of such offences had been prosecuted. CAT had also noted an increase in hostile attitudes towards members of ethnic or religious minorities, including people of African descent, Roma, Muslims and Russian and Swedish speakers. The latter is particularly noteworthy as it confirms the well-known truth that any form of hate speech – in this case Russophobic – will only expand to include other ethnic, racial and linguistic components if not addressed at the outset.
The Committee is also concerned about the increase in the number of reported violent attacks against migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers, while it notes with concern the increase in anti-immigrant, racist and xenophobic discourse among politicians. The CAT experts were dissatisfied with the lack of information on the impact and effectiveness of the Finnish authorities' policy and awareness-raising measures in reducing incidents of hate speech and hate crimes, and the ineffective collection of such data by the competent authorities.[3219]
Finland continues to record cases of violations of the rights of migrants and Roma who face discrimination and harassment in areas such as employment, housing and education. Refugees are subject to a number of restrictions in the processing of their respective status, including not being allowed to add new information to repeated asylum applications and obstacles to family reunification, including income requirements. The alternatives to detention that were introduced, such as "prescribed residence", also include restrictive reporting obligations.
The Finnish authorities are steadily tightening their migrant policy. In spring 2022, in order to counter "hybrid threats," including the migration crisis and the large number of asylum seekers, the Border Guard Act was amended to allow the Finnish authorities to limit the reception of asylum applications in emergency circumstances by concentrating them at only one or a few border crossings. This change was received with concern by international human rights bodies. In her letter to the Finnish Minister of the Interior dated 27 July 2022, the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe[3220], while generally understanding the concerns of Finns, drew attention to the fact that the provisions introduced may lead to violation of the universal principle of non-refoulement of a person to his/her home country where he/she may be in danger, and could also contribute to depriving foreigners of the fundamental right to claim asylum if they are turned away en masse at the border. The letter also draws attention to the fact that the measures envisaged by the amendments may result in migrants being placed more frequently in special centres located at the border.
A separate risk group includes seasonal workers from developing countries with poor knowledge of the local language and legislation, who are almost entirely dependent on their employers. Thus, in autumn 2023, it became known that the Finnish police had completed an investigation into the large-scale exploitation of berry pickers from Thailand in Finland, which took place in 2020-2022.[3221] There are five suspects in the case, and the potential number of victims exceeds 2,000. The collected materials have been submitted to the Finnish prosecutor's office for a decision on bringing charges in court. In Thailand, with which Finland has co-operated in the case, investigations are still ongoing. It is also known that Finland is not the only EU country where similar cases have been recorded over the years.
On 16 June 2024, Finland adopted a draft Act on Temporary Measures for the Prevention of Instrumentalised Migration, which, according to many experts, contradicts a number of provisions of the Finnish Constitution and the norms of international conventions. It is seen by the country's leaders as the most effective mechanism to counter the flow of migrants seeking to enter the European Union through Finland under the guise of refugees. The act is supposed to limit the acceptance of applications for international protection at "certain parts of the Russian-Finnish border" in case the Finnish authorities come to the conclusion that a foreign state seeks to use migration to influence Finland. According to the country's Prime Minister P. Orpo and Interior Minister M. Rantanen, the Finnish government is allegedly forced to take "Russian hybrid influence-driven" steps contrary to international norms in the country's best interests and to protect the external border of the EU and NATO.
The UN Human Rights Committee,[3222] the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,[3223] the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the UN Committee against Torture (CAT) have all drawn attention to migrant issues. CRC has raised the issue of various forms of discrimination against migrant children. More generally, it expressed concern at the persistence of discrimination against children and young people in Finland on grounds of gender, age, language, national or ethnic origin, migration status, disability, religious affiliation. It also drew attention to violence and bullying against children from vulnerable groups on the Internet and in everyday life, including bullying in schools, and suggested research into the root causes of such violence. The Committee also highlighted the problem of obtaining quality education free from discriminatory attitudes for children from vulnerable categories, which included migrants, Roma, persons with disabilities and children from disadvantaged families, as well as Sami children. CRC experts called on the Finnish authorities to intensify awareness-raising campaigns promoting ideas of equality, which could contribute to changing people's behaviour and transforming discriminatory social norms. CRC also focused on the situation of migrant children in particular, noting the Finnish authorities' obstruction of the reunification of unaccompanied migrant children with their families.[3224]
CAT indicated with concern that recent changes to Finnish legislation, in particular the Aliens Act (No. 301/2004) and the Border Guard Act (No. 578/2005), weakened legal safeguards for asylum-seekers and increased the risk of their expulsion (CAT referred to this as refoulement). According to the Committee's experts, the existing legal regime may result in asylum-seekers who have been victims of torture not always being effectively identified in migration centres. Separately, the CPT drew attention to the fact that appeals against decisions on expulsion, return, transfer or extradition may not have automatic suspensive effect and persons who have appealed against decisions of the Finnish authorities may still be expelled from the country. The Committee has also indicated that the introduction by the Finnish authorities of a fast-track procedure at the borders for asylum applications for applicants from countries recognised as safe, as well as for applicants who have submitted manifestly unfounded claims, in situations of mass arrivals of migrants, may prevent these persons from obtaining fair and effective international protection and asylum, as the fast-track procedure will not allow their claims to be properly examined by the authorities. The comprehensive examination of asylum claims is also hampered by restrictions on applicants to provide new information in subsequent asylum applications. CAT was also concerned that, in practice, non-citizens entering Finland without documentation continued to be placed in detention. They are restricted in their access to social, educational and health services while in a special centre.[3225]
The same problem was highlighted by the EU Agency for Fundamental Human Rights (FRA) in its 2024 Report.[3226]
In her report on her visit to the 56th session of the UN Human Rights Council in April 2024, HRC Special Rapporteur on the right to education F. Shaheed addressed a number of problems faced by migrant children in the educational sphere.[3227] While she generally praised the Finnish education system, she noted that the system is currently facing serious challenges that need to be addressed. For example, the HRC Special Rapporteur noted that the proportion of migrant pupils in Finland has more than doubled in the last 10 years, from 3 percent in 2012 up to 7 percent in 2022. In 2022, there were 4 percent of 15‑year-old pupils who were born in another country (first-generation immigrants). Of these, 42 percent arrived in Finland at the age of 5 or younger, and 20 percent arrived after the age of 12, having completed primary school in another education system. According to the Special Rapporteur, up to 80 percent of pupils in a number of schools in the Greater Helsinki area are now first or second generation migrants whose mother tongue is not Finnish or Swedish. This shift, according to F. Shahid, will have consequences for the integration of such people into society as a whole. She also noted that the figures cited could explain the widening achievement gaps among Finnish schools. In previous years, differences in performance by school, including differences between rural and urban schools, had been small by international standards. Differing performance is also associated with different levels of economic, demographic and wealth structure both between and within regions. This difference has intensified in recent years and affects the performance of educational institutions, especially in the country's largest cities.
With reference to data from the Finnish Centre for Educational Assessment, it is noted that between 2003 and 2018, the differences between pupils in Finnish lower secondary schools in the same school have remained largely stable. By now, these differences have intensified. In basic education schools where the gaps in grades between pupils are large, it is not always possible to bridge the gaps. The gaps themselves persist as pupils move on to upper secondary school. For example, in 2022, non-migrant pupils scored 65 points higher than migrant pupils in maths and 92 points higher in reading. The Special Rapporteur notes that migrant pupils in Finland tend to live in a more socio-economically disadvantaged situation than non-migrant pupils: while 25 percent of all pupils are considered socio-economically disadvantaged, the corresponding proportion among pupils with migrant backgrounds is almost twice as high at 48 percent.
F. Shahid also raised the question to what extent the Finnish education system in its current form ensures social mobility and helps to overcome existing inequalities. According to the Special Rapporteur's data, general and vocational secondary education in Finland are equally valued by Finnish and migrant children, as half of the pupils choose each of them. However, data disaggregated by socioeconomic status, gender, language and migrant background show that in 2021, almost 80 percent of pupils with a migrant background (country of birth or mother tongue) chose vocational rather than general upper secondary education.
Referring to a survey of Roma children conducted by the Finnish Office of the Ombudsman for Children's Rights in 2022 (including with regard to the realisation of their rights to education), F. Shahid noted that there were cases where teachers did not intervene sufficiently in cases of discrimination against Roma pupils. This was pointed out by the participants themselves during the survey. Some of them also reported a lack of support in learning and attending school, and that teachers' prejudice towards Roma and their children had a negative impact on their motivation to learn and their grades at school. It was also noted that some Romani children prefer to study in languages other than Romani in order not to be discriminated against for belonging to the Romani community.[3228]
The repatriation to Finland of children of Finnish citizens from Syrian camps for the families of terrorist fighters has received much less attention from the international community. This problem is common to many European countries whose citizens have taken part in fighting in Syria on the side of terrorist organizations. According to the Finnish Border Guard, in 2012-2016, about 80 Finnish citizens left the country to join the ISIS. In December 2019, the Finnish Government decided to return Finnish children in the camp (more than 30 people). Of them, two returned home, but the repatriation plan was subsequently suspended due to the coronavirus pandemic.
Concerns about the situation of these children were expressed by the Human Rights Committee[3229] in March 2021. This issue was also raised by representatives of several Middle East countries during the next round of the Universal Periodic Review of Finland at the HRC in November 2022.[3230]
In October 2022, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child indicated that Finland should repatriate Finnish children from Syrian refugee camps. The Committee made this decision after considering a communication (individual complaint) from the children's relatives.[3231] This is the second decision of this body on this issue (the first was made in relation to France).
The situation of people of Russian origin in the country remains difficult. According to the Statistics Finland, as of 31 December 2022, more than 71,000 Russian citizens (1.3 percent of the population) lived in the country. The number of people speaking Russian as their mother tongue on the same date was 93,500 (1.7 percent of the population), making Russian the most widely spoken foreign language in Finland.
From a formal point of view, the legal framework of Finnish legislation on national minorities consists of multilateral treaties to which Finland is a party, bilateral agreements (in relations with Russia, the 1992 Treaty on the Foundations of Relations is in force) and national acts (including the Constitution (731/1999), the Non-Discrimination Act (1325/2014), the Act on the Promotion of Immigrant Integration (1386/2010), the Language Act (423/2003), a group of so-called educational acts, including the Basic Education Act (628/1998), etc.).
The Swedish-speaking community (287,000 people, 5.2 percent of the population) is in the most privileged position in legal terms, as their language has the status of the State language along with Finnish. In addition to the Swedes, special attention is declared for the Sami community, the only indigenous people of Finland living compactly in the northern part of the country. It is noteworthy that the legislation mentions the Roma as a minority, but this does not contribute to the complete eradication of discrimination against them.
Legally, the Russian and Russian-speaking communities are categorized as "other groups," which have the right to maintain and develop their own language and culture. Provisions on guarantees for the diaspora are also included in the Russian-Finnish Treaty on the Foundations of Relations, as well as in the specialized 1992 Agreement on Cultural, Educational and Scientific Cooperation, which provides for Finnish support to natives of Russia in preserving their identity and cultural heritage.
Despite legislative guarantees, the Russian-speaking diaspora in Finland faces a number of challenges. In addition to higher unemployment rate than among the Finnish population, the difficulty of finding a job in a profession obtained in the USSR or the Russian Federation remains an important problem for our economically active compatriots. Many are forced to accept low-paid jobs that do not require high qualifications.
Discrimination against non-Finnish communities has affected the Russian community long before 2022. In June 2019, the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities expressed concern about the increased intolerance in Finland in recent years, which has resulted in higher pressure on local national minorities, including Russians. The Committee emphasized, inter alia, that a large proportion of Russians have faced discrimination on the grounds of origin and language. It also pointed out that there has been no mechanism for monitoring Russophobic statements.
Following the start by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation of a special military operation to denazify and demilitarize Ukraine and protect the civilians of Donbass, a large-scale anti-Russian information campaign was launched in the Finnish media, against the background of which an increase in negative and discriminatory attitudes towards local Russian-speaking population was recorded. Their public associations became the object of powerful pressure. The Finnish authorities, for their part, tried to prevent a possible rise in social tensions by repeatedly appealing to prevent violations of the rights of Russians. The situation has been partly stabilized: a survey conducted in June-July 2022 on behalf of the Finnish Culture Foundation showed[3232] that the vast majority of Russian speakers (82 percent) did not experience discrimination or hate speech on the grounds of language after the start of the operation. However, despite this generally positive picture, the same survey indicates that there is a significant segment of the Russian-speaking diaspora (17 percent) that experienced the effects of anti-Russian rhetoric fuelled by the local press. Individual episodes of intolerance that emerged in the press after the survey confirmed the persistence of Russophobic attitudes in the Finnish society in various spheres, including labour, education, culture and sports.
In recent times, the Finnish Government, especially its new composition, the start of whose work was marked by racist scandals, has itself increasingly resorted to an openly discriminatory line towards Russian citizens. As an example the Finnish Government has taken a decision on visa restrictions against Russians, which, in fact, have become a manifestation of discrimination based on nationality. In August 2022, a daily quota was introduced for the total number of applications accepted (500 per day for the entire Russia, including 100 tourist applications). Later, a decision was taken to completely ban the issuance of tourist visas to Russian citizens from 30 September 2022 and to restrict the entry of Russian citizens to Finland for tourist purposes.
On 6 July 2023, the Finnish authorities introduced another package of restrictions, tightening entry for Russian students of Finnish educational institutions, businessmen and property owners from 10 July. Businessmen are allowed to travel only to Finland; transit to other countries through the Finnish territory is prohibited. In addition, businessmen have to justify the need to visit the country and personally conduct business there in each case. Property owners must also now provide reasons for their presence in the country. Students are only allowed to enter Finland if they obtain an academic degree at the end of their education.[3233] [3234]
Finland's adherence to the Russophobic vector of the "collective West" has also had a negative impact on the situation of many compatriot organisations in the country. Under the conditions of the dominance of anti-Russian sentiments disseminated by the Finnish media, and sometimes due to undisguised external pressure, a significant number of compatriot organisations have sharply reduced the scale of their activities. At the same time, some of them were forced to refrain from contacts with Russian partners for fear of negative consequences for themselves.
Russian owners of Finnish real estate are unjustifiably subject to special control. In 2022, amendments to national legislation were adopted to strengthen the control and blocking functions of supervisory authorities, in particular the Finnish Ministry of Defence. With reference to national defence interests, transactions with Russian participation are blocked:[3235] in October 2023 it was reported that three real estate transactions with Russian participation were blocked, and by August 2024 – two more. Defence Minister Häkkänen established an interdepartmental working group to study the possibility of a complete ban on such transactions for Russian citizens and organisations,[3236] while a similar group formed by the previous minister concluded that such a measure would be inappropriate.[3237]
In the spring of 2024, a working group of the Finnish Ministry of Defence, established within the framework of the P. Orpo government's programme to assess the adequacy of the country's current legal regulations to control the acquisition of real estate by foreigners, published a report, the authors of which propose to prohibit Russian individuals and legal entities from acquiring land plots in Finland, and to introduce the practice of monitoring of properties already in Russian possession. The Finnish Ministry of Defence is ready to make an exception for Russian citizens who also have Finnish citizenship or a permanent residence permit. According to the report's authors, Russia can use any means for "hybrid influence" on Finland, and the possession of land plots creates an opportunity for "intelligence, sabotage and other hostile activities" in the country. It will be up to the Finnish Government to decide whether the Finnish Defence Ministry's proposals will be submitted to Parliament in the form of a bill.
The Finnish authorities see a threat to national security not only in the possession of Finnish property by Russian citizens, but also in the Russian community as a whole. A thesis is being cultivated about the risks posed by Russian passport holders: they could allegedly be used by our country to exert "hybrid influence" on Finnish society. In this context, there is a serious discussion of the need of revising the relevant legislation in order to deprive natives of Russia of the possibility of combining Russian citizenship with Finnish citizenship ("dual citizenship").
The current international situation has partially affected the presence of the Russian Orthodox Church in Finland. In the heat of Russophobic fervour, the Turku authorities revoked a previously granted permit for the use of a municipal building adjacent to the Russian Consulate General in Turku, which housed a parish of the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. As a result, the Church of the Dormition of the Blessed Virgin Mary, which had existed there since 2001 and had a permanent congregation, was forced to close in the summer of 2022, and its staff was forced to find other ways to continue the activities demanded by local Russian speakers.
The large-scale anti-Russian information campaign launched in the country since February 2022 has also led, according to media reports, to a decline in the popularity of the Russian language among applicants to some universities and language courses. Bilateral co-operation between Finnish and Russian educational institutions has been frozen. A number of former partners involved in the dissemination of the Russian language, such as the Finland-Russia Society, a major NGO, have discredited themselves by their unfriendly stance.
Another measure to influence Russians and compatriots living in Finland was the closure of border crossings on the Russian-Finnish border by the Finnish authorities. This measure, taken at the end of 2023 under the pretext of the situation with migrants crossing the border to seek asylum in Finland and Russia's allegedly deliberate actions to organise such flows,[3238] resulted in the violation of the right to freedom of movement and the severing of family ties on both sides of the border. Given the Finnish government's determination to combat "hybrid threats" and its blatant disregard for the rights of groups interested in the normal functioning of the border, it is to be expected that such restrictions will be extended further.
The scale of the problem was so great that it was brought to the attention of the UN Committee against Torture in May 2024. In particular, the CAT indicated that the complete closure of Finland's eastern land border on 30 November 2023 due to "alleged use by a third country of the movement of asylum-seekers and migrants" raises "concerns about effective access to means of legal entry for the purpose of asylum" in Finland and could lead to a violation of the principle of non-refoulement and the prohibition of collective expulsion.[3239] These actions by the Finnish authorities have also attracted the attention of the FRA.[3240]
The Finnish Non-Discrimination Ombudsman also notes that keeping all border crossings on the eastern border closed and centralising applications for international protection at air and sea border crossings seriously undermines the real and effective possibility of making an application for international protection. In the absence of real and effective access to the asylum procedure, there is a clear risk of violating the principle of non-refoulement and the prohibition of collective expulsion.[3241]
Evidence of Finland's persistent Russophobia has repeatedly become public. The incident in October 2022 when a contestant on The Voice of Finland was disqualified from competing because of her Russian citizenship caused widespread publicity.[3242] Employment problems were reported by Russian IT specialists, one of whom was dismissed from the national pension authority Kela following a security check and another who was not allowed to work on a commercial project related to the authority.[3243] Citing Europe-wide restrictive measures or security concerns, Russians have been denied flight training, participation in advanced scientific research and national sporting events.[3244] In commenting on such cases, the Finnish authorities emphasise that discrimination is unacceptable. However, it is clear that such efforts, although undertaken at the national level, are not sufficient.
As mentioned above, the UN Committee against Torture in May 2024 noted with concern the growing hostility in Finland towards ethnic and religious minorities, among which it mentioned Russian and Swedish speakers.[3245]
Russian remains the most widely spoken foreign language in the country. However, the Finnish authorities are increasingly determined to displace Russian-language education. Thus, in the autumn of 2023, the Turku city administration, citing organisational and financial reasons, announced plans to close the enrolment in "Finnish-Russian classes" combining teaching in Finnish and partly Russian languages at the Puolala municipal school from 2024. And the administrations of three Finnish border towns – Lappeenranta, Imatra and Joensuu – reported about joint plans to close down in 2025 the School of Eastern Finland (established in 1997, about 600 pupils) functioning in these settlements and specialising in teaching in Russian. There have been isolated cases of bullying of Russian-speaking children in schools on ethnic grounds.
The Finnish sports authorities, who share the common position of the Nordic countries that "now is not the right time for Russians to return to international sport", continue to consistently defend the anti-Russian line. Such statements were also made by Finnish officials. In particular, former Minister of Science and Culture P. Honkonen said in December 2022 that "Russia, as well as Belarus, which supports it, should not be allowed to participate in international sports competitions". In view of this, the International Olympic Committee's promulgation in late March 2023 of the conditions for the admission of Russian and Belarusian athletes to international sports competitions, and in early December 2023 – to the Summer Olympic Games in Paris, was met with clear rejection by official Helsinki.[3246]
The case of Voislav Torden (Jan Petrovsky) has caused a resonance with regard to the detention of Russian citizens abroad. The Russian citizen was detained in July 2023 at Vantaa airport for violating the order of entry into the territory of Finland. Later, in August of the same year, he was transferred to prison as an interim measure in connection with a request from the Prosecutor General's Office of Ukraine for his extradition on charges of "committing criminal offences in the Donetsk region in 2014-2015".[3247] After examining the request and all the circumstances, the Supreme Court of Finland decided to refuse extradition due to the fact that expulsion to Ukraine could endanger Torden's life and health.[3248] As a result, the Russian was transferred to the Migration Service's Temporary Detention Centre to decide on his deportation. Shortly thereafter, however, the Finnish Public Prosecutor's Office decided to initiate its own investigation into the case on the basis of the so-called universal jurisdiction, which allows for the examination of offences of a grave and socially significant nature regardless of the place of commission, nationality of the perpetrator or the victim.[3249] To this end, the District Court of Helsinki on 18 December 2023 authorised the remand of V. Torden in custody as an interim measure for the investigation. Finnish prosecutors have not formulated any charges against V. Torden for alleged war crimes committed by him in Ukraine, but the Russian citizen remains in custody.
In terms of discrimination, significant shortcomings have been identified with regard to the situation of Finland's indigenous people, the Sami (some 10,000 people in total, with about 2,000 native speakers). International human rights mechanisms have identified a number of significant shortcomings in the enjoyment of the rights by Finland's indigenous people – the Sami. Most often, attention is focused on problems related to the practical realization of the right to use the Sami language, which is enshrined in legislation. The ratification by Finland of the International Labour Organization Convention No. 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, signed by Finland in 1989 along with other countries, has been "in limbo" for a long time. The issue of ratification of the instrument to strengthen the protection of the rights of the Sami people has been repeatedly raised by States during the Universal Periodic Review of Finland at the HRC in November 2022.[3250]
The right of citizens to participate in elections to the Sami Parliament is high on the agenda: In the thirty-five years of the existence of the Finnish Sami Parliament, a new version of the Sami Parliament Act, promoted by the Sami themselves, has been fought over for more than ten years. One of the most important points of change is the issue of voting rights in elections to the Sami Parliament.
In recent years, there have been numerous cases in which persons who have been rejected from the electoral list by the Sami authorities have challenged the rejection before the Supreme Administrative Court of Finland and have eventually been included in the list. The court's judgements have been based on an expansive interpretation of the criteria for membership of the Sami community as set out in the Sami Parliament Act. This interpretation was first applied by the court in connection with the 2011 Sami elections. Subsequently, similar practices have occurred in other elections to the Sami representative body. The Saami view such decisions as a violation of their legal rights, including the right to self-determination within the meaning of article 3 of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
The Sami believe that by using the wording of the relevant law, which allows for an expansive interpretation of the notion of belonging to the Sami, the Finnish authorities are deliberately introducing elements into the Sami Parliament that are far from understanding the specifics and needs of the indigenous people. Thus, in 2019 alone, the board of the Sami assemblies rejected 200 applications for inclusion in the electoral list (with a total electoral list of the Sami Parliament of 5,800 people). According to the Sami Union (a non-governmental organisation uniting the Sami people of Norway, Russia, Finland and Sweden), with a total electoral roll of 5,800 persons for the Sami Parliament, 161 people have been admitted by the court since 2011, against the will of the Parliament itself. To date, as mentioned above, the demands of the Sami authorities have consisted of cancelling previous court judgements and amending legislation in order to avoid ambiguities in the interpretation of the definition of Sami.
Consequently, there have been disputes between the Sami and the Finnish authorities for many years, as a result of the fact that the Sami are not satisfied with a number of candidates included in the voting lists by the court and have challenged these decisions in court.
The 2023 electoral lists (approved in February 2023) have had a record number of eligible voters, exceeding 6,000.[3251] Besides, there are twice as many newly registered voters as in the previous election cycle. According to the Sami representatives, this indicates not so much an increase in the consciousness of the Sami themselves or in the size of the community, but confirms the fact that the Finnish authorities have deliberately expanded the electoral list of the Sami Parliament.
The updated draft law on the Sami Parliament is aimed at changing this order of things. A total of 23,000 signatures were collected in favour of this document, which was proposed by Sami representatives. Despite this, in February 2023, the Eduskunta Constitutional Law Committee stopped consideration of the bill for the formal reason of the expiry of the current body's term of office. In their petition from the Sami Parliamentary Council to Prime Minister of Finland Sanna Marin on 23 March 2023, Sami expressed disappointment at the failure of the process of amending the Sami Act. They also noted that many statements made by Finnish authorities and municipalities during the consideration of the bill made it clear that the rights of the Sami as indigenous peoples, "even though they are also specified in the Finnish Constitution, are not understood or seen as necessary for realization in Finland."[3252]
As of March 2024, the reform of the Sami Parliament Act has not been implemented, as the completed cabinet headed by Prime Minister S. Marin failed to rush it through the previous supreme legislature, so the renewed body of deputies, formed following the April 2023 elections, is forced to consider the issue "from scratch", but the bill was again postponed in April 2024.
The issue of Sami rights is also receiving attention in the international arena. Thus, during Finland's next round of the Universal Periodic Review at the HRC in November 2022, among the recommendations relating to the rights of the indigenous people of Finland, the early completion of the process of adopting the updated draft Act on the Sami Parliament, taking into account the views of the Sami themselves, was frequently mentioned.[3253]
The Sami perspective is shared by international human rights bodies, including the UN Human Rights Committee and the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, which issued observations and recommendations on this topic to the Finnish authorities in February 2019 and June 2022, respectively.[3254]
Land use issues are often involved in legal disputes between the Finnish Sami and the State. Indigenous people are dissatisfied with the disregard of their interests in certain issues related to economic activities in the Sami region, such as the granting of permits to resource extraction companies. In decisions on claims by the Sami community, Finnish courts have ruled that the Sami communities and the Sami Parliament have no authority to challenge licences. According to the law, the hereditary rights to Sami land are based on the principle of permanent use, but these rights have not been documented for the Sami, and the territories are therefore under the jurisdiction of the State. Also in this context, the ratification by Finland of the above-mentioned International Labour Organization Convention No. 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries has long been on the agenda.
It should be noted that the issue of mineral development on Sami pastures has received considerable attention in scientific studies (e.g. plans to develop the Sokli ore deposit in Finland's largest pastoral area, Kemin-Sompio). There are also examples where infrastructure projects, which are steadily increasing in number, have an impact on the areas where they are located. For example, it is a common phenomenon when wind turbines benefit local remote settlements but also provoke conflicts between Sami and the companies that own the facilities (as they are installed mainly in Sami pasture areas).[3255] In the case of Sami pastoral reindeer herding, the construction of such a facility affects the surrounding neighbourhood and causes a deterioration of the traditional way of life of the indigenous peoples. According to researchers, Finland's legislation in this area has not yet been applied positively in practice.[3256]
The Finnish authorities' policy towards Sami children who have been sent to boarding schools also remains on the agenda. The Finnish way of life promoted in these institutions, aimed at forming "true" Finnish citizens, has led to the fragmentation of Sami children's identity or contributed to a sense of being "between" two worlds and an inability to fully integrate into Sami or dominant Finnish society.[3257]
The wide range of problems faced by Sami children in the field of education was highlighted by the HRC Special Rapporteur on the right to education, F. Shaheed, following her visit to Finland in November 2023.[3258] In particular, she pointed to the lack of both qualified teachers with knowledge of the Sami language and teaching materials in that language. In addition, during her visit F. Shaheed identified serious problems in Finnish education in general. Referring to the School Health Promotion Study 2023, she highlighted worrying trends of increasing loneliness, depression and anxiety among young people in Finland, which contribute to their psychological problems. The main reason for "study leave" during school is mental health, which the report indicates is often linked to the lack of social interaction among young people, as more and more children and young people are spending time on social media to the detriment of face-to-face interaction, sport or other forms of leisure. There has also been an increase in bullying and harassment of fellow students, including online. There are problems related to ensuring equal access to education due to segregation of certain ethnic groups. In the Special Rapporteur's opinion, the Finnish education system does not sufficiently ensure the social mobility of certain groups of the population and does not contribute to overcoming existing inequalities based on socio-economic status, language, place of birth or residence, religion and disability. Furthermore, the principle of equality in access to education, which, according to F. Shaheed, is essential for successful integration into Finnish society, is undermined by the fact that Finnish schools may have up to 80 percent of pupils whose mother tongue is not Finnish. While noting that the authorities are taking measures to remedy the situation, F.Shaheed pointed out that they still do not address the root causes of the problem and recommended a more thorough study of the issue.
The Special Rapporteur also noted with concern the Finnish authorities' stated intention to reduce budgetary allocations to municipalities in the long term, which would have a serious impact on the education sector, as well as budgetary expenditures for the further digitalisation of education in the country. The Special Rapporteur noted that she had received signals from pupils and their parents who reported that they were learning only with electronic learning materials, without sufficient books or paper copies of learning materials for the whole class, and in some schools sometimes even without computers. It was also noted that the ongoing digitalisation of education is not accompanied by a discussion of its shortcomings, including the physical and mental health problems of students, the protection of their personal data on the Internet, and the risks of students becoming withdrawn and possibly unable to communicate in person.
In addition to the problems listed above, in her 56th session of the UN Human Rights Council report following her visit, F. Shaheed noted that the teaching of the Sami language is uneven and of varying quality in Sami neighbourhoods in Finland (including, according to the Special Rapporteur, the fact that three Sami languages are used – North Sami, Inari Sami and Skolt Sami; all three languages are equally protected but not equally used, which creates difficulties in organising teaching in the less used languages). It was also noted that there are very few Sami language teachers and support staff. Furthermore, the lack of resources for the development of teaching materials has a direct impact on the quality of education and equality of Sami-speaking children and youth. At the same time, the Special Rapporteur noted that Finland has taken measures to organise instruction in Sami for small groups of pupils.[3259]
France has a well-developed legislative framework to suppress manifestations of neo-Nazism, racism and xenophobia, as well as attempts to glorify Nazis and their accomplices.
The Constitution guaranteed the equality of citizens before the law regardless of origin or religion[3260].
The Law on the Suppression of All Racist, Anti-Semitic and Xenophobic Acts of 1990[3261] (the "Hesso Law") criminalizes the denial of crimes against humanity as defined in the Statute of the Nuremberg Tribunal.
The dissemination of ideology based on ideas of superiority of a group of persons or humiliating, insulting, calling for discrimination of other persons, calls for hatred or violence, public insult of a person or a group of persons on the grounds of belonging or not belonging to an ethnic group, nation, race and religion are criminalized. The relevant provisions are set out in the Anti-Racism Law of 1972 (the "Pleven Law").
Under Article 24 of the Freedom of the Press Act of 1881[3262], such acts are punishable by a fine of 45,000 euros and/or imprisonment for one year. Persons who deny crimes against humanity and glorify war crimes are punishable by a fine of 45,000 euros and imprisonment for five years.
Act No. 2001-434 of 21 May 2001 stipulates that "the transatlantic slave trade, as well as the Indian Ocean slave trade on the one hand and slavery on the other, committed since the fifteenth century in the Americas and the Caribbean, the Indian Ocean and Europe against African, Amerindian, Malagasy and Indian populations, constitutes a crime against humanity[3263]".
Due to numerous cases of racial, ethnic or religious hate speech on the French Internet, the Law on Combating the Spread of Hate on the Internet[3264] was adopted in 2020. This act contains provisions that oblige operators of Internet platforms to inform law enforcement authorities of users' posting of unlawful materials and to remove them from search engines, social networks and websites within 24 hours. Failure to comply with this requirement is punishable by a fine of 75,000 euros and imprisonment for one year.
Pursuant to article 132-76 of the Criminal Code, racist motives qualify as an aggravating circumstance of a criminal offense[3265].
The wearing or display in public places of Nazi symbols, uniforms and insignia is prohibited in France under article R645-1 of the Criminal Code, except where necessary for the production of a film, the staging of a play or the organization of a historical exhibition[3266]. The wearing or display in public places of uniforms, insignia or symbols resembling those used either by members of an organization designated as criminal under article 9 of the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal or by a person convicted of one or more crimes against humanity is a contravention de 5e classe (i.e. the most serious of the non-serious violations of the law[3267]).
The penalties for this offense for natural persons include confiscation of the objects with which it was committed, a fine of 1,500 euros, community service for a period of 20 to 120 hours, confiscation of weapons owned or possessed by the offender, and a ban for at least three years on keeping or carrying weapons for which a permit is required. In case of recidivism, a fine of up to 3,000 euros is provided for. For legal entities, there is liability in the form of a fine of 7,500 euros and confiscation of the objects with which the offense was committed, and in case of recidivism, a fine of up to 15,000 euros.
However, reproducing the gestures used by the Nazis (the so-called "Roman greeting") is not an offense. Nevertheless, law enforcement authorities sometimes criminalize such gestures as "incitement to ethnic hatred", especially at sporting events, as they fall under Article L332-7 of the French Sports Code[3268].
The debate on the need to criminalize these gestures has been going on in France for a long time. A scandalous resonance was caused by the antics of R.Rebeirot, a member of the French National Assembly from the pro-presidential Renaissance party, who on July 12, 2022, addressed a member of the opposition right-conservative party "Rassemblement Nationale" using a Nazi greeting[3269].
Another wave of public outrage was provoked by a Nazi salute by the mayor of Villeneuve-Saint-Georges (a suburb of Paris), F. Gaudin, made on camera during a debate at a municipal council meeting on April 21, 2024[3270]. Despite the mayor's public apology for the "bad joke", the prefect of the department initiated a prosecutor's investigation.
The fight against organized neo-Nazi groups is conducted in France on the basis of the provisions of the 1936 law on militant groups and private armed structures and anti-terrorism legislation, which allow for arrests on suspicion of forming an extremist group without waiting for the commission of illegal acts. As of 2017, such criminal cases are generally investigated by the French National Counter-Terrorism Prosecutor's Office.
In order to prevent the spread of extremist ideology, the French authorities use the mechanism developed in 2016 and optimized in 2020-2021, which allows for the administrative (extrajudicial) dissolution and banning of any organizations whose activities threaten public security on the basis of a decree of the Council of Ministers. However, representatives of the General Directorate of Internal Security of the French Interior Ministry in interviews with French media on the right of anonymity note that the administrative dissolution of far-right groups and associations has proved to be counterproductive and only contributes to their unification[3271]. It is not uncommon for neo-Nazi groups to be reconstituted after a short period of time, changing their name or not registering at all (as so-called undeclared associations).
Despite the authorities' efforts to curb the spread of neo-Nazism, the problem has been worsening in recent years. According to Europol and the Directorate General of Internal Security, France accounts for more than half of the total number of arrests of far-right extremists in the EU, with a rising trend[3272].
The French competent authorities count up to 3,000 neo-Nazi radicals in the country, including 1,300 who are prone to violent acts and are listed in the database of persons posing a threat to national security (about 100 of them are under special control of the French Interior Ministry's Directorate General of Internal Security as potential terrorists)[3273]. According to police assessments, the activities of the far-right have recently increased. They are recruiting young people into new groups to replace the banned ones[3274].
Between 2019 and 2022, 35 serious crimes committed by neo-Nazi groups were recorded in France . According to preliminary data, there were at least 22 in 2023 alone[3275]. In 2022, 4 such terrorist attacks were prevented by law enforcement authorities[3276].
The level of coordination between far-right groups in the country is increasing. On December 14, 2022, a wave of riots involving radicals swept through French cities after the France-Morocco World Cup semifinal soccer match[3277]. Police detained 266 people. Of the 38 extremists arrested in the capital, 15 were registered as posing a security threat, including leaders and members of the previously banned or dissolved Paris Zouaves", "Alvarium" and "Group Union of Defense" neo-Nazi organizations ". Two of them had French military IDs, and one was a French Interior Ministry official[3278].
Military personnel, including those holding "sensitive" positions, often joined far-right organizations. Thus, according to media reports, the "Recolonization of France" included a colonel who served at the Vilacoublay airbase, where a significant number of state aircraft are serviced[3279], and the network of far-right associations "DW Renversement" includes several active military personnel. In 2020-2021, the French publication Mediapar published investigations[3280] into dozens of neo-Nazis in the French armed forces, identified through their social media pages.
French ultra-nationalist groups are traditionally active in the regions of Brittany, Burgundy-Franche-Comté and Alsace, the capital Ile-de-France, as well as in the cities of Lyon and Marseille.
The "Strasbourg Offender" group operates in Alsace, whose members are involved in large-scale arms trafficking[3281], threatening journalists[3282] and attacking foreigners[3283]. During searches in May 2022, law enforcement officers found unregistered weapons, ammunition, gunpowder and extremist literature. In the fall of 2021, 14 members of "DW Renversement" were detained in Alsace, planning to carry out a coup d'état[3284]. A related group, Honor and Nation, whose members were planning to blow up a Masonic lodge, was also disarmed[3285].
In Lyon, which has established itself as a far-right "capital", there have been attempts to re-establish a "French Nationalist Party[3286]". Currently, there is a group called "Oplots", whose members beat up representatives of the left-wing "Unruly France[3287]" party and hold torchlight marches[3288]. On January 5, 2023, neo-Nazis pasted leaflets with images of the war criminal C. Barbier, guilty of torturing and killing members of the Resistance Movement, on the Historic Center of Resistance and Deportation of Lyon[3289].
In Burgundy-French-Comté, the Vandal Besak group, created in 2021, periodically holds various actions in the administrative center of the region, Besançon, including marches with Nazi songs, fascist salutes, posters and leaflets with SS symbols[3290]. In coordination with other groups, it participated in November 2023 in anti-Muslim demonstrations and pogroms organized in various cities around the country following the murder of a French teenager in Crepol (Drome[3291]). In September 2023, it was revealed that its members were two active military men from the 35th Infantry Regiment of Belfort[3292]. Since December 2022, a group called "Nationalist Raccoons" has been active in Burgundy-Franche-Comté, spreading quotes from the anti-Semitic writer M. Barres on social networks and praising the founder of the "British Union of Fascists", O. Mosley[3293].
In November 2023, neo-Nazi leaflets and posters were simultaneously distributed in many French cities[3294].
Recently, radicals have become more active in other regions, including the capital, where in late 2022 the "Union Defense Group" was reconstituted. Its leader, M. de Caqueray-Valmeneuil, rallied around him the small and fragmented Versailles of Octorum," "Luminis" and "Division Martel" groups. In 2023, the "Group of the Union of Defense" held three events[3295], organized a demonstration[3296] in memory of the Nazi collaborator journalist R. Brazillac, shot by the sentence of the French court in February 1945. Every May it gathers radicals, including representatives of the banned far-right organizations "Social Bastion" (dissolved in 2019), "Generation Identity" and "Alvarium" (dissolved in 2021), as well as "Paris Zouaves" (dissolved in 2022), in Paris for a rally in memory of the nationalist S. Daisier, killed on May 9, 1994[3297]. 550-700 people in black cloaks, with their faces hidden under masks and hoods, march with black flags and Celtic crosses. Everything ends with a concert of musical groups with Nazi greetings and symbols, as well as flags with the logo of the Ukrainian terrorist organization "Azov"[3298]. The prefect's bans on these are challenged in court or ignored. The Waffen Assas, a youth group affiliated with the Defense Union Group, has been raiding the capital's university campus since early 2023, beating left-wing students[3299].
After the above-mentioned murder of a 16-year-old teenager and the wounding of 16 other people at a youth party in Crepol (Drome department) on November 19, 2023, mass clashes between banned far-right groups and police representatives took place in a number of cities, trying to prevent them from entering the places of compact Muslim population.
On December 1, 2023, more than 200 ultra-nationalists marched in the French capital in an action agreed upon by the city's authorities[3300]. Another neo‑Nazi march involving the "Union Defense Group" and the "Nationalist Revolutionary Youth" took place in Paris on May 11, 2024[3301].
On February 25, 2023, a concert of neo-Nazi bands took place near Chambery (Savoie). Some performers came from neighboring countries. Among other things, the song "White Legion", which glorifies the SS Wallonia Division, was sung. Nazi symbols and gestures were displayed, Nazi slogans were heard, and merchandise was sold, including those bearing the emblem of the SS "Dead Head"[3302]division. In the Brittany region, concerts by neo-Nazi groups are held annually, despite bans by the authorities.[3303]
As mentioned above, many of the dissolved extremist groups are re-registering under new names[3304]. However, their activities are not limited to demonstrations, sporting events and singing songs. In some cities, local government leaders have received anonymous threats. On May 9, 2023, the mayor of Saint-Brevin-les-Pins, J. Morez, who was building a center to house refugees, resigned because of attacks and the burning of his house[3305]. On January 11, 2023, due to pressure from Breton nationalists, the mayor of Kallak [3306]resigned from such a project, and the staff of the local weekly "Poer", which supported him, received daily threats of physical violence[3307]. In Bordeaux, since the beginning of 2023, neo-Nazis have vandalized mosques, terrorized humanitarian NGOs, including the local branch of SOS Racism, and intimidated representatives of the mayor's office and members of the city council with death threats and physical violence[3308].
Far-right radicals are behind a number of high-profile acts of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia. These include the desecration of 10 Jewish graves in a German cemetery in November 2023 and 96 graves in a Jewish cemetery in the Lower Rhine department in February 2019; the demolition and swastika desecration of a stele at the site of a synagogue destroyed by the Nazis and a swastika poster at the entrance to a kindergarten in Strasbourg; and Islamophobic inscriptions on the walls of a Franco-Turkish mosque in the commune of Fleur (Orne department) in November 2022.
Recently, judges have sought to give such extremists the longest possible prison sentences as punishment. In January 2022, the Paris correctional court sentenced neo-Nazi A. Chapot to 9 years in prison for "self-preparation to commit a terrorist act." This is the second conviction in the history of the country with this wording[3309]. Harsh sentences were handed down by courts in Lyon against seven far‑right activists in 2023[3310] and two in 2024[3311].
At the national level, attempts to glorify Nazism or to promote neo-Nazi ideas are supressed by the French authorities. France continues to treat the monuments located on its territory to Soviet soldiers who died during the Second World War, as well as their burial sites, with respect and care. The main among them are the Soviet military necropolis in Nouailles-Saint-Martin, monuments to Russian participants of the Resistance Movement at the Père-Lachaise cemetery in Paris and to the Normandie-Niemen air regiment in Le Bourget. French central and local authorities usually assist in organizing commemorative events on the occasion of Victory Day in the Great Patriotic War. Since 2015, "Immortal Regiment" marches have been traditionally organized in France.
In 2022-2024, the authorities of a number of French cities, including Paris, not only issued permits for "Immortal Regiment" rallies, but also helped to ensure security and protect participants from provocations. The exception in 2024 was Lyon, where the city authorities, which had previously authorized the marches, did not issue permits this time[3312].
At the same time, the French side began to avoid holding joint ceremonies to commemorate the legendary Normandie-Niemen air regiment, which had become a good tradition over many decades. In the spring of 2023, it was reported that the French had not only obscured the Soviet stars on the fuselages of the aircraft of the current air regiment named Normandie-Niemen, but also sent them to the Russian borders to "conduct exercises."
An assessment of the organization of this ceremony in 2024 and related events is given by the columnist of the Sunday newspaper Le Journal du Dimanche, Régis Le Sommier, in a report of June 9, 2024, which states that France tried to rewrite history by not inviting Russian representatives to the ceremony of the 80th anniversary of the Normandy landings. Instead, the guest of honor at the ceremony was Ukrainian President Zelensky, whose term of office expired on May 20. "If Ukrainians participated in the Battle of Normandy 80 years ago," Le Saumier elaborates, "it was mostly on the side of Nazi Germany: among those who carried out several massacres, who participated in the mopping up of the village of Saint-Marcel, sending some of its inhabitants to deportation. A Ukrainian auxiliary unit wounded and killed Emile Bouetard, the first French paratrooper, who fell on June 6 at Plumelec. (...) Only a few of the Ukrainians deserted and joined the Resistance. (...) Paris is deliberately silent about this now in order to fit history to an acceptable agenda. (...) Without the sacrifice of 27 million Soviet soldiers, the landings would never have been possible. If we forget this for the sake of welcoming the Germans and Ukrainians in a spirit of reconciliation, one has to wonder who exactly we were fighting against then[3313]."
Up to and including 2021, France abstained each year from voting on the draft UN General Assembly resolution prepared by Russia and other co‑sponsors on "Combating the glorification of Nazism, neo-Nazism and other practices that contribute to the escalation of contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance", referring to the consolidated position of the European Union. In 2022‑2023[3314] France, along with other EU member states, voted against the resolution[3315].
According to the assessment of the French Foreign Ministry, the text of the resolution in no way promotes the fight against racism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia. Such an important topic is allegedly replaced by a "simplistic approach" aimed at dividing Europeans "by attributing to the Nazi regime all opponents of the Soviet Armed Forces" (although the text of the document itself does not mention the "Soviet Armed Forces" or the "Red Army", but uses the term "Anti-Hitler Coalition", of which France was a member). At the same time, it is emphasized that "France continues to pay tribute to all victims of Nazi ideology before, during and after the Second World War".
For many years now, Paris has been turning a blind eye to the rehabilitation and glorification of Nazis and collaborators, as well as neo-Nazism in Ukraine, the Baltic States and other countries of Eastern Europe, in fact condoning these phenomena.
Thus, on June 10, 2021, Senator N. Goulet sent a request to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs in which she noted the widespread spread of neo‑Nazi ideology in Ukraine and demanded a public assessment of the activities of Ukrainian nationalist organizations. In response, Cais d'Orsay said that neo‑Nazis in Ukraine allegedly "have no political influence" and their presence "does not reflect the political trends" of that country[3316]. This is the spirit of most publications in the French media, where the Azov battalion, Right Sector (terrorist organizations banned in Russia) and other neo-Nazi groups are deliberately whitewashed and qualified as patriots, at best as extreme right-wing forces[3317], and the use of Nazi symbols is even interpreted as "raising the morale" of Ukrainian soldiers and volunteers without reference to Hitler's crimes[3318].
Meanwhile, after the start of the special military operation to denazify and demilitarize Ukraine and protect the civilian population of Donbas, French neo‑Nazis are fighting in the ranks of the AFU[3319]. We are talking about dozens of representatives, primarily of soccer ultras and such far-right groups as the "Paris Zouaves" and the "Defense Union Group[3320]". According to TASS, in May 2024, French neo-Nazi leader Cesar Ozhar, who allegedly had ties with the French security services, was liquidated in the Avdiivka direction in the SWO zone.
On May 22, 2024, the Mediapar online media portal posted a publication titled "French army trains Ukrainian neo-Nazis in combat" which reports that the militants of the 3rd Assault Brigade of the AFU - "heirs of the national battalion Azov[3321]" - will undergo military training in France at the end of 2023. It is alleged that the French military condoned the neo-Nazi orientation of the Ukrainian cadets, posting photos with Nazi Germany paraphernalia on social networks and tattoos with "SS" symbols.
Neo-Nazis fighting in Ukraine themselves admit that when they return to France they are interrogated by representatives of the Directorate General of Internal Security, including for the purpose of gathering intelligence[3322]. However, practice shows that no restrictive or prohibitive measures are taken against them.
France is a State party to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and reports on the implementation of its provisions to the relevant United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD). However, despite the Committee's recommendations, Paris refuses to withdraw its reservation to article 4 of the Convention, which places respect for "freedom of speech and of the press" above the obligation to prohibit ideologies of racial superiority[3323].
France has reservations to many articles of universal and regional human rights instruments. For example, articles 13 and 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are implemented with a constitutional amendment to the principle of secularism.
Based on the principles of the unitary State and the equality of all citizens regardless of their ethnic and racial origin, the French authorities did not recognize the existence of ethnic minorities or indigenous peoples on their territory. There was a formal ban on the collection of relevant statistics.
France has not ratified the Council of Europe's European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages and is not party to Protocol No. 12 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the Convention on the Participation of Foreign Nationals in Public Life at Local Level. France is also not a party to the 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families and the 1989 International Labour Organization Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, which it is actively encouraged to do[3324], including in the framework of the 2023 Universal Periodic Review (UPR) of the United Nations Human Rights Council (HRC).
Despite a well-developed legislative and law enforcement toolkit (in 2023, a new "National Plan to Combat Racism, Anti-Semitism and Discrimination on the Basis of Origin" was adopted for the period until 2026[3325]), the situation with racism, xenophobia and anti-Semitism in the country, including manifestations of their contemporary forms, leaves much to be desired.
A study published in June 2021 by the French Institute of Public Opinion (IFOP) notes that 42% of job rejections can be put down to ethnic reasons[3326]. According to IFOP surveys in 2022, 51% of non-indigenous French people have been the target of racist perceptions or behavior and have experienced racial discrimination when looking for a job, 36% suffer discrimination when looking for housing, 32% in police checks, 17% when applying for loans[3327]. A report by the NGO Observatoire des inégalités[3328], published in November 2023, highlights systemic discrimination in recruitment: 5.4 million vacancies on the French labour market (i.e. almost one in five) are "closed" to non‑EU foreigners.
In recent years, France has witnessed an increase in ethnic, racial and religiously motivated offenses, which has been of great concern to the authorities. A report published in March 2024 by the French Ministry of the Interior[3329] notes that their number in annual terms increased by 32% and amounted to more than 15 thousand (in 2022‑12.6 thousand, in 2021‑12.5 thousand), of which 8.5 thousand were criminal offenses. At the same time, the number of criminal offenses in comparison with 2022 increased by 22% (in 2022‑6.6 thousand cases). There is also an increase in administrative offenses, the number of which reached 6.4 thousand after a 12% decrease in 2022. Attempts on life and health accounted for 5% of the total number of crimes (6% in 2022), but no racially motivated murders were committed in 2023. The most disadvantaged regions are the Ile‑de‑France metropolitan area, the Lower Rhine, and the Maritime Alps.
This picture is complemented by the French newspaper Le Figaro of March 20, 2024, according to which in Paris in 2023, such crimes motivated by xenophobia, racial and religious hatred were registered three times more than the national average. In most cases, xenophobic outbursts consist of insults or provocation. The most frequent victims are Afro-descendants between the ages of 24 and 54[3330].
The majority of religiously motivated offenses have a Christianophobic orientation. These are mainly vandalism of churches, attacks and manifestations of verbal aggression by radicalized representatives of the Muslim community against Catholics conducting religious ceremonies.
In 2021, according to the French Ministry of the Interior, there were 1,659 manifestations of xenophobia on religious grounds (857 against members of the Christian faith, 589 on the grounds of anti-Semitism, 213 on the grounds of Islamophobia), while in 2023 the total number of such manifestations exceeded 2,500[3331]. Of these, about 1,000 offenses were recorded against Christians[3332]. The 2023 report of the French National Consultative Commission on Human Rights (CNCDH) noted that up to 93% of such acts were "desecrations of places of worship and cemeteries" and not attacks on people (in contrast to the situation with anti-Islamic and anti-Semitic acts, where cases of physical violence account for 38% and 53% respectively[3333]). Up to 800,000 people aged 18 and over were victims of some form of racist attitude in 2021[3334]. However, only 4% of victims of racist and xenophobic offenses reported to the police. According to the CNCDH, there is underreporting of racist attacks in France.
Despite the public outcry caused by the publication of this information, the topic of Christianophobia is silenced by the media and the government. It is indicative that since 2022 the Ministry of Internal Affairs began to publish statistics of such offenses without specifying the object of religious hatred.
Although attacks against Christians are not so frequent (in 2023, the French Ministry of the Interior recorded only 84 such attacks[3335]), examples of particular brutality are known. For example, three people were killed (one of the victims had their throat slit[3336]) in an attack at Notre Dame Cathedral in Nice by a 21-year-old immigrant from Tunisia on October 29, 2020. Another attack on Church ministers in that city took place on April 24, 2022 at the Church of St. Peter the Apostle[3337].
A series of attacks on churches in 2022 has swept across the country[3338]. Among the most high-profile cases - acts of vandalism in churches in the suburbs of Paris (Saint-Denis, Bondy, Romanville, Créteil[3339]) , the destruction of the interior decoration of the cathedral in Boulogne-Sur-Mer (Pas-de-Calais department) on July 26, 2022, Theft of relics in Pare-le-Monial (Seine et Loire) on January 8‑9, 2022, and in Fecan (Seine Maritime) on June 1‑2, 2022. On April 12, 2023, the Church of St. Magdalene in Angers (Meuse et Loire[3340]) was vandalized; in June 2023, it was reported that two Islamist fanatics who were preparing a terrorist attack on a church in Paris[3341] were detained. In March 2024, in Clermont d'Exidey (Dordogne), Islamists spray-painted anti-Christian inscriptions on the doors of a local church and more than 50 graves[3342].
A similar case occurred in the same department on May 7, 2024, in the cemetery of Tourtoireac, where graves were marked with Islamist and anti-Semitic symbols[3343].
One of the serious problems of French society is the high level of anti‑Semitism. France, whose Jewish community is considered one of the largest in Europe (about 500 thousand[3344]), continues to occupy the first positions in the EU by the number of anti-Semitic actions. And in most cases, anti-Semitism comes not from far-right forces, but from the radicalized Muslim part of the population.
On January 24, 2024, the Council of Representatives of Jewish Institutions of France (CRIF), citing the French Interior Ministry and the "Service for the Protection of the Jewish Community", reported that in 2023, 1676 anti-Semitic acts were recorded against 436 in 2022[3345]. At the same time, the head of the Interior Ministry J. Darmanen mentioned 1762 cases against the background of the worsening of the Arab-Israeli conflict[3346]. More than half of them (57.8% in 2023 against 53% in 2022) were directed against individuals, there were 85 cases of attacks or violence. It is noted that acts of anti-Semitism cover 94% of the French territory (recorded in 95 of 101 departments) and are increasingly occurring in schools and lycées (12.7% of the total).
Against this background, on October 12, 2023, French Interior Minister J. Darmanin sent out a circular instruction to prefects to ban any pro-Palestinian demonstrations "because they could lead to a disturbance of public order"[3347]. No ban on pro-Israeli rallies was imposed. Pro-Palestinian NGOs and human rights activists attempted to challenge the decision in court, but the courts upheld the Minister[3348]. The Council of State, in a resolution dated October 18, 2023, emphasized that the Interior Minister's directive "does not constitute a gross and clearly illegal violation of freedom of demonstration and freedom of expression"[3349].
At the same time, the authorities decided to extrajudicially dissolve pro‑Palestinian NGOs under the pretext of them supporting Hamas. On October 14, 2023, J. Darmanen announced the initiation of such a procedure[3350]. The increasing practice of dissolving NGOs has previously been criticized by human rights activists, who call on the state to more clearly formulate the provisions of the legislation to prevent arbitrary infringements of the rights to privacy, freedom of expression and freedom of the press.
According to experts, the government has so far failed to stop the spread of radical Islamist anti-Semitism, with the authorities shifting their focus on combating far-right movements for domestic political reasons.
It is noteworthy that the threat of anti-Semitism comes not only from neo-Nazis or radical Islamists, but also at the everyday level from ordinary citizens who tend to blame Jews for all the flaws of capitalism and globalization. Anti-Semitic slogans and manifestations took place during the "yellow vest" demonstrations during 2019 and then during the coronavirus pandemic.
In France, there are cases of desecration of graves and monuments, including by drawing Nazi symbols. These acts are predominantly anti-Semitic in nature. Only 20% of the perpetrators were convicted in 2020[3351].
Thus, in August 2020, vandals desecrated the memorial center for the victims of World War II in Oradour-sur-Glane [3352](Haute-Vienne department). In December 2020, a swastika was drawn on 67 graves in Fontainebleau[3353]. In August 2021, swastikas and anti-Semitic messages were found on the walls of a cemetery in Ruffache (Haut-Rhin), and in Perros-Gerek (Côte d'Armor) a swastika was inscribed on a memorial stone in honor of the prominent French Jewish politician S. Veil, who was a prisoner of the Auschwitz and Bergen-Belsen concentration camps during World War II and served as president of the Holocaust Memorial Foundation from 2001 to 2007.
In March 2022, a swastika was painted on a plaque dedicated to Jewish resistance fighters in Grenoble[3354].
In May 2023, four Christian and two Jewish graves were desecrated in the Noé cemetery south of Toulouse[3355]. The incident was widely publicized because many of those buried in the cemetery were prisoners of a nearby concentration camp during World War II. On July 15, 2023, a memorial to members of the Resistance was desecrated in Plec-L'Hermitage (Côte d'Armor) on the 79th anniversary of their execution by Hitler's troops[3356], and on September 20, a swastika was placed on the graves of a cemetery in Chalon-en-Champagne (Marne[3357]).
In order to strengthen the fight against manifestations of anti-Semitism, to collect information, prevent and investigate racist and xenophobic crimes and offenses, the National Hate Crimes Unit was created in 2019 under the Directorate General of the National Gendarmerie of the French Interior Ministry. Its main task is to coordinate investigations into anti-Semitic acts throughout the country[3358].
In France, the problem of radical Islamism is worsening, especially in the suburbs. According to a study by the French Institute of Public Opinion (IFOP[3359]), up to 74% of young French Muslims consider the principles of Islam more important than the laws and values of the French Republic. In 2023, it was reported that some 17,000 people in France who are Islamic radicals and potentially dangerous to the public are under police surveillance[3360].
The manifestations of Islamophobia are increasing as a consequence of the long-term systemic migration crisis, as well as the reaction of a part of society to the growth of Islamic radicalism and the increase in the level of terrorist threat. If in 2022 there were 188 actions against Muslims[3361], in 2023 their number increased to 213. Some Muslim associations claim that the statistics quoted by the Interior Ministry are understated.
According to the NGO "Collective against Islamophobia", there are cases of desecration of cemeteries, cultural centers and mosques, and desecration of the Koran. However, the most frequent targets of aggression are Muslim women.
On October 28, 2019, a mosque in Bayonne was attacked, injuring two people. The attacker motivated his actions by revenge for a fire allegedly set by Muslims at Notre Dame de Paris Cathedral[3362]. In December 2021, the Muslim section of a cemetery in Mulhouse (Haut-Rhin[3363]) was desecrated. In November 2022, offensive Islamophobic inscriptions were found on the walls of a mosque in the commune of Fleur (Orne), as well as inscriptions praising French Waffen CC legionnaires from the Charlemagne Division[3364]. In March 2023, the premises of the Al Amal Muslim Association in Vattigny (Nor[3365]) were attacked. In January 2024, two attacks on mosques (including an attempted arson attack[3366]) in the department of Finistère .
As part of measures to combat radical Islamism, the state has begun to systematically interfere in the intra-confessional affairs of Muslims, which, according to human rights NGOs, is often accompanied by abuses and infringements on freedom of religion and worship.
Under the pretext of combating Islamist ideology that fuels terrorism, the French government is pursuing a line of tightening control over NGOs and faith-based organizations.
On August 24, 2021, Law No. 2021-1109 "Respect for Republican Principles[3367]" was passed, which introduced new restrictions on three key civil liberties: religion, assembly and speech (especially in the context of freedom of teaching). In addition to strengthening state control over the activities of religious organizations, it provides for the introduction of the principle of neutrality in the civil service and the training of civil servants in the principles of secularism. In particular, monitoring of the financing of religious organizations was strengthened, procedures for closing NGOs and places of worship were simplified, opportunities for home schooling were significantly reduced, and oversight of private educational institutions was strengthened. Prefects have been authorized to close Islamic schools that violate republican principles. The granting of subsidies to NPOs is now conditional on their commitment to respect the values and principles of the Republic and the conclusion of a contract (contrat d'engagement républicain) with the State.
The Amnesty International report notes that such strict control over the activities of NGOs based on vague criteria is fraught with abuse and disproportionate restrictions on freedom of assembly.
As a result of the authorities' actions, in 2021, the French Council of Muslims (CCMF), which united representatives of the main confessional groups and movements, ceased its work and virtually disintegrated. In its place, with the participation of the French Ministry of the Interior, the NGO "Forum Islam de France" (FORIF) was established. The new structure does not enjoy the authority of Muslims, many of whom are turning to radicalism as a result. The government also banned and dissolved the NGO Collective Against Islamophobia as an organization that supported radical Islamist ideology.
In April 2023, the head of the Ministry of Interior threatened to deprive the NGO "League of Human Rights" of 500 thousand euros of state funding because of its publications about the violent dispersal of a demonstration of eco-activists in the town of Saint-Solin, who opposed the construction of a reservoir. At the same time, Prime Minister E. Bourne stated at a Senate hearing that she no longer recognized the human rights NGO.
In February 2022, more than 30 representatives of academic circles in an open appeal to Emmanuel Macron expressed concern about the "institutionalization of Islamophobia" at the level of state power, which sees signs of radicalism in ordinary Muslim religious practices and bans them under the pretext of the primacy of the republican principle of secularism. However, the mainstream media refused to publish the appeal, considering it an inappropriate intervention on the eve of the presidential elections.
Human rights activists criticize the practice of closing mosques in France if the imams preaching there spread Islamist ideology. They see this as a typical example of the implementation of the principle of collective responsibility, from which parishioners suffer more.
France was home to some 16,000 Roma, who, owing to widespread prejudice and stereotypes, were subjected to attacks and experienced various forms of discrimination. They were often restricted in their access to public services, including education, health care and social security. Racist rhetoric is often used against them, authorities forcibly close down their illegal settlements, and there are cases of a number of municipalities refusing to enroll Roma children in schools. The UN Committee against Torture (CAT), the UN Human Rights Committee (HR Committee), CERD and the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) have pointed out the many problems faced by Roma in France.
The problem of excessive use of force by law enforcement agencies has become chronic, often again connected with discrimination based on racism and various forms of xenophobia.
On March 4, 2024, during the 55th session of the UN Human Rights Council (HRC), the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights F. Türk, speaking with the report "Update on human rights in the world", referred to the survey "Being Black in the EU" conducted by the EU Agency for Fundamental Human Rights (FRA) in 2023. It found, among other things, that 58% of people stopped by police officers perceived the action as racially motivated. And this figure has risen since 2016 in Denmark, Finland, France, Germany and Finland, as well as Ireland. Emphasizing the importance of analyzing the factors underlying such perceptions and addressing them, Türk noted that "data, where available, show that many states need to take comprehensive measures to address police violence and discrimination"[3368].
The number of murders committed by police officers and gendarmes is increasing. Until 2018, France had no official statistics on homicides committed by law enforcement officials. Now it is published by the Inspectorate General of the National Police of the Interior Ministry. Thus, in 2017, 14 people were killed by law enforcement officers, in 2018 – 17 people, in 2019 – 27 people, in 2020 – 32 people, in 2021 – 37 people, in 2022 – 38 people.
The French human rights NGO "Enough!" ("Basta!") cites different figures reflecting higher deaths due to law enforcement forces: 2017 г. – 27 people, 2018 – 26 people, 2019 – 26 people, 2020 – 40 people, 2021 – 52 people, 2022 – 38 people[3369].
Analysis of the data collected by human rights defenders and experts shows that the typical profile of a victim is a man of African or Arab origin, 25‑30 years old, living in a disadvantaged neighborhood of a major city. Typical circumstances of the killing are during apprehension/attempted escape or during pre‑trial detention (due to restraint measures).
In 40% of cases there is no information in public sources about the legal consequences of deaths caused by law enforcement officers, in 20% the investigation is terminated for lack of corpus delicti, in 10% the court acquits the law enforcement officers, in 25% a suspended sentence is imposed, and only 5% are sentenced to real terms of imprisonment.
Deaths are often caused by heart attack or asphyxiation during arrest or pretrial detention as a result of the use of special immobilization techniques (the "folding" and "mechanical asphyxiation" techniques, banned in many countries but not in France), which are recognized as cruel by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) operating within the Council of Europe, including because of the high risk of death. France continues to ignore the recommendations of human rights bodies to prohibit the use of these techniques.
The most common cause of death is gunshot wounds and injuries caused by so-called non-lethal weapons. In 70 per cent of cases, these are the actions of criminal or border police rather than of units neutralizing terrorists and dangerous criminals. It is not uncommon for police officers to shoot to kill when attempting to flee or refusing to comply with police demands, even in the absence of a direct threat to themselves or third parties.
The NGO "Enough!" attributes the increase in fatalities to the change in law enforcement practice following the adoption of the law of February 28, 2017 on public security, which relaxed the conditions for the use of firearms by the police.
There are frequent cases of ill-treatment of migrants by law enforcement officers, as well as French citizens of non-European phenotype, against whom checks are often carried out under spurious pretexts, when the real reason is the racial or ethnic origin of the person being checked[3370].
One of the most recent high-profile cases is the killing of a 17-year-old Arab boy, Nael M., by a police officer in Nanterre (a suburb of Paris) on June 27, 2023, after his repeated refusal to obey the demands of the authorities, which provoked a large-scale wave of unrest in France.
OHCHR expressed concern about the killing of the teenager, calling on the French authorities to "reflect on addressing racism and discrimination deeply rooted in law enforcement" and to ensure that "the use of force by the police is consistent with the principles of legality, proportionality, non‑discrimination, discretion and accountability[3371]".
Repeated instances of excessive use of force by police during forced closures of migrant camps and against Roma have been pointed out by UN human rights treaty bodies such as CERD and CAT[3372].
On July 7, 2023, CERD adopted a statement on the situation in France, in which it made a number of recommendations on racial profiling and excessive use of force by law enforcement agencies[3373]. The statement was supported by the HRC Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, I. Achiume, the UN Permanent Forum on People of African Descent, the HRC Working Group of Experts on People of African Descent and the International Expert Mechanism for the Promotion of Racial Justice and Equality in the Context of Law Enforcement.
Complaints against "people in uniform", depending on their structural affiliation, are first dealt with by either the General Directorate of the National Police or the General Directorate of the National Gendarmerie, which delays possible prosecutions.
In September 2021, President Macron announced the establishment of a mechanism for parliamentary monitoring of human rights violations by law enforcement officials. Human rights activists believe that this measure does not guarantee fully independent control over the activities of the police and gendarmerie.
A separate problem that has become extremely relevant recently is the growth of Russophobic sentiments after the beginning of the SMO. The situation of Russian citizens and Russian-speaking persons in France was particularly alarming in the spring of 2022. Many faced and continue to face manifestations of Russophobia and aggression at the domestic level, being discriminated against by banks, educational institutions and service organizations. Cases of damage to the property and personal vehicles of Russian compatriots have been recorded (causing impact dents, deep scratches, breaking rearview mirrors and wipers, damaging cars with blue and yellow paint, breaking windows), as well as cases of psychological pressure and threats against priests of the Russian Orthodox Church. The anti-Russian rhetoric of the French authorities and media, as well as the activity of the radicalized Ukrainian diaspora, contributes to all of this.
Financial institutions are still selectively suspending the operations of Russian citizens under the pretext of "conducting additional checks", and the practice of arbitrary refusals to issue loans is known.
On August 22, 2022, more than 70 citizens of Russia, Belarus and France filed a class action lawsuit against French banks for discrimination on the basis of nationality[3374]. The lawsuit was artificially delayed by the judicial authorities and then dismissed. After filing a new application, the court imposed an inadequately high security deposit on the plaintiffs in an attempt to force them to abandon their claims.
Against the backdrop of anti-Russian hysteria in the spring of 2022, everything that reminds of Russia was threatened with a ban. Thus, in March 2022, a number of bookstores were instructed to remove Russian-language publications from sale, including pedagogical literature for teaching Russian. In some grocery stores there were notices about the withdrawal of "Russian products" from sale. Owners of Russian restaurants in different regions of France received threatening letters with the same content, requiring them to leave the country. The scale of the mailing of such letters has not been fully assessed, as not all owners reported receiving them.
On March 1, 2022, J. Thévenot, president of the Valenciennes Bar Association and part-time president of the Autonomous Fund for the financial settlements of lawyers (CARPA) at the Bar Association of the Hauts-de-France region, sent a letter to five bar associations in the region with a blatantly racist instruction to "block all money transfers to clients whose names sound Slavic".
There are cases of Russian citizens, including cultural figures, being denied visas on spurious pretexts, especially those who openly support their country's foreign policy. To counter accusations of "abolishing Russian culture," the French provide venues for performers who have left Russia, whose performances are often accompanied by anti-Russian outbursts and statements in support of Ukraine.
The malfunctioning national justice system remains a source of human rights violations in France. Human rights activists have documented a biased attitude towards foreigners: unacceptably long deliberations, discriminatory and biased approach to sentencing, unfairly harsh sentences. Investigations are conducted in a non-partisan manner. Lawyers have limited access to persons under investigation and to investigation materials, which are handed over to the defense on a piecemeal basis and with significant delays.
Episodes of a discriminatory approach by French judges to the imposition of unreasonably harsh preventive measures and penalties on Russian citizens are a cause for serious concern. In 2016-2022, A. Vinnik, I. Zhirnov, M. Ivkin, P. Kosov, V. Balakhnichev, A. Melnikov, spouses I. Druzhinin and M. Druzhinina[3375], and O. Basov had to deal with shortcomings in the administration of justice, including unsatisfactory conditions of detention in penitentiary institutions and untimely submission of case files to lawyers and their clients. In some cases, Russian consular officials were prevented from visiting the defendants, as in the case of compatriot E. Vinogradova.
A series of blatant manifestations of Russophobia was connected with the preparations for the 2024 Summer Olympic Games in Paris (July 26‑August 11). Thus, on March 30, 2024, being in Kiev, the mayor of the French capital A. Hidalgo stated that "Russian and Belarusian athletes are not welcome" in Paris[3376]. In May 2024 it became known that under the far-fetched pretext of ensuring security, volunteers from Russia and Belarus and even volunteers with Russian and Belarusian surnames living in France would not be allowed to participate in the provision of the Olympics[3377].
The traditional object of harsh criticism of human rights activists is the French penitentiary system. Overcrowded French prisons and detention centers for many years have been considered almost the worst in Western Europe. According to the Ministry of Justice of France, as of June 1, 2023, 73,699 people were held in places of detention, with 60,562 places available. The average occupancy rate of penitentiary institutions is 121.7%, in ten prisons it exceeds 200%, including in the cities of Nîmes, Rochefort and Perpignan, and in the prison of Majikavo (Mayotte Island) it reaches a "record" 297.4%.
In a report published in May 2023, the Comptroller General of places of deprivation of liberty, D. Simoneau, notes the deplorable state of French prisons. According to her data, their average occupancy rate is 142.2%, and the people held there live in conditions that violate human dignity and sanitary standards. In April 2023, at the height of demonstrations against the pension reform, D. Simoneau wrote a letter to the head of the French Interior Ministry criticizing the indiscriminate preventive detention of protesters, which violates fundamental freedoms, as well as the "instrumentalization of this preventive measure for repressive purposes".
Every year, the reports of the Comptroller General of places of deprivation of liberty document a particularly harsh approach to the detention of Islamist prisoners. They are placed in isolation units to prevent the spread of their ideology, prevented from working, receiving education, and are not provided with psychologists, despite their requests. Although it is not always about persons sentenced to serve sentences under strict regime for serious crimes. High security measures are applied to all Islamist prisoners. They are held in conditions that go beyond legal norms. For the slightest misdemeanor, their sentences are extended to the maximum extent possible.
Lawyers complain about the practice of "labeling". Sometimes in the literal sense: the prison administration may hang a sign on the cell door stating that a prisoner is under surveillance for signs of radicalization.
The harsh approach to the detention of Islamist prisoners is recognized at the official level. The prosecutor of the Court of Cassation, F. Malan (formerly head of the anti-terrorism unit of the public prosecutor's office), stated that it allows "to protect society by prolonging their stay in prisons for as long as possible."
In June 2022, the French section of the International Prison Observatory and the NGO Amnesty International demanded that the French government develop a nationwide action plan to urgently address prison overcrowding and inhumane prison conditions.
On July 24, 2021, the CPT expressed concern at the prevalence of ill‑treatment of prisoners in France, inadequate conditions of detention, prison overcrowding and racist attitudes on the part of the police and prison administration. In the CPT's assessment, "conditions of detention, particularly in national police stations, do not always correspond to the notion of human dignity"[3378].
The undemocratic and irrelevant mechanisms of forming, supplementing and updating the list of persons "posing a threat to the state security of France" are noteworthy. This list includes not only potential or actual terrorists and disruptors of public order, but also political activists, journalists, and organizers of demonstrations. All of them could be subject to information and communication interceptions or physical surveillance. The procedure for updating the database is bureaucratized. As a result, dossiers on potential terrorists are periodically "lost" (as in the case of the perpetrators of the January 2015 attacks), while political activists remain in the database for life.
On July 30, 2021, Law No. 2021-998 was passed, which made permanent the exceptional measures introduced in November
2015 due to the heightened terrorist threat and extended in 2017 on a trial basis until the end of 2020. Thus, intelligence and law enforcement agencies retained most of the unprecedented powers granted to them under the state of emergency.
The HRC Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, F. Ni'Aloin, emphasized that the French Government's counter-terrorism actions should be based on international law, including human rights, humanitarian law and refugee rights. She recommended the establishment of an independent, adequately resourced expert oversight body to monitor the implementation by the competent agencies of their powers and to review legislation, law enforcement practices and policies in the field of national security and counter-terrorism[3379].
The situation with respect for the rights of migrants and asylum seekers is of serious concern to human rights defenders.
The precarious situation of migrants in France has regularly been the subject of criticism by UN human rights treaty bodies, in particular CESCR, CERD, CAT and CEDAW. Experts have pointed with concern to poor reception and accommodation conditions for asylum-seekers, inadequate sanitary and living conditions in reception and accommodation centers, lack of access to food, clean water, health services, psychological support and legal advice, as well as increased risks of violence or exploitation. In June 2020, some 50 NGOs supporting refugees stated that only half of those in need receive places in reception and accommodation centers and called on the authorities to address the shortage of resettlement places[3380].
On July 22, 2021, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) ruled against France for the inhumane treatment of a woman and her infant child in a temporary accommodation center in the Loire-et-Cher department. OHCHR expressed concern about France's "increasingly regressive migration policy" and the "inhuman and substandard conditions in which migrants are held". Hundreds of migrants and asylum-seekers in Calais, Grande-Saint and other locations on the northern coast of France were found to be living without temporary accommodation and without adequate access to drinking water, toilets and washing facilities.
Refugees are often deprived of chances for settlement and integration. By law, a person who has applied for refugee status to the National Bureau for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons is entitled to free accommodation for three months (the normal period for processing applications). However, in practice, applicants often join the army of homeless people. They are forced to settle illegally in empty buildings or in spontaneous camps.
In the run-up to the 2024 Summer Olympics in Paris (July 26‑August 11), the French homeless aid organization Le revers de la médaill drew public attention to the plight of the homeless, whose temporary shelters are increasingly being cleared[3381].
On April 14, 2024, Le Monde reported that the police had cleaned up the largest squat (an abandoned office building) that had sheltered up to 450 migrants for months. About 250 law enforcement officers were mobilized by the authorities for this purpose. Many of the homeless fled before the police arrived[3382].
According to United Migrants, an association dedicated to helping refugees, 80 per cent of the migrants evacuated from the squat are in France legally. Some of them have lived in the building for many months, unable to rent a home or waiting for social housing[3383].
According to The New York Times of July 19, 2024, over the past year, French authorities have removed about 5,000 homeless migrants from Paris because of the upcoming 2024 Summer Olympics. The arrivals were taken by bus to Lyon or Marseille, where they were placed in special shelters. The very fact that the homeless were expelled precisely because of the upcoming Olympics, the government denies, saying that everything took place within the framework of a "voluntary program" for resettlement. At the same time, the newspaper refers to an e-mail that was available to it, which says that the purpose of relocating homeless migrants was precisely to "identify people on the street in places near the Olympic venues[3384].
According to the migrants themselves, the authorities promised to provide them with housing and social assistance. After the homeless were placed in shelters, they were screened to see if they met the criteria for asylum. Those who met the criteria were able to receive long-term housing while their asylum application was being processed. However, as the publication notes, only about 40 per cent of homeless migrants typically receive such housing[3385].
In early June 2024, the French television channel "BFMTV" ("BFMTV") reported that in connection with preparations for the Olympic Games, about 13,000 people with no permanent residence were removed from the Paris region during the year. In this regard, representatives of the human rights organization "Reverse Side of the Medal" intend to appeal to the French Interior Ministry with a demand to find an acceptable solution to the problem of the homeless. In particular, activists consider it necessary to create about 20 thousand places for accommodation of homeless people[3386].
In December 2022, the ECtHR ruled in M.C. and Others v. France that the French government had violated the right of access to court for disadvantaged asylum seekers by failing to comply with emergency accommodation orders issued by the judge of the Administrative Court for Urgent Applications. In July 2020. The ECHR ruled in the case of N.H. and Others v. France, finding the state guilty of violating the rights of three asylum seekers - creating inhuman and degrading conditions for them. The migrants were deprived of the material and financial support to which they were entitled and forced to live directly on the street without access to sanitary facilities in constant fear of attack or robbery.
A 2022-2023 report by the NGO Amnesty International notes that French border guards detained and summarily deported people, including unaccompanied minors, to Italy without following proper procedures and without taking into account individual circumstances, using racial profiling. Those who crossed the border were detained without legal grounds and handed over to the Italian police. Dozens of people had died trying to cross the border in a dangerous way.
The NGO Association for Assistance to Undocumented Persons states that up to 10,000 people are detained and placed in detention centers at Paris airports every year (often without the possibility of timely access to lawyers and relatives). The cells are overcrowded and unhygienic, and the conditions of detention are degrading. According to human rights defenders, the procedure of repatriation of illegal immigrants remains humiliating.
Human rights defenders also point to the violation of migrants' rights to family life. French authorities often refuse to issue visas to their next of kin, preventing family reunification. Refugees from conflict zones are also sometimes unjustifiably denied the right to asylum and expelled from the country until all necessary procedures are completed.
In 2021, the NGO Amnesty International found that migrants and refugees in France continue to be subjected to degrading treatment. In Menton and Briançon, cases of denial of the right to asylum have been recorded. In Calais, police and local authorities restricted refugees' access to humanitarian aid. In search of a better life, they make attempts to cross the English Channel, which sometimes end tragically: on November 24, 2022, at least 27 people drowned trying to reach the UK by boat.
Many human rights NGOs have noted discrimination against refugees in France on the basis of nationality: after February 24, 2022, Ukrainian nationals were given priority housing, social and financial assistance to the detriment of asylum seekers from other countries.
As of October 26, 2022, the French authorities spent almost 6 million euros for 73 days of detention of about 930 Ukrainian refugees on board the ferry "Mediterranean" in Marseille[3387].
According to "Politico" of March 25, 2024, according to the data for January 2024, France received 64,720 refugees from Ukraine, making the proportion of one refugee per thousand people. At the same time, Belgium hosted more than 75 thousand people, Spain received 197 thousand refugees, and in Germany their number is 270 thousand. Thus, France lagged far behind the other countries of the European Union in receiving Ukrainian refugees, being one of the "outsiders" in the list. The ratio of refugees to the country's population is also the lowest[3388].
In the areas of compact settlement of legal migrants from Muslim countries, Islamist radicalism, whose attitudes are far from modern human rights guidelines, is strengthening its position. Among those Muslims who place Sharia law above republican law, forced marriages, disinheritance of women, polygamy, etc. are often practiced. So far, the attempts of the authorities to influence the situation have not been successful.
UNICEF France emphasizes the "extremely worrying situation of minors on the coast", calls for reform of the initial reception procedure for unaccompanied minors to ensure the right to an effective remedy so that they are protected until a final judicial decision is taken, and to guarantee the same level of protection to all minors placed in the care of the Children's Social Assistance Service. It is recommended that the French Government put an end to the illegal practice of denial of asylum and "expulsions without diagnosis or offer of resettlement", introduce a legislative ban on administrative detention of children for migration reasons, whether in detention facilities or waiting areas, and give preference to non-custodial solutions.
On June 2, 2023, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) released its observations on the review of the protection of children's rights in France. CRC noted with regret that the situation of migrant and asylum-seeking children remains unchanged. The Committee expressed deep concern at the continued detention of families with children and unaccompanied children in airport waiting areas and other administrative detentions[3389].
80 per cent of migrant children living in emergency housing or temporarily with relatives do not attend school. In the EUROCEF v. France decision, the European Committee of Social Rights considered that France had violated the right of unaccompanied foreign children to social, legal and economic protection on several grounds due to shortcomings in the national shelter assessment and allocation system for unaccompanied foreign children; delays in appointing an ad hoc guardian; the detention of unaccompanied migrant children in waiting areas and in hotels; the use of bone testing to determine age, which the Committee considered inappropriate and unreliable; and a lack of clarity about how unaccompanied children could access an effective remedy[3390].
In Khan v. France, the ECtHR found the state guilty of violating Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which prohibits inhuman or degrading treatment, because the authorities failed to provide accommodation for an unaccompanied 15-year-old child evicted from an unofficial refugee camp in Calais.
France is among the leaders among EU countries in the number of restrictions on the liberty of migrant minors for less than 48 hours before they are further distributed under the Dublin system. And while detention of unaccompanied children is not allowed by law, France assumes that families with children may be subject to this measure in extreme cases.
In mainland France, 276 minors from 113 families spent just under two days in restraint in 2019. However, the largest number of children are detained in the overseas department of Mayotte – around 3,100 young migrants from over 2,200 families in 2019 (1,221 children in 2018). Most of the children come from the nearby Comoros Islands. According to NGOs working on the island of Mayotte, there are cases of ignoring by responsible officials of birth certificates confirming that the migrant has not reached the age of majority.
The former Commissioner for Human Rights in France, J. Toubon, has regularly noted that unaccompanied migrant children in the country regularly face difficulties in realizing their rights to access to justice, to a lawyer, and to an interpreter. Lack of care on the part of the state increases the risk that they can (and often do) become objects of human trafficking and various kinds of exploitation, including sexual exploitation. The problem is aggravated by the fact that trafficked children, like adults, are considered offenders rather than victims and are treated on that basis.
The situation of persons from the Chechen Republic of the Russian Federation living in France deserves special attention. Recently, there has been an increase in the number of revocations of refugee status for foreigners suspected of radicalization or convicted of disturbing public order, with a view to their subsequent expulsion to their home country. In 2020, the French National Bureau for Refugees and Stateless Persons revoked refugee status from 312 people. Almost a quarter of those involved are Russians, most of them Chechens. This is significantly higher than for other ethnic groups. For example, Afghans, the leading group of asylum seekers in France, accounted for only 5% of revocations. The human rights community notes that these are often claims and suspicions that are not sufficient grounds for deprivation of refugee status.
Until 2022, French authorities refused to repatriate their own nationals suspected of terrorist offenses and their families from Syria. In the summer of 2022, 16 women and 35 children were returned to France. However, according to Amnesty International, Paris has taken a selective approach to repatriation. Dozens of other French, including children, remain in overcrowded camps in Kurdish-controlled territory in life-threatening conditions.
In September 2022, the ECHR condemned France in H.F. and Others v. France for refusing to repatriate two women of French nationality held in Kurdish camps because of suspicions that their husbands were ISIS fighters.
On February 24, 2022, the CRC found that France's refusal to repatriate French children from Syria violated their right to life as well as their right to freedom from inhuman and degrading treatment. It is emphasized that France, which is responsible for the lives of these children, has not shown that it has given due consideration to the children's interests when considering their relatives' requests for repatriation. The Committee called for urgent measures to repatriate the remaining children and reduce the risks to their life, survival and development. UNICEF France made similar recommendations.
There are serious "overreaches" and double standards in the field of juvenile justice. However, these issues are generally ignored by human rights defenders.
The human rights community has many questions about the human rights situation in France's overseas territories.
Thus, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights examined France's fifth periodic report in October 2023 in the framework of the implementation of the relevant international covenant. The questions addressed to the French State concerned inequalities between metropolitan and overseas territories (unemployment rate 2.5 to 5 times higher, etc.[3391]). CERD noted, with regard to overseas territories, that the legal regime of land use in respect of areas that have belonged to indigenous peoples since time immemorial, where mining activities are carried out, does not allow them to pursue their traditional way of life. Those groups could not fully enjoy the right to housing and faced obstacles in exercising the right to freedom of movement. Their access to education, health care and public services, in particular civil registration and justice, is impeded.
In New Caledonia, land ownership issues related to the Kanak population have not been resolved. This community faces difficulties in securing its economic and social rights and is underrepresented in administrative bodies. There are difficulties in access to education in local languages and to Kanak culture for children.
A large proportion of the indigenous population of French Guiana and almost half of the population of Mayotte lack birth certificates and identity documents, which deprives them of basic services, including education and health care. This is largely due to the fact that article 55 of the French Civil Code provides for a very short period of time for birth registration, after which it takes up to 18 months to complete the judicial procedure, leaving children without legal proof of their existence. The lack of access to health services for indigenous populations is one of the reasons for the high maternal mortality rates in these overseas departments.
According to human rights defenders, the French authorities do not pay due attention to the problem of the negative impact on public health from military and economic activities in the overseas territories: the consequences of nuclear tests in French Polynesia, mercury poisoning of water and soil as a result of mining in French Guiana and others.
In Germany, attempts to glorify the Nazi movement and its individual representatives in any form are criminalized. Public denial, justification or underestimation of the seriousness of the crimes committed by National Socialism, public approval or glorification of Nazi tyranny, distribution of propaganda materials and use of symbols of anti-constitutional organizations, which include Nazi and neo-Nazi organizations are punishable under criminal law (§§ 86, 86a and 130 of the Criminal Code (CC) of Germany).
At the same time, manifestations of racist ideologies of various kinds, including neo-Nazism, accompanied by aggressive Russophobia at the state level and unlimited support for the Kiev regime, have been growing in recent years.
In 2024, while commemorating the 79th anniversary of the Victory in the Great Patriotic War, the display of the "Z" and "V" symbols was prohibited throughout Germany (prosecuted under para. 140 of the German Criminal Code "Encouragement and Approval of Crimes", punishable by up to three years' imprisonment). Other restrictions were regulated on a case-by-case basis.
The most severe restrictions were introduced in Berlin, where it was not allowed to use flags of Russia and the USSR, the Victory Banner, elements of historical military uniforms, St. George's ribbons, orders and medals, including on photo images of war participants, or to listen to songs of the war years, etc. near Soviet war memorials on 8 and 9 May. Restrictions on the wearing of military uniforms, insignia and the St. George's ribbon did not apply to veterans of the Great Patriotic War. Neither did these restrictions apply to diplomatic delegations.[3392]
In Cologne and Hürth, by contrast, all traditional symbols were allowed. In Hamburg, all flags/signs and the St. George's ribbon were banned. In Frankfurt am Main it was possible to use the flags of Russia, the USSR and the Victory Banner, in Kiel – only the flag of the USSR and the Victory Banner, in Saarbrücken, Augsburg and Homburg – the flag of Russia. The St. George ribbon and historic military uniforms were banned almost throughout the Germany.
After the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation launched a special military operation to denazify and demilitarize Ukraine and protect the civilian population of Donbass (SMO), Russian foreign missions in Germany recorded a sharp increase in the number of cases of desecration/vandalism at the Russian (Soviet) war graves and memorials in the country: three such incidents took place in 2021, 16 – in 2022, and twelve in 2023. Thirteen cases were reported in January – May 2024.
The changing attitude towards historical memory in Germany is particularly alarming. The country's historical responsibility for the crimes of the Nazi regime is recognized at the state level for the present. At the same time, despite the fact that the German establishment understands that attempts to revive the Nazi ideology and the theory of racial superiority are inadmissible and that it still recognizes German negative role in World War II, the activities of the German authorities in this area and increasing manifestations of neo-Nazi ideology in Germany cause concern.
Many steps of the official Berlin call into question the German authorities' commitment to preserving the historical truth about the World War II. For instance, Germany maintains double standards with regard to the payment of individual compensation to those who survived the siege of Leningrad, which was one of the most terrible acts of genocide committed by Nazi Germany against the peoples of the Soviet Union during the Great Patriotic War, when more than one million residents of Leningrad of various nationalities fell prey. Under far-fetched pretexts Germany makes payments only to Jews who survived the blockade, who, of course, have every moral right to them. Berlin has refused for years to extend payments to the remaining survivors of the blockade, to the defenders and residents of the city.
On 28 February 2024, the Russian side sent a note to the Foreign Ministry of the Federal Republic of Germany, in which it officially raised the issue of recognizing the siege of Leningrad and other crimes against the peoples of the USSR during World War II as genocide, as well as reiterated its position that German individual payments should be extended to all living blockade survivors.
In a reply note dated 26 April 2024, the German Foreign Ministry informed that Berlin remains unchanged its legal assessment of the siege of Leningrad by the German occupation troops and their allies in 1941-1944 which it consider solely as a war crime. With reference to the USSR's refusal to receive reparations in 1953, claims for appropriate compensation to all survivors of the blockade, irrespective of nationality, were also rejected.
Germany's refusal to extend payments to all blockade survivors without discrimination on the basis of nationality is shocking against the background of the social benefits it has been paying for decades to former Third Reich soldiers who served in SS units and other recognized criminal paramilitary structures, as well as to foreign collaborators of Hitler's regime directly involved in the blockade of Leningrad.
According to AFP, 1,532 people in Europe receive such pensions, including 573 in Poland, 184 in Slovenia, 101 in Austria, 94 in the Czech Republic, 71 in Croatia, 54 in France, 48 in Hungary, 34 in the UK, 34 in the Netherlands, and 18 in Belgium. In total, more than 2,030 people worldwide received payments in February 2023, which roughly amounted to about EUR 1,300 per month per person, including 250 people in the United States and 121 people in Canada.[3393] The case of Heinz Barth is representative. An 80‑year‑old former Nazi SS officer had been serving a life sentence in a German prison for his part in the June 1944 massacre of hundreds of civilians in the French town of Oradour.[3394] After the German reunification in 1990, he gained the right for a monthly payment of USD 450 on the grounds that he had lost a leg during the war.
The German authorities' position regarding the prosecution of persons who had previously collaborated with the Nazis is ambiguous. There are both cases of their conviction (although largely of a formal nature) and refusal to bring such persons to justice. For instance, on 20 December 2022, the court in Itzehoe passed a sentence on 97-year-old Irmgard Furchner, who worked as a secretary and stenographer at the Stutthof concentration camp (near the Polish city of Gdańsk) in 1943-1945.[3395] The case found that Irmgard Furchner enjoyed the trust of the camp authorities. Because the defendant was a minor when she worked for the Nazis, she was tried in juvenile court. The charges against Furchner stemmed from an investigation that started in 2016 and from interviews with witnesses that spanned several countries. According to media reports, Irmgard Furchner gave her testimony as a witness in other cases in the 1950s in 2021. At the time, she testified that she used to type out execution orders for the commandant of the camp, Paul Werner Hoppe, and that most of his letters crossed her desk. During the trial, prosecutor Maxi Wantzen quoted a former colleague of Furchner, Ellen Steussloff, who said during an interrogation in the 1950s that it was common knowledge that Jewish prisoners were gassed at Stutthof, and that anyone claiming otherwise was not telling the truth.[3396]
In early July 2024, a regional court in Hanau, Hesse, ruled that 99-year-old Gregor Formanek, who served as a guard at the Nazi concentration camp Sachsenhausen (the largest concentration and labour camp near Berlin) between 1943 and 1945, could not stand trial because his mental and physical condition did not permit it. This decision was made after the conclusion of a medical expert. The last known surviving Nazi concentration camp guard Gregor Formanek was accused of helping to murder more than 3,300 people during his service in Sachsenhausen. The media also reported that the lawyers of the plaintiffs, relatives of Nazi victims, intend to appeal against the ruling. The prosecutor in the German town of Gießen also said he would file an appeal that would be taken to the Higher Regional Court in Frankfurt am Main.[3397] The expert at the Simon Wiesenthal Centre, Dr Efraim Zuroff, said that "this is a sad day for Jewish people and the survivors of the holocaust." He called the case of Gregor Formanek the last Nazi trial, which seems not going to happen, and expressed his regret at this end of the era of such trials. In his opinion, the age of the perpetrator does not diminish his guilt, and the former concentration camp guard himself enjoys the luxury of living to a ripe old age.[3398]
On the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany there are a sufficient number of memorial objects in honour of manufactures who worked under the Nazis and used slave labour of concentration camp inmates in their enterprises. These include streets named in their honour, as well as educational institutions, memorial plaques, amenities of public spaces, etc. They were maintained regardless of the fact that many of these individuals were convicted for their crimes (such as Alfred Krupp and Max Ilgner). In particular, The Forward project, dedicated to the study of monuments in honour of the Nazis and their accomplices in a number of countries around the world, provides information on the streets in honour of Willy Messerschmitt in Taufkirchen, Albert Reimann in Ladenburg, Max Ilgner in Espelkamp, as well as the Alfred Krupp Institute for Advanced Studies at the University of Greifswald, the conference centre in honour of Nazi Party member Adolf Messer in Bad Soden and a number of other similar sites. It is also mentioned that churches in many German cities still have bells with the swastika on them. In addition, according to the project, in 2010 a memorial plaque was erected in Munich to a member of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, Yaroslav Stetsko, and his wife, who lived in this city after the World War II.[3399] As of 2022, The Forward Project found 178 monuments, streets and other sites in Germany and Austria that preserve the memory of Nazis and collaborators.[3400] In March 2024, project participants found that there is a plaque in the Plattling city war cemetery commemorating soldiers of the Russian Liberation Army, which was led by Andrey Vlasov and collaborated with the Nazis.[3401]
In addition, information has been published on social networks that memorial plaques with photographs of Wehrmacht soldiers are preserved in localities in a number of states, often in churches. The inscriptions simply refer to the Nazis as "killed in fights" in Russia or other Eastern Front countries.[3402]
It is also known that many Germany's current leaders have ancestors who were members of the SS or the NSDAP. In particular, in February 2024, Bild, with reference to the discovered dossier, reported that during the World War II, the grandfather of Foreign Minister Annalena Berbock, Waldemar Baerbock, was an engineer in the field of air defence systems, reread Hitler's book "Mein Kampf" and supported the Nazi regime. In 1944, he was awarded the Nazi Knight's Cross of the War Merit Cross in Gold with swords.[3403]
In June 2024, the Bunte magazine reported[3404] that the great-grandfather of the Vice-Chancellor and Minister for Economic Affairs and Climate Action of the Federal Republic of Germany Robert Habeck, Walter Granzow, was a prominent Nazi and was part of the leadership of the Third Reich. He held the rank of SS Brigadenführer, was close friends with Hitler's propaganda minister, Joseph Goebbels, and was convicted as a war criminal after the end of World War II. And his son, Kurt Granzow, Habeck's grandfather, held the rank of Obersturmführer SA.[3405]
In July 2024, the German Defence Ministry added a list of Wehrmacht officers, a number of whom were members of the SS and the NSDAP, to a list dedicated to Germany's military tradition.[3406] They were presented as "an example of military superiority, operational readiness, and the will to fight to achieve a goal." After a barrage of criticism of the decision, the list was withdrawn in its entirety, with all 40,000 soldiers who had served in Hitler's Germany.[3407]
The fact that the German delegation votes against the draft resolution on "Combating glorification of Nazism, neo-Nazism and other practices that contribute to fuelling contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance", which the Russian Federation, together with other co-sponsors, submits every year to the United Nations General Assembly, is yet another indicator of the real attitude of the German authorities towards the inadmissibility of the rehabilitation of Nazism. In 2022 and 2023, Germany, along with its former World War II Nazi Axis allies (Italy, Japan, etc.) voted against the draft resolution. This position marked the first time in history that former Axis member states openly opposed a document condemning the glorification of Nazism and various forms of racial discrimination. In previous years, the German delegation also abstained, in line with the collective EU policy.
Taking into consideration the situation today, the data indicate an increase in the number of manifestations of extremism. The German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, BfV) counts about 39,000 right-wing extremists in the country, of whom an estimated 14,000 people are described as violent-prone.[3408]
There are several right-wing political parties in the country. The largest of them is the Homeland party ("Die Heimat", until 2023 – the National Democratic Party of Germany), which exists since 1964 and currently has about 3,000 members. Other right-wing extremist parties – Right Wing, Third Way, "Free Saxons" parties – are not numerous (each counting no more than 500‑700 members each), but they actively participate in organization of mass events with corresponding slogans and disseminate aggressive nationalist propaganda in Internet.[3409]
In addition to political parties, right-wing circles arrange their activities via other organizations and movements registered as legal entities or operating on an informal basis. These include, among others, the Identity Movement, Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West (PEGIDA), the Citizens' Movement for Chemnitz, neo-Nazi "free associations," self-appointed "civil defence squads," etc. The BfV points to a decrease in the influence of officially registered ultra-right parties and organizations in favour of informal, non-permanent structures without a common leader, emerging inter alia on the Internet, which makes monitoring by law enforcement agencies more difficult.[3410] In February 2020, this principle was used in particular by the "Group C" (whose members planned terrorist attacks against Muslims and political figures), the right-wing extremist organization Combat 18, which was banned by the German Ministry of the Interior in January 2020, and local cells of the international neo-Nazi groups "Blood and Honour"[3411] and "Atomwaffen Division".[3412]
"Citizens of the Reich" stay close to the ultra-right forces. They are revisionists who do not recognize the legitimacy of Germany and its authorities and consider themselves citizens of the German Empire in its pre-war borders. Their number has been increasing and is currently estimated at about 23,000 people. More than 2,000 of them are considered to be prone to violence.[3413] The radicalization of these people has increased, as has their willingness to engage in open conflict with the authorities. On 7 December 2022, during a large-scale special police operation, the activities of Reichsbürger, who according to investigators were planning an attempted armed coup d'état, were suppressed (25 individuals were detained).[3414] In April‑May 2024, trials began against the alleged conspirators on charges of participating in a terrorist association and preparing an act of treason.
Sociological studies indicate that extremist ideologies have gradually spread to broad segments of German society. In 2022, a major study by the University of Leipzig was released in Germany focusing on the wide range of radical and extremist attitudes in society.[3415] Its authors (drawing parallels with a similar paper from 2020) conclude that the number of people with deep, holistic right-wing radical views is declining slightly, but that extremist circles have effectively consolidated. In addition, it is pointed out that the level of intolerance towards foreigners is not on the rise, but is at a high level. Meanwhile, the same people hold a range of discriminatory beliefs (including supporting racism, homophobia, and sexism).
Similar trends were revealed in a study conducted by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (recognized as undesirable on the territory of Russia by the decision of the General Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation on 14 February 2024) on right-wing extremist and anti-democratic trends in Germany in 2020-2021.[3416] It notes that 70.3 percent of respondents consider right-wing extremism a threat to the country (first place in the list of threats), 35.3 percent named Islamism as the main threat, and 34.8 percent – left-wing extremism. Support for the populist ideas decreased from 38.2 percent of respondents in 2018-2019 to 28.2 percent in 2020-2021. Such trends are noticeable not only among supporters of far-right parties, but also among voters of the CDU/CSU, SPD and the Left Party.
The study had found that such theses as "it is in the national interest to establish a dictatorship" and "we need a leader who will rule Germany with a strong hand" were condemned by the overwhelming number of respondents (summing up the answers "completely disagree" and "mostly disagree", 85.1 percent and 84.4 percent respectively). Also, the absolute majority did not support the statements "foreigners come to Germany to take advantage of its social system" (against 57.3 percent), "if there is a shortage of jobs, foreigners should be deported to their home countries" (80.4 percent) and "there are already so many foreigners in the country that it already constitutes a danger for us" (67.4 percent).
It is also noted that verbal "disapproval" of foreigners and stereotypes unrelated to the potential use of violence, are much more widespread than other forms of xenophobia. The negative attitude to antisemitic clichés is quite unambiguous. 80.7 percent of respondents disagreed with the statement "even today the influence of Jews is too great". 86.2 percent disagreed with the statement "Jews more often than representatives of other nationalities use cunning methods to achieve their goals", 84.9 percent disagreed with the statement "Jews have special characteristics; they are not suitable for our society". In general, only 4.5 percent of respondents expressed unequivocal support for hatred of foreigners, 1.7 percent for antisemitism, 1.7 percent for right-wing extremism, and 2.2 percent for a dictatorial form of government. All of these manifestations are more widespread in East Germany than in West Germany. The authors summarize: only a small part of the population has unambiguously right‑wing extremist views. But the percentage of such in the latent plane is higher, because a larger proportion of respondents are susceptible to right-wing populist propaganda, which may lead to the formation of right-wing radical views in the future.
In addressing a noticeable increase in extreme right-wing sentiments in the society, the German authorities are building up comprehensive opposition to the relevant political groups. At the same time, the German state invokes the need to fight radicals as a cover to actually suppress citizens who disagree with the social and political realities established in the country. The so-called German mainstream media has been waging a campaign aimed at promoting social intolerance toward dissidents. The German authorities, hoping there through to shackle German society, which is losing its internal stability for objective reasons, have only been further polarizing it by pushing more and more Germans, who become victims of this pressure, to organize themselves in often highly offbeat movements.
Experts point out that in recent years German authorities have increased pressure on right-wing circles (including the Alternative for Germany party) which oppose the sanctions policy against Russia. In early December 2022, this was prompted by an above-mentioned alleged coup attempt prepared by supporters of the "Second Reich". Reportedly, many of the participants shared extreme right-wing views, many had served in the armies of the Federal Republic of Germany and the former German Democratic Republic in the past.
Large-scale right-wing extremist and xenophobic events are regularly held in the country. Among the largest of such events are demonstrations in Dresden on the anniversary of the savage bombing of the city by British and American aircraft on 13-15 February 1945. Up to 1,000 people took part in another such demonstration with revisionist slogans on 13 February 2023.[3417] (in 2023, the number of participants in this action was estimated at about 600.)[3418] In addition, far-right forces, especially in the east of the country, regularly organize protests of up to several hundred people against the settlement of asylum seekers in compact settlements.[3419] In total, according to the Federal Ministry of the Interior of the Federal Republic of Germany, about 200 right-wing large-scale events took place in the country in 2023.[3420]
The scale of the integration of right-wing extremist elements into law enforcement agencies is significant. According to the second special report of the German Federal Ministry of the Interior, from July 2018 to June 2021, 860 checks were carried out against members of the security services (police, special services, Bundeswehr, customs) on suspicion of having right‑wing extremist views or views close to those of "Reich citizens". In 327 cases (38 percent of the total number) the suspicions were confirmed. Over 450 criminal cases on incitement of ethnic hatred, use of symbols and propaganda of anti-constitutional organizations and others were opened.[3421]
A specialized report published in December 2020 by the Parliamentary Oversight Panel of the Bundestag (which oversees the activities of law enforcement agencies) pointed out that right-wing radicals in the police, special services, and Bundeswehr maintain close ties to right-wing extremist parties, movements, and groups.[3422] It was also stated in documents of the Panel that right-wing radicals in the police, special services, and Bundeswehr maintain close ties with right-wing extremist parties, movements, and groups. In particular, this was pointed out in the government's response published in July 2022 to a request by a group of Bundestag deputies to conduct an analysis of extremist manifestations in German security agencies for the period from 1 July 2018 to 30 June 2021. According to the published data, there were 189 confirmed cases of staff members belonging to right-wing extremists in the federal states, and 138 such cases in federal government agencies. It was also noted that 201 officers out of 327 security services officers put on the list of probable or confirmed cases of affiliation with right-wing extremists really maintained contacts with right-wing organizations.[3423]
In the German armed forces, the most problematic unit in terms of right-wing extremist sentiments is the KSK Special Forces, one of whose companies was disbanded in July 2020 for this reason. It was revealed that in April 2021, German soldiers in the NATO contingent in Lithuania had organized Nazi parties, where Hitler had been glorified and sexual violence had taken place.[3424]
The German police was repeatedly shaken by scandals when dozens of its officers engaged in electronic chat rooms, where pictures of Hitler, swastikas, photo montages of shootings of black people, etc. were forwarded.[3425],[3426]
Civil society activists pointed out that the German authorities tolerated various neo-Nazi manifestations, although they pretended not to notice them. In particular, the chairman of the German Union of Freethinkers Klaus Hartmann pointed this out when referring to participation of the German military in the NATO regular military exercises "Iron Wolf" (one of the largest tactical exercises on the territory of Lithuania), which is conducted by the Lithuanian infantry brigade having the same name. In 2024, this exercise has taken place for over two weeks in June at several Lithuanian military training grounds. More than 3,700 Lithuanian troops and military units from Belgium, the Czech Republic, the United States, Luxembourg, Norway, the Netherlands, and Germany were involved.[3427]
The historically scandalous name of the exercise refers to the 1930s Lithuanian nationalist movement Iron Wolf (Geležinis Vilkas), also known as the Iron Wolf Association. The movement was antisemitic and Nazi in nature, and its ideology called for ridding Lithuania of Poles and Jews and generally creating a powerful state similar to the European fascist movements. During World War II, its members collaborated with the Nazi authorities.[3428]
The media reported on ties between German right-wing radicals and foreign extremist structures. For example, investigative journalism materials published in February 2021 by Die Zeit revealed the fact that German far-right organizations had strengthened ties to Ukrainian neo-Nazis and, among other things, had participated in the armed conflict in Donbass on the side of the Kiev regime. Active efforts of the Ukrainian neo-Nazi regiment "Azov" in Germany and its cooperation with German neo-Nazi associations were mentioned.[3429]
The Internet plays a significant role in the dissemination of right-wing extremist ideology in Germany. Far-right groups actively use the opportunities provided by popular social networks to propagandize and mobilize participants in public events. Such views are also disseminated on so-called image-boards ("4chan", "8chan", etc.) and on platforms for gamers ("Steam", "Discord", etc.).[3430] Sociological research has recorded a consistently high level of hate speech against persons belonging to ethnic and religious minorities in the German segment of the Internet.[3431]
A recent trend noted by the Centre for the Study of Extremism and Radicalism regarding the activities of far-right groups, mostly small groups of a few dozen people, is noteworthy. Such associations are officially registered as NGOs. At the same time, almost all of them were either associated with criminals or engaged in criminal activities. Therefore, the process of banning such a group takes a considerable amount of time, not least because of its status as an NGO.[3432]
The German Ministry of the Interior recorded 28,900 politically motivated right-wing extremist crimes in 2023 (it was 23,500 in 2022), of which 1,270 were violent crimes.[3433] 2,400 crimes (more than 300 were violent) were directed against refugees and asylum seekers, 180 crimes were directed against places of their accommodation. At the same time, 222 people were injured.[3434] When commenting on these statistics, the vice-president of the Bundestag, Petra Pau (Left Party), stated the appalling scale of right-wing political crime in the country. The German Federal Commissioner for Migration, Refugees, and Integration Reem Alabali-Radovan (SPD), called far-right ideology the greatest threat to the peaceful coexistence of people in German society.[3435]
The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) with reference to German relevant agencies identified a 23 percent increase in hate crime (an all‑time high since data collection commenced in 2001). The 29 percent increase in antisemitic crimes was also recorded. Equality bodies in Germany also record a high level of complaints of discrimination. In particular, out of a total of 5,617 complaints filed with the Federal Anti-Discrimination Agency in 2022, 2,080 cases (37 percent) were related to racial discrimination.[3436]
The need to counter extreme right-wing activity was highlighted by multilateral human rights monitoring mechanisms. In its March 2020 report on Germany, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, operating within the framework of the Council of Europe, pointed out with alarm the increase in hate speech, xenophobia and Islamophobia in German public discourse and the rise of violent right-wing extremists.[3437]
In November 2021, the UN Human Rights Committee also highlighted this problem. In particular, the Committee expressed concern about incitement of hatred in Germany, including verbal attacks, online publications and hate speech in the context of political discourse, as well as the significant number of hate crimes, including violent attacks and desecration of religious sites, committed against people of African descent, Roma, Muslims, Jews, refugees and migrants.[3438]
In December 2023, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) also expressed concern about the increase of racist hate speech, and incitement to racial discrimination, including in public and political discourse, on the Internet and on social media.[3439] The Committee also pointed out to the lack of a legal framework in Germany that prohibits racist hate speech and provides access to effective legal remedies for victims. Despite the measures adopted by German government, the experts also noted the increasing number of extremist organizations and groups, including right wing extremist political parties (CERD also categorized Alternative for Germany party as such). The Committee also noted the increase in the number of violent racially based incidents, including violent attacks against persons belonging to ethnic minorities, in which right‑wing extremists are involved. German authorities are recommended to effectively investigate all acts of racist hate speech and hate crimes, including those committed by political and public figures, and encourage the authorities to actively distance themselves from expressions of racist hate speech by public and political figures. The German government is also recommended to adopt measures aimed at strengthening public trust in the authorities, and thus ensure that such crimes are identified and recorded.
It should be noted that German government makes efforts to develop the legal framework to combat manifestations of hatred. In 2021, a new law against right-wing extremism and hate crimes (Gesetz zur Bekämpfung des Rechtsextremismus und der Hasskriminalität) came into force in Germany. It specifically criminalized the threat and use of hate speech on the Internet, including against social groups.[3440] However, there are no statistics yet on its application.
Ordinary citizens experience manifestations of racism. According to the German Centre for Research on Integration and Migration, over 80 percent of respondents reported systemic inequality caused by racial differences in such spheres as education, employment, and renting housing. The National Monitoring of Discrimination and Racism for 2022 reported that 22 percent of all German citizens and 58 percent of those who may be discriminated because of "appearance" had experienced racism. 45 percent of respondents experienced racial discrimination at least once. 90 percent of respondents acknowledged the existence of racism in Germany, 61 percent of which agreed that it was quite common, and 70 percent expressed their personnel willingness to confront racism as best they could.[3441]
The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination noted manifestations of discrimination against athletes belonging to ethnic minorities, in particular football players.[3442]
With the beginning of the special military operation to denazify and demilitarize Ukraine and protect the civilian population of Donbass, the German authorities set a goal of inflicting a "strategic defeat" on Russia. This policy included freezing of contacts and cooperation between the Russian and German government agencies, and has negatively affected the attitude of the German authorities and society towards Russian-speaking residents of Germany.
In reality, after the Russian Armed Forces launched a special military operation, there was a sharp increase in cases of discrimination, insults, threats and direct violence against Russian-speaking citizens living in Germany. According to the BKA, at its peak in the spring of 2022, up to 200 crimes per week were recorded on this basis.[3443]
It should be noted that the sharp increase in discrimination after the start of Russian special operation was against all representatives of the Russian-speaking diaspora, including Jews and Russian Germans from among the late resettles, including citizens of Germany. Since late February 2022, there have been a lot of quite different incidents, even those coming beyond the legal framework, and cases of violence: the use of physical force, threats, insults, deliberate damage to the property of Russian-speaking people, refusal to provide them with services, including medical and bank services, illegal dismissal from work, forced public repentance and condemnation of actions of the Russian authorities, etc. Psychological harassment and persecution of Russian-speaking children in schools – by both classmates and teachers – has become widespread. Many schools hold classes in which teachers, following centralized instructions, assigned homework which discredited Russia and its authorities and distorted information about what is happening in Ukraine and in the Russian regions, including the Crimea, the Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics, and Zaporozhye and Kherson Oblasts. Russian-speaking children who refuse to attend such classes and complete assignments are threatened with expulsion from school.
Both German human rights activists and the police recognized the facts of discrimination against Russian-speaking residents of Germany, i.e. the entire community of German residents for whom Russian is their native language or one of the main means of communication, as well as against citizens of Russia and Belarus.[3444]
The German human rights organization VADAR reported that between June 2022 and early September 2023, about 1,600 Russian-speaking residents of Germany faced discrimination on ethnic grounds. More than 400 appeals received by the organization were prioritized, including more than 100 with specific legal assistance. In 2023 alone, VADAR received nearly 700 requests for help. According to the VADAR head, Ulrich Oehme, a particular problem for Russian-speaking residents was the blocking of bank accounts and confiscation of cars registered in Russia.[3445]
The Russian Embassy in Berlin actively receives feedback from Russian compatriots to collect information about cases of discrimination and harassment of Russian-speaking people, as well as to respond promptly to their concerns about such discriminatory incidents. The Embassy takes into account and systematizes the information received about specific cases of violation of the rights of Russian-speaking citizens in Germany.
The cultural and religious spheres were affected by the wave of Russophobia. A campaign to force Russian cultural figures to publicly condemn the actions of the Russian leadership was launched in Germany. This was followed by demonstrative refusals to cooperate with Russian cultural figures and institutions, as well as attempts to eliminate works by Russian authors from programs. In March 2022, attacks on and desecration of Russian Orthodox churches of the Moscow Patriarchate in Düsseldorf, Essen, and Krefeld and of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad in Hanover, Berlin, and Bielefeld were recorded.
The German authorities have been putting pressure on and intimidating those activists of the Russian-speaking community who openly express their disagreement with the ongoing demonization of Russia in Germany and show a loyal attitude to our country. The German media publish articles claiming that such activists are under the control of the Kremlin, accusing them of working with the Russian Embassy and collaborating with extremists. This is broadly in line with the general approach of the German authorities to the activities of public organizations whose members are under surveillance. The EU Agency for Fundamental Right noted the problem of surveillance of NGOs, pointing out, inter alia, that the German authorities have been monitoring and searching the homes of activists involved in climate change activities.[3446]
A striking example of the persecution of Russian citizens in Germany is the criminal proceedings initiated by the German authorities against the pro-Russian activist Yelena Kolbasnikova, who has been living in the country for many years now, and her husband Maxim Schlund. They are known for their active participation in the organization of several pro-Russian automobile rallies in Germany.
In her interviews with the media, Yelena Kolbasnikova told that quite a large number of indigenous Germans participated in the actions organized by her. However, each time their number decreased, because the police came to search them, and people became afraid to publicly express their position.[3447] That is, under the pretext of countering the "Russian threat", the authorities are creating an atmosphere of general fear, which is already having a general effect on the population of this country and the ability of specific individuals and groups to enjoy their rights and freedoms.
Following a criminal case against Yelena Kolbasnikova, the Cologne District Court found her guilty and fined her with EUR 900 for her statements in support of Russia on 8 May 2022 during the Victory Day event in June 2023. At the same time, she was charged with "war propaganda" under Article 140 of the German Criminal Code for publicly supporting Russia's "aggression against Ukraine". An appeal was filed against the court's decision.
Yelena Kolbasnikova and Maxim Shlund are being investigated on suspicion of violating the Foreign Trade and Payments Act of the Federal Republic of Germany, which prohibits the export and transfer of goods subject to EU sanctions (the maximum penalty under this law is up to five years in prison). In particular, as the investigation believes, they handed over insulated tents, helmets, cash, etc. to the Russian military during a trip to Donbass in the fall of 2022. As part of this investigation, the apartments of Yelena Kolbasnikova and Maxim Shlund were searched on 27 March and 21 August 2023.[3448]
The International Association of Russian Speaking Lawyers (IARL) and the International Council of Russian Compatriots (ICRC) issued a statement calling on the German authorities to stop politically motivated persecution of Yelena Kolbasnikova and suggesting that international human rights organizations provide an objective assessment of the gross ideologically motivated actions of the German authorities.[3449]
Yelena Kolbasnikova's husband Maxim Schlund is also being persecuted. Because of his participation in pro‑Russian rallies, he was first denied access to his workplace because his employer allegedly had reason to doubt his trustworthiness, then suspended from work, and in March 2023, he was fired. The activist has been trying to defend his rights in court, get financial compensation from his former employer and be reinstated.
Due to the persecution initiated against the activists by the German authorities, Yelena Kolbasnikova and Maxim Schlund were forced to leave Germany.
German authorities persecute also other Russian citizens: V.A.Dekanov, A.Gevorkov, Y.Y.Orekhov, Y.S.Prokhorova, and M.V.Gatzemeier. Most of the cases brought against Russian citizens were initiated after they published pro-Russian content on social networks.[3450]
In addition to criminal prosecutions, in 2023 there was a significant number of cases when personal vehicles of the Russian citizens residing in Germany (including Bavaria, Berlin, Hamburg, Schleswig-Holstein) or staying in the country for the purpose of transit of vehicles registered in Russia and temporarily imported into Germany were seized under the EU Council Regulation No. 833/2014 of 31 July 2014. Article 31 of this document establishes a ban on the import of a number of cargoes and goods from Russia to the territory of EU countries, including personal cars, telephones, computers, bags, clothes, cosmetics, hygiene products, etc. In response to the Russian Embassy's notes on the invalidity and illegality of the German authorities' actions, the German Foreign Ministry noted that the possibility of exemption from the sanctions regime is being considered by the competent customs and judicial authorities on a case-by-case basis.
Double standards and various methods of pressure were applied to the Russian media operating in Germany. After the beginning of the special military operation to demilitarize and denazify Ukraine, the Russian media outlets "Russia Today" (RT DE) and "SNA News" (formerly "Sputnik Deutschland") fell under EU-wide sanctions, which prohibit their activities in all European Union member states. "SNA News" took the decision to completely stop broadcasting in Germany and closed its official web portal and social network accounts. The RT DE TV channel is officially blocked in Germany. Significant fines were imposed on Russian media outlets. Attempts to challenge them in court were rejected and the fines were subsequently increased.
It is telling that targeted attacks on the part of social, political and journalistic circles against the Russian media active in Germany had taken place even earlier, since 2020. First of all, they were directed against the "Russia Today" (RT DE) TV channel and its affiliated video agency "Ruptly". A toxic background had been carefully created around RT DE: the German press disseminated unfounded insinuations about its political prejudice and bias, and attempts to sow discord in the German society, etc. In May 2021, Commerzbank announced the closing of the accounts of RT DE and "Ruptly" and stopped rendering financial services to them without explaining the reasons. Under pressure from Berlin, the Luxembourg authorities refused to grant the Russian TV channel an appropriate broadcasting license. The refusal came despite the fact that the channel's application had been prepared in accordance with Luxembourg and general EU legislation and had been submitted on the same grounds as a number of other media had done, including from countries outside the European Union, which had previously been approved by the Luxembourg authorities without any difficulty. The climax of the campaign was the announcement voiced by representatives of the German intelligence agencies that they were officially "monitoring" the activities of RT DE. On 2 February 2022, the Berlin-based company managing the TV Channel received an official notice from the media regulator to cease its linear broadcasts via the Internet, satellite and third-party media platforms and applications.
Human rights defenders are concerned about the worsening problem of antisemitism in Germany. According to the FRA report on manifestations of antisemitism in 2012-2022, in 2022, the police recorded 2,641 politically motivated crimes committed on antisemitic grounds, 969 of them were perpetrated online.[3451] This figure is lower than in the previous year (3,027 antisemitic offences in 2021, with 1,194 committed online).[3452] However, the FRA notes that as the number of politically motivated crimes committed on antisemitic grounds recorded by the police has increased every year since 2015, the overall trend covering 2012-2022 shows an upward trend, despite the 2022 decrease. Politically motivated crimes committed on antisemitic grounds made up around 23 percent (2,641 out of 11,520) of all crimes with a hate motive. Given that the Jewish population in Germany makes up around 0.1 percent of the total population, such a high rate of crimes with an antisemitic motive indicates a disproportionately high level of persecution of Jews.[3453]
With reference to German law enforcement authorities, the FRA also notes a general trend of increasing acts of violence with antisemitic motives. In 2022, 88 such incidents were reported (compared to 64 in 2021). In this context, it is also important to note that such an incident is included in the statistics on manifestations of antisemitism if the victim was physically injured or wounded, and the local police authority conducting the investigation has passed the information to the Criminal Investigation Registration Service (Kriminalpolizeilicher Meldedienst – Politisch motivierte Kriminalität, KPMD PMK), which is responsible for collecting statistical data.
Since October 2023, against the backdrop of the Middle East escalation, Germany has seen a dramatic increase in crime on this basis. While 2,600 antisemitic crimes were reported in 2022, over 5,100 were reported in 2023 (2,700 in the last quarter of the year alone), with 56 people injured.[3454] For the first quarter of 2024, 793 offenses were recorded on this ground. The German Ministry of the Interior points to a significant increase in antisemitic crimes motivated by religious and foreign extremist ideology.[3455] Dr. Felix Klein, the Federal Government Commissioner for Jewish Life in Germany and the Fight against Antisemitism, called the high level of antisemitic crime "shameful" for the country and criticized the lack of attention to the problem on the part of the German public. Josef Schuster, the President of the Central Council of Jews in Germany, pointed out that because of fears for their safety, many members of his people living in Germany have stopped wearing symbols in public that identify them as Jews.[3456]
The third sociological study of antisemitism conducted by the FRA among representatives of Jewish communities in a number of EU countries has also revealed a number of problems faced by Jews living in Germany (according to the Agency, the country has the second largest Jewish community in the EU). According to the answers of respondents, Germany ranks first in terms of increasing manifestations of antisemitism: 86 percent of respondents indicated this. Germany had one of the highest percentages of respondents saying that antisemitism is a very serious problem (77 percent). Germany demonstrated one of the highest shares of respondents who had encountered antisemitic "conspiracy theories that Jews are responsible for events that have nothing to do with them and were not committed by them" (81 percent). The percentage of those who faced manifestations of antisemitism during cultural events was significant: 41 percent. Respondents noted that they very often faced the situation when Germans do not consider Jews living in Germany as citizens of the country (88 percent). 66 percent of the respondents constantly face antisemitism on the Internet, and 47 percent – in reality. At the same time, online manifestations of antisemitism are most frequent on the social networks Facebook and Instagram as well as in the electronic media (23 percent, 17 percent and 23 percent respectively). Moreover, the level of dissatisfaction with the authorities' actions to combat such manifestations is one of the highest in the EU (88 percent). The number of those who had experienced antisemitism in the year preceding the survey (43 percent) was one of the highest in Germany. Compared to the results of the previous 2018 survey, the country has seen a slight increase in routine harassment on the grounds of antisemitism, from 31 percent to 36 percent. At the same time, the highest proportion of those who do not report such incidents to law enforcement agencies because they do not believe in the effectiveness of this (11 percent), and those who do not trust in the German police is the highest in the EU at 19 percent. Germany was among the countries (along with Belgium and France) with the highest proportion of respondents who fear that they (59 percent) or their family (65 percent) will be victims of persecution and violence motivated by hatred of Jews. Accordingly, 80 percent of respondents fear wearing objects and symbols that indicate their Jewish origin (of which 59 percent explicitly linked such behaviour to security concerns). 31 percent of respondents avoid participating in Jewish activities and 41 percent avoid visiting certain locations where they live because as Jews they do not feel safe there. A significant number of survey participants said that the escalation of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict very or fairly strongly influenced their assessment of their own security (57 percent). Germany was among the countries (together with Belgium, France and Italy) with the highest number of respondents who felt that society holds them responsible for these actions either all the time, often or occasionally (80 percent and more). The share of those who had considered moving from Germany was high (58 percent).[3457]
Experts recognise that police statistics represent the "tip of the iceberg" and do not take into account a variety of "domestic" incidents that are not prosecuted. A group of specialised NGOs, Federal Association of Departments for Research and Information on Antisemitism (RIAS), in its 2022 report (released in June 2023) recorded 2,480 incidents on this ground. Of these, 1,912 cases involved offensive language or inscriptions of a relevant nature. There were 186 cases of property damage, 72 cases of threats, and 56 attempts to use physical violence that posed a serious threat to life and health (such offences included arson, as well as shooting at Jewish communal properties).[3458] The organisation noted a sharp increase in antisemitic incidents in Germany in 2023, which experts attribute to the escalation of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in October 2023. In its 2023 report, RIAS pointed to a sharp rise in antisemitic incidents in the second half of the year: A total of 4,782 such incidents were recorded. 58 percent of these incidents (2,787) took place after 7 October, with an average of 32 incidents recorded per day. It was also noted that manifestations of antisemitism took violent forms in 2023: ten attacks were recorded on average each month, and 121 in total. There were also 183 incidents with antisemitic threats recorded.[3459]
Antisemitism at German universities has intensified. Jewish students are often forced to withdraw from classes, fearing for their safety.[3460] According to RIAS, 471 cases were reported in schools, universities, museums and theatres in 2023, which corresponds to about nine cases per week. A total of 184 such incidents were recorded in 2022.[3461]
Moreover, there has been an increase in Islamophobic sentiments in Germany, including their significant dissemination in broad segments of German society and in all spheres of public life. The report of the independent expert group on combating Islamophobia under the Ministry of the Interior of the Federal Republic of Germany (established in September 2020 "following" the racist terrorist attack in Hanau on 19 February 2020) noted strengthened Islamophobic sentiments, as well as their significant spread in broad segments of German society and in all spheres of public life. Among other things, the report notes that every second German resident has Islamophobic attitudes and stereotypes. For example, 45 percent of respondents would not want their municipality to be headed by a Muslim. 38 percent of respondents said that because of the large number of Muslims living in Germany, they feel like "strangers in their own country". 46 percent are of the opinion that there are many Islamist fanatics among Muslims living in Germany. 49 percent of respondents disagree with the opinion that Muslim migrants integrate well into German society. 29 percent approve of the demand for a ban on immigration for Muslims. 30 percent favoured restricting the practice of Muslim religion in Germany. 42 percent favour a ban on the construction of mosques in Germany. 43 percent believe that the Muslim community should be under the state control. The study also noted that there is a widespread attitude in Germany towards Islam as a backward archaic religion that is not compatible with modern traditions and religious teachings. There is also a widespread opinion that Islam promotes violence and restricts women's rights. In this context, exercise of religious practices is often interpreted as fundamentalism, and individuals who demonstrate adherence to that religion are perceived as a threat.
The Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (AC FCNM) in 2022 noted with concern the deformation of the general atmosphere of tolerance in Germany. In particular, it pointed out that while mainstream political discourse had come to acknowledge that Germany is an immigration country with an ethnically, linguistically and religiously diverse society, the voice of those opposing diversity has become louder. According to the AC FCNM, this is due, inter alia, to the growing popularity of far-right parties. Moreover, with politicians publicly voicing such xenophobic, antisemitic and Islamophobic views, the ideology began to resonate in public debates, entering the mainstream political discourse. Consequently, fuelled by social media, the polarization between those advocating for openness towards diversity and those opposing it is increasing. With reference to two 2019 studies on antisemitism and Islamophobia, the AC FCNM noted that antisemitism (according to a related case study, more than a quarter of respondents agreed with a number of antisemitic statements and stereotypes about Jews) and Islamophobia had reinforced in German society. Moreover, according to the second survey, Islam is perceived by about half of those surveyed in a 2019 study as a threat. This is a view amplified by German media reports, which often cast Islam in a negative light.[3462]
The UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has expressed concern about persistent racial and xenophobic, including antisemitic and Islamophobic, prejudices and stereotypes towards persons belonging to ethnic minorities in Germany.[3463] With regard to antisemitic manifestations, CERD noted an increase in antisemitic sentiment, hate crimes and hate speech in Germany, in particular after the outbreak of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in Gaza in early October 2023. The Committee also expressed concern that Muslims in Germany often faced general suspicion from public authorities, which fuels prejudice and negative stereotypes against ethnic Muslim communities. In this regard, the Committee noted with concern the bans against peaceful demonstrations commemorating the Nakbah and peaceful demonstrations in support of Palestinians in Gaza.
The Committee noted that structural discrimination against people of African descent still persisted in the country. CERD also noted that the history of Germany regarding colonialism and slavery was not included in school curricula. There is still structural discrimination and stigmatization against people of African descent. The Committee experts expressed concern that Germany's colonial past and its role in slavery continued to fuel racial discrimination and racial inequalities. Berlin is recommended to provide comprehensive restitution and compensation to the descendants of the victims of the genocide of the Ovaherero and Nama tribes in the former German colonies in Africa in the early 20th century.[3464]
In the light of concerns expressed by international human rights monitoring mechanisms about the persistence of discrimination and xenophobia in Germany, there are some worrying ideas to change the German law, namely the initiative launched in 2020 to exclude from Article 3 of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany the reference to race as a ground on which no discrimination can take place. The proponents of amending the constitution cite the following arguments: the definition of "race" is outdated in itself and even racist. Experts note that such innovations may have discriminatory consequences for racial and ethnic minorities. Alliance 90/The Greens and the Left Party expressed support for the initiative in parliamentary debates held the same year. The initiative has not yet been adopted, rather because of the complexity of the process of changing Germany's Basic Law than because the parties in the ruling coalition have no such intentions. In addition, similar processes at the land level are proceeding at a markedly faster pace. In August 2022, the ruling coalition in the state of Hamburg decided to remove the word "race" from the text of land laws.[3465]
The above-mentioned problem of Islamophobia is linked with the situation with migrants, as Germany still ranks first in the EU in the number of foreign asylum seekers. The majority of migrants are from the Middle East and North Africa. According to statistics from the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, there were 329,100 initial asylum applications in 2023, 51 percent higher than the figure for 2022 (217,800). Most asylum seekers came from Syria (102,900 initial applications), Turkey (61,100) and Afghanistan (51,200). They were followed by asylum seekers from Iraq (11,100), Iran (9,400), Georgia (8,400) and Russia (7,663 applications).[3466] Refugees from Ukraine are not included in these statistics, as they are admitted under a special EU procedure that exempts them – unlike applicants from other countries – from having to apply for asylum. More than 1,100,000 Ukrainian refugees are reportedly registered in the Federal Republic of Germany.[3467]
On 18 January 2024, the Bundestag passed a law to improve the deportation of foreigners from Germany.[3468] Among the innovations are an increase in the maximum period of placement of deportees in places of compulsory detention before expulsion from 10 to 28 days, as well as the cancellation of prior notification of impending deportation (except for families with children under 12 years of age). Police officers are empowered to seize electronic devices in order to identify migrants, as well as to conduct searches in their places of accommodation. The changes have been criticized by human rights defenders. Violations of the basic rights of asylum-seekers, including the right to privacy and confidentiality of personal correspondence were highlighted.[3469]
Human rights activists and representatives of migrant associations point to the widespread "domestic" racism in Germany, which manifests itself in discrimination against persons of foreign origin in the labour market, in healthcare, when looking for housing, etc., as well as "institutional" racism in government and administration, including the practice of "racial profiling".[3470] At the same time, anti-migrant sentiments are widespread in the German society. A YouGov study published at the end of December 2022 shows that in recent years German citizens have had a negative attitude toward migrants: Two-thirds of those surveyed see nothing positive in the permanent reception of refugees.[3471]
At the same time, different attitudes towards refugees from different countries are recorded. The human rights community and especially immigrant associations criticize Germany for giving Ukrainian refugees greater rights than asylum-seekers from other crisis regions of the world. In June 2022, for example, 57 organizations in the Federal Republic of Germany addressed the German Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs demanding an end to the unequal treatment of Ukrainian and non-Ukrainian refugees. In this open letter, particular attention was paid to medical care. It also criticized the treatment of persons without Ukrainian citizenship who resided in Ukraine as of 23 February 2022. This particularly affected foreign students who had a limited Ukrainian residence permit. Human rights defenders recorded cases of discrimination against students from African countries who arrived in Germany from the territory of Ukraine.[3472]
There is also different attitude towards migrants living in special centres and those renting accommodation. In particular, asylum-seekers living in hostels receive 10 percent less social benefits than those with the same status outside such special centres (this rule has been in force in Germany since 2019). The difference in approach was recognized in October 2022 by the German Constitutional Court as contradicting the tenets of equal rights and equal provision of all persons with the minimum means consistent with human dignity. The Court demanded that the rule be repealed.[3473]
FRA reported that discriminatory treatment of migrants influenced attitude to Ukrainian Roma. The latter were repeatedly portrayed in the media in a negative way; therefore they were treated differently from other Ukrainian nationals.[3474]
Migrants' issues have come to the attention of multilateral human rights monitoring mechanisms. The UN Human Rights Committee noted the restrictions on family reunification due to quotas imposed by the German authorities, the negative practice of deporting migrants without providing individual case-by-case assessment procedures, the poor living conditions in migration centres, which are also located in geographically remote areas, limiting access to basic services for those living there.[3475]
In September 2022, the Committee on the Rights of the Child pointed out discrimination against disadvantaged children, including asylum-seeking, refugee and migrant children, Roma and other minority children, children with disabilities, and children from social and economically disadvantaged families.[3476]
In addition, the Committee drew attention to a number of problems in the educational sphere. In particular, the experts expressed concern about the shortage of teachers in German schools and the high level of stress faced by students due to pressure from teachers and the widespread practice of bullying. In addition, it has been recorded that a large number of children with disabilities drop out of school before they receive their high school diploma.
This concern of the human rights structures is also supported by studies in this area published by the media. According to a study by a group of experts presented at the conference of education ministers in early December 2022, the education in German schools has deteriorated. There has been a noticeable decline in the performance of schoolchildren: one in five German fourth-graders does not speak German properly and does not know elementary mathematics.[3477] Most of the students who fall behind are children of migrants and from disadvantaged families. Insufficient funding for education and a shortage of teachers in schools and kindergartens are also pointed out.
CERD indicated with concern that ethnic minority and migrant children face discrimination within the education system in schools. Children from ethnic minorities are more likely to suffer bullying at school, more likely to drop out of school and less likely to attend pre-school.[3478]
The problem of racial profiling in German law enforcement agencies is quite acute. Sociological research confirms that people with migrant backgrounds are disproportionately subjected to police checks. Many respondents complained about racist and Islamophobic remarks from police officers.[3479]
According to the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights, although the German authorities claim to have developed and implemented measures to combat racial profiling among police officers, such efforts are not systematic and are mostly undertaken on an individual level. There is an isolated case of a Dresden administrative court ruling that the detention and search of a Guinean man was unlawful because of his skin colour.[3480]
Both international human rights monitoring mechanisms and human rights organizations draw attention to this problem. In 2019, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance highlighted this issue, as well as the lack of effective support mechanisms for victims of racial profiling. In this regard, ECRI called on the German authorities to take appropriate measures to remedy the situation.[3481]
Another study on the manifestations of racism suggests that the phenomenon should be seen as a threat to social cohesion in the context of specific institutional spheres of society. An analysis is conducted by an interdisciplinary association of 11 German universities and research institutes. The overall study on racism had been expected to be completed in 2024, but at the time of ECRI's consideration of the issue, it was only at the methodological stage. In this regard, the Commission noted that none of the studies reported by the German authorities explicitly referred to racial profiling and that the most important component was only investigated on the example of two German cities and not at the state or even not at the federal level.
In November 2021, the Human Rights Committee also expressed concern about racial profiling practiced by German police officers. The experts of the Committee called on Germany to provide training to law enforcement officials to raise their awareness of the need to conduct themselves in a manner that does not lead, even unintentionally, to acts of racial profiling, and to monitor the effectiveness of such activities.[3482]
The problem of racial profiling in Germany was also brought to the attention of the Advisory Committee of the Framework Commission for the Protection of National Minorities in February 2022. Among such manifestations are references by police officers to the alleged ethnic origin of suspects while registering crimes; investigations based on general suspicions; and cases of police violence against ethnic minorities. The AC FCNM emphasized, in particular, that in addition to the individual harm caused to victims of discriminatory police treatment, racial profiling stigmatizes groups of people who are already under public suspicion, creates among them a sense of humiliation, injustice and resentment, and results in a direct loss of trust in the police on their part. According to the AC FCNM, national minorities who do not trust the police for these reasons will be reluctant to turn to law enforcement agencies when they have been victims of racist crimes, which in turn means that such crimes may go unnoticed and unpunished.[3483]
In 2023, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination highlighted with concern the practice of racial profiling in Germany and the excessive use of force by German law enforcement officials against members of ethnic minorities. The German authorities were recommended to prohibit racial profiling by law and establish an independent complaints mechanism for such actions, as well as to establish regular monitoring of data on the number of police checks, including document checks, and complaints in cases of police violence.[3484]
In its decision in Basu v. Germany case of 18 October 2022, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) criticised the lack of an independent investigation into a complaint of discriminatory control measures taken by members of the German Federal Police.[3485]
In May 2023, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women noted with concern the increasing manifestations of racism against migrants and Roma in Germany, including by right-wing extremists and police officers. It also noted the continued discrimination against members of these communities (with a focus on women and girls) in all areas of public life, notably education and social security. It recommended that the German authorities take effective measures to combat racism against migrants and Roma, including through police training programmes and awareness-raising campaigns with the media to prevent cross-discrimination.[3486]
As in a number of other European countries, Germany has not resolved the issue of legal consequences for German citizens who have joined the terrorist organisation "Islamic State" (banned in the Russian Federation) and their children. Fionnuala D. Ní Aoláin, the Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Human Rights Council on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism drew attention to this problem. The Special Rapporteur presented a report[3487] on the results of her visit to Germany and Northern Macedonia at the 55th session of the HRC in March 2024. She pointed to the need to repatriate all citizens of these countries (it was noted that so far 150 children and 22 female members of terrorist families remain in Syrian camps). She indicated that the practice of official repatriation by the German authorities from conflict zones, particularly from camps in Syria and Iraq, had only been actively pursued in August 2019 following a series of court judgments in individual cases obliging the German authorities to locate and repatriate German minors and their mothers (although German authorities had previously made efforts in this regard). She noted that investigations by the Federal Office of the Public Prosecutor General have already resulted in 20 convictions in cases involving women who have returned to Germany, and another court judgment has been handed down in a case involving the son of a member of a terrorist organisation who travelled to a conflict zone and reached the age of criminal responsibility. In addition, a further 311 investigations into persons linked to terrorists are ongoing in the Federal Office of the Public Prosecutor General and the offices of the federal states.
Discrimination against Roma has also been recorded in Germany. In its regular report published in June 2023, the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights pointed out the fact that Roma in Germany face discriminatory treatment due to widespread prejudice, especially large families when looking for housing.[3488]
The AC FCNM also drew attention to the problems of the Roma community in Germany, noting in particular the increasing number of crimes against members of this community, as well as the continuing practice of negative portrayals of this national minority in the mainstream German media, which promotes anti-Roma stereotypes among the majority of the population. In addition, it was noted that the German Central Council of Roma and Sinti periodically lodges complaints with the regulatory authorities of the federal states with regard to such biased news items in German television programmes. However, following their consideration of such complaints, these authorities rarely adopt even any recommendation for remedying the situation, let alone impose sanctions on the offenders.[3489]
CERD also indicated that discrimination, negative stereotyping, prejudice and intolerance against Roma in Germany are widespread.[3490]
In the Republic of Croatia, manifestations of nationalist ideologies are generally condemned at the official level. However, sympathy for figures of the collaborationist fascist Independent State of Croatia (ISC) of the World War II period is occasionally reflected in the statements of some representatives of the Croatian Catholic Church, politicians and journalists.
The speeches of Bishop V. Košić of Sisak are particularly noteworthy in this regard. The clergyman, for example, expressed the opinion that the collaborators were "fighters for freedom and independence" and exaggerated in every possible way the "crimes" committed by the partisans.[3491]
Attempts to canonize Archbishop A. Stepinac of Zagreb, convicted for collaboration with the Ustasha regime during the ISC period, continue unabated. Thus, on 6 February 2020, this issue was once again raised by Croatian Prime Minister A. Plenković during his meeting with Pope Francis. In the assignments for the school state examination on the history of religion in 2023, A. Stepinac was characterized as "a Croatian blessed, national hero, fighter against atheism, Nazism and communism".[3492]
There have been occasional attempts to distort historical facts about the infamous Jasenovac concentration camp.[3493] On 17 January 2019, the presentation of J. Pečarić's book "Jasenovac – A Lie Uncovered" denying the Ustasha's involvement in the deaths of the prisoners of the ISC's largest concentration camp, was held at a Catholic Church in Zagreb. On 13 March 2019, the presentation of the book took place at the central Catholic Church of Sisak. Since 2022, Croatian authorities have banned Serbian President A. Vucic from visiting the Jasenovac Memorial; in April 2024, Đ. Milićević, Serbian Minister in charge of relations with the diaspora, was not allowed to lay a wreath at the memorial.[3494]
There are also cases of whitewashing Nazi accomplices and collaborators. In April 2019, former military dictator of the ISC, A. Pavelić, was described as a "fighter against the Belgrade violence" on the central HRT television channel in the daily cultural and information programme "Calendar". It should be noted that the Croatian Liberation Movement party[3495], founded by him in 1956 in Argentina, was registered in the Republic of Croatia in February 1992 and is still operating there today.
In the cities, some streets are still named after the Ustasha regime officials and their accomplices. Only in April 2023 did the Zagreb City Council decide to rename four streets (out of the ten known) in the eastern districts of the Croatian capital named after prominent figures of the ISC and give them the names of prominent cultural figures.[3496]
It should be noted that the personality of A. Pavelić is receiving attention in other countries as well. Thus, in late March 2024, several chain bookstores in Ukraine started selling his memoirs,[3497] which is not surprising given the neo-Nazi nature of the Kiev regime.
The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), which operates within the framework of the Council of Europe, has pointed to an increasing number of revisionist materials on social networks. It noted, among other things, that there were dozens of cases in 2015 where photos of people wearing Ustasha uniform were posted on Facebook.[3498]
Internet portals such as www.otporas.com (dedicated to the Ustasha movement) or www.dоmоbrаnzd.com (dedicated to the memory of the armed forces of the ISC) operate freely in the country. The magazines "Hrvatski tjednik" and "Hrvatski domobran", which periodically publish articles glorifying the Ustasha, are issued with the financial support of a number of relevant state agencies (the Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of Veterans' Affairs). Controversial historical essays and pseudo-studies aimed at creating a negative image of the Yugoslav partisans[3499] and attributing to them the crimes they never committed[3500] are publicly available.
The problem of spreading hate speech online remains a significant challenge for Croatia. Hate comments and posts on the Internet against members of national minorities get many hits and quickly spread in society, which poses a threat to the security of members of some diasporas. In order to counter the spread of such publications, a possibility to regulate at the legislative level the official information portals where hateful comments attract particularly high public attention, was being discussed.
The rise of radical nationalism in Croatia which has had a negative impact on the ability of certain population groups to fully enjoy their rights has been highlighted by the Council of Europe's Advisory Committee of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. The document also specifically noted that historical revisionism affected the Serb, Roma and Jewish national minorities.[3501]
In the case of overtly neo-fascist offenses, the initiators and perpetrators of such acts are brought to justice in a selective manner.[3502]
Attempts are also being made to whitewash the collaborationist regimes of the World War II period. In 2003, the initiative of a number of parliamentarians to introduce a new article on "Glorification of Fascist, Nationalist and Other Totalitarian Ideologies and Promotion of Racism and Xenophobia" into the Criminal Code of the Republic of Croatia failed. Despite the fact that this amendment had been adopted by the Croatian Parliament and had entered into force, on 27 November 2003, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia annulled it, citing a procedural error in its adoption as justification.[3503]
In 2018, the Council for Dealing with the Consequences of the Rule of Non-Democratic Regimes under the Government of the Republic of Croatia in its conclusion,[3504] in fact, equated the Ustasha regime in the ISC with the socialist system of the former Yugoslavia. A draft law on the prohibition of symbols of totalitarian regimes is being prepared, which is expected to include, inter alia, the ban on the Red Star.
In May 2024, preparations began for the creation of a museum of the victims of communism in the territory of the country (the official name is yet to be approved, the project is still being drafted).[3505]
The situation with the preservation and restoration of anti-fascist and partisan monuments in Croatia remains rather complicated. The State Register of Protected Cultural Objects lists 75 monuments dedicated to World War II (including three monuments to Soviet soldiers). The number of monuments razed to the ground or desecrated between 1991 and 2000 is 2,964.[3506] But official statistics regarding the desecration of monuments for the period since 2001 is not available in the public domain.
At the same time, Croatian authorities have made some efforts to maintain anti-fascist monuments in proper condition. Thus, in 2019, the administration of the Primorsko-Goranska županija allocated 250 thousand kuna (about 2.5 million rubles) for the restoration of the Partisan monument in Kastva. In April 2022, a new monument to the victims of the Holocaust and the Ustasha regime was unveiled in the center of Zagreb.[3507] In October 2023, the Partisan monument in Povlane (Istarska županija) was refurbished.[3508]
There are also some positive examples of respect for the memory of Soviet soldiers. In 2018, the remains of a Soviet soldier were discovered on the territory of Baranja-Sremska županija. The Croatian side covered all expenses related to the exhumation and burial of the remains in the mass grave of the Victory Memorial in Batina.
In 2019, local authorities reported that a mass grave of alleged Soviet soldiers (with the remains of about 700 persons) had been discovered in the Čakovec area.
At the same time, a number of cases of desecration of anti-fascist monuments in Dalmatia (Split, Cetinska Krajina, Vodice, Bukovica, Zrmanja) were registered during this period. Thus, the head of the Gračac municipality administration drafted a decision to demolish the monument commemorating the memory of 1,826 victims of fascist terror and 816 fallen partisans. Due to the protests of local residents, the demolition was suspended. On 27 March 2019, the Dudik memorial complex was desecrated in the suburb of Vukovar.[3509] In May 2019, vandals painted the monument to the people’s hero of Yugoslavia, leader of the Kordun people’s uprising, and former mayor of Zagreb V. Holevec in the capital of the country with swastikas and nationalist abbreviations. In 2020 and the first half of 2021, the monument to Holocaust victims (Varaždin) was desecrated with a Nazi cross and Ustasha symbols; the monument to Croatian anti-fascist liberators (Zadar) was dismantled under the pretext of fighting against non-democratic regimes.[3510] On 22 June 2023, an anti-fascist monument in Zagreb dedicated to prominent women partisans who perished in the Second World War, was desecrated.[3511] In September 2023, the memorial with the burial of fallen partisans and victims of World War II in the village of Kutina was desecrated. [3512]
The consecration of the monument to the Russian-Serbian suffering and brotherhood during the Second World War in the Jasenovac monastery on 13 September 2021 was a notable event attended by Metropolitan Isidor of Smolensk and Dorogobuzh, Patriarch Porfiry of the Serbian Orthodox Church, Metropolitan Ioannikije of Montenegro and Primorye, M. Dodik, Serb member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Ambassador A. Vraneš of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The Russian Embassy and the Coordination Council of Organizations of Russian Compatriots Living in Croatia also carry out activities aimed at perpetuating the memory of the war period. The Russian Embassy gives priority to repairing and refurbishing Soviet war graves, especially since some of them are classified as objects of historical and architectural heritage of Croatia (e.g., in Batina, Ilok, Vukovar, Beli Manastir, Gunja, Borovo Naselje, Aljmaš). The administrations of the above-mentioned towns show respect for the burial sites of the Soviet Army soldiers, maintaining them in a proper condition and organizing a series of commemorative events to mark Victory Day.
At the same time, the Croatian Ministry of Veterans' Affairs is the main sponsor of erecting memorials in honour of "war and post-war victims" (referring primarily to the victims among Croatian nationalists in April‑September 1945). Eighty one monuments of this kind have been erected at the expense of the state budget since 1998 to the present day, including those openly glorifying the ISC regime.
Thus, in 2019, with the financial support of the municipal authorities of Valpovo, a memorial was erected in honour of "all Croatian soldiers who gave their lives for the Independent State of Croatia". A commemorative plaque in the shape of the borders of the ISC was placed on the building of the local administration of Zadar, featuring the coat of arms of the collaborationist state.
As part of the policy of "condemnation of all totalitarian regimes" the Croatian authorities officially support the events held to commemorate the "victims of the Yugoslav regime and Tito's partisans".[3513] On 25 August 2019 (2020-2021 were skipped due to the pandemic), on the European Day of Remembrance for Victims of All Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes, Croatian Prime Minister A. Plenković, together with Minister of Interior D. Božinović and Minister for Veterans' Affairs T. Medved laid wreaths at the monument in honour of the defeated Ustasha army which was erected in 1994 at the central cemetery of Zagreb.[3514] The monument features soldiers dressed in the Ustasha uniform, the ISC coat of arms, and the inscription: "To the Croatian victims on the Bleiburg field and the Way of the Cross in 1945".
Under the auspices of the Croatian Sabor (Parliament), commemorative events of this kind had also been held on the Bleiburg field itself (Austria) until 2022.[3515] The controversial nature of these events, attended by top officials of the Republic of Croatia and representatives of the Croatian Catholic Church, has always attracted attention of the Austrian authorities and the public. For example, in 2019, the Catholic Church of Carinthia (Austria) withdrew its permission to hold another church service at the Bleiburg field, which provoked a very harsh negative reaction from official Zagreb. On 14 March 2019, the Croatian Foreign Ministry accused Austrian media of "misinterpreting" the commemorative events in Bleiburg, calling the Black Legion marches,[3516] the use of Ustasha symbols and salutes during the official part of the events, and the glorification of A. Pavelić and his henchmen, "isolated cases". However, on 9 July 2020, the Domestic Policy Committee of the Austrian National Council (lower house of parliament) unanimously adopted a resolution against holding commemorative events in Bleiburg due to the fact that the demonstrations involved groups of nationalists and fascists from Croatia who used Ustasha symbols.[3517] Previously, an expert group formed under the Austrian Interior Ministry had assessed the "memorial ceremonies" near Bleiburg as the largest gathering of neo-Nazis in Europe. It was noted that Croatian representatives violated Austrian laws by using Ustasha symbols and glorifying Nazi ideas. As a result, the Austrian Parliament decided to dismantle all Croatian symbols at the Bleiburg field in 2022.
The problem of using the greeting "Za dom spremni!" (or "ZDS" – "For the Homeland – Ready!", a World War II Ustasha salute analogous to the German "Sieg Heil") remains unresolved. Despite numerous protests by human rights organizations and court rulings that the use of the greeting is unlawful because of its direct link to the ISC,[3518] the exclamation continues to be used with the tacit approval of the Croatian authorities. Under the pretext that the slogan is not legally prohibited, legal entities using it in their statutes or emblems are being officially registered.[3519]
The greeting is chanted during public events, especially at the concerts of M. Perković (Thompson)[3520], popular contemporary Croatian singer whose songs contain references to the ISC and related topics, as well as the aforementioned "ZDS" greeting. M. Perković participated in mass celebrations in the center of Zagreb on the occasion of Croatia's second place in the 2018 FIFA World Cup. According to the media, he was invited to perform at the request of Croatian team captain Luka Modric who himself is known for his controversial behavior. According to Z. Puhovski, political observer and professor at the University of Zagreb, such sentiments are manifested in Croatia in a specific right-wing radical manner. In addition, this demonstrates, in his opinion, that many Croats do not consider the Ustasha past and its symbols as problematic. In this regard, it is worth mentioning the opinion of one of the members of the Croatian football team, Ivan Ergić (a Croatian Serb), who noted that players have "minimal political sensibilities" and therefore follow populist ideas and expectations of the masses. In this regard, he pointed out that the peoples who used to live in the same country "are mainly directing the hate towards one another, and we see the continuation of "war by other means".[3521]
It is also indicative that former Croatian President K. Grabar-Kitarović is favorable to M. Perković's work and has always supported his performances, referring to him as one of her favorite artists. She also publicly expressed support for the Ustasha ideology. In particular, she is known for her statement that "there should be a debate on whether the exclamation "ZDS" is an old Croatian greeting or not". Besides, she invited Croatian politicians openly sympathetic to the Ustasha, including the well-known right-wing TV host Velimir Bujanec (known to be photographed with a swastika on his arm and wearing a German Nazi uniform), to her inauguration. She also met with Ustasha descendants in Argentina and Croatia.[3522]
There is information in the media that concerts of various performers with a small number of attendees are an important way of establishing contacts between far-right organizations in Europe. Information about them is usually disseminated in closed groups and chat rooms on social networks. In Croatia, one of such events is the annual "Despa Memorial" concert which is held in memory of right-wing activist Goran "Despa" Despic, who died in a car accident in 2014 and whom the Croatian branch of Blood and Honor called its "brother". According to the mentioned structure, the 2022 concert was attended by "about 70 persons from Croatia, Germany, England, Hungary, Slovenia and Switzerland". The neo-Nazi orientation of these events is known. For example, photos from the first such concert published in 2015 on the portal "Voice of Patriots – Voice of Croatian Patriots" showed people displaying Nazi salutes.[3523]
The media also periodically draw attention to the fact that souvenirs with the abbreviation ZDS are freely available in the center of the Croatian capital.[3524] For example, on 5 August 2020, during the events commemorating the anniversary of Operation Storm (1995, against the Republic of Serbian Krajina), dozens of participants wore clothes with the ZDS symbol and shouted the Ustasha greeting.[3525] According to the Anti-Fascist Council of the Republic of Croatia, ZDS is a feature sine qua non at all events commemorating Croatia's victories in the 1991-1995 conflict. In June 2023, graffiti with the Ustasha symbols appeared on the fence of an Orthodox church in the center of Zagreb.[3526]
Manifestations of neo-Nazism by football fans have also been reported. For example, in February 2019, during a football match in Poljud, fans stretched a banner with the pro-Ustasha inscription "Max's Butchers" (Vjekoslav "Max" Luburić was the head of the network of concentration camps of the ISC, including the Jasenovac concentration camp). On 11 June 2020, more than 10 fans of the football club Dinamo (Zagreb) with Nazi and Ustasha symbols on their clothes and flags, stretched a banner calling for the rape of Serbian women and children and shouted the slogan "Kill the Serb".[3527] In August 2023, numerous groups of football fans chanting the ZDS greeting marched through the streets of Knin and Vukovar. Overall, according to the Croatian Interior Ministry, in 2023, there were 952 cases of "unsportsmanlike behavior" by Croatian fans aimed at inciting hatred based on race, nationality or religion.[3528]
On 12 April 2020, a female reporter was beaten on the outskirts of Split after witnessing the holding of a Mass in violation of the country's strict epidemiological measures. During the attack, the four perpetrators were holding the flag of the ISC and were shouting "Za dom spremni", referring to the media representatives as "the reds".[3529] On 29 January 2020, a member of the Dubrovnik Legislative Assembly wrote an open letter to the Dubrovnik mayor calling for the removal of the widespread graffiti with Nazi and Ustasha symbols in the city.28 In June 2020, print media drew attention to the images of Nazi symbols and hanged Serbs that appeared in Zagreb. 31 In June 2022, a banner was put up in Karlovac in front of a secondary school showing the name and emblem of the Azov Ukrainian radical neo-Nazi battalion alongside the symbols of the ISC. [3530]
By its decision U-II-6111/2013 of 10 October 2017, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia recognized that the ISC and everything related to it was illegal and contrary to the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia. Earlier, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia by its decision U-III-2588/2016 of 8 November 2016 defined the Ustasha slogan "Za dom spremni" as a symbol of racist rhetoric and declared it unconstitutional. On 14 August 2019, the High Arbitration Court of the Republic of Croatia confirmed the slogan's illegitimacy due to the fact that it provokes hatred on the basis of religion, race and nationality. However, on 3 June 2020, the High Court of Administrative Offences of the Republic of Croatia fully disregarded the established judicial practice in Croatia, and, as noted by a number of publications and politicians, thus effectively legitimized the Ustasha greeting.[3531]
In 2021, an attempt was made to supplement the Criminal Code of the Republic of Croatia with the provisions on the prohibition of fascist and Ustasha symbols, but it failed. The Croatian Sabor discussed the draft law on supplementing the Criminal Code of the Republic of Croatia with a new article that would prohibit the use of symbols, slogans, greetings, as well as other means of identification of fascists, Ustasha and Chetniks. However, the discussion did not lead to any significant results, and the initiator of the project, head of the Coordination Committee of the Jewish Communities in Croatia O. Kraus declared that the proposal had to be postponed. Consideration of the relevant amendments was postponed for an indefinite period of time. In April 2023, the Law on Offenses against Public Order was amended to provide for fines of up to 4,000 euros for the use of symbols of hatred or hate speech. [3532]
Given such tolerant attitude in Croatia towards Nazi collaborators, it is not surprising that the delegation of this country, in line with the common position of the EU Member States, had abstained until 2021 from voting in the UN General Assembly on the annual resolution initiated by Russia and other co-sponsors on "Combating glorification of Nazism, neo-Nazism and other practices that contribute to fuelling contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance". However, in 2022 and 2023, following the EU, Croatia voted against this initiative condemning contemporary manifestations of Nazism and other discriminatory ideologies.
Historical revisionism also manifests itself in Croatia in the way the 1991-1995 armed conflict is interpreted, often affecting ethnic minorities living in the country, especially the Serb minorities whose rights are being infringed. According to the authorities and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, by January 2017, 134,000 Serbs had returned to Croatia (more than half of those who had fled the country before 1995). While the overall conditions conducive to return are positive, ECRI notes that returnees continue to experience problems in accessing their rights, especially in the areas of housing and health care, as well as in issues relating to legal status and access to legal aid. In Slavonia, the access by returnees to public services such as electricity, gas and water is intermittent, and investments to rebuild the severely damaged infrastructure have not been provided for a long time already. Returnees have had to assume the financial burden of obtaining citizenship or regularizing their residence status.[3533]
The issue of discrimination against ethnic minorities in Croatia has been raised by many multilateral universal and regional human rights mechanisms. For example, the Advisory Committee of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (AC FCNM) in its latest opinion on Croatia stated that the rise of radical nationalism in the country had had a negative impact on the full enjoyment of the rights by certain population groups. The document also specifically noted that historical revisionism affected the Serb, Roma and Jewish national minorities.[3534]
The same problem was highlighted by F. Salvioli, UN Human Rights Council (HRC) Special Rapporteur on the Promotion of Truth, Justice, Reparation, and Guarantees of Non-Recurrence, who visited Croatia in late November-early December 2021.[3535] In his statement following the visit, he noted an increased number of instances of hate speech, glorification of convicted war criminals and denial of their crimes (including by high-ranking government officials), as well as downplaying of the importance of the ICTY and national tribunal decisions. F. Salvioli pointed out the creation of memorials to war criminals with the support of Croatian officials, as well as a fairly widespread use of Fascist and Ustasha slogans and insignia. The Special Rapporteur described as unsatisfactory the implementation of the legislative measures taken by the Croatian government to address this extremely worrying trend (the Protocol on Hate Crimes and the hate crime reporting systems were mentioned in this context, as well as the new provisions in the Criminal Code criminalizing hate crimes, public incitement to violence and hatred, and denial of genocide and serious human rights violations). In this regard, he called on the relevant Croatian police, judicial, legislative and executive bodies to take all necessary measures to respond adequately to the rise of radicalization and hatred in certain segments of society in order to ensure that the reconciliation measures taken so far are not irrevocably abolished.
In the context of his mandate, the Special Rapporteur pointed out that ethnic preferences also have an impact on the choice of areas to search for missing persons, establishing the location of mass graves, the subsequent identification of victims and their exhumation. F. Salvioli noted that ethnic differences had a negative impact on judicial proceedings in related cases. In particular, he highlighted, with reference to the findings of other international human rights mechanisms, that the proceedings in Croatia have been criticized for the bias against ethnic Serbs who are disproportionately targeted by the selection of cases. He cited representatives of victims' associations and other interested population groups of the country as stating that many crimes allegedly committed by the Croatian army and police in 1995 had not been investigated into and that those responsible had not been brought to justice. While Croatian prosecutors were unable to provide information on cases initiated and prosecuted disaggregated by the ethnicity of defendants, civil society organizations reported that in the 43 cases they monitored in 2020, 61 defendants (i.e. 86 percent) were members of Serb paramilitary groups and the Yugoslav People's Army, while 10 defendants (14 percent) were members of the Croatian Army and the Croatian Defense Council. The Special Rapporteur also pointed out discrepancies in the sentences imposed on ethnic Serbs and ethnic Croats. Mitigating circumstances were applied to the latter because it was claimed that they had defended Croatia during the war.
As of the end of 2022, the number of people reported missing during the crisis of the early 1990s was 1,816.[3536] At the initiative of the Croatian side, framework agreements on mutual assistance in search operations were signed in 2017 with Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro. A working group with Serbia is also operating.
Representatives of the Serb national minority and the Jewish community in Croatia have repeatedly expressed their disapproval of the position of national authorities on the growing revanchist attitudes in Croatian society and the use of pro-fascist and Ustasha symbols. Since 2016, Serb and Roma national minorities, as well as the Jewish community, have abstained from participating in the commemorations of the liberation of the Jasenovac concentration camp organized by the state authorities as a sign of protest, and have held their own independent actions.[3537]
The problem of historical revisionism and discriminatory approach to investigating the events of those years was highlighted in 2015 by the UN Human Rights Committee[3538] and the HRC Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances.[3539]
Issues related to the investigation of crimes committed between 1991 and 1995 were also touched upon in 2023 by the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in its Concluding Observations.[3540] In particular, it noted with concern the decline since 2013 in the number of trials in Croatia for crimes of that war, the delays in obtaining witness statements and the high number of trials in absentia. Among other things, the Committee's attention has been drawn to the fact that in such cases there is a noticeable difference of approach to the sentencing of persons belonging to the Serb ethnic group as compared to the Croatian one, based specifically on ethnicity. In the Committee's view, this creates an inequality between the two ethnic groups in the justice system. CERD also noted the discriminatory interpretation by Croatian courts of the provisions of the specialized law on civilian victims of war when it comes to ethnic Serb victims, who are thus unable to regain their rights. It also noted the glorification of convicted war criminals and denial of their crimes, including by Croatian high-ranking officials; the creation of memorials to war criminals, the increased use of fascist and Ustasha slogans and insignia; and the lack of detailed information on investigations, court cases and prosecutions related to such actions. CERD also referred to the visit of the HRC Special Rapporteur on the promotion of the truth, F. Salvioli, and, following his recommendations, urged the Croatian authorities to take measures to monitor and actively combat hate speech, incitement to racial hatred and other manifestations of discrimination against the Serb minority, including on the Internet and social media, as well as by officials and State institutions. The Committee specifically called on the Croatian authorities to prevent the glorification of war criminals and the denial of their crimes.
In its report, ECRI deplored the growing number of revisionist materials on social networks. For example, in 2015, dozens of cases were reported when photos of people wearing Ustasha uniform were posted on social networks.[3541]
The situation with the spread of various forms of intolerance in Croatia remains unfavorable, affecting mainly ethnic and religious minorities.
Thus, on 7 January 2019, the son of one of the Croatian MPs, I. Đakić, on his Facebook page "congratulated" Serbs on Orthodox Christmas with a picture of an Ustasha holding the severed head of a Serb.
Statistics in recent years point to an increase in ethnic crimes (against Serbs and Bosniaks, Jews and Roma).[3542] In 2017, Croatia even attempted to put to a referendum the question of reducing the number of representatives of national minorities in the Croatian sabor (national parliament) and limiting their power regarding motions of censure against the government and adoption of the country's budget.
Experts note that there is a tendency in Croatia to classify hate crimes as administrative offenses (rather than crimes).[3543] Moreover, due to the lack of public trust in law enforcement, the percentage of complaints to the police or the Ombudsperson in this category of cases is very low. This was pointed out by international human rights monitoring mechanisms when describing the situation of national minorities, as will be discussed further below in relation to the situation of each specific national minority.
According to former Croatian Ombudswoman L. Vidović[3544], the quality of training and retraining of government officials and law enforcement officers on issues related to the fight against Nazism, racism and the protection of human rights needs to be improved.33
When the new government was being formed following the results of the April 2024 parliamentary elections, the exclusion of Serb national minority parties from the government and the withdrawal of state funding for the Serb National Council (SNV) journal "Novosti" were essential conditions for establishing a sustainable coalition between the ruling Croatian Democratic Union party and the radical right-wing Homeland Movement.[3545]
It should be noted that in 2019, Russians were elected for the first time to the local administrations of Primorsko-Goranska and Splitsko-Dalmatinska zupanija (in addition to Međimurska zupanija and the city of Zagreb).
In recent years, the international human rights community has highlighted the unsatisfactory state of affairs with respect to ensuring the rights of national minorities.
The Committee on the Rights of the Child in 2022 noted with concern the de-facto discrimination in Croatia against ethnic minority children, particularly Serb and Roma children, children with disabilities, and migrant, asylum-seeking and refugee children, especially in the areas of education and health care services. The authorities were encouraged to ensure full implementation of the legislation prohibiting discrimination and to intensify public awareness-raising campaigns in order to eliminate negative societal attitudes towards children from ethnic minorities.[3546]
The 2022 report of the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), citing data from the Croatian Ombudsperson, noted an increase in the number of complaints about discrimination on the basis of race and ethnicity (based on the comparison of the figures for 2021 and 2020).[3547] The same trend was highlighted in the FRA report published in June 2023.[3548]
According to ECRI, the role of the media in spreading hate speech and inciting interethnic hatred is increasing. Regional print media portray national minorities, mainly Serbs and Roma, in a negative and stereotypical manner.[3549]
AC FCNM in February 2021 also noted an increase in the use of hate speech in social media and political discourse, the formation of prejudicial attitudes, primarily towards Serbs and Roma. Print, audio-visual and other media resources, according to the monitoring body, replicate negative stereotypes about persons belonging to national minorities. Although such practices are condemned and even prosecuted, the existing response measures have very limited effect in reality. Representatives of national minorities hardly ever appear on Croatian radio or television programmes. At the same time, the reluctance of media companies to allocate sufficient human and financial resources makes it impossible to create the necessary quantity of quality products oriented to the needs of national minorities.[3550]
Racist attacks against members of ethnic minority groups, in particular Roma and Serbs, continue to be a matter of concern. The UN Human Rights Committee (HRCttee) highlighted this problem in March 2015, while also expressing concern that proper investigations were not conducted in such cases and perpetrators were not brought to justice.[3551] Furthermore, the same problem was pointed out by the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in August 2023. CERD recommended that the Croatian authorities intensify their efforts to combat hate crimes directed against Roma communities, members of the Serb minority group and non-citizens, as well as racist hate speech against the same ethnic groups.
Human rights activists note that Ethnic Serbs living in Croatia tend to be the most frequent targets of ethnically motivated attacks. According to the Serb National Council (SNV, or Veche) annual report, there were 506 incidents of hate speech against the Serbian population in 2021, the highest number in the last several years (compared to 400 incidents in 2019, 381 – in 2018, 393 – in 2017, and 331 – in 2016).[3552] Particularly noteworthy is the multiple increase in the number of offensive graffiti on walls calling for violence against Serbs: from about 10-40 graffiti per year in the previous reporting periods to 297 in 2021.[3553] According to SNV head M. Pupovac, in most cases vandals leave them in crowded areas: in schools, universities, kindergartens and at bus stops. This, in turn, has a negative effect on the younger generation, cultivating intolerance towards Serbs from childhood and glorifying certain members of the Ustasha movement. In this regard, a public action was held in the city of Rijeka this spring to remove such inscriptions from city facades. At the same time, the policies of the city authorities of Zagreb, Vukovar, and Knin who do not pay due attention to solving this problem, were sharply criticized.
In its report, ECRI drew attention to cases of property damage, mostly concerning bilingual signs featuring Cyrillic scripts, religious buildings and cemeteries.[3554]
The UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in 2023 pointed with concern to the discrepancy between the number of cases of racial discrimination registered officially by the Croatian authorities in accordance with the Anti-Discrimination Act and the much larger number of cases of racial discrimination indicated in surveys of members of ethnic or national minorities and non-citizens.[3555]
Croatia still fails to implement the government's plan to employ members of national minorities in the executive branch and the judiciary. Its goal was to bring the share of representatives of national minorities in these spheres to 5.5 percent by 2015. In 2021, the figure was 3.03 percent of the total number of officials (in 2019 – 3.1 percent) and 3.45 percent of the total number of law enforcement officers and court officials (3.17 percent in 2019).[3556]
In 2023, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination paid considerable attention to the problems of the Serb community in Croatia. In particular, it acknowledged with concern the prevalence of hate crimes and racist hate speech, and of the dissemination of negative stereotypes against Serbs (alongside Roma) in the media, on the Internet and in social media. It also pointed to the frequent use of racist hate speech by Croatian politicians, particularly at the regional and local levels, and by influential public figures and the total impunity of such persons. According to the Committee, such rhetoric and manifestations are also common in sports. CERD also confirmed that quite often hate crimes were not qualified or officially registered as such and that those responsible were not identified and prosecuted. The Committee also acknowledged the underreporting of manifestations of discrimination, including incidents of racist hate speech and hate crimes, by ethnic minorities owing to their lack of trust in Croatian remedies.[3557] The Committee also expressed concern at the lack of detailed and comprehensive information on the socioeconomic situation of ethnic and national minority groups, including members of the Roma and Serb communities, and of non-citizens, such as migrants, refugees, asylum-seekers and stateless persons. Further on, CERD indicated that members of the Serb and Roma communities remained inadequately represented in Croatian law enforcement, public administration and the judiciary. It also noted that the Croatian delegation did not provide any information on special measures taken to address structural discrimination against members of the above-mentioned minority groups.[3558]
The problem worth special mentioning is the implementation of the Law on Languages of National Minorities, according to which a national minority language is introduced as a second language for use in those administrative and territorial units where members of this minority constitute at least one third of the population. Despite the fact that in July 2019 the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia ruled the actions of the Vukovar authorities who decided to prohibit the use of the Serbian language in the city illegal, the Cyrillic script is still not used in official documents and on signposts, markings and address names. In December 2022, the Vukovar City Council, referring to the most recent Croatian census which showed that the percentage of Serbs among the inhabitants of Vukovar was less than one third (29.73 percent), amended the City Statute and prohibited the use of the Cyrillic alphabet and Serbian language for official purposes.[3559] The HRCtte also highlighted difficulties faced by persons belonging to national minorities in enjoying the right to use their own languages, particularly those in Cyrillic script, in 2015.[3560]
There are a number of problems with the realization of the rights of the Roma community in Croatia. According to the latest 2021 census, there are 17,810 Roma living in the country.[3561] However, the real number, according to some Roma officials and certain researchers, ranges between 30 and 40 thousand, which makes this ethnic group one of the largest national minorities in Croatia. Among the main reasons for the plight of this population group are the low level of housing, lack of access to adequate health care, education, etc. Dire living conditions of the Roma community are also mentioned. About one third of the Roma population live in uninhabitable houses or even slums, and more than half of their dwellings are overcrowded. Only one third of Roma homes are connected to water supply and electricity systems. Only 4 percent of Roma households meet European hygiene standards.
According to the Eurobarometar analytical center data for 2023, more than 65 percent of the country's residents admit discrimination against Roma.[3562] There are manifestations of discrimination against the Roma minority in employment, services, and education. At the same time, this population group formally has the largest support from the authorities, particularly from V. Kajtazi, Roma parliamentarian who is actively involved in solving their problems. As part of measures aimed at supporting the Roma community, the 2021-2027 National Roma Inclusion Strategy was adopted in 2021, which envisages not only funding for cultural projects, but also support for countering discrimination and ensuring the full integration of the members of the diaspora into society. In October 2023, the Croatian government adopted a roadmap for the implementation of the National Roma Integration Plan for 2023-2025.[3563]
Nevertheless, the National Roma Inclusion Strategy (2014-2020) has never been implemented. According to the data for 2022 provided by the Ombudsperson for Croatia,[3564] only 41 percent of members of the Roma minority have paid jobs, and more than 55 percent of Roma households have no access to tap water.
The issue of eradicating discrimination against Roma children in educational institutions remains acute. According to the FRA report, Croatia has one of the highest levels of segregation of Roma children, with 53 percent of such children attending segregated schools.[3565] In the 2021/2022 academic year, 52 percent of Roma children aged between six and 15 studied in separate or mixed classes in which Roma pupils accounted for an absolute majority.[3566] According to FRA, in the 2018/2019 academic year, there were 65 Roma-only classes in Croatian schools. Nevertheless, this number was higher than the year before.[3567] As an example of a particularly challenging situation of the Roma one can mention the situation in Međimurska zupanija where 1,622 Roma schoolchildren are registered: 75 percent of them study in general education schools where the share of Roma children is more than 80 percent.
At the same time, Croatia is one of the EU countries where a considerable share of the Roma youth (about 40 percent) have at least general education. Yet, Croatia is among countries with the lowest rates of nursery school attendance by Roma children in the EU.[3568]
According to available 2021 statistics, over 92.3 percent of the Roma minority live below the poverty line, with 70 percent of Roma families living in extreme poverty.[3569]
Another aspect showing disparity in living standards is heating. Thus, on average, 56 percent of households in the country are heated with wood (among Roma this figure is 90 percent), while the rest are heated with gas from a gas pipeline or gas cylinders.
Inequality is also visible in the level of material deprivation (inability to meet one's material needs) of the population: 69.5 percent among the Roma group and 23.8 percent among the rest of the population. The disparity is even more apparent in terms of extreme material deprivation: 47.1 percent against 12.2 percent respectively.
The difference between the living standards of the Roma in urban areas and in rural areas is even more pronounced. Those living in rural areas in almost 93 percent of cases face the lack of basic amenities. There also exists an important problem of illegal settlements, the exact number of which is impossible to identify. Due to the absence of such data in the databases of local self-government bodies it is impossible to deal with the development of these territories. This leads to unauthorized dumpsites and environmental pollution.
In 2023, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination acknowledged the entire range of problems faced by the Roma community.[3570] In particular, it noted the extreme poverty and unsatisfactory living conditions of Roma, who mostly live in isolated neighbourhoods or informal settlements without infrastructure. This situation is further exacerbated due to the widespread practice of demolishing Roma houses as illegal structures without providing alternatives. CERD also pointed to the high rate of unemployment among Roma, low attendance at schools (most of which are segregated) with a high dropout rate of Roma students from educational institutions, and limited access of Roma to healthcare. The Croatian authorities received the recommendation to take measures to combat these negative manifestations.
In March 2015, the Human Rights Committee (HRCttee) expressed its concern about the statistics suggesting a limited level of enjoyment of rights by Roma and Serbs, in particular in the areas of access to housing, health care, employment and participation in the conduct of public affairs. The Committee pointed out registered incidents of racist attacks against members of ethnic minority groups, in particular Roma and Serbs, and noted the lack of proper investigation and prosecution of the perpetrators.[3571] The Ombudsperson for the Republic of Croatia also stated that the majority of ethnically-motivated crimes were committed against the Serb minority and Roma.
However, most cases of ethnically motivated violent incidents against Roma are not reported due to the limited trust and mutual understanding between the Roma community and the police, as well as the widespread practice of ethnic profiling by law enforcement officials.[3572]
This trend has also been acknowledged by the EU Agency on Fundamental Rights in its Survey on Roma in 10 European Countries published in 2022. In particular, FRA noted that only 5 percent of all Roma victims of discrimination in the EU reported or made a complaint about the last incident of discrimination, with Bulgaria and Slovakia showing the largest reduction in the rates of reporting discrimination along with Croatia.[3573]
The Agency also indicated that Croatia had the largest differences in attitudes towards Roma and other groups. However, Roma men experienced discrimination to a greater extent than Roma women.[3574]
The Committee on the Rights of the Child in 2022 also highlighted the problems of Roma children. In particular, it indicated that girls from the Roma community are more likely to be victims of trafficking and recommended that Croatian authorities improve the identification of potential child victims of sexual exploitation and trafficking, allocate sufficient funding for this purpose, and provide adequate assistance to victims. The Committee also noted the increasing inequality in access to quality preschool education, especially for children of unemployed parents, Roma children and children with disabilities. It was concerned at the persistently high school dropout rates of Roma children, particularly girls, and recommended that the Croatian authorities ensure the full integration of Roma children into mainstream education and introduce effective measures to prevent early dropout.[3575]
The official statistics regarding manifestations of anti-Semitism provide very few cases. In particular, FRA notes that only two criminal offences motivated by antisemitism were officially registered in 2022, and none in 2021 and 2020. FRA also highlights the absence of any NGO data on this issue.[3576] This picture fits perfectly to the situation described above, where Croatian authorities qualify hate crimes as administrative offenses rather than criminal ones. In addition, according to Eurobarometar analytical center data for 2023,[3577] the attitude of the Croatian population towards members of the Jewish minority is satisfactory and does not cause concern. However, this state of affairs is not compatible with the fact that, as noted above, leaders of the Jewish communities in Croatia – along with the Serb and Roma communities – have refused to jointly participate in events at the Jasenovac memorial site for several years in a row due to their disagreement with parliamentary representatives on a number of issues related to national identity. In October 2023, several incidents of antisemitic nature were reported by the Jewish community in Rijeka during the Jewish Cultural Festival.[3578]
The problem of ill-treatment of migrants persists in the country. Amid reports of a sharp increase in the number of such incidents, representatives of the Council of Europe's European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) undertook an ad hoc five-day visit to Croatia in August 2020. Members of the delegation visited a number of border checkpoints, as well as the main alien reception centers. The CPT representatives also visited temporary reception centers and informal migrant settlements in north-west Bosnia and Herzegovina. That is where asylum-seekers who were expelled from the Croatian territory are accommodated. In December 2021, a report on the aforementioned visit was published outlining recommendations to the official authorities. It pointed out the need to put an end to the ill-treatment of migrants by police officers and to ensure that such cases are investigated into. The CPT experts were concerned that, during the 2020 visit, they had for the first time encountered difficulties caused by the authorities' unwillingness to cooperate with the CPT (provision of incomplete information, denial of access to documentation by police officers, etc.). Migrants' complaints of violence by Croatian police officers were also recorded. Doctors from the delegation documented numerous fresh wounds and bruises on migrants' bodies. According to testimonies received by the CPT, the victims were forced to march through the forest barefoot and with their hands tied towards the Croatian border with Bosnia and Herzegovina, where they were thrown into the river. Some of them had to make this journey wearing only their underwear or even naked. There were also flagrant cases of police officers discharging their weapons into the ground close to migrants lying face down on the ground. Following the visit, the CPT pointed to the lack of effective mechanisms in Croatia to bring perpetrators of such acts to justice.[3579] This report attracted the attention of the Amnesty International NGO (recognized as undesirable in the Russian Federation), which also noted that Croatian authorities have consistently assaulted refugees and irregular migrants and denied them access to asylum.[3580]
FRA noted that in Croatia, allegations of physical abuse and theft of property during apprehensions and summary returns of migrants to neighbouring Bosnia and Herzegovina increased in the second half of 2023.[3581]
In August 2023, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination highlighted the problems of migrants. In particular, the Committee noted that there are cases of expulsion and denial of entry to migrants at borders, as well as excessive use of force by law enforcement officials, resulting in injuries and bodily harm. It also noted that refugees and asylum-seekers face discrimination in Croatia, particularly in accessing employment.[3582]
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) noted problems with the infrastructure for the accommodation of refugees and migrants in its judgment in Daraibou v. Croatia (No 84523/17). The migrant applicant's claim concerned a migrant detention center where three detained migrants had died in a fire and the applicant himself had suffered severe injuries. The ECtHR concluded that Croatia had violated its obligations stemming from Article 2 (right to life) of the European Convention on Human Rights, given that the staff had been ill-prepared to deal with the outbreak of a fire and the investigations had several shortcomings.[3583]
The above-mentioned facts clearly indicate that there are serious problems in the Republic of Croatia with the spread of neo-Nazi ideology and racial discrimination, which are not effectively addressed by official authorities. At the same time, the increasing number of manifestations of intolerance on the grounds of ethnicity indicates that xenophobic attitudes in society, in particular towards Serbs and Roma, remain among the most pressing issues in the country's human rights dossier.
Montenegro maintains a fairly strong anti-fascist tradition. Partisan fighters who died for the liberation of Montenegro are duly commemorated. The date of 13 July – the day when an uprising broke out in 1941 against the Nazi occupiers (which later turned into the People's Liberation War in Yugoslavia) is enshrined in law as a national holiday.
There are two veteran organizations in the country (the Union of Veterans and Antifascists of Montenegro, SUBNOR, and the Union of Veterans of the Former Yugoslavia, SOBNOR), which seek to preserve the historical truth about World War II. In early October 2020 in Podgorica, ceremonies were held to award commemorative medals "75 Years of Victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945" to veterans of the People's Liberation War in Yugoslavia, members of SOBNOR and SUBNOR.
About 40 memorial sites under state protection (including partisan common graves) are dedicated to the People's Liberation War of 1941-1945, as well as to national heroes and outstanding figures of Montenegro who made a significant contribution to the fight against the Nazi occupiers.
Since there were no military operations involving Soviet Army units in the territory of Montenegro during World War II, there are no registered Soviet war graves. Yet on 9 December 2020, on the initiative of the local authorities in Berane, a bust to Georgy Zhukov, commander, Marshal and four-time Hero of the Soviet Union, who was awarded numerous Soviet and foreign decorations was unveiled.
Over the past year, no instances of glorification of Nazism, dissemination of the Nazi ideology, including on the Internet, neo-Nazi demonstrations, prohibition of Soviet symbols, or obstructing the activities of veterans' organizations in any form have been reported. Cases of desecration of monuments to fighters against Nazism are extremely rare. Few incidents of damage being caused to such facilities (mostly graffiti by young people, sometimes depicting Nazi symbols) are decisively criticized by socio-political circles, civil society organizations and anti-fascist veterans.
There is no evidence that monuments to the Nazis and their accomplices are erected anywhere in Montenegro, or public neo-Nazi demonstrations held, or members of Nazi organizations and collaborators declared participants in national liberation movements.
Before and during 2021, Montenegro, in line with the "EU solidarity", annually abstained when voting on the draft UN General Assembly resolution on "Combating the glorification of Nazism, neo-Nazism and other practices that contribute to fuelling contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance" submitted by Russia together with other co‑sponsors from all regions of the world. In 2022-2023, Montenegro, following suit of other EU countries, voted against the resolution, thus in fact publicly expressing its support for neo-Nazism.
Concurrently, Montenegro continues to face certain problems in countering racial discrimination. In particular, there are facts of discrimination and unequal treatment of citizens on the grounds of nationality and social background, as well as facts of gender inequality. Members of certain social groups, including persons with disabilities, Roma and other ethnic minorities, as well as women have faced various violations of their rights and freedoms, in particular violations of the right to employment. The UN Committee against Torture (CAT) in 2022 pointed ut the widespread physical and psychological ill-treatment or torture committed by police officers against detainees during interrogations to extract confessions or information.[3584] Against this backdrop, CAT highlighted the lack of efficiency in investigating such incidents, particularly with regard to identifying the offenders. Law enforcement officers are not suspended while under investigation for this type of offence. Among other things, the Committee noted that investigations into alleged acts of torture or ill-treatment could be carried out by the same prosecutor that had been tasked with investigating charges against the detainee who made the allegations. Furthermore, courts impose lenient sentences in such cases, including probation. The Committee also pointed out that Montenegro's Criminal Code allowed the police to detain suspects for up to 24 hours before bringing them before the public prosecutor, and it was during this initial period that the majority of alleged violations occurred.
The CAT noted that its recommendations to the Montenegrin authorities had only been partially implemented. Besides, owing to the existing definition of torture in the Criminal Code (which includes situations in places of deprivation of liberty), acts of torture or ill-treatment are not punishable by penalties commensurate with their grave nature, and that the statute of limitations for the offence of torture remains in force, making it difficult to prosecute the perpetrators of such offences.
On the whole, these observations by the CAT seem valid, as issues with the slowness and inefficiency of the authorities and excessive duration of judicial proceedings have been regularly reported in Montenegro. This is evidenced in particular by the fact that most of the complaints by Montenegrin citizens to the Protector concerned the activities of public authorities and government agencies, including those that had led to violations of the rights and freedoms of citizens, as well as failure of government entities to take decisions within the statutory time limits. Major reasons for applicants' complaints about the functioning of the judiciary traditionally remained the lengthy review and revision of court judgments. In addition, Montenegrin citizens were dissatisfied with the work of the prosecutor's office, as prosecutors often failed to take the necessary action on complaints of crimes and offences, and to update the victims on the progress in the investigation of cases initiated on such complaints. Violations of victims' rights during court and pre-trial proceedings also caused criticism.
Experts raised questions about the use of religious issues to foment enmity and settle internal political scores. Such incidents leading to increased public discontent have been registered in recent years. For example, potential for conflict was embedded in the Law on Freedom of Religion and Belief and the Legal Status of Religious Communities adopted in late December 2019, which requires religious organizations to prove their ownership of buildings and churches prior to 1918. This was largely seen as a pretext for a possible seizure by the state of a significant share of the property of the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC), which remains the largest religious association in Montenegro. This initiative caused large-scale protests of SOC adherers across the country. According to opponents of the law, its provisions aimed to strengthen the position of the "Montenegrin Orthodox Church" (an unrecognized schismatic structure). The Montenegrin authorities consequently took steps to remove the contentious elements from the law. In December 2020, amendments to the said document consistent with the interests of the SOC were presented. Among other things, it specified the status of immovable property of the canonical church, and the possibility of resolving disputes about real estate through administrative procedure was removed. These changes were enshrined in the agreement[3585] on the principles of relations between the government of Montenegro and the SOC signed by Montenegrin prime minister Dritan Abazović and patriarch of the Serbian Orthodox Church Porfirije. This helped remove the urgency of the issue.
Inter alia, the problem of inter-ethnic and inter-religious conflicts in Montenegro was highlighted in 2018 by the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), which expressed concern over the reported instances of hate speech by Montenegrin political and public figures targeting a number of ethnic or ethno-religious groups, particularly during election campaigns. It also noted racist discourse, insults and derogatory remarks in the media and on the Internet, particularly among Serbs and Montenegrins. CERD experts were concerned about the fact that Montenegrin law enforcement agencies and Protector continued to register only a limited number of complaints against racial discrimination. Besides, very few cases led to investigation and judicial sanction. As far as the practice goes, most such cases are qualified by Montenegrin law enforcers as misdemeanors. The Committee also pointed to cases of violence against Roma.[3586]
The issue had escalated to such an extent that CERD put it on the list of questions sent to Montenegro following the consideration of the report as ‘interim reporting’. The Committee found the measures described by the Montenegrin side to be insufficient. In its letter of response on the issue, CERD expressed concern over the fact that 95 percent of complaints of infringement of equality, which appeared to include incitement to national, racial and inter-religious hatred, had been rejected by the Montenegrin prosecutor's office. It also noted that, while Montenegro provided statistical data on the complaints filed and relevant cases initiated, the Committee still lacked information on investigations carried out and the number of those held responsible for these offences. In this regard, CERD highlighted the need for the Montenegrin authorities to include in their next periodic report information on the reasons for the high number of rejections to initiate criminal cases alleging racial discrimination.[3587]
Experts list the persistent attempts by the authorities to revise history, in particular, the issue of recognizing events in Srebrenica as an act of genocide, among factors that negatively affect inter-ethnic relations. In 2021, following the adoption by Montenegrin parliament of a resolution recognizing the genocide in Srebrenica, minister of justice Vladimir Leposavic, who had adopted pro-Serbian attitudes and publicly opposed the recognition of the events in Srebrenica as genocide, was dismissed from office.[3588]
The support by the government of Montenegro of the UN General Assembly resolution on the 1995 Srebrenica genocide, which declared the Serbian people accounting for nearly half of the population according to the latest census guilty of genocide, did little to help improve inter-ethnic relations. Mass rallies broke out, which labeled Montenegro's voting on the resolution as a treachery. For instance, on 23 May 2024, a protest was held in front of the government building, gathering thousands of people. Protest participants stated that "the government led by Montenegran prime minister Milojko Spajic demonstrated in the most blatant manner that it had no respect for either victims among the Serbian people or its own national duty – the need to resist another attempt to place collective guilt on the Serbs as a people."[3589]
One of the responses to this step of the government was the initiative of the Speaker of parliament, leader of the New Serbian Democratic Party A.Mandić to submit to the Montenegrin Parliament a resolution on the recognition of the genocide of Serbs in concentration camps during World War II.[3590]
On 28 June 2024, the Parliament of Montenegro adopted by majority vote this document entitled "Resolution on Genocide in the Jasenovac, Dachau and Mauthausen Camp Systems", condemning the genocide of Serbs in concentration camps in Croatia, Germany and Austria. Milan Knezević and Andrija Mandić representing the Future of Montenegro coalition initiated the resolution.[3591]
International human rights organizations draw attention to the persistent problems of the Roma community in Montenegro caused by discrimination in the socio-economic, educational and healthcare spheres, poor living conditions and lack of adequate housing for displaced Roma. This issue was raised, inter alia, by the Advisory Committee on Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities,[3592] the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance,[3593] the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW),[3594] the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,[3595] as well as UN Human Rights Council Special Rapporteur on trafficking in persons Maria Grazia Giammarinaro following her visit to Montenegro in 2019. In May 2024, the UN Committee on Elimination of Racial Discrimination against Women once again highlighted the range of problems faced by Roma in Montenegro. Among other things, it pointed to the link between prostitution and human trafficking for the purposes of sexual exploitation, noting that it affects to a large extent women and girls from Roma communities. According to CEDAW experts, Roma women and girls continue to face the risk of abuse and exploitation as well as discrimination in access to employment, healthcare and education due to the lack of civil registration documents. With regard to education the Committee noted that only 7 percent of children aged 15 – 18 in Roma settlements attend secondary school or universities, as compared to the population in general, for which this figure stands at 88 percent of children attending secondary school.[3596]
It was not only in its Concluding observations that the UN Committee on Elimination of Racial Discrimination highlighted the above-mentioned problems faced by Roma. Its experts put this issue on the list of questions following the consideration of the report, to which Montenegrin authorities were required to submit additional follow-up information. It its conclusion on the information provided, CERD drew particular attention to the situation of Roma, highlighting, among other things, the need to reach out to the population to prevent discrimination against Roma, refugees and migrants, as well as the issue of birth registration of Roma children.[3597]
UN Human Rights Council Special Rapporteur on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography, Mama Fatima Singhateh, underlining the problem of trafficking of children in Montenegro for sexual exploitation, forced labour and financial exploitation, including forced begging, which often occurs under the guise of child marriage, points out that this phenomenon affects Roma communities the most, mainly due to their social exclusion, discrimination and poverty. Girls are primary victims of these activities. According to the Special Rapporteur, it is difficult to establish how widespread this phenomenon is, in general. In her view, only few cases of sexual violence against children are reported to the competent authorities. Among other things, this leads to underreporting and under-identification of victims. The culture of non-reporting or tolerating such crimes in Montenegro, and the fact the competent authorities often disbelieve children or blame them for having provoked the perpetrators to violence by their behaviour, considerably hinders the resolution of the problem.[3598] Besides, Montenegro remains a transit country for persons subjected to trafficking and sale for the purposes of sexual exploitation and forced labour.
Montenegro joined the Russophobic campaign that has been actively fomented in Europe since the Russian Armed Forces launched the special military operation to denazify and demilitarize Ukraine and protect the civilian population of Donbass (SMO). This was fuelled by Podgorica's ever-increasing policy of unconditional adherence to the line imposed by Washington and the EU from Brussels. In June 2022, for example, the Montenegrin operator "Mtel" shut off all Russian TV channels operating in the country, including "Russia Today", "RT Documentary", "RTR-Planeta" and "Rossiya 24".
On 25 June 2024, as instructed by Brussels and the EU, Montenegro blocked a number of Russian media outlets. These were "Channel One", "REN TV", several VGTRK channels, including "Russia 1", "Russia 24", "RT" TV Channel and its offices worldwide, as well as "Sputnik" and other outlets.[3599]
In fact, even before 2022, Montenegrin government officials had made hostile public statements against Russians and the Russian authorities. Particularly noteworthy were the provocative statements made by the then Foreign Minister of Montenegro, Đorđe Radulović, which were almost hostile and racist in nature.[3600]
In the context of the aforementioned Russophobic campaign, the activities of the Ukrainian Embassy in Montenegro; the ambassador, after Russia had launched a special military operation, organized several "protests" in Podgorica using extremist and neo-Nazi symbols, were highly illustrative. It also resorted to aggressive rhetoric (including in social media) and hate speech against Russian military, Russian Embassy staff and members of the Russian diaspora. There were no reports that the Montenegrin authorities had suppressed such hateful activities or disassociated themselves from them.
It should be noted that racial discrimination persists in the media sphere in Montenegro. This situation also provokes criticism on the part of human rights defenders, including the Ombudsman for Montenegro. It has also been noted that manifestations of hatred and intolerance towards different opinions are most frequently observed, according to the Ombudsman, in digital media and on the Internet. There have also been instances of attacks on or threats of violence against journalists and publishing houses.
The situation with the exercise of social and economic rights by Montenegrin citizens remains challenging. A significant number of persons, mainly in the northern regions of the country, continue to live in poverty. Such issues as employment, better wages and living conditions have remained relevant for many citizens. Such circumstances have an adverse impact on the socio-economic situation in the country. The national human rights body acknowledged the direst situation of the unemployed, the elderly and people with disabilities. Furthermore, the European Committee on Social Rights pointed out that Montenegro was in violation of the European Social Charter on the ground that not all non-resident foreign nationals in need who were lawfully present in the territory were entitled to emergency social assistance.[3601]
The situation around glorification of Nazism and racial discrimination in Czech Republic (hereinafter – the CR) remains concerning. One of the reasons – Prague's consistent "drift" towards a blatantly Russophobic course which has taken an aggressive form of a "war" with monuments to Soviet soldiers in the country and open whitewashing of Nazi collaborators. This takes place amid the increased attempts to promote the "equal responsibility of totalitarian regimes for unleashing WWII" concept in Czech social and political space. Equating the symbols of the USSR and Red Army to Nazi swastika with a view to ban them in the future, hushing up the Red Army liberating role (including through promoting the myth of Prague self-liberation assisted by the Vlasovites) and tarnishing the Soviet soldiers and military commanders are among the goals of this campaign. When the Russian Federation launched the special military operation to de-Nazify and demilitarize Ukraine and protect the civilians in Donbass (SMO), Prague openly and actively advocated the neo-Nazi regime in Kiev (along with its nationalist battalions) by supplying it with various weaponry.
Such support of neo-Nazi forces outside the Czech Republic fully demonstrates the double standards applied by Czech authorities. Czech Ministry of Interior's 2020 report on manifestations of extremists categorically indicated that the risk of a neo-Nazi movement remained, while absurdly linking it to "narratives from the Russian Federation"[3602].
Given the Czech authorities' sympathy for Nazi collaborators as well as disrespect to the memory of Red Army soldiers who gave their lives for liberation of the Czech Republic from Nazism, it comes as no surprise that up until 2021 the Czech delegation, in line with the EU consolidated position, was abstaining from the vote (except for in 2011, when it voted "against") in the UN General Assembly on the resolution "Combating glorification of Nazism, neo‑Nazism and other practices that contribute to fuelling contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance" initiated by Russia and co-sponsors. However, in 2022-2023, the Czech Republic took a step further and, following the EU suite, voted against this initiative that condemns modern manifestations of Nazism and other discriminating ideologies.
Since 2020 the Czech neo-Nazis have become active on the Internet, which the experts explain by the restrictive measures taken by the country's authorities due to COVID-19. The law enforcement agencies noted that this tendency will grow further yet.
In May-June 2020 the Czech public attention was drawn to the cases of embracing the neo-Nazi sentiments for profit. "Naše vojsko" publishers released a calendar with photos featuring Third Reich leaders, occupational administration in the territory of the Czech Republic and other Nazi criminals (it had already offered similar "memorabilia" earlier). "Guidemedia" publishing house released a book containing denial of the Holocaust (prior to that, it had published Adolf Hitler's speeches and antisemitic articles).
The Czech non-governmental organizations – Federation of Jewish Communities (FJC) and Holocaust Victim Compensation Fund (HVCF) – filed a police report on "propaganda of the movement oriented on suppressing human rights and freedoms". Consequently, searches were conducted at the premises of the said publishers. The Czech Ministry of Interior terminated the warehouse lease contract with one of them. German and Israeli Ambassadors to Prague initiated a public discussion condemning the "Naše vojsko" publications.
So far the publishers managed to avoid responsibility under the pretext that it was the matter of commercial activities rather than propaganda of Nazism. In this regard, FJC President Michal Klima called upon Czech MPs to amend the national legislation to directly ban the sales of such products as a form of propaganda.
It is noteworthy, that the said publishing house continued being involved in the unlawful activity of releasing the banned or morally controversial articles. In April 2021, "Naše vojsko" publisher was fined and its director Emerich Drtina given a suspended sentence for distributing the book advocating inhalant abuse. As for the case of spreading the Nazi symbols, it was returned by the court for further investigation.
On 22 November 2021, the Czech "Reflex" magazine posted on its website a set of historical photos featuring Nazis in the occupied Soviet territories to demonstrate, according to the authors' idea, Hitlerites' benevolent attitude towards local residents.
Monuments and memorials in honour of Nazis are also erected (or restored) here and there in Czech Republic. For example, the Iron Cross granite memorial (replica of the Iron Cross, a Nazi military award) was restored in 2011 at the village of Kořenov's Štěpánka Lookout. It honours the local residents who fought in the Wehrmacht and Waffen SS ranks, serving as a pilgrimage destination for European neo-Nazis. It is known, in particular, that on 6 February 2021, members of Czech Young Nationalist organization held a rally there declaring the intent to carry on with their "gatherings". According to "The Forward", a project that tracks monuments to Nazis and their collaborators, the cross, which originally had a swastika in its center, was erected in October 1944 as a memorial to the fallen Third Reich soldiers. The memorial was unveiled by Konrad Henlein, the Reichsstatthalter (governor) of Sudetenland, where Kořenov belonged to. In 1945, after Germany's capitulation, the cross was toppled from its pedestal. It remained in pieces until 2011, when it was reinstalled.[3603]
The FJC was also concerned over the release of "Sudety Soldierzz" music album by "Dvojlitrbojz" Czech rap singers containing references to the Third Reich's ideology. Earlier the fans of this band (as well as of some other similar performers) raised their hands in Nazi salute. According to the FJC, such practice contributes to "creeping legitimation" of extremist views, so that such marginal manifestations could become acceptable.
In April 2023, a Czech court notably ruled that the "Respekt" weekly did not have to apologise to the right-wing "Svoboda a přímá demokracie" for labelling that party a "fascist movement in parliament" in an article. The court found that the news outlet had violated disproportionately no plaintiff's rights. The party itself had filed a lawsuit against the weekly demanding an apology for using the comparison.[3604] The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) also drew attention to this case in its 2024 report.[3605]
Meanwhile, it should be noted that certain steps to combat neo-Nazi manifestations have been indeed taken in the country: in 2020 Czech prosecuting bodies decided to reconsider the case of "National resistance", the earlier acquitted neo-Nazi organization. It was charged with organizing the events to commemorate SS fighters and white power music concerts.
Unfortunately, the careful and respected attitude towards the memorials of Red Army soldiers and victims of Nazism previously observed by Czech residents has lately given place to Czech authorities' "combatting" the Soviet memorial sites. The most obnoxious cases include dismantling in 2017 by the Prague's Mayor's Office of the memorial plaque from the town hall in the main square which was dedicated to the liberation of the city by the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front;[3606] dismantling of the monument to Soviet tankmen (in the form of IS-2 tank which was removed from the pedestal and repainted in pink); placing of the "explanatory plaques" in 2018 on the monument to Marshal Ivan Konev (under his command the troops of the red Army fought to liberate the city) on the Interbrigade Square (in Prague-6 city district). This monument was repeatedly vandalized as well as the monument to Red Army soldiers in the vicinity of Prague Castle.
The removal of the Ivan Konev monument, carried out by the administration of Prague-6 district in early April 2020, in violation of the Russian-Czech Treaty of Friendly Relations and Cooperation of 1993 epitomized this cynical campaign. The statue of Konev was put in a depository and its pedestal destroyed (according to the authorities, an abstract memorial dedicated to "all liberators" of the city is planned to be created at this site). Both calls of the public to preserve the historically significant landmark and condemnation from President Miloš Zeman were ignored in committing this sacrilegious act. Besides, according to Ondřej Kolář, Prague-6 district head, authorities deliberately took advantage of the state of emergency imposed due to COVID-19 and limitations on free movement within the city to conduct the dismantling without public protests.
Yet the Czech Russophobes didn't stop at that. In May 2022, the Prague‑3 district administration decided to rename the street that was named in 1946 after Ivan S. Konev. Upon decision of the Prague city authorities of 26 May 2022, Marshal Konev was deprived of the Prague honorary citizen title. Moreover, on 21 June 2022, Prague-3 legislative assembly voted for renaming the above mentioned Konev Street.[3607] The relevant decision was adopted by Prague City Council on 19 June 2023.[3608]
According to the Russian MoD's Department for the Perpetuation of the Memory of Those Who Died in Defense of the Fatherland, 28 out of 665 military memorial and individual burial sites had been completely eliminated in the Czech Republic as of 1 December 2023.[3609]
However, activists and organizations involved in the preservation and restoration of monuments to Soviet soldiers continue to operate in the Czech Republic. By the beginning of 2023, thanks to the work of "Czech Union of Freedom Fighters in Ústí nad Labem" activists, a city monument, where seven urns with the ashes of Red Army soldiers are buried, was restored. The activists were able to repair the monument, but never succeeded in ceremoniously opening it after the repair. Simultaneously, Jelena Vičanova, chairperson of the organization, expressed concerns that a new wave of Soviet monument demolition could ensue from the decommunization law in the country.[3610]
Setting a course for the falsification of WWII history and demonization of the USSR and Russia, Czechia puts a considerable effort into whitewashing the image of Andrey Vlasov's Russian Liberation Army, with a purpose, in particular, to ascribe this criminal formation the decisive role in liberating Prague from Nazism in May 1945. Having become more frequent in the country over the recent years, such public attempts appear to go in parallel with the measures to "fight" against Soviet monuments. Thus, a monument in honour of the Vlasovites was erected on 30 April 2020 in Prague's Řeporyje district at the initiative of its odious head Pavel Novotny. On 7 May 2022, a commemorative wreath-laying ceremony was held at this "installation". It is also noteworthy that the Olšany Cemetery has its Russian Liberation Army memorial where similar events are held on a regular basis. Also, according to The Forward project, a monument to the RLA in the form of a column topped with a T-34 tank miniature covered with a helmet was erected in the Prague Lnáře district in 2021.[3611]
Other acts of vandalism against Soviet monuments were also reported. For example, in December 2020, unidentified perpetrators vandalized the Red Army soldiers monument located in Ostrava-Zábřeh community in the Eastern CR.
Such incidents are becoming more frequent in the territory of the Czech Republic. In 2022, there were 9 cases of vandalism against memorial sites dedicated to the Soviet soldiers who liberated Czechoslovakia from Nazism. In March 2022, upon the decision of Přibyslav (Vysočina region) local authorities, a sculpture of the Red Army soldier was detached from the monument to those fallen in WW I and II and then placed in a depository.[3612] In the city of Olomouc, swastikas and letters "UA" were painted on the monument to the Red Army soldiers in March[3613] and September[3614] 2022 respectively. Vandals also defiled the monument to the Red Army soldiers in the city of Litoměřice in October 2022[3615] and August 2023[3616]. Similar acts were committed in the cities of Přerov in October 2022, Přibor (March 2023) and Děčín (May 2023). Illustrative are the cases of Czech side's refusal to invite Russian representatives to participate in the commemorative events dedicated to anniversaries of liberation of Czech cities by the Red Army[3617].
The majority of the descendants of Russian "first wave" emigrants – the "Russian tradition" society as well as their allies from compatriots' communities that criticize Russia, supported by the Czech Russophobes – are deeply involved in whitewashing the Nazi collaborators.
The "Russian tradition" acts as a key co-organizer of an International conference dedicated to the proclamation of Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia manifesto by Andrey Vlasov in 1944. There is a RLA memorial at the Olšany Cemetery where the said Russian compatriot groups hold commemorative events on a regular basis.
The "Russian Word", a Russian-language magazine published in Czechia by the "Russian tradition" with the financial support from the Czech Ministry of Culture regularly publishes articles aimed at the justification of Vlasovite Nazi collaborators.
Also worth mentioning is a book that was published in 2020 about Emil Hácha, "State President of Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia" in 1939-1945 (he was arrested by Czechoslovak authorities in May 1945 on the charges of collaboration during the war and died before the trial). Local historians note that it substitutes historical analysis for an emphasis on Hácha's "human" qualities depicting him as almost an anti-Fascist resistance member. The said book declares Czech nationalists as "patriots" and the Nazi invasion regime as a "non-standard concept of democracy".
As part of rewriting history on the wave of Russophobia, forces unfriendly to us are trying to erase the memory of the constructive development of Czechoslovak-Soviet relations in the post-war period. The inscription "Moscow-Prague" as a design element of the Anděl Prague metro station (called Moskevská until 1990), became the object of their hatred. On 13 May 2024, the Prague City Council ordered another "explanatory plaque" under the pretext of condemning the SMO, dubbing the "legend of" friendship between our countries "a narrative imposed by the Soviet invasion authorities".[3618]
The situation of Russian citizens and compatriots living in the country has significantly worsened over the recent years as a result of the artificial escalation of Russophobia and creation of an unhealthy atmosphere around the Russian diaspora by the Czech authorities.
In 2021, as a result of unfriendly actions by the Czech authorities, the Russian embassy school in Prague was forced to suspend its work.
After the SMO was launched, the discrimination against Russian citizens and compatriots, fuelled by the official statements, has significantly intensified in Czechia. In June 2023, Petr Pavel, President of the Czech Republic, urged to establish surveillance over all Russians residing in the West, referring to a similar US during WWII-era practice in relation to the people of Japanese origin.[3619] CR Foreign Minister Jan Lipavsky alleged that the Russian special services were using Russian minorities abroad to achieve their goals[3620].
Against this background, the phenomenon of "individual sanctions" against people of Russian origin is no surprise in various areas of life (banking, horeca, education institutions). In essence, the Czech authorities used the crisis in Ukraine as a pretext for taking restrictive measures against the Russians.
Some of the cafes in Prague featured written announcements that Russians would not be served unless they condemn Russia's foreign policy and leadership (including in written form) and apologize for what is happening in Ukraine. The cases of refusal to provide medical aid were also made public.
Russians faced refusals to open or maintain their accounts in various Czech banks. The bankers had no common approach towards Russians: some banks have only expanded the list of required documents for clients of Russian origin and dragged out the procedures, others gave a complete refusal with no explanation.
In the educational sphere, incidents were also recorded, when Russians living in Czechia faced discrimination in local universities – refusal to teach and take exams by the teaching staff;[3621] refusal of admissions offices to consider secondary education papers issued in the Republic of Crimea; limited training areas (mainly technical) under the pretext of national security considerations. Some Czech universities are known to have terminated cooperation agreements with Russian educational institutions.
Many major Czech companies have shown discriminatory attitude towards Russian citizens. Thus, Pytloun Hotels chain (includes 14 city and mountain hotels) declared its refusal to receive guests with Russian and Belarussian citizenship until the special operation in Ukraine is finished. An official press-release of "Central Group", the country's largest building company, announced that it would not sell real property to the citizens of Russia. Exceptions mentioned were only possible if the clients distanced themselves in writing from Russia's policy in Ukraine.
Not only ordinary citizens of Russian origin, but also diplomatic representatives have faced aggressive manifestations in Czechia. On 24 February 2022, unidentified perpetrators assaulted the Russian Embassy in Prague. The assaulters tried to force their way into the mission premises and threw various objects at the building.
In line with the EU approach, Decree № 130 of Czech Government of 25 February 2022 suspended the issuing of visas and residence permits to Russian citizens including on the applications submitted prior to the said Decree's entry into force. Exceptions are only possible given a foreign policy interest for the Czech Republic. Alongside with that, it was also declared that visas would be issued in humanitarian cases. Commenting on the Czech position as to this matter, Minister of Interior Vít Rakušan explained that humanitarian cases are understood as family reunification or threat of prosecution in Russia. The Czech Foreign Ministry further extended that list: "A humanitarian visa is issued to an individual whose life is endangered by repression or due to their resistance or criticism of the regime as well as in case of a threat of prosecution on political or other grounds". Even the need of medical assistance or death of a close relative are not considered by the Czech authorities as strong reasons for issuing a visa. On 2 March 2022, the Czech Government issued a Decree incapacitating Belarussian nationals as well.
In June 2023, the Czech Government banned Russian and Belarussian athletes from participating in competitions in the country's territory.[3622]
The Prague concert of Russian opera singer Anna Netrebko scheduled for October 2023 was cancelled under pressure from the city authorities that gave the organizers a relevant "recommendation" after consulting the Ukrainian Embassy in the Czech Republic.[3623]
Aside from the persecution of Russians, repressions are recorded against those common-sense citizens of Czechia who dare to publicly express their opinion. Those who openly show support for Russia, especially in the context of the Russian SMO (or whose statements and actions can be interpreted accordingly), are facing the risk of being prosecuted under CR Criminal Code § 365 "approval of a criminal offense" and § 405 "denial, questioning, approval and justification of genocide" with a possible imprisonment term of three years.
Back in February 2022, Igor Stříž, the Prosecutor General of the Czech Republic, stated that public support for the Russian leadership and Russian actions in Ukraine could entail criminal responsibility and imprisonment. According to the Prosecutor General's Office of the Czech Republic as of March 2023, the courts have already handed down nine guilty verdicts, several dozen more people have been charged, and 90 criminal cases have been opened.[3624]
According to open data, between February 2022 and November 2023, the Czech police opened 384 criminal cases in connection with public expressions of support for the actions of Russia, its leadership and armed forces in the context of the Ukrainian crisis; in 99 cases, charges were brought.[3625]
An illustrative example in this regard is that of Czech citizen M. Bednářová, a Prague school teacher who, at her lesson in April 2022, gave an evaluation of developments in Ukraine that contradicted the official Prague position. Her own students secretly recorded her words on a cell phone and laid information against her. A criminal case was opened against the teacher thereupon.[3626] In June 2023 Prague-6 District Court ruled to terminate it. On 25 January 2024, M. Bednářová (who had been fired and never reinstated) was acquitted in court again. However, the prosecutor, insisting on holding the woman accountable for an alleged criminal offense, appealed the acquittal again.[3627] The prosecutor's appeal was rejected by a higher court only in May 2024.[3628]
On 25 February 2022, the Czech authorities advocated blocking web resources that, in their opinion, spread "pro-Russian disinformation." A relevant appeal was sent to Internet providers. Neither the Prague City Court nor the CR Supreme Administrative Court found any violation of law here, arguing that the appeal to providers is no order and that the blocking was carried out voluntarily.[3629] This logic was also supported by the CR Constitutional Court on 6 December 2023.[3630]
Accordingly, violations of the rights of Russian citizens and their persecution in the Czech Republic do not receive the attention they deserve from local law enforcement agencies. Czech NGOs, as well as EU structures, are more focused on other domestic policy issues.
Not only discriminative attitudes against Russian citizens have been recorded in the Czech Republic. Over the recent years, the Czech authorities' general Russophobic tilt has strengthened significantly in their policy which is an outright interference into the domestic affairs of a sovereign nation and is aimed at supporting unlawful actions. For example, in July 2022, Prague provided a platform for Russian radical non-systemic oppositionists. The participants of "Free Nations of Postrussia Forum" called for a violent regime change in Russia and ethnic- and region-based separatism (de-facto dismemberment of the Russian Federation). They followed up the Forum with adopting a "Declaration of decolonization of Russia".[3631]
However, the Czech Republic goes beyond just efforts to glorify Nazi collaborators and implant Russophobia. The manifestations of racism and hatred ideology that are not directly related to glorification of Nazism, are also recorded in the country. Meanwhile, statistics show an increase in such crimes. In particular, in the second half of 2023, the Czech Ministry of Interior recorded 181 hate crimes, 83 of them were investigated; 98 people were brought to justice.[3632] In the first half of 2024, it registered 100 such crimes, of which 38 were investigated. Also, 35 of these offenses were violent. The Czech police brought a total of 72 people to justice.[3633]
Law enforcement agencies estimate that the ultra-right groups, despite their efforts, cannot attract considerable number of members. Experts cite "Working Party of Social Justice" (Dělnická strana sociální spravedlnosti), "Working Youth" (Dělnická mládež) and "National Democracy" (Národní demokracie) among these marginal structures.
Multilateral universal and regional human rights supervising organizations have repeatedly highlighted the situation with manifestations of racism in Czechia. They record, in particular, the spread of racist ideas and prejudices, race-based crimes, in particular, offences against property, threats to Roma, Jews, migrants and activists representing the national minorities and assaults on them. Among other things, they note that the majority of victims are afraid to inform of the crimes committed against them which entails the lowered corresponding numbers in police reports.
For example, the UN Committee against Torture (in May 2018)[3634], the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (in August 2019)[3635], the UN Committee for Human Rights (in October 2019)[3636] and the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (in March 2022)[3637] expressed concern about the extent to which racist and hateful ideas, prejudices and stereotypes, and hate speech are common among the general public, mainly through the Internet and social media. CERD indicates that such rhetoric is used by Czech politicians and public figures, including MPs, city mayors and ministers. The media plays no small role in spreading racist stereotypes and prejudices against minority groups. It often comes to the point where journalists trying to independently and impartially cover migration issues are faced with threats and pressure from radicals. HRCttee notes that the media is used to reinforce stereotypical prejudices based on ethnicity or religion.
The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights also points out to persistent discrimination, hate speech, prejudice and stereotypes in the Czech Republic against certain individuals and marginalized groups, including persons with disabilities, migrants, refugees and asylum seekers. The Committee also notes that education in minority languages does not cover all national minorities and is not extended to the entire country.[3638]
The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) expressed similar concerns in October 2020. In particular, ECRI notes that hate speech against Muslims, migrants and Jews is widespread in the country, while Islamophobia and migrant phobia had become hallmarks of political discourse over the past five years. Despite the fact that the Czech Republic has experienced neither terrorist attacks by Islamic terrorist organizations nor the aftermath of the 2015 migration crisis, there is a low level of tolerance towards these two groups of people in the country.[3639]
The Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (AC FCNM) also expressed concern in 2021 about the increase in hate speech against national minorities and migrants in the Czech Republic. It notes that some Czech politicians, including at the top level, are foostering stereotypes in certain parts of society against national minorities, Roma and migrants, including Muslims. In AC FCNM view, this may be detrimental to the general climate of tolerance and respect, as well as provoke spillover effects on those national minorities who are currently generally tolerated.[3640]
The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights noted that "odious incidents" of racial hatred and xenophobia, involving primarily migrants and ethnic minorities, were reported in the country in 2017. Examples cited included large‑scale campaigns "against the dominance of Roma and migrants" in Brno, Ostrava and other major Czech cities, which often ended in riots, clashes with the police, followed by numerous detentions of protesters.
The controversial 2014 case when the owner (with Ukrainian roots) of Brioni Hotel in Ostrava refused to accommodate Russian citizens due to the reunification of Crimea with Russia was illustrative in terms of displays of discrimination against a certain ethnic group, particularly Russians. Later, the hotel management began to require Russian customers to sign a statement condemning the "annexation" of the peninsula as a condition for accommodation. The case was referred to Czech courts and reached the Constitutional Court, which sided with the hotel owner and overruled the decisions of lower courts and the Supreme Administrative Court, stressing that entrepreneurs should not be politically neutral. The verdict does not comply with Czechia's international legal obligations, including those under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Czech experts criticized this odious decision, saying it was wrongful. It is noteworthy that Pavel Rychetský, Chairman of the CR Constitutional Court, expressed categorical disagreement with the final decision and recommended that the case be referred to the EU Court in Luxembourg,[3641] which, in his opinion, could "deal with this phenomenon".
The Czech Government's Human Rights Council also drew attention to this case by including it in the "discrimination on the grounds of race and ethnic origin" section of its review. The Council tried to explain the Constitutional Court's final decision that had justified the businessman's desire to express his political views and thus draw the line between clients with freedom of enterprise and the fact that citizenship is considered no grounds for discrimination according to the Czech laws. At the same time, the Council stipulated that the list of these reasons was specified, but not limited, and "it remains unclear how this case would have ended" if "nationality" had been cited as the reason instead of "citizenship," as these concepts are interrelated.
Antisemitic outbursts have also been documented in the Czech Republic. Official statistics confirm an increase in the number of antisemitic crimes. Thus, a consistent growth in the number of such crimes was recorded from 2018 to 2021 (in 2018 – 15 cases, in 2019 – 23, in 2020 – 27, in 2021 – 37). In 2022, a slight decline in the number of detected crimes was recorded – 25. At the same time, in the period from 2018 to 2022, the number of registered antisemitic crimes remained below the level recorded in 2014-2015 (then law enforcement agencies registered over 40 incidents per year).
Besides, the FRA, with reference to data from the Czech FJC (since 2018, it has been maintaining an online service with an option to report antisemitic incidents) also provides unofficial statistics. Thus, in 2021, the Federation registered 1,128 antisemitic incidents in the country. In 2022, the number of registered incidents almost doubled to reach 2,277 cases. These are the highest figures for the period 2012-2022. By comparison, 874 such incidents were recorded in 2020, and 694 in 2019.
Almost all antisemitic incidents in 2022 involved hateful texts, images or speech posted in the media or online: 2,265 out of 2,277 incidents. Of these, 2,211 cases occurred online, especially on social media (1,642). According to the FRA, such a surge online in antisemitic incidents indicates an increased risk of disinformation spreading.[3642]
The third sociological study of antisemitic incidents endeavoured by the FRA among Jewish community members in several EU countries included the situation in the Czech Republic for the first time (and it was here that the majority of respondents (59 percent) turned out to be older than 60 years of age). According to survey results, only 27 percent of Czech respondents said that antisemitism was a serious problem in their country. Meanwhile, the number of those who noticed an increase in anti-Semitism in the past five years was quite high (43 percent). Although respondents in all countries reported experiencing antisemitism in real life and online, the Czech Republic had a higher than average percentage of those who had experienced antisemitism online, at 32 percent. The main form of antisemitism in the Czech Republic, along with Hungary, Poland, Romania and Sweden, was the stereotype of "Jews having too much power." The Czech Republic was among the countries with the lowest percentage of respondents concerned about themselves and their families because of their Jewish origin. The percentage of those who does not attend Jewish celebrations and other events was also low (17 percent). The country was also among the countries where over 65 percent of respondents wear religious Jewish symbols and/or clothing indicating their affiliation with the Jewish community. At the same time, the percentage of those who at least occasionally avoid wearing Jewish symbols and clothing is quite high in Czechia (54 percent), while 20 percent constantly avoid demonstrating any affiliation with the Jewish community for security reasons. According to survey data, the October 2023 escalation of Palestinian-Israeli conflict caused no personal safety concerns among the majority of Czech respondents (45 percent expressed no concern in this regard, and 30 percent were slightly concerned). This is in full accordance with the fact that the Czech Republic, like Hungary, had the lowest number of those who were frequently blamed for the actions by Israeli authorities in the Gaza Strip (3 percent and 4 percent, respectively, while 70 percent of respondents in the two above countries faced no such accusations). In addition, according to the survey, the Czech Republic had the lowest level of persecution – both online and in real life – motivated by hatred of Jews (21 percent). Even lower was the number of those who were discriminated against due to their Jewish community membership in the year preceding the survey (6 percent).[3643]
The Czech Republic still has issues with the Roma community (this minority is considered the largest in the country: the Czech Government's 2020 data suggest that approximately 150-300 thousand Roma live in the Czech Republic, that is 1.4 – 2.8 percent of the population). According to the office of the CR Commissioner for Human Rights, the number of socially disadvantaged areas (ghettos) in the country has almost tripled recently. The Czech governmental policy in this area is almost invariably criticized by international and national specialized organizations which point out to the lack of inclusiveness in the Czech society.
Thus, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) notes a relatively low rate of racially motivated hate incidents in the country. At the same time, it highlights that "hate speech", in particular against Roma, Muslims and migrants is very common in Czechia, including in the speeches of even high-level politicians. Upward xenophobic and antisemitic trends are also noted.[3644]
ECRI mentions the long-standing problem of "vicious circle" where a large part of the local Roma population finds itself in: lack of education leads to them being in no demand on the labour market, living in disadvantaged areas, which negatively affects access to social security and health care. Roma children face discrimination in education: segregated schools are widespread. About 20 percent of Roma children attend primary schools, where more than half of the pupils are Roma. In 13 such schools, Roma pupils make up more than 90 percent. ECRI highlights a high profile court case involving an elementary school in Ostrava where one building was earmarked for Roma children and the other one for all others.
The question of compensation for Roma minority members who were forcibly sterilized in the Czech Republic (the last incident, according to local human rights activists, occurred in the mid-1990s) has not yet been resolved either. It is very symptomatic that the Commission highlighted in December 2022 that the Czech authorities had failed to implement recommendations to combat the segregation of Roma children in schools. This negative trend was noted as persisting and the authorities' efforts to address the problem as futile. There are, for example, 77 Czech schools in which Roma children make up the majority of pupils, although only in few of them such a concentration can be explained by many Roma pupils living in the relevant catchment area.[3645]
In addition, on 23 November 2020, the European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR) issued a decision on a complaint filed in 2017 by the European Roma Rights Centre and the Mental Disability Advocacy Centre. The petitioners pointed to the local practice of "institutionalizing children" under the age of three (predominantly Roma and disabled), i.e. placing them in social welfare institutions instead of providing family forms of care. According to Dainius Pūras, United Nations Human Rights Council Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health, the ECSR found Prague in violation of Article 17 of the European Social Charter of 1961 which provides for the right of mothers and children to social and economic protection.
The Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities noted in 2021 that Roma and Muslims are most often affected by racist hate speech, while its focus has shifted over recent years from Roma to Muslims and migrants. In general, however, it is stated that public anti-gypsy utterances still occur frequently, increasing noticeably on social media. Statements by some Czech politicians, including top ones, support such negative attitudes. AC FCNM therefore reports that this attitude raises serious concerns and frustration among national minorities.[3646]
Roma discrimination in the Czech Republic and the segregation of Roma children in schools (they study either in separate schools or special schools for children with disabilities) are pointed out to with concern by UN human rights treaty bodies, i.e. the Committees against Torture in May 2018[3647], on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in August 2019[3648], for Human Rights in October 2019[3649] and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in March 2022.[3650] In particular, CESCR, noting the lack of reliable data on the situation of Roma in the Czech Republic, expresses concern over the fact that members of this community face stigmatization, poverty and endemic discrimination in the areas of healthcare, education, employment and housing. The Committee also mentions that very many Roma children are placed in special school establishments alongside children with disabilities.
According to the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights, segregation in Czech schools affects roughly one in two Roma children (49 percent). Moreover, the Czech Supreme Court recognized in 2022 the segregation of Roma in Czech educational institutions (decision № 25 Cdo 473/2021).[3651]
CESCR also addresses the issue of compensation for Roma women who had been forced to undergo sterilization between 1966 and 2012. While welcoming the 2021 law regulating the provision of payments, the Committee points out that the statutory period of three years to apply for compensation may be too short for victims to receive proper information about it and to formalize payments.
According to the opinion of the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights of 27 February 2023, following her visit to the Czech Republic, the Roma minority faces discrimination in virtually every area of life, including education, housing, employment, as well as in their interaction with the police. The problem of segregation of Roma children in Czech educational institutions was particularly highlighted. She pointed to the ongoing problems that many Roma victims of 1970s forced sterilization face in effectively accessing the compensation mechanism, as well as the discriminatory approach of local authorities to Roma refugees from Ukraine.[3652]
The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights 2023 report also mentions discrimination faced by Ukrainian Roma in the Czech Republic, especially when looking for housing.[3653] It also notes, citing data from human rights NGOs, that this group of people faces refusals when applying for medical care.
In addition, according to the Agency, trust in the police among Czech (that is autochtonous) Roma has been dropping since 2016 (33 percent), reaching its lowest level of 19 percent in 2021, while the average level of trust among the country's population is 75 percent.
The European Commission has also drawn attention to discrimination against Roma children in education, initiating a related procedure against the Czech Republic.[3654]
As Czech experts note, absent effective measures the protracted process of improving the situation with the rights of the Roma population, including children, could result in the consideration of the problem in European institutions ad infinitum.[3655]
The human rights treaty bodies have also paid attention to the problems related to keeping refugees and asylum seekers arriving in the Czech Republic in special camps. Criticism has been expressed both over the conditions in these detention centres, and lengthy terms of detention. This has been, inter alia, highlighted by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the Committee against Torture, the Human Rights Committee and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The HRCttee notes with concern that senior Czech officials encourage the public perception of migration as a public security threat, and that the media is used to instil fear of migrants and asylum-seekers. The Committee also referred to the low number of positive asylum applications, noting a possible correlation between these statistics and rhetorics by Czech senior public officials.[3656]
The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights underscores that Czech landlords are reluctant to let property to migrants who also face above-market rents for low-quality accommodation.[3657]
In September 2022, the UN Committee on Enforced Disappearances drew attention to gaps in Czech legislation relating to the expulsion and extradition of foreign nationals (including migrants). For example, the Committee pointed to the lack of clear criteria to evaluate and verify any claim regarding the danger of being subjected to enforced disappearance if the person is expelled, returned, surrendered, or extradited to another State. The Committee is also concerned about the lack of effective safeguards in Czech legislation against refoulement in execution of an expulsion sentence, since the lodging of an application for international protection has no automatic suspensive effect on the deportation order.[3658]
The discriminatory situation of refugees from Ukraine in general, not just Ukrainian Roma, has also come to the attention of international monitoring mechanisms. For example, the EU FRA 2023 report notes the significant problems of this group in finding employment. The results of a survey published in June 2022 show that, while some 45 percent of such persons who received official protection status and, accordingly, the right to work, have higher education, but 80 percent of refugees were able to find just low-skilled work.[3659]
The Swiss authorities prefer to avoid mentioning the Confederation’s ties to the Nazi regime during the Second World War. However, evidence of such ties is now growing. Despite its official declaration of neutrality, Bern’s extensive economic cooperation with the Axis powers is well known. As early as August 1940, Switzerland granted the Nazis most-favoured-nation treatment for trade and transit, supplied military equipment under an agreement signed in October 1940, and provided millions of dollars in loans. In addition, the Confederation did not prevent recruitment on its territory, which resulted in more than 2,000 Swiss joining the Waffen‑SS.
Since the spring of 2023, the Western media have been actively discussing the collaboration of the Swiss bank Credit Suisse (in 2023 absorbed by the Swiss bank UBS) with the Third Reich. The bank is accused of managing the accounts of Nazi Party members, even after they had fled to Argentina. According to observers, this vicious practice allegedly continued until 2020.[3660]
At the same time, it is worth noting the efforts of the authorities to combat the display of various types of racist and extremist symbols in public spaces.
In early May 2023, the National Council voted overwhelmingly in favour of Marianne Binder-Keller’s initiative to ban the use of Nazi symbols in public space (paradoxically, she is also actively in favour of increasing arms supplies to the Nazi regime in Kiev). In December 2023, the Council of States (the upper house of the Swiss Parliament) considered this initiative and then rejected it. Instead, it proposed a more general ban, covering not only Nazi symbols but also other racist, extremist, and violent symbols.[3661]
On 17 April 2024, the National Council approved a ban on Nazi symbols. The next step is for the Swiss Government to draft legislation to prohibit wearing, displaying or distributing racist, violent or extremist symbols. The ban would apply to propaganda materials, gestures, slogans, and flags.[3662]
On 9 June 2024, in a referendum to amend the constitution of the region (the canton of Geneva), 85 per cent voted in favour of banning corresponding symbols. Geneva will thus become the first canton to include in its basic law a ban on displaying or wearing in public places of symbols, emblems, and other signs of hatred, including the Nazi symbol.[3663]
At the same time, Switzerland does not prohibit the existence and activities of far-right extremist groups, which often adhere to neo‑Nazi ideas (this would require a specific government decree based on a UN or OSCE resolution). As early as 2009, a cross-party consensus was reached in the Swiss Federal Parliament on the need to strengthen the legal framework to combat radicalization more effectively. However, this idea has not yet been implemented.
According to the Swiss Federal Intelligence Service (FIS), despite the self-dissolution in February 2022 of the only right-wing political party, the Party of Nationally Oriented Swiss, which officially existed since 2000, the local far-right scene is strengthening its position.
According to the 2023 FIS Swiss Security Report, violent demonstrations involving far-right extremists are on the rise. In 2022, a total of 36 such incidents were recorded, 5 of which were violent.[3664] According to local law enforcement, glorification of National Socialism, xenophobia, hatred of minorities, and anti-Semitism are typical of far-right circles that tend to commit violent acts. Most of them believe in the so-called Great Replacement, which implies the existence of a “conspiracy of the world’s elites” to replace the white European population with “coloured” migrants. The main stream of neo‑Nazi propaganda comes through social media.
The right wing of the Swiss People’s Party, the largest party in the Confederation, is promoting ideas that border on radicalism. As a rule, such initiatives are directed against migrants and relate to restricting their access to the country and tightening the state’s migration policy as a whole.
Another Swiss far-right movement that continues to operate is the National Action Front. In the autumn of 2020, the largest neo‑Nazi youth group, Young Action, was founded under its aegis, with 20 to 50 active members.[3665] Its symbol is a rune in the form of an upward pointing arrow, which was used in Nazi Germany by SA units and the Hitler Youth. At the same time, Young Action is following current trends of “modernizing” neo-Nazism to attract young people to its ranks. The group actively disseminates professionally produced videos on social networks and its Telegram channel (7,200 users). They emphasize the heroic themes of their homeland and its picturesque nature. One of the important areas for Young Action is “re-emigration” (the return of “crime-prone” refugees to their country of origin). It is promoted both in the virtual space on a special website[3666] and in the form of “topical” lectures held, among other places, in local beer halls. They often choose symbolic dates for their meetings, such as 20 April (Hitler’s birthday), 22 June (the day Nazi Germany invaded the USSR), etc. The group also runs its own website, which contains far-right slogans but makes no direct reference to National Socialist ideology. Young Action seeks to establish links with like-minded individuals in other countries, mainly Germany and Austria. Moreover, the Swiss press has reported on the group’s contacts with the SNP youth organisation.[3667]
The neo-Nazi group Kombat 18A (a paramilitary unit of the international neo-Nazi network Blood and Honour that originated in Britain), which is banned in Germany, also operates a small but quite active Swiss “branch” on the Internet.
Other neo-Nazi movements include Brigade 8 and the Morgenstern Association in central Switzerland, the Homeland Loyal Association in the cantons of Schwyz and St. Gallen, the international Hammerskins group, Iron Lucerne, and the Avalon Community.
The Swiss FIS estimates that there are between 300 and 400 activists in the country who are prepared to commit acts of violence.
Previously, a local branch of the international neo‑Nazi group Misanthropic Division, which was founded in Ukraine in 2013‑2014, operated in the country. In 2017, it was discovered that four of the neo‑Nazi supporters had served in the Swiss army. As reported by the Tages-Anzeiger newspaper, in March 2022, Swiss far-right radicals called on social media to join the neo‑Nazi Azov Regiment to participate in combat operations.
The right-wing extremist newspaper Expresszeitung also continues to be published. It is owned by Swiss nationals Ruben Buchwalder and André Barmettler. The editorial staff is made up of German nationals, including Gerhard Wisniewski, a well-known proponent of “alternative facts” and conspiracy theories. The paper is printed in Zurich in a printing house owned by Tamedia, one of the largest Swiss media groups.
Far-right activists have been actively involved in the discussions of the so-called coronasceptics, who spread conspiracy theories, including those of an anti-Semitic and racist nature, online and urge citizens not to agree to vaccination. According to local press, one of the anti-vaccination groups, Mass‑Voll, that failed in its attempt to enter the Swiss Parliament in the October 2023 national elections, has contacts with right-wing radicals in Germany and Austria. In July 2023, its leader Nicolas Rimoldi took part in a demonstration of the Austrian far-right group Identitarian Movement in Vienna under the slogan “Re‑emigration” and met with its leader, one of the most prominent European far‑right figures, Martin Sellner. On his way back to Switzerland, he stopped in the Austrian village of Braunau am Inn, where Adolf Hitler was born, and posted a corresponding photo on social networks. Responding to a wave of criticism from the public, politicians, and the media, Rimoldi said that he was unaware of this fact and that he had only stopped to rest.[3668] This controversy led other “anti-vaccination” organisations to disassociate themselves from Mass‑Voll, declaring inadmissible contacts with far-right extremist circles.[3669]
On 16 March 2024, the aforementioned Austrian far-right extremist Sellner, known for his rallies in Germany and Austria, was to give a speech on Ethnic Choice and Re-emigration at the invitation of the Young Action group. This was to take place in the wine museum of the canton of Aargau in Tegerfelden, despite the fact that he had been banned from entering Switzerland. He nevertheless crossed the border by swimming across Lake Constance in an inflatable boat, but was detained by the cantonal police later that evening, and the event itself was disrupted, according to the group’s claims.[3670]
In 2023, the media began to actively spread information about the discovery of a large (13 tons) stone monument in the Swiss cemetery in Chur at the burial site of German soldiers who died during the First World War. The stone bears the inscription “1914‑1918. German soldiers rest here”. Journalists who drew attention to the controversial monument emphasize that the installation of such monuments on the initiative of Germany was one of the directions of Nazi propaganda at that time. The monument in Chur was no exception to this rule. Some sources claim that it was brought from Munich to Switzerland and erected there on the eve of the Second World War. In addition, according to some sources, a swastika was drawn on the monument on days considered “memorable” by the Nazis.[3671]
Notably, Switzerland “traditionally” abstains from voting in the United Nations General Assembly on the annual resolution introduced by Russia and other co-sponsors entitled “Combating the glorification of Nazism, neo-Nazism and other practices that contribute to fuelling contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance”. In explaining its position, the Swiss side refers to the inadmissibility of restricting the exercise of the rights to freedom of expression, assembly, and association.
The Confederation lacks specific legislation to combat racist manifestations. At the federal level, there is no legal definition of direct and indirect racial discrimination or provisions explicitly prohibiting racial profiling, while the Criminal Code does not include the commission of a racially motivated hate crime as an aggravating circumstance. This has been criticised by experts from the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD).[3672]
The Council of Europe’s European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) has also pointed out that Switzerland has inadequate national legislation to combat discrimination against national minorities, resulting in their unclear legal status and inequality due to different standards at the cantonal level.[3673]
The legal basis for the fight against racism is currently provided by Article 8 paragraph 2 of the Constitution (prohibition of discrimination based on origin, race, sex, age, language, social status, religious and political convictions or disability) and Article 261bis of the Swiss Criminal Code. Calls for racial, ethnic or religious discrimination, public dissemination of such ideology, organising, promoting, and participating in propaganda activities, public insults, and manifestations of discrimination, denial of genocide and other crimes against humanity, and refusal to provide public services on racial grounds are punishable by imprisonment of up to three years or a fine.
In February 2023, the experts of the Council of Europe’s Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (ACFCNM) once again expressed their concern about reports of an increase in racism and intolerance in Switzerland during the reporting period. These included in particular antigypsyism, anti-Semitism, anti-Muslim and anti-Black racism.[3674]
As early as December 2021, CERD experts also noted an increase in racism and the rarity of legal action taken in this regard. In addition, monitoring of such offences remains insufficient due to the non-mandatory nature of their registration and the lack of uniformity in its implementation.[3675]
The use of xenophobic and hate speech by some Swiss political parties is highlighted in the report of the OSCE/ODIHR Needs Assessment Mission to observe the Swiss parliamentary elections scheduled for 22 October 2023, published on 13 September 2023.[3676]
According to a survey published in May 2024 by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office, four out of ten permanent residents in Switzerland have experienced discrimination and violence, 39.6 per cent of them because of their nationality (citizenship), 25.5 per cent because of their language, 22.9 per cent because of their gender, 20.7 per cent because of their ethnic origin, 10.6 per cent because of their religion, and 10.2 per cent because of their skin colour.[3677]
Despite regular recommendations by UN experts and human rights defenders, Switzerland has not yet organised sufficient and accessible remedies for victims of racial discrimination, including in civil and administrative law.
Even after the Federal Assembly passed the law establishing a national human rights institution on 1 October 2021, CERD expressed doubts about its effectiveness in addressing the problem, as the institution does not have a mandate to receive and consider individual complaints and reportedly would not have sufficient financial resources. The current Federal Commission against Racism lacks the financial resources to fully implement its mandate. A lack of financial and human resources is also a problem for the cantonal counselling centres, whose task is to register racist incidents and facilitate victims’ access to support and legal advice.[3678]
After Russia launched a special military operation to demilitarise and denazify Ukraine and protect civilians in Donbass on 24 February 2022, anti-Russian sentiments manifested themselves in Switzerland. Swiss banks conducted a massive check of the grounds for opening accounts for Russian clients residing in the Confederation, not subject to sanctions, and not holding Swiss or EU citizenship. In some cases, Russian children were victims of racism and harassment in schools. However, the authorities prefer not to comment on these issues.
During rallies in support of the Kiev authorities in February-March 2022, mayors of major Swiss cities made statements that were insulting and inciting hatred against the Russian leadership.
In February and March 2022, a Swiss citizen and his wife, a native of Ukraine, publicly and repeatedly disseminated on various pages in social networks hate speech in the Russian language against Russians and Belarusians, including those in the country, up to and including death wishes. In April 2022, the Russian Embassy in Switzerland asked the Public Prosecutor’s Office to investigate whether the couple had violated the Swiss Criminal Code, which prohibits public incitement to hatred or discrimination against an individual or group of individuals on the basis of their race or ethnic origin. In August 2022, the Public Prosecutor’s Office confirmed to the Embassy that criminal proceedings had been initiated against the couple under four articles punishable by up to three years in prison or a fine. On 11 October 2022, the Public Prosecutor’s Office of Lenzburg-Aargau confirmed that the court decision of 8 September to prosecute the Ukrainian-born woman (suspended fine of CHF 14,700, real fine of CHF 2,000, and court and police costs of CHF 1,821.5) had entered into force. Her husband was found not guilty.
In October 2023, unidentified persons desecrated the monument to the companions of Generalissimo Alexander Suvorov, who died crossing the Alps in 1799, in the Schollenen Gorge. In this connection, the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Bern protested to the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA) of Switzerland. This is not the first time that the monument has been vandalized. In October 2022, two black swastikas were drawn on the monument. A note of protest was also submitted to the FDFA, demanding that measures be taken to identify and punish the perpetrators.[3679]
We continue to see isolated attempts to “cancel” Russian culture. For example, in May 2024, under pressure from the cantonal government, Anna Netrebko’s concert in Lucerne scheduled for 1 June 2024 was cancelled under the pretext of “temporal and geographical proximity” to the “Summit on Peace” in Ukraine in Bürgenstock (15‑16 June 2024). This happened despite assurances by her representatives that the singer had repeatedly spoken out against the “war in Ukraine”.[3680]
In 2022–2024, the Swiss authorities tried to prohibit the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Switzerland from organising a traditional wreath-laying ceremony at the monument to Soviet soldiers at the Hörnli cemetery (the canton of Basel-Stadt). In 2022, the event in a reduced format (without the participation of compatriots and mass media) could be agreed only after a démarche to the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, and in 2023-2024, only after a long correspondence with the cantonal authorities, in a similarly shortened format.
Anti-Semitism is still an issue in Switzerland. According to the Anti-Semitism Report[3681] of the Foundation against Racism and Anti-Semitism and the Swiss Federation of Jewish Communities, there was a significant increase in the number of anti-Semitic acts in Switzerland in 2023, with 155 incidents (compared to 57 in 2022), including 10 incidents of physical violence (compared to only one in 2022). There has also been an increase in neo‑Nazi and anti-Semitic graffiti in a number of major Swiss cities (42 incidents compared to 9 in 2022). Moreover, there were 975 such incidents in virtual space (compared to 853 in 2022). In particular, it was noted that anti-Semitism increased sharply following the escalation of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict on 7 October 2023 (114 incidents between October and December 2024 alone).
According to a representative survey conducted in November 2023 by the research institute Sotomo, 22 per cent of the Swiss believe that Jews have too much influence in the Confederation. At the same time, 20 per cent of respondents have a negative attitude towards people of the Jewish faith.[3682]
In October 2023, pro-Palestinian and anti-Israeli demonstrations with corresponding slogans took place in major Swiss cities. There was an incident involving an associate professor of Arab origin (name withheld) at the Institute for the Study of the Middle East and Muslim Societies at the University of Bern, who publicly described the Hamas attack as a legitimate act of Palestinian resistance and “the best birthday present ever”.[3683] He was soon fired, and in February 2024, the University’s rector, Christian Leumann, decided to disband the Institute and create a new one.
In April-May 2024, groups of students from the universities of Lausanne, Geneva, Basel, Bern, Fribourg, and Zurich occupied individual university buildings and demanded that the rectors speak out against Israel’s military operation in the Gaza Strip and completely stop cooperating with Israeli universities. Pro-Palestinian and anti-Semitic slogans were heard during the protests. In most cases, university administrators called in the police to disperse the protesters.
On 12 February 2024, another anti-Semitic incident took place in the popular resort town of Davos. The Pisha restaurant and hotel complex, which rents out skiing equipment, posted a notice in Hebrew announcing that it would not rent out any sports equipment to people of Jewish origin “due to various unfortunate incidents, including stolen sleds”.[3684] Following intense criticism in the media, the notice was removed and the hotel management apologised. The cantonal police are currently investigating the incident in order to initiate criminal proceedings.
According to the head of the Swiss Federation of Jewish Communities, Jonathan Kreutner, this is not an isolated case of anti-Semitism in Davos. For example, in the summer of 2023, a local tourist agency suspended cooperation with Jews.[3685]
On 2 March 2024, a terrorist attack on an Orthodox Jew in the centre of Zurich caused a massive public outcry when the man was severely stabbed by a 15‑year‑old Swiss of Tunisian descent. Twenty-four hours later, the perpetrator was arrested. He was found to have openly called for a “worldwide fight against Jews” on social networks and expressed solidarity with the Islamic State terrorist organisation. He had not previously come to the attention of law enforcement.[3686]
In April 2022, the Swiss Federal Council decided to increase funding for the security of Jewish community institutions from CHF 500,000 to CHF 2.5 million per year starting in 2023. In December 2023, against the backdrop of the events in Israel and the subsequent wave of anti-Semitism, the Swiss Parliament approved an additional CHF 2.5 million increase in security funding for threatened minorities.[3687]
According to the annual report of the Federal Commission against Racism[3688], there were 876 cases of racial discrimination in Switzerland in 2023 (compared to 708 in 2022), including 387 cases of discrimination based on foreign origin, 327 cases against Black people, 69 cases against people of Arab origin, 62 cases against Muslims, and 46 cases against Jews. On average, the number of racist incidents increased by 19 per cent in 2023 compared to 2022. These incidents occurred mainly in education (181 cases) and in the workplace (124 cases).
Negative sentiments towards Muslims persist, with vandalism of cemeteries and offensive graffiti in mosques. According to a representative survey conducted in November 2023 by the research institute Sotomo, 44 per cent of the Swiss have a negative attitude towards Muslims.[3689]
Furthermore, some Islamic figures see the constitutional ban on the construction of new minarets, imposed following the referendum of 29 November 2009, as a violation of their community’s rights.
In 2023, the Swiss Parliament passed a law banning face coverings in public (51.21 per cent of the country’s population supported it in the 2021 referendum).[3690] Thus, burqas and niqabs, the traditional garments of Muslim women, were automatically banned and may now be worn only in places of religious worship. Naturally, this innovation caused dissatisfaction among people who profess Islam. For example, the Islamic Central Council of Switzerland stated that the result of the referendum had caused “deep disappointment among Muslims born and raised” in this country. For their part, a number of NGOs stated that the fundamental rights of the country’s religious minority had been violated.
The law has been criticised by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. At a press conference in 2021, the Office’s spokesperson Ravina Shamdasani stressed that the move was xenophobic and would further marginalise Muslim women in the country.[3691]
The main problem for the nomadic Roma peoples of the Yenish and Sinti/Manush remains the lack of areas to set up camps, which contributes significantly to the prejudice and hostility they face. Roma of non-Swiss origin are often not allowed to stop in certain areas at all. This reinforces xenophobic attitudes and leads to conflicts between different population groups.[3692]
There have also been cases of local residents demonstrating against the establishment of Roma camps. During their protests, the demonstrators use placards with expressions and images that insult and humiliate the dignity of this population group.
In October 2019, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights took note of discriminatory attitudes towards Roma. The experts of this UN expert mechanism expressed concern that the measures taken by the authorities are not sufficient to promote the traditions, culture, and languages of this people. There is also a lack of support for the education of children belonging to this minority.[3693]
The ACFCNM, for its part, noted the lack of influence of Yenish and Sinti/Manush organisations on political and legislative processes, particularly at the cantonal level, and regretted the absence of a permanent mechanism for consultation with national minorities at all levels of government to take into account their views on issues affecting them.
At the same time, Roma remain concerned that school curricula and teaching and learning materials contain very little information about the history of their people, including how they were affected by the tragedy of the Holocaust. The application lodged by the Roma community to be recognised as a national minority has been rejected.[3694]
According to ACFCNM experts, repeated instances of public expressions of hostility towards Yenish and Sinti/Manush, as well as towards members of the Jewish or Muslim community, clearly amount to hate speech. This phenomenon has reached particularly large proportions on social media. At the same time, immediate and public condemnation of such acts is not systematic.[3695]
According to the CERD, in addition to people of African descent, Yenish, Sinti/Manush, Roma, and non-citizens are also victims of violence inflicted by law enforcement officers. However, there remain few cases in which the courts have found in favour of the complainant, when it comes to prosecuting police officers who have committed such ill-treatment.[3696]
In response to persistent cases of racial profiling during police stops, a majority of the Zurich City Parliament approved an initiative in November 2022 requiring local police to issue receipts of stops to individuals upon request, to be verified by the local executive authorities.
At the same time, experts say that amendments to the Federal Act on the Use of DNA Profiles in Criminal Proceedings and for the Identification of Unknown and Missing Persons could further exacerbate racial profiling and the stigmatisation of persons on the basis of their race, skin colour, and ethnic origin. The amendments would allow the police to carry out DNA analysis of external features (DNA phenotyping) at crime scenes.[3697]
In January 2022, the UN Human Rights Council’s Working Group of Experts on People of African Descent paid an official visit to Switzerland. As part of its mission, the Working Group visited Bern, Zurich, Geneva, and Lausanne. Concluding the visit, the experts noted that people of African descent face systemic racial discrimination in a number of ways. The Group once again highlighted the issue of racial profiling and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. Such actions by the police, as the experts noted in their statement, only reinforce negative racial stereotypes in the public realm.[3698]
One of the most high-profile and appalling examples of the discriminatory attitude of the Swiss judiciary and penitentiary system towards people of African descent was the story of Brian Keller, a Swiss citizen of mixed Swiss-Cameroonian descent. He was first charged with arson in 2005 at the age of ten. At the time, he was interrogated by the Zurich police and detained in a closed facility for about a month.[3699]
As was later discovered, the accusations against the child turned out to be false. However, the result of this traumatic experience was that the following year Keller embarked on a life of crime, for which he was repeatedly sentenced to prison or compulsory psychiatric treatment. At the age of 12, he was placed in solitary confinement for the first time. He was subsequently handcuffed to gurneys, forced to sleep on a concrete floor and forcibly injected with medical drugs.
In 2011, while in pre-trial detention, he attempted suicide twice. By 2021, when Keller’s case first came to the attention of the then Special Rapporteur of the UN Human Rights Council on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Nils Meltzer, the Swiss citizen had spent more than half his life in penitentiary institutions and had been in solitary confinement for three years. At the time, the Special Rapporteur was forced to conclude that the Swiss Confederation was in breach of the relevant Convention against Torture[3700] and demanded that the country’s official authorities immediately stop keeping their citizen in isolation.[3701]
In May 2024, Keller was arrested again in Zurich and remanded in custody on suspicion of attempted grievous bodily harm.[3702] However, he was released from custody in July, and the criminal case against him remains open (as of July 2024).[3703]
The fact that there is no centralised arrangement for providing training to justice system personnel on racial profiling and, where it does take place, the voluntary nature of the training is not conducive to improving the situation. Police training, including specific anti-discrimination training, is also insufficient to effectively eradicate racial profiling.[3704]
In February 2024, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) ruled on an appeal by Mohamed Wa Baile against racial profiling during a police identity check at Zürich Hauptbahnhof railway station in 2015. The Court found that three provisions of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms had been violated, both during the identity check and in subsequent proceedings in the case: the prohibition of discrimination, the right to respect for private and family life, and the right to an effective remedy.[3705]
In addition to prejudicial and often intolerant attitudes towards members of certain ethnic groups, regardless of their nationality, there is also discrimination against foreigners in Switzerland, which manifests itself in various ways. In particular, CERD has provided information about acts of violence against asylum-seekers, including children, by security personnel in federal centres designed to accommodate this vulnerable category of persons.
Unaccompanied migrant children are regularly denied admission to school, despite the state-guaranteed right to free primary education.[3706]
In December 2019, the Council of Europe’s European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) noted the uncertainty faced by rejected asylum seekers who cannot be expelled from the country after 140 days from the date of their application. They are not permitted to work and are forced to live for long periods in emergency shelters before a solution is found. According to one of the recommendations made by ECRI, migrants who cannot be returned to their country of origin after six years (or even less) should be granted regular residence status in the Confederation.[3707]
Nevertheless, in its 2022 interim follow-up to Switzerland’s previous recommendations, ECRI concluded that the Swiss authorities had not taken any steps to remedy the situation in the several years since the publication of the report. Meanwhile, the government’s refusal to regularise the status of such persons means that migrants are forced to remain dependent on emergency assistance for an indefinite period of time. At the same time, their living conditions deteriorate to such an extent that, according to ECRI, neither further integration nor return to their country is possible.[3708]
During World War II, Sweden formally maintained a neutral status, yet it made significant concessions to Nazi Germany in terms of providing resource support and territory for the transit of Hitler's troops to the Eastern Front.
Currently, it has become a well-established practice in Sweden to use the term "occupation" when referring to the fact of Soviet troops entering the Baltic States and Eastern Europe, to highlight the expansionist nature of the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939‑1940, and to identify both Nazism and Communism with "totalitarian regimes". The Soviet Union's decisive contribution to the victory over Nazism is deliberately downplayed, while the role of the USSR's allies led by the United States is, by contrast, emphasized.
Double standards are also demonstrated with regard to Nazi collaborators. The Swedish authorities have not initiated any investigations into the 270 Swedes who fought in the Waffen-SS, many of whom, according to recent research, were involved in the Holocaust. The Swedish legislation does not allow for the prosecution of World War II criminals who found refuge in the country, including those of Swedish origin.
Double standards are also evident in Sweden's approach to contemporary manifestations of neo-Nazism and racism. The Swedish authorities adopt a very ambiguous position with regard to condemning the glorification of Nazism in the Baltic States. Official Stockholm has publicly repented for the extradition in 1945 to the USSR of a group of Latvians, Lithuanians and Estonians who had fought on the side of Nazi Germany, and now condones radical statements falsifying the Second World War by the current authorities of these states. Cases of the glorification of Nazism, acts of vandalism and the dismantling of monuments to Soviet soldiers-liberators in a number of European countries (primarily Poland, the Baltic States, Ukraine and the Czech Republic) also remain unheeded by the Swedish authorities and are not covered in any noticeable way by the Swedish media.
Similar condoning approaches are applied to neo-Nazi manifestations in Ukraine, where more than 30 Swedish ultra-right activists arrived freely in 2014‑2016 to participate in combat operations as part of the nationalist battalions Azov and Aidar during the so-called Anti-Terrorist Operation in Donbass. During the current crisis in Ukraine, the Swedish authorities are also keeping silent about the Nazi nature of the Kiev regime and the crimes committed by Ukrainian radical nationalists. Swedish mercenaries participating in the Ukrainian nationalist battalions (at least 400 persons) are being referred to as employees of humanitarian organizations.
Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that in 2022‑2023 Stockholm, consistently acting along the EU lines, voted against the Russian UN General Assembly resolution "Combating the glorification of Nazism, neo-Nazism and other practices that contribute to fuelling contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance" (previously, following the EU Member States, it abstained from voting on this initiative condemning neo-Nazism and other contemporary manifestations of racism).
At the same time, Swedish municipal authorities conscientiously take care of the Soviet military burial sites located on their territories. Thanks to the efforts of Swedish activists, for example, research has been conducted to determine the fate of Soviet servicemen interned in the Byringe camp (Södermanland).
Nevertheless, there are cases of desecration of memorials in honour of Soviet soldiers in Sweden. One such act of vandalism took place in September 2023 when unknown vandals desecrated a memorial stone to Soviet soldiers in the Karlsvik district, covering its front side with the inscription "Glory to Ukraine" in blue paint. The memorial stone was restored with the assistance of the municipal authorities.
Right-wing radical and neo-Nazi movements remain active in Sweden.
The primary source and the main promoter of right-wing extremist ideology in Swedish society is the far-right organization Nordic Resistance Movement (Nordiska motståndsrörelsen, NRM), which has about 200‑300 active members (NGOs cite a larger number) and stretches its influence to the neighbouring countries of Norway and Finland. The NRM operates on the territory of Sweden absolutely legally and has "non-party" supporters. In particular, open sympathies for neo-Nazis and even membership in this organization in the past are attributed to the representatives of the country's main anti-migrant parliamentary party, the Sweden Democrats (SD). During the 2022 elections, it came second with 20.6 percent of the vote (the party's best result), thus outpacing other more popular Swedish right-wing parties.[3709]
NRM traces its origins to the Swedish Resistance Movement founded in 1997 as a merger of a number of right-wing extremist organizations active in the second half of the 20th century. In 2015, it changed its name to the NRM, having brought together four Northern European branches – Swedish, Norwegian, Danish and Finnish. Sweden remains the centre of the NRM, hosting its headquarters (Grängesberg, Dalarna province) and the majority of its members. Since the same year, the organization has been headed by S. Lindberg.
The NRM chose as its symbol the Tiwaz rune (or the rune of Thor), which was used by Nazi structures, including the Hitler Youth organization (Hitlerjugend). This is not the only borrowing from Nazi Germany. There is also information that at regular trainings and educational seminars organized for NRM members, films glorifying Adolf Hitler are shown and the works of the "classics" of fascism are promoted.
Experts note that in 2014-2019 the NRM pursued a strategy of maximum expansion. Presumably, since 2019 it has shifted its focus to building a strong group of active members who can effectively manage the organization.
It is reported that the NRM has its own publishing house, Nationellt Motstånd (National Resistance), which publishes propaganda literature, as well as a newspaper bearing the same name.
In a report by the international NGO Anti-Defamation League published in May 2022, three distinctive features of the NRM are noted: (1) a fanatical Nazi ideology verging on a cult, combined with the proclaimed goal of revolution by any means; (2) a marked emphasis on violence and violent methods of achieving goals, which is also complemented by a paramilitary bias in the organization; and (3) a rigid hierarchy as well as an established bureaucratic organizational structure that serves to maintain the cohesion of the organization even after the movement has spread throughout Scandinavia.[3710]
The centrepiece of the NRM ideology is antisemitism. The organization also consistently attracts new members supporting the theory of white supremacy to its ranks. According to experts, the movement will continue to maintain this mindset, using antisemitic rhetoric as a "key theory" that can explain every other branch of the far-right extremist thinking. The NGO Anti-Defamation League points out that the NRM "seeks to stage a revolution to replace democratic governments with a Nazi dictatorship, covering Scandinavia and the Nordic region."
According to Sharon Nazarian, Senior Vice President in International Affairs of the Anti-Defamation League, "what is particularly disturbing about the Northern Resistance Movement is its obsession with violence and its dominant antisemitic beliefs. In preparation for the "overthrow of European democracies", the NRM members conduct hundreds of combat training sessions where they teach their supporters paramilitary tactics for street battles and clashes with police."[3711]
According to the Swedish Security Service, the NRM has the potential for terrorist activities and could also be plotting to commit crimes against the country's constitutional order. There is evidence that more than half of the NRM members have previous criminal convictions (some of them repeated ones), including for murder and attempted murder, violence, theft, incitement to hatred against certain population groups, vandalism of places of worship, and violations of anti-drug laws.
In June 2024, the United States recognized the NRM as a terrorist organization, which is the second such case of recognition with regard to white supremacy movements. This was due to the NRM's growing ties with American right-wing radicals, as well as the actions of the movement's activists to incite violence on the Internet.[3712]
Law enforcement agencies also highlight the fusion of the country's neo-Nazi community with organized crime.[3713] In November 2021, police arrested a 25‑year‑old NRM supporter on a farm near Gothenburg. A stockpile of homemade bombs, semi-automatic weapons and weapon parts made on a 3D printer, as well as a huge amount of ammunition, were found in his house. The detainee was active in chat rooms of neo-Nazi forums, and was interested in organizing mass shootings in schools, among other things. [3714]
Since the second half of the 2010s, other neo-Nazi movements have also become active in the country. Most popular online platforms include Mutgift (this former information resource of the nationalist "Party of the Swedes" is believed to consolidate the country's nationalists), Det fria Sværje, Ingrid ok Karlqvist, the Swedish Nationalist Youth movement, and Soldiers of Odin. These resources and movements were particularly popular in 2015‑2016; by now their activity has declined.[3715]
Neo-Nazis actively initiate campaigns aimed at inciting interethnic and interreligious discord (on average, they organize about three thousand actions annually in the country, often in conjunction with Holocaust memorial ceremonies, May Day demonstrations, pacifist and anti-fascist rallies).
In most cases, these are usually isolated statements or actions of individuals preaching ultra-right-wing ideology. Many of them have been prosecuted. Thus, on 5 November 2019, a case was brought against two students from Skara municipality (Västra Götaland, South-western Sweden) after their statements insulting Jews and welcoming A. Hitler.[3716] On 27 November 2019, a trial was held in Malmö against an NRM member T. Malvo over charges of antisemitism, racial hatred and glorification of Hitler (he was sentenced to probation and a monetary fine).[3717] On 9 March 2020, another NRM member, A. Jönsson, was sentenced to six months' imprisonment for numerous antisemitic calls and honouring Hitler.[3718]
On 9 April 2020, a criminal case was initiated against a 60‑year‑old woman who repeatedly expressed hatred against migrants and welcomed Hitler.[3719]
In recent years, police have in most cases authorized neo-Nazis to hold demonstrations, bringing the troublemakers to justice only retroactively.
The provocative burning of the Qur'an in front of the Turkish Embassy in Stockholm in January 2023 by R. Paludan, leader of the neo-Nazi party "Hard Course" of Swedish-Danish origin, caused a wide public response.[3720] Such extremist acts also led to a crisis in Sweden's relations with the Islamic world. The foreign policy ministries of a number of Muslim countries strongly protested to Sweden. On 31 July 2023, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation held an extraordinary meeting in response to the incidents. After that, the Swedish police prohibited holding similar actions.[3721] It is noteworthy that the ban only applies to the desecration of the holy book of Islam.
It should be noted that there have been cases in the country in the past when migrants organized protests, including quite aggressive ones, in response to insulting attitudes towards Islam. For example, in August 2020, a Qur'an-burning action organized by nationalists provoked protests in Malmö, which soon turned into aggressive clashes with the police. After about seven hours of protests, accompanied by the burning of cars and stores, the police managed to bring the situation under control. Several persons were detained.[3722]
The statistics of hate crimes is alarming (6‑7 thousand cases per year). About 70 percent of them have xenophobic and racist overtones. Most of the risks come from right-wing extremists driven by neo-Nazi and anti-migrant sentiments, as well as radical Islamists. Accordingly, the most frequent victims of racially motivated hate crimes are ethnic minorities professing Islam, especially those originating from Africa. At the same time, the practice of investigating such cases shows that the offender faces real punishment for such offenses only in 3‑5 percent of cases.[3723]
The situation is aggravated by the fact that Sweden has no legal ban on the activities of racist organizations under the pretext of the need to fully respect fundamental freedoms. Despite calls from the majority of Swedish political parties, work to introduce such a ban has been delayed. For example, in 2017, the government announced the start of work to introduce a ban on the use of Nazi symbols (including the NRM emblem, the rune of Thor), but no concrete results have been achieved.
There are cases of compiling registers of citizens on the basis of nationality, ethnicity and gender (although such registration is prohibited by law in the country). The UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) expressed concern in May 2018 about frequent cases of racial profiling by police of all vulnerable groups, particularly persons of African descent, Muslims and Roma.[3724]
In January 2019, Swedish TV4's investigative journalism programme Kalla Fakta highlighted the fact that in recent months there have been around 100 cases of unjustified police detentions of citizens of a non‑Swedish appearance. In 2021, the UN Committee against Torture (CAT) highlighted with concern the persistence of ill-treatment and excessive use of force by police officials in Sweden.[3725]
Despite the fact that back in 2015 Swedish police established the Department of Special Investigations as an independent body with the mandate to gather information in cases of allegations of ill-treatment and excessive use of force by police officials, human rights activists continue to express doubts that its activities are truly impartial. This was highlighted in particular by the UN Committee against Torture in December 2021.[3726] Similar concerns were expressed by the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) in its 2022 report.
The FRA also noted in its 2019 report that interviews with police officers and individuals who have been subjected to ethnic profiling showed that 24 percent of all respondents of African descent had been stopped by police. Among these, four in 10 (41 percent) characterized such incidents as racial profiling. Men of African descent are three times more likely to be stopped by police (22 percent) than women (seven percent).[3727]
Members of the International Independent Expert Mechanism to advance racial justice in the context of law enforcement, following their visit to Sweden in early November 2022, called on Stockholm to step up efforts to fight systemic racism and focus on strategies to restore trust between police and minority groups. They also expressed concern that the Swedish authorities may be addressing security challenges, including growing gang criminality, through a response which focuses on over policing, surveillance, and undue deprivation of liberty.[3728]
The 2023 FRA report once again highlighted manifestations of systemic racism in Sweden. In particular, these trends were demonstrated by a labour market study. For example, the risk of being bullied for foreign-born workers is almost four times higher in Sweden than for natives. Moreover, male applicants with foreign-sounding names are significantly more disadvantaged than female applicants with foreign-sounding names.[3729]
International human rights monitoring bodies and mechanisms regularly draw attention to persistent manifestations of hatred in Sweden. CERD has expressed concern about the existence of racist and extremist organizations and their public demonstrations, as well as the dissemination of hate speech in the country, including during election campaigns and in the media, and has particularly emphasized that the State continues to allow the formation of organizations that promote and incite racial hatred.[3730]
Similar concerns about Sweden's record of hate speech against Afro-Swedes, Jews, Muslims and Roma, particularly during election campaigns, as well as in the media and on the Internet, and the persistence of racially motivated violence in the country were raised by the Committee Against Torture (CAT) in November 2014,[3731] the Human Rights Committee (HRC) in March 2016 (with the Committee reiterating its previous concerns in this regard),[3732] and the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (CESCR) in June 2016.[3733] It is noteworthy that, despite the explanations provided by Sweden to the HRC on the situation against racism, the experts still have concerns about this issue.[3734] The UN Committee against Torture also expressed its concern by remaining threats to minorities and marginalized individuals in the Swedish society despite measures taken to combat hate crime and racism, and police measures to protect religious buildings and communities. CAT called on Stockholm to make efforts to prevent and prosecute criminal acts motivated by discrimination, intolerance, hatred or negative stereotypes and to conduct effective investigations in order to prosecute and punish those responsible.[3735]
In its report on Sweden, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) within the Council of Europe also highlighted an increase in racist and xenophobic hate speech targeted at migrants, Muslims, people of African descent and Roma. The commission found the law enforcement response to such cases insufficient and the number of prosecutions for hate crimes low. According to ECRI, the number of registered cases of defamation and the expression of racially motivated prejudices remains at the same level (643 in 2011 and 635 in 2015). However, the number of cases related to threats increased by 20 percent (1,650 in 2011 and 1,972 in 2015), agitation against certain groups increased by 39 percent (396 in 2011 and 552 in 2015), and infliction of damage/graffiti increased by 138 percent (296 in 2011 and 703 in 2015).[3736]
In February 2021, the European Commission launched a procedure against Sweden due to the fact that its legislation does not fully or accurately comply with EU standards on the prosecution of racist and xenophobic incidents.
In its 2022 report, the EU Agency for Fundamental Human Rights noted that racism in Sweden was manifested in all public institutions. As evidence, a research based on the survey of over 500 scientific articles, books, chapters of studies and academic reports published in Sweden from January 2016 to May 2021 was used. In addition, in 2021 the European Commission pointed out that Swedish national laws did not fully or accurately incorporate EU rules on combating racism and xenophobia and initiated relevant infringement proceedings against Stockholm.[3737]
In its 2023 report, FRA found that Sweden was among the 12 EU Member States that had not incorporated into national law – fully and correctly – the provisions of the 2008 EU Framework Decision on Combating Racism and Xenophobia.[3738]
In 2024, the CESCR, having noted the Swedish authorities' steps to revise the Discrimination Act to the possible inclusion of acts of public officials, such as stop-and-search activities by police officers, pointed out the ineffectiveness of Stockholm in combating discrimination and the unreliable statistics on such offences. The Committee remains concerned about the closed list of prohibited grounds of discrimination contained in the Discrimination Act. The Committee is also concerned about the reported incidents of hate crime and discrimination, based on disability, race, ethnicity and religion, including Islamophobia. It is further concerned that victims of discrimination and harassment face barriers in seeking effective remedies. The Swedish authorities were recommended to improve their data collection system, including through the use of proxy indicators, such as mother tongue, in order to produce reliable data disaggregated by prohibited grounds of discrimination and to identify those groups that are disadvantaged. The experts also requested Stockholm to provide information on the new legislation to combat organized crime and gang-related violence, including information on measures adopted to prevent racial profiling and racially motivated police violence. Another recommendation in this area was the need to ensure that effective judicial remedies and accessible legal aid, in addition to administrative remedies, are available to victims of harassment, hate crimes and discrimination.[3739]
In addition to the aforementioned issues, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination noted in 2018 a significant difference between the number of reported cases of hate speech and hate crimes and the number of their investigations and criminal prosecutions of offenders. According to the Committee, the most frequent victims of racially motivated hate crimes are ethnic minorities, especially those from Africa. The Committee called on the Swedish authorities to effectively identify, register and investigate cases of racist hate speech, incitement to racial hatred and racially motivated violence and to bring those responsible to justice. Stockholm was also recommended to publicly condemn and distance itself from racist hate speech and xenophobic statements of government officials and politicians, including publications in the electronic media. CERD called on the Swedish authorities to expend the example of national contact points and special hate crime groups throughout the country.[3740]
In the report, following a visit to Sweden, at the 55th HRC session, the Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Human Rights Council on freedom of religion or belief, Nazila Ghanea, pointed out that discrimination was a widespread and complex societal problem. Referring to numerous surveys and perception studies, she noted that ethnicity (which often overlaps with religion or belief in Sweden) was the second most common ground for perceived discrimination after that of sex. "Of the actual complaints filed with the Equality Ombudsman, ethnicity is also the second most common ground for discrimination, after disability", she said.[3741]
Human rights activists point out that there are "dark spots" in keeping statistics on hate crimes, as many victims do not turn to law enforcement for lack of funds to finance trials, or simply fearing "revenge" from their persecutors.
One of the most vulnerable national groups in Sweden is the Jewish community. Its representatives complain that they often face manifestations of aggression from opponents of Israel's policy, whose activity is growing against the background of the pro-Palestinian line of Sweden, the first in the EU to officially recognize the independence of Palestine, and also criticize the local authorities for not paying enough attention to the problem of antisemitism. In 2018, a wave of antisemitic protests and demonstrations swept across Sweden as a result of US President Donald Trump's unilateral decision on the status of Jerusalem. Due to the incessant threats, the Jewish community of Umeå (north-eastern Sweden) was dissolved in the same year.
Often antisemitic actions are organized by radical nationalists.
Such campaigns are regularly carried out by the NRM nationalist radical organization not only in Sweden, but also in other Nordic countries. Thus, actions organized in October 2020 in nearly 20 different cities in Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and Iceland included demonstrations in front of synagogues, placing antisemitic posters in public places, and distributing relevant leaflets. Neo-Nazis publish information about this on their websites. The actions of the neo-Nazis caused indignation of international Jewish organizations. Ronald Lauder, president of the World Jewish Congress, condemned the coordinated brutal campaign of hatred against Jews in northern Europe, unleashed by the modern successors of the NRM Nazis. The Simon Wiesenthal Center Director for International Relations Shimon Samuels also sent a letter of concern to the Swedish leadership, urging Stockholm to follow Finland's example of banning the NRM in September 2020, and to take action against the organizers of the antisemitic campaign.[3742]
In July 2019, in Visby, in the south of the country, NRM activists blocked the entrance to an exhibition on Holocaust survivors organized by the Raoul Wallenberg Institute together with photographer Sanna Sjösvärd, and then entered the grounds, where they chanted antisemitic slogans. Arrived at the scene of the incident, the police did not detain the radicals, who left the building unhindered.[3743]
At the end of March 2021, baby dolls sprayed with red paint were hung outside the synagogue in Norrköping along with a banner describing the Pesach as the Jewish celebration of the death of Egyptian children. The NRM published on its website a photo of this installation. Swedish police have opened an investigation into a suspected hate crime.[3744]
According to Haaretz, in 2021 Sweden recorded an increase in online hate speech, especially in social media. The spread of antisemitic rhetoric in social media is most noted among schoolchildren and young people. This resulted in acts of aggression with antisemitic overtones against children of Jewish origin. To a large extent such manifestations occur in Malmö.[3745]
A new round of antisemitic manifestations began in Sweden in connection with another aggravation of the situation in the Middle East in October 2023. This "wave" intensified the already harsh political criticism of Israel. Thus, on 4 November 2023 in Malmö, pro-Palestinian activists shouting calls to bomb Israel burned the flag of this Middle Eastern country in front of the local synagogue.
The problem of antisemitism in Sweden has been addressed by many international universal and regional human rights bodies. The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) pointed to an increase in the number of antisemitic statements. In particular, the Commission noted a doubled number of cases prosecuted for antisemitic propaganda, from 54 in 2011 to 102 in 2015, and threats against Jews, from 77 to 127 over the same period. However, according to ECRI estimates, these figures can be significantly higher, as representatives of the Jewish community do not always contact the police, doubting the effectiveness of law enforcement.[3746]
In its second monitoring study on antisemitism (2018) the FRA included Sweden in the top three European countries (along with the United Kingdom and Germany) with the tensest situation for Jews, indicating that 82 percent of representatives of this nationality in the country characterize antisemitism as a "serious problem"[3747] (for comparison in 2013 – 60 percent of respondents chose this answer).
In the third survey on antisemitism (2023), the FRA noted that 81 percent of respondents in Sweden had indicated that the problem of antisemitism persisted. The level of those who consider manifestations of aggression towards Jews in public places to be a serious problem is also quite high in the country (62 percent). At the same time, Sweden had the highest percentage of those who had experienced antisemitism in the 12 months before the survey – 99 percent. For this report, it is of great significance that the FRA survey identifies the image of the swastika as one of the most frequent antisemitic symbols in Sweden (as indeed for most other countries). The percentage of those who have encountered a negative stereotype "accusing Jews of holding power" in the country is very high – 92 percent. Accordingly, Sweden was among the four EU countries with the highest number of respondents (more than 80 percent) who at least on occasion avoid wearing in public things that would make them recognisable as Jews; 53 percent of respondents do so because they are concerned for their safety. Moreover, the FRA survey revealed that the number of police reports of hate crimes against Jews had increased by more than 400 percent between 7 October and 31 December 2023, a Swedish Central Council of Jews report shows. Higher proportions of Jews in Sweden (49 percent) considered emigration for various reasons, inter alia, because of fears for safety and security (one of the highest shares in the EU – 39 percent) and limitations on practising their religious traditions (45 percent).[3748]
The FRA's data on the crimes with an antisemitic motive recorded by Swedish law enforcement agencies are significant. In 2020, 170 incidents were reported. A great difference of data for 2018 – 287 incidents – is explained by changes in data collection methodology in 2020.[3749]
The ever-growing Muslim community in the country also faces discrimination. Hidden Islamophobia is a very common phenomenon in the media and in various spheres of public life (especially access to work and social services), which shows the shortcomings of the State that carefully hides this problem.
Violence against Muslims, especially Muslim women in traditional dress, is not uncommon. According to ECRI, the number of cases of Islamophobic threats/attacks doubled between 2011 and 2015 (123 and 247 cases, respectively), Islamophobic defamation increased from 38 to 68 cases, damage from 16 to 76 cases (375 percent, and anti-Muslim propaganda from 45 to 102 cases (127 percent).[3750]
Of special concern is the situation in Malmö (south of Sweden) – the third largest city in the country which is home to a considerable portion of Muslim refugees as well as to the third largest Jewish community in Sweden. In view of this, right-wing extremist movements have been traditionally strong in the city.
The Human Rights Committee and the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination drew attention to the problems of discrimination based on religion in March 2016 and in May 2018 respectively, and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in March 2024; in particular, the HRC expressed concern about a large number of episodes of religious intolerance in Sweden, including physical violence against persons belonging to religious minorities, in particular Muslims and Jews, and attacks on their places of worship, and the fact that law enforcement agencies did not register all such cases.[3751] CERD is equally concerned about reports of the difficulties faced by Swedish Muslims, in particular people of African descent, in accessing employment and housing outside their areas of compact settlement, amounting to de facto segregation. Besides, their economic segregation and difficulty accessing health care and education were noted. CERD experts are concerned about reports of attacks against mosques, as well as about the lack of sufficient funding to safeguard mosques against attacks. The Committee is also concerned about reports of stereotypical (read as negative) representation of Muslims in the media and by politicians.[3752] CESCR, expressing concerns about the reported incidents of hate crime and discrimination in Sweden, separately listed Islamophobia as a qualifying characteristic, indicating the scale of the problem. CESCR also underlined the importance of combating Islamophobia while recommending the Swedish authorities to ensure that effective judicial remedies and accessible legal aid are available to victims of this hate crime. The Committee is also concerned that persons with a migrant background, in particular persons of African descent and those perceived to be Muslim or of Middle Eastern descent, as well as persons with disabilities and the Roma, continue to be disproportionately affected by discrimination in the labour market.[3753]
In the context of religious communities protection CERD raised the issue of the selectivity of the Swedish law enforcement agencies' response to racist offenses.[3754] According to experts, the Law on Combating Terrorism (which is also seriously criticized by human rights defenders for violations of citizens' rights) is aimed mainly at the persecution of Muslims, while crimes committed by other groups, including neo-Nazi structures, are not considered by Swedish law enforcement agencies as terrorist acts. Concerns over such practice of stigmatizing persons of foreign origin or those belonging to ethnic and religious minorities were also voiced by the Human Rights Committee.[3755]
Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Human Rights Council on freedom of religion or belief, Nazila Ghanea, paid an official visit to Sweden from 11 to 20 October 2023. Following the visit, she issued a statement[3756] calling on the Swedish authorities to be vigilant against manifestations of religious intolerance as well as discrimination in society in the context of the worrying recurrence of Koran burnings. It also noted that social persecution, discrimination and threats should not be concealed and that freedom of both faith and belief in general and its manifestations should be better understood and protected under Swedish law. According to the Special Rapporteur, this could be facilitated by incorporating the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights into local legislation. At the same time, Nazila Ghanea noted that United Nations standards and human rights norms in general are rarely mentioned in Swedish legal proceedings and political narrative. She called for their more active application. Another shortcoming noted by the HRC Special Rapporteur was the irregular, undetailed and generally insufficient data collection on problematic subjects by the Swedish authorities.[3757]
In her report, following the visit, at the 55th session of the UN Human Rights Council, the Special Rapporteur noted that members of religious minorities reported experiencing hostility, whether in relation to religious practices, public manifestations of religion, or highly negative stereotypes, for example of Muslims, who are often associated with terrorism and with discrimination against women. Numerous surveys and perception studies show perceived discrimination by the police of persons belonging to religious minorities, in particular Muslims.[3758]
The situation of Swedish Roma, who suffer from deep-rooted prejudices, leaves much to be desired. There are multiple reports of cases of discrimination against members of this minority in public places (in cafes, shops, hotels, hospitals, transport, etc.), labour and housing markets. Biased decisions on depriving Roma people of their parental rights and baseless denial of access to education are quite common. According to the FRA, as of 2019, 20 percent of Roma children experienced hunger.[3759]
The Human Rights Council in March 2016[3760], the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in June 2016[3761] and March 2024,[3762] and CERD in May 2018[3763] pointed out the systemic discrimination of Roma in Swedish society, the difficulties of representatives of this people, including citizens of other European Union countries from among the Roma, in obtaining education, employment and health care, housing and basic social services, and access to justice. CERD and CESCR also expressed concern about the increasing number of cases of forced evictions of certain groups of Roma living in informal settlements, as well as the fact that hate crimes continue to be committed against them.
According to the research on the situation of Roma conducted by the FRA in 2019 in five Western European countries (Belgium, France, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden) and the UK, every second representative of this national minority faced discrimination in the year preceding the survey, 44 percent of respondents faced manifestations of aggression motivated by racial hatred, and one in ten respondents was profiled by the police.[3764]
In Sweden, the situation of migrants or their descendants in the second generation, mainly of African or Asian origin, is also very unfavourable. This category of the population has a lower level of education than the national average, and unemployment, especially among young people, is higher. Segregation is observed in opportunities of learning the Swedish language and, subsequently, in access to educational institutions and the labour market. According to the ECRI, this leads to the development of "parallel societies", which, in turn, further hinders the integration of immigrants and their children.[3765] Afro-Swedes tend to have low-status and low-paid jobs compared to the rest of the population, despite their level of education. It is more difficult for this category of population than other citizens of Sweden to move up the career ladder.[3766]
According to the research, people of African and Asian origin more often face unemployment.[3767] Besides, sociological studies have revealed that the risk of being bullied for foreign-born workers is almost four times higher than for natives.[3768]
Since 2015, violations against refugees have increased due to the worsening migration crisis. Many migrants, waiting for their asylum applications to be processed for a long time, are housed in ultra-compact concentrations in isolated "ghetto areas", being cut off from education and health systems, as well as from integration and employment opportunities. The Swedes have also been criticized for the persistence of severe restrictions in national migration policy, despite a decrease in the intensity of refugee flows in 2017‑2018.
International human rights organizations have criticized Sweden for "extraordinary" legal provisions that make family reunification difficult, the "inhumane" practice of undifferentiated expulsion of Afghans (even if there are threats to their safety at home), the deteriorating mental state of unaccompanied children and adolescents (apathy and suicide attempts due to long waiting for asylum decisions), refugee trafficking (sexual, labour and criminal exploitation, slavery).
The practice of withdrawing protection status from asylum seekers has also been criticized. According to the FRA, Sweden had the second highest number of withdrawals of refugee status after Germany in 2021 (1,349 and 3,690 cases respectively).[3769]
The practice of Swedish law enforcement agencies of forcibly removing migrants and asylum seekers and detaining them before doing so was highlighted by the Committee against Torture in November 2014[3770] and December 2021[3771], the Human Rights Committee in March 2016[3772], and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in June 2016[3773]. Despite further information provided by the Swedish authorities to the HRC on this issue, experts remained concerned about the situation.[3774] In March 2018, Nils Muižnieks, then Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, pointed out Sweden's overly strict legal provisions making family reunification difficult, the "inhumane" practice of undifferentiated expulsion of refugees (that is, even when their safety at home is threatened); long periods of unaccompanied children and young people in detention, which worsen the mental health of new arrivals; and human trafficking.
In 2021, the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities ruled on an individual complaint, stating that expulsion of a person of Afghan origin back to Afghanistan, despite existing threats to his life, violates Sweden's obligations under the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.
In 2023, the Committee on the Rights of the Child was deeply concerned about the impact of the amendments in 2021 to the Aliens Act (2005) restricting family reunification and eligibility for permanent residence permits and social security. The Committee recommended the Swedish authorities to prevent the detention of children on the basis of their or their parents' migration status, and pointed out the disparities in access to quality education and discrimination, harassment and bullying in schools primarily faced by migrant children and children from socioeconomically disadvantaged families.[3775]
The FRA, with reference to the corresponding sociological studies, confirms that there is a discriminatory treatment of parents of foreign origin by Swedish school authorities and personnel. According to one of such studies published in 2022, when a total of 3,430 Swedish elementary school principals were contacted by sociologists who pretended to be parents with Arabic- or Swedish-sounding names or with low- or high‑SES professions. The results show clear signs of discrimination, particularly in regard to ethnic minority aliases.[3776]
Local Christians, including representatives of the Russian Orthodox community, who are sometimes forced to avoid advertising their religious symbols, have been feeling uneasy against this background lately.
In July 2023, the newspaper "Dagens Nyheter" published the results of a shocking investigation into the disastrous working conditions of migrant workers in Swedish berry plantations. Thus, berry pickers from Thailand, who became victims of unscrupulous employers, were actually engaged in slave labour: 12‑hour working day in conditions of increased physical strain, extremely low wages or none at all, an extensive system of fines, total unsanitary living conditions (usually in barrack-type houses), denial of medical care, etc. It is worth noting that the problem of violation of the rights of berry pickers in Sweden is systemic. Russian citizens have also suffered from the actions of unscrupulous Swedish entrepreneurs in different years.
This story is a good example of a general tendency of labour discrimination of migrants in Sweden that was noted by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in March 2024. Furthermore, the Committee is concerned about the growing problem of labour exploitation, which largely affects migrant workers and asylum-seekers working in sectors such as construction, agriculture and cleaning. Moreover, the Committee is concerned about reports of rising poverty, particularly among disadvantaged and marginalized groups, including single older women and immigrants who have relatively recently arrived in Sweden. The Committee is also concerned about the disproportionately high rates of poverty faced by residents of foreign descent.[3777]
Since the start of Russia's special military operation to demilitarize and denationalize Ukraine and protect civilians in Donbass, violations of the rights of Russian compatriots living in Sweden have increased (unless 20,000 people).
The media and social networks strongly promoted the thesis that Russian citizens and compatriots should publicly distance themselves from the policy of Russian President Vladimir Putin in Ukraine. Dissenters have received various threats, from dismissal from their jobs to physical violence. Russian speaking children were subjected to bullying in Swedish schools.
Not only have there been cases of discrimination against our citizens by the Swedish authorities or an extremely Russophobic atmosphere in the local media, but also beatings for speaking in Russian, dismissals from a job without explanation and bullying of children. Traditionally, the attitude of the Social Service remains predatory, as migrant families are a priori classified as socially disadvantaged and as a result are put "under control" by the local competent authorities. There is also a social stigmatization of managers and employees of small and medium-sized enterprises and NGOs connected to Russia.
There have been cases of temporary removal of children from Russian citizens by social authorities on the basis of the law on forced custody of minors. In September 2023, V. Babushin, archpriest of the Sergiev parish in Stockholm, was forced to leave Sweden because of threats by social services to remove his minor children from him.
One of the first victims of Sweden's caveman Russophobia has been the Russian-language children's educational centres. In fact, they were held hostage to the attitude of their leaders to the events that were taking place: everyone was required to publicly dissociate themselves from the actions of the Russian armed forces and, even better, to condemn Russian President Vladimir Putin personally. In addition, virtually all Russian-speaking children in schools were subjected to ethnically motivated violence and harassment. Swedish teenagers, "freely expressing their opinion in a free country", simply humiliated Russian-speaking children, demanding their expulsion, in the worst case, they were beaten up. Children not only from Russia, but also from other former Soviet republics were harassed. Attempts by parents to appeal to the management of educational institutions to prevent harassment have not always resulted in a resolution of the situation.
It is noteworthy that in March 2024, during its consideration of Sweden's progress report, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights noted with concern the reports of increasing harassment and hate speech in Swedish schools. In the light of this information, the Committee regrets the lack of clarity on the remedial measures available to students and their parents, by way of the Equality Ombudsman, the Schools Inspectorate, the courts or other recourse mechanisms. The Committee also regrets the lack of specific information provided on the mandate of the Schools Inspectorate, particularly with respect to the enforcement of the requirement that education providers prevent and identify discrimination and harassment. Also more broadly, CESCR expressed concern about the growing socioeconomic stratification of schools, disparities in students' performance and discrimination in access to education, based, in particular, on the grounds of gender, race, ethnicity, religion, disability status and national origin. Besides, the Committee is concerned that scientific progress and its applications, including information and communications technologies, are not accessible in the languages spoken and used by the national minorities residing in its territory.[3778] Moreover, in 2023, the Committee on the Rights of the Child pointed out racist and xenophobic activities among children.[3779]
The activities of compatriots' organizations are seriously hampered. Swedish authorities on the pretext of "undemocratic" activity of the associations such as the Union of Russian Associations in Sweden (Stockholm), the Alliance of Russian Associations in Sweden (Göteborg), Sputnik (Luleå) have not only refused them budget financing, which they received, but also demanded the return of 2022‑2023 grants.[3780]
Under pressure from the Swedish security services and due to the refusal of the country's authorities to provide public associations with funding from the state budget, the largest organization of compatriots, the Union of Russian Associations in Sweden (Stockholm), was forced to take the decision to self-liquidate. At the same time, the Swedish Youth and Civil Society Office obliged the organization to return the funding allocated to it by this office for the years 2022‑2023. The Union of Russian Associations was forced to repay the funds in its accounts and subsequently declared bankruptcy.
Aftonbladet, the biggest Swedish trade union, suspended cooperation with these associations; it provided them with rent-free premises. On 23 May 2023, after 15 years of work, I.V. Khromova, chairman of the association of compatriots in Göteborg "Alliance of Russian Associations in Sweden", was dismissed from the Göteborg branch of Aftonbladet. She was refused to be provided with premises by Aftonbladet, so the activity of the organization was practically frozen.
During 2023, several police investigations were initiated against Russians on suspicion of espionage without sufficient grounds. The course of the investigations was covered extensively and extremely one-sidedly in the Swedish media.
The story of a Russian female police officer who was forced to resign from the police because of harassment by colleagues and the media on the grounds of "her friendly attitude to the policies of Vladimir Putin" caused a wide resonance. The case ended with the signing of an amicable agreement with the payment of 14 monthly salaries to the victim.
Representatives of the Russian non-systemic opposition play a notable role in organizing harassment and persecution of compatriots who remain loyal to Russia. First of all, this is connected with the structures of Mikhail Khodorkovsky (the so-called "Russian Anti-War Committee in Sweden").
Recently, there has been a widespread practice of targeting anti-Russian materials that claim that actions taken by Sweden and other Western countries are directed against the Russian authorities and not the Russian people. Such documents also often contain strong recommendations to join the condemnation of Russia's actions on social media and in public actions.
The incoming Ukrainian refugees are also discriminated, inter alia, being forced into prostitution.[3781] Besides, the FRA claimed that the level of financial support even for this category of refugees was insufficient to ensure an adequate standard of living.[3782]
In Sweden, problems related to the protection of children's rights, moreover of racist nature, were reported. In addition to the situation of migrant children and underage girls from Muslim families (they are taken abroad for female circumcision and forced to marry), pedophilia and child prostitution issues were reported. The return of children of fighters who combatted on the side of terrorist organizations in Syria has not been easy for Swedish society either. The authorities are dragging their feet on this issue.
In February 2023, the Committee on the Rights of the Child expressed concern about the persistence of discrimination, including racism and organized bullying of children from socially disadvantaged groups. The issue of regional disparities, including access to health care, social services, education and the justice system, was raised by CRC. The Committee recommended Sweden to strengthen its efforts to combat racist and xenophobic behaviour among children; eliminate discrimination against children from socially disadvantaged groups; address disparities between municipalities in guaranteeing equal access to quality education, adequate housing and protection from violence.[3783]
In March 2024, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights touched upon the issues of harassment and hate speech in Swedish schools. The Committee is concerned by reports of drug testing in schools and the lack of information as to whether penalties, including suspensions or expulsions, disproportionately affect the rights of students, in particular from disadvantaged and marginalized groups, to education.[3784]
The question of the situation and status of the Sámi – the country's indigenous population living up north – remains a specific human rights problem for Sweden, given the historical conflict between the Sámi and the Swedish state (Sámi used to be forcibly converted to Christianity and subjected to racial experiments, with their culture and language being deliberately suppressed). Industrial and urban development continues to claim Sámi lands, and military exercises in northern territories create obstacles to reindeer herding and their traditional livelihoods.
The proposals made by the special commissions that operated in Sweden from 1997 to 2019 to settle the "land" conflict between the state and the Sámi have not been implemented in practice. According to experts, the reason for this is that they primarily affect areas of special economic interest to state and commercial mining corporations or "reserved" for the location of energy infrastructure.[3785]
According to the Living History Forum, Amnesty International and other NGOs, discrimination and racism against the Sámi remain a problem in Sweden in relation to their traditional livelihoods. Often members of national minorities have to defend their right to reindeer herding, hunting, gathering, and shooting predators that threaten the free grazing of livestock and their livestock in years-long legal proceedings.
In particular, in January 2020, in an unprecedented ruling (spanning more than 10 years), the Supreme Court of Sweden found in favour of the inhabitants of a Sámi village in Ellivare, northern Sweden, regarding their exclusive right to hunt and fish in their traditional habitat, inter alia, granting it to third parties without state approval. However, since the Supreme Court's verdict, threats have been made against the Sámi community, even violence and sabotage have been reported (such incidents were mentioned in a joint article by the Norwegian, Finnish and Swedish line ministers in February 2022).
However, individual Sámi victories in the "court field" do not solve the problem of displacement of the indigenous population from their historical homeland. The main culprits are extractive industries and green energy, which have had a negative impact on the environment and the traditional livelihoods of the Swedish Sámi.
A key episode in this track is the concession granted by the government on 22 March 2022 to a local company, Jokmokk Iron Mines AB, to mine iron ore in the country's largest undeveloped deposit in the municipality of Jokmokk (northern Sweden) as well as and the British mining company, Beowulf Mining plc, for the rights to develop the Kallak iron ore deposit near the Bjerkholmen settlement in the same municipality. The application was submitted as early as 25 April 2013, but due to widespread criticism from a number of Swedish authorities, NGOs and international organizations, the review process has been delayed for many years. In particular, the State Office for the Protection of Cultural Monuments, the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency, the regional authorities of Norrbotten county and UNESCO recommended that the project should not be implemented in the light of environmental and cultural and humanitarian aspects.
Independent UN experts have also voiced their concerns. In particular, on 10 February 2022, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Francisco Cali Tzay, and the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environment, David Richard Boyd, issued a joint statement calling on the Swedish authorities not to grant an iron ore mining license for the deposit in question. They have pointed out that a mine in the Sámi area will generate huge amounts of pollutants and toxic waste and threaten the protected ecosystem of the nearby World Heritage Site of Laponia and reindeer migration.[3786]
In January 2023, since unveiling plans of the government and the mining LKAB concern to develop the largest rare earth metals deposit in Kiruna, northern Sweden, representatives of Sámi organizations have severely criticized this decision due to serious environmental risks as well as violation of the rights and interests of indigenous peoples of the North.[3787]
However, Swedish business is trying to follow international standards and recommendations in the area of corporate social responsibility when developing projects (primarily mining, wind power generation etc.) in the territories of traditional residence of indigenous and local communities.
Various local environmental NGOs have closely monitored Swedish businesses' compliance with corporate standards, including the "Agüey‑gu Voluntary Guidelines for Conducting Cultural, Environmental and Social Impact Assessments of Proposed or Possible Project Impacts in Sacred Areas and on Lands and Waters Traditionally Occupied or Used by Indigenous and Local Communities" (2004).
However, the public debate on the issue, due to the non-binding nature of the Agüey‑gu principles, rarely goes beyond municipal or regional debates.
However, Swedish credit institutions declare their adherence to the Equator Principles[3788] when considering financing a project.
In Sweden, the effectiveness of the so-called Sámi Parliament, the main platform for the Sámi people in the Swedish and North European public space, has been questioned. In November 2023, the Swedish Public Administration Agency published a report in which it pointed out significant shortcomings in the performance of the Sámi Parliament's tasks, including the development of reindeer husbandry, public programmes and others. It should not be ruled out that the Sámi self-government body may face increased scrutiny from central government institutions.
Over the past decades, Sweden has repeatedly been the target of criticism from international bodies (including the UN Human Rights Council, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the ILO, the HRC Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Issues, and numerous NGOs) regarding the rights of national minorities (especially the Sámi), but there has been no real progress on the issue.
The range of problems faced by the Swedish Sámi was pointed out, in particular, by the Human Rights Committee in March 2016[3789], the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in June 2016[3790] and 2024[3791], the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in April 2018 and ECRI in December 2017[3792]. In the conclusion of ECRI, referring to the opinion of representatives of the Sámi community, it is noted that discriminatory manifestations against them continue to take place in everyday life, especially in cities. In some cases, the Sámi are forced to hide or deny their ethnic origin in order not to face hostile and biased attitudes.
CESCR notes a number of measures taken by the Swedish authorities to improve the situation of the Sámi people (in particular, the information provided on the entry into force of the Act on Consultation (2022:66), which requires the Government and government agencies to consult the Sámi representative organizations on issues concerning the Sámi. The Committee also notes that the Truth Commission for the Sámi People was established in November 2021, and that a bill concerning elections to the Sámi Parliament is being drafted. Nevertheless, it drew attention to a significant problem in the area of indigenous peoples' rights. The Committee regrets, in particular, the lack of specific information on effective guarantees, both in law and in practice, to ensure effective consultation with the Sámi in the decision-making that affects them, as well as to ensure their free, prior and informed consent. The Committee has thus questioned the effectiveness of all actions taken by the Swedish authorities in this area. CESCR is also concerned about the lack of adequate consideration of the impact on the Sámi people of the development of industries such as wind power and mining of critical minerals on Sámi land, which are being implemented in the context of the green transition, adversely affecting the Sámi people's right to an adequate standard of living and enjoyment of their culture.
The Committee's doubts about the effectiveness of the actions taken by the Swedish authorities were also reflected in its recommendations to Stockholm: ensure the effective implementation of the Act on Consultation and ensure that the development of a bill concerning elections to the Sámi Parliament and a strategy for climate adaptation involve extensive consultation with the Sámi Parliament and reflect the needs and priorities of the Sámi. The Swedish authorities are also recommended to ensure the Truth Commission for the Sámi People has access to all necessary information and resources to conduct its investigations thoroughly, while guaranteeing that its findings and recommendations are fully considered and implemented, where appropriate, to address historical injustices and promote reconciliation. In terms of extractive companies and other economic activities on Sámi land, Stockholm is recommended to adopt comprehensive measures to protect the rights of the Sámi people against the adverse effects of large development projects, including through environmental and human rights impact assessments in consultation with the Sámi, ensuring their free, prior and informed consent before initiating such projects, and establish mechanisms to mitigate and compensate for any negative impacts on their traditional lifestyles and reindeer herding activities. While welcoming the plans of the Swedish authorities to take steps towards the repatriation of cultural objects to communities abroad, the Committee regrets the limited information on steps taken towards the return of cultural heritage items to the Sámi people within the Swedish territory.
In the Republic of Estonia (RE), over the whole period of the country's "independence", the nationalist circles in power have imposed systematically and persistently a distorted interpretation of the common history of Russia and Estonia, implicated in nationalist ideology and Russophobia. The Soviet period, which is presented by modern Estonian historiography as the "occupation of 1940-1991", and the events of the Great Patriotic War on the territory of the country, are subjected to the utmost falsifications.
At the same time, the authorities of Estonia, as of other Baltic countries, pursue the Russian-speaking population discrimination policy that aims at eliminating ethnic, language and national diversity of the country. Current Estonian authorities continue their consistent policy of building a monoethnic society that falls short of any national minorities, in particular Russian-language population. The assimilation in progress is confirmed also by the governmental integration programme being focused mainly on creating the Estonian mentality among Russian speakers and eliminating their historical memory of the past. Therefore, the Estonian authorities claiming to build a country with the advanced democratic society are out of whack with the reality.
Efforts to glorify Nazis and their accomplices are implemented rather actively and often to the prejudice of other policy lines, especially in the social aspects. As for the ideological cover, until recently the legalization of Nazis in Estonia has rested upon poorly concealed governmental support and virtual reluctance of the population. Since 2022, the Estonian authorities came out of hiding and openly took the path of supporting Nazism and glorifying its accomplices. All this causes a serious increase in the political weight of right‑wing nationalist forces, more frequent manifestations of xenophobia, antisemitism, neo-Nazism, cases of desecration of monuments to Red Army soldiers and higher activity of right-wing radical groups.
The country aggressively whitewashes Estonian collaborators and justify their crimes. For this purpose, a myth about "freedom fighters" who fought against "Soviet aggressors" in the ranks of the 20th Waffen‑SS Grenadier Division (Estonian Legion),[3793] security and punitive units and anti-Soviet gangs is constructed. Estimates are put forward that the presence of the Nazis on the Estonian territory was a "lesser evil" than the "Soviet occupation", which allegedly prompted the titular population to voluntarily join the Nazis to resist the "return of the Soviet regime". The Union of Former Forest Brothers of Estonia, which also works to glorify "partisans", operates without any hindrance.
At the same time, not only do they cover the crimes committed by Estonian collaborators and Forest Brothers, their active participation in the massacres of civilians in Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, mass extermination and torture of concentration camp prisoners and Soviet prisoners of war, as well as mass murder of Jews, but they also glorify such "activists" as heroes of "the fight for independence". Thus, since 2007, after the adoption by the Estonian Parliament of the amendment of the law on public holidays, the day of the liberation of Tallinn from Nazi troops (celebrated on 22 September) has been declared a Day of Resistance. The attitude of the Estonian authorities to Victory Day is similar. Consequently, the Estonians who fought in the ranks of the Red Army and liberated the territory of the Estonian SSR are secretly deleted from the local "pantheon of heroes" and are given out as accomplices of the "Soviet occupiers".
The following fact also demonstrates the true attitude of the official Tallinn toward Nazi ideology and its advocates. In recent years Estonia, following the collective EU course, abstained from voting on the United Nations General Assembly resolution "Combating glorification of Nazism, neo‑Nazism and other practices that contribute to fuelling contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance" that is submitted by Russia together with co‑sponsors from all regions of the world (the exception was made in 2011 when the Estonian delegation in the UN General Assembly voted against the resolution). However, in 2022‑2023, while voting on the corresponding draft resolution, which condemns the glorification of the Nazi movement and former members of the SS organization, including the Waffen‑SS units, as well as destruction of monuments and memorials in honour of fighters against Nazism and fascism, Estonia spoke against it without any attempts to conceal its support for neo-Nazism.
Various events devoted to the memory of Estonian SS members are also held openly, with participation of representatives of Estonian state authorities. The Estonian authorities are attempting to falsify history at the highest level in order to smear the Soviet Union and the actions of the Red Army that liberated Europe, and to obscure their own unsightly pages of the history linked with cooperation with the Nazis. Thus, for this purpose on 7 May 2020, the Presidents of Lithuania (Gitanas Nauseda), Latvia (Egils Levits) and Estonia (Kersti Kaljulaid) adopted a joint statement on the occasion of the 75th anniversary of the end of World War II in Europe. The video address of the heads of those three Baltic states published in June 2021 on the occasion of the 80th anniversary of the deportations from these countries (14 June 1941) also contains interpretations that distort the real history.[3794] These documents promote pseudohistorical arguments about the identity of the Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, their equal accountability for having waged the war and the idea that after the liberation of the Baltic States one occupation was replaced by another.
The annual ceremony commemorating the victims of the Soviet air raid on the headquarters of Hitler's command in the centre of Tallinn in March 1944, which is presented in Estonia not as a military operation but "a manifestation of hatred for pro-Western Estonians" and "the desire to destroy the European appearance of the Estonian capital" is of the same rank. The coverages of the event are provided along corresponding lines. While depicting the event, they stress that there were casualties among civilians; they try to omit the fact that it is the Nazis which considered the Baltic states citizens "untermenschen" who were the target.
Supporters of the ultranationalist Fatherland Party and Conservative People's Party of Estonia (CPPE) are the main political forces in Estonia who glorify Nazism. The Blue Awakening CPPE youth movement can be found frequently among organizers of events that glorify Nazis.
Estonia persists a rather comfortable base for far-right groups. Local unit of the Soldiers of Odin Finnish nationalist and racist organization founded in 2016 display high activity here. Its activists stay connected via closed groups in Facebook and attend mass events dedicated to glorification of Nazi accomplices. New group followers are actively and openly enlisted via www.soldiersofodin.ee website. The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) under operating the Council of Europe pointed to the fact that this structure organizes actions fuelling racial and religious hatred.[3795]
Radicalization in the Internet which contributes to the growing youth involvement to radical ideology has also become noticeable recently. In January 2020, the Security Police (Sipo) identified a 13-year-old teenager who was one of the leaders of the Feuerkrieg Division large international network neo‑Nazi group. He used actively the online communication to recruit new followers and spread antisemitic and neo-Nazi campaigns. However, due to the neo‑Nazi being under age the law enforcement bodies were not able to bring him to justice but informed only of taking some steps. It is illustrative that this topic was made public through the 2021 Sipo Yearbook, by which the Estonian "security" recognized the presence of extreme right-wing groups in the country as one of the threats to national security (although the notorious "Kremlin's hand" certainly remains the major threat). The Russophobic line of extreme rightists is none the less neglected by the Estonian law enforcement.
Efforts to glorify the WWII-era Nazi accomplices though underlie the main field of activities of the Estonian far-rightists. Annual gatherings of former SS members and their contemporary admirers (held at the end of July) on the heights of Sinimäe (Ida‑Viru County), where in 1944 the Red Army fought bloody battles with Estonian, Belgian and Dutch Waffen‑SS units, is one of the key neo-Nazi events. Usually this event is attended by representatives of the legislative and executive branches of government as well as representatives of the Estonian Evangelical Lutheran Church and members of ultranationalist and neo-Nazi groups.
For example, on 27 July 2019, Riigikogu MPs from the CPPE and Fatherland Party, representatives of the Ministry of Defence and the Defence League (people's militia) took part in this event.[3796] Members of the Estonian parliament also participated in neo-Nazi get-together on Sinimäe in 2021, while in 2020, the coronavirus pandemic prevented the event. The symbols of the criminal Hitler organizations are traditionally openly displayed at such gatherings. Human rights activists point out that this event is financed from the state budget. The regular gathering of the Waffen‑SS Estonian division veterans and their followers on Sinimäe on 30 July 2022 was rather modest, without participation of politicians and other prominent figures of the country. About a hundred people gathered there.[3797] In 2023, a similar event of former SS members was held on 30 July, though the media didn't report the participation of politicians in the event. It started from the performance of the anthem of the Estonian Republic, meanwhile, the Ukrainian flag was placed next to the Estonian flag.[3798] Then different organizations and individuals (total in up to 100 people) laid wreaths at the memorial stones whereas a pastor from the Estonian Evangelical Lutheran Church held a memorial service. The 2024 event took place on 27 July. According to mass media, the gathering was attended by representatives of historical and public organisations totalling to about 300 persons who laid flowers and lit candles at the memorial to the SS members. The official part culminated in the event participants visiting the Vaivara Sinimägede Museum.[3799]
According to "The Forward" project dedicated to studying Nazi and their accomplices monuments in certain countries around the world, the main building of the Sinimägede Museum also has two memorial stones to commemorate the 5th SS Volunteer Assault Brigade "Wallonia" (also known as the Walloon Legion, consisting of French-speaking volunteers from Belgium) and to honour the Dutch soldiers, nurses and auxiliary troops who voluntarily went to fight against the USSR. Besides, there are three more memorial stones next to the main building to honour the Flemish volunteers (Dutch-speaking soldiers from Belgium), SS-Panzergrenadier-Regiment 24 "Danmark" and SS‑Panzergrenadier-Regiment 23 "Norge". A memorial stone to the III (German) SS Panzer Corps, a large military unit consisting partly of Scandinavian, Dutch and Belgian volunteer units, marked with other stones, is located nearby.[3800]
Public events are also held on the territory of Estonia where various souvenirs with Nazi symbols, propaganda posters of the Third Reich, uniforms and insignia of the Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS branch, books about the SS unit and its members, Hitler's Mein Kampf, memoirs of former SS members, etc. are openly sold. For instance, the media published information about a fair of Nazi souvenirs and genuine military uniform items found in the course of excavations on the territory of the military propaganda museum in Valga (used, among other things, for NATO events) in 2019.[3801] According to the media, such fairs and sales of Nazi products are held at the museum almost every month.[3802] A similar exhibition, in the course of which Forest Brothers were also honoured, took place on 19‑20 August 2022 in the framework of the XIV International Festival of Military History, which, among other organizers, included local units of "freedom fighters".
Annually, a hike along the route of the Erna reconnaissance and sabotage group, which was composed of Estonians and Finns and sent to operate deep behind the Soviet Army lines in summer 1941 is arranged in August. The final point of the hike is Kautla settlement, where a decisive battle took place between the saboteurs of Erna and the NKVD fighters on 31 July 1941.[3803] In 2019, the "anniversary" 20th "military patriotic hike", organized by the Estonian Scout Association NGO with support of the Defence Ministry and Ministry of Education and Research, brought together 26 teams, including those composed of NATO member states military contingent soldiers stationed in the republic.
Fans of the Estonian SS members are united by the Friends Club of the Estonian Legion NGO that has a Facebook page and its own website www.eestileegion.com. These resources have a detailed description, written in positive terms, of the "heroic path" of the Estonian formations within the Waffen‑SS as well as the history of this unit, and deny the crimes of the Holocaust.
Another torchlight procession that took place on 24 February in the centre of Tallinn on the occasion of the anniversary of the declaration of independence of the RE confirms the overall sentiment in the Estonian ruling circles to glorify Nazism. It follows the traditional route from Freedom Square (Vabaduse) through the Old City back to the starting place. As a rule, the organizer of the event is the Blue Awakening CPPE youth organization or CPPE itself. During the 2020 event, which brought together a significant number of participants from Estonian neo-Nazi groups, the symbols of the Waffen‑SS and Nazi Germany were openly demonstrated, and nationalist and xenophobic slogans were chanted. In 2021, due to the restrictions imposed in regard to the spread of the coronavirus infection, the event was of a limited scope. In 2022, the organizers provided all comers with a free-of-charge torchlight.[3804]
Information is available that some of the photos of Nazi criminals on the websites of the Russian Immortal Regiment online campaign were posted, inter alia, from the territory of Estonia in May 2020. Having established the IP addresses from which the pictures of Nazis had been uploaded, the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation instituted legal proceedings on these facts under the Article on Rehabilitation of Nazism.
Honouring the Estonian SS members remains common in Estonia; it includes describing Nazis as "fighters for independence" and giving them state awards. On 31 August 2020, Minister of Justice Raivo Aeg held a regular ceremony of presenting the Oak Wreath of Freedom badge, timed to coincide with the 26th anniversary of the withdrawal of Russian troops from the country. Along with the members of the Estonian Legion, the awards were given to former Forest Brothers, members of various underground groups that opposed the Soviet authorities, and court historians who presented the mythology of the Estonian "liberation movement" in an ideologically verified manner.
There is a steady trend to proliferate books and publications that portray Nazi henchmen in a positive way in the country. Thus, the "Culture and Life" magazine is still being published, despite the fact that its each issue contains materials which represent positively the period of Nazi occupation, glorify Estonian Nazi collaborators and Waffen‑SS members and denigrate the Soviet period. The magazine has its own website. In 2019, in addition to the aforementioned fair in Valga, the re-issue of Hitler's "Mein Kampf" in Estonian by Matrix Publishing was very successful in Estonian bookstores.
Apart from the existing bust of Harald Nugiseks (1921–2014), Oberscharführer of the 20th Waffen-SS Division, holder of the highest military award of Nazi Germany – the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross of Laup (the opening of this bust in 2016 at the city school was timed to coincide with his 95th anniversary) and memorial plaques in honour of the SS Standartenführer, commander of the 20th Waffen‑SS Division Alfons Rebane (1906–1976), also awarded the Nazi Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross in the cities of Mustla and Viljandi[3805], monuments are being erected in Estonia to the direct participants of the Nazi formations. Another similar action took place in August 2020 in the village of Luulupe on the island of Saaremaa, during which a monument was unveiled to one of the most famous Forest Brothers commanders in Estonia Elmar Ilp and his "comrades-in-arms" Redese Toomson and Aleksander Tuuling. The ceremony was attended by the then-speaker of the Estonian Parliament Henn Pylluaas (CCPE), who called the Nazi collaborators "freedom fighters".
In presenting Elmar Ilp as a hero, the Estonian ultra-right activists remain silent about the fact that in reality he committed criminal offenses, terrorized and killed civilians for the sake of robbery, and tortured women and the elderly. Between the end of 1944 and 1946, Ilp's gang killed 456 local citizens and five Red Army officers. These figures clearly show who the bandits were really "fighting" against.[3806]
In October 2020, Lääne-Viru county held the "topic-related day on the ambiguous and tragic history of the Forest Brothers", and as soon as in November, in the same county, their restored bunker and a memorial plaque were unveiled with pomp and circumstance. The work was carried out by the Society of Friends of Väike‑Maarja Museums at the suggestion of the Union of Former Forest Brothers of Estonia. Similar sites are to appear all over the country.
On 22 August 2021, members of the Union of Former Forest Brothers inaugurated a monument to the Forest Brothers in the village of Hüti (Mõniste Parish, Võru County) on the territory of the Estonian House memorial complex. Estonian then-Foreign Minister Urmas Reinsalu, Valga Rural Municipality Elder Monika Rogenbaum, Rõuge Rural Municipality Elder Rein Loik, Estonian Memory Institute Board Member Martin Andreller and Valga War Museum Director M.Kivi participated in the ceremony.[3807]
The same month, the Ennuksemäe Forest Brothers' bunker was rebuilt in Viljandi County.
The scale of the Estonian authorities' work to propagate the heroic myth of the Forest Brothers is illustrated by the fact that in May 2021 Estonia and Latvia created a map and brochure of historic-military tourist sites, which aimed at glorifying these armed formations. The mentioned map includes more than 150 places – well-kept "former military facilities" with an extensive exposition as well as "natural sites" – battlefields, trenches and bunkers of Forest Brothers. The organizers propose to combine their visit with walks in the woods and nature trails.
On 7 August 2022, on the island of Saaremaa, the Estonian Society of Freedom Fighters organized a reconstruction of the "last battle" of the Forest Brothers' gang led by Ilp with NKVD officers of the USSR. It was announced at the event that a three-meter oak cross would be erected in memory of this criminal.[3808]
On 10 August 2022, a military sports game of reconnaissance patrols named after Admiral Johan Pitka took place, in which 27 teams from 12 countries participated. Among these teams, there was one joint team, which included people from the United States, Estonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina – all representatives of the Allied battle group deployed in the RE.
The media have published plans to recreate once again a memorial to a soldier in an SS uniform with a German automatic rifle in his hands in Lihula in western Estonia to commemorate "the Estonians who fought against Bolshevism and for the restoration of Estonian independence in 1940-1945". The monument to the soldiers of the 20th Estonian SS division appeared back in 2002, when a memorial sign with a bas-relief of a soldier in the form of a Wehrmacht with an iron cross on his chest and a "Schmeiser" pointing east in his hands was installed in one of the parks of the resort town of Pärnu. Then in 2004, it was moved to Lihula rural municipality, but after a few days it was pulled down.[3809] The original of the last dismantled stone with inscriptions is in a museum near Tallinn.[3810]
On 8 December 2022, in the town of Kose, Harju County, a monument to Forest Brothers who died in "battles" against NKVD units was unveiled. The remains of the three of them (L.Kivilo, J.Priska, L.Kaun) were reburied "with honours" during a "memorial service". The ceremony was attended by Military Museum archaeologist A.Unt, Kose Mayor D.Voss, Riigikogu MP Eerik‑Niiles Kross.[3811]
On 19 December 2022, Riigikogu MP representing Conservative People's Party of Estonia Urmas Reitelmann posted a message about "the victory of the white" on social media after the final of the 2022 Football World Championship in Qatar.[3812]
On 2 February 2023, on the occasion of the 102nd anniversary of the Treaty of Tartu, the Conservative People's Party of Estonia organized a torchlight procession in Tartu. Some participants of the march used Nazi symbols, in particular the SS skull insignia on headgear. The appearance of a H.Karu with Hitler-like moustache and hairstyle provoked a response even in the local media. This former member of the party and a current Friends Club of the Estonian Legion member turned out to have appeared multiple times in a Nazi uniform at the "like-minded people" get-togethers where the Estonian Waffen‑SS members were celebrated. President of the mentioned organization Marko Mihkelson (Riigikogu MP, a former Chair of Foreign Affairs Committee) rushed to reassure the public, explaining the behaviour of H.Karu with the phrase "we shouldn't be ashamed of the Estonian national pride and of the deeds of its forebears."[3813]
On 3 February 2023, Riigikogu MP from the Estonian Reform Party Eerik‑Niiles Kross appeared on a pre-electoral billboard, on which he modelled on the background of Alexander Nevsky Cathedral in Tallinn with a "Mauser" rifle, which gang formations members of the Estonian nationalist underground – the very Forest Brothers – were armed with after the Great Patriotic War.[3814]
Efforts to impose a distorted perception of historical events, glorification of Nazi accomplices, and search for new "enemies" of Estonia have also been observed in the educational sphere. Thus, the regular report of the Security Police, published in 2021, describes the celebration of Victory Day over Nazism by Russian schoolchildren as hostile activity towards Estonia.
Currently, patriotic education of the Estonian Defence Forces and the Kaitseliit militia is being built on the example of the "exploits of the Forest Brothers" and the Estonian SS members. Human rights activists also noted that they received reports that Russians serving in the Estonian army were forced to learn the song of the Forest Brothers as a drill.
There are registered cases of the Estonian media publishing materials aimed at falsifying the history of the Great Patriotic War and equating the exploits of the Soviet people with the misanthropic intentions of Nazi Germany. Such publications are often timed with memorable dates of that War, especially before Victory Day or on the anniversary of Nazi Germany's attack on the USSR. On the eve of the 9th of May, 2021, several Estonian media made marks with such actions. On 7 May, the news website "DELFI" published a Russophobic article on the 76th anniversary of the Allied Victory over Nazi Germany and its satellites. By placing this "opus" on the main page of the portal, the publication thus showed solidarity with the position of the author.[3815]
Also in early May the "Rus.Postimees.ee" portal published an article about the opinions of the young people about this holiday, which was accompanied by a Bronze Soldier Monument photographed upside-down. Immediately after the release of the response of the Russian embassy to the article on Facebook, the editorial board of the portal changed the photo that caused complaints in the article, however, on the Estonian Internet version of the newspaper, as well as in the paper edition, there was still an upside-down Bronze Soldier.[3816]
On 22 June 2021, on the 80th anniversary of Nazi Germany's attack on the Soviet Union, which marked the beginning of World War II, the Estonian Eesti Päevaleht newspaper published an article titled "80 Years of the 'Summer War': Why Hitler attacked Stalin". The article also contains unsubstantiated revisionist claims that Nazi aggression was a "preventive measure by Germany" because "Hitler did not want a big war but Stalin did" and "in July 1941, the Soviet leadership was preparing to attack Germany".
Located in Tallinn, the private Museum of Occupations&Freedom has made maintaining a negative perception of the Soviet period of history its key task. In the exposition of this Museum, episodes related to Stalinist repressions and deportations are emphasized, and Estonia's time as part of the USSR is presented in a biased manner, without mentioning the socio-economic, scientific or cultural achievements of the Soviet period.
On 19 July 2022, the Postimees published a praiseworthy review of an article by Henrik Prunsvelt, which positively assessed the activities of Karl Litzmann, head of the Estonian Generalbezirk Estland of the Reichskommissariat Ostland and the SS Obergruppenführer. At the same time, the note concealed important moments in the biography of this "activist". In particular, among those concealed was the fact that Litzmann was one of the organizers of massacres of the peaceful population of the Estonian SSR during the Great Patriotic War as a result of which 61 thousand civilians and 64 thousand Soviet prisoners of war were killed.[3817]
Along with glorification of Nazism and the formation of the cult of the Forest Brothers in Estonia, the thesis of "suffering from the Communist regime" is actively promoted. For this purpose, other matching "cultural objects" are also created. Thus, Memorial to the Victims of Communism, the concept of which is based on commemorating victims of "crimes committed by the Soviet communists" in 1940-1941, has been working in Tallinn since August 2018. In 2019, an exhibition titled "Communism is a prison" was opened in the building of the former Patarei Prison in the Estonian capital. There are plans to turn the exhibition into an international museum in the memory of victims of communism by 2026.
Attempts to glorify Nazi accomplices, which have become an integral part of the state policy, are directly related to the increased manifestations of antisemitism and the desecration of monuments to Soviet soldiers killed on the territory of Estonia in battles with the Nazi invaders. In June 2019, vandals destroyed several tombstones at Tallinn Jewish cemetery (for the first time in 110 years, including the period of Nazi occupation), with the grave of the former head of the Tallinn veteran association Vladimir Metelitsa among them.
At the same time, the official Estonian statistics note that in the period from 2015 to 2018, not a single incident of an antisemitic nature was recorded in the country. In 2019, only two such cases were registered while in 2020 – none and in 2021 only one such incident was officially registered.[3818] These data are annually repeated in the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) overviews. In particular, the latest overview notes that in 2022, in Estonia, the authorities did not receive any information on incidents or crimes of antisemitic nature.[3819]
It is with regret that we have to state that the leaders of the Jewish community of Estonia diligently ignore the above-mentioned incidents and phenomena, focusing exclusively on commemorating the victims of the Holocaust.
In the same year, new cases of desecration of the graves of Red Army soldiers of the time of the Great Patriotic War were reported – in the city of Kuressaare (an inscription with aerosol paint was written on the monument), in the village of Tehumardi (gravestones were doused with engine oil). The local police conducted administrative proceedings, but the perpetrators were not found.
On 2 March 2021, unknown persons desecrated the T‑34 tank Monument in Narva, established in memory of the crossing of the Narva River by Soviet troops on 25‑26 July 1944, during the offensive operation of the Leningrad Front. The monument was covered with graffiti saying "to the fallen heroes of the amphetamine war ... 2018."[3820]
In early April 2021, a monument to the victims of fascism was desecrated at the Tallinn Rahumäe Cemetery. According to the local police, on 3 April, unknown persons put chicken eggs on the monument. The birds that broke the eggs stained the tombstone. Traces of vandalism were not found by the police. A criminal case was initiated over the desecration of the monument.[3821]
On 7 April 2021, vandals toppled the memorial stone in Raeküla, which had been established at the site of the execution of Red Army soldiers in July 1941. After an appeal from the Russian Embassy to the chairman of the Pärnu City Assembly, the monument was restored to its original location.
The fact that even before 2022 not only were monuments to Red Army soldiers killed in battles for the liberation of Estonia from Nazism vandalized but any monuments erected in the honour of soldiers who fought and were killed in the Soviet uniform were under attack of vandalism, confirms the actual sentiment of Estonian radicals. On the eve of municipal elections on 17 October 2021 the monument erected in the Tondiloo park on Kivila Street in Lasnamäe city district in honour of the Soviet soldiers killed in Afghanistan in 1980s was desecrated. The memorial erected in 2006 to commemorate not only Russians but also Estonian "Afghans" was sprayed with paint by unknown assailants.[3822]
The Estonian authorities joined the "struggle" of vandals against monuments to Soviet soldiers long before the massive campaign of 2022 to destroy memorials: the process of demolition of monuments and desecration of burial places of participants of the Great Patriotic War had continued in all Baltic countries by that time for many years. One of the first and most symbolic steps in this direction was the relocation of the monument to the fallen in the Great Patriotic War, set up in Tallinn on the Tõnismägi hill on 22 September 1947, which got the unofficial name of the Bronze Soldier. In April 2007, the Estonian Cabinet of Ministers decided to relocate the memorial and the remains of soldiers to a military cemetery on the outskirts of Tallinn. This decision provoked unrest involving thousands of people. The most tragic episode of those events was the murder of Russian citizen Dmitry Ganin.
Despite the relocation, the memorial retained its central role in the celebration of Victory Day. Every year on 9 May (the day the Great Patriotic War ended), tens of thousands of Tallinners gathered at the Bronze Soldier to commemorate the fallen heroes. Moreover, representatives of the Estonian Defence Forces also laid a commemorative wreath at the monument with the permission of their commanders. However, the memorial still continued to be attacked by vandals.
Russian compatriots were widely outraged by the desecration of this monument on 22 June 2019, when unidentified persons pinned a leaflet depicting a skull on the monument. The Estonian police did not bring the perpetrators to justice, letting the investigation of the incident go unnoticed and referring to the "poor quality of surveillance camera footage".
In July 2019, the memorial and burial place of the Red Army in Taebla, Lääne-Nigula Parish, were dismantled. The "relocation" of the burial ground was initiated by the management of a school being reconstructed nearby, which was allegedly disturbed by the Soviet obelisk. According to the museum of the armed forces which was responsible for realization of such works, remains of 11 people were exhumed at this place (however, according to the archival data, 26 people were buried there). According to a representative of the rural municipality administration, the monument is kept on the territory of a local gymnasium, but no photos were provided.
On 25 October 2019, the Russian Ambassador to Estonia, Alexander Petrov, sent a note to the Undersecretary for Political Affairs, Pait Teesalu, requiring official explanations of the incident. However, no meaningful response was ever received. Further attempts to engage in a constructive dialogue with the Estonian side also failed. The Estonian authorities refer to the provisions of the Law on the Protection of Military Graves of 10 January 2007, according to Article 8 of which the "remains are subject to reburial if the military burial is located in an inappropriate place". This wording has a rather broad interpretation. It is obvious that such vague provisions allow, if necessary, to recognize any memorial of this kind as "inappropriate".
The Estonian authorities used the Ukrainian crisis to jump start the demolition of Soviet memorial legacy on the territory of the country and delete the historical truth from people's memory. This stance is being aggressively imposed on all citizens in the country, including Russian speakers as well as independently thinking Estonians who believe that the task of the heritage assets protection is to keep memory. This is why it is necessary to preserve heritage of various times for them to stay before eyes as an open study book. All activities of the Estonian authorities in the memorial sphere were presented under the slogan of "Estonia being at information war with Russia using Soviet symbols as a weapon".[3823]
The process began from prohibitions of Soviet and Russian symbols. On 21 April 2022, the Estonian Parliament adopted the law banning open demonstration of symbols "used at commission of an act of aggression, genocide, crime against humanity or war crime, to support or justify such crimes". The law also introduced penalties of up to five years in prison for "joining the armed forces of a foreign state committing an act of aggression or another armed association of a foreign state taking part in an act of aggression; taking part in the commission or preparation of an act of aggression or knowingly supporting an act of aggression by a foreign state, including its financing".
The Estonian authorities created obstacles to the celebration of Victory Day by the Russian-speaking population in Estonia. Head of Central Criminal Police of the Police and Border Guard Board Aivar Alavere stated on 24 March 2022 that the attitude of law enforcement officers towards appearance of Georgian Ribbon in the public space had to be reconsidered because this symbol was worn by Russian soldiers who "kill Ukrainian citizens."
Elmar Vaher, head of the Police and Border Guard Board, voiced the same position on TV broadcasts of Estonian State TV and Radio ERR, saying that the Estonian police would take increased measures to counter the display of Russian military symbols (including Soviet army uniforms and St. George Ribbons) on 9 May, because "the situation is not comparable to previous years". He also expressed the hope that the Estonian Parliament will make some amendments to the law by the 9th of May in order to give a free hand to the police in respect to those who openly demonstrate such symbols.
The Estonian police officially banned from 26 April to 10 May public gatherings associated with Bronze Night and Victory Day that expressed support for the "aggressor country" and used military symbols, including Soviet and Russian flags, St. George Ribbons and Soviet military uniforms. At first the ban was imposed in Tallinn, Harjumaa and Ida-Virumaa, and later it was extended to the whole country. On the eve of 9 May, police control (including social media control) was enhanced: On this day, "provocative" symbols were recorded in various regions of Estonia, about thirty persons were detained because of that, fines were imposed on 12 "habitual offenders".
In July 2022, the Estonian government ordered the removal[3824] of all monuments to Soviet soldiers killed in World War II and the reburial of the remains of soldiers under military monuments by the end of the year. According to Prime Minister Kallas, specific decisions were made concerning the war monuments, which stipulated that the remains of soldiers underneath the monuments should be reburied gradually, step by step, and the monuments themselves should be relocated.[3825] All in all, this demolition campaign focused on about 400 Soviet monuments.
The same month, a special commission on the dismantling of Soviet monuments has been formed,[3826] whose task was to prepare a list of memorials subject to demolition and destruction. However, the entire composition of the commission was classified. So far, only the name of its head, Asko Kivinuk, who used to work in the Estonian state centre of defence investments, is known.
It is noteworthy that the commission, having considered the facts of the demolition of monuments and cemeteries that had already taken place, approved of them completely. It only recommended in some cases to "remove the tombstone part of the monument but to keep the sculpture if possible". Besides, in a number of cases the commission demanded to replace even tombstones – they were considered to ostensibly not be "neutral" in some places. For example, the commission members did not like that at the foot of the mass grave monument in Kehtna park a memorial stone was established with the following text, "To the Soviet Army soldiers killed during the Great Patriotic War".[3827]
On 10 November 2022, the Estonian authorities adopted a set of amendments to the Building Code, the Building Code Enforcement Act, the Planning Act, and the State Property Act. The aim was to create the legal framework to demolish Soviet military monuments that were deemed "inappropriate for public spaces". The document cynically states that building parts, monuments, sculptures and other structures visible to the public cannot express incitement to hostility, support or justify "the occupation regime, acts of aggression, genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes".[3828]
In November 2022, the mentioned working group on Soviet military memorials presented a report which states that 322 "red" monuments had been found in Estonia, 244 out of which are subject to demolition in whole or in part,[3829] and mass graves that are located in "inappropriate" places (parks, squares in front of schools, in the centre of any populated area) are to be relocated to cemeteries, coordinated with local authorities. A catalogue, published on the Government Office web-site,[3830] was also presented that contained photographs and descriptions of the monuments (type – a monument, a mass grave, an individual soldier's grave; coordinates of the location; form of property; a brief history) as well as "recommendations" for what to do with them next (demolish, replace or keep).
The public was presented with a sample of a "neutral sign" (a stone plaque with the inscription "Victims of World War II"),[3831] designed to replace monuments and tombstones containing words "to Soviet soldiers", "during the Great Patriotic War" or Soviet symbols (the star, the hammer and sickle, etc.).
At the same time, tombs and memorials to the Estonians who fought for the Third Reich are kept untouched. Mass media reported that the working group on Soviet memorial heritage did not take any decisions concerning graves of Fascist soldiers located on the territory of Estonia.[3832]
Answers to "citizen's typical questions" related to Soviet memorials are noteworthy as well. Thus, among the list of reasons to get rid of military monuments, it is stated that they do this for "ensuring domestic security", since the monuments "once again have come to be symbols of active terror" and also "were established by the countries that occupied Estonia; they do not commemorate the memory of the fallen soldiers but bear a wider anti-humanist ideology." They particularly stress that "social tensions are rapidly growing around memorials of the occupation authorities".[3833] An answer to the question why memorials to soldiers who fought in SS are not being taken down is notable, "There is an agreement signed between Estonia and Germany to preserve military graves which stipulates that the dead soldiers of the German army are buried in neutral graves that do not contain any Nazi symbols, so there is no need to remove the tombstones".
In practice, all this manifested itself mainly in local authorities removing red stars from the monuments to Red Army soldiers and naming all those killed simply as "victims of World War II". It looks like the Soviet soldiers are treated in Estonia as collaborationists because the Estonian authorities call them "victims of World War II" as well.[3834]
What calls attention to itself as well is the fact that the Soviet monuments fell subject of elimination in Estonia prior to the decision of the working group. Mass media reported 56 monuments as already destroyed in the country even before the working group issued its decision. In some cases, the disinterment of the nearby war communal graves took place simultaneously with the demolition of monuments. For example, in August and September 2022, the authorities ordered to disentomb a total of 40 mass graves to rebury the remains in places where, according to the Estonian officials, the dead soldiers "will cease serving the Soviet ideology". Having considered the cases of elimination of several dozens of monuments, the working group endorsed them. In several cases this body recommended to "remove the tomb piece off the monument and to preferably preserve the sculpture". Some of the monuments dismantled even before the corresponding recommendations turned out to be broken during the dismantlement, as it was the case, for example, with the Soviet monument in Elva, the demolition of which was supported by the commission.[3835]
The Estonian authorities categorically opposed as well proposals by the society to organize public debates over every monument. In particular, Estonian Foreign Minister Urmas Reinsalu was staunchly against it. In his opinion, the people, having cast their vote for the ruling politicians, already give them a free hand to act in any manner while "this public discussion only binds hand and foot". He noted, "Red monuments are to be removed. The aim is to do this in the current year. This process has moved forward, it does not stand still any more. This makes us happy".
The representatives of the Estonian authorities did not even conceal that their efforts in this field were aimed at deleting the truth about what was going on during the Great Patriotic War from the memory of Russian residents of Estonia. For example, Minister of Justice Lea Danilson-Järg (member of the Fatherland right party) said in 2022, "The task of the bill [she meant the draft law on combating Soviet memorial heritage] is simple – to relieve the country from the symbols that threaten our security. Besides, if we expect the integration of Russian-speaking residents of the country so that we have the same understanding of history, then this is difficult to achieve if we have monuments that symbolize a false understanding of history". She also voiced fear over the fact that in Estonia, gatherings of representatives of the country's Russian community took place near Soviet monuments, who protested against impairment of their rights and called for doing away with this practice.[3836]
On 15 February 2023, Riigikogu approved a bill on amendments to the State Property Act, the Building Code Enforcement Act, the Planning Act, as well as to the Building Code,[3837] which will require land owners, including municipalities where monuments with "the forbidden symbols" on are located, to bring the appearance of the monuments into line with new standards (must not "incite hostility, support the occupation regime, genocide and war crimes"). This is to be done within six months, otherwise the Ministry of Justice will assume responsibility for the work in question. The same month the President of Estonia signed the bill. The adopted law simplifies and simultaneously expedites the procedure to demolish monuments to Red Army soldiers killed in the battles for liberation of Estonia from Nazism. Meanwhile, as it was stated earlier, on 27 September, 2023, the Estonian Parliament "refused to adopt without amendments" the law on the demolition of the Soviet era monuments. Earlier, in March 2023, it was turned down by the Estonian President Alar Karis.[3838]
In spring 2023, the Estonian authorities introduced a fine of EUR 1200 for celebrating Victory Day on 9 May. The Estonian residents were prohibited to gather in groups on this day, to use the Soviet symbols of the Great Patriotic War period, and even to play the music of the war and post-war years that was declared "aggressive."[3839]
We also should remember that, after the beginning of the Special military operation to denazify and demilitarize Ukraine, and to protect Donbass civilians by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in February 2022 (SMO), the anti‑Russian hysteria provoked a surge in acts of vandalism. According to the Russian Embassy in Estonia, 110 memorials to Soviet soldiers have been dismantled on the territory of the country since 2022 with 28 of them subject to exhumation of the remains of the buried Red Army soldiers. Besides, the acts of vandalism were committed against 13 sites (with five being desecrated twice and one – four times).
There were the following 86 eliminated memorials,
(1) Tombstones on the grave at the Mihkli Cemetery in the village of Emmu;[3840]
(2) Monument to Red Army soldiers killed during the Great Patriotic War installed on the mass grave in the centre of Otepää;[3841]
(3) Monument to the Soviet commander Major General Pavel Potapov, installed on the place of his death on Kindralimägi Hill on the road to Etsaste village; [3842]
(4) Monument on the mass grave of Soviet Army soldiers in the village of Lümanda on the island of Saaremaa;[3843]
(5) Monument on the grave of soldiers fallen during the Great Patriotic War in the battles for liberation of Estonia from Nazi invaders in the village of Simuna;[3844]
(6) Tank T-34 monument in Narva;[3845]
(7) Memorial stone and memorial sign to the troopers of the 260th independent brigade of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet marine infantry in the village of Meriküla;[3846]
(8) Memorial in remembrance of the Hero of the Soviet Union Igor Grafov on Narva – Narva-Jõesuu highway;[3847]
(9) Memorial stones on Peter's square in Narva city;[3848]
(10) Obelisk on the Soviet military burial in the castle park at the entrance to the Narva Castle;[3849]
(11) "Three bayonets" memorial and the bas-relief commemorating Soviet soldiers on the 9th km of Narva – Narva-Jõesuu highway;[3850]
(12) Memorial stone on the mass military burial of Soviet soldiers, prisoners of war and victims of fascism between the Narva River and the Victoria Bastion;[3851]
(13) Monument on the mass grave of the Red Army soldiers fallen during the Great Patriotic War at the Iide- Torgu crossroad in the village of Iide on the island of Saaremaa;[3852]
(14) Monument on the mass grave of Soviet soldiers in the village of Tuudi;[3853]
(15) Monument on the mass grave of Soviet soldiers in the village of Hanila;[3854]
(16) Monument on the mass grave of Soviet soldiers in the village of Varbla;[3855]
(17) Monument on the mass grave of Soviet soldiers in the village of Kirbla;[3856]
(18) Monument on the mass grave of Soviet soldiers in the village of Lihula;[3857]
(19) Monument on the mass grave of Soviet soldiers in the village of Karksi‑Nuia;[3858]
(20) Tombstones at the Maarjamäe memorial complex commemorating Soviet army units that liberated Tallinn from Nazi invaders;[3859]
(21) Monument to the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army soldiers who defended Hiiumaa island in 1941;[3860]
(22) Obelisk on the mass grave monument to Soviet prisoners of war and victims of fascism on the southern shore of Viljandi lake;[3861]
(23) Monument on the mass grave of Soviet soldiers in the town of Tapa;[3862]
(24) Monument on the mass grave of Soviet soldiers in the town of Kohtla-Järve;
(25) Monument commemorating the soldiers fallen during liberation of Estonia from German fascist invaders during the Great Patriotic War in the town of Kohtla-Järve;
(26) Monument commemorating the residents of Kallaste fallen during liberation of Estonia from German fascist invaders during the Great Patriotic War in the town of Kallaste;
(27) Monument commemorating the Red Army soldiers fallen during liberation of Estonia from German fascist invaders during the Great Patriotic War in the town of Kallaste;
(28) Monument on the mass grave of Soviet soldiers in the town of Kodavere;
(29) Monument on the mass grave of Soviet soldiers in the village of Järva-Jaani;
(30) Monument on the mass grave of Soviet soldiers in the village of Ambla;
(31) Monument on the mass grave of Soviet soldiers in the village of Järva-Madise;
(32) Monument on the mass grave of Soviet soldiers in the village of Uhtna;
(33) Monument on the mass grave of Soviet soldiers in the village of Imara;
(34) Monument on the mass grave of Soviet soldiers in the village of Anseküla;
(35) Monument on the mass grave of Soviet soldiers in the village of Valjala;
(36) Memorial plaque on the house where Alexander Gorchakov was born in the city of Haapsalu;
(37) Monument on the mass grave of Soviet soldiers in the village of Tori;
(38) Monument on the mass grave of Soviet soldiers at the cemetery of the town of Paldiski;
(39) Monument on the mass grave of Soviet soldiers at the old cemetery of the town of Pärnu;
(40) Monument on the grave of the commander of the 2nd separate Latvian rifle regiment Karlis Ulpe;
(41) Monument on the mass grave of Soviet soldiers in the village of Ilmatsalu;
(42) Monument on the mass grave of Soviet soldiers in the village of Kambja;
(43) Monument on the mass grave of Soviet soldiers in the village of Vallapalu;
(44) Monument on the mass grave of Soviet soldiers at the cemetery of Vananymme on the island of Saaremaa;
(45) Monument on the mass grave of Soviet soldiers in the village of Pikasilla;
(46) Monument on the mass grave of Soviet soldiers in the village of Ala;
(47) Monument on the mass grave of Soviet soldiers in the village of Kolli;
(48) Monument on the mass grave of Soviet soldiers in the village of Helme;
(49) Monument on the mass grave of Soviet soldiers near the railway station in the village of Kadrina;
(50) Monument on the mass grave of Soviet soldiers and victims of fascism in the village of Viru-Jaagupi;
(51) Monument on the mass grave of Soviet soldiers in the village of Iide on the island of Saaremaa;
(52) Monument on the mass grave of Soviet soldiers in the village of Lõupõllu on the island of Saaremaa;
(53) Monument on the mass grave of Soviet soldiers in the village of Viru-Nigula;
(54) Monument on the mass grave of Soviet soldiers in the village of Kunda;
(55) Monument on the mass grave of Soviet soldiers in the village of Leisi, Saaremaa island;
(56) Monument on the mass grave of Soviet soldiers in the village of Simuna;
(57) Monument on the mass grave of Soviet soldiers in the village of Mehikoorma;
(58) Monument on the mass grave of Soviet soldiers in the village of Rõngu;
(59) Monument on the mass grave of Soviet soldiers in the village of Koosa;
(60) Monument on the mass grave of Soviet soldiers in the village of Elistvere;
(61) Monument on the mass grave of Soviet soldiers in the town of Võru at the municipal cemetery near the chapel;
(62) Monument on the mass grave of Soviet soldiers in the village of Tindi;
(63) Monument on the mass grave of Soviet soldiers in the village of Kaarepere;
(64) Monument on the mass grave of Soviet soldiers in the village of Hummuli;
(65) Monument on the mass grave of Soviet soldiers in the village of Vilina;
(66) Monument on the mass grave of Soviet soldiers on Kubja street in the town of Võru;
(67) Monument on the mass grave of Soviet soldiers No. 1 in the village of Sinimäe;
(68) Monument on the mass grave of Soviet soldiers and victims of fascism at the municipal cemetery of the town of Jõhvi;
(69) Monument on the mass grave of Soviet soldiers in the village of Tõrva;
(70) Monument on the mass grave of Soviet soldiers in the village of Vana‑Otepää;
(71) Monument on the mass grave of Soviet soldiers in the village of Kuigatsi;
(72) Monument on the mass grave of Soviet soldiers in the village of Soontaga;
(73) Monument on the mass grave of Soviet soldiers at Massinymme cemetery, the village of Jubide, Saaremaa island;
(74) Monument on the mass grave of Soviet soldiers in the village of Nina;
(75) Monument on the mass grave of Soviet soldiers in the village of Kolkja;
(76) Monument on the mass grave of Soviet soldiers in the village of Vara;
(77) Monument to soldiers of the Viljandi Communist Rifle Regiment in the city of Narva;
(78) Parts of the monument to those fallen during liberation of Estonia from the German Fascist invaders in the time of the Great Patriotic War, the village of Sinimäe;
(79) Monument on the mass grave of Soviet soldiers in the village of Põltsamaa;
(80) Monument on the mass grave of Soviet soldiers in the village of Külitse;
(81) One of the two parts from the monument on the mass grave of Soviet soldiers in the village of Kääpa (memorial stone);
(82) Monument on the mass grave of Soviet prisoners of war at Liiva cemetery, Tallinn;
(83) Monument on the grave of Hero of the Soviet Union Yakov Lyakhov in the village of Pikasilla;
(84) Memorial and personalized plaques on the mass grave of Soviet soldiers in the village of Lustivere;
(85) Memorial on the mass grave of Soviet soldiers at Saikla-Nymme cemetery in the village of Tumala;
(86) Statue on the mass grave of Soviet soldiers in the village of Kuivastu.
28 memorials were dismantled together with the remains buried in mass graves underneath being disentombed in the following locations,
(1) Central part of the town of Rakvere;[3863]
(2) Viisu village;[3864]
(3) Noo village;[3865]
(4) Old Park in the town of Parnu;[3866]
(5) Town of Suure-Jaani;[3867]
(6) Emmaste village;[3868]
(7) Raadi park in the city of Tartu;[3869]
(8) Viiratsi village;[3870]
(9) Suislepa village;[3871]
(10) Kärstna village;[3872]
(11) Võhma village;[3873]
(12) Pilistvere village;[3874]
(13) Viljandi town;[3875]
(14) Elva town.[3876]
(15) Türi town;
(16) Haapsalu town;
(17) Tapa town;
(18) Hargla village;
(19) Õruste village;
(20) Tamsalu village[3877];
(21) Tsirgulina village;
(22) Lüllemäe village;
(23) Ansekula village;
(24) Tagavere village;
(25) Iisaku village;
(26) Ambla village;
(27) Kehra town;
(28) Muusika village.
The following 14 monuments were desecrated (with five of them – twice and one – four times),
(1) Obelisk erected in the central part of the town of Rakvere on the mass grave of soldiers fallen in the Great Patriotic War (twice[3878] [3879]);
(2) Memorial on the mass grave in the town of Tapa (twice[3880] [3881]);
(3) Memorial to the Soviet Army soldiers fallen in the Great Patriotic War erected in the centre of the town of Otepää;[3882]
(4) Statue commemorating a Soldier Liberator at Tallinn Military Cemetery (twice[3883] [3884]);
(5) Tombstones on the mass graves of Soviet soldiers at Tallinn Military Cemetery[3885];
(6) Memorial on the mass grave of Soviet soldiers in the town of Lüganuse (four times[3886] [3887]);
(7) Tombstone on the solitary grave of I.Nosik single grave in the village of Ansekula, Saaremaa island[3888];
(8) Monument on the mass grave in the village of Tehumardi[3889];
(9) Monument on the mass grave in the Raadi Park in the city of Tartu (twice[3890] [3891]);
(10) Memorial stone erected at the site where Soviet troops crossed the Emajõgi River in September 1944[3892];
(11) Monument in the village of Vosu to officers of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, Red Army soldiers and Soviet activists killed in combat against German invaders;[3893]
(12) Monument to the fallen during the liberation of Estonia from fascist Nazi invaders in the years of the Great Patriotic War erected on the mass grave of Soviet soldiers at the old cemetery of Türi (twice[3894] [3895]);
(13) Monument on the mass grave of Soviet soldiers at Pauluse cemetery[3896];
(14) Two tombstones on solitary graves at Tallinn Military Cemetery.
The confrontation between Estonia's authorities and residents of Narva over the T‑34 tank monument became in fact the main symbol of a new stage in the Estonian authorities' fight against Soviet monuments. The Estonian government's decision to demolish all memorials and monuments to Red Army soldiers was met with hostility by some citizens of Narva who were in favour of keeping the monument in the town. The Estonian leadership expectedly expressed its opposition to it stressing that monuments like the T‑34 tank in Narva were causing a divide in Estonian society in the context of the Russian Special military operation. Nevertheless, on 8 August 2022, at the meeting of the governing coalition in the city municipality it was decided to call a meeting of the City Council to instruct the City Government to dismantle the Narva tank and move it to a closed and secure location within the city[3897].
The Narva authorities conducted a poll to find out the opinions of the citizens concerning the fate of the tank standing on the monument to Soviet warriors. According to then Mayor Katri Raik, two-thirds of the three thousand respondents supported the tank to be kept in the town and stored in a closed area. She said that the majority in the City Council also voted to keep it, as this exact standpoint was adopted during the inter‑faction consultations.[3898]
On 16 August 2022, during an extraordinary press conference of the government in Tallinn, it was announced that seven Soviet monuments in Narva and Narva-Jõesuu are to be relocated. On the same day, the dismantling of the T‑34 monument in Narva and its subsequent transfer to the Estonian War Museum in Viimsi began. Also, in Narva, plaques were moved from Petrovskaya Square, as well as a monument to Red Army soldiers in the park near the castle and a memorial sign to Hero of the Soviet Union Igor Grafov who died in the liberation of Narva in 1944. The "Three bayonets" monument and a monument to the Meriküla landing force were moved to Narva-Jõesuu. Soviet symbols were removed from the gravestone on the common grave of those killed in the Great Patriotic War, located between the Narva River and the Victoria Bastion. To protect themselves against possible local protests, the authorities deployed additional police force in Narva blocking the access roads to the monuments to be dismantled.
In 2023, Estonian authorities continued their fight against the Narva monument while trying to legalise their actions to demolish the monument. On 4 January, the Chancellery sought the Narva authorities' consent to remove from public space two other monuments with Soviet symbols. One of these is a memorial plaque with the names of residents of Prinarovye died between 1941 and 1945 at the hands of the Nazis, which is located in Voidu Park near the former Vasily Gerasimov Palace of Culture. The second is a tombstone in the Dark Garden marking the burial place of Communists and Red Army soldiers fallen in the battles for Narva in November 1918. The Chancellery also sought the Sillamäe authorities' consent to remove a Soviet monument to the Unknown Soldier erected in 1975.[3899] In April 2023, Minister of the Interior Lauri Läänemets signed an order, under which the land in Narva, the former site of the T‑34 tank monument, was to be expropriated. The declared intention was to convert it to a surveillance position to "monitor Russia."[3900]
Besides, Narva residents were forbidden to celebrate the 79th anniversary of the town's liberation from Nazi invaders. Estonia's police imposed an official ban on any public gatherings in Narva from 26 July to 2 August 2023. Estonia's law enforcers did not even allow a group of former juvenile prisoners of Hitler's concentration camps to lay flowers on a mass grave to Soviet soldiers. There was a police presence at all potential venues for commemorative events. Ideological affinity between Estonia's authorities and the Nazis was illustrated by the head of the Narva police station, Indrek Püvi, saying that "laying flowers on the day the Red Army marched into Estonia clearly supports Russia's propaganda narratives".[3901]
According to journalist Aleksey Stefanov, the T‑34 tank, which was transferred from Narva to the Military Museum, became an object for real pilgrimage. According to the museum's management, thirty-three thousand people visited it in 2022, whereas before the pandemic, the museum received up to twenty-four thousand visitors annually. Museum director Hellar Lill admitted that the record number was achieved thanks to the transfer of a T‑34 tank forcibly removed from the street of Narva. He called the tank "the most famous piece" in the museum's collection. Hellar Lill also pointed out that people from Narva and other Estonian settlements come to see the T‑34. The Director specified that Narva residents are interested in the condition of the monument, which they have considered for many years to be theirs.[3902]
The Russian Embassy sent Notes of Protest to the Estonian Foreign Ministry regarding all the above acts of vandalism against war memorials, as well as similar barbaric episodes that took place earlier. In August 2022, the Russian diplomatic mission made an attempt to inquire as to the legal basis for the authorities' actions and whereabouts of the dismantled monuments, dates and sites of reburial of the remains (photographs of the new graves, their size, layout, geographical coordinates, address, number of buried persons), as well as whether the remains were identified during the exhumation and what the results were. No response has been received.
The Embassy's major efforts to protect the memory of the Great Patriotic War, preserve memorials and graves of Soviet soldiers and officers, as well as strong response to attempts to glorify the Nazis and their accomplices were widely supported by enthusiasts from the Russian community and certain organisations of compatriots, primarily uniting veterans, former residents of besieged Leningrad and juvenile prisoners of the Fascist concentration camps.
The Estonian authorities do not intend to stop at the achieved in their "war against monuments" to Red Army soldiers on Estonian territory. It was reported on 12 January 2023 that a memorial at the mass grave of Soviet soldiers in Kohtla-Järve was destroyed. Representatives of Estonian law enforcement agencies notified the city administration about the planned act of state vandalism just half an hour in advance. The monument in the form of a female figure was located in a mass grave in the cemetery in the old part of the city. It was there that Kohtla-Järve residents brought flowers to celebrate the Victory Day.[3903]
In May 2023, three mass graves located in Haapsalu were excavated. The former monument to Soviet soldiers was dismantled and the remains of the Red Army soldiers were reburied in an abandoned corner of one of the city's cemeteries.[3904]
In June 2023, excavations of the mass grave of Soviet soldiers in Tapa began. The monument to the soldiers of the Soviet Army that stood there was already demolished in 2022. The authorities did not get to the remains in the grave until over a year later. They have also been reburied in a place without many people nearby.[3905]
On 9 February 2023, at a government press conference, Foreign Minister Urmas Reinsalu announced that 64 monuments to Red Army soldiers were removed from public space and about 150 more remained.[3906]
According to the Estonian Ministry of Defence, the government is covering the related costs, which are estimated at EUR 1.42 million.[3907] Estonia's authorities continue to finance it despite the economic crisis the country has faced.
It should be stressed that all the actions of the Estonian authorities in destroying monuments to Soviet soldiers and sacrilegious transfer of their remains have not been enshrined in law. As stated above, in March 2023, Estonian president Alar Karis denied the approval of the relevant bill as "contravening the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia."[3908] Nevertheless, the Estonian authorities persistently continue the "war" against monuments.
Is should be also noted that the "war" on monuments declared in Estonia is not limited to monuments in honour of the Red Army soldiers who died in the battles to liberate the country from Nazism. The Estonian authorities take active steps to "rebury" the remains of Soviet soldiers.
In November 2023, the Estonian War Museum announced the reburial of the remains of 18 servicemen of the Soviet Army and Navy buried in the Tallinn Military Cemetery under the pretext of "clearing a passage" to the monument to the Knights of the Cross of Freedom. The burials of soldiers who died after the war fell under this initiative. It took on horrifying scopes. On 31 January 2024, the Russian Embassy in Estonia reported that relevant information signs announcing the upcoming "reburial" appeared at 38 graves of soldiers. Such actions of the cemetery administration are aimed at quietly waiting six months from the date of installation of the signs and, without attracting attention or notifying the relatives of the buried, dismantle the headstones "in the absence of objections", thus abusing the remains of the buried. The Russian Embassy called such actions a blasphemous act of state vandalism against Soviet (Russian) war memorial heritage sites, aimed at revising the outcome of the Second World War. The Embassy's website published a list of burial sites[3909] to be "relocated". The Chairman of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation, Alexander Bastrykin, has instructed the central office of the agency to conduct an investigation in connection with information about such intentions of the Estonian authorities.[3910]
As a result of blasphemous activities of the Estonian authorities to "fight" against Soviet monuments and mass graves of Red Army soldiers, as of the beginning of May 2024, 160 tombstones with Soviet symbols were replaced with neutral ones, and 95 monuments were destroyed. To date, 24 monuments remain in the public space, as the landowner's permission to dismantle them has not been obtained. According to a statement by Hellar Lill, the director of the Military Museum, nearly 2,000 remains in war graves in public places were "reburied".[3911]
Representatives of the Estonian authorities justify their "fight" against the Soviet memorial heritage also with efforts to protect public order. According to Indrek Püvi, the head of the Narva Police Department, the number of ideologically motivated offenses has noticeably decreased in the city after the removal of the so-called Soviet monuments from the public space. This allowed the police to focus on more important issues. He claimed that the law and order situation had improved over the year and a half since most of the "red" monuments were dismantled. Police have become less concerned with "ideological rallies and public order violations near these monuments."[3912] He used this wording to refer to actions when the mostly Russian-speaking citizens paid tribute to Red Army soldiers. He also meant protests against the demolition of these memorials that were significant to them. Moreover, this representative of the Estonian authorities has earlier publicly opposed the celebration of Victory Day by the citizens.
At the end of June 2024, the Estonian authorities unilaterally began destroying the monument and "relocating the burial site" of Soviet soldiers in the village of Tehumardi on Saaremaa Island. Liis Lepik, Assistant of the head of Saaremaa rural municipality, said that the rural municipality itself applied for the "reburial". It was announced that the remains of Soviet soldiers will be reburied on the same island, at the Vanananõmme cemetery in the village of Lõmala. However, the dolomite gravestones with the names of the Red Army soldiers will not be put back after the reburial of their remains. And the text on the sword-shaped obelisk will be changed.[3913] Given recent practice in this area, it is easy to assume that these inscriptions would also reflect the parallel reality in which the Estonian authorities live.
Against this background, the Russian Embassy in Tallinn sent a note of protest to the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs with a call to stop the transfer of the remains of Soviet soldiers, which was started the day before. In this note, the Russian Embassy expressed "strong protest in connection with the commenced dismantling of the tombstones and the planned exhumation of the remains of the Red Army soldiers buried under them."[3914] The Estonian authorities were called upon to stop the blasphemous actions and immoral campaign to eradicate the objects of Soviet war memorial heritage, aimed at revising the results of the Second World War, and demanded to return the monuments to their former places. At the same time, in its commentary, the Russian Embassy pointed out the difference in the Estonian authorities' approach to the burials of Soviet soldiers and German soldiers who fought on Hitler's side. The latter receive demonstrative care. The well-maintained monument in the village of Sõrve, over which the German flag proudly hovers, serves as an example.[3915]
On 10 June 2024, another sacrilegious act of vandalism took place: The monument in the village of Pikasilla, Valga County, in honour of the Hero of the Soviet Union Yakov Lyakhov, who died on 17 September 1944, was demolished. The pilot was shot down during the assault of the German fascist invaders near the Estonian town of Tõrva and directed the burning plane at a place where there were a lot of enemy vehicles.[3916]
In addition, in June 2024, the Estonian authorities destroyed a monument to the Tallinn workers who defended the city from the Nazis in 1941. The monument was located on the Tallinn-Paldiski highway in Harku rural municipality. In the villages of Kadrina and Kose, monuments on the graves of Soviet soldiers were demolished and the remains buried under these monuments were exhumed.
There is also a noticeable difference in the attitude of Estonian authorities towards memorials in honour of Soviet soldiers and monuments to Hitler's soldiers and collaborators. Media reports describe such events emotionally and use appropriate terminology ("desecration of the memorial", "offenders", etc.). The objects in honour of Nazi collaborators are called memorials "in honour of those who fell for the freedom of Estonia". In particular, on 1 February 2024, it was reported that the Estonian Internal Security Service had arrested two men it suspected of desecrating the Sinimäe memorials on 23 and 31 January 2024. Estonian authorities accused them of allegedly acting at the request of Russian special services. One of the detainees is a Russian citizen, the other has dual citizenship of Estonia and Russia. Both defendants were placed in custody. One of those arrested, according to Estonian law enforcement services, was also involved in the desecration of Alfons Rebane's bas-relief with paint[3917],[3918]. On 24 January 2024, the Estonian authorities reported that the memorial dedicated to "Estonian freedom fighters" in Narva-Jõesuu in Sinimäe was desecrated and that a relevant criminal case was initiated.[3919] In 2023, Estonian law enforcement authorities were also quick to respond to sporadic actions against monuments to Estonian collaborators. Media reported that on the night of 9 May 2023, "at least seven monuments to soldiers of Estonia and other countries who fought on the side of Germany in World War II were vandalized" in the village of Sinimäe, Ida‑Viru County, Vaivara rural municipality. In particular, three plaques at the Grenaderimäe in the village of Sinimäe were toppled, a memorial stone near the Tallinn-Narva highway was overturned, and three other monuments near the military history museum were sprayed with white paint. The reaction of head of the Narva police station, Indrek Püvi is indicative in this regard, who stated that the police takes such incidents seriously and will do everything possible to find the offender.[3920] The actions of the local authorities are also illustrative: Since May 2023, when unknown persons toppled three memorial stones at Grenaderimäe and sprayed paint on the military museum and the memorial stones in honor of collaborators by the roadside, the Narva-Jõesuu municipality restored these memorial signs. Moreover, against this background, it turned out that the memorial signs have no legal owner, and Narva-Jõesuu city government has started the procedure to take them into its ownership.[3921] In acting so, the Estonian authorities are clearly demonstrating their sympathy for Nazi collaborators.
The law enforcement agencies of Russia are paying close attention to the sacrilegious actions of the authorities of the Baltic States aimed at destroying Soviet war memorials. In September 2023, the Russian Investigative Committee reported that it was investigating 16 criminal cases involving 143 cases of desecration, destruction or damage to war graves, monuments and memorials to Soviet soldiers. A total of 173 foreign nationals, including citizens of Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Poland and Ukraine, were prosecuted in absentia for the offences in question.[3922]
In February 2024, the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs put Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas and State Secretary Taimar Peterkop on the wanted list.[3923]
At the same time, Russia has been investigating the crimes of the Estonian punishers on the USSR territory during the Great Patriotic War. Among other things, documents have been declassified, testifying to the crimes committed by Estonian Nazi accomplices on the territory of the Pskov region, where they destroyed entire villages along with their inhabitants. In August 2021, the Pskov Regional Court recognized the established and newly revealed acts committed in 1941‑1945 by the Nazis on the territory of the former Estonian concentration camp in Moglino – as well as in various areas of the Pskov region – as war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide of national and ethnic groups living in the USSR.
Inciting Russophobia directly impacts the overall situation with hatred in the country: increase in the political weight of the right-wing nationalist forces being nurtured by authorities to fight against the "Soviet legacy" fuels xenophobia, antisemitism, neo-Nazism, as well as triggers far-right groups. This issue has been repeatedly raised by human rights activists defending the rights of the country's Russian-speaking population.
Xenophobic sentiments are on the rise, primarily among ethnic Estonians. A significant contribution to the incitement of hatred against migrants and national minorities is made by CPPE activists who do not conceal their racist views. In February 2021, head of the conservative faction in the Tallinn City Council Mart Kallas, on his Facebook page, called the opponents of the removal of the memorial to the Warrior-Liberator from the centre of Tallinn in 2007 and compatriots sympathizing with them a human trash with Soviet mentality.
It is also known that the book "Estonian handbook: 100 things that a real Estonian does" written by Mihkel Raud, a TV presenter, musician, and former member of the Riigikogu, was sold in Estonia in 2017. There is a chapter "An Estonian talks about Russians" in the book, which contains more than 30 insulting expressions, which, according to the author, "real Estonians" use to call Russians.
Moreover, the CPPE newspaper "Uued Uudised" (Fresh News) publishes daily articles inciting hostility against people of African and Asian descent and other "foreigners" and hyping around the thesis that there are threats to indigenous population which may be "displaced" by them. As a consequence, there has been an increase in public insults and physical attacks against people from Asia, Africa and the Middle East. Inter-ethnic and inter-racial hate speech is increasingly visible on social networks, but in practice the authorities do not take any steps to reduce inter-ethnic tensions.
These xenophobic attitudes among CPPE activists were also pointed out by ECRI. In particular, the Commission noted that since 2017, public discourse in Estonia became less tolerant, and that in their speeches, politicians more often divide the country's population on ethnic grounds and pit groups against each other. This particularly affected refugees and migrants, ethnic and religious minorities. It was also noted that at the 2019 general elections, CPPE publicly announced its plan to combat displacement of Estonians. This allowed the party to win almost 18 percent of the vote and become part of Estonia's government. Besides, ECRI has noted cases of racist speech by CPPE members, including their publications in social media. For instance, during the 2019 election campaign, the CPPE candidate called the mayor of Tallinn "that unfit Asian". ECRI has also noted that CPPE members made derogatory public remarks about the Russian-speaking population, particularly in the context of minority education policies and the ongoing debate about Russian-language schools in the country. The attention was also drawn to anti-Muslim, antisemitic and anti-migrant statements by the party members, mainly in the form of verbal abuse in public places.[3924]
Human rights activists note that there is a high degree of Russophobia among Estonians. Fifty percent of Russians maintain contacts with Estonians, while only 30 percent Estonians maintain contacts with Russians.
It is very noteworthy that Ukrainian labor migrants also fall victims of nationalists. In March 2021, adviser to the CPPE parliamentary faction Yury Kukk, in a note for the party's news website "Uued Uudised", complained that Ukrainian construction workers "make the public space of our national state too Russian". The threat of Russification of Estonia, according to him, "comes not only from Putin, but also from the Ukrainian labour force". At the same time, Conservative leader Mart Helme stated in the autumn of 2020 that the Language Department (language inspection until 1 August 2020), a special supervisory and punitive body that monitors the purity of the Estonian linguistic space and is not subject to parliamentary and public control, should be involved in the identification of illegal migrants, primarily from neighbouring Russian-speaking countries. Its functions are limited solely to the identification of insufficient knowledge or use of the Estonian language, followed by the imposition of sanctions and heavy fines on individuals and legal entities.
It should be noted that the spread of extreme right-wing ideologies and increasing manifestations of hatred in Estonia, as well as the reluctance of the authorities to take measures to combat these phenomena, have come to the attention of multilateral universal and regional human rights monitoring mechanisms. For example, in August 2014, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination expressed concern about the lack of a ban on racist organizations in the Criminal Code as well as the criminalization of hate speech and incitement to hatred. In addition, according to the Committee, excessively lenient measures (a fine of EUR 100) were provided in 2011 under Section 151(1) of the Estonian Criminal Code for posting comments on the Internet that are recognized as hate speech and incitement to violence.[3925] In particular, the Committee noted that the Criminal Code does not fully prohibit racist organizations, the dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or racial hatred; neither does it punish racially motivated hate speech and incitement to hatred. The Committee reiterated its concern at the lenient penalties for the cases provided for in the law. It is also noted that there are political parties and public figures who use hate speech. The use of such rhetoric goes unchecked and is not investigated by the competent authorities, and the perpetrators are not brought to justice. The Committee has also expressed its concern that hate crimes in Estonia were often not recorded or investigated as such. According to the Committee, this is confirmed by the low number of reports on the use of hate speech and hate crimes in Estonia.[3926]
The Human Rights Committee (HRCttee) pointed out in March 2019 that Estonian law does not provide equal protection against discrimination on all grounds prohibited under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in all areas of life. The HRCttee was most concerned that current Estonian legislation does not provide for comprehensive protection against hate speech and hate crimes, due to the rather lenient penalties and strict requirements for imposing them for crimes of incitement to hatred, violence or discrimination (in such cases, Article 151 of the Estonian Criminal Code requires "threats to the life, health or property" of the victim). However, other offenses, such as public denial, approval or justification of genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes, or propaganda of hatred of a racist nature, or otherwise inciting discrimination, are not prohibited by law. Against this background, it is not surprising that the Committee has observed frequent instances of hate speech, including by politicians and opinion-makers, as well as hate crimes.[3927]
On 30 October 2020 the European Commission notified Estonia about its decision to start proceedings concerning non-compliance of Tallinn with its obligations to implement EU legislation. One of the issues was the lack of qualification of racist and xenophobic motives as aggravating circumstances in the criminal legislation, evasion of Estonian authorities from criminalization of such obvious manifestations of racism and xenophobia as public justification, denial or downplaying of international crimes and Holocaust crime, public calls for violence and inciting hatred against certain groups (Estonia remains one of the two EU countries without legislative prohibition of such activities). In addition, it is noted that Estonian law does not take into account racist and xenophobic motives for committing crimes as aggravating circumstances.[3928]
With reference to the European Commission, the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights drew attention to these aspects in its report on human rights in the European Union for 2021.[3929]
In 2022, the CERD also pointed to worrying trends in the spread of hatred in Estonia, thus confirming the views of the Human Rights Committee. For example, with reference to data from Estonian officials, in particular the Ministry of Justice, it was noted that in most cases of incitement to hatred in Estonia, Article 151 (incitement to hatred) of the Criminal Code is applied, and the punishment under this article is rather mild – a fine or detention (up to 30 days). According to official statistics, between 2016 and 2020, not a single case handled by the prosecutor's office under this article went to criminal prosecution. In 2016, two cases of incitement to hatred were recorded, in 2017 – five, in 2018 – one, none were recorded in 2019 and 2020. At the same time, the NGO provides for selected data: citing Internet monitoring reports by the NGO "OpCode", it says that a total of 100 incidents were reported as illegal content on Facebook. The number of officially registered cases of hate-motivated violence is also low: of which, 15 occurred in 2016, four occurred in 2017, six occurred in 2018, ten occurred in 2019 and three occurred in 2020.[3930]
In addition, human rights activists note that activities of the Estonian human rights protection bodies, in particular the Chancellor of Justice and the Gender Equality & Equal Treatment Commissioner, in combating racial discrimination are ineffective. The decisions of the Gender Equality & Equal Treatment Commissioner are of an advisory nature. The consent of a person suspected of discrimination is required in order to initiate a conciliation procedure regarding racial discrimination against individuals. According to activists, no cases of consent to this procedure have been recorded so far. There are also no positive examples of protection from racial discrimination in judicial practice.
Another blatant manifestation of Estonia's almost neo-Nazi state policy is discrimination based on language and ethnicity. First of all, this manifests itself in the persisting practice of mass statelessness, including in the form of such a category as "non-citizens."[3931] As of 1 January 2023, there were 64,297 stateless persons in Estonia, which amounts to about five percent of the population (as compared to 66,592 non-citizens in the previous year, and 68,992 people in 2020, which is six percent). The overwhelming number of these persons is Russian compatriots and their descendants. Estonia remains among the top ten countries in the world with the highest number of stateless persons.
"Grey passport holders"[3932] are significantly limited in their civil rights: they are not allowed to vote or be elected in Estonian parliamentary elections or European Parliament elections; they are not allowed to join political parties, hold state and municipal leadership positions, or serve in the military and security forces. In 2016, stateless persons were granted the right to vote in local elections, but they cannot be elected to local governments. However, even this right of stateless persons can be abolished by the Estonian authorities. On 21 April 2022, members of the faction of Riigikogu's Fatherland party used the "disloyalty" of foreigners (referring primarily to Russian citizens and stateless persons) as a pretext to submit a bill depriving these groups of the country's population of the right to vote in local elections.
According to the Estonian Law on Ratification of the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, "non-citizens" are not eligible for protection under this instrument. For this category alone, registration at the place of residence is requisite for the exercise of their social and economic rights. Besides, "grey passport holders" experience serious difficulties during international travel.
In 1992, the residents of the country who did not have citizenship of the pre‑war Estonian Republic (1920-1940) or who were not descendants of its citizens became stateless. The Estonian authorities' justification for such deprivation of rights is that "non-citizens" themselves or their parents were "brought" to Estonia during the "Soviet occupation." Having made such decision Estonia grossly violated the norms and principles of the Treaty on the Foundations of Interstate Relations of 12 January 1991 between the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic and the Republic of Estonia, in particular, Article 3, which stipulates as follows: "The Parties shall provide the opportunity to obtain citizenship of their countries to all the permanent residents of the respective territories in accordance with their freely expressed desire." Accordingly, children born in Estonia to stateless persons were also stateless. Estonia has not yet acceded to such key international documents in this area as the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, and the 1997 European Convention on Nationality.
Despite regular criticism from international organizations, including the UN, the OSCE and the EU (represented by the European Parliament), as well as human rights NGOs, the Estonian authorities, following the policy laid down in 1991 to build a mono-ethnic and mono-lingual state, refuse to grant full civil status to this category of residents of the country, requiring them to pass advanced exams to confirm their proficiency in the Estonian language.
The 1995 Law on Citizenship stipulates that Estonian citizenship is acquired by birth by a child at least one of whose parents holds Estonian citizenship at the time of the birth of the child. The rest are offered "naturalization," that is, obtaining citizenship by acquisition.
Now the requirements for foreigners who have reached the age of 15, are the following: to have a long-term residence permit or the right of permanent residence; to live in Estonia before applying for citizenship for at least eight years, of which the last five – permanently; to have a registered place of residence in the country; to know the Estonian language at level B1;[3933] to know the Constitution of Estonia and the Law on Citizenship; to have permanent legal income, to be "loyal to the Estonian State"; to swear allegiance to the Estonian constitutional order.
Birth of new "non-citizens" stopped only on 1 January 2016 after an amendment to the Law on Citizenship came into force, allowing children of "grey passport holders" born in Estonia to acquire Estonian citizenship if they had legally lived in the country for at least five years at the time of their birth. As a small "indulgence," in June 2018, stateless persons were given the opportunity to attend the Estonian language classes covered by the State budget to subsequently pass the citizenship test. The number of "non-citizens" declines – like in neighbouring Latvia, where this shameful, but acceptable (due to the lack of adequate response) for the EU phenomenon, still persists – mainly due to natural causes.
A certain progress was made as amendments to the Law of the Republic of Estonia on Citizenship came into force in February 2020, which facilitated the procedure of application for citizenship for minors born in Estonia to a "grey-passport" parent or grandparent who had lived in the country before 20 August 1991, with the other parent being a foreign citizen. However, if a minor applying for Estonian citizenship is a citizen of another state, they must renounce that citizenship in advance. There are about 1,500 children under the age of 18 living in Estonia entitled to the simplified application procedure. However, most of them (about 1,300) have Russian citizenship, while Russian legislation does not allow them to renounce it and get other country's passport before their 18th birthday.[3934] Thus, the vast majority of persons covered by the amendments cannot actually take advantage of the exemptions.
International human rights monitoring mechanisms pay considerable attention to the problem of statelessness in Estonia. In January 2017, the Committee on the Rights of the Child noted the limited nature of the amendments to the Law on Citizenship and urged the Estonian authorities to ensure the accelerated naturalization of children of non-citizens.[3935] Following her visit to Estonia (11‑15 June 2018), CoE Commissioner for Human Rights Dunja Mijatović raised the issue of easing the conditions of naturalization for persons above 65, pointing out that many Russian-speaking older persons are still unable to obtain Estonian citizenship because of their inability to learn the Estonian language.[3936]
In February 2019, the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights expressed concern in this regard (CESCR; according to the Committee, as of 1 January 2019, non-citizens made up 5.5 percent of the total population.) At the same time, CESCR criticized the 2015 amendments to the Law on Citizenship, which, in its opinion, were of a limited nature and did not apply to a number of categories of children.[3937] In April 2019, the Human Rights Committee also expressed concern about the limited scope of the amendments insofar as they excluded certain categories of stateless children; the stringent language requirements that formed part of the naturalization tests; and the adverse impact of the "undetermined citizenship" status on the right of stateless persons to political participation, and recommended to take measures to address these gaps.[3938]
In April 2022, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination highlighted a special issue: members of national minorities and "non-citizens" are sentenced to imprisonment more often as compared to other residents of Estonia. In particular, the Committee pointed out the high number of non-Estonians and "non-citizens" among the prison population. It was also concerned about reports of incidents where prison authorities refused to accept and translate complaints from prisoners that were not written in the official language. CERD experts stressed that this practice limited the opportunities of inmates of minority origin to file complaints. In this context, the Committee reiterated its recommendation that Estonia eliminated discrimination against prisoners on the basis of their lack of proficiency in the Estonian language and that prisoners are not penalized with regard to administrative and disciplinary matters because they do not have a sufficient understanding of the Estonian language.[3939]
The comments and recommendations mentioned above have been ignored by Estonia. At the same time, right-wing nationalist politicians from the ruling parties do not hide their hopes to solve the problem of "non-citizens" in a natural way (that is, through natural decline, migration, etc.).
The infringement of the rights of national minorities in Estonia, primarily Russian-speaking, which, according to human rights activists, makes up more than 30 percent of the country's population, remains an acute problem. The problems in question are closely connected, since it is the Russian-speaking population that represents the majority of non-citizens. The mother tongue education is an issue of great concern, given that in Estonia ethnic Estonians, their language and culture enjoy institutionalized supremacy over other ethnic groups living in the country,[3940] so they are not able to exercise their political, social, economic and cultural rights in full. The Estonian Ministry of Education and Research designed the Estonian Language Strategy for 2021-2035, which completely eliminates education in Russian, starting in preschools.
Estonian ruling elite have always been transparent about their intentions to eliminate the Russian-language space in the country. Top-level Estonian officials have called for the elimination of the Russian-language education. For example, in December 2019, then-President Kersti Kaljulaid publicly stated that "we have actually decided to switch to a unified Estonian-language education system." On 24 February 2021, on Estonian Independence Day she said that sending Russian children to Estonian schools is not just the right of Russian parents, but their obligation.[3941] On 28 December 2022, Kersti Kaljulaid, already not being the president of the state (on 11 October 2021 Alar Karis took office of the president of the Republic of Estonia), tried to give a good look to actions of Estonian authorities in elimination of the Russian-language education, stating that it was a safety issue for a small state, so that "we all stay in one information space and there is no situation that our Russian-speaking people receive worse education and therefore they have less opportunities." At the same time, she revealed the real motive of the Estonian authorities, pointing out that students who receive education in Russian probably have "an entirely different worldview."[3942]
Recently, the media has been actively manipulating public opinion promoting the idea of the "need and demand" for the transition to "unified school" and "single educational system" allegedly intended to benefit Russian population, the worse social and economic situation of which is supposedly connected to low official language proficiency. Such policy suggests that there will be no separate Estonian and Russian schools and kindergartens, but institutions teaching in Estonian and offering students from non-majority communities some optional opportunities to maintain their spoken native language.
To date, any opportunity for the Russian-language education has been eradicated in the country. Estonian authorities continue to disregard the Hague Recommendations regarding the Education Rights of National Minorities prepared on the initiative of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities in October 1996 and containing references to fundamental international documents in this area: the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (Art. 4); the UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Education (Art. 5); the Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE (Paragraph 34); Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (Art. 14).
The Russian language is almost completely excluded from the higher education system. The only option of the Russian-language education available in Tallinn University and the University of Tartu is partial Russian-language instruction for those majoring in Russian Philology (Bachelor's degree) and Slavic Languages and Cultures (Master's degree). Russian-language programmes are still available at the private Estonian Business School of Applied Sciences and the Estonian Academy of Art. As a consequence, the rate of Russian-language high school graduates entering Estonian universities barely reaches 30 percent, while the proportion of those of Estonian-language schools exceeds 50 percent.
The systematic forced Estonianization of upper and vocational secondary education (10‑12 grades) and preschool education is almost completed. With the adoption of another legislative innovation by the country's authorities, all opportunities to receive education in mother tongue are completely eliminated (until the end of the current academic year, the quotas established earlier, when no more than 40 percent of subjects could be taught in Russian in upper secondary schools, are still in effect). On 19 December 2022, the president of Estonia approved the amendments[3943] to the Law on Basic School and Upper Secondary School. Under the amended law, from 1 September 2024 on, first and fourth grade pupils and pre-schoolers will have to switch to Estonian. Teachers and educators must have a certificate of proficiency in Estonian at (academic) level C1 as a qualification requirement by 1 August 2024, and principals from 1 August 2023. This will be monitored by the Department of Languages,[3944] which can impose fines of up to EUR 9,600 on employers. The 10th to 12th grades will be able to continue studying in the 60/40 scheme (i.e. no more than 40 percent of subjects in Russian) until school year 2029/2030 (the Russian language will be phased out by 2029 in secondary schools, and in upper secondary schools – by 2033.) After that, schools must switch to teaching exclusively in the official language within three years. On 16 December 2022, shortly before this amendment was passed, a 2030 plan of action for Russian schools to switch to Estonian language education was approved.[3945]
Some Estonian municipal officials started to implement this discriminatory government decision "ahead of schedule." For example, in Tartu, the local authorities announced that two local schools and three kindergartens will switch to the state language by 2025. In this regard, deputy mayor Lemmit Kaplinski said, "The state has set the goal to complete the reform by 2033. But this is our time limit, and we can do it even faster taking into account our good starting positions."[3946]
The remaining formal reservations, which allegedly allow for "native language and culture" lessons, are unable to cover the educational needs of Russian-speaking children. The measures developed by the Estonian authorities discriminate against Russian school teachers: those who do not pass the Estonian language proficiency exam by August 2023 will be fired, even though there was no one to replace them in the country.[3947]
On 15 January 2024, responding to questions about unified Estonian-language education raised by members of the Estonian Parliament, Prime Minister Kaja Kallas confirmed the intentions of the authorities to stop funding Russian-language education. Seeking to whitewash such actions of authorities to destroy every opportunity to study in Russian, Kaja Kallas claimed that Estonia has no desire to "Russify" the state's children. According to Kaja Kallas, in order to achieve these objectives, the authorities will work to ensure that all Estonia's citizens are part of a single information space, speak Estonian, and the number of people using Estonian continues to grow.[3948]
In addition to that, the Estonian government is implementing a program of merging Russian-language and Estonian-language secondary and upper secondary schools under the pretext of "optimization" and saving money, as well as transferring them from the jurisdiction of local governments to the Estonian Ministry of Education and Science. As a result, completely Estonian-language educational institutions (Keila, Tartu, Rakvere, Haapsalu, Viljandi, Kohtla-Järve, Põlva, Võru, etc.) appear without regard to the interests of Russian students and their parents. Moreover, Estonian courts often uphold the actions of local authorities.
Several illustrative examples of this approach can be provided. First is the merger of the Russian and Estonian upper secondary schools in Kohtla-Järve in 2019 (with ethnic Russian accounting for 75 percent of the city's population) into a fully Estonian-language public upper secondary school without any discussion of this step with the Russian-speaking community. Russian-speaking students in this institution have faced blatant discrimination on linguistic and ethnic grounds exercized by the administration and Estonian teachers since the first days of study. Besides, similar reform was scheduled to take place at Russian educational institutions in Narva (where more than 90 percent of the population is Russian-speaking) and Mustvee rural municipality by 2022.
The same happened to the school in Kallaste (Peipsiääre rural municipality, the town is inhabited by descendants of Russian Old Believers), which was moved to the village of Kolkja, and to the school in Kiviõli (Lüganuse rural municipality, Ida-Viru county). First, both schools were transformed from upper secondary schools to secondary schools. As for the Kallaste school, it was decided to move it to the village of Kolkja, where there was also a Russian school. On 1 July 2021, the Russian school in Kallaste was closed. Earlier, as a result of the 2017 administrative reform, which envisaged merging rural municipalities, the rural municipalities inhabited by the descendants of the Old Believers of Lake Peipus region were dissolved and merged with Estonian ones. As a result, the newly formed municipalities became predominantly Estonian, and the descendants of the Russian Old Believers lost their self-government. In this way the authorities were able to make decisions without taking into account the opinion of the Russian population.[3949]
The alarming situation with Kiviõli school occured in 2021 and followed the same pattern. As a result of the administrative reform to unite Kiviõli with the surrounding villages populated by Estonians, the rate of Estonian population in the new municipality increased. As a consequence, local authorities plan to merge the school with the Estonian-speaking school as part of the reform of the local school network, but they do not discuss the process with the school administration. The school staff has resented such negligent attitude on the part of the authorities and the fact that their inquiries as to the nature and the process of the reform have been disregarded.[3950]
The next negative example is the following: under the very same "optimization" pretext, in November 2019 the municipal authorities of Keila eliminated the only Russian school in the city. This was made despite the opposition of parents and their rallies for preserving the Russian-language school. It is illustrative that at the town meeting that decided to close the Russian school, the mayor said that the purpose of closing it was to create a single Estonian community in the city (according to civic activists, this was recorded in the minutes of the meeting).[3951]
In February 2021, the Tallinn District Court ruled to dismiss the appeals of students' parents and uphold the decision of 19 August 2020 of the administrative court refusing to overturn Keila's authorities' decision to reorganize the town's school system. On 21 June 2021, the Estonian Supreme Court also dismissed a cassation appeal challenging this decision to close the school. The plaintiffs announced that they were going to appeal this decision to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).
As a result of such cynical policy of the Estonian authorities, the number of Russian-language basic schools in Estonia has considerably reduced within the recent ten years. As of 2021, there were 74 Russian-language secondary schools in Estonia, educating 20 percent of the country's school pupils.[3952] The country's largest school is the Linnamäe Russian Lyceum in Tallinn educating about 2,000 children.[3953]
Civic activists in Estonia who defend the right to maintain education in Russian note that the transfer of Russian children to education in Estonian leads to a decrease in their competitiveness in the educational sphere. This is supported by a scientifically informed opinion. In their study "Foreign-speaking child in Estonian school" (Institute of Psychology, Tallinn University, Tallinn, 2012), Professor Alexander Pulver and Professor Aaro Toomela acknowledge that Russian-speaking children studying in Estonian schools cannot fulfill their potential performing a level lower than they would if taught in their native tongue. Children with high abilities show average results. Children of average ability correspondingly perform poorly. This does not happen with teaching in the native language: in this case children develop and maintain their level of achievement. The difficulties faced by Russian-speaking children in Estonian schools undermine their self-esteem. Children who study in their native language do not experience such changes. Thus, we cannot talk about equal educational opportunities. Showing results below their abilities, Russian children are limited in getting education and especially in continuing it at a higher level (gymnasium and university).[3954]
Public activists also point out that the main problem in the integration of Russian-speaking students is not their poor command of Estonian, but rather the inability of Estonian authorities to provide quality teaching of the official language after all the years of the country's independence. Furthermore, the dismantlement of the system of training and professional development for Russian-speaking teachers in 1990s has had a very negative impact on Russian-speaking schools. Estonian textbooks and Russian-speaking teachers of Estonian are lacking. Estonians are extremely reluctant to teach in Russian schools and gymnasiums. The situation is aggravated by the fact that the whole education sector in Estonia is in a rather deplorable state. The Estonian budget allocates insufficient funding for this area and, consequently, teachers' salaries are low, which causes dissatisfaction among the staff. In November 2023, Estonian school and kindergarten employees held a warning strike over the government's inaction on low wages. Three-quarters of the country's educational institutions have joined the strike demanding salary increases.[3955] Since the authorities did not make concessions, claiming that there were no funds in the budget to increase salaries, Estonian teachers started a new strike on 22 January 2024. It was originally declared open-ended, but the timing of specific faculty members' participation is voluntary. According to the Education Workers Union, 9,471 teachers from 330 schools are participating. The strikers' demand is to increase the minimum monthly salary for teachers in general education schools by EUR 150 (to make it EUR 1,950), as the high workload and low salaries lead to a growing shortage of teachers.[3956] The strike ended on 30 January 2024 with an agreement with the government that slightly increased the minimum wage for teachers (EUR 1,820). As of 31 January 2024, schools reopened.
As a result, as Tallinn is pursuing a policy towards the Estonianization of all spheres, primarily education, Russian-speaking children are not merely assimilated, but are also deprived of the right to receive education in their native language, which automatically limits their access to quality education and, consequently, their ability to maintain a decent standard of living. Aleksandr Chaplygin, editor-in-chief of the Russian-language newspaper Stolitsa in Tallinn, pointed out that translating education into Estonian would be a blow to children's academic performance. In particular, he noted the following, "Receiving an education in a non-native language is inherently harder." No special techniques are provided. Children are thrown into the water without a life preserver. Schools will breed underachievers whose top career will be working as a janitor or cashier. Apparently, lawmakers want to cut off Russians from higher education. President of the Association of Baltic Studies Nikolai Mezhevich also noted that in Estonia they are trying to destroy the Russian-speaking diaspora and in a short period of time to finish Russian education, Russian culture, Russian journalism.[3957]
The NGO "Russian School of Estonia" monitors the situation and takes active measures to inform multilateral universal and regional human rights mechanisms about these violations. In August 2022, its leadership informed the Advisory Committee on Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (AC FCNM) in the Council of Europe about Estonia's flagrant violation of the provisions of the document.[3958] On 1 October 2022, the Annual Congress of the Federal Union of European Nationalities in Berlin adopted a resolution condemning the closure of Russian schools and kindergartens and discrimination against the Russian minority in the country.[3959] Assessment of the forced Estoniniazation of Russian education was brought to the attention of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, Kairat Abdrakhmanov, at a meeting in Tallinn on 10 November 2022.[3960]
In mid-December 2022, the information portal www.baltija.eu posted a public appeal of the "Russian School of Estonia" calling on local (Estonian) governments to launch the constitutional oversight mechanism and recognize the amendments to the laws on education in the Russian language as unconstitutional.[3961]
In March 2023, representatives of the NGO "Russian School of Estonia" held a working meeting with Eleonora Lotti, Senior Adviser to the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, who was informed of the plans of the Estonian Government aimed at the complete Estonianization of the country's educational institutions.[3962]
The issue of discrimination in Estonia on the basis of proficiency in the official language has become the focus of international human rights monitoring mechanisms, which in most cases did nothing but contribute to legalizing Estonian authorities' efforts aimed at forced assimilation of Russian-speaking community. However, even these mechanisms could not ignore the blatant violations of the rights of Russians residing in Estonia. In August 2014, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination noted with concern the discrepancies in employment and income levels between the Estonian and non-Estonian populations based on language proficiency.[3963] In 2022, the Committee had to come back to the issue again noting the lack of progress on it. The Committee has also pointed out the differences in employment and income between the Estonian and non-Estonian population, including on the basis of proficiency or lack of proficiency in the language.[3964]
In 2015, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) operating within the Council of Europe drew attention to problems related to language discrimination in Estonia. The Commission noted, among other things, that Estonian legislation (especially the Equal Treatment Act) does not provide protection against discrimination on the basis of language and citizenship, and that the requirements for national minorities to pass the Estonian language are too complicated.[3965]
ECRI also focused on this problem in 2022. It noted that during the contact visit of its delegation to a number of Estonian regions, representatives of the Russian-speaking population had expressed concerns about the implementation of the 60 percent quota of teaching in Estonian in high (upper secondary) schools. It also noted the difficulties experienced by a number of Russian-speaking pupils and students in acquiring mastery in core subjects that were taught only in Estonian, in particular in high school; shortages of teachers having the required linguistic qualifications in Russian-speaking schools and the lack of flexibility in the implementation of the 60 percent quota. ECRI noted with concern the persisting performance gap between Estonian and Russian schools, which, in its opinion, was worsening regional disparities and hindering mobility across the country because of the language barrier. It was also mentioned that the situation of the Russian-speaking population remained characterized by higher levels of social exclusion.[3966]
In January 2017, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child expressed concern about the language policy in secondary education, which often prevented Russian-speaking students from acquiring mastery in core subjects. It also pointed to general discrimination against children belonging to ethnic minorities in accessing education.[3967]
In February 2019, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) expressed concern over the lack of flexibility in the implementation of percentage quotas for teaching in Estonian in the Russian-speaking upper secondary schools. The Committee's experts believed that it often made it difficult for Russian-speaking students in Russian-speaking schools to acquire mastery in core subjects that were taught only in Estonian and, in the case of vocational schools, led to an insufficient number of qualified teachers capable of teaching the specialized subjects. The situation is exacerbated by the punitive approach of the Estonian authorities to enforcing the Law on Language, including through the mandate and functions of the Language Inspectorate.[3968]
The UN Committee for Human Rights has expressed concern about the impact of language policies and practices, which continue to impede the full enjoyment of the rights of the Russian-speaking population on an equal basis with the rest of the country's population. It also supported CESCR's opinion that a quota for teaching in Estonian was applied without flexibility.[3969]
The lack of constructive dialogue between Estonian authorities and the communities of national minorities about language-related developments and the role of the Language Inspectorate was also emphasized by the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (AC FCNM) in 2015.[3970] In 2022, the AC FCNM paid considerable attention to the issue of teaching in Russian in Estonia once again. The Advisory Committee pointed out that the education system, in dividing into Russian-language schools and Estonian-language schools, was not conducive to promoting intercultural dialogue, but rather enforced dividing lines between communities, risking the creation of parallel societies. This is also relevant for the Roma and other minorities who attend the Russian-language schools. The Advisory Committee stressed that there was a strong desire among the Russian minority to maintain Russian as a medium of instruction for a substantial part of the curriculum, in addition to Estonian. The body was also concerned about the tendency shown by the Russian-speaking students to give up studies due to the lack of proficiency in Estonian. The Committee also cited the opinion of the organizations protecting the rights of the Russian-speaking community about Estonian studies allegedly showing that attendees of Russian-language schools were 1‑1.5 years behind their counterparts who attend Estonian schools in terms of achievements in education. It was pointed out that these results were a consequence of the increased teaching in Estonian in public schools since 2007, which by default put students speaking Russian as their native language at disadvantage, rather than a fault in the system itself. The AC FCNM was concerned about the unequal achievements in education of Russian-speaking students compared to the majority and called for an independent research into the causes of these disparities. In this context it emphasized that both the Advisory Committee and the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe have previously raised these concerns with the Estonian authorities when the transition to Estonian as a language of instruction began. They warned back then that the lack of analysis of the quality of education raised questions about the compatibility of the transition with the right to education for students studying in Russian-language schools. Besides, the Advisory Committee noted that due to the low presence of minorities' issues in school curricula, the general population in Estonia knew very little about national minorities. Among other things, the AC FCNM pointed out that the restricted scope of subjects taught in Russian in "integrated" secondary schools appear neither sufficient, nor reflective of the full richness of Russian culture. The Advisory Committee believed that classes in advanced Russian language or broader Russian culture – even if elective – could help remedy this situation. In its opinion, this step would provide students with a richer curriculum and consequently a broader understanding of the Russian culture.[3971]
Problems with the use of the Russian language in Estonia are noted not only in the educational sphere, but in general with regard to the possibility of its application in various spheres of public life. Estonia, which ratified the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities in late 1990s, evades implementing the provisions of its Article 11, which expressly bind the Parties to recognise the patronymics of national minorities, and refuses to enter this data in national identity documents issued to its Russian-speaking residents. The Estonian authorities also ignore the recommendations of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to officially recognise the patronymics of Russian-speaking residents. In particular, in February 2019, the CESCR noted that administrative barriers against the use of patronymics in official personal documents, which Estonian authorities put up, restricted certain national minorities from enjoying their right to protect their cultural identity.[3972]
The initiatives of the ruling party to introduce a legislative ban on the Russian language have also been recorded. For example, in 2022, the CPPE introduced amendments to the Estonian Parliament to ban the use of any language other than the state language in the public sphere. The bill also included a provision that "Estonian texts may be accompanied by a translation into a foreign language, but not into Russian". Eduard Odinets (the Social Democratic Party of Estonia), Chairman of the Constitutional Committee of the Riigikogu, pointed out that if this draft law were adopted, public and private legal entities in Estonia would no longer be able to use the Russian language in their work. According to him, the authors of the bill wanted to ban Russian-language channels on the Public Broadcasting, private media and the Russian Theatre. The CPPE has reached the highest point of absurdity with its desire to hurt the national minorities living in Estonia and to put them in their place. This party wants to discriminate against one national group and all people whose first language is Russian," Odinets said. He also wondered about further initiatives in this regard, suggesting that "burning books published in Russian" could be expected next. According to him, the very fact that the parliament of one of the EU countries was forced to discuss a ban on the use of one of the languages in public space is shameful.[3973] In November 2022, this scandalous initiative was rejected. A number of experts noted that the introduction of such an odious bill was part of the electoral campaign of the CPPE before the next parliamentary elections. In particular, this was pointed out by Riigikogu MP Jaak Aab (Centre Party).[3974]
There are also cases of infringement of rights and interests of Russian-speaking people of Estonia in social and economic sphere. According to statistical data, the share of unemployed is twice as high among the Russian-speaking population as among Estonian one. There is a clear imbalance in the civil service, where the number of non-Estonians does not exceed 3 percent (while the share of non-Estonian population is about 30 percent). This problem was highlighted in February 2019 by the CESCR, which subjected Estonian authorities to criticism for the persistent discrimination against the non-Estonian-speaking population, which faces systemic discrimination in all areas of public life due to their lack of proficiency in the Estonian language. This, according to CESCR experts, is evidenced by the high level of unemployment and poverty among the non-Estonian-speaking population[3975].
This issue was also highlighted by ECRI and the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (AC FCNM). ECRI noted that the unemployment rate of Russians was still significantly higher (9.4 percent) than Estonians (5.8 percent) in 2020. 29.3 percent of persons living in the Ida-Virumaa county, which the ECRI delegation visited during its visit, was at risk of falling below the poverty line in 2019. The Commission pointed out a very important and indicative negative trend: Russians occupy the most disadvantaged positions in the Estonian labour market. Along with that a number of challenges faced by the Russian-speaking community in the area of education due to the language of instruction were also stressed. The Commission noted that the spread of the coronavirus had an adverse impact on employment rates of the Russian-speaking population, as their jobs often did not allow remote working. Moreover, many of them refused to reveal symptoms of illness for the fear of losing jobs.[3976]
The ACFC also noted a higher unemployment rate among the Russian population than among Estonians. The Advisory Committee pointed out that in Ida-Viru county, the unemployment rate increased by more than the national average, reaching 12.3 percent in 2020 (up from 8.7 percent in 2019). Across the country, "non-Estonians" also saw a larger increase in unemployment than Estonians (3 percent v 2 percent).[3977]
As of 4 August 2024, the highest unemployment rate was still in the Russian-speaking region in North-East Estonia, where it increased from 12.9 percent to 13.1 percent.[3978]
The problem of unequal representation of majority and minority communities in local authorities, especially in Tallinn, remains unsolved. If we proceed from the principle of proportional representation, then in the Estonian capital, which has about 350 thousand voters, one deputy of the City Assembly (79 seats) should be elected from about 4,430 eligible citizens. However, according to the law on local elections, 16 deputies are elected to the Tallinn City Assembly from the largest "Russian" district Lasnamäe (over 100 thousand voters), while 6 deputies are elected from the predominantly "Estonian" district Pirita (slightly more than 13 thousand voters). Thus, to elect one deputy the "Russian" district needs about 6 thousand votes, while the "Estonian" district needs only 2 thousand.
The whole range of the problems that the Russian-speaking population and national minorities in Estonia face was noted by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in April 2022.[3979] In particular, the Committee was concerned about the lack of balance between the measures adopted by the country's authorities to impose the Estonian language and promote proficiency in Estonian, and minorities' opportunities to enjoy the right to use their native languages, which was reflected, among other things, in the authorities' goal to transition to Estonian-language school education. CERD also stressed that Estonian authorities continued to rely on punitive elements in their approach to the promotion of the official language, particularly in the realm of employment. The Committee discussed that issue in detail, emphasising that while the Equal Treatment Act prohibited discrimination against an employee or a potential employee based on criteria such as nationality and ethnic origin, different treatment based on Estonian language proficiency was not considered discrimination in practice. The Committee was also concerned at the discrepancies between the employment and income levels of the Estonian and non-Estonian populations, including as a result of language proficiency. It was noted that the Language Act restricted the use of minority languages in public administration only to local governments. Besides, minorities' need for self-identification was not sufficiently addressed, including due to the impossibility to use patronymics.
In this context, it was recommended that Tallinn should reconsider the best balance between its recognition of diversity and the degree to which it made the Estonian language a condition for employment and other essentials of its non-Estonian-speaking citizens. To eliminate discrimination of national minorities in the field of employment, CERD reiterated its recommendation that Estonia ensured that language requirements in relation to employment are based on objective criteria and are linked to the needs for the performance of each individual job, and that it continued to be mindful of indirect discrimination effects of public policies on vulnerable groups. Furthermore, the recommendation was reiterated that the Estonian authorities intensify their efforts to address the persistent disadvantages of minority groups with regard to rates of employment and remuneration based on the State language proficiency. In addition to the above, Estonia was recommended to review its legislation to allow a wider scope for the use of minority languages in public administration and to take measures to address minorities' need for self-identification.
In August 2023, the UN Human Rights Council Special Rapporteur on minority issues Fernand de Varennes, Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights Alexandra Xanthaki, and Special Rapporteur on education Farida Shaheed said that as a result of Estonian authorities' education reform minorities' language was effectively eliminated as a medium of instruction. In their joint statement they noted with concern that the amendments adopted in December 2022 envisaging transition to Estonian-language education severely restricted education in Estonia's minority languages and virtually eliminated minority language education. They expressed particular concern about how the new provisions could affect members of the Russian linguistic minority, who make up a significant proportion of the country's population. It was also noted that despite protests from Russian-speaking parents and children, a number of Russian-language schools were closed in recent years.[3980]
The recommendations given by human rights monitoring mechanisms to the Estonian authorities in regard to elimination of discrimination against Russian-speaking residents in Estonia are also confirmed by many civic activists who point out that Russian people in Estonia are almost completely squeezed out of many important spheres of the economy. The authorities' policy aimed at "integration" of the non-Estonian population while disregarding social and economic integration only exacerbates the situation. For example, it is much more difficult for a Russian entrepreneur to take on a loan than for an Estonian one. In addition, even Russians who know Estonian do not stand competition with Estonians. As a result, inequality between ethnic communities in the country continues to increase. The unemployment rate among Estonians stands at 5.8 percent while among Russians it reaches 9.4 percent. The largest number of unemployed is recorded in the regions inhabited by Russians (mainly in the Ida-Viru county).
Regardless of the development of the economic situation, the regional units of the country with predominantly Russian population receive less government funding. As a result, the poorest municipalities in Estonia are those populated by Russians. The poorest places include the cities of Narva, Kohtla-Järve, Sillamäe in the Ida-Viru county, and the town of Maardu near Tallinn.
A sharp deterioration in the situation of the Russian-speaking population is evidenced by the report on the results of integration monitoring published by the Estonian Ministry of Culture on 10 May 2021. These results confirm that the government's integration reform in Estonia has virtually failed. Forced Estonianization does not contribute to the natural involvement of national minorities into the Estonian society. Thus, 29 percent of non-Estonians believe that "they are not welcome here" (in 2016, it was only 16 percent of respondents). 38 percent of non-Estonians feel that they are "second-class people" in Estonia (21 percent in 2016). 26 percent of respondents stated that intolerance is manifested towards them (10 percent in 2016). Up to 70 percent of people in the target group believe that they have no influence on the development of society and the state, another 73 percent believe that their career prospects are inevitably worse than those of ethnic Estonians. There remains a strong correlation between socio-economic and career advancement and ethnic and language association. Ethnic discrimination in terms of wages persists, with non-Estonian being on the average paid 15 percent less. 50 percent of students studying in a non-native Estonian language have difficulties with their studies and experience serious stress.
Following other Baltic states, Estonian authorities have launched campaigns to rename topographical objects in the country. On 10 July 2024, it became known that Tallinn authorities plan to rename Moskovsky Boulevard, where mainly Russian-speaking population lives, to Lasnamäe. This proposal was made by the right-wing Fatherland Party (Isamaa) and the head of its Tallinn branch, Riina Solman.[3981]
Notable irritation of the Tallinn officials is caused by activists fighting for the rights of the country's Russian-speaking population and preservation of the historical truth about the developments of World War II. In order to suppress such activities, the Estonian state has created and uses powerful repressive forces. For instance, over the last 30 years, total censorship has taken shape in the country. It is directed, first and foremost, against the Estonian alternative media platforms that go against the official agenda (especially those publishing in Russian) and serves purposes to squeeze Russian public and private media resources out of the country. Accordingly, the Estonian authorities enthusiastically cleanse the country's public and political space, silencing all alternative voices. To this end, spy mania and anti-Russian (and anti-Belorussian in recent years) hysteria are being spread. Meanwhile, Estonian security services are using various methods to put pressure on politicians, public figures, human rights defenders and journalists, as well as civil society activists who are disloyal to the authorities and express position on the internal and foreign policy of the country and its history that differs from the official one. The Legal Information Centre for Human Rights NGO, constantly appears in the Sipo yearbook among "threats to national security." An NGO, Russian School of Estonia, receives similar public attention with the same regularity.
In this regard, an illustrative example is an interview given to Delfi information portal on 1 June 2020 by Arnold Sinisalu, the Estonian Security Police Director, during which he directly pointed to the "non-loyalty" of the Estonian Legal Information Centre for Human Rights NGO (the oldest organisation in the country promoting legal assistance to Russian and Russian-speaking community), as well as openly declared that staying in Estonia for those who disagree with violations of the rights of national minorities is undesirable.
Launching criminal investigations under far-fetched pretexts is one of the methods employed by security services to put pressure on dissenters. Before 2018, for example, criminal proceedings related to the "provision of incorrect data" and "forgery" were under way against Alexander Kornilov, the editor-in-chief of the compatriot information portals Baltija and Baltnews, called in the 2014 Sipo yearbook "Kremlin's propagandist and agent" (the case was settled by paying a heavy fine). February 2019 saw the entry into force of a court verdict convicting Andrey Krasnoglazov, a prominent Estonian specialist in Russian philology and Director of Tallinn Pushkin Institute NGO, on charges of funds embezzlement and document forgery. In July 2019, head of the "Kitezh" human rights NGO and the Russian School of Estonia Mstislav Rusakov was detained by police and subjected to hours of interrogation. The purely civil action brought against him, which was related to internal disputes within the United Left Party of Estonia, was used by the security forces to seize all technical carriers and communication tools from him. In March 2020, the case against him was closed, but in April 2021, tax authorities launched an investigation against Mr. Rusakov.
At the end of March 2021, it became known about the detention of human rights defender and lawyer Sergei Seredenko in connection with a criminal charge brought against him of committing a crime against the Republic of Estonia (in August 2021, the case was brought to the court). It is noteworthy that Estonian authorities concealed the information about his arrest for almost a month.[3982]
Estonian human rights activists, as well as their colleagues from other Baltic countries, note that the reason for these unlawful acts was the active work of Sergei Seredenko and other Russian activists in Estonia aimed at preserving education in the Russian language and protecting monuments to Red Army soldiers killed in the battles for liberation of Estonia from Nazism (including the Night Watch movement). For a long time, Sergei Seredenko had performed the functions of the "Russian ombudsman" in Estonia on a voluntary basis. In addition, the Estonian media brainwash the public opinion in order to create a negative impression about the human rights defender. Many facts about him being put under pressure are intentionally hushed up. For example, it is not mentioned that Mr. Seredenko, who has two university degrees, recently had to work as a janitor at the Maardu High School, as he could not get a job in his specialty because he was mentioned in the Sipo yearbook. Sergei Seredenko also provided free legal help to human rights activists and activists of Russian communities in Latvia and Lithuania.[3983]
The arrest of Sergei Seredenko was a high-profile case in the Baltic States. NGOs representing Russian-speaking community of Estonia, members of the United Left Party of Estonia[3984], representatives of the Russian Union of Latvia (RUL) and other activists held demonstrations in his support. Members of the European Parliament Tatiana Zhdanok (Latvia)[3985] and Yana Toom (Estonia)[3986] raised the issue of Seredenko's prosecution. For example, Tatiana Zhdanok, who herself is now put under tremendous pressure from the Latvian political establishment and local police, noted that Mr. Seredenko participated in the European Parliament hearings on persecution of dissidents in the Baltic countries. This refers to Algirdas Paleckis, Alexander Gaponenko, Vladimir Linderman and other human rights activists who allowed themselves to freely express their own opinions. According to the MEP, the arrest of the human rights defender two years after those hearings in the European Parliament is an indication that the situation got worse.[3987] Yana Toom pointed out that Seredenko's arrest was a very disturbing message to those believing that Estonia is a State based on an open government and the rule of law. Many members of the Russian-speaking community are treated with arrogance and disrespect here. It is truly inconceivable that such deafening silence would occur during the arrest of an Estonian-speaking political activist.[3988]
The NGO "Russian School of Estonia" in the context of the Seredenko case called the PACE to pay attention to the persecution of citizens for dissent in the country and noted the practice of launching baseless criminal investigations against people who disagree in any way with the generally accepted "correct opinion".[3989]
The party "Latvian Russian Union" reported on the appeal sent by representatives of the Russian community of the Baltic region, the European Parliament, Riigikogu and Riga City Council to the then President K.Kaljulaid with a call to stop politically motivated prosecution of human rights activist Sergei Seredenko. Among those who signed the open letter were MEP Tatyana Zhdanok, Riga City Council members Miroslav Mitrofanov, Yakov Pliner, Vladimir Buzayev and Aleksandr Kuzmin, as well as Mihhail Stalnuhhin , a former Estonian MP.[3990]
On 22 September 2022, the Estonian court sentenced Sergei Seredenko to five and a half years in prison. The trial was held behind closed doors, so the details of the case remained unknown for a long time. A month after the verdict, Sergei Seredenko got in touch with journalists and told exactly what his "crime" was. According to him, five different versions of the accusation were put forward successively during the investigation. The Estonian prosecutor's office could not formulate what the criminal activities of the human rights defender consisted of. That's why the hearing was closed. Finally, Sergei Seredenko was charged under section 1 of Article 235 (1) of the Estonian Criminal Code – Conspiracy against Republic of Estonia in favour of a foreign state. Russia was appointed as such. The article is extremely vague and thus allows for broad interpretations. The lawyer of Sergei Seredenko filed an appeal against the decision of the court of the first instance[3991], but it was rejected.
In January 2024, Sergei Seredenko was denied a transfer to an open prison with a convoy-free regime, although under current Estonian law he already had formal grounds to do so in January 2024. The convoy-free regime allows prisoners to stay outside the prison grounds from morning to evening, working somewhere in the neighbourhood. Sergei Seredenko planned to get a job at any enterprise where labour was needed. This way he would have had the opportunity, among other things, to pay the fine imposed by the court, more than 5 thousand euros (this is the amount the court estimated Sergei Seredenko's royalties for his publications over 12 years on Russian portals).[3992] However, this was denied to him, although it is known that such a regime is granted to those convicted of violent offences. In addition, the European Court of Human Rights refused to take into consideration his complaint against the court verdict.[3993]
On 3 September 2022, the Center Party expelled Mihhail Stalnuhhin, Riigikogu MP and Narva City Council member, from the party and blacklisted him for calling Estonia's officials "Nazis" and "fascists" over their decision to clean up Narva from the Red Army monuments. A video was uploaded on Youtube channel Slavia.[3994]
On 16 January 2023, Dimitri Klenski was expelled from the Estonian Association of Journalists for harsh criticism over removing the Soviet war memorial heritage in Estonia and expressing neo-Nazi sentiments in Estonian society, as well as violating the rights and interests of the Russian-speaking population of the country.[3995]
Lodging financial claims is another favourite method of the Estonian secret services to deal with the unwanted. For example, Andrei Krasnoglazov, the director of the Tallinn Pushkin Institute NGO, was forced to leave Estonia after his office was searched in June 2021 by the Tax and Customs Department (under the Ministry of Finance).
In recent years, the Russian media have had to operate in Estonia under constant pressure from local authorities who consider them agents of "hostile propaganda." For example, as of 1 January 2020, the Estonian bureau of the Russian news agency Sputnik ceased operations under the threat of criminal prosecution of the staff by the Money Laundering Data Bureau. Labour relations with this media outlet were illegally declared a violation of EU sanctions against Dmitry Kiselev, the general director of the "Rossiya Segodnya" news agency. Due to these restrictions, 35 employees (including three Russian citizens) lost their jobs. These actions were taken despite the fact that back in December 2019, Harlem Desir, the then‑OSCE representative on Freedom of the Media, noted that no sanctions had been imposed on Sputnik agency on the territory of the European Union. He urged the Estonian authorities "to refrain from unnecessary restrictions on the work of foreign media, which may negatively affect the free flow of information".
Since 20 March 2020, under pressure from government and law enforcement agencies, the daily news program "News of Estonia" on the First Baltic Channel (operated by the Russian First Channel franchise) was discontinued.
A few remaining Russian journalists accredited in the country have been denied access to official events without any explanation. State and municipal officials avoid contact with them under formal pretext. The Estonian authorities pointedly ignore requests and appeals from representatives of the Russian media accredited in the country, such as Interfax, "RIA‑Novosti", TASS, and VGTRK. Journalists do not receive newsletters and press releases from Estonian government agencies and are not allowed into government institutions. Financial pressure is also exerted to them. Under the pressure of the security services, banks refuse to provide services to them (accounts closure, unilateral termination of contract obligations without providing the reasons thereof, etc. is practiced).
The Russian Federation's Special military operation to denazify and demilitarise Ukraine and protect civilians in Donbass was a serious catalyst for cleansing the Estonian information space of "Kremlin misinformation and propaganda." The Estonian authorities a priori view the Russian media as instruments of influence.
As a result, in 2022, all the methods to put pressure on journalists practiced by the Estonian secret services were used with renewed vigour. Aggressive propaganda against everything related to Russia was unleashed in the country. The Estonian information space appeared completely closed off to alternative points of view, any "dissent" was interpreted as war propaganda and misinformation, Russian media were censored/closed down, criminal cases against unwanted journalists were fabricated, and social networks, including the accounts of Russian diplomatic and consular missions in the country, were closely monitored. For example, in early March 2022, "Sputnik Meedia[3996]," an Internet news portal, announced the termination of work because of pressure and restrictions from Estonian banks and authorities, and threats to its employees. Throughout the year, banks in Estonia froze employee salaries and closed Sputnik's accounts based on absurd suspicions of "money laundering, financing of terrorism, illegal sale of alcohol." Besides, recently such tense atmosphere made many newsmakers to refuse to cooperate with the portal, and "open threats" from unknown persons started coming to its editor-in-chief and employees.
On 6 April 2022, "Sputnik Meedia" editor-in-chief Elena Cherysheva was detained in Tallinn by the Estonian Money Laundering Data Bureau on suspicion of violating sanctions. She was facing up to five years in prison, but her defence succeeded in having the case evidence declared illegal. On 10 May 2022, the Harju County Court ruled that the seizure of property without a warrant during the search of Elena Cherysheva's house and, accordingly, the evidence obtained thereby, were illegal. On 7 July 2022, the Tallinn District Court did not satisfy the appeal of Chief State Prosecutor Taavi Pern.
As a result of the efforts of Estonian authorities, by May 2022, more than 40 Russian and Russian-language TV channels (including First Baltic Channel, which rebroadcasts "Russian First Channel in the Baltic States," STS, REN TV, "Rossiya 24," "NTV+" etc.) were banned in the country. More than 50 Web sites (including TASS, RT, RBC, and "Sputnik") were also blocked. Publishing and selling print publications ("Komsomolskaya Pravda in Northern Europe[3997]") became impossible.
Tallinn officials decided not to limit themselves to banning Russian TV channels, as they are available on the Internet. In April 2023, the Consumer Protection and Technical Regulatory Authority (TTJA) demanded from the Internet providers to block access to 53 web-sites broadcasting Russian TV channels as part of its activity to "protect the information space of Estonia."[3998] However, it seems as if the Estonian media regulator sees one of the main enemies in Estonian retirement homes with access to Russian TV channels. In February 2024, it was reported that a bill proposing to give the above-mentioned authority the right to instruct to discontinue providing media services to a residence provider or any other operator of a public facility with access to Russian TV channels, was being considered.[3999]
Amid growing Russo-phobic frenzy in Estonia, it comes as no surprise that now it is prohibited for Russian journalists to pursue their professional activities in the country. On 17 August 2022, Kseniya Soldatova and Dmitry Timofeev, journalists from the "Izvestia" information agency, who tried to cover the removal of the T‑34 tank monument in Narva, were detained and expelled from Estonia.
The Estonian authorities continue cancelling residence permits (by reason of a threat to the national security) and expelling Russian citizens permanently residing here, as well as banning them from entering the Schengen area for five years.
The residence permit of Maxim Reve, one of the defenders of the Warrior-Liberator monument at the time of its blasphemous relocation during the "Bronze Night" in 2007, was revoked. He was also banned from entering the Schengen area for 10 years on security grounds ("threat to the constitutional order, terrorist crime or other serious crime").
On 27 April 2022, Sergei Chaulin, a Russian citizen, one of the organisers of the "Immortal Regiment" events and a board member of the NGO "Russian Compatriots in Europe", was detained on suspicion of organising illegal public protests. He came to Tõnismägi (where the Bronze Soldier Memorial used to stand before its relocation) with flowers and candles. On 14 February 2023, he was stripped of his permanent residence permit and expelled from the country. On 9 May 2022, activist of the Russian-speaking community Yulia Kalinina was detained.
On 6 December 2022, the Police and Border Guard Board (under the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Estonia) sent a notification of cancellation of the residence permit to Aleksandr Kornilov, editor-in-chief of "Baltija.eu" portal and member of the "Coordinating Council of Russian Compatriots of Estonia", who has been staying in Russia since June 2022.
Similar measure was taken against Alexey Yesakov, member of the board of the NGO "Russian Compatriots in Europe" and one of the organisers of the Immortal Regiment in Tallinn (expelled on 4 May 2022), Ramil Usmanov, activist of the "Russian Union in Tartu", former leader of the "South-Estonian Union of Afghan War Veterans" (expelled on 14 June 2022), Andrey Suschev, an activist from Narva declared the "Kremlin's agent provocateur" (expelled on 21 September 2022) and Sergei Neprimerov, chairman of the board of the "Narva Union of Chernobyl Accident Liquidators" (expelled on 30 September 2022).
According to publicly available data, in 2022 184 Russian citizens were expelled by the Police and Border Guard Board and 1187 Russian citizens were denied entry to the Republic of Estonia.
In June 2023, the Sipo launched reprisal against Zoya Palyamar, board member of the NGO "Russian Compatriots in Europe", and revoked her permanent residence permit for her many-year participation in organizing the Immortal Regiment in Tallinn and her efforts to collect and dispatch humanitarian aid to Donbass.
On 4 April 2023, due to open pressure on the part of the Sipo, the Coordination Council of Russian Compatriots of Estonia had to terminate its activities.
In addition, expulsions are also applied to Russian citizens with criminal records under the formal ground of a "country of origin." They do not take into account their lack of strong ties with Russia (housing, jobs, relatives, etc.), so they end up in vulnerable economic situation.
As a punitive measure, Estonia bans entry into the Schengen Area to "undesirable" third-country citizens, usually using it against undesirable Russian politicians, journalists, historians, publicists, and public figures. Their visas are cancelled and entry bans are imposed for long periods of time. In case victims attempt to protect their violated rights, the Estonian courts, which are formally independent, rule against them with reference to "national security interests." This practice had been tightened up by amending the Law on Entry and Departure in the fall of 2017 due to "significant changes in the current environment and security architecture" long before the European Union developed the relevant directives in 2023. The restrictions affected a number of Russian politicians and journalists, including Russian State Duma MP Konstantin Zatulin, journalists Pavel Kostrikov, Elena Erofeeva, Andrey Zakharov, and St. Petersburg activists Anastasia Koveza, Sergey Khristenko, Mikhail Pirogov, and Alexander Malikov.
In addition to oppressing Russians, Estonian authorities, like the authorities of the neighbouring Lithuania and Latvia, persecute ethnic Estonians that either cooperate with the Russians or oppose the official policy. The charge of "espionage" also became quite common.
For example, a criminal case was initiated against Andrey Andronov, activist of the Russian compatriots' movement and Estonian citizens Aivo Peterson, leader of the "Together for Peace Movement" (KOOS) who polled almost 4,000 votes at elections to Riigikogu in mostly Russian-speaking Ida-Viru county, and his associate Dmitry Rootsi. All of them were arrested in the night of 10 March 2023 on charge of violating Article 235.1 of the Republic of Estonia Criminal Code ("establishing and maintaining ties with Russia against Estonia... with the aim of committing an offence", which is punishable with a term of imprisonment of up to six years). Later, the prosecution changed the charges to Article 232 of the Republic of Estonia Criminal Code "High treason" (punishable by life imprisonment).
In early August 2024, the Swiss human rights organisation Justice pour Tous Internationale sent a complaint to the six special procedures of the UN Human Rights Council, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, and the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Estonia to the UN Office and other international organisations in Geneva, Riia Salsa-Audiffren, calling for an end to political persecution and abuse of state security legislation against Aivo Peterson for his legitimate and peaceful activities.[4000]
Other party members were also persecuted. On 27 March 2024, it became known that Russian-speaking journalist Svetlana Burtseva was arrested on 1 March on suspicion of violating international sanctions. These charges were brought against her in connection with her work for the Baltnews online publication, which is part of the Rossiya Segodnya media group. Moreover, the Sipo brought additional charges against Burtseva under the article "Relations against the Republic of Estonia". Burtseva previously worked as a journalist at the Sputnik Eesti publication, which ceased its operations in Estonia in 2019.[4001]
Mikhail Vlasov, member of the Estonian national curling team was disqualified by the Estonian Curling Association for the whole 2023-2024 season for his participation in the tournament held on 24‑27 August 2023 in Svetlogorsk, Kaliningrad Oblast, Russia.[4002]
Merited teacher of the Russian language Eleonora Rudakovskaya-Borisova with a doctoral degree was dismissed from the Tallinn French School in September 2023 for having taken part in the XXIII International Pushkin Competition for Russian Language Teachers held in Moscow[4003].
On 7 December 2023, the Sipo detained Allan Khantsom, who previously worked for the Sputnik Estonia as an editor (before the media was closed by the authorities in March 2022) and currently the head of the Estonian News portal, suspecting him of "intelligence activities against the Republic of Estonia".[4004] A month earlier, the Estonian Consumer Protection and Technical Regulatory Authority issued a prescription requiring him to delete ten publications on the demolition of monuments to Soviet warriors, the country's increasing Ukrainianization and growing Russophobia, due to the fact that "the information published on the web-site incited hatred and violence on grounds of ethnic origin, as well as fuelled war and justified war crimes".[4005] On 10 May 2024, it became known that the court sentenced Allan Khantsom to six and a half years in prison for actions related to "intelligence activities" and support of these activities. The details of the charges, "naturally", remained classified.[4006]
On 3 January 2024, the Sipo detained Russian citizen Vyacheslav Morozov, who had shortly before that taught theory of international politics at the University of Tartu, on suspicion of intelligence activities against the Republic of Estonia (Article 234.2(1) of the Criminal Code of Estonia).[4007] After suspicions were raised against Vyacheslav Morozov, his employment relationship with the institute was terminated. According to state prosecutor Triinu Olev, the Russian citizen allegedly acted in the interests of the Russian intelligence and security services and "did so for a long time". Director General of the Estonian Internal Security Service Margo Palloson stated that Vyacheslav Morozov "regularly passed information to Russian agents" in the Russian territory and allegedly received monetary remuneration.[4008] On 18 June 2024, the Harju County Court found him guilty of espionage against the Republic of Estonia. He received a sentence of 6 years and 3 months' imprisonment from the date of his arrest on 3 January 2024.[4009]
The Sipo reported that on 20 January 2024 the authorities revoked the permanent residence permit of Andry Josu (also known as Andrey Traderson and Andrey Torganov), who had allegedly had dual citizenship (Russian and Romanian), and deported him to Russia, as "his activities posed threat to the security of the Republic of Estonia".[4010] [4011] Andry Josu was notified by the police in Jõhvi of revocation of his residence permit in Estonia and was presented an order for immediate expulsion from the country. The businessman was not even given a chance to pack his bags and was taken in handcuffs to the Russian border the same day.[4012] The security agency declared that he acted as "Kremlin's agent provocateur, spreading misinformation and misrepresenting the Soviet Union as the liberator." Furthermore, the Sipo noted that "glorifying and actively supporting an aggressor and rewriting history ran counter to Estonian laws and values. At the time of Russia's aggression against Ukraine Andry Josu condemns the European Union's support of Ukraine and sanctions against the Russian Federation, and relentlessly spreads the Russian authorities' messages." One of the main points of the activist's accusation of anti-Estonian activities was that he ended his speech at the anti-war rally of the KOOS / Together party with the phrase symbolising the anti-fascist movement "No pasaran".[4013]
On 2 April 2024, the Harju County Court found Estonian poet and musician Jüri Kivit guilty of desecrating the Estonian national anthem and sentenced him to a monetary fine. In total, he will have to pay more than 15,000 euros. The criminal case against Jüri Kivit was initiated in October 2022 when he posted a music video composition "My country has gone mad" based on the Estonian national anthem on a social network. According to the Estonian prosecutor's office, in this composition the musician mocked the Republic of Estonia and denigrated its official symbol. Jüri Kivit is known to many in Estonia for his poems and humorous songs on topical issues, which have long irritated the Estonian authorities.[4014]
Estonian authorities willingly satisfy requests of the third countries persecuting Russian citizens under invented pretexts. On 30 January 2023, the Estonian side received an official request for the extradition of Russian citizen Vadim Konoshchenok to the United States, and having considered it, the Harju County Court ruled in favour of the extradition. The Tallinn District Court dismissed the appeal against the ruling. On 13 July 2023, Russian citizen Vadim Konoshchenok was extradited to the United States where he was accused of conspiracy to defraud the U.S. public authorities, violation of the anti-Russian sanctions regime and the Export Control Reform Act, as well as of smuggling of dual-use items, including of the U.S. origin (paragraph 371, title 18; paragraph 554, title 18 of the United States Code).[4015]
To intimidate Russian compatriots, local mass media supporting Estonian authorities publish reports on punitive measures against those who disobey and venture to have their own opinion. In March 2023, the Supreme Court issued a decision proclaiming a woman who posted a congratulation showing the symbols of the Russian Airborne Force in a public Facebook group on 2 August 2022 "guilty of supporting and justifying the crimes committed by the Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine" and sentencing her to a EUR 120 fine.[4016] In April, after the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal filed by a resident of Narva, Ida prefecture's decision entered into force on imposing a EUR 444 fine on him for having worn a t‑shirt with a "USSR" print on it on 9 May 2022.[4017] On 4 September 2023, Kohtla-Järve police pinned to the ground and handcuffed an elderly gentleman. The reason for that was St. George ribbon attached to the rear mirror of his car.[4018] The same pretext was used on 12 September 2023 in Narva to impose a fine of EUR 400 on another driver.[4019] A similar sum was paid on 18 September 2023 by a Polish citizen who entered Estonia from Russia.[4020] In late September 2023, a resident of Estonia had to pay EUR 500 for using a sticker with an inscription "I am Russian".[4021] On 5 October 2023, the police initiated a criminal case against two men who played the hymn of Russia in the yard of one of the houses of Tallinn's district Mustamäe.[4022] In mid‑October 2023, a Russian citizen who entered Estonian Republic from Russia was given a fine of EUR 400 for having a St. George Ribbon tied to a rear view mirror of his car.[4023] On 23 October 2023, a citizen of Estonia, who crossed the border between Estonia and Russia, had to pay a EUR 400 fine for wearing a hat with the coat of arms of the USSR[4024].
On 9 May 2023, while Narva residents watched the concert held in Ivangorod on the Russian bank of the Narova river, Vyacheslav Sorokin was detained for a conflict with a local blogger Daniil Kurakin.[4025] On the embankment, Daniil Kurakin unfurled the flag of Ukraine towards the Russian side. According to him, by doing so, he wanted to protest against "this massive fit of victory-related hysteria" in Ivangorod and show the Russians that "Estonia opposed the Ruscist ideology." Such insulting behaviour on the part of the blogger brought about the indignation of the Russian compatriots present. All the requests to stop behaving in such a way were met with extreme rudeness. As a result, Vyacheslav Sorokin lost control and tried to wrest the flag from the blogger. During the fight that ensued, Daniil Kurakin was pushed from the side of the promenade onto a staircase leading down to the river.
After the incident, the court charged Vyacheslav Sorokin with "breaching public peace" and gave him a suspended sentence of fifteen months. The compatriot, who had previously had no criminal record, was put on probation for a year and nine months and obliged to pay the cost of litigation amounting to EUR 687.75. In addition to that, he faced a case on charge of using St. George ribbon. Daniil Kurakin, who provoked the incident, faced no punishment.
In addition to the individual cases of persecution of Russian citizens mentioned above, in 2022, Estonian authorities used Russia's special military operation as a pretext to increase pressure on Estonia's Russian-speaking population in general, infringing their labour rights as a first step. On 18 March 2022, the Estonian Labor Inspectorate notified employers that if they saw an employee wearing a St. George Ribbon, a "Z" symbol or using the Russian flag in social media, they should bear in mind that "incitement to war and hate speech are criminalised by Estonia's Criminal Code, and entitle employers to terminate employment for loss of trust based on Article 88 (1), paragraph 5, of the Employment Contracts Act."
This recommendation justifies the local managers who proactively operated in this way. For instance, the head of Elron (government-owned passenger train operator) Lauri Betlem, as early as on 1 March 2022, informed his employees that expressing "support to the Russian criminal regime" on social media was inadmissible. He announced that those who do it will have their labour contracts terminated for "loss of trust and damaging the employer's reputation."
On 25 March 2022, President Alar Karis stated that military propaganda can entail criminal liability, and called Riigikogu to identify the symbols justifying "Russia's aggression." The Fatherland Party faction presented a bill prohibiting public use of any symbols of "support to aggressive war" in Estonia. On 21 April 2022 Riigikogu banned the public display of "hostile symbols".[4026]
Estonian law enforcement and security agencies are taking measures to identify pro-Russian citizens. On 8 March 2022, the Police and Border Guard Board urged social media users to promptly report "questionable publications" (i.e., pro-Russian publications) to web police to check them for "incitement to war and hate speech". The next day, the the Sipo specified that it should be immediately informed of all "egregious cases" of social media activity.
On 22 March 2022, the faction of the Conservative People's Party of Estonia (CPPE) in Riigikogu presented a blatantly discriminating bill amending the Weapons Act and envisaging the right to possess arms only for the citizens of EU and NATO countries. The relevant bill was approved on 22 February 2023 (the licenses granted to the citizens of Russia will remain valid for one year, after that the weapons will be seized).[4027]
However, Estonian authorities started withdrawing the licenses well before the law entered into force. The Police and Border Guard Board cancelled the weapons licenses of three residents of Russian-speaking Ida‑Viru County for their "active opposition" to the relocation of the T‑34 Tank monument in Narva, as their right to bear arms allegedly "threatened public order and national security". The attempt of one of the compatriots to challenge this decision in the administrative court of Tartu in October 2023 failed.[4028]
Guided by anti-Russian sentiments, some of Estonia's leading universities, as if on command, announced that they were against "aggression" and therefore decided not to admit students from Russia in the 2022/2023 academic year: the University of Tartu – on 7 March 2022[4029], the Estonian Academy of Music and Theatre (EAMT) – on 24 March 2022[4030], Tallinn University of Technology – on 4 April 2022[4031]. It is noteworthy that these decisions were welcomed by deputy Director General of Sipo Martin Arpo, who called them a "solidarity reaction of the democratic world to Russia's aggression and war crimes".[4032]
On 3 March 2022, Tallinn's Alexela Concert Hall cancelled a scheduled performance of St. Petersburg Eifman Ballet scheduled for 11 March 2022.
From 13 September 2023, after the EU had developed another set of restrictions aimed directly at Russian citizens, Estonia banned Russian-registered cars from entering the country.[4033]
On 22 December 2023, Prime Minister Kaja Kallas announced that the country's authorities were searching for ways to deport Estonian residents who decided to become Russian citizens. She compared the desire to become Russian citizens to supporting terrorism and threatening the country. A similar initiative was also voiced by Estonian Minister of the Interior Lauri Läänemets who announced the possible deportation of residents of the country who became Russian citizens.[4034]
On 20 December 2023, the prime ministers of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia agreed on a common approach to applying the EU sanctions against Russia and Belarus. In January 2024, the heads of the three Baltic States' customs services concluded a treaty as a follow-up to that agreement.[4035] There is a huge gap between these declarations and what is done in practice, as even Estonian leadership's families demonstrate entirely different attitude to the sanctions regime. In late August 2023, a scandal erupted after it became known that Arvo Hallik, Estonian Prime Minister's spouse, earned over EUR 1.5 million transporting goods between Estonia and Russia after February 2022. Furthermore, it leaked out to the media that Kaja Kallas had twice accompanied her husband at the events related with his company and invested 370 thousand euros in their family business, while her total declared income for the three previous years was only 248 thousand euros. This also raised questions as to double standards used by the head of Estonian government: she was virtually putting pressure on Estonian entrepreneurs and calling on them to "find moral compass" and renounce "grey" supplies from Russia, when in reality she was merely eliminating her spouse's competitors.[4036] There was no publicly available information on whether Estonian competent anti-corruption agencies showed any interest in the case.
In early 2024, the Estonian leadership resumed discussions on the need to "temporarily suspend" the right of citizens of "aggressor states" (Russia and Belarus) residing in the republic to vote in municipal elections "until the end of the war". According to Prime Minister Kallas, while earlier the Parliament intended to adopt a separate law to that end ("similar to that depriving convicts of their electoral rights"), now Estonian Reform Party took into account President Karis's and Chancellor of Justice Madise's opinions that the bill would contradict the Constitution, and opted to work to amend the fundamental law of the country.[4037]
In mid-January 2024, Estonia's Border Guard Service announced that the country could close its crossing points on the border with Russia. They explained such decision by the fact that in the previous weeks Russia "had intentionally sent groups of foreign citizens who had no legitimate right to enter the European Union, to the Russian-Estonian border".[4038]
On 19 January 2024, Estonian government approved a bill denouncing the country's treaty with Russia on legal assistance and legal relations on civil, family and criminal matters. In their comment on this step, Estonian agencies noted that Estonia "would maintain only minimum bilateral ties with Russia" and pursue such course "until hostilities in Ukraine end".[4039]
In February 2024, Estonian authorities launched a massive intimidation campaign targeting Russian citizens residing in Estonia in order to reduce the voter turnout at Russian presidential elections of 17 March. Estonian media attempted to exercise psychological pressure on Russian citizens. Russian voters were clearly "warned" of the consequences of participation in the elections, which is viewed as "support of mass falsifications: and "aggression against Ukraine". In addition to that, by February 2024, the authorities had failed to respond to Russia's request under the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations to ensure protection of a polling station during the presidential elections.
Following the example of their ideological patrons, German Nazis, Estonian authorities started suppressing any manifestations of Russian ethnic and cultural identity.
In autumn 2023, ten police officers of the Russian-speaking Narva were dismissed due to the fact that their Estonian language proficiency level was below C1.[4040]
In December 2023, when little children aged between 3 and 5 were having an excursion at the "Raeapteek" at the Town Hall Square, its employee forbade them to sing a song in Russian.[4041]
Estonian State authorities have also persecuted Estonian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (EOC-MP) and its Primate Metropolitan of Tallinn and All Estonia Eugene. After the Special military operation began, the nationalists called the EOC-MP "the conduit of the voice of Moscow". On 27 September 2022, Estonian Minister of the Interior Lauri Läänemets stated that he expected Metropolitan Eugene to condemn the words of Patriarch Cyrill and added that "no church calling on Russians to kill Ukrainians could operate in the country." The Estonian official also threatened to withdraw the Metropolitan's residence permit unless the latter expressed his position publicly before 12 October. On that day Metropolitan Eugene issued a letter to the Minister of the Interior and the Minister of Justice saying that he did not share what the Patriarch said in his sermon on 25 September 2022. He also assured that EOC-MP "did not engage in any propaganda of war and incitement of hate" in its parishes.
At the end of 2022, the Estonian Parliament cut off financing of the Estonian Orthodox Church, removing it from the list of organisations receiving regional investments.
Estonian authorities found that insufficient. On 18 January 2024, the Police and Border Guard Board announced that it would not extend the residence permit to the Primate of Estonian Orthodox Church Metropolitan Eugene, so he should leave Estonia by 6 February.[4042] According to Indrek Aru, head of Border Guard Buro of the Police and Border Guard Board, "Estonian State's" decision to deny the extension of residence permit to the head of EOC‑MP was brought about by his "support of the aggressor and persistence in his conduct countering the law and values of the Republic of Estonia despite repeated warnings he had received".[4043] However, even these measures taken by Estonian authorities have no bearing on who will lead the diocese of the canonical Orthodox Church. The Primate's message published on EOC's website says that he will continue to steer the Church from abroad.
On 14 April 2024, a new coalition agreement was signed in Tallinn between the Reform Party, the Social Democratic Party, the Eesti 200 and Isamaa parties, which includes a provision that "the city will terminate contracts and will no longer support individuals, organisations and projects that increase the influence of the Russian Federation".[4044]
Nationalist circles in Estonia continue to increase pressure on the EOC. The media reports that Estonian Interior Ministry officials meet with priests and parishioners, convincing them of the need to sever all relations with Moscow. Estonian law enforcers recommend considering the Latvian option where the church is fully autocephalous. Another option that has been voiced is to bring the Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Constantinople.
On 23 April 2024, Minister of the Interior Lauri Läänemets visited the Stavropegic Pühtitsa Convent in Kuremäe to persuade its leadership not to cooperate with the Moscow Patriarchate. Lauri Läänemets emphasized that the state intends to allow churches and parishes to make their own decisions. However, he made it clear that if church parishes do not make the "right" decisions, they will face forced termination of their activities by the state decision. The minister said bluntly that parishes "who are subordinate to Patriarch Cyrill, i.e. Moscow, may face problems. If they do not make their own decisions, the state may eventually have to seek through the courts to terminate their activities. However, the issues can certainly be resolved".[4045]
In the published statement of the Convent, it was noted that its stavropegic status is stipulated in its statute, which states that the change of jurisdiction is impossible, and therefore the Convent itself cannot initiate the cancellation of the stavropegic status. Therefore, the Convent proposed to the government of the Republic of Estonia, represented by the Minister of the Interior, who insists on changing the jurisdiction of the monastery, being the initiator of the process, to appeal himself to Patriarch Cyrill with a proposal to cancel the stavropigic status of the Convent.[4046]
On 25 April 2024, a delegation from the Estonian Ministry of the Interior visited the Resurrection of Christ Cathedral in Narva. Representatives of the Ministry suggested that the parish should either sever canonical ties with Moscow or come under the wing of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. In this case, the law enforcers also used threats, pointing out that if negotiations fail to reach a consensus, "the application of the mechanism of forced liquidation provided for by law cannot be ruled out".[4047]
Another step of undisguised pressure on the Estonian Orthodox Church was the adoption on 6 May 2024 by the Estonian Parliament of a statement condemning the Moscow Patriarchate for supporting the Russian Special military operation and calling on the EOC‑MP to sever ties with it. Among other things, the statement said that the Moscow Patriarchate should be recognised as "an institution that supports the military aggression of the Russian Federation". In addition, it notes that "Orthodox associations and parishes must also independently assess the threat to public order and their members posed by hostile influence activities and take the necessary steps to cut ties with the Moscow Patriarchate".[4048] In mid-April 2024, Estonian Interior Minister Lauri Läänemets addressed the Riigikogu with a proposal to declare the Moscow Patriarchate as terrorist and supporting terrorism in its activities. This recognition would give the Ministry of the Interior the opportunity to apply to the court with an initiative to terminate the activities of the EOC.[4049]
Estonia's efforts to suppress Russian activists struggling to preserve the memory of the heroic deeds of the Red Army soldiers who fought against Nazism, make it clear that the country has fully engaged in supporting neo‑Nazism and to this end has launched a rewriting of its history during World War II and subsequent period. That is why throughout the whole period of the country's "independence" nationalist circles in power have been systematically and persistently imposing a distorted interpretation of the joint history of Russia and Estonia based on nationalist ideology and Russophobia, especially the events of the Great Patriotic War on the territory of Estonia.
We note Tokyo's increasingly evident policy aimed at whitewashing Japan's crimes (Japanese militarism) in South-East Asia and the Pacific during the World War II in the light of neo-Nazi manifestations and glorification of Nazism.
The events of those years are often presented as a different story that has no direct connection with the confrontation of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition with Nazi Germany in the European theater of war. At the same time, the issues related to Japan's tripartite alliance with Hitler and Italian fascists as well as multifaceted military-technical and logistical assistance that Japan provided to Nazi Germany and was directed primarily against the USSR, are consistently silenced.
These trends signalize the desire to restore the positions lost after the defeat in World War II shown by political forces that promote nationalist Shinto ideas – a set of local pagan beliefs based on the concept of the divine origin of the Emperor and the Japanese people.
Close affiliation of Shinto circles with the ruling elite reflects the extent to which they influence Japan’s politics. For example, the largest group in the Japan's legislative is the Shinto parliamentary group, which accounts for about 300 deputies and lobbies for the interests of the Shinto Association of Spiritual Leadership, a key political organ of the Shintoists. The second largest group (about 280 deputies) supports the largest right-wing nationalist organization, the Japan Council (Nippon Kaigi), also based on Shinto ideology. At the same time, 15 out of the 20 members of the Kishida current Cabinet of Ministers, including the Prime Minister, are members of at least one of the aforementioned parliamentary structures.
Japanese experts recognize that these forces have successfully promoted the idea of revising the restrictions imposed on the country after the war: Shinto conservatives have successfully managed to return the system of chronology based on the epoch of the emperors' reign and restore some traditional national holidays of the pre-war period, in particular the birthday of Emperor Hirohito, who lead Japan into an alliance with Nazi Germany and unleashed the war in the Pacific Ocean.
Among the notable revanchist manifestations that disregard the national interests and feelings of the peoples of neighboring Asian states subjected to Japanese aggression in the 1930s and 1940s are regular trips arranged by members of parliament and government representatives to Yasukuni shrine which honors the memory of all Japanese who died on the battlefields. Since 1978, its lists include Class A war criminals executed under the sentence of the Tokyo Tribunal of 1946-1948.
These kinds of group "pilgrimages" of the Japanese political circles are usually carried out in conjunction with the beginning of the traditional fall (October) and spring (April) festivals, as well as the country's annual commemoration of the anniversary of the end of World War II on 15 August.
In April 2022, 103 lawmakers visited the shrine. The aforementioned August event was attended by Sanae Takaichi, Minister of State for Economic Security, Akiba Kenya, State Minister for Reconstruction, and Koichi Hagiuda, Chairman of the Policy Research Council of the Liberal Democratic Party.
When reacting to criticism, exercised by Seoul and Beijing, during a press conference on 15 August 2022, Hirokazu Matsuno, Chief Cabinet Secretary, justified the government officials’ visit to the shrine claiming that they went there as private citizens and that "paying homage to those who gave their lives for the motherland is natural for any country."
In April 2023, 87 lawmakers belonging to the mentioned parliamentary group visited the shrine. Like in 2022, the above mentioned August event was attended by current Minister Sanae Takaichi.
In April 2024, 94 lawmakers visited the shrine,[4050] including Sanae Takaichi, Yoshitaka Shindo, Minister in charge of Economic Revitalization, Kazuchika Iwata, Deputy Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, and Yoichi Fukazawa, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs.
In accordance with the established practice, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida refrains from visiting the shrine to avoid complications with China and the Republic of Korea, but continues to send regular donations and offerings at his own expense as the head of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP; another donation was made on 21 April 2024).
The Presidents of both Houses of Parliament did the same in 2024: Fukushiro Nukaga, President of the House of Representatives, and Hidehisa Otsuji, President of the House of Councillors.
There is a clear demonstration of continuity between the Imperial Army (which committed numerous crimes during World War II) and the modern Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF).
In January 2024, 22 representatives of the JSDF Command visited Yasukuni shrine. Since April, retired Maritime JSDF vice admiral Umio Otsuka has been the temple's chief priest. It is the second ime that a former military officer is appointed to the post.
These circumstances, coupled with Japan's dependence on its key ally – the United States, primarily in ensuring national security, create fertile ground for the government, experts and journalists to interpret certain aspects of the history of World War II in a one-sided and sometimes blatantly Russophobic way. In particular, the media, with the tacit approval of the authorities, regularly publishes scandalous articles containing distorted speculations about the allegedly equal responsibility of the USSR and Hitler's Germany for unleashing the war as well as articles about "the invasion of Soviet troops in Poland" and "the armed seizure of the three Baltic states after the conclusion of a secret agreement with Berlin."
In January 2021, the Jerusalem Post published a joint article by the then Foreign Minister of Japan, Toshimitsu Motegi (who is now the Secretary General of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party), and Foreign Minister of Lithuania, Gabrielius Landsbergis, on the occasion of the International Holocaust Remembrance Day. This article clearly demonstrated that most Japanese political elites held predominantly incorrect perceptions about the beginning of World War II.[4051] Let alone this Japanese-Lithuanian "nexus", where Vilnius, which honors Nazi collaborators, has been trying to impose on Tokyo its leading role in interpreting, in fact – falsifying the history of World War II.
This article claims that the Soviet Union allegedly "occupied" Poland and Lithuania and draws unacceptable parallels between the actions of the USSR and the policy of Hitler's Germany which invaded many Eastern European countries. At the same time, the publication predictably blurred the criminal role of Japan in World War II and its alliance with the Nazi regime.
There is a clear duplicity in the statements of official Tokyo concerning the events which took place in August and September 1945. For example, neither the Japanese Prime Minister nor heads of regional administrations in their annual addresses on the occasion of the anniversary of atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki nor relevant analytical materials clearly mentioned the United States’ responsibility for this tragedy.
At the same time, the media deliberately highlights the USSR's entry into the war against Japan, which, on the contrary, clearly demonstrates the Japan's deep-rooted unwillingness to recognize the objective results of the World War II that are enshrined in the UN Charter.
The campaign to distort history intensified in 2020-2022 in the context of the 75th anniversary of the beginning of the Manchurian Strategic Offensive Operation, as well as of 15 August which is considered in Japan as the date marking the end of hostilities. Publications in the national media, including such major news agencies and newspapers as Jiji, Iomiuri, Asahi, Sankei, or Hokkaido, widely propagated Japanese interpretations and were bristling with biased and ideologically distorted descriptions of the events of that time.
The history of the war years in textbooks is portrayed in a revisionist way. In a number of textbooks, information about the tragedies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki is included into a subsection vaguely entitled "Atomic Bombings and the Entry of the USSR into the War", which may create a distorted associative pattern.
In this regard, the results of the work on the approval of school textbooks' content to be republished and used in high schools since 2023 that were made public by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology in March 2022 are also illustrative. It was reported that all publishers had fully complied with the government's requirement for the "exhaustive coverage" of the "ancestral ownership" by Japan of the "Northern Territories" (the Southern Kurils) and the disputed islands of Takeshima/Dokdo and Senkaku/Diaoyu in the textbooks for the advanced optional courses in geography and political economy.
At the same time, the report negatively assesses the "superficial" explanation of official approaches to these disputes in the textbooks for "History of Japan", "World History", "History and Geography" and "Social Science", for which ideological prescriptions of the Ministry are still advisory. The Ministry also criticized the "lack" of references to the "continuing illegal occupation" of the Southern Kurils, which is described as one of the factors detrimental to Japan's interests and the integrity of its foreign policy, and which leads to the "worrisome risks" of a flawed perception of the importance of defending national sovereignty which students may have.
According to the results of the analysis, the Ministry noted with satisfaction that new editions of textbooks on "History and Geography", "World History" and "Social Science" include abstracts clearly emphasizing Russia's "annexation" of Crimea in 2014. Among other things, they now contain references to Moscow's alleged "violation" of international law, arguments about Kremlin's attempts to "legitimize the seizure" of the peninsula through "propaganda of a biased historical narrative" (primarily relying on the fact that Grand Prince Vladimir and his retinue were baptized in these lands).
The fact that the Japanese government support annual "Northern Territories Day" events on 7 February is illustrative. Their proclaimed goal is to "return" the Southern Kurils allegedly illegally seized by the USSR in 1945 to Tokyo. Traditionally, its central event is a "national rally". Apart from representatives of public organizations and local governments from Hokkaido Prefecture, the country's leadership, opposition leaders, parliamentarians and public figures participate in it.[4052]
Far-right nationalist organizations regularly hold pickets near Russian missions abroad demanding the "return of the Northern Territories". They conduct particularly large-scale, noisy and sometimes aggressive actions (involving transport convoys painted with provocative propaganda slogans with loudspeakers) on such "important" dates as 7 February, 9 and 15 August. The mailboxes of the Embassy and Consulates General are flooded with petitions with the usual set of accusations regarding historical and "island" issues. In 2020, a slight increase in such activities of extremist groups was recorded, which, in particular, may be associated with the so-called "anniversary" of the issue.
In 2023, for the first time since 2018, the wording "illegal occupation" was returned to the text of the statement traditionally read at the end of the "national rally for the return of the Northern Territories": "It is absolutely inexcusable that 77 years ago the Soviet Union illegally occupied four islands of the "Northern Territories."
Another manifestation of the Japanese authorities' line on revanchist interpretation of the results of World War II and on justification of Tokyo's expansionist militarist policy of those years is an unprecedented in its Russophobic intensity propaganda campaign in government, journalistic and expert circles against Russia and its citizens, which was launched in the country at the behest of the Kishida administration after the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation launched a Special Military Operation (SMO) on 24 February 2022 to denazify and demilitarize Ukraine and protect civilians in Donbass (before there were no mass violations of the rights of Russians and their discrimination).
Russophobic narrative has sharply intensified in the Japanese information space, including the media, social networks and blogs. Official authorities were taking consistent steps to persuade the public that total solidarity with the Western countries in condemning Russia was indisputable.
Under the guise of slogans of "ideological solidarity" and adherence to international law, the Kishida administration and major Japanese media regularly voice and publish theories questioning the neo-Nazi and anti-Russian character of the Kiev regime and its longstanding crimes against the Russian-speaking population of Donbass.
The public is offered a deliberately distorted picture of events, in which numerous fascist statements and open calls for the genocide of Russians by Ukrainian officials are completely ignored. Instead, an emotional narrative is planted about the alleged crimes committed by the Russian military after the beginning of the Special Military Operation (particularly notable were the provocation in the town of Bucha, the so-called "shelling" of residential houses, the maternity hospital, the theater building in Mariupol and other social infrastructure facilities) and about the "resistance to the invader" shown by the Ukrainian armed forces, fighters of the "Azov" nationalist regiment and other similar neo-Nazi formations banned in Russia.
Against the background of official Tokyo's emphasized promotion of the concept of "human security", its principles and norms are demonstratively not applied to the events in Ukraine.
In particular, in April 2022, the Japanese side removed the Ukrainian nationalist battalion "Azov" from the list of terrorist organizations in the national "International Terrorism Situation Review" for 2021. Thus, for political reasons, the activities of this terrorist organization are actually encouraged, which poses new threats to the lives and security of Russian citizens.
As Maria Zakharova, the official representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry stated, Japan has thereby presented itself as an accomplice of neo-Nazism and damaged its own security.[4053]
An equally eloquent example is the supply to the UAF of military equipment (bullet-proof vests, helmets, etc.) and armoured vehicles (cars and transport all-terrain vehicles) from the arsenals of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces in 2022-2023. According to many local experts, these supplies may violate the national legislation prohibiting the provision of military and technical assistance in conflict regions.
There have been repeated attempts to misuse the Ukrainian issue in order to satisfy Tokyo's illegitimate territorial claims to the Southern Kurils: Japanese media has been actively implanting the idea that Russia aims to "solve problems by force," drawing parallels between the "invasion of Ukraine" (beginning with the so-called "annexation of Crimea" in 2014) and the so-called "illegal occupation of the Northern Territories by the Soviet troops" in 1945, and that there is no other alternative but to stand in solidarity with the Zelensky regime in order to achieve progress in the "return" of the Russian islands to Japan.
In line with the Russophobic campaign launched by the Kishida administration under the pretext of "the Russian aggression against Ukraine," Tokyo has been unprecedentedly distorting facts.
For example, the Hiroshima memorial ceremony hold on 6 August 2022 and 2023, which formerly was an event to commemorate the victims of American barbarism, was, in fact, turned into a propaganda meeting aimed at smearing Russia: A false thesis about a "nuclear threat from Moscow" was promoted. Moreover, organizers made an unprecedented decision to refuse the traditional invitation of Russian and Belorussian representatives to the ceremony.
In 2023, the mourning ceremony on the 78th anniversary of the tragedy was attended by Fumio Kishida, members of the government, representatives of international organizations and diplomatic missions of 111 states – a record number of participants for the entire time the ceremony has been held.
All Japanese politicians who spoke at the mourning ceremony for the victims of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima in 1945 did not mention that the bomb was dropped by the United States. At the same time, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and Governor of Hiroshima Prefecture Hidehiko Yuzaki mentioned Russia. Hidehiko Yuzaki, not having mentioned the country that dropped the atomic bomb on the city, began his speech with a thesis about "nuclear blackmail by Russia," as well as criticism of North Korea's nuclear and missile programs. In this context, the governor emphasized the need to abandon nuclear weapons, saying that "hostilities" in Ukraine began "not because Ukraine does not have nuclear weapons, but because Russia has them."[4054]
Another example of direct support for the neo-Nazi ideology is the holding of the next congress of the so-called "Forum of Free Peoples of Post-Russia". It was organized in Tokyo at the parliamentary complex on 1-2 August 2023 by a Polish NGO whose activities were recognized undesirable by the Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation in March 2023 and whose members were included in the Russian roster of extremists and terrorists. Members of the Japanese parliament who took part in the event signed the final "document" containing calls for the abolition of Russia’s statehood and violation of the territorial integrity of our country. The activists of the "forum" were given a public platform to broadcast hate speech and open calls for terrorist attacks on the Russian territory.
Against this background, it is not surprising to see Tokyo's position during the vote at the UN General Assembly on the resolution on Combating Glorification of Nazism, neo-Nazism and other Practices that Contribute to Fueling Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance. Having abstained over the past years in the vote on this document, which is presented annually by Russia and other co-sponsors, Japan changed its approach in 2022 and 2023 and voted against it.
Such hostile rhetoric, coupled with the Russophobic propaganda of the Kishida administration affects Russian compatriots living in Japan and leads to the violation of their social and economic rights.
After the beginning of the Special Military Operation, the Russian consular offices have received reports from compatriots about domestic violence in mixed families and ethnic-based harassment at work in Japanese companies (insults, humiliation, denial of employment).
A number of Japanese companies have deliberately created a work environment in which their Russian employees could not openly express their opinion about current events and processes in Russia and abroad for fear of being fired.
An example of a violation of the legal rights and interests of compatriots is the situation with the detention of the 17-year-old daughter of a Russian citizen, V.A.Kazantseva, by Japanese social services in Tokyo. Since May 2022, employees of the juvenile center have prevented face-to-face contact between the mother and the teenager as well as their communication in Russian over the phone.
On 3 March 2022, an illustrative incident of vandalism took place at the Red Square store of Russian goods in Tokyo: An intruder (a U.S. citizen of Ukrainian descent) smashed the sign at the entrance.
Other worrisome examples include attempts by a number of hotels to deny accommodation to Russians (February-March 2022; the incidents were promptly resolved after direct intervention by city administrations), public "doubts" expressed by the head of the political council of the opposition Democratic Party for the People, Kohei Otsuka, about the necessity of placing Russian-language inscriptions on road signs in northern Hokkaido Prefecture "in light of the situation in Russia" (when faced with accusations of xenophobia from his followers, he hastily deleted the tweet).[4055] There was also an illustrative attempt to hide Russian-language signs at Tokyo's Ebisu station in April 2022 allegedly due to complaints from passengers who found them inappropriate in the context of the situation in Ukraine (the signs were returned a week later after a wave of criticism against the management of the JR East transportation company).
Discriminatory measures introduced in 2022 at customs checkpoints in Japanese airports against persons traveling to Belarus and Russia continue to apply.
For example, it is prohibited to export "luxury goods" (clothes, shoes, hats, laptops, ceramics, furs, jewelry, watches, perfumes, etc.), that cost more than 40,000 yen (300 US dollar). Restrictions apply to cash up to 100,000 yen (700 US dollar).
Special rooms have been organized at border crossing points (airports, seaports), where Russia-bound passengers, regardless of their nationality, are subjected to additional checks for compliance with the illegal restrictive measures imposed by the Japanese government prior to check-in. According to some experts, by doing so the Japanese authorities violate Article 13 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights that proclaims freedom of movement for every citizen.
It should be noted that the official Tokyo has made certain efforts to curb discrimination against Russians in the Japanese society qualifying such phenomena as "unacceptable and inappropriate" through the mouth of the then Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirokazu Matsuno and Foreign Minister Yoshimasa Hayashi.[4056]
Attempts to put pressure on Russian missions are quite common: unfriendly and insulting actions, pickets and demonstrations near the buildings of diplomatic and consular missions are held on a regular basis. The Russian diplomatic missions also receive threatening phone calls and mail letters. There are certain difficulties associated with the fact that a number of management companies refuse to fulfill their contractual obligations or conclude new contracts, referring to "international turmoil."
In, there were regular manifestations of protocol discrimination from the Japanese side, including against the Russian ambassador in Tokyo.
During the 2022-2023 Russophobic campaign, at the apparent instigation of the official authorities, the Japanese political, business and public circles completely suspended contacts with the Russian ambassador in Tokyo. In fact, he found himself in "informational isolation", which makes difficult performing his official duties.
The above mentioned refusal to invite the head of the Russian diplomatic mission to the regular August commemorations of U.S. atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 2022, 2023 and 2024 (for the first time in almost 50 years) is an outrageous act of protocol discrimination.
Moreover, the Hiroshima authorities essentially insulted on the memory of the victims of the American-inflicted nuclear disaster by throwing away a wreath laid at the city cenotaph by the Russian ambassador, who visited the city on own initiative in 2022.
The Russian visa centre located in the Akasaka Ward (Tokyo) regularly receives anonymous threats and demands that our compatriots "get out of Japan".
Similar "appeals" have been sent to the Moscow Patriarchate in Tokyo, as well as to the clergy of the Autonomous Orthodox Church of Japan.
In October 2023 an attempt was made to replace the national flag of the Russian Federation with the "protest" flag (white with a blue stripe, which is banned in our country), on the signboard of the Far Eastern Federal University (FEFU) branch in the city of Hakodate.
At the same time, according to a 14 June 2024 RIA Novosti report, citing the FEFU press service, the university has stopped recruiting students to and is going to wind up work in its Hakodate branch. The main reason behind this decision was that Russian studies became generally considered unpromising in Japan (the experience of the USA, where the shortage of Russia experts fatally tells on the quality of foreign policy expertise, is obviously simply ignored). This led to a decrease in the number of applicants. The branch staff began to receive threats, and aggressively-minded citizens even entered the territory of the educational institution.
Despite the Russophobic campaign launched in Japan, the number of people wishing to study Russian has not decreased, but even increased in some places, which the leading Japanese media noted, not without surprise, in the spring of 2023. This can be explained by the fact that with Russia in the centre of media attention, the demand for information directly from Russian sources is growing.
In 2023, two applicants were admitted to the master's and postgraduate programs, and 22 people to additional professional training programs in the Russian language under the quota of the Government of the Russian Federation. Recommendations of the Japanese Foreign Ministry and most universities to avoid traveling to our country, as well as the high cost of air travel that has increased nearly twice under the conditions of illegal anti-Russian restrictions, are serious deterrents to exchanges. In this situation, the distance learning format, successfully mastered by many Russian educational institutions, has become increasingly popular.
In 2023, the Russian Embassy managed to hold a number of planned military memorial events. Ceremonial events were held at the monument to Richard Sorge, Hero of the Soviet Union (wreath-laying on 23 February, 9 May and 7 November) with diplomats of friendly countries’ embassies, as well as compatriots present.
It should be noted that in 2023 – early 2024, attempts to "harass" Russians have significantly scaled down. Meanwhile, however, the repeated refusal of Japanese consular authorities to issue visas to Russian citizens living in the Southern Kuril Islands, Republic of Crimea and new constituent entities of the Russian Federation (the Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics, Kherson and Zaporozhye Oblasts) is the main Russophobic manifestation now.
As for racism, xenophobia and other manifestations of intolerance in the Japanese society, they are directed mainly at representatives of other nationalities living in the country.
As of today, a legal framework prohibiting discrimination on racial, national or religious grounds lacks in Japan, where 97% of the population is ethnic Japanese. The issue of a comprehensive legislation in this area has been raised by the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) established under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.[4057]
The UN Human Rights Council, as well as other international monitoring structures and a significant number of human rights NGOs have consistently criticized the Japanese government for the continuing gap in living standards between indigenous peoples, the Ainu and Ryukyuan, on the one hand, and the state-forming Japanese population on the other.
There are cases of harassment of members of these indigenous groups both in the labour market and in terms of access to education and a number of social programs. At the same time, discrimination against the Burakumin,[4058] the descendants of the "impure" medieval caste, persists in the areas of employment, housing and marriage.
In recent years, the Japanese government has made considerable efforts to protect the identity of indigenous peoples. In implementing the provisions of the Law on the Promotion of Policies to Foster Public Respect for the Heritage of the Ainu People adopted in May 2019, it is now recognized that the Ainu people face biased and discriminatory attitudes, including in everyday life.
According to 2020 surveys, about a quarter of people who identify themselves as the Ainu said they have experienced such problems firsthand, and another 13 per cent were aware of such cases among acquaintances. Public discrimination against the Ainu is quite common, including in the mainstream media,[4059] in particular Japan's largest public broadcaster NHK. Various Ainu and human rights organizations continue to criticize the opportunistic nature of the law that, in their opinion, was adopted without sufficient consideration of the Ainu people viewpoint and "actually means exploiting their cultural and historical heritage". It is noteworthy that doubts as to where the efforts by the central authorities are useful, also appear periodically in the expert and journalist communities.
The Cabinet of Japan is accused of exaggerating the positive effects of the proposed social and economic measures, since the real beneficiaries of the allocated financial resources are the Hokkaido Prefecture and its administrative and territorial entities, and not the Ainu community itself. The need is emphasized to supplement the basic policy with provisions detailing the steps to be taken to ensure the small people’s rights to practice traditional methods of fishing, forestry and religious ceremonies. From November 2020 to April 2024, the Sapporo District Court (Hokkaido Prefecture) was hearing a lawsuit filed by the Ainu Raporo Nation group demanding recognition of river fishing as their inalienable right under the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the lifting of salmon fishing ban imposed by Japanese regulations (the verdict is negative). This is the first lawsuit of its kind in the Japanese legal practice.
In 2020, the Upopoy Ethnic Harmony Center dedicated to the Ainu people, their history, cultural characteristics and traditions was opened on the island of Hokkaido. However, in 2021, the Honbetsu City Council (Hokkaido Prefecture) rejected the Ainu Association's request for permission to build traditional ceremonial structures on the island.
The situation of the indigenous people of the Ryukyu Islands remains difficult. The official Tokyo denies them benefits and support for their cultural identity. Experts from non-governmental structures point out to the distorted school courses that contain virtually no information about the identity and ethnic and linguistic uniqueness of the Ryukyu people. On the contrary, the municipal authorities of the Okinawa Prefecture call on the government to persuade the UN structures to withdraw resolutions recognizing the Ryukyu as an indigenous people. Therefore, the Ryukyu people appealed to the international community to protect their indigenous rights on 4-8 July 2022, on the sidelines of the 15th session of the Human Rights Council's Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
In addition to these problems, residents of the northernmost and southernmost Japanese islands continue to face other manifestations of discrimination.
There have been cases of incitement to ethnic hatred and crimes against ethnic minorities, especially Koreans, who are frequently subjected to open discrimination.[4060] Official representatives do not shy away from offensive statements either. However, neither officials nor private individuals have ever been held accountable for racist hate speech or committing hate crimes.
Another scandal broke out in December 2022. Mio Sugita, Parliamentary Vice Minister of Internal Affairs, Local Government, Communications and Telecommunications of Japan, posted derogatory comments in her private blog about traditionally dressed ethnic Koreans and Ainu who attended a Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women meeting. The politician had to apologize under public pressure, but according to local observers, her forced "repentance" was not convincing.[4061] The fact that she was removed from office by Prime Minister Kishida after a month following opposition demands only and retained her parliamentary mandate caused particular resentment.
Yoshiaki Yoshida, CEO of DHC, a major cosmetics and dietary supplement company, has repeatedly (most prominently in 2016, 2020, and 2021) declared, including on the brand's official website, that the "overrepresentation of Koreans" in the official and political circles, as well as in media industry is unacceptable because it "threatens Japanese statehood".[4062] Small-scale boycotts, suspension of cooperation with the corporation, and other forms of public reaction seem to only temporarily mute the DHC leadership’s hostile rhetoric. There have been no meaningful prosecutions of businessman Yoshiaki Yoshida.
The contents of new Japanese history textbooks unveiled in the spring of 2023, highlighting controversial and sensitive for the Koreans issues from a standpoint that is advantageous to Japan only, caused Koreans’ indignation. Some of the manuals missed mentioning of the fact that during World War II, workers from Korea and China were forcibly mobilized to work in Japanese enterprises. Instead, the neutral phrase "were engaged in the works" was used. Moreover, the thesis was repeated again and even stronger about the Japanese ownership of the East (Japanese) Sea Dokdo (Takeshima) archipelago which is under the control of South Korea (the Koreans consider it theirs).
On 28 March 2023, the Minister-Counselor of the Japanese Embassy was summoned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, to whom deep disappointment was expressed in connection with the history textbook contents. In this regard, a Ministry spokesman told reporters that "Japan must accept what it did in the past and raise its young generation in a more responsible manner... Japan needs to keep its promises to support previous apologies".[4063]
This happened against the backdrop of the agreements signed during the South Korean-Japanese summit in Tokyo on 16-17 March 2023, where South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and Prime Minister Fumio Kishida agreed to improve bilateral relations. At that, Seoul made significant concessions, proposing an indirect scheme for paying compensation to Korean workers who were forcibly mobilized to work in Japanese enterprises. The compensation will be paid not by Japanese firms, which they and the Japanese government categorically objected to, but by Korean companies that received subsidies from Tokyo for paying post-war reparations.
Moreover, the Japanese Prime Minister uprightly refused to apologize for the crimes of the past, saying only that he supported the Government's 1998 statement, where deep regrets were expressed on behalf of Japan. These agreements, diligently advertised as a "diplomatic breakthrough" by the Government and President of South Korea, faced a negative reaction in that country due to serious unilateral concessions.
In this regard, a wave of criticism in relation to Japan and its crimes, as well as Tokyo's official assessment of historical facts, has once again arisen in the South Korean society and media.
The "Remembrance, Remorse, and Friendship" memorial that had been opened in 2004 in Takasaki city (Gunma Prefecture) by local activists to honour Korean workers forcibly sent to Japan during World War II, was demolished in late January 2024 after many years of litigation. The prefectural leaders claim that the reason behind this decision was "a violation of the obligation not to use the site for political events", while admitting that there were no consultations with the Embassy of the Republic of Korea in Japan on this issue.[4064]
The adoption (June 2016) of the Law on the Promotion of Efforts to Eliminate Unfair Discriminatory Speech and Behaviour against Persons Originating from Countries other than Japan was a positive step toward eliminating hate rhetoric.
At the same time, critics note that the normative act contains limited legal remedies for ethnic minorities,[4065] as its scope of application is narrowed to the actions vis-a-vis persons "legally" residing in the state, and there is no description of specific measures to punish violators.
Japan's General Police Department (GPD) published a report in November 2022 evaluating the 2021 performance of law enforcement agencies, according to which there were six cases of ethnic or racial profiling by local law enforcement officers during the reporting period.[4066] These incidents involved police officers from the Metropolitan Department, Kanagawa, Miyagi and Osaka Prefectures. Inappropriate behaviour included the attempts to inquire about "ethnicity" instead of "citizenship," checking up the contents of personal belongings of a young man with African and Japanese roots, and prejudicial comments, etc. The head of the Department claimed that the officers "had no racially or ethnically biased discriminatory intent". Plans were voiced to provide necessary training and instructions to police officers so that they interact with citizens in an appropriate manner.
A detailed GPD review of this aspect was triggered by the US Tokyo Embassy warning to US citizens that was posted on Twitter on 6 December 2021 about Japanese police racial profiling cases.[4067] However, experts believe the report cited figures understated. According to the Tokyo Bar Association, nearly 63 per cent of the 2,094 foreigners interviewed in 2022 faced persistent questioning by law enforcement officials, and 85 per cent of them believed their physical difference from the Japanese to have triggered it.[4068]
According to TRT Russian of 30 January 2024, three Japanese residents of foreign descent have filed a lawsuit against the government, accusing police of racial profiling. The case sheds light on simmering tensions over national identity in the ethnically homogeneous country. The plaintiffs who live in Tokyo, claim that they have been repeatedly stopped and questioned by police officers solely on the basis of their appearance — their race and skin colour. The victims claim this to be discrimination that violates the Japanese Constitution. Besides seeking compensation from the government, they also want to set a legal precedent by having racial profiling declared illegal in court.[4069]
It is worth noting that the issue goes well beyond such police incidents - studies have shown that in Japan, people of foreign descent often face discrimination in housing, employment, and various forms of social interaction.
The high profile of the above trial has sparked public debate about inclusivity and the very essence of what it means to be “Japanese.” The recent case of a Ukrainian-born model being crowned Miss Japan 2024 has given rise to discussions as to beauty standards and the social acceptance of those who look different.[4070]
According to a BBC report of 24 January 2024,[4071] the victory of Karolina Shiino, who was born in Ternopol, Ukraine, and moved to Japan at the age of five, in the Miss Japan 2024 beauty pageant on 22 January 2024, has provoked national identity debate among the Japanese public and whether a model of non-Japanese origin can even hold the title.
Many Japanese rebelled against the complete lack of Japanese roots in case of this 26-year-old model who became the first naturalized Japanese citizen to win the pageant. Some social media users called her win a sign of the times, others said she didn't look like Miss Japan,[4072] and others pointed out to the political undertones,[4073] wondering whether the model's Ukrainian heritage made her a suitable winner of the pageant.[4074]
In general, the situation with regard to combating various forms of intolerance in Japan can be characterized as unfavourable and gradually deteriorating. The course of historical revisionism professed by the official authorities, as well as the latent cultivation of nationalist and militarist ideas, in particular, are indicative of this. In addition, ineffective domestic policies to suppress discriminatory attitudes toward country’s non-titular ethnicities have contributed to growing interethnic tension.
Tokyo's refugee stance remains a pressing issue. Japan contributes financially to the work of international humanitarian aid bodies, yet it takes a very passive stance regarding the admission of foreign nationals. In 2022, there were 7,237 pending status applications, of them 187 approved, 5,418 rejected, and 1,632 remained pending (compared to 3,936 status requests received, and only 47 approved in 2020), which is the lowest rate among developed countries[4075].
A case of a Sri Lankan citizen who died at the age of 33 in immigration detention in March 2021 due to a lack of access to medical care (before national law amendments of June 2023, detention in an immigration center could be of an indefinite term which was considered inhumane treatment by the UNHRC), is well-known.
Despite Tokyo's archaic approaches to refugees and asylum seekers, authorities began to make exceptions for Ukrainian citizens after Russia launched its special military operation in Ukraine. As of July 2023, 2,120 Ukrainians had arrived to Japan. They received the right to residence, public health insurance, and employment assistance.
Tokyo also receives a certain amount of criticism from its closest allies. For example, the US Department of State 2022 Trafficking in Persons Report documented Japan's failure to meet minimum standards for the eradication of human trafficking, forced labour and sexual exploitation, also noting the country's efforts to remedy the situation[4076]. The report also documented cases of passports being confiscated from students from Bhutan taking courses in Japan's apprenticeship programs.
Priština has consistently pursued a course towards falsifying history and misrepresenting historical facts. It has increasingly engaged in glorifying the accomplices of Hitler's coalition. At the same time, the situation with ensuring the rights of national minorities keeps degrading, as interim authorities extensively and systemically resort to ethnically motivated violence with the connivance of their Western patrons. The so-called "authorities" have openly engaged in forced Albanization and the extermination of the Serbian population of the Province.
They have gone radical in pursuit of maximum "dissociation" from Serbia and the "Yugoslavian heritage". It has manifested itself, inter alia, in the destruction and desecration of dozens of memorials to the fighters against Nazism and Fascism during World War II in Kosovo (as a result of which only 11 memorials have survived in the Province from the Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia and Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia). At the same time, after 1999, over 1,600 various sites honouring the militants of the terrorist "Kosovo Liberation Army" (KLA) emerged.[4078]
The Province's "cabinet of ministers" has actively encouraged the falsification of history. The establishment of a "museum of crimes of the former Yugoslavia and Serbia against Albanians in Kosovo since 1918" is but one initiative to this effect. A concept of a project is being developed, aimed, among other things, at whitewashing KLA and promoting the image of Serbs as a "genocide-prone" nation. What is more, in December 2023, Albin Kurti presented the newly established "Institute for the Research and Documentation of Crimes Committed during the War of 1998–1999", which is also intended for anti-Serbian activities.
In the meantime, in April 2023, trials began at the Kosovo Relocated Specialist Judicial Institution in The Hague against four former KLA leaders Hashim Thaçi, Kadri Veseli, Rexhep Selimi, and Jakup Krasniqi, on charges of committing war crimes during the 1998-1999 Kosovo conflict. Albin Kurti's "government" established a fund to help the accused and their families, but allocated no funds to pay compensation to the victims.
Public attention was attracted to the project facilitated by the Kosovo authorities and involving the reconstruction of the house that belonged to Xhaferr Deva, one of the main Nazi henchmen during World War II and a mayor of Mitrovica, who took part in the persecution of Serbs, Jews, Roma and other non-Albanians. Later, he served as the "Minister of the Interior" in the puppet Nazi government in Albania, and was at the forefront of establishment of the SS Skanderbeg division. At the end of war, Deva migrated to the United States, where he died in 1978.
Written appeals from Maja Gojković, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Culture and Information of Serbia to the leadership of the EU and the UN Development Program in February 2022 made these organizations, which had previously promised support for the project within the framework of the EU Cultural Heritage as a Driving Force for Intercommunity Dialogue and Social Cohesion program, announce funding freeze.[4079] The idea of glorifying a Nazi collaborator was condemned by the German Ambassador to Priština Jörn Rohde and the German rapporteur on Kosovo in the European Parliament Viola von Cramon.
After the huge public scandal, the "Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports" of Kosovo stated that the building was a highly valuable piece of architecture, being the first example of Western European style in Mitrovica, and therefore needed protection and restoration in any case regardless of which historical figures had lived there. The "Government" of Kosovo ignored Belgrade's and Kosovo Serbs' protests and included the corresponding item in the draft budget for 2023 presented to the "Assembly" on 31 October 2022. It provided for the allocation of EUR 300 thousand for the "conservation and restoration" of a building in Mitrovica. A total of EUR 643 thousand is earmarked to be spent for these purposes before 2026. On 15 December 2022, the "Parliament" of Kosovo approved the document in the second reading. The Western structures did not respond to this event at all.
On 4 January 2023, Dejan Ristić, Director of the Museum of Genocide Victims (Serbia) sent letters to the ambassadors of Israel, the United States, Germany and Sweden and to the head of the EU Delegation in Belgrade, pointing out the negative long-term consequences of the glorification of a Nazi criminal and characterizing the mentioned developments as an extremely dangerous precedent for the Balkans and Europe as a whole. According to him, such a project de facto legitimizes the crimes committed against Serbs, Roma, Jews and other non-Albanian peoples in Kosovo during World War II and indicates that national minorities remain unwelcome on these lands today.[4080] He believed that the Western patrons' initial plan to open an interethnic reconciliation cultural centre in the renovated building was especially insulting to the victims.[4081]
These actions were also publicly condemned by Efraim Zuroff, Head of the Simon Wiesenthal Centre (Israel), who believed that the West's relaxed attitude towards the historical role of Xhafer Deva was explained by the his many years' cooperation with the CIA during his years in the United States.[4082]
In 2024, the interim authorities in Priština resumed the renovation of the house of the Nazi accomplice despite the heated criticism of the international community.
Kosovo's new toponyms honouring Nazi collaborators has become another aspect contributing to the "perpetuation of their memory". Three streets have been named after Xhafer Deva in the province (in Mitrovica, Uroševac and Priština). The streets in Priština and Uroševac and the city park in Srbica received the name of collaborationist Shaban Polluzha. In the village of Glogovac, where he was born, a memorial house was opened, which was included on Kosovo's list of architectural heritage. The name of Bedri Pejani, who initiated the establishment of the SS Skanderbeg division, has been given to a secondary school in Peć.
In Priština, there are some streets named after the members of the puppet Albanian government created by Nazis, which was the main contributor to the implementation of Nazis' policy in the Balkans. These include streets bearing the name of Rexhep Mitrovica, the country's Prime Minister during the Nazi occupation of Albania (one of the streets is situated in the city of Mitrovica), Rexhep Krasniqi, nationalist and Minister of Education, and Anton Harapi, a Franciscan friar, collaborationist and a member of the Regency Council under German occupation (a street named after him is also situated in Peć). The name of another member of the Regency Council, Mehdi Frashëri, was given to a street in the city of Mitrovica.[4083]
Efforts are made to glorify Mid'hat Frashëri, Albanian nationalist and a founder of the Balli Kombëtar movement, who openly collaborated with the Nazi Germany. Streets are named after him in the cities of Priština and Mitrovica. In Djurakovac, a professional school bears his name, and a bust is installed.[4084]
Albanian majority's explicitly discriminatory attitude towards Serbian population remains one of the key human rights issues in the province not controlled by Belgrade. Rather than trying to solve the existing problems, Kosovo authorities have been consciously and consistently pursuing a policy of the forced "Albanization" of the province by squeezing out national minorities.
After the ultra-nationalist Self-Determination Party led by Albin Kurti came to power in Kosovo in February 2021, the anti-Serbian course of the interim authorities in Priština has become many times tougher. According to Belgrade, in 2023 178 ethnically motivated offences were committed against Serbs and their property, and about 500 such incidents have been recorded since 2021.[4085]
The resolution of the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers on the implementation of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities in Kosovo and Metohija of 3 July 2019, which took into account the comments of the UN Mission in Kosovo, recommended that the provincial leadership take urgent steps to promote interethnic dialogue and tolerance at central and local level, condemn all ethnically motivated attacks and ensure that these acts are effectively investigated, improve the implementation of legislation to protect vulnerable ethnic groups, address disparities in access to justice between the Kosovo Albanian majority and members of other ethnic groups; align the use of the Serbian language in judicial and administrative documents etc.[4086] However, the Council of Europe's Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities in its Fifth Opinion on Kosovo published on 26 May 2023 and taking into account the comments of the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), stated that hardly any progress was made in addressing the problems concerning the local Serb community and national minorities in general.[4087]
Serbs remain the largest national minority in Kosovo (more than 100,000 people, or about 6 per cent of the population) and retain a quota of 10 out of the 20 seats reserved for national minorities in the 120-seat unicameral "Assembly" ("Parliament") of Kosovo. The remaining 10 seats are divided among the six other ethnic groups recognized by Priština as national minorities (Bosniaks, Turks, Gorani, and Roma). Legislation requires that any initiative affecting the interests of minorities should be approved by the affected minorities in the "Assembly" (the so-called "double majority" principle). However, the Kosovars often circumvent this rule. This refers, in particular, to "pushing" through the "Parliament" the decision to establish a Kosovo "Army" based on the "Kosovo Security Force" (KSF) in contravention of the UN Security Council Resolution 1244. Kosovars failed to obtain consent of the Serb members and to secure the desired "double majority" in the "Assembly", and began to build up the KSF military component without formally changing its name. On 14 December 2018, three laws were adopted by a simple majority: on KSF, on Service in the KSF and on the Ministry of Defense of Kosovo. Thus, the body, originally intended to mitigate natural and man-made disasters, was endowed with the functions of protecting the "sovereignty and territorial integrity" of the province.
The implementation of the accord enshrined in the Brussels agreements between Belgrade and Priština of 2013 and 2015 to establish the Community of Serb Municipalities of Kosovo (CSMK) with executive powers remains an outstanding issue. The Kosovars refuse to discuss the issue in an EU‑mediated dialogue with Belgrade. They stated that the CSMK could be formed exclusively by a decision of the province's "constitutional court" and as a non-governmental organization fully controlled by Priština. The "Agreement on the path to normalization" with Priština imposed on Belgrade by Western mediators, makes no mention of the CSMK.
On 5 November 2022, in response to the dismissal of the head of the Kosovo "police" in the northern municipalities Nenad Đurić (a Serb), the province's Serbs announced their withdrawal from the "state institutions". A "minister" of the "government", some members of the "parliament", heads of four "municipalities", more than 450 police officers, over 100 officers of the "border service", 150 officers of the "court" and "prosecutor's office" resigned. Albin Kurti took advantage of the power vacuum that ensued and authorized, on 14 December 2022, forceful seizure of the "municipal council" in the province's north populated by Serbs, as a result of which all the seats were occupied by Kosovo Albanians and Muslim Bosniaks, without observing any democratic procedures.
Cases of discrimination in the electoral sphere have been reported. Contrary to the previous many years' practice and despite the calls of the international presences, the EU and Western countries' leadership, Priština disrupted the holding of voting in the Serb-populated areas of the province on 16 January 2022 in a referendum on amending the Serbian Constitution, on 3 April 2022 – in the general elections in Serbia, and on 17 December 2023 in Serbian parliamentary elections. Only a small part of voting electorate could leave for the Central Serbia to vote.
On 23 April 2023, the extraordinary "municipal elections" were held in four Serb-populated communities in the north. The largest party of province's Serbs, the Serb List, refused to participate until Priština created conditions for the return of the Serbs to the "government bodies" (formation of the CSMC, withdrawal of special "police" forces from the north). Only 13 Serbs came to the polling stations, the turnout including Albanian voters was 3.5 per cent. The Albanian "winners" received from 100 to 519 votes depending on the municipality, and were sworn in as new "mayors" in May.
On 26 May 2023, the placement, as directed from Priština, of fictitious "mayors" in the municipal buildings of Zvečan, Zubin Potok and Leposavić caused protests from residents and sharply aggravated the situation. The "police" used tear gas and stun grenades to disperse the Serb protesters, many of whom were injured. On 29 May, the attempt to disperse the demonstrators' crowd in Zvečan was made by the NATO contingent military to result in harsh fistfights using the firearms. Dozens of Serbs and NATO soldiers were injured. "Mayors" who do not represent the local Serb population continue to lead municipalities. To de-escalate the situation, Belgrade and the West demanded, inter alia, that repeat elections should be held in the north of the province. The initiative put forward by the residents in April 2024 to recall the self-appointed "mayors" was blocked by Priština, who established unreal conditions for holding such elections.[4088]
Serbs in Kosovo are subject to regular economic pressure, and unlawful seizures of property. On 8 December 2022, in Velika Hoča (Orahovac Municipality), the Kosovo "police" with the military support of NATO contingent, collected 42 thousand litres of wine from the private winery owned by the Serbian family of Petrovič. The confiscation of land plots from Serbs in the north of the province in order to establish the Kosovo "police" support bases has become a regular practice. In June 2023, Priština once again blocked the import of goods from central Serbia, including medical goods and drugs, which resulted in the threat of humanitarian crisis in Serb-populated communities.
Serbian business has been intensively persecuted, licenses have been actively revoked, including from strategic enterprises. There is a direct seizure of objects, on 20 December 2023, the "police" occupied the balneological complex "Rajska Banja" in Banjska (Zvečan), declaring that it was under the jurisdiction of the Kosovo "privatization agency", which, on 14 December, leased it to the "Ministry of Interior." At the same time, since 2015, the Office for Kosovo and Metohija has invested EUR 7 million in the development of the resort.[4089]
Heavily armed special forces squad of the Kosovo "police" (ROSU) regularly invade the Serb‑populated north of the province (14 such raids were recorded in 2017-2022; after another round of crisis in December 2022, this became an everyday reality.) Since December 2022, seven "police" outposts have been established there, for which lands of residents of Zubin Potok and Leposavić were forcibly alienated. "Authorities" are not complying with the Priština court ruling of 18 December 2023 on the illegal nature of this expropriation.[4090]
On 23 January 2023, in northern Kosovo, riot police fired on a vehicle on the road, critically wounding one of the Serbs in the vehicle in the chest.[4091] On 10 April 2023, in Zvečan, a local Serbian taxi driver was shot[4092], and, on 17 June 2023, two Serbian teenagers were injured.[4093]
After the shooting incident in Banjska on 24 September 2023, in which three local Serbs and an Albanian police officer were killed, the Kosovo "police" increased the number of detentions and arrests of Serbs, not only alleged participants in the event, but also those who went on peaceful protests in 2022‑2023 or suspects of committing war crimes in 1998‑1999. There are elderly and seriously ill people among the detainees, who are being denied the opportunity to receive necessary therapy because of the lack of "Kosovo" labelling on the medicines from Central Serbia that are brought by relatives.[4094] According to Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, many Serbs detained under a made-up pretext have been in detention for more than two years.[4095]
As Kosovo's "authorities" fueled hatred against non-Albanians, attempts to physically assault Serbs resumed. On Christmas Eve, 6 January 2023, in the municipality of Štrpce, two Serbs, cousins Stefan (11 years old) and Milos (21 years old) Stojanovič, were injured in a shooting by local Albanian law enforcement officer Azem Kurtaj. On the night of 7 January 2023, Serbian Stefan Tomic (18 years old), who was returning from Christmas service, was beaten by a group of Albanians in the municipality of Klokot. On 17 June 2023, in Zvečan, Kosovar police officers beat two Serbian teenagers of 16 and 18 years old.
Priština's ban on financial transactions in Serbian dinars from 1 February 2024, including transfers from Belgrade for the payment of pensions and social benefits, is another discriminatory act.
Language discrimination is widespread, as reflected by the EU and Council of Europe in their documents. Despite being one of the two "official" languages of Kosovo, Serbian is being consistently evaporated from all spheres of public life under the pretext of a shortage of qualified translators. Transcripts of "parliamentary" meetings are not translated into Serbian.[4096] The Serbian language is excluded from the instruction system in the vast majority of Kosovo Albanian schools and other educational institutions and is relegated to the status of a language of other national minorities, being used, as a rule, only in Serb-populated areas. In Albanian-populated municipalities, road signs in Serbian are regularly vandalized. On 14 September 2023, in Gračanica, Kosovo "police" beat two Serbs (they required hospitalization) in response to a request for a traffic ticket form in Serbian.[4097]
Errors in translations are often made intentionally. In particular, the name of the self-proclaimed "Republic of Kosovo" in the Serbian version of the designation of various "state" institutions is written in the Albanian manner ("Kosova"). Serbian journalists covering the work of the Kosovo "Parliament" regularly report the lack of simultaneous interpretation of meetings into the Serbian language.
Another problem in the province is the religious discrimination. To date, no changes have been made to the law on Freedom of Religion that would allow religious organizations to obtain the status of legal entities, conduct business activities, own property, open bank accounts and enjoy tax benefits. The amendments were also supposed to regulate the status of certain religious groups requiring recognition as separate religious communities.
Anja Hoffmann, the executive director of the Observatory against Intolerance and Discrimination against Christians, emphasizes the discrimination and ongoing violence against the Christian minority. It is stressed that due to the lack of a mechanism for obtaining legal status and registration, religious communities are restricted in their right to own property, open bank accounts, etc., which hampers their activities.
Persecution of the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) was unleashed. The restoration of the Church of St. Nicholas on the territory of the Monastery of the Holy Archangels in Prizren, the Church of Our Lady of Ljeviš, included in the UNESCO World Heritage List, is not moving forward, as well as the completion of the construction of the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour in Priština, despite the existing decision of the Kosovo court in favour of the SOC. In January 2020, the University of Priština appealed to the municipal court of first instance to cancel the 1991 Serbian government decision to give the Serbian Orthodox Church the land to build the church. If successful, the authorities will be free to remove the cathedral as it allegedly hinders the expansion of the aforementioned institution's campus.
The same holds true for the long-running confrontation between Priština municipality and the Kosovo Jewish community over the location of a future synagogue, construction of which has been approved in principle back in 2016. Local authorities deny the right to build the facility in the city centre, demanding it to be moved to the suburbs, which has sparked reasonable outrage among Jews.
In June 2022, the Kosovo "police", under a far-fetched pretext, prevented the organization of the liturgy on the occasion of the Ascension Day in the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour in Priština. Those facts are confirmed, inter alia, by the international presence: in July 2022, the head of the OSCE mission in Priština Michael Davenport (Great Britain) presented a report on the Protection of the Cultural Heritage in Kosovo in which he documented 247 incidents happened to the cultural and religious sites in 2014-2020.[4098]
On 20 October 2023, the hegumen of the Devina Voda Monastery (Zveçan municipality), Photios, was urgently expelled from the province. Citing "national security concerns", he is banned from entering Kosovo for five years.
Another act of Priština's permissive attitude was the prevention by the "Kosovo authorities" of Serbian Patriarch Porfirije from attending the traditional opening of a SOC bishops' council in the Patriarchal Monastery of Peć.[4099]
Kosovo Albanian "authorities" are increasingly practicing the appropriation of Serbian Orthodox sites in the province. The Law on Special Protective Zones which stipulates a special regime for cultural and historical sites, is constantly violated. In August 2020, another attempt was made to resume the construction of the highway to Montenegro (Dečani – Plav), which began in 2018 through the territory adjacent to the Dečani Monastery, the 14th century site inscribed on UNESCO's World Cultural Heritage List. Despite the efforts of international mediators who managed to temporarily suspend the works, the head of the local municipality said that he did not intend to retreat, counting on support of the Kosovo "Constitutional Court."
The future of the territories of the Serbian monastery complex in Hvosno, where the foundations of several destroyed Orthodox churches are located, is a cause for concern.[4100] On 19 January 2024, on the Feast of the Epiphany of the Lord, Priština's "authorities" unlawfully fenced off the ruins of the 13th century Church of the Mother of God in Hvosno (special protective zone) in the village of Vrelo (Istok municipality), with a sign in Albanian calling this historical and architectural monument under state protection since 1990 "the remains of the basilica of the 6th century."[4101] In March 2024, the site was vandalized and the fence around the monastery complex was damaged. In this regard, the Serbian Orthodox Church reiterated its concerns about possible illegal actions against the complex.[4102]
In December 2023, Kosovo's "Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports" declared the medieval Orthodox church in Gorne Vinarc (Mitrovica) Catholic and announced its restoration without consulting the Raska-Prizren diocese of the SOC. Earlier in November 2023, a false priest from Albania, Nikolla Xhufka(Nikolla Xhufka), accompanied by a group of Albanians from Kosovo, Podujevo, performed a "service" in the Church in the nearest village of Rakitnica.[4103] The Kosovo newspaper Koha Ditore, on the Orthodox Christmas Eve, attributed pagan Illyrian origins to the cathedral church of St. Petka in Prizren.[4104] In May 2024, the Church of the Holy Trinity in the village of Naklo (Peć municipality) was desecrated with graffiti saying "we don't want churches, we want mosques... Islam is the only true religion!", "Allahu Akbar" in Albanian.[4105]
In March 2024, after years of inaction the local "authorities" implemented the 2016 decision of the "constitutional court" of Kosovo to recognize the ownership of the SOC monastery of Visoki Dečani on the adjacent land of 24 hectares.[4106] Nevertheless, the decision still exists only on paper, it remains unclear how the rights of the monastery will be exercised in practice.
Desecration of Serbian Orthodox cemeteries and monuments is not uncommon: in November 2021 in Kosovo Polje (cemetery) and Velika Hoča (memorial slabs honouring Serbian journalists killed during the 1998‑1999 conflict), and in December 2021 in Kisnica (cemetery).
In October 2023, an old Orthodox cemetery in northern Mitrovica was desecrated during "road works", tombstones were broken and the remains of the dead were scattered.[4107] After complaints from local residents, the municipality suspended construction. A criminal case was opened. In its turn, the OSCE condemned the road construction activities, which damaged the Orthodox cemetery.[4108]
In total, according to some reports, at least 10,000 Serbian graves were destroyed between 1999 and 2023.[4109]
The problem of return of refugees and IDPs to the province is not bring solved (according to Belgrade, only 1.9 per cent of about 200 thousand people were able to return safely). Since 1999, 312 settlements in Kosovo have been completely cleansed of Serbs and other national minorities. Until June 1999, 372.4 thousand non-Albanians (including 239.8 thousand Serbs) lived in the province, from which 209 thousand people (including 156.6 thousand Serbs) were forced to leave. The proper level of security is not ensured, in July 2023, in Istok municipality and, in September 2023, in Vucitrnje, houses intended for Serb returnees were burned down.
The issue of restitution of real estate belonging to refugees and IDPs remains acute. 40,000 applications for restitution of usurped property have been filed with the Priština's "Real Estate Inspection Agency." 18,400 claims for compensation for material damage are pending in Kosovo courts.[4110] Even if verdicts were passed in favour of the injured party, they are often not implemented.
In April 2024, a census of the province's population was launched, which includes a separate questionnaire to record the damage caused to citizens during the conflict. However, following the policy of discrediting Serbians, the data are collected only for the period ending in June 1999 (i.e., before the withdrawal of Serbian troops from Kosovo.) Thus, the human and material losses among the non-Albanian population that occurred in the following years as a result of Priština's unleashed terror will not be included in the statistics.[4111]
List of Annexes:
- Text of United Nations General Assembly resolution 78/190 "Combating glorification of Nazism, neo-Nazism and other practices that contribute to fuelling contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance" (Russian)
- Text of United Nations General Assembly resolution 78/190 "Combating glorification of Nazism, neo-Nazism and other practices that contribute to fuelling contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance" (English)
- List of cosponsors of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 78/190 "Combating glorification of Nazism, neo-Nazism and other practices that contribute to fuelling contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance"
- Results of voting when adopting draft United Nations General Assembly "Combating glorification of Nazism, neo-Nazism and other practices that contribute to fuelling contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance" on 19 December 2023
Annex 1
Резолюция, принятая Генеральной Ассамблеей 19 декабря 2023 года
[по докладу Третьего комитета (A/78/478, пункт 33)]
78/190. Борьба с героизацией нацизма, неонацизмом и другими видами практики, которые способствуют эскалации современных форм расизма, расовой дискриминации, ксенофобии и связанной с ними нетерпимости
* Российская Федерация и ряд государств отмежевались от параграфа 4 постановляющей части резолюции, включенного в текст после голосования по внесенной западными странами поправке.
Генеральная Ассамблея,
руководствуясь Уставом Организации Объединенных Наций, Всеобщей декларацией прав человека[4112], Международным пактом о гражданских и политических правах[4113], Международной конвенцией о ликвидации всех форм расовой дискриминации[4114] и другими соответствующими документами по правам человека,
ссылаясь на положения резолюций Комиссии по правам человека 2004/16 от 16 апреля 2004 года[4115] и 2005/5 от 14 апреля 2005 года[4116] и соответствующих резолюций Совета по правам человека, в частности резолюций 7/34 от 28 марта 2008 года[4117], 18/15 от 29 сентября 2011 года[4118] и 21/33 от 28 сентября 2012 года[4119], а также резолюций Генеральной Ассамблеи 60/143 от 16 декабря 2005 года, 61/147 от 19 декабря 2006 года, 62/142 от 18 декабря 2007 года, 63/162 от 18 декабря 2008 года, 64/147 от 18 декабря 2009 года, 65/199 от 21 декабря 2010 года, 66/143 от 19 декабря 2011 года, 67/154 от 20 декабря 2012 года, 68/150 от 18 декабря 2013 года, 69/160 от 18 декабря 2014 года, 70/139 от 17 декабря 2015 года, 71/179 от 19 декабря 2016 года, 72/156 от 19 декабря 2017 года, 73/157 от 17 декабря 2018 года, 74/136 от 18 декабря 2019 года, 75/169 от 16 декабря 2020 года и 76/149 от 16 декабря 2021 года по этому вопросу и своих резолюций 61/149 от 19 декабря 2006 года, 62/220 от 22 декабря 2007 года, 63/242 от 24 декабря 2008 года, 64/148 от 18 декабря 2009 года, 65/240 от 24 декабря 2010 года, 66/144 от 19 декабря 2011 года, 67/155 от 20 декабря 2012 года, 68/151 от 18 декабря 2013 года, 69/162 от 18 декабря 2014 года, 70/140 от 17 декабря 2015 года, 71/181 от 19 декабря 2016 года, 72/157 от 19 декабря 2017 года, 73/262 от 22 декабря 2018 года, 74/137 от 18 декабря 2019 года, 75/237 от 31 декабря 2020 года, 76/226 от 24 декабря 2021 года и 77/205 от 15 декабря 2022 года, озаглавленных «Глобальный призыв к конкретным мерам, направленным на ликвидацию расизма, расовой дискриминации, ксенофобии и связанной с ними нетерпимости и всеобъемлющее осуществление и принятие последующих мер по выполнению Дурбанской декларации и Программы действий»,
учитывая другие важные инициативы Генеральной Ассамблеи, направленные на повышение степени осведомленности о страданиях жертв расизма, расовой дискриминации, ксенофобии и связанной с ними нетерпимости и дискриминации в различных формах, в том числе в исторической перспективе, в частности в память о жертвах рабства и трансатлантической работорговли,
ссылаясь на Устав Нюрнбергского трибунала и приговор Трибунала, который признал преступными, в частности, организацию СС и ее составные части, включая «Ваффен СС», в лице официальных членов СС, причастных к совершению или знавших о совершении военных преступлений и преступлений против человечности, связанных со Второй мировой войной, а также на другие соответствующие положения Устава и приговора,
памятуя об ужасах Второй мировой войны и подчеркивая в этой связи, что победа над нацизмом во Второй мировой войне способствовала формированию условий для создания Организации Объединенных Наций, призванной предотвратить будущие войны и избавить грядущие поколения от бедствий войны,
отмечая, что неонацизм не сводится лишь к героизации движения, существовавшего в прошлом, а представляет собой современное явление, которое поощряют субъекты, кровно заинтересованные в расовом неравенстве и готовые пойти на многое ради того, чтобы заручиться широкой поддержкой своих необоснованных притязаний на расовое превосходство,
ссылаясь на соответствующие положения Дурбанской декларации и Программы действий, принятых 8 сентября 2001 года Всемирной конференцией по борьбе против расизма, расовой дискриминации, ксенофобии и связанной с ними нетерпимости[4120], в частности пункт 2 Декларации и пункты 84-86 Программы действий, а также на соответствующие положения итогового документа Конференции по обзору Дурбанского процесса от 24 апреля 2009 года[4121], в частности пункты 11, 13 и 54,
будучи встревожена распространением во многих частях мира различных экстремистских политических партий, движений, идеологий и групп расистского и ксенофобского толка, включая группы неонацистов и «бритоголовых», и тем, что эта тенденция привела к принятию дискриминационных мер и политики на местном и национальном уровнях,
с обеспокоенностью отмечая, что даже в тех случаях, когда неонацисты или экстремисты формально не входят в состав правительства, присутствие в нем ультраправых идеологов может привести к включению в процесс управления и политический дискурс тех же самых идеологических концепций, которые делают неонацизм и экстремизм столь опасными,
будучи встревожена распространением песен и видеоигр, пропагандирующих расовую ненависть и подстрекающих к дискриминации, вражде или насилию,
будучи обеспокоена тем, что группы, пропагандирующие ненависть, используют онлайновые платформы для планирования публичных мероприятий, включая митинги и демонстрации, нацеленные на пропаганду расизма, ксенофобии и связанной с ними нетерпимости, а также насильственные акции, и для распространения информации о них и мобилизации средств на их проведение,
памятуя о той роли, которую может играть Интернет в содействии равенству, инклюзивности и недискриминации как составляющей укрепления демократии и уважения прав человека,
испытывая серьезную обеспокоенность в связи с тем, что неонацистские группы, а также другие группы и отдельные лица, исповедующие идеологию ненависти, все активнее работают с восприимчивыми лицами, главным образом детьми и молодежью, используя специально созданные веб-сайты для их идеологической обработки и вербовки,
будучи глубоко обеспокоена всеми недавними проявлениями насилия и терроризма, спровоцированными воинствующим национализмом, расизмом, антисемитизмом, дискриминацией на основе религии, убеждений или происхождения, в том числе исламофобией, христианофобией и афрофобией, ксенофобией и связанной с ними нетерпимостью, в том числе во время спортивных мероприятий,
с глубокой обеспокоенностью констатируя вызывающее тревогу продолжение увеличения числа случаев дискриминации, нетерпимости и насильственного экстремизма, мотивируемых антисемитизмом, религией или убеждениями, в том числе исламофобией и христианофобией, и предубеждениями против лиц, имеющих иное этническое происхождение, исповедующих иные религии или придерживающихся иных убеждений,
обращая особое внимание на отсутствие единообразия среди существующих норм, касающихся защиты свободы слова и выражения мнений и запрета расовой дискриминации, а также пропаганды национальной, расовой или религиозной ненависти, представляющей собой подстрекательство к дискриминации, вражде или насилию,
с обеспокоенностью отмечая в этой связи, что в силу различия национальных стандартов, запрещающих язык ненависти, некоторые страны могут служить убежищем для распространителей неонацистских, экстремистских, агрессивных националистических, ксенофобских или расистских идей, поскольку многие неонацистские и близкие к ним экстремистские группы расистского и ксенофобского толка действуют на транснациональном уровне, опираясь на поставщиков Интернет-услуг или платформы социальных сетей,
подчеркивая, что цель борьбы с языком ненависти заключается не в том, чтобы ограничить или запретить свободу слова, а в том, чтобы предотвратить подстрекательство к дискриминации и насилию, которое должно быть запрещено законом,
выражая обеспокоенность тем, что экстремистские и разжигающие ненависть группы, включая неонацистские группы, используют цифровые технологии, чтобы распространять свою идеологию, и признавая при этом, что цифровые технологии имеют большое значение для осуществления прав человека и борьбы с расизмом, расовой дискриминацией, ксенофобией и связанной с ними нетерпимостью,
- подтверждает соответствующие положения Дурбанской декларации и итогового документа Конференции по обзору Дурбанского процесса, в которых государства осудили попытки сохранить и возродить неонацизм, неофашизм и агрессивные националистические идеологии, основанные на расовых и национальных предубеждениях, и заявили, что эти явления никогда не могут заслуживать оправдания – ни в каких случаях и ни при каких обстоятельствах;
- ссылается на положения Дурбанской декларации и итогового документа Конференции по обзору Дурбанского процесса, в которых государства признали, что осуществление права на свободу выражения мнений, в частности средствами массовой информации и с помощью новых технологий, включая Интернет, и полное уважение права свободно искать, получать и распространять информацию могут внести позитивный вклад в дело борьбы с расизмом, расовой дискриминацией, ксенофобией и связанной с ними нетерпимостью;
- принимает к сведению доклад Специального докладчика по вопросу о современных формах расизма, расовой дискриминации, ксенофобии и связанной с ними нетерпимости, подготовленный в соответствии с просьбой, содержащейся в ее резолюции 77/204[4122];
- с тревогой отмечает, что Российская Федерация пытается оправдать свою территориальную агрессию против Украины мнимым предлогом искоренения неонацизма, и подчеркивает, что использование неонацизма в качестве предлога для оправдания территориальной агрессии серьезно подрывает подлинные попытки борьбы с неонацизмом;
- выражает признательность Верховному комиссару Организации Объединенных Наций по правам человека и Управлению Верховного комиссара Организации Объединенных Наций по правам человека за их усилия по борьбе с расизмом, расовой дискриминацией, ксенофобией и связанной с ними нетерпимостью, в том числе за ведение Управлением Верховного комиссара базы данных о практических способах борьбы с расизмом, расовой дискриминацией, ксенофобией и связанной с ними нетерпимостью;
- выражает глубокую обеспокоенность по поводу героизации в любой форме нацистского движения, неонацизма и бывших членов организации «Ваффен СС», в том числе в форме сооружения памятников и мемориалов и проведения публичных демонстраций в целях прославления нацистского прошлого, нацистского движения и неонацизма, а также посредством объявления или попыток объявить членов указанной организации и тех, кто боролся против антигитлеровской коалиции, сотрудничал с нацистским движением и совершал военные преступления и преступления против человечности, участниками национально-освободительных движений, а также переименования улиц в целях их героизации;
- призывает ко всеобщей ратификации и эффективному осуществлению Международной конвенции о ликвидации всех форм расовой дискриминации и настоятельно призывает те государства-участники, которые еще не сделали этого, рассмотреть вопрос о том, чтобы сделать заявление в соответствии с ее статьей 14, и тем самым признать компетенцию Комитета по ликвидации расовой дискриминации принимать и рассматривать сообщения от отдельных лиц или групп лиц, находящихся под их юрисдикцией, которые утверждают, что они являются жертвами нарушения государством-участником каких-либо прав, закрепленных в Конвенции;
- настоятельно призывает государства ликвидировать все формы расовой дискриминации всеми соответствующими средствами, в том числе, сообразно обстоятельствам, законодательно, обеспечив при этом, чтобы закрепленное в законодательстве определение расовой дискриминации соответствовало определению, содержащемуся в статье 1 Конвенции;
- рекомендует тем государствам, которые сделали оговорки к статье 4 Конвенции, серьезно рассмотреть вопрос об отзыве таких оговорок в первоочередном порядке, как было подчеркнуто Специальным докладчиком по вопросу о современных формах расизма, расовой дискриминации, ксенофобии и связанной с ними нетерпимости;
- признает, что дискриминация по признаку расовой, этнической или религиозной принадлежности или убеждений во всех ее формах и проявлениях, включая неонацизм, исламофобию, христианофобию и антисемитизм, представляет угрозу для социальной сплоченности в целом, а не только для тех расовых и этнических групп, против которых она направлена непосредственно;
- напоминает о том, что любые законодательные или конституционные меры, принимаемые в целях противодействия экстремистским политическим партиям, движениям, идеологиям и группам расистского и ксенофобского толка, включая группы неонацистов и «бритоголовых», и подобным им экстремистским идеологическим движениям, должны быть сообразны соответствующим международным обязательствам в области прав человека, в частности сформулированным в статьях 4 и 5 Конвенции и статьях 19–22 Международного пакта о гражданских и политических правах;
- призывает государства разработать и осуществлять национальные планы действий по ликвидации расизма, расовой дискриминации, ксенофобии и связанной с ними нетерпимости, с целью обеспечить, в частности, тщательное отслеживание проявлений нацизма, неонацизма и отрицания Холокоста, как, например, торжественные чествования нацистского режима, его союзников и связанных с ними организаций;
- рекомендует государствам – участникам Конвенции принять надлежащие меры для приведения их законодательства в соответствие с их обязательствами по Конвенции, в том числе по статье 4;
- подчеркивает, что обеспечение права на свободу выражения мнений, проведение мирных собраний и свободу ассоциации имеет важное значение для поддержки борьбы с расизмом, расовой дискриминацией, ксенофобией и связанной с ними нетерпимостью во всем мире;
- вновь особо отмечает рекомендацию Специального докладчика в адрес государств запретить «любые торжественные чествования – как официального, так и неофициального характера – нацистского режима, его союзников и связанных с ними организаций»[4123] , особо отмечает также, что подобные виды практики оскорбляют память бесчисленных жертв Второй мировой войны и оказывают негативное влияние на детей и молодежь, и подчеркивает в этой связи, что государствам необходимо принять в соответствии с международным правом прав человека меры по противодействию любому чествованию нацистской организации СС и всех ее составных частей, включая «Ваффен СС», и что отсутствие эффективного противодействия со стороны государств подобным видам практики несовместимо с обязательствами государств — членов Организации Объединенных Наций по ее Уставу;
- выражает глубокую обеспокоенность участившимися попытками и случаями осквернения или разрушения памятников, воздвигнутых в честь тех, кто боролся против нацизма в годы Второй мировой войны, а также незаконной эксгумации или переноса их останков и в этой связи настоятельно призывает государства в полной мере выполнять их соответствующие обязательства, в частности по статье 34 Дополнительного протокола I к Женевским конвенциям 1949 года[4124];
- решительно осуждает инциденты, связанные с героизацией и пропагандой нацизма, как то: акты нанесения граффити и рисунков пронацистского содержания, в том числе на памятники жертвам Второй мировой войны;
- приветствует усилия государств-членов по сохранению исторической правды, в том числе путем строительства и сохранения памятников и мемориалов, посвященных тем, кто сражался в рядах антигитлеровской коалиции;
- выражает тревогу по поводу использования экстремистскими группами, включая неонацистские группы, и отдельными лицами, исповедующими идеологию ненависти, информационных технологий, Интернета и социальных сетей для вербовки новых членов, в особенности для обращения к детям и молодежи, в том числе для усиления воздействия распространяемых ими идей ненависти, признавая при этом, что Интернет можно также использовать для борьбы с такими группами и для оказания противодействия этим группам;
- призывает государства принять соответствующие меры для противодействия новым и возникающим угрозам, связанным с ростом числа террористических атак, инспирируемых расизмом, ксенофобией и проявлениями нетерпимости в иных формах или совершаемых во имя религии или убеждений;
- с обеспокоенностью отмечает значительное число инцидентов расистского характера по всему миру, включая активизацию групп «бритоголовых», причастных ко многим из этих инцидентов, а также всплеск насилия на почве расизма и ксенофобии, направленного, в частности, против лиц, принадлежащих к национальным или этническим, религиозным и языковым меньшинствам, или на какой-либо иной почве, включая поджоги домов и акты вандализма и насилия в школах и местах отправления культа и на кладбищах;
- подтверждает, что такие акты могут при определенных обстоятельствах быть квалифицированы как подпадающие под действие Конвенции, что они не могут быть оправданы как акты осуществления свободы мирных собраний, свободы ассоциации или свободы выражения мнений и что они будут зачастую подпадать под действие статьи 20 Международного пакта о гражданских и политических правах и в отношении них могут вводиться определенные ограничения, предусмотренные статьями 19, 21 и 22 Пакта;
- рекомендует государствам принять надлежащие конкретные меры, в том числе в законодательной области и в сфере образования, в соответствии с их международными обязательствами в области прав человека, с тем чтобы предотвратить пересмотр истории и итогов Второй мировой войны и отрицание преступлений против человечности и военных преступлений, совершенных во время Второй мировой войны;
- призывает государства принимать активные меры для обеспечения того, чтобы в системах образования были подготовлены необходимые материалы, точно отражающие историю, а также поощряющие толерантность и другие международные принципы в области прав человека;
- ссылается на вынесенную Специальным докладчиком рекомендацию о том, что просвещение, направленное на то, чтобы не дать прорасти семенам расизма, посеянным националистическим популизмом, должно включать в себя точное и репрезентативное изложение национальной истории, отдающее должное расовому и этническому многообразию и разоблачающее лживые попытки вычеркнуть этнические группы из национальной истории и самосознания нации в целях сохранения этнонационалистических мифов о «чистоте» нации в расовом или этническом отношении[4125];
- безоговорочно осуждает любое отрицание или попытку отрицания Холокоста, а также все проявления религиозной нетерпимости, подстрекательства, преследования или насилия в отношении отдельных лиц или общин по признаку этнического происхождения или религиозных убеждений;
- подтверждает свою глубокую приверженность исполнению долга памяти и приветствует призыв Специального докладчика активно сохранять те связанные с Холокостом объекты, которые использовались нацистами в качестве лагерей смерти, концентрационных лагерей и лагерей принудительного труда и тюрем, а также его обращенный к государствам призыв принять меры, в том числе законодательные, правоохранительные и образовательные, с тем чтобы положить конец любому отрицанию Холокоста[4126];
- ссылается на сделанный Специальным докладчиком вывод о том, что ревизионизм и попытки фальсифицировать историю могут при определенных обстоятельствах подпадать под предусмотренный в статье 4 а) Конвенции запрет использования языка ненависти, которое государства обязаны объявить караемым по закону преступлением[4127], и что предпринимаемые неонацистами при вербовке попытки пропагандировать экстремистскую идеологию или расовую, этническую или религиозную ненависть и нетерпимость могут подпадать под действие статьи 4 b) Конвенции;
- призывает государства продолжать принимать все надлежащие меры, направленные на предупреждение и пресечение использования языка ненависти, в том числе в Интернете, и подстрекательства к насилию против лиц, находящихся в уязвимом положении, в том числе в рамках организации собраний и сопряженных с насилием акций протеста, сбора средств и совершения других действий;
- выражает серьезную озабоченность в связи с попытками запретить на законодательном уровне символику, ассоциируемую в государствах с победой над нацизмом;
- выражает глубокую обеспокоенность по поводу попыток распространения коммерческой рекламы, спекулирующей на страданиях жертв военных преступлений и преступлений против человечности, совершенных нацистским режимом во время Второй мировой войны;
- подчеркивает, что память необходимо уважать и что описанные выше виды практики оскорбляют память бесчисленных жертв преступлений против человечности, совершенных во время Второй мировой войны, в частности преступлений, совершенных организацией СС и теми, кто боролся против антигитлеровской коалиции и сотрудничал с нацистским движением, и могут оказывать негативное влияние на детей и молодежь и что отсутствие эффективного противодействия со стороны государств подобным видам практики несовместимо с обязательствами государств – членов Организации Объединенных Наций по ее Уставу, включая обязательства, относящиеся к целям и принципам Организации;
- подчеркивает также, что все виды такой практики могут вести к эскалации современных форм расизма, расовой дискриминации, антисемитизма, дискриминации на основе религии или убеждений, включая исламофобию и христианофобию, ксенофобии и связанной с ними нетерпимости и способствуют распространению и умножению числа различных экстремистских политических партий, движений и групп расистского и ксенофобского толка, включая группы неонацистов и «бритоголовых», и призывает в этой связи к повышению бдительности;
- выражает обеспокоенность в связи с тем, что угроза правам человека и демократии со стороны экстремистских политических партий, движений и групп носит всеобщий характер и что от нее не застрахована ни одна страна;
- особо отмечает необходимость принятия соответствующих мер для борьбы с описанными выше видами практики и призывает государства и все другие заинтересованные стороны принимать при полном уважении международного права прав человека более эффективные меры по предупреждению подобных явлений и формирования экстремистских движений расистского и ксенофобского толка, создающих реальную угрозу демократическим ценностям, и борьбе с ними, а также повышать бдительность и инициативно добиваться признания этих проблем и эффективно их решать;
- обращает особое внимание на то, что надежные дезагрегированные данные и статистическая информация о преступлениях на почве расизма и ксенофобии имеют большое значение для квалификации совершенных правонарушений, выявления характерных признаков жертв и преступников и установления возможных связей последних с экстремистскими движениями или группами, улучшения понимания этого явления, определения эффективных мер борьбы с преступлениями на почве расовой неприязни и ксенофобии и оценки воздействия этих мер, и напоминает в этой связи о принятых в Повестке дня в области устойчивого развития на период до 2030 года[4128] обязательствах в отношении данных, мониторинга и подотчетности, включая сбор данных в разбивке по параметрам, значимым для стран;
- рекомендует государствам принимать дальнейшие меры в поддержку подготовки сотрудников полиции и других правоохранительных органов по вопросам, касающимся идеологий экстремистских политических партий, движений и групп, апологетика которых представляет собой подстрекательство к насилию на почве расизма и ксенофобии, укреплять свой потенциал в деле борьбы с преступлениями на почве расизма и ксенофобии и предупреждать практику расового профилирования, выполнять свою обязанность привлекать к ответственности виновных в таких преступлениях и бороться с безнаказанностью;
- выражает глубокую обеспокоенность по поводу увеличения числа мест, занимаемых представителями экстремистских партий расистского или ксенофобского толка в ряде национальных и местных парламентов, и особо отмечает в этой связи, что все демократические политические партии должны разрабатывать свои программы и строить свою деятельность на основе принципа уважения прав человека и свобод, демократии, верховенства права и благого управления и осуждать любые заявления, пропагандирующие идеи расового превосходства или ненависти и преследующие цель эскалации современных форм расизма, расовой дискриминации, ксенофобии и связанной с ними нетерпимости;
- напоминает об обеспокоенности Специального докладчика по поводу возрождения неонацизма в современную эпоху и расширения поддержки и принятия неонацизма и связанной с ним идеологии во все большем числе стран[4129];
- с удовлетворением отмечает в этой связи обращенный к политическим лидерам и партиям призыв Специального докладчика решительно осуждать подстрекательство к расовой дискриминации или ксенофобии, утверждать идеалы терпимости и уважения и воздерживаться от формирования коалиций с экстремистскими партиями расистского или ксенофобского толка[4130];
- приветствует рекомендацию Специального докладчика продолжать принимать в рамках национального законодательства и в соответствии с международным правом прав человека меры, направленные на предупреждение использования языка ненависти и подстрекательства к насилию, и прекратить оказывать поддержку – будь то финансовую или какую-либо иную – политическим партиям и другим организациям, которые прибегают к неонацистскому или иному языку ненависти, и принимать меры по роспуску организаций, которые несут ответственность в тех случаях, когда целью использования такого языка ненависти является подстрекательство к насилию или когда есть основания предполагать, что оно приведет к нему[4131];
- призывает государства увеличивать многообразие кадрового состава правоохранительных органов и настоятельно призывает их принимать все надлежащие меры для облегчения подачи жалоб и для введения надлежащих санкций в отношении находящихся на государственной службе лиц, признанных виновными в совершении актов насилия на почве расовой неприязни или уличенных в использовании языка ненависти;
- выражает глубокую обеспокоенность по поводу увеличения числа сообщений о случаях проявления расизма, антисемитизма, дискриминации на основе религии, убеждений или происхождения, включая проявления исламофобии, арабофобии, афрофобии и ксенофобии во время спортивных мероприятий, в том числе со стороны экстремистских групп расистского и ксенофобского толка, включая группы неонацистов и «бритоголовых», и призывает государства, международные организации, спортивные федерации и другие соответствующие заинтересованные стороны усилить меры по борьбе с такими инцидентами, приветствуя при этом шаги, предпринятые многими государствами и спортивными федерациями, клубами и группами болельщиков для искоренения проявлений расизма на спортивных мероприятиях, в том числе предоставление возможностей для занятий спортом без какой бы то ни было дискриминации и в духе олимпийских идеалов взаимопонимания, терпимости, инклюзивности, справедливости и солидарности;
- напоминает о рекомендации Специального докладчика, касающейся включения в национальное уголовное законодательство положения, согласно которому совершение преступления с расистскими или ксенофобскими мотивами или целями является отягчающим обстоятельством, влекущим за собой более суровые меры наказания[4132], и призывает те государства, в законодательстве которых нет подобных положений, рассмотреть возможность выполнения этой рекомендации;
- отмечает меры, принятые государствами в целях предотвращения дискриминации в отношении, в частности, лиц, принадлежащих к национальным или этническим, религиозным и языковым меньшинствам, лиц африканского происхождения, цыган, мигрантов, беженцев и просителей убежища и обеспечения их интеграции в общество, настоятельно призывает государства обеспечить полное и эффективное осуществление правовых, политических и институциональных мер по защите этих лиц и групп, включая женщин и девочек, и рекомендует государствам твердо гарантировать всем, без какой бы то ни было дискриминации, их права человека, в том числе связанные с защитой и безопасностью, доступ к правосудию, адекватную компенсацию и надлежащее информирование об их правах, а также обеспечить, сообразно обстоятельствам, судебное преследование и надлежащее наказание тех, кто совершил в их отношении преступления расистского и ксенофобского характера, включая возможность требовать возмещения материального и морального ущерба, причиненного в результате таких преступлений;
- призывает государства повысить степень информированности общественности о доступных национальных и других средствах правовой защиты в случае нарушения прав человека на почве расовой дискриминации и расизма;
- обращает особое внимание на то, что экстремизм обусловлен множеством причин, устранение которых требует адекватных мер, таких как просвещение, повышение уровня осведомленности и развитие диалога, и в этой связи рекомендует активизировать работу с молодежью по разъяснению опасности идеологий и деятельности экстремистских политических партий, движений и групп;
- подтверждает в этой связи особую важность дополнения законодательных мер просвещением во всех формах, в том числе по вопросам прав человека, и призывает государства продолжать вкладывать средства в образование в рамках как традиционных, так и нетрадиционных учебных программ, в частности с целью изменения взглядов людей и развенчания представлений о расовой иерархии и идей расового превосходства и противодействия их негативному влиянию, а также способствовать утверждению идеалов недискриминации, равенства и уважения всех людей, как это отмечено Специальным докладчиком;
- признает важнейшую роль просвещения в деле поощрения прав человека и основных свобод и в борьбе против расизма, расовой дискриминации, ксенофобии и связанной с ними нетерпимости, в особенности в утверждении принципов терпимости, недискриминации, инклюзивности и уважения этнического, религиозного и культурного многообразия и в предупреждении распространения экстремистских расистских и ксенофобских движений и пропаганды;
- решительно осуждает использование в образовательном процессе образовательных материалов и риторики, пропагандирующих расизм, дискриминацию, ненависть и насилие на основе этнического происхождения, национальности, религии или убеждений;
- особо отмечает представленную Специальным докладчиком Генеральной Ассамблее на ее шестьдесят четвертой сессии рекомендацию, в которой он отметил важность уроков истории, посвященных драматическим событиям и человеческим страданиям, ставшим результатом становления идеологий нацизма и фашизма[4133];
- подчеркивает важность других позитивных мер и инициатив, направленных на сближение общин и предоставление им пространства для подлинного диалога, например в форме круглых столов, рабочих групп и семинаров, в том числе учебных семинаров для государственных должностных лиц и работников средств массовой информации, а также различных мероприятий по повышению информированности общественности, особенно мероприятий, организуемых по инициативе представителей гражданского общества и требующих постоянной поддержки со стороны государства;
- обращает особое внимание на позитивную роль, которую могут играть в вышеупомянутых областях соответствующие органы и программы Организации Объединенных Наций, в частности Организация Объединенных Наций по вопросам образования, науки и культуры;
- подтверждает статью 4 Конвенции, согласно которой государства- участники осуждают всякую пропаганду и все организации, основанные на идеях или теориях превосходства одной расы или группы лиц определенного цвета кожи или этнического происхождения или пытающиеся оправдать или поощряющие расовую ненависть и дискриминацию в какой бы то ни было форме, и обязуются немедленно принять позитивные меры, направленные на искоренение всякого подстрекательства к такой дискриминации или актов дискриминации, и с этой целью, действуя в соответствии с принципами, провозглашенными во Всеобщей декларации прав человека, и правами, ясно изложенными в статье 5 Конвенции, в частности:
а) объявляют караемым по закону преступлением всякое распространение идей, основанных на расовом превосходстве или ненависти, всякое подстрекательство к расовой дискриминации и все акты насилия, направленные против любой расы или группы лиц другого цвета кожи или этнического происхождения, и подстрекательство к таким актам, а также предоставление любой помощи для осуществления расистской деятельности, включая ее финансирование;
b) объявляют противозаконными и запрещают организации, а также организованную и всякую другую пропагандистскую деятельность, которые поощряют расовую дискриминацию и подстрекают к ней, и признают участие в таких организациях или в такой деятельности преступлением, караемым законом;
с) запрещают национальным или местным органам государственной власти или государственным учреждениям поощрять расовую дискриминацию или подстрекать к ней; - подтверждает также, что, как подчеркивается в пункте 13 итогового документа Конференции по обзору Дурбанского процесса, всякое выступление в пользу национальной, расовой или религиозной ненависти, представляющее собой подстрекательство к дискриминации, вражде или насилию, должно быть запрещено законом, что всякое распространение идей, основанных на расовом превосходстве или ненависти, или подстрекательство к расовой дискриминации, а также все акты насилия или подстрекательство к совершению таких актов должны быть объявлены преступлениями, караемыми по закону, в соответствии с международными обязательствами государств и что такого рода запреты согласуются с правом на свободу мнений и их свободное выражение;
- ссылается на Стратегию и План действий Организации Объединенных Наций по борьбе с языком ненависти, которые представляют собой стратегическое руководство для системы Организации Объединенных Наций по борьбе с ненавистнической риторикой на национальном и глобальном уровнях;
- признает ту позитивную роль, которую осуществление права на свободу мнений и их свободное выражение и полное уважение свободы искать, получать и распространять информацию, в том числе через Интернет, могут играть в борьбе с расизмом, расовой дискриминацией, ксенофобией и связанной с ними нетерпимостью;
- призывает государства улучшать ситуацию с осуществлением права на свободу выражения мнений, реализация которого может иметь решающее значение для продвижения демократии и противодействия расистской и ксенофобской идеологии, основанной на идеях расового превосходства;
- призывает также государства, которые несут главную ответственность за противодействие дискриминации и использованию языка ненависти, и всех соответствующих субъектов, включая политических и религиозных лидеров, поощрять инклюзивность и единство в реагировании на пандемию коронавирусного заболевания (COVID-19) и предотвращать расизм, ксенофобию, использование языка ненависти, насилие, дискриминацию и стигматизацию, высказываться против этих явлений и принимать решительные меры по борьбе с ними;
- выражает обеспокоенность в связи с все более широким использованием цифровых технологий для пропаганды и распространения идей расизма, расовой ненависти, ксенофобии, расовой дискриминации и связанной с ними нетерпимости и в этой связи призывает государства – участники Международного пакта о гражданских и политических правах противодействовать распространению вышеупомянутых идей, памятуя при этом о своих обязательствах согласно статьям 19 и 20 Пакта, в которых гарантируется право на свободное выражение мнений и изложены основания, позволяющие ограничивать по закону осуществление этого права;
- считает необходимым поощрять использование новых информационно-коммуникационных технологий, включая Интернет, для содействия борьбе с расизмом, расовой дискриминацией, ксенофобией и связанной с ними нетерпимостью;
- признает позитивную роль, которую средства массовой информации могут играть в борьбе против расизма, расовой дискриминации, ксенофобии и связанной с ними нетерпимости, в утверждении культуры терпимости и инклюзивности и в отражении многообразия многокультурного общества;
- рекомендует государствам, гражданскому обществу и другим соответствующим заинтересованным сторонам использовать все возможности, в том числе возможности, предоставляемые Интернетом и социальными сетями, для противодействия в соответствии с международным правом прав человека распространению идей расового превосходства или ненависти и для утверждения идеалов равенства, недискриминации, многообразия и демократии;
- рекомендует национальным правозащитным институтам там, где они существуют, разработать соответствующие программы, направленные на утверждение идеалов терпимости, инклюзивности и уважения ко всем, и осуществлять сбор соответствующей информации по этой теме;
- отмечает важность укрепления сотрудничества на региональном и международном уровнях в целях противодействия всем проявлениям расизма, расовой дискриминации, ксенофобии и связанной с ними нетерпимости, в частности применительно к вопросам, затронутым в настоящей резолюции;
- подчеркивает важность тесного сотрудничества с гражданским обществом и международными и региональными правозащитными механизмами для эффективного противодействия всем проявлениям расизма, расовой дискриминации, ксенофобии и связанной с ними нетерпимости, а также экстремистским политическим партиям, движениям и группам, включая группы неонацистов и «бритоголовых», и другим подобным им экстремистским идеологическим движениям, которые подстрекают к расизму, расовой дискриминации, ксенофобии и связанной с ними нетерпимости;
- напоминает о том, что Комиссия по правам человека в своей резолюции 2005/5 просила Специального докладчика продолжить проработку этого вопроса, сформулировать соответствующие рекомендации в будущих докладах и запросить и принять к сведению в связи с этим мнения правительств и неправительственных организаций;
- предлагает государствам рассмотреть вопрос о включении в свои доклады для универсального периодического обзора и в доклады соответствующим договорным органам информацию о шагах, предпринимаемых для борьбы против расизма, расовой дискриминации, ксенофобии и связанной с ними нетерпимости, в том числе в порядке выполнения положений настоящей резолюции;
- просит Специального докладчика подготовить для представления Генеральной Ассамблее на ее семьдесят девятой сессии и Совету по правам человека на его пятьдесят шестой сессии доклады об осуществлении настоящей резолюции и рекомендует Специальному докладчику уделить особое внимание пунктам 5, 12, 14, 15, 16, 20, 28, 29, 30, 48 и 50 выше с учетом мнений, собранных в соответствии с просьбой Комиссии, упомянутой в пункте 66 выше;
- выражает признательность тем правительствам и неправительственным организациям, которые предоставили информацию Специальному докладчику при подготовке ею своего доклада Генеральной Ассамблее;
- рекомендует государствам и неправительственным организациям сотрудничать со Специальным докладчиком, в том числе предоставляя информацию о событиях, которые имеют отношение к затрагиваемым в настоящей резолюции вопросам, в целях содействия подготовке будущих докладов Генеральной Ассамблее;
- подчеркивает, что такая информация важна для обмена опытом и передовыми методами противодействия экстремистским политическим партиям, движениям и группам, включая группы неонацистов и «бритоголовых», а также другим экстремистским идеологическим движениям, которые подстрекают к расизму, расовой дискриминации, ксенофобии и связанной с ними нетерпимости;
- рекомендует правительствам увеличить объем ресурсов, выделяемых на подготовку и распространение информации об успешных конструктивных мерах по предупреждению расизма, расовой дискриминации, ксенофобии и связанной с ними нетерпимости и противодействию этим явлениям в дополнение к применению санкций за любые нарушения, в том числе путем предоставления в соответствующих случаях средств правовой защиты пострадавшим;
- рекомендует правительствам, неправительственным организациям и соответствующим субъектам как можно шире распространять информацию о содержании настоящей резолюции и изложенных в ней принципах, в том числе через средства массовой информации и по другим каналам;
- постановляет продолжать заниматься этим вопросом.
50-е пленарное заседание
19 декабря 2023 года
Annex 2
Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 19 December 2023
[on the report of the Third Committee (A/78/478, para. 33)]
* Russian Federation and a number of states dissotiated from the operative paragraph 4 of the resolution, which was included in the text after the vote on the amendment introduced by Western countries.
The General Assembly,
Guided by the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,[4134] the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,[4135] the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination[4136] and other relevant human rights instruments,
Recalling the provisions of Commission on Human Rights resolutions 2004/16 of 16 April 2004[4137] and 2005/5 of 14 April 2005[4138] and relevant Human Rights Council resolutions, in particular resolutions 7/34 of 28 March 2008,[4139] 18/15 of 29 September 2011[4140] and 21/33 of 28 September 2012,[4141] as well as General Assembly resolutions 60/143 of 16 December 2005, 61/147 of 19 December 2006, 62/142 of 18 December 2007, 63/162 of 18 December 2008, 64/147 of 18 December 2009, 65/199 of 21 December 2010, 66/143 of 19 December 2011, 67/154 of 20 December 2012, 68/150 of 18 December 2013, 69/160 of 18 December 2014, 70/139 of 17 December 2015, 71/179 of 19 December 2016, 72/156 of 19 December 2017, 73/157 of 17 December 2018, 74/136 of 18 December 2019, 75/169 of 16 December 2020 and 76/149 of 16 December 2021 on this issue, and its resolutions 61/149 of 19 December 2006, 62/220 of 22 December 2007, 63/242 of 24 December 2008, 64/148 of 18 December 2009, 65/240 of 24 December 2010, 66/144 of 19 December 2011, 67/155 of 20 December 2012, 68/151 of 18 December 2013, 69/162 of 18 December 2014, 70/140 of 17 December 2015, 71/181 of 19 December 2016, 72/157 of 19 December 2017, 73/262 of 22 December 2018, 74/137 of 18 December 2019, 75/237 of 31 December 2020, 76/226 of 24 December 2021 and 77/205 of 15 December 2022, entitled “A global call for concrete action for the elimination of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance and the comprehensive implementation of and follow-up to the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action”,
Acknowledging other important initiatives of the General Assembly aimed at raising awareness about the suffering of victims of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance and forms of discrimination, including in the historical perspective, in particular regarding commemoration of the victims of slavery and the transatlantic slave trade,
Recalling the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal, and the Judgment of the Tribunal which recognized as criminal, inter alia, the SS organization and its integral parts, including the Waffen SS, through its officially accepted members implicated in or with knowledge of the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity connected with the Second World War, as well as other relevant provisions of the Charter and the Judgment,
Mindful of the horrors of the Second World War, and stressing in this regard that the victory over Nazism in the Second World War contributed to the establishment of the conditions for the creation of the United Nations, designed to prevent future wars and save succeeding generations from the scourge of war,
Noting that neo-Nazism is more than just the glorification of a past movement, it is a contemporary phenomenon with strong vested interests in racial inequality and an investment in gaining broad support for its false claims of racial superiority,
Recalling the relevant provisions of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action adopted by the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance on 8 September 2001,[4142] in particular paragraph 2 of the Declaration and paragraphs 84 to 86 of the Programme of Action, as well as the relevant provisions of the outcome document of the Durban Review Conference of 24 April 2009,[4143] in particular paragraphs 11, 13 and 54,
Alarmed at the spread in many parts of the world of various extremist political parties, movements, ideologies and groups of a racist or xenophobic character, including neo-Nazis and skinhead groups, and at the fact that this trend has resulted in the implementation of discriminatory measures and policies at the local or national level,
Noting with concern that, even where neo-Nazis or extremists do not formally participate in government, the presence therein of extreme right-wing ideologues can have the effect of injecting into governance and political discourse the same ideologies that make neo-Nazism and extremism so dangerous,
Alarmed at music lyrics and video games that advocate racial hatred and incite discrimination, hostility or violence,
Concerned by the use of Internet platforms by groups that advocate hatred to plan, fundraise and circulate information about public events aimed at promoting racism, xenophobia and related intolerance, such as rallies, demonstrations and acts of violence,
Mindful of the role that the Internet can play in promoting equality, inclusion and non-discrimination as part of strengthening democracy and respect for human rights,
Seriously concerned that neo-Nazi groups, as well as other groups and individuals espousing ideologies of hatred, have increasingly targeted susceptible individuals, mainly children and youth, by means of specifically tailored websites with the aim of their indoctrination and recruitment,
Deeply concerned by all recent manifestations of violence and terrorism incited by violent nationalism, racism, antisemitism, discrimination based on religion, belief or origin, including Islamophobia, Christianophobia and Afrophobia, xenophobia and related intolerance, including during sports events,
Recognizing with deep concern the continued alarming increase in instances of discrimination, intolerance and extremist violence motivated by antisemitism, religion or belief, including Islamophobia and Christianophobia, and prejudices against persons of other ethnic origins, religions and beliefs,
Underlining the existing lack of uniformity of norms regarding protected speech and expression and prohibited racial discrimination and advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence,
Noting with concern, in this regard, that the variation in national standards prohibiting hate speech may provide safe havens for neo-Nazi, extremist, violent nationalist, xenophobic or racist speech owing to the fact that many neo-Nazi and relevant extremist groups of a racist or xenophobic character operate transnationally by relying on Internet service providers or social media platforms,
Stressing that the purpose of addressing hate speech is not to limit or prohibit freedom of speech, but to prevent incitement to discrimination and violence, which shall be prohibited by law,
Expressing its concern about the use of digital technologies by extremist and hate groups, including neo-Nazi groups, to disseminate their ideology, while recognizing that digital technologies are of great importance for the enjoyment of human rights and for combating racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance,
- Reaffirms the relevant provisions of the Durban Declaration and of the outcome document of the Durban Review Conference, in which States condemned the persistence and resurgence of neo-Nazism, neo-Fascism and violent nationalist ideologies based on racial and national prejudice and stated that those phenomena could never be justified in any instance or in any circumstances;
- Recalls the provisions of the Durban Declaration and of the outcome document of the Durban Review Conference, in which States recognized the positive contribution that the exercise of the right to freedom of expression, in particular by the media and new technologies, including the Internet, and full respect for the freedom to seek, receive and impart information can make to the fight against racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance;
- Takes note of the report of the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, prepared in accordance with the request contained in its resolution 76/149;[4144]
- Notes with alarm that the Russian Federation has sought to justify its territorial aggression against Ukraine on the purported basis of eliminating neo-Nazism, and underlines that the pretextual use of neo-Nazism to justify territorial aggression seriously undermines genuine attempts to combat neo-Nazism;
- Expresses its appreciation to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights for their efforts to fight racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, including the maintenance by the Office of the High Commissioner of the database on practical means to combat racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance;
- Expresses deep concern about the glorification, in any form, of the Nazi movement, neo-Nazism and former members of the Waffen SS organization, including by erecting monuments and memorials, holding public demonstrations in the name of the glorification of the Nazi past, the Nazi movement and neo-Nazism, declaring or attempting to declare such members and those who fought against the anti-Hitler coalition, collaborated with the Nazi movement and committed war crimes and crimes against humanity participants in national liberation movements, as well as by the renaming of streets glorifying them;
- Calls for the universal ratification and effective implementation of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and urges those States parties that have not yet done so to consider making the declaration under its article 14, thus providing the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination with the competence to receive and consider communications from individuals or groups of individuals within their jurisdiction claiming to be victims of a violation by a State party of any of the rights set forth in the Convention;
- Urges States to eliminate all forms of racial discrimination by all appropriate means, including legislation as required by circumstances, while ensuring that the definition of racial discrimination set out therein complies with article 1 of the Convention;
- Encourages those States that have made reservations to article 4 of the Convention to give serious consideration to withdrawing such reservations as a matter of priority, as stressed by the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance;
- Acknowledges that discrimination based on race, ethnicity, religion or belief in all its forms and manifestations, including neo-Nazism, Islamophobia, Christianophobia and antisemitism, is a threat to social cohesion, not just to those racial and ethnic groups that are their direct target;
- Recalls that any legislative or constitutional measures adopted with a view to countering extremist political parties, movements, ideologies and groups of a racist or xenophobic character, including neo-Nazis and skinhead groups and similar extremist ideological movements, should be in conformity with the relevant international human rights obligations, in particular articles 4 and 5 of the Convention and articles 19 to 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;
- Encourages States to develop and implement national action plans for the elimination of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, with a view to, inter alia, monitoring closely the phenomenon of Nazism, neo -Nazism and Holocaust denial, such as commemorative celebration of the Nazi regime, its allies and related organizations;
- Encourages States parties to the Convention to take appropriate measures to ensure that their legislation is in accordance with their obligations under the Convention, including those under article 4;
- Stresses that the rights to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly and association are important in supporting the fight against racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance worldwide;
- Emphasizes once more the recommendation of the Special Rapporteur that “any commemorative celebration of the Nazi regime, its allies and related organizations, whether official or unofficial, should be prohibited” by States[4145] also emphasizes that such manifestations do injustice to the memory of the countless victims of the Second World War and negatively influence children and young people, and stresses in this regard that it is important that States take measures, in accordance with international human rights law, to counteract any celebration of the Nazi SS organization and all its integral parts, including the Waffen SS, and that failure by States to effectively address such practices is incompatible with the obligations of States Members of the United Nations under its Charter;
- Expresses deep concern about increased frequency of attempts and activities intended to desecrate or demolish monuments erected in remembrance of those who fought against Nazism during the Second World War, as well as to unlawfully exhume or remove the remains of such persons, and in this regard urges States to fully comply with their relevant obligations, inter alia, under article 34 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949;[4146]
- Firmly condemns incidents that glorify and promote Nazism, such as acts involving pro-Nazi graffiti and paintings, including on monuments dedicated to victims of the Second World War;
- Welcomes efforts by Member States to preserve historical truth, including through constructing and preserving monuments and memorials dedicated to those who fought in the ranks of the anti-Hitler coalition;
- Expresses alarm over the use by extremist groups, including neo-Nazi groups, and individuals espousing ideologies of hatred, of information technologies, the Internet and social media to recruit new members, especially targeting children and young people, and to disseminate and to amplify their hate-filled messages, while recognizing that the Internet can also be used to counteract these groups and their activities;
- Calls upon States to take appropriate measures to address the new and emerging threats posed by the rise in terrorist attacks incited by racism, xenophobia and other forms of intolerance, or in the name of religion or belief;
- Notes with concern the significant number of racist incidents worldwide, including the rise of skinhead groups, which have been responsible for many of these incidents, as well as the resurgence of racist and xenophobic violence targeting, inter alia, persons belonging to national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities, or on any other grounds, including arson attacks on houses and vandalization of and violence in schools and places of worship and cemeteries;
- Reaffirms that such acts may, in certain circumstances, be qualified as falling within the scope of the Convention, that they may not be justifiable as exercises of freedom of peaceful assembly, freedom of association and freedom of expression and that they will often fall within the scope of article 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and may be subject to certain restrictions, as set out in articles 19, 21 and 22 of the Covenant;
- Encourages States to take appropriate concrete measures, including legislative and educational ones, in accordance with their international human rights obligations, in order to prevent revisionism in respect of the Second World War and the denial of the crimes against humanity and war crimes committed during the Second World War;
- Calls upon States to take active measures to ensure that education systems develop the necessary content to provide accurate accounts of history, as well as promote tolerance and other international human rights principles;
- Recalls the recommendation of the Special Rapporteur that education that seeks to undercut the racist effects of nationalist populism should include accurate and representative accounts of national history that give voice to racial and ethnic diversity and that expose the untruths of those who attempt to write ethnic groups out of national histories and identities in order to sustain ethnonationalist myths of racially or ethnically “pure” nations;[4147]
- Condemns without reservation any denial of or attempt to deny the Holocaust, as well as any manifestation of religious intolerance, incitement, harassment or violence against persons or communities, on the basis of ethnic origin or religious belief;
- Affirms its deep commitment to the duty of remembrance, and welcomes the call of the Special Rapporteur for the active preservation of those Holocaust sites that served as Nazi death camps, concentration and forced labour camps and prisons, as well as his encouragement to States to take measures, including legislative, law enforcement and educational measures, to put an end to all forms of Holocaust denial;[4148]
- Recalls the conclusions of the Special Rapporteur that revisionism and attempts to falsify history may, in certain circumstances, fall under the prohibition of hate speech under article 4 (a) of the Convention, which States are required to declare as offences punishable by law,[4149] and that neo-Nazi recruitment attempting to mainstream extreme ideologies or racial, ethnic or religious hatred and intolerance may fall under article 4 (b) of the Convention;
- Calls upon States to continue to take all appropriate measures aimed at preventing and countering hate speech, including on the Internet, and incitement to violence against persons in vulnerable situations, including the organization of meetings and violent protests, fundraising and engagement in other activities;
- Expresses serious concern regarding attempts to prohibit, at the legislative level, symbols associated in States with the victory over Nazism;
- Expresses deep concern about attempts at commercial advertising aimed at exploiting the sufferings of the victims of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed during the Second World War by the Nazi regime;
- Stresses the need to respect the memory and that the practices described above do injustice to the memory of the countless victims of crimes against humanity committed in the Second World War, in particular those committed by the SS organization and by those who fought against the anti-Hitler coalition and collaborated with the Nazi movement, and may negatively influence children and young people, and that failure by States to effectively address such practices is incompatible with the obligations of States Members of the United Nations under its Charter, including those related to the purposes and principles of the Organization;
- Also stresses that all such practices may fuel contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, antisemitism, discrimination based on religion or belief, including Islamophobia and Christianophobia, xenophobia and related intolerance and contribute to the spread and multiplication of various extremist political parties, movements and groups of a racist or xenophobic character, including neo-Nazis and skinhead groups, and in this regard calls for increased vigilance;
- Expresses concern that the human rights and democratic challenges posed by extremist political parties, movements and groups are universal and no country is immune to them;
- Emphasizes the need to take appropriate measures necessary to counter the practices described above, and calls upon States and all other stakeholders to take more effective measures, while fully respecting international human rights law, to prevent, counter and combat those phenomena and extremist movements of a racist or xenophobic character, which pose a real threat to democratic values, and to increase their vigilance and be proactive in strengthening their efforts to recognize and effectively address those challenges;
- Underlines the importance of reliable disaggregated data and statistics on racist and xenophobic crimes for identifying the types of offences committed, the profiles of victims and of perpetrators and whether the latter are affiliated with extremist movements or groups, thus enhancing better understanding of the phenomenon, identifying effective measures to address such racist and xenophobic crimes and assessing the impact of these measures, and recalls in this regard the commitments made in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development[4150] on data, monitoring and accountability, including collecting data disaggregated by characteristics relevant in national contexts;
- Encourages States to adopt further measures to support training for the police and other law enforcement bodies on the ideologies of extremist political parties, movements and groups the advocacy of which constitutes incitement to racist and xenophobic violence, to strengthen their capacity to address racist and xenophobic crimes and prevent racial profiling practices, to fulfil their responsibility for bringing to justice the perpetrators of such crimes and to combat impunity;
- Expresses deep concern about the increased number of seats occupied by representatives of extremist parties of a racist or xenophobic character in a number of national and local parliaments, and emphasizes in this regard the need for all democratic political parties to base their programmes and activities on respect for human rights and freedoms, democracy, the rule of law and good governance and to condemn all messages disseminating ideas that are based on racial superiority or hatred and that have the objective of fuelling contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance;
- Recalls the concern of the Special Rapporteur regarding the resurgence of neo-Nazism in contemporary times and growing support for and acceptance of neo-Nazism and related ideology in an increasing number of countries;[4151]
- Notes with appreciation, in this regard, the call of the Special Rapporteur upon political leaders and parties to strongly condemn incitement to racial discrimination or xenophobia, to promote tolerance and respect and to refrain from forming coalitions with extremist parties of a racist or xenophobic character;[4152]
- Welcomes the recommendation of the Special Rapporteur to continue to take steps through national legislation, in accordance with international human rights law, aimed at preventing hate speech and incitement to violence, to withdraw support – financial and otherwise – from political parties and other organizations that engage in neo-Nazi or other hate speech and to take steps to dismantle responsible organizations where such hate speech aims, or can reasonably be expected, to incite violence;[4153]
- Encourages States to improve diversity within law enforcement agencies, and urges them to take all appropriate measures to facilitate the filing of complaints about and to impose appropriate sanctions against those within the public service found to have committed racially motivated violence or to have used hate speech;
- Expresses deep concern about the increase in reported cases of racism, antisemitism, discrimination based on religion, belief or origin, including Islamophobic, Arabophobic, Afrophobic and xenophobic manifestations during sports events, including those committed by extremist groups of a racist or xenophobic character, including neo-Nazis and skinhead groups, and calls upon States, international organizations, sports federations and other relevant stakeholders to strengthen measures to address such incidents, while also welcoming the steps that many States and sports federations, clubs and fan groups have taken to eliminate racism at sporting events, including through sport practised without discrimination of any kind and in the Olympic spirit, which require human understanding, tolerance, inclusion, fair play and solidarity;
- Recalls the recommendation of the Special Rapporteur to introduce into national criminal law a provision according to which committing an offence with racist or xenophobic motivations or aims constitutes an aggravating circumstance, allowing for enhanced penalties,[4154] and encourages those States whose legislation does not contain such provisions to consider that recommendation;
- Notes measures taken by States to prevent discrimination against, in particular but not limited to, persons belonging to national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities, people of African descent, Roma, migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers, and to ensure their integration into society, urges States to ensure the full and effective implementation of legal, policy and institutional measures protecting these individuals and groups, including women and girls, and recommends that States effectively guarantee to everyone, without discrimination of any kind, their human rights, including those related to safety and security, access to justice, adequate reparation and appropriate information about their rights, and pursue prosecution and adequate punishment, as appropriate, of those responsible for racist and xenophobic crimes against them, including the possibility of seeking reparation or satisfaction for damages suffered as a result of such crimes;
- Calls upon States to increase awareness about available national and other remedies for human rights violations based on racial discrimination and racism;
- Underlines that the roots of extremism are multifaceted and must be addressed through adequate measures such as education, awareness-raising and the promotion of dialogue, and in this regard recommends the increase of measures to raise awareness among young people of the dangers of the ideologies and activities of extremist political parties, movements and groups;
- Reaffirms, in this regard, the particular importance of all forms of education, including human rights education, as a complement to legislative measures, and calls upon States to continue to invest in education, in both conventional and non-conventional curricula, inter alia, in order to transform attitudes and counteract ideas of racial hierarchies and superiority, and counter their negative influence, and to promote the values of non-discrimination, equality and respect for all, as outlined by the Special Rapporteur;
- Recognizes the paramount role of education in promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms and combating racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, especially in promoting the principles of tolerance, non-discrimination, inclusion and respect for ethnic, religious and cultural diversity and preventing the spread of extremist racist and xenophobic movements and ideas;
- Strongly condemns the use in educational settings of educational material and rhetoric that promulgate racism, discrimination, hatred and violence on the basis of ethnic origin, nationality, religion or belief;
- Emphasizes the recommendation of the Special Rapporteur presented at the sixty-fourth session of the General Assembly, in which he emphasized the importance of history classes in teaching the dramatic events and human suffering which arose out of the adoption of ideologies such as Nazism and Fascism;[4155]
- Stresses the importance of other positive measures and initiatives aimed at bringing communities together and providing them with space for genuine dialogue, such as round tables, working groups and seminars, including training seminars for State agents and media professionals, as well as awareness-raising activities, especially those initiated by civil society representatives, which require continued State support;
- Underlines the positive role that relevant United Nations entities and programmes, in particular the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, can play in the aforementioned areas;
- Reaffirms article 4 of the Convention, according to which States parties condemn all propaganda and all organizations which are based on ideas or theories of superiority of one race or group of persons of one colour or ethnic origin, or which attempt to justify or promote racial hatred and discrimination in any form, and undertake to adopt immediate and positive measures designed to eradicate all incitement to, or acts of, such discrimination and, to this end, with due regard to the principles embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the rights expressly set forth in article 5 of the Convention, inter alia:
a) Shall declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, and incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of violence or incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons of another colour or ethnic origin, and also the provision of any assistance to racist activities, including the financing thereof;
b) Shall declare illegal and prohibit organizations, and also organized and all other propaganda activities, which promote and incite racial discrimination, and shall recognize participation in such organizations or activities as an offence punishable by law;
c) Shall not permit public authorities or public institutions, national or local, to promote or incite racial discrimination; - Also reaffirms that, as underlined in paragraph 13 of the outcome document of the Durban Review Conference, any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence should be prohibited by law, that all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, or incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of violence or incitement to such acts, shall be declared offences punishable by law, in accordance with the international obligations of States, and that these prohibitions are consistent with freedom of opinion and expression;
- Recalls the United Nations Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech, which sets out strategic guidance for the United Nations system to address hate speech at the national and global levels;
- Recognizes the positive role that the exercise of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, as well as full respect for the freedom to seek, receive and impart information, including through the Internet, can play in combating racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance;
- Calls upon States to strengthen freedom of expression, which can play a crucial role in promoting democracy and combating racist and xenophobic ideologies based on racial superiority;
- Also calls upon States, which have the primary responsibility to counter discrimination and hate speech, and all relevant actors, including political and religious leaders, to promote inclusion and unity in response to the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic, and to prevent, speak out and take strong action against racism, xenophobia, hate speech, violence, discrimination and stigmatization;
- Expresses concern about the increased use of digital technologies to promote and disseminate racism, racial hatred, xenophobia, racial discrimination and related intolerance, and in this regard calls upon States parties to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to counter the dissemination of the abovementioned ideas while respecting their obligations under articles 19 and 20 of the Covenant, which guarantee the right to freedom of expression and outline the grounds on which the exercise of this right can be legitimately restricted;
- Recognizes the need to promote the use of new information and communications technologies, including the Internet, to contribute to the fight against racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance;
- Also recognizes the positive role that the media can play in combating racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, promoting a culture of tolerance and inclusion and representing the diversity of a multicultural society;
- Encourages States, civil society and other relevant stakeholders to use all opportunities, including those provided by the Internet and social media, to counter, in accordance with international human rights law, the dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred and to promote the values of equality, non-discrimination, diversity and democracy;
- Encourages national human rights institutions, where they exist, to develop appropriate programmes to promote tolerance, inclusion and respect for all and to collect relevant information in this regard;
- Notes the importance of strengthening cooperation at the regional and international levels with the aim of countering all manifestations of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, in particular regarding issues raised in the present resolution;
- Stresses the importance of cooperating closely with civil society and international and regional human rights mechanisms in order to counter effectively all manifestations of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, as well as extremist political parties, movements and groups, including neo-Nazis and skinhead groups, and other similar extremist ideological movements that incite racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance;
- Recalls the request of the Commission on Human Rights, in its resolution 2005/5, that the Special Rapporteur continue to reflect on this issue, make relevant recommendations in future reports and seek and take into account in this regard the views of Governments and non-governmental organizations;
- Invites States to consider including in their reports for the universal periodic review and their reports to relevant treaty bodies information on the steps taken to combat racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, including with the aim of implementing the provisions of the present resolution;
- Requests the Special Rapporteur to prepare, for submission to the General Assembly at its seventy-ninth session and to the Human Rights Council at its fifty-sixth session, reports on the implementation of the present resolution, and encourages the Special Rapporteur to pay specific attention to paragraphs 5, 12, 14, 15, 16, 20, 28, 29, 30, 48 and 50 above, based on the views collected in accordance with the request of the Commission, as recalled in paragraph 66 above;
- Expresses its appreciation to those Governments and non-governmental organizations that have submitted information to the Special Rapporteur in the course of the preparation of her report to the General Assembly;
- Encourages States and non-governmental organizations to cooperate with the Special Rapporteur, including by providing information on developments with regard to the issues raised in the present resolution in order to contribute to the preparation of future reports to the General Assembly;
- Stresses that such information is important for the sharing of experiences and best practices in the fight against extremist political parties, movements and groups, including neo-Nazis and skinhead groups, and other extremist ideological movements that incite racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance;
- Encourages Governments to invest more resources in building and sharing knowledge on successful positive measures to prevent and counter racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, in addition to sanctioning any violations, including by providing remedies to victims of violations, as appropriate;
- Encourages Governments, non-governmental organizations and relevant actors to disseminate, as widely as possible, information regarding the contents of and the principles outlined in the present resolution, including through the media, but not limited to it;
- Decides to remain seized of the issue.
50th plenary meeting
19 December 2023
Annex 3
List of cosponsors of the resolution of the 78th session
of the UN General Assembly "Combating glorification of Nazism,
neo-Nazism and other practices that contribute to fuelling contemporary
forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia
and related intolerance"
(without Russia)
- Algeria
- Armenia
- Azerbaijan
- Belarus
- Burkina-Faso
- Cambodia
- Cameroon
- Central African Republic
- China
- Congo
- Cuba
- Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
- Egypt
- Equatorial Guinea
- Eritrea
- Gambia
- Kazakhstan
- Kyrgyzstan
- Lao People’s Democratic Republic
- Madagascar
- Mali
- Nicaragua
- Nigeria
- Pakistan
- Senegal
- South Africa
- Sri Lanka
- Sudan
- Syrian Arab Republic
- Tajikistan
- Togo
- Turkmenistan
- Uganda
- Uzbekistan
- Venezuela
- Vietnam
- Zimbabwe
Annex 4
Voting results
on draft resolution "Combating glorification of Nazism, neo-Nazism
and other practices that contribute to fuelling contemporary forms
of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance"
at the plenary meeting of the 78th session
of the United Nations General Assembly
on 19 December 2023
|
N |
Australia |
Y |
Dominican Republic |
Y |
Maldives |
N |
Slovakia |
|
N |
Austria |
Y |
Egypt |
N |
Malta |
N |
Slovenia |
|
Y |
Azerbaijan |
Y |
Zambia |
- |
Morocco |
N |
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland |
|
N |
Albania |
Y |
Zimbabwe |
N |
Marshall Islands |
N |
United States of America |
|
Y |
Algeria |
Y |
Israel |
Y |
Mexico |
Y |
Solomon Islands |
|
Y |
Angola |
Y |
India |
N |
Micronesia (Federated States of) |
Y |
Somalia |
|
N |
Andorra |
Y |
Indonesia |
Y |
Mozambique |
Y |
Sudan |
|
Y |
Antigua and Barbuda |
Y |
Jordan |
N |
Monaco |
Y |
Surinam |
|
Y |
Argentine |
Y |
Iraq |
Y |
Mongolia |
Y |
Sierra Leone |
|
Y |
Armenia |
- |
Iran (Islamic Republic of) |
A |
Myanmar |
Y |
Tajikistan |
|
- |
Afghanistan |
N |
Ireland |
Y |
Namibia |
Y |
Thailand |
|
A |
Bahamas |
N |
Iceland |
- |
Nauru |
Y |
Timor-Leste |
|
Y |
Bangladesh |
N |
Spain |
Y |
Nepal |
Y |
Togo |
|
Y |
Barbados |
N |
Italy |
Y |
Niger |
A |
Tonga |
|
Y |
Bahrain |
Y |
Yemen |
Y |
Nigeria |
Y |
Trinidad-Tobago |
|
Y |
Belarus |
- |
Cape-Verde |
N |
Netherlands |
A |
Tuvalu |
|
Y |
Belize |
Y |
Kazakhstan |
Y |
Nicaragua |
Y |
Tunisia |
|
N |
Belgium |
Y |
Cambodia |
N |
New Zealand |
Y |
Turkmenistan |
|
- |
Benin |
Y |
Cameroon |
N |
Norway |
A |
Turkey |
|
N |
Bulgaria |
N |
Canada |
Y |
United Republic of Tanzania |
Y |
Uganda |
|
Y |
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) |
Y |
Qatar |
Y |
United Arab Emirates |
Y |
Uzbekistan |
|
N |
Bosnia and Herzegovina |
Y |
Kenia |
Y |
Oman |
N |
Ukraine |
|
Y |
Botswana |
N |
Cyprus |
Y |
Pakistan |
Y |
Uruguay |
|
Y |
Brazil |
N |
Kiribati |
A |
Palau |
- |
Fiji |
|
Y |
Brunei-Darussalam |
Y |
China |
A |
Panama |
Y |
Philippines |
|
Y |
Burkina-Faso |
Y |
Columbia |
A |
Papua New Guinea |
N |
Finland |
|
Y |
Burundi |
Y |
Comoros |
Y |
Paraguay |
N |
France |
|
Y |
Bhutan |
Y |
Congo |
Y |
Peru |
N |
Croatia |
|
Y |
Vanuatu |
Y |
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea |
N |
Poland |
Y |
Central African Republic |
|
N |
Hungary |
Y |
Costa Rica |
N |
Portugal |
Y |
Chad |
|
- |
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) |
Y |
Côte d'Ivoire |
A |
Republic of Korea |
N |
Montenegro |
|
Y |
Vietnam |
Y |
Cuba |
N |
Republic of Moldova |
N |
Czech Republic |
|
Y |
Ghabon |
Y |
Kuwait |
Y |
Russian Federation |
Y |
Chile |
|
Y |
Haiti |
Y |
Kyrgyzstan |
Y |
Ruanda |
A |
Switzerland |
|
Y |
Guiana |
Y |
Lao People’s Democratic Republic |
N |
Romania |
N |
Sweden |
|
Y |
Gambia |
N |
Latvia |
Y |
Salvador |
Y |
Sri Lanka |
|
Y |
Ghana |
Y |
Lesotho |
A |
Samoa |
A |
Ecuador |
|
Y |
Guatemala |
- |
Liberia |
N |
San Marino |
Y |
Equatorial Guinea |
|
A |
Guinea |
Y |
Lebanon |
- |
Sao Tome and Principe |
Y |
Eritrea |
|
Y |
Guinea-Bissau |
Y |
Libya |
Y |
Saudi Arabia |
- |
Eswatini |
|
N |
Germany |
N |
Lithuania |
N |
North Macedonia |
N |
Estonia |
|
Y |
Honduras |
N |
Lichtenstein |
Y |
Seychelles |
Y |
Ethiopia |
|
Y |
Grenada |
N |
Luxembourg |
Y |
Senegal |
Y |
South Africa |
|
N |
Greece |
Y |
Mauritius |
Y |
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines |
A |
South Sudan |
|
N |
Georgia |
Y |
Mauritania |
Y |
Saint Kitts and Nevis |
Y |
Jamaica |
|
N |
Denmark |
Y |
Madagascar |
Y |
Saint Lucia |
N |
Japan |
|
- |
Democratic Republic of Congo |
Y |
Malawi |
Y |
Serbia |
|
|
|
Y |
Djibouti |
Y |
Malaysia |
Y |
Singapore |
|
|
|
A |
Dominica |
Y |
Mali |
Y |
Syrian Arab Republic |
|
|
___________________________
Symbol "-" means that delegation of the country has not participated in the voting.
Countries are listed in accordance with the alphabet of the Russian language
[1] Australia announces the transfer of a USD 250 million package of military assistance to Ukraine. Izvestia. 12 July 2024.
[2] Australia to send 70 personnel to train Ukrainian soldiers. TASS. 18 January 2023.
[3] Government commits more support for Ukraine. Australian Government Defence. 4 March 2024.
https://www.defence.gov.au/news-events/news/2024-03-04/government-commits-more-support-ukraine
[4] Previously, it had mostly abstained from voting.
[5] Notorious Australian neo-Nazi joins Ukrainian forces to fight Russia – media. Russia Today. 23 March 2023.
https://www.rt.com/news/573493-australian-neo-nazi-ukraine-army/
[6] Senior neo-Nazi slips out of Australia hoping to fight Russian army. The Sydney Morning Herald. 23 March 2023.
[7] Notorious Australian neo-Nazi joins Ukrainian forces to fight Russia – media. Russia Today. 23 March 2023.
https://www.rt.com/news/573493-australian-neo-nazi-ukraine-army/
[8] Newman's mission. Australian Nazi sets off to fight in Ukraine. Argumenty i Fakty. 24 March 2023.
https://aif.ru/politics/world/missiya_nyumana_avstraliyskiy_nacist_poehal_voevat_za_ukrainu
[9] Media say Australian Nazi joined AFU to fight against Russia. RIA Novosti. 24 March 2023.
[10] He wants to live. Australian mercenary fled Ukraine in awe after the first combat. Argumenty i Fakty. 30 May 2024.
[11] Scared that I will kill you? Frightened foreign mercenary leaves Ukraine. Argumenty i Fakty. 2 June 2024.
https://aif.ru/politics/world/-boishsya-chto-ubyu-inostrannyy-naemnik-v-strahe-sbezhal-iz-ukrainy
[12] Australian mercenary killed in Ukraine. Izvestia. 28 December 2022.
https://iz.ru/1447913/2022-12-28/na-ukraine-likvidirovali-avstraliiskogo-naemnika
[13] The death of a mercenary: an Australian sniper "Ninja" killed in Ukraine. Moskovsky komsomolets. 6 November 2022.
[14] Brock Greenwood killed in Ukraine among Australians "lulled" to fight war without military training. ABC News. 12 July 2024.
[15] Soldiers of hate: Army investigates neo-Nazis in its ranks. The Sydney Morning Herald. 18 March 2023.
[16] Australian soldiers flew Nazi swastika flag from vehicle in Afghanistan; PM says diggers' actions absolutely wrong'. ABC News.
13 June 2018.
[17] Australian authorities comment on the Nazi flag flown over their soldiers' vehicle. INTERFAX.RU. 14 June 2018.
https://www.interfax.ru/world/616919
Australian soldiers flew Nazi swastika in Afghanistan. Sky News. 14 June 2018.
https://news.sky.com/story/australian-soldiers-flew-nazi-swastika-in-afghanistan-11404308
[18] Afghan war crimes victim family says ready for Australia travel to seek justice. Anadolu Ajansi. 21 November 2023.
[19] Jacqui Lambie wants International Criminal Court to investigate military commanders for alleged war crimes. ABC News.
20 June 2023.
[20] Experts urge Australia to pay compensation owed to victims of war crimes in Afghanistan. United Nations. 7 August 2024.
[21] Racial Hatred Act 1995.
[22] Criminal Code Act 1995.
[23] The Racial Hatred Act: What is the racial hatred act? Australian Human Rights Commission
https://www.humanrights.gov.au/publications/racial-hatred-act-what-racial-hatred-act
[24] An Australian state prohibits the use of Nazi symbols. RIA Novosti. 12 October 2023.
[25] South Australia bans Nazi symbols and salute. Government of South Australia. 27 June 2024.
https://www.agd.sa.gov.au/news/south-australia-bans-nazi-symbols-and-salute
[26] Australia enacts a ban on the demonstration of Nazi symbols. RIA Novosti. 8 January 2024.
[27] How to counter Australia's growing neo-Nazi threat. The New Daily. 12 April 2024.
https://www.thenewdaily.com.au/news/2024/04/12/neo-nazi-australia-threat
[28] Anthony Albanese condemns balaclava-clad neo-Nazis who swarmed Sydney train. SBS News. 26 January 2024.
[29] White supremacists celebrate Hitler's birthday in Australia. The Jerusalem Post. 23 April 2023.
[30] "If it wasn't so serious it would be pathetic": Third neo-Nazi gathering broken up in NSW. SBS News. 28 January 2024.
[31] Notorious Australian white supremacist Jacob Hersant arrested at Melbourne neo-Nazi demonstration. The Australian.
28 July 2024.
[32] Australian politicians bought Nazi artefacts, auction house director claims. The Guardian. 22 June 2023.
[33] The Secret of Bandera Road. Bandera Lobby Blog. 19 April 2021.
https://banderalobby.substack.com/p/the-secret-of-bandera-road
[34] Symbols of hate': The lingering afterlife of Croatian fascism in Australia. The Sydney Morning Herald. 11 June 2023.
Investigation finds widespread celebration of fascism in Croatian community. The Jewish Independent. 5 March 2024.
[35] Australian Croatian Club back in the spotlight after portrait of WWII fascist Ante Pavelić inadvertently included in soccer
team photograph. ABC News. 20 September 2023.
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-09-20/act-australian-croatian-club-ante-pavelic-portrait/102876238
[36] How the Sydney United 58 controversy highlights "old soccer" tensions at heart of "new football". ABC News. 4 October 2022.
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-10-04/sydney-united-australia-cup-analysis/101498652
[37] Man charged with displaying Nazi symbol at football match "can't remember", court told. News.com.au. 9 April 2024.
[38] Trio appeal convictions for Nazi salute at Australia Cup game. ESPN. 12 July 2024.
[39] Australian Court bans the extradition of a 90-year-old Nazi criminal to Hungary. Pravo.ru. 16 August 2012.
https://pravo.ru/interpravo/news/view/76342/
Former soldier Zentai wins extradition fight. ABC News. 15 August 2012.
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-08-15/high-court-upholds-decision-to-allow-zentai-to-stay/4199864
[40] Man tied to 1944 murder of Jewish teen in Budapest dies at 96. The Times of Israel. 22 December 2017.
https://www.timesofisrael.com/man-tied-to-1944-murder-of-jewish-teen-in-budapest-dies-at-96/
[41] War crimes suspect dies amid controversy. The Sydney Morning Herald. 13 July 2016.
https://www.smh.com.au/national/war-crimes-suspect-dies-amid-controversy-20060713-gdnya8.html
[42] Hungary investigates WWII war crimes suspect in Melbourne. ABC News. 17 November 2005.
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2005-11-17/hungary-investigates-wwii-war-crimes-suspect-in/742602
[43] "I am Bob. Just Bob": could a Wollongong folk hero have had a Nazi past? The Guardian. 20 March 2022.
[44] Wollongong gallery pledges to "honestly represent" benefactor's Nazi past. The Guardian. 24 June 2022.
[45] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the 18th to 20th periodic
reports of Australia. November 2017.
[46] Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee on the 6th periodic report of Australia. October 2017.
[47] Report of the Working Group of Experts on People of African Descent on its visit to Australia A/HRC/54/67/Add.2 27 September 2023
[48] Ibid.
[49] Australian Jews suffer 738 per cent spike in anti-Semitic abuse. News.com.au. 16 December 2023.
[50] Islamophobic and antisemitic incidents record large spike in Australia, advocates say. The Guardian. 9 November 2023.
[51] Anti-Defamation Commission chairman Dvir Abramovich condemns "chilling" anti-Semitic graffiti on Melbourne
Jewish School. Sky News.com.au. 25 May 2024.
[52] Jewish students bullied at Melbourne's Brighton Secondary College win discrimination case. ABC News. 14 September 2023.
Victorian education official to apologise in person for anti-Semitic bullying at Brighton secondary college. The Guardian. 30 October 2023.
[53] Neo-Nazis desecrate Jewish graves in Tasmanian cemetery. The Jerusalem Post. 19 November 2021.
[54] Jewish leaders condemn Nazi graffiti on gravestones as police probe suspected Hunter Valley hate crime. ABC News. 3 February 2023.
[55] Australia appoints special envoys as antisemitism, Islamophobia rise over Gaza war. CNN. 9 July 2024.
[56] Commission of Inquiry into Antisemitism at Australian Universities Bill 2024 (No.2). The Parliament of Australia.
Senate inquiry to shine a light on ugly tide of antisemitism at universities. Joint media release of Sarah Henderson and Julian Leeser. 4 July 2024.
[57] Committee to weigh up Senate inquiry into antisemitism on campus. The Australian Jewish News. 4 July 2024.
https://www.australianjewishnews.com/committee-to-weigh-up-senate-inquiry-into-antisemitism-campus/
[58] Brisbane's Holland Park mosque vandalised with swastika, accused Christchurch shooter's name on walls. ABC News. 11 September 2019.
[59] Eight men charged after Melbourne mosque break-in. Nine.com.au. 20 June 2022.
Group charged over damage to Langwarrin mosque. The Age. 20 June 2022.
[60] Islamic Society of SA concerned fires near Adelaide mosques represent "changing attitude" amid Israel-Gaza war. 25 October 2023.
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-10-25/police-investigate-fires-near-adelaide-mosques/103018278
[61] Hate crimes squad called in over vandalism attacks at Gwynneville mosque. Illawarra Mercury. 31 July 2024.
[62] In Australia, the party expelled an election candidate because of his pro-Russian position. TASS. 24 March 2023.
[63] An Australian observer got threats because of his assessments of the Russian election. RIA Novosti. 4 April 2024.
[64] Discriminatory: Australian university's Russian student boycott draws criticism. SBS. 24 March 2023.
[65] Turk regrets Australia No vote as missed opportunity, urges inclusion and participation. 24 October 2023. https://www.ohchr.org
/en/press-releases/2023/10/turk-regrets-australia-no-vote-missed-opportunity-urges-inclusion
[66] Australia: UN experts urge support for Indigenous Voice vote. 5 October 2023.
[67] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities on the combined 2nd and 3rd periodic reports of Australia. October 2019.
https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CRPD%2fC%2fAUS%2fCO%2f2-3&Lang=en
[68] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child on the combined 5th and 6th periodic reports of Australia. November 2019.
[69] United Nations Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Country Engagement Mission Australia. Advisory Note. April 2024.
[70] Family Matters Report 2023.
https://www.snaicc.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Family-Matters-Report-2023.pdf
[71] Report finds Indigenous children 10.5 times more likely be in out-of-home care than non-Indigenous children. ABC News. 29 November 2023.
[72] Indigenous investigation. "Beyond heartbreaking": 500 Indigenous deaths in custody since 1991 royal commission: The Guardian. 6 December 2021.
https:www.google.co.uk/amp/s/amp.theguardian.com/australia-news/2021/dec/06/beyond-heartbreaking-500-indigenous-deaths-in-custody-since-1991-royal-commission
[73] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the 18th to 20th periodic reports of Australia. November 2017.
[74] Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples on her visit to Australia from 20 March to 3 April 2017. Published on 8 August 2017.
[75] Human Rights Committee. Views adopted by the Committee under article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol, concerning communication No. 3624/2019.
[76] Traditional owners in WA's north demand removal of gag clauses to help them protect ancient rock art. ABC. 24 March 2022.
[77] Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the 5th periodic report of Australia. May 2017
https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=E%2fC.12%2fAUS%2fCO%2f5&Lang=en
[78] Aboriginal Heritage Act in Western Australia. The Government of Western Australia.
[79] Letter from the Chairman of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination to the Permanent Representative of Australia to the United Nations Office at Geneva. 26 April 2024
https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=INT%2FCERD%2FALE%2FAUS%2F9986&Lang=en
UN committee says WA government's botched handling of Aboriginal heritage could be racial discrimination convention breach. ABC News. 27 May 2024.
[80] Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee on the 6th periodic report of Australia. October 2017.
[81] Coalition of legal experts sound alarm over new laws they fear will lead to indefinite detention of refugees. SBS. 14 May 2021.
[82] Immigration Detention and Community Statistics Summary as of 31 December 2023.
[83] United Nations Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Visit to Australia undertaken from 16 to 23 October 2022: recommendations and observations addressed to the State party. Report of the Subcommittee. Issued on 20 December 2023.
[84] Report of the United Nations Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (SPT) on the visit to Australia undertaken from 16 to 23 October 2022: recommendations and observations addressed to the State party. Published on 20 December 2023.
[85] Rushed bill forcing hundreds of non-citizens to facilitate own deportation passes lower house. The Guardian. 26 March 2024
[86] Hundreds of unlawful non-citizens face jail if they refuse to cooperate in deportation from Australia. The Guardian. 26 March 2024
[87] Labour's deportation bill fails to pass Senate in "almighty backfire" as Coalition and Greens team up. The Guardian. 27 March 2024.
[88] ots.at/amp/pr/OTS_20231220_OTS0162/
[90] https://www.dsn.gv.at/501/files/VSB/180_2024_VSB_2023_V20240517_BF.pdf
[91] m.noen.at/korneuburg/stockerau-nach-hassposting-yasar-erkol-tritt-aus-spoe-aus-und-legt-amt-zurueck-394926
[92] Austria, ZARA (2024), Racism report 2023, Vienna, ZARA.
[93] "Identity and Democracy": The Far Right in the European Parliament/translation from English by A.Kolgashkin; ed. by V.Krasheninnikova. – Moscow: Institute for Foreign Policy Research and Initiatives.
[94] Tagesschau.de/ausland/europa/waffenarsenal-oesterreich-100
[96] https://www.puls24.at/news/chronik/antisernitische-vorfaelle-in-oesterreich-um-400-prozent-gcstiegen/312481
[97] https://kurier.at/amp/chronik/wien/brandanschlag-auf-dem-juedischen-teil-des-wiener-zentralfriedhofs/402653096
[98] https://wien.orf.at/stories/3230431
[99] https://www.derstandard.at/story/300000019225/israelische-fahnen-in-linz-und-salzburg-heruntergerissen
[100] www.oe24.at/oesterreich/politik/wien-1-mai-juedische-jugendliche-mit-steinen-beworfen/593415336
[101] The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance Report on Austria (sixth monitoring cycle), adopted on 7 April 2020, published on 2 June 2020. https://rm.coe.int/report-on-austria-6th-monitoring-cycle-/16809e826f
[102] https://www.ikg-wien.at/nachrichten/antisemitismus-bericht-2021
[103] www.antisemitismus-meldestelle.at
[104] www.antisemitismus2022.at
[105] ECRI Report on Austria (sixth monitoring cycle), adopted on 7 April 2020, published on 2 June 2020
https://rm.coe.int/report-on-austria-6th-monitoring-cycle-/16809e826f
[106] https://www.parlament.gv.at/fachinfos/rlw/Antisemitismus-2022
[107] https://dokustelle.at/fileadmin/Dokuments/Reports/Report_2022/Dokustelle-Report-2022.pdf
[108] https://dokustelle.at/publikationen/reports/news-list/news-details?tx_news_pi1%5Baction%5D=detail&tx_news_pi1%5Bcontroller%5
D=News&tx_news_pi1%5Bnews%5D=10&cHash=256569ad169d77f909a307624e5c342c
[109] 2020 FRA Fundamental Rights Report.
https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2020-fundamental-rights-report-2020_en.pdf
[110] https://www.diepresse.com/17754503/krisenkabinett-werden-uns-anschauen-was-in-den-moscheen-geprcdigt-wird
[111] https://www.oe24.at/oesterreich/politik/pro-palaestina-demo-in-wien-darf-heute-stattfinden/571943450
[112] https://kurier.at/amp/chronik/wien/nach-berlin-auch-in-wien-wcrden-pro-palaestina-demos-untersagt/402628067
[113] https:// islamnews.ru/natsionalnaya-karta-islama-obespokoila-musulman-astrii
[114] https:// islamnews.ru/natsionalnaya-karta-islama-obespokoila-musulman-astrii
[115] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women on the 9th periodic report of Austria, July 2019
[116] ECRI Report on Austria (sixth monitoring cycle), adopted on 7 April 2020, published on 2 June 2020
https://rm.coe.int/report-on-austria-6th-monitoring-cycle-/16809e826f
[119] https://euaa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/2024-06/2024_Asylum_Report_Executive_Summary_RU.pdf
[123] https://cdn.amnesty.at/media/10646/amnesty-international-oesterreichjahresbericht_2022.pdf?mode=pad&format=webp&quality=90&rnd= 133243948930000000
[125]https://kurier.at/politik/inland/wie-vucic-orban-und-nehammer-gegen-illegale-migration-vorgehen-wollen/402168057
[127] https://exxpress.at/oesterreich-stellt-klar-liefern-keine-wehrfaehigen-ukrainer-an-selenskyj-aus/
https://ria.ru/20230907/ukraina-1894794545.html
[128] https://exxpress.at/oesterreich-stellt-klar-liefern-keine-wehrfaehigen-ukrainer-an-selenskyj-aus/
[129] https://www.heute.at/s/maybachs-g-klassen-fpoe-donnert-gegen-ukraine-autos-120017921
[130] https://lenta.ru/news/2024/02/04/v-avstrii-udivilis-dorogim-mashinam-ukrainskih-bezhentsev/
[131] Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Austria (sixth monitoring cycle), adopted on 7 April 2020, published on 2 June 2020.
https://rm.coe.int/report-on-austria-6th-monitoring-cycle-/16809e826f
[132] Committee on the Rights of the Child. Concluding observations on the combined fifth and sixth periodic reports of Australia. March 2020.
[133] Committee on the Rights of the Child. Concluding observations on the combined fifth and sixth periodic reports of Australia. March 2020.
[134] https://www.integrationsfonds.at/mediathek/mediathek-publikatonen/publikation/migration-und-integration-2021-zahlen-daten-indikatoren-10674/
[135] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women on the 9th periodic report of Austria. July 2019 https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CEDAW%2fC%2fAUT%2fCO%2f9&Lang=ru
[136] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women on the 9th periodic report of Austria. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CEDAW%2fC%2fAUT%2fCO%2f9&Lang=ru
[137] Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Austria (6th monitoring cycle) adopted on 7 April 2020, and published on 2 June 2020. https://rm.coe.int/report-on-austria-6th-monitoring-cycle-/16809e826f
[138] Report on the visit to Austria of the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe, published on 12 May 2022
https://rm.coe.int/commdh-2022-10-report-on-the-visit-to-austria-en/1680a6679a
[139] Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee on the 5th periodic report of Austria. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2fC%2fAUT%2fCO%2f5&Lang=ru
[140] https://ria.ru/20240228/vena-1929979186.html
[141] https://ria.ru/20240228/vena-1929979186.html
[142] https://www.mk.ru/social/2024/05/08/universitetskaya-okkupaciya-protiv-genocida-v-evrope-policiya-stala-vyazat-protestuyushhikh-studentov.html
[143] https://www.aa.com.tr/ru/vg/%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BE-%D0%B3%D0%B0%D0%B
B%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%B5%D1%8F/%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B7%D0%B3%D0%BE%D0%BD-%D0%BF%D1%
80%D0%BE%D0%BF%D0%B0%D0%BB%D0%B5%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%
B9-%D0%B0%D0%BA%D1%86%D0%B8%D0%B8-%D0%B2-%D0%B2%D0%B5%D0%BD%D1%81%D0%BA%D0
%BE%D0%BC-%D1%83%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B2%D0%B5%D1%80%D1%81%D0%B8%D1%82%D0%B5%D1
%82%D0%B5-%D0%B2%D1%8B%D0%B7%D0%B2%D0%B0%D0%BB-%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%BE%D1%82%D0%B5%D1%81%D1%82%D1%8B/0
[144] https://www.amnesty.at/presse/amnesty-kritisiert-klima-der-straflosigkeit-bei-polizeigewalt-in-oesterreich/
[145] EU Agency for fundamental human rights report 2024
https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2024-fundamental-rights-report-2024_en.pdf
[146] https://www.amnesty.at/news-events/polizeigewalt-prozess-startet-im-fall-simmering-neue-ermittlungsstelle-nimmt- arbeit-auf/
[147] https://bundeskriminalamt.at/501/files/2022/Presseinformation_Polizeiliche_
Kriminalstatistik_2021_BF_20220215.pdf
[149] https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/377459/umfrage/umfrage-in-oesterreich-zum-vertrauen-in-die-polizei/
[150] ECRI Report on Austria (sixth monitoring cycle), adopted on 7 April 2020, published on 2 June 2020. https://rm.coe.int/report-on-austria-6th-monitoring-cycle-/16809e826f
[151] Ibid.
[152] https://www.statistik.at/fileadmin/announcement/2023/10/20231024IKTH2023.pdf
[153] https://www.wienerzeitung.at/nachrichten/politik/oesterreich/2144444-Reform-vorerst-ohne-Wirkung.html
[154] https://www.wienerzeitung.at/nachrichten/politik/oesterreich/2144444-Reform-vorerst-ohne-Wirkung.html
[155] https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000135086225/warum-das-hass-im-netz-gesetz-so-wenig-ausgereizt-wird
[156] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child on the combined fifth and sixth periodic reports of Austria. March 2020. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CRC%2fC%2fAUT%2fCO%2f5-6&Lang=ru
[160] https://mid.ru/ru/press_service/publikacii-i-oproverzenia/publikatsii/1435003/
[161] https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_223351.htm?selectedLocale=ru; https://www.rbc.ru/politics/04/03/2024/65e5dca09a794765559c6f34; https://www.interfax.ru/world/948917; https://regnum.ru/article/3872563
[162] https://russian.rt.com/world/article/1281221-albaniya-baza-nato-aviaciya-rossiya
[163] https://russian.rt.com/world/article/1281221-albaniya-baza-nato-aviaciya-rossiya
[164]https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2fC%2fALB%2fCO%2f9-12&Lang=ru.
[165]https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/g19/048/76/pdf/g1904876.pdf?token=gaDpnDL63FTza67kc7&fe=true
[166]https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CRC%2FC%2FALB%2FRQ%2F5-6&Lang=en. Committee on the Rights of the Child, Ninety-third session, 8–26 May 2023, Item 4 of the provisional agenda. Consideration of reports of States parties. Replies of Albania to the list of issues in relation to its combined fifth and sixth periodic reports. Date received: 15 February 2023
[167]https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CRC%2FC%2FALB%2FRQ%2F5-6&Lang=en. Committee on the Rights of the Child, Ninety-third session, 8–26 May 2023, Item 4 of the provisional agenda. Consideration of reports of States parties. Replies of Albania to the list of issues in relation to its combined fifth and sixth periodic reports. Date received: 15 February 2023
[168]https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/g19/048/76/pdf/g1904876.pdf?token=gaDpnDL63FTza67kc7&fe=true
[169]https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/g19/048/76/pdf/g1904876.pdf?token=gaDpnDL63FTza67kc7&fe=true
[170] CERD/C/ALB/CO/9-12, para. 4, and United Nations country team submission, p. 15.
[171]https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/g19/048/76/pdf/g1904876.pdf?token=gaDpnDL63FTza67kc7&fe=true
[172] Recommendations 106.22, 106.23, 104.95.
[173]https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/g19/048/76/pdf/g1904876.pdf?token=gaDpnDL63FTza67kc7&fe=true
[174]https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/g19/048/76/pdf/g1904876.pdf?token=gaDpnDL63FTza67kc7&fe=true
[175]https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2fC%2fALB%2fCO%2f9-12&Lang=ru.
[176] https://albania.unwomen.org/en/digital-library/publications/2020/12/alternative-report-on-the-implementation-of-the-cedaw-convention-in-albania
[177] CERD/C/ALB/CO/9-12, para. 13, and United Nations country team submission, p. 15.
[178]https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/g19/048/46/pdf/g1904846.pdf?token=0w6IagaLWpRdBruDwa&fe=true
[179] The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights Report 2023.
[180] ECtHR, Balkasi and Others v. Albania, App. No. 14800/18, final judgment 14 June 2022
[181] https://rm.coe.int/report-on-the-visit-to-albania-from-21-to-25-may-2018-by-dunja-mijatov/16808d2e22
[184] https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2fC%2fALB%2fCO%2f9-12&Lang=en
[185] European Commission (2020), A union of equality: EU Roma strategic framework for equality, inclusion and participation, COM (2020)620 final, Brussels, 7 October 2020.
[186]The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights Report 2022. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2022-fundamental-rights-report-2022_en.pdf
[187] Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Albania (6th monitoring cycle) adopted on 7 April 2020, published on 2 June 2020. https://rm.coe.int/report-on-albania-6th-monitoring-cycle-/16809e8241
[188] Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Albania (6th monitoring cycle) adopted on 7 April 2020, published on 2 June 2020. https://rm.coe.int/report-on-albania-6th-monitoring-cycle-/16809e8241.
[189] https://civic-nation.org/albania/society/hate_crime_violence_and_terrorist_attacks/attacks/.
[190]https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CEDAW%2fC%2fALB%2fCO%2f4&Lang=en
[191]https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CEDAW%2fC%2fALB%2fCO%2f4&Lang=en
[192] https://albania.unwomen.org/en/digital-library/publications/2020/12/alternative-report-on-the-implementation-of-the-cedaw-convention-in-albania
[193]https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/g19/048/46/pdf/g1904846.pdf?token=0w6IagaLWpRdBruDwa&fe=true; https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/
layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2fC%2fALB%2fCO%2f9-12&Lang=ru; CERD/C/ALB/CO/9-12, para. 15.
[194] https://hatecrime.osce.org/ru/albania
[195] Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. Fifth Opinion on Albania. Adopted on 6 June 2023, published 19 October 2023.
[196] https://rm.coe.int/5th-com-albania-en/1680acf46c
[197] The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights Report 2023.
[198] See iSIGURT.al (n.d.), ‘Albania: Protection from crimes and hate speech’ (‘Shqipëria: Mbrojtja nga krimet dhe gjuha e urrejtjes’).
[199] https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2fC%2fALB%2fCO%2f9-12&Lang=ru; CERD/C/ALB/CO/9-12, para. 29.
[201] https://am.sputniknews.ru/20230514/premer-gretsii-prigrozil-zablokirovat-vstuplenie-albanii-v-es-59619416.html
[202] The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights Report 2023.
[203] ECtHR, Balkasi and Others v. Albania, App. No. 14800/18, final judgment 14 June 2022
[205] The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights Report 2024.
https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2024-fundamental-rights-report-2024_en.pdf
[206] Belgium and Ukraine signed a “reconstruction agreement” worth 150 million euros. TASS. 17 July 2024. https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/21384481
[207] Belgium: Dutch far-right leader attacked by man wielding umbrella. Sky News. 27 October 2023.
https://news.sky.com/video/belgium-dutch-far-right-leader-attacked-by-man-wielding-umbrella-12993933
[208] “Belgium may be placed among the states that are the most loyal to Hitler’s regime” Military and history magazine. Publication of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation. 27 June 2022.
https://history.ric.mil.ru/Stati/item/412799/
[210] Nazi collaborator monuments in Belgium. Forward. 27 January 2021.
https://forward.com/news/462660/nazi-collaborator-monuments-in-belgium/
[211] Ibid.
[212] Belgian Jews shocked by display of Nazi flag artwork in Brussels. European Jewish Congress. 18 September 2019.
[213] Letter to Belgium returned to Israeli marked with swastika and antisemitic slur. Israel National News. 10 January 2022. https://www.israelnationalnews.com/news/320212
[214] Antisemitism: Swastikas and neo-Nazi symbols appear in Brussels. The Brussels Times. 26 February 2023. https://www.brusselstimes.com/381090/swastikas-and-neo-nazi-references-anti-semitic-uprising-in-brussels
[215] Anti-Semitic graffiti appears in Brussels. The Brussels Times. 10 May 2023.
https://www.brusselstimes.com/496786/anti-semitic-graffiti-appears-in-brussels-again
[216]Antisemitism: Swastikas and neo-Nazi symbols appear in Brussels. The Brussels Times. 26 February 2023.
https://www.brusselstimes.com/381090/swastikas-and-neo-nazi-references-anti-semitic-uprising-in-brussels
[217] Pro-Nazi personalized license plates escape Belgian censor. The Brussels Times. 3 September 2022. https://www.brusselstimes.com/282634/pro-nazi-personalised-license-plates-escape-belgian-censor
[218] Anti-Semitic Belgian registration: N-VA calls for power to withdraw racist license plates. The Brussels Times. 19 April 2023.
[219] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 20th to 22nd periodic reports of Belgium. May 2021.
[220] Intelligence Service report. 2021-2022. VSSE. https://www.vsse.be/sites/default/files/ra-vsse-2022-uk-web.pdf
[221] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child on the combined 5th and 6th periodic reports of Belgium. February 2019.
[222] Intelligence Service report. 2021-2022. VSSE. https://www.vsse.be/sites/default/files/ra-vsse-2022-uk-web.pdf
[223] Schild & Vrienden: l'ex-député Dries Van Langenhove renvoyé devant le tribunal correctionnel pour négationnisme. Rtbf.be. 23 February 2023. https://www.rtbf.be/article/schild-vrienden-l-ex-depute-dries-van-langenhove-renvoye-devant-le-tribunal-correctionnel-pour-negationnisme-11157244
[224] Dries Van Langenhove démissionne de son poste de député: «Plus activiste que politicien». 7 sur 7. 4 February 2023. https://www.7sur7.be/belgique/dries-van-langenhove-demissionne-de-son-poste-de-depute-plus-activiste-que-politicien~a6b6a9d0/?referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2F
[225] Ibid
[226] Former Belgian MP sentenced to imprisonment for “inciting hate and racism”. Anadolu Ajansi. 12 March 2024.
https://www.aa.com.tr/ru/мир/бывший-бельгийский-депутат-приговорен-к-тюремному-заключению-за-разжигание-ненависти-и-расизма-/3162677#
[227] Outrage after car brandshing Nazi symbols joins Vlaams Belang protest. The Brussels Times. 28 September 2020. https://www.brusselstimes.com/133244/outrage-after-car-brandishing-nazi-symbols-joins-vlaams-belang-protest
[228] Soccer fans in Belgium do Nazi salutes, chant about killing Jews, Hamas. The Jerusalem Post. 31 December 2021. https://www.jpost.com/diaspora/antisemitism/article-690264
[229] Belgian police officer made ‘Nazi’ salute in cell of man who died. The Guardian. 20 August 2020.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/aug/20/belgian-police-officer-made-nazi-salute-in-cell-of-man-who-died
[230] Decision of Belgian Court in Chovanec Case Postponed until September 25. TASR. 4 June 2024. https://etasr.sk/article/20768906
[231] News digest: Government mulls inter-state complaint over Slovak’s death in Belgium. The Slovak Spectator.
7 February 2024. https://spectator.sme.sk/c/23279373/news-digest-government-mulls-inter-state-complaint-over-slovaks-death-in-belgium.html
[232] Three Belgian neo-Nazis facing prison sentences for Hitler-inspired funeral. The Brussels Times. 4 April 2023. https://www.brusselstimes.com/440977/three-belgian-neo-nazis-facing-prison-sentences-for-hitler-inspired-funeral
[233] Une simple déclaration de culpabilité pour des chants et saluts nazis lors de funérailles. RTL info. 22 january 2024 г. https://www.rtl.be/actu/belgique/faits-divers/une-simple-declaration-de-culpabilite-pour-des-chants-et-saluts-nazis-lors-de/2024-01-22/article/629472
[234] Man faces six months in prison for giving Nazi salute in Fort Breendonk. The Brussels Times. 3 June 2021 https://www.brusselstimes.com/172388/verreycken-vlaams-belang-right-wing-resistance-flanders-man-faces-six-months-in-prison-for-giving-nazi-salute-in-fort-breendonk
[235] The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report. 2020. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2020-fundamental-rights-report-2020_en.pdf
[236] Le rapport annuel d’Unia montre une hausse des demandes d’assistance. UNIA. 25 June 2024. https://www.unia.be/fr/articles/rapport-annuel-2023-de-unia
[237] The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report. 2023.
[238] Signed by Belgium in 2001.
[239] Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the 5th periodic report of Belgium. March 2020.
[240] The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report. 2022. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2022-fundamental-rights-report-2022_en.pdf
[241] The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report. 2023.
[242] Ibid
[243] The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report. 2020.
https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2020-fundamental-rights-report-2020_en.pdf
[244] Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Belgium (6th monitoring cycle). Adopted on 12 December 2019, published on 18 March 2020. https://rm.coe.int/ecri-sixth-report-on-belgium-/16809ce9f0
[245] Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Belgium (6th monitoring cycle). Adopted on 12 December 2019, published on 18 March 2020. https://rm.coe.int/ecri-sixth-report-on-belgium-/16809ce9f0
[246] Antisemitic acts have risen sharply in Belgium and France since the Israel-Hamas war began. The Associated Press. 25 January 2024. https://apnews.com/article/belgium-antisemitism-israel-hamas-war-holocaust-denial-5ff82ca75a001304fc1838bad023e0c7
[247] At least 85 Jewish graves damaged in Belgian cemetery. RTE. 23 November 2023. https://www.rte.ie/news/2023/1123/1418237-at-least-85-jewish-graves-damaged-in-belgian-cemetery/
[248] Vandals desecrate Jewish cemetery with swastikas. The Brussels Times. 19 December 2023.
https://www.brusselstimes.com/846286/vandals-desecrate-jewish-cemetery-with-swastikas
[249] Man suspected of planning terrorist attack against Jewish institutions arrested in Antwerp. European Jewish Congress. 15 January 2024. https://eurojewcong.org/news/communities-news/belgium/man-suspected-of-planning-terrorist-attack-against-jewish-institutions-arrested-in-antwerp/
[250] College of Europe launches probe after students’s door daubed with swastika. Politico. 26 March 2024. https://www.politico.eu/article/college-of-europe-probe-jewish-student-door-antisemitic-swastika/
[251] Belgian mob breaks Israeli’s jaw after he removes anti-Israel sticker. The Jerusalem Post. 17 May 2024.
https://www.jpost.com/diaspora/antisemitism/article-801592
[252] Jewish community sends open letter about anti-Semitism to Belgian Prime Minister. The Brussels Times. 8 April 2024. https://www.brusselstimes.com/997123/jewish-community-sends-open-letter-about-antisemitism-to-belgian-prime-minister
[253] Gap in Belgian Constitution obstructs prosecution of Islamophobic discrimination cases, says expert. Anadolu Ajansi. 1 July 2023. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/gap-in-belgian-constitution-obstructs-prosecution-of-islamophobic-discrimination-cases-says-expert/2934469
[254] Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Belgium (6th monitoring cycle). Adopted on 12 December 2019, published on 18 March 2020. https://rm.coe.int/ecri-sixth-report-on-belgium-/16809ce9f0
[255] Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee on the 6th periodic report of Belgium. December 2019. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2fC%2fBEL%2fCO%2f6&Lang=ru
[256] Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the 5th periodic report of Belgium. March 2020. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=E%2fC.12%2fBEL%2fCO%2f5&Lang=ru
[257] Ook mensenrechten in beslag genomen. UNIA. 17 May 2019.
https://www.unia.be/nl/artikels/ook-mensenrechten-in-beslag-genomen
[258] Decision on admissibility and on immediate measures: European Roma Rights Centre v. Belgium,
Complaint No. 185/2019. 14 May 2020. https://www.coe.int/en/web/european-social-charter/pending-complaints/-/asset_publisher/lf8ufoBY2Thr/content/no-185-2019-european-roma-rights-centre-v-belgium
[259] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 20th to 22nd periodic reports of Belgium. May 2021. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2fC%2fBEL%2fCO%2f20-22&Lang=ru
[260] The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report. 2022. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2022-fundamental-rights-report-2022_en.pdf
[261] Flemish social democratic leader apologises for racist remarks against Roma people. The Brussels Times. 7 October 2023.
[262] Discrimination against persons of African origin. UNIA. 2022. https://www.unia.be/fr/publications-et-statistiques/publications/discriminations-a-lencontre-des-personnes-afrodescendantes-2022
[263] The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights “Being Black in the EU - Experiences of People of African Descent” report. 2023. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2023-being-black_in_the_eu_en.pdf
[264] Ibid
[265] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 20th to 22nd periodic reports of Belgium. May 2021. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2fC%2fBEL%2fCO%2f20-22&Lang=ru
[266] African university students protest discrimination in Belgium. Anadolu Ajansi. 12 May 2023.
[267] L’État des droits humains en Belgique 2023. Ligue des droits humains.
[268] Leopold II and «Congo Free State»: how the King of Belgium organized genocide in a country, where he had never been. Military Review. 11 May 2023.
[269] La Belgique échoue à présenter des «excuses» pour son passé colonial. Le Temps. 19 December 2022. https://www.letemps.ch/monde/belgique-echoue-presenter-excuses-passe-colonial
[270] The children colonial Belgium stole from African mothers. Al Jazeera. 3 February 2021. https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2021/2/3/the-children-colonial-belgium-stole-from-africa
[271] Chambre des Représentants de Belgique. Résolution relative à la ségrégation subie par les métis issus de la colonisation belge en Afrique. 29 March 2018. https://www.lachambre.be/FLWB/pdf/54/2952/54K2952007.pdf
[272] Belgium apologizes for colonial-era abduction of mixed-race children. Reuters. 4 April 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-belgium-congo-/belgium-apologizes-for-colonial-era-abduction-of-mixed-race-children-idUSKCN1RG2NF/
[273] Des députés Engagés ont dormi devant le siege de l’Open VLD: ils dénoncent le manqué de place pour les demandeurs d’asile. RTL INFO. 19 December 2022. https://www.rtl.be/info/belgique/politique/crise-de-l-accueil-les-engages-plantent-leur-tente-devant-le-siege-de-l-open-vld-1421957.aspx
[274] Asylum seekers sleep rough on the streets of Brussels. Anadolu Ajansi. 28 October 2022. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/asylum-seekers-sleep-rough-on-the-streets-of-brussels/2723205
[275] Ibid.
[276] Compte Rendu Analytique. Commission de l’Intérieur, de la Sécurité, de la Migration et des Matières Administratives. Chambre des Représentants de Belgique. 16 March 2022. https://www.lachambre.be/doc/CCRA/pdf/55/ac727.pdf
[277] Noise and rage in Liège. Rossiyskaya Gazeta. 14 March 2021. https://rg.ru/2021/03/14/v-lezhe-demonstraciia-v-zashchitu-prav-temnokozhih-vylilas-v-pogromy.html
[278] The protesters set a police station on fire in the capital of Belgium. Rossiyskaya Gazeta. 14 January 2021.
https://rg.ru/2021/01/14/v-stolice-belgii-protestuiushchie-podozhgli-policejskij-uchastok.html
[279] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 20th to 22nd periodic reports of Belgium. May 2021. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2fC%2fBEL%2fCO%2f20-22&Lang=ru
[280] Previously, the delegation of Bulgaria had traditionally abstained from voting on the document.
[281] "Сто години да стои, nак нищо няма да му стане". Къgе са фигурите от съветския паметник. Свободна Европа. 5 March 2024.
[282] Bulgarian President greeted fellow citizens with St. George ribbons. Rossiyskaya Gazeta. 9 May 2024.
[283] Prosecutor-General urged to act against "National Resistance" over anti-democratic ideology. The Sofia Globe. 8 August 2019.
[284] A fascist organization active in Bulgaria in 1932-1944.
[285] Bulgarian court refuses to ban neo-Nazi march. The Balkanist Project. 14 April 2022.
[286] Neo-Nazi Lukov March in Bulgaria: Prosecutors call for public order to be protected. The Sofia Globe.
25 February 2023. https://sofiaglobe.com/2023/02/25/neo-nazi-lukov-march-in-bulgaria-prosecutors-call-for-public-order-to-be-protected/
[287] Bulgarian police thwart neo-Nazi Lukov March. The Sofia Globe. 25 February 2023.
https://sofiaglobe.com/2023/02/25/bulgarian-police-thwart-neo-nazi-lukov-march/
[288] 80 години от трагичната гибел на Герхард Венгел. The website of the organization Koubrat Youth.
https://kubrat.idem.bg/новини/80-години-от-трагичната-гибел-на-герхард-венгел
[289] Bigger than football: Bulgaria has a problem with Neo-fascism. European Roma Rights Center. 18 October 2019. https://www.errc.org/news/bigger-than-football-bulgaria-has-a-problem-with-neo-fascism
[290] Angel Dzhambazki: Bulgarian MEP sanctioned for perceived Nazi salute in Parliament. Euronews. 5 April 2022. https://www.euronews.com/2022/04/05/angel-dzhambazki-bulgarian-mep-sanctioned-for-perceived-nazi-salute-in-parliament
[291] The face of hate in Bulgaria: MEP Angel Dzambazki. European Roma Rights Center. 20 July 2017.
https://www.errc.org/news/the-face-of-hate-in-bulgaria-mep-angel-dzambazki
[292] Bulgarian Jewish organization condemns nationalist Sofia mayoral candidate's backing for Lukov March. The Sofia Globe. 20 October 2019. https://sofiaglobe.com/2019/10/20/bulgarian-jewish-organisation-condemns-nationalist-sofia-mayoral-candidates-backing-for-lukov-march/
[293] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 23rd to 25th periodic reports of Bulgaria. December 2023.
[294] The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report.. 2022. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2022-fundamental-rights-report-2022_en.pdf
[295] Mosque in Bulgaria's Karlovo defaced with Nazi symbols, vulgar language. The Sofia Globe. 4 July 2019.
https://sofiaglobe.com/2019/07/04/mosque-in-bulgarias-karlovo-defaced-with-nazi-symbols-vulgar-language/
[296] Stones thrown at Muslim HQ in Bulgaria's capital Sofia. The Sofia Globe. 5 July 2019.
https://sofiaglobe.com/2019/07/05/stones-thrown-at-muslim-hq-in-bulgarias-capital-sofia/
[297] Fourth opinion of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities on Switzerland. Adopted on 26 May 2020.
[298] North Macedonia, Bulgaria PMs Proclaim Goodwill Ahead of Tough Talks. Balkan Insight. 18 January 2022.
[299] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 23rd to 25th periodic reports of Bulgaria. December 2023.
[300] По време на молитва: Вандали разлепиха некролог с лика на Хитлер върху синагогата в София. BTV. 10 January 2024.
[301] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 23rd to 25th periodic reports of Bulgaria. December 2023.
[302] Fourth opinion of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities on Switzerland Adopted on 26 May 2020.
[303] Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Belgium (6th monitoring cycle). Adopted on 28 June 2022, published on 4 October 2022.
[304] Ibid.
[305] The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report.2023.
[306] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child on the combined 6th and 7th periodic reports of Bulgaria. February 2024. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CRC%2FC%2FBGR%2FCO%2F6-7&Lang=en
[307] Ibid.
[308] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women on the 8th periodic report of Bulgaria. March 2020.
https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N20/062/21/PDF/N2006221.pdf?OpenElement
[309] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child on the combined 6th and 7th periodic reports of Bulgaria. February 2024.
[310] Report of the fact-finding mission to Bulgaria by Ms Leyla Kayacik, Special Representative of the Secretary General on Migration and Refugees (11-14 September 2023). Published on 30 January 2024. https://rm.coe.int/0900001680ae3ac0
[311] Ibid.
[312] Bulgarian authorities investigate an attack on foreigners on Vitosha Boulevard in Sofia. BNR 9 March 2024.
[313] Bulgaria proposes to increase the capacity of refugee centers. BNR. 3 January 2024.
https://bnr.bg/ru/post/101929703/v-bolgarii-predlagaut-uvelichity-vmestimosty-centrov-dla-bejencev
[314] Crisis at "Ovcha Kupel" Refugee Center Sparks Slow Relocation. Novinite.com Sofia News Agency. 13 March 2024. https://www.novinite.com/articles/224818/Crisis+at+%27Ovcha+Kupe
l%27+Refugee+Center+Sparks+Slow+Relocation
[315] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 23rd to 25th periodic reports of Bulgaria. December 2023.
[316] The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report. 2023. http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2023-fundamental-rights-report-2023_en_1.pdf
[317] Refugees held in cage on EU's border as Frontex agents watched. Le Monde. 8 December 2022.
[318] The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report. 2024.
https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2024-fundamental-rights-report-2024_en.pdf
[319] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination upon consideration of the combined 12th and 13th periodic reports of Bosnia and Herzegovina. August 2018.
https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2fC%2fBIH%2fCO%2f12-13&Lang=ru
[320] According to various estimates, between 600,000 and 800,000 people, mostly Serbs, but also Roma, Jews and representatives of other peoples who took part in the anti-fascist movement, were killed in the worst "death camp" of Jasenovac.
[321] For example, a statement by M.Ivanisevic, Director of the Institute for the Study of the Suffering of the Serbian People (Belgrade); Drugi svjetski rat u BiH je odnio 904.000.000 zivota. RTV BN. 4 February 2015.
https://www.rtvbn.com/332446/Drugi-svjetski-rat-u-BiH-je-odnio-904000-zivota
[322] Retired in January 2022.
https://www.vrhbosanska-nadbiskupija.org/ordinarij
[323] Sarajevska misa za "bleiburške zločince". Deutsche Welle. 13 May 2020.
https://www.dw.com/bs/sarajevska-misa-za-bleibur%C5%A1ke-zlo%C4%8Dince/a-53422443
[324] Mitropolit Hrizostom: Zbog mise za Blajburg prestaje saradnja Mitropolije dabrobosanske i Vrhbosanske. Oslobođenje. 11 May 2020.
https://www.oslobodjenje.ba/vijesti/bih/mitriopolit-hrizostom-zbog-mise-za-blajburg-prestaje-saradnja-mitropolije-dabrobosanske-i-vrhbosanske-nadbiskupije-555699
[325] In May 1945, Yugoslav partisan troops penetrated into Austrian territory, into Carinthia, and near Blyburg, near the modern border between Austria and Slovenia, massacred Croatian Ustasha and Slovenian collaborators who had fled to Austria.
[326] https://balkans.aljazeera.net/videos/2023/5/28/komemoracija-u-stocu-razliciti-pogledi-na-dogadjaj-iz-proslosti
[327] Uklanjajte s tabli protivnike antifašizma. Oslobođenje. 6 April 2021.
https://www.oslobodjenje.ba/vijesti/bih/uklanjajte-s-tabli-protivnike-antifasizma-644952
[328] Nije samo Mustafa problem, i Fuad je. Oslobođenje. 18 January 2021.
https://www.oslobodjenje.ba/dosjei/kolumne/nije-samo-mustafa-problem-i-fuad-je-621370
[329] Strijeljali ga partizani 1944. u Vitezu: Da li je to dovoljno da se ulica po njemu zove? Oslobođenje. 3 February 2021.
https://www.oslobodjenje.ba/vijesti/bih/strijeljali-ga-partizani-1944-u-vitezu-da-li-je-to-dovoljno-da-se-ulica-po-njemu-zove-626411
[330] Pukovnik NDH u Sarajevu: Ko je bio Sulejman Pačariz? Oslobođenje. 26 January 2021.
https://www.oslobodjenje.ba/vijesti/bih/pukovnik-ndh-u-sarajevu-ko-je-bio-sulejman-pacariz-623855
[331] I on ima svoju ulicu... / Slijedio je put Hitlera i Pavelića. Oslobođenje. 2 February 2021.
https://www.oslobodjenje.ba/vijesti/bih/i-on-ima-svoju-ulicu-slijedio-je-put-hitlera-i-pavelica-626097
[332] Alija Nametak je djelovao u periodu NDH: Bio je sluga okupatora. Oslobođenje. 29 January 2021.
https://www.oslobodjenje.ba/vijesti/bih/alija-nametak-je-djelovao-u-periodu-ndh-bio-je-sluga-okupatora-625032
[333] Ulica Huseina Ef. Đoze. Oslobođenje. 16 February 2021.
https://bhdani.oslobodjenje.ba/bhdani/kolumne/ulica-huseina-ef-doze-617675
[334] Sattler i Schmidt čestitali Kordiću i Vijeću. Top portal. 14 July 2022.
https://topportal.info/sattler-i-schmidt-cestitali-kordicu-i-vijecu/
[335] Više od 1.000 antifašista na Partizanskom groblju u Mostaru pod jakom policijskom pratnjom. Dnevni avaz. 11 February 2023.
https://avaz.ba/vijesti/bih/808380/vise-od-1-000-antifasista-na-partizanskom-groblju-u-mostaru-pod-jakom-policijskom-pratnjom
[336] Kordić osuo paljbu po antifašistima, stigla brza reakcija SDP-a. Dnevni avaz. 11 February 2023.
https://avaz.ba/vijesti/bih/808466/kordic-osuo-paljbu-po-antifasistima-stigla-brza-reakcija-sdp-a
[337] Episkop Sergije: Skrnavljanje Korčanice se nastavlja. RTRS.tv. 1 May 2024.
https://www.rtrs.tv/vijesti/vijest.php?id=553737
[338] SABNOR BiH osudio postavljanje biste Draži Mihailoviću u Bijeljini https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/bijeljina-draza-mihailovic-spomenik/31400683.html
[339] Interreligious Council condemns desecration of church in southern Bosnia. N1. 3 May 2019.
https://n1info.ba/english/news/a342010-interreligious-council-condemns-desecration-of-church-in-southern-bosnia/
[340] Девастирана Саборна црква у Мостару - свештенство у сузама, страхује за безбједност. РТРС. 7 December 2022.
https://www.rtrs.tv/vijesti/vijest.php?id=495973
[341] Додик најоштрије осудио вандалски напад на Саборну цркву Свете тројице у Мостару. РТРС. 7 December 2022.
https://www.rtrs.tv/vijesti/vijest.php?id=496012
[342] Системско рушење православних гробаља у ФБиХ. Катера. 18 February 2023
https://katera.news/sistemsko-rusenje-pravoslavnih-grobalja-u-fbih
[343] Родитељи: приредили су нам пакао, рекли су "само вас србе смо чекали". СРНА. 14 January 2023.
http://89.111.245.19/novosti/1067389/roditelji-priredili-su-nam-pakao--rekli-su-samo-vas-srbe-smo-cekali.htm
[344] St. Sava's Day is a Serbian Orthodox holiday in honor of the founder of the Serbian Orthodox Church.
[345] Приједор: Имам Амир Махић приписао Светом Сави фашизам, а СПЦ секташтво. РТРС. 2 February 2023.
https://www.rtrs.tv/vijesti/vijest.php?id=501795
[346] Имам Махић ће се изјаснити пред дисциплинском комисјом Ријасета. Катера. 3 February 2023.
https://katera.news/imam-mahic-ce-se-izjasniti-pred-disciplinskom-komisjom-rijaseta
[347] Poziv vjerskim liderima da se uzdrže uvredljivih komentara. Козарски вjeсник. 3 February 2023.
https://kozarski.com/poziv-vjerskim-liderima-da-se-uzdrze-uvredljivih-komentara/
[348] Kavazović: Zaključak Skupštine Grada Prijedora je sramotan. Dnevni avaz. 16 February 2023.
https://avaz.ba/vijesti/bih/809646/kavazovic-zakljucak-skupstine-grada-prijedora-je-sramotan
[349] Cvijanović: Kavazović ne brani imama iz Kozarca, već ono što je imam rekao. ATV. 17 February 2023.
https://www.atvbl.rs/republika-srpska/cvijanovic-kavazovic-ne-brani-imama-iz-kozarca-vec-ono-sto-je-imam-rekao-17-2-2023
[350] Dodik: Imam iz Kozarca povrijedio sve Srbe. ATV. 2 February 2023.
https://www.atvbl.rs/republika-srpska/dodik-imam-iz-kozarca-povrijedio-sve-srbe-2-2-2023
[351] Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Bosnia and Herzegovina (6th monitoring cycle). Adopted on 9 April 2024, published on 25 May 2024.
https://rm.coe.int/fourth-ecri-report-on-bosnia-and-herzegovina/1680b0661f
[352] Ibid.
[353] Fifth Opinion of the Advisory Committee of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities on Bosnia and Herzegovina. Adopted on 8 February 2024, published on 24 June 2024.
https://rm.coe.int/5th-op-bih-en/1680b07a26
[354] Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Bosnia and Herzegovina (6th monitoring cycle). Adopted on 9 April 2024, published on 25 May 2024.
https://rm.coe.int/fourth-ecri-report-on-bosnia-and-herzegovina/1680b0661f
[355] Article 163 of the Criminal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
[356] Monitoring hate speech incidents. OSCE.
https://www.osce.org/hatemonitorbih
[357] Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Bosnia and Herzegovina (6th monitoring cycle). Adopted on 9 April 2024, published on 25 May 2024.
https://rm.coe.int/fourth-ecri-report-on-bosnia-and-herzegovina/1680b0661f
[358] Fifth Opinion of the Advisory Committee of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities on Bosnia and Herzegovina. Adopted on 8 February 2024, published on 24 June 2024.
https://rm.coe.int/5th-op-bih-en/1680b07a26
[359] Decision of the High Representative on the Issuance of the Law Amending the Criminal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina. http://www.ohr.int/hrs-decision-on-enacting-the-law-on-amendment-to-the-criminal-code-of-bosnia-and-herzegovina/
[360] UN General Assembly adopts resolution on Srebrenica genocide. TASS. 23 May 2024.
https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/20887053
[361] Decision Enacting the Law on Amendments to the Election Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
http://www.ohr.int/decision-enacting-the-law-on-amendments-to-the-election-law-of-bosnia-and-herzegovina-8/
Decision Enacting Amendments to the Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. http://www.ohr.int/decision-enacting-amendments-to-the-constitution-of-the-federation-of-bosnia-and-herzegovina-3/
[362] I danas protesti u Sarajevu: Bošnjaci traže od Šmita da odustane od izmena Izbornog zakona! Kurir. 26 July 2022.
https://www.kurir.rs/region/bosna-i-hercegovina/3979607/i-danas-protesti-u-sarajevu-bosnjaci-traze-od-smita-da-odustane-od-izmena-izbornog-zakona-video
[363] Džaferović od Ustavnog suda BiH traži ukidanje Šmitovih odluka. Euronews Serbia. 26 October 2022.
https://www.euronews.rs/evropa/region/66790/dzaferovic-od-ustavnog-suda-bih-trazi-ukidanje-smitovih-odluka/vest
[364] Decision enacting the Law on Amendments to the Criminal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina. https://www.ohr.int/decision-enacting-the-law-on-amendments-to-the-criminal-code-of-bosnia-and-herzegovina/
[365] Čubrilović: Ustavni sud BiH odavno je instrument samo jedne politike i samo jednog naroda u BiH. ATV.
15 July 2022.
https://www.atvbl.rs/republika-srpska/cubrilovic-ustavni-sud-bih-odavno-je-instrument-samo-jedne-politike-i-samo-jednog-naroda-u-bih-15-7-2022
[366] Većina osuđenih ratnih zločinaca – Srbi? Deutsche Welle. 13 November 2010.
https://www.dw.com/sr/ve%C4%87ina-osu%C4%91enih-ratnih-zlo%C4%8Dinaca-srbi/a-6226266-0
[367] За међународну заједницу Срби нису жртве: Убијено 35.042 Срба, у Хагу пресуда од само 45 година. Републички центар за истраживање рата, ратних злочина и тражење несталих лица. 2 December 2022.
https://www.rcirz.org/za-medjunarodnu-zajednicu-srbi-nisu-zrtve-ubijeno-35-042-srba-u-hagu-presuda-od-samo-45-godina/
[368] Čedomir Antić za Glas Srpske: Srebrenica postala temelj bošnjačkog nacionalnog mita. Balkanska slobodna reč.
https://balkanskapravila.com/cedomir-antic-za-glas-srpske-srebrenica-postala-temelj-bosnjackog-nacionalnog-mita
[369] Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Bosnia and Herzegovina (6th monitoring cycle). Adopted on 9 April 2024, published on 25 May 2024.
https://rm.coe.int/fourth-ecri-report-on-bosnia-and-herzegovina/1680b0661f
[370] Fifth Opinion of the Advisory Committee of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities on Bosnia and Herzegovina. Adopted on 8 February 2024, published on 24 June 2024.
https://rm.coe.int/5th-op-bih-en/1680b07a26
[371] Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the 3rd periodic report of Bosnia and Herzegovina. November 2021.
https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=E%2fC.12%2fBIH%2fCO%2f3&Lang=ru
[372] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 12th and 13th periodic reports of Bosnia and Herzegovina. August 2018. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2fC%2fBIH%2fCO%2f12-13&Lang=ru
[373] Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Bosnia and Herzegovina (6th monitoring cycle). Adopted on 9 April 2024, published on 25 May 2024.
https://rm.coe.int/fourth-ecri-report-on-bosnia-and-herzegovina/1680b0661f
[374] Fifth Opinion of the Advisory Committee of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities on Bosnia and Herzegovina. Adopted on 8 February 2024, published on 24 June 2024.
https://rm.coe.int/5th-op-bih-en/1680b07a26
[375] Ibid.
[376] Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the 3rd periodic report of Bosnia and Herzegovina. November 2021. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=E%2fC.12%2fBIH%2fCO%2f3&Lang=ru
[377] Fifth Opinion of the Advisory Committee of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities on Bosnia and Herzegovina. Adopted on 8 February 2024, published on 24 June 2024.
https://rm.coe.int/5th-op-bih-en/1680b07a26
[378] Ibid.
[379] "Protection of Historical Memory – the Foundation of Russian Statehood", National Defence, Nikolai Patrushev, Assistant to the President of the Russian Federation. 22 June 2024.
[380] Britain first among G7 to sign security guarantees for Ukraine. RBK. 12 January 2024.
https://www.rbc.ru/politics/12/01/2024/65a131f59a7947f6e807d8df
[381] Ukraine and Britain strengthen partnership. Anadolu Ajansi. 14 August 2024.
https://www.aa.com.tr/ru/мир/украина-и-великобритания-укрепляют-партнерство/3303090
[382] UK pledges biggest aid package in Ukraine's history. RBK. 23 April 2024.
https://www.rbc.ru/politics/23/04/2024/6627209b9a794762685e2094
[383] UK has trained 37 thousand Ukrainian military personnel. Rossiyskaya Gazeta. 15 May 2023.
https://rg.ru/2023/05/15/britaniia-s-2014-goda-obuchila-37-tysiach-ukrainskih-voennyh.html
[384] Times: Britons have complained about Ukrainian military personnel training in the country. TASS. 12 September 2023.
https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/18728607
[385] Instructors from Denmark and the UK trained fighters at Azov's base. RIA Novosti. 6 August 2023.
https://ria.ru/20230806/instruktory-1888416090.html
[386] Neo-Nazi groups recruit Britons to fight in Ukraine. The Guardian. 2 March 2018.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/02/neo-nazi-groups-recruit-britons-to-fight-in-ukraine
[387] Putin: London hardly realises its responsibility for the training of Ukrainian saboteurs. TASS. 12 September 2023. https://tass.ru/politika/18727251
[388] Ukraine Neo-Nazis pictured with UK-made rocket launchers. Declassified UK. 10 March 2022.
https://www.declassifieduk.org/ukraine-neo-nazis-pictured-with-uk-made-rocket-launchers/
[389] Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation: more than 13 thousand foreign mercenaries are fighting on the side of the AFU. Vedomosti. 14 March 2024. https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/auditor-general-indigenous-policing-housing-trade-1.7148255
[390] Lis Truss criticized for backing Britons who wish to fight in Ukraine. The Guardian. 28 February 2022.
[391] Boris Johnson captured on video with a Nazi slogan. smotrim.ru. 23 August 2019. https://smotrim.ru/video/2131010
[392] UK MPs applaud Ukrainian neo-Nazis. Russia Today. 23 May 2024.
https://www.rt.com/news/598149-azov-welcomed-parliament-london/
[393] Boris Johnson pictured holding Ukrainian neo-Nazi banner/ Russia Today. 24 May 2024.
https://www.rt.com/news/598192-boris-johnson-picture-neo-nazi-flag/
[394] Mariupol: Wife of fighter still inside Azovstal steelplant speaks to BBC. 12-13 May 2022.
[395] Ukraine: Azov Battalion fighters defend Mariupol. BBC News. 27 February 2022. https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-europe-31657354
[396] Azov Battalion drops neo-Nazi symbol exploited by Russian propagandists. The Times. 30 May 2022.
[397] Azov Battalion: "We are patriots – we’re fighting the real Nazis of the 21st century". The Times. 30 March 2022. https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/azov-battalion-we-are-patriots-were-fighting-the-real-nazis-of-the-21st-century-sdccf0w9t
[398] Heroes of Azovstal freed as Russian missiles rain down. The Times.30 June 2022.
[399] Inside Azov, the far-Right brigade killing Russian generals and playing a PR game in the Ukraine war. The Telegraph. 18 March 2022. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2022/03/18/inside-azov-neo-nazi-brigade-killing-russian-generals-playing/
[400] Azov wives: "Every goodbye could be the last goodbye – we are always ready to learn that they are dead". The Telegraph. 15 May 2022. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2022/05/15/azov-wives-husbands-betrayed-ukrainian-traitors/
[401] On another inaccurate publication in The Times, UK. MFA of Russia website. 19 March 2023.
[402] Nazi collaborator monuments in the United Kingdom. Forward. 27 January 2022.
https://forward.com/news/481609/nazi-collaborator-monuments-in-the-united-kingdom/
[403] Nazi collaborator monuments in the United Kingdom. Forward. 27 January 2022.
https://forward.com/news/481609/nazi-collaborator-monuments-in-the-united-kingdom/
[404] Ibid.
[405] The Waffen SS living in Britain: Twenty five officers are still drawing pensions in the UK after being allowed entry after the Second World War. The Daily Mail. 2 August 2016.
[406] 'Fooled Stalin: Why the British sheltered Nazis from Ukraine'. RIA Novosti. 1 October 2023.
[407] Article by Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev "How the Anglo-Saxons promoted fascism in the XX century and resuscitated it in the XXI. Five questions about history for our former allies". 8 May 2024.
http://www.scrf.gov.ru/media/files/file/0xAETutZAVpaKQFCDiAxAUgkkjxHJWbT.pdf
[408] Ibid.
[409] England called Nazis to fight together against the USSR, Hitler's aide said. RIA Novosti. 27 April 2024. https://ria.ru/20230427/natsisty-1868144786.html
[410] Britain’s Cameron, in Kyiv, promises Ukraine aid for "as long as it takes". Reuters. 3 May 2024.
[411] Ofcom revokes RT’s broadcast licence. Ofcom. 18 March 2022.
https://www.ofcom.org.uk/news-centre/2022/ofcom-revokes-rt-broadcast-licence
[412] Sotheby's, Christie's and Bonhams call off Russian art auctions in response to war in Ukraine. The Art Newspaper. 16 March 2022.
[413] Controversy as young Russian pianists banned from international music competitions. Classic FM. 10 March 2022.
[414] Cardiff Philharmonic removes Tchaikovsky performance over Ukraine conflict. The Guardian. 9 March 2022. https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2022/mar/09/cardiff-philharmonic-orchestra-removes-tchaikovsky-over-ukraine-conflict
[415] Bolshoi Ballet run cancelled by Royal Opera House. The Times. 26 February 2022. https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/bolshoi-ballet-run-cancelled-by-royal-opera-house-mk5vsftqh
[416] London's National Gallery has renamed "Russian Dancers". Rossiyskaya Gazeta. 5 April 2022. https://rg.ru/2022/04/05/londonskaia-nacionalnaia-galereia-pereimenovala-russkih-tancovshchic.html?utm_source=yxnews&utm_medium=desktop
[417] Motorsport UK announces actions in response to the situation in Ukraine. Motorsport UK. 2 March 2022. https://www.motorsportuk.org/news/motorsport-uk-announces-actions-in-response-to-the-situation-in-ukraine/
[418] Daniil Medvedev could be banned from Wimbledon unless he denounces Vladimir Putin. The Independent. 16 August 2022. https://www.independent.co.uk/sport/tennis/daniil-medvedev-putin-russia-wimbledon-b2037376.html
[419] Russians assaulted, threatened and abused in UK as hate crimes linked to Ukraine war surge. Sky News. 3 March 2023.
[420] Ibid.
[421] The Russian Ambassador: several hundred people try to disrupt the polling at the Embassy in London. TASS. 17 March 2024. https://tass.ru/politika/20260873
[422] Zakharova: Nature Physics shows nationalism. TASS. 9 July 2024.
[423] Article by Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev "How the Anglo-Saxons promoted fascism in the XX century and resuscitated it in the XXI. Five questions about history for our former allies". 8 May 2024.
http://www.scrf.gov.ru/media/files/file/0xAETutZAVpaKQFCDiAxAUgkkjxHJWbT.pdf
[424] State of Hate 2021. Backlash, Conspiracies & Confrontation. Hope not Hate. March 2021. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2fC%2fHRV%2fCO%2f3&Lang=ru
[425] Neo-nazis active in Scotland use Instagram and Telegram to recruit youngsters. The Ferret. 21 March 2021. https://theferret.scot/neo-mazis-instagram-telegram-recruit-scotland/
[426] Over 100 arrested as UK far-right groups clash with police. Deutsche Welle. 13 June 2021. https://www.dw.com/en/over-100-arrested-as-uk-far-right-groups-clash-with-police/a-53796903
[427] State of Hate 2021. Backlash, Conspiracies & Confrontation. Hope not Hate. March 2021 https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2fC%2fHRV%2fCO%2f3&Lang=ru
[428] Ibid.
[429] Ibid.
[430] Terrorism Act 2000. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/contents
[431] London Police Officer Convicted of Membership in Neo‑Nazi Group. The New York Times. 1 April 2021. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/01/world/europe/london-metropolitan-police-neo-nazi.html
[432] National Action: Ben Raymond jailed for eight years. BBC News. 3 December 2021. https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-wiltshire-59519211
[433] State of Hate 2023: Rhetoric, Racism and Resentment. Hope not Hate. 26 February 2023.
https://hopenothate.org.uk/2023/02/26/state-of-hate-2023-rhetoric-racism-and-resentment/
[434] Policy Paper. Proscribed terrorist groups or organizations. Gov.UK. 26 April 2024.
[435] Global Britain in a Competitive Age: the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy. Policy Paper.
[436] Accredited official statistics. Operation of police powers under the Terrorism Act 2000, quarterly update to September 2022. Gov.UK. 8 December 2022.
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/operation-of-police-powers-under-the-terrorism-act-2000-quarterly-update-to-september-2022
[437] Xenophobia, Radicalism, and Hate Crimes across the OSCE: 2018-2020. Moscow, 2021. – 188 pages.
[438] Over 100 arrested as UK far-right groups clash with police. Deutsche Welle. 13 June 2021. https://www.dw.com/en/over-100-arrested-as-uk-far-right-groups-clash-with-police/a-53796903
[439] Report of the Working Group of Experts on People of African Descent A/HRC/54/67/Add.1
October 2023.
[440] Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee on the 8th periodic report of the United Kingdom. March 2024.
[441] Local Child Safeguarding Practice Review. March 2022.
https://chscp.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Child-Q-PUBLISHED-14-March-22.pdf
[442] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child on the combined 6th and 7th periodic reports of the United Kingdom. May 2023.
[443] The Lammy Review. 2017.
[444] Judiciary in England and Wales "institutionally racist", says the report. The Guardian. 18 October 2022.
[445] Racial Bias and the Bench. The University of Manchester. 2022.
[446] Report of the Working Group of Experts on People of African Descent A/HRC/54/67/Add.1
October 2023.
[447] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 21st to 23rd periodic reports of the United Kingdom. August 2016.
[448] Report of the Working Group of Experts on People of African Descent to the 74th session of the UN General Assembly (A/74/274). October 2019. https://undocs.org/en/A/74/274
[449] NEW REPORT: Black men seven times more likely to die following police restraint but racism not being addressed. Inquest. 2023.
[450] Baroness Casey Review. Baroness Casey of Blackstock DBE CB. 2023.
https://www.met.police.uk/SysSiteAssets/media/downloads/met/about-us/baroness-casey-review/update-march-2023/baroness-casey-review-march-2023a.pdf
[451] Broken Ladders: the Myth of Meritocracy for Women of Colour in the Workplace.
[452] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 21st to 23rd periodic reports of the United Kingdom. August 2016.
[453] Concluding observations of the Committee against Torture on the 6th periodic report of the United Kingdom. May 2019.
[454] Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee on the 8th periodic report of the United Kingdom. March 2024.
https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2FC%2FGBR%2FCO%2F8&Lang=en
[455] Fifth Opinion of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities on the United Kingdom. Adopted on 8 December 2022. Published on 25 May 2023.
[456] Irish Travellers (a nomadic ethnic community of Irish descent, own name Pavees).
[457] Fifth Opinion of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities on the United Kingdom. Adopted on 8 December 2022. Published on 25 May 2023.
[458] Report of the UN Human Rights Council Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, E. Tendayi Achiume A/74/253, pursuant to Assembly resolution 73/157. October 2019. https://undocs.org/en/A/74/253
[459] Antisemitic incidents 2023. The Community Security Trust. 2024.
https://cst.org.uk/data/file/9/f/Antisemitic_Incidents_Report_2023.1707834969.pdf
[460] Anti-Muslim cases surge in the UK since Hamas attacks, charity finds. BBC. 22 February 2024.
[461] CPS quarterly data summaries.
[462] "The Costs of Keeping the Faith". Voice for Justice UK. June 2024.
https://vfjuk.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/The-Costs-of-Keeping-the-Faith-Report.pdf
[463] Report reveals widespread harassment of UK Christians in every part of society. Catholic Herald. 11 June 2024.
https://catholicherald.co.uk/report-reveals-widespread-harassment-of-uk-christians-especially-among-younger-generations/
[464] Caribbean nations demand UK reparations for indentured labor. The Times. 12 March, 2024.
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/uk-reparations-slavery-labour-caribbean-countries-kjg75rddd
[465] How do we know David Cameron has slave owners in family background? The Guardian. 29 September 2015.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/29/how-do-we-know-david-cameron-has-slave-owning-ancestor
[466] Rishi Sunak refuses to apologize for UK slave trade or to pledge reparations. The Guardian. 26 April 2023.
[467] Eighty Afghan civilians May have been summarily killed by SAS, inquiry told. The Guardian. 2 July 2023. https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2023/jul/02/eighty-afghan-civilians-may-have-been-summarily-killed-by-sas-inquiry-told
[468] Minister says he tried and failed to disprove alleged SAS war crimes. BBC. 20 February 2024.
[469] Independent Inquiry relating to Afghanistan. https://www.iia.independent-inquiry.uk
[470] SAS killings: Bereaved Afghans recall brutality of night raids. The Times. 13 July 2024.
[471] Special forces blocked UK resettlement applications from elite Afghan troops. BBC. 19 February 2024. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-68332923
[472] Concluding observations of the Committee against Torture on the 6th periodic report of the United Kingdom. May 2019.
[473] Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee on the 8th periodic report of the United Kingdom. March 2024.
https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2FC%2FGBR%2FCO%2F8&Lang=en
[474] UK Parliament must not introduce impunity for war crimes, say UN experts. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. 5 October 2020. https://www.ohchr.org
[475] Divisive legacy of a British army base in Kenya. France 24. 28 October 2024.
https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20231028-divisive-legacy-of-a-british-army-base-in-kenya
[476] Kenya hears "heartbreaking" claims against UK soldiers. BBC. 30 May 2024.
[477] Kenya Veterans for Peace condemn British Army’s alleged misconduct in Kenya. The Eastleigh Voice. 19 June 2024.
[478] Kenyans demand compensation for fire set by British Army. Russia Today. 24 October 2023. https://www.rt.com/africa/585665-kenya-demand-compensation-uk-army/
[479] Pat Finucane: UK government in legal breach over investigation. BBC. 21 December 2022. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-64053473
[480] State of Hate 2023: Rhetoric, Racism and Resentment. Hope not Hate. 26 February 2023.
https://hopenothate.org.uk/2023/02/26/state-of-hate-2023-rhetoric-racism-and-resentment/
[481] "The tragedy became a trigger. why the UK is gripped by anti-immigrant riots". Russia Today. 6 August 2024.
https://russian.rt.com/world/article/1350567-zasedanie-velikobritaniya-protesty-migranty
[482] Far-rights forums used to plan UK riots encouraging anti-Semitic attacks. The Guardian. 6 August 2024.
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/article/2024/aug/06/far-right-forums-used-to-plan-riots-now-encouraging-antisemitic-attacks
[483] Joint civil society statement on the passage of the Illegal Migration Act. Redress. July 2023.
[484] Parliamentarians should uphold the United Kingdom's international obligations when scrutinizing the Illegal Migration Bill. COE Commissioner for Human Rights. 27 March 2023.
[485] UN expert urges UK to halt transfer of asylum seekers to Rwanda. 17 June 2022.
[486] UN human rights criticizes Britain's Nationality and Borders Bill. 14 January 2022. https://news.un.org/ru/story/2022/01/1416912
[487] Prohibition of collective expulsion of aliens.
[488] Right to life.
[489] Bibby Stockholm: Asylum seekers to be returned to migrant barge. BBC. 10 October 2023.
[490] Wethersfield asylum seekers protest over conditions on base. BBC. 17 November 2023.
[491] Report to the United Kingdom Government on the ad hoc visit to United Kingdom carried out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) from 25 to 28 November 2022. Published on 29 June 2023.
[492] Report to the United Kingdom Government on the visit to the United Kingdom carried out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) from 27 March to 6 April 2023. Published on 8 February 2024. https://rm.coe.int/1680ae68ac
[493] Ibid.
[494] Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee on the 8th periodic report of the United Kingdom.
[495] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child on the combined 6th and 7th periodic reports of the United Kingdom. May 2023.
[496] Charity launches legal action over children placed in "unlawful' asylum hotels. Children and Young People Now. 12 June 2023.
[497] Children missing from Home Office hotels likely to have been trafficked, report finds. The Guardian. 16 August 2023.
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/article/2024/jul/17/children-missing-from-home-office-hotels-likely-to-have-been-trafficked-report-finds
[498] Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee on the 8th periodic report of the United Kingdom. March 2024.
[499] Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee on the 8th periodic report of the United Kingdom. March 2024.
[500] Criminal Code of Hungary, Article 335.
[501] The Supreme Court of Hungary deems such actions to violate certain provisions of national legislation that forbid commemorations of inhumane crimes committed during the National Socialist dictatorship.
[502] In October 2019, a group of around 50 members of the association attacked representatives of an NGO operating under the auspices of the Jewish Youth Union. Local human rights groups have indicated that the investigation into the case was closed without charges being brought.
[503] The Skins4Skins group, the Nordic Resistance Movement, a Swedish neo-Nazi organisation, and Die Rechte, a German extremist party.
[504] Budapest utcáin vonult a Karpatszka Szics. Kárpát Hír. 31 October 2019. https://karpathir.com/2019/10/31/budapest-utcain-vonult-a-karpatszka-szics/
[505] A neo-Nazi network based in the UK. The activities of its Hungarian branch were banned by a court decision in 2005.
[506] Hungary Bans Annual Neo-Nazi Gathering in Budapest. Balkan Insight. 2 February 2022.
https://balkaninsight.com/2022/02/02/hungary-bans-annual-neo-nazi-gathering-in-budapest/
[507] https://www.jurist.org/news/2024/02/anti-fascist-protestors-march-in-budapest-against-right-wing-day-of-honour-event-amid-diplomatic-tension-between-italy-and-hungary/
[508] This information was also published on the website of the Hungarian branch of the Blood and Honor. https://28h.hu/esemeny/day-of-honour-2024/
[509] Anti-fascists protest annual neo-Nazi gathering in Budapest. Peoples Dispatch. 14 February 2023. https://peoplesdispatch.org/2023/02/14/anti-fascists-protest-annual-neo-nazi-gathering-in-budapest/;
Budapest citizens opposed a neo-Nazi gathering. 360. 12 February 2023. https://360tv.ru/news/mir/zhiteli-budapeshty-vystupili-protiv-shodki-neonatsistov/
[510] Rendkívüli: Antifa terror Magyarországon! Mi Hazánk. 12 February 2023. https://mihazank.hu/koveteljuk-hogy-minositsek-terrorszervezette-az-antifat/
[511] https://www.jurist.org/news/2024/02/anti-fascist-protestors-march-in-budapest-against-right-wing-day-of-honour-event-amid-diplomatic-tension-between-italy-and-hungary/
[512] Ibid.
[513] Hungary: Roma counter-demonstrators outnumber neo-Nazis in Nyíregyháza. European Roma Rights Center. 12 September 2022. http://www.errc.org/news/hungary-roma-counter-demonstrators-outnumber-neo-nazis-in-nyiregyhaza
[514] Hungary's Act LV of 2018 on the right of assembly, Article 14.
[515] 2012 Criminal Code of Hungary, Article 334.
[516] Report by the European Centre for the Development of Democracy. Problems of xenophobia, discrimination and aggressive nationalism in Europe (January 2014 - June 2015), 2015.
[517] Xenofóbia vizsgálati eredmények és ajánlások Magyarországon a humán migráció kezelésének rendészeti feladatait ellátók között. (Xenophobia research results and recommendations in Hungary among those responsible for the management of human migration). Belügyi Szemle. № 2021/6. https://ojs.mtak.hu/index.php/belugyiszemle/article/view/6560/5185
[518] Report of the European Commission against Intolerance and Racism on Hungary (sixth monitoring cycle), adopted on 6 December 2022, published on 9 March 2023. https://rm.coe.int/ecri-6th-report-on-hungary-translation-in-hungarian-/1680aa687b
[519] The page on Hungary in the OSCE ODIHR database on state reporting of hate crimes.
[520] Joint report of the Center for the Study of Extremism and Radicalism at the Moscow Institute of Economics and the European Center of Democracy Development "Xenophobia, Minority Rights and Radicalisation in the OSCE Area, 2020-2022" https://civic-nation.org/pan-european-report/Report%202023%20en%20(3).pdf
[521] European Agency for Fundamental Rights. Overview of Antisemitic Incidents Recorded in the EU in 2012-2022. http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2023-antisemitism-update-2012-2022_en.pdf
[522] Study by the Center for European Studies at Mathias Corvinus Collegium. 30 March 2023.
https://europeanstudies.mcc.hu/uploads/default/0001/01/aa8a4587a4f7ce2101a4a22de2c108062b617e9c.pdf
[523] Joint report of the Center for the Study of Extremism and Radicalism at the Moscow Institute of Economics and the European Center of Democracy Development "Xenophobia, Minority Rights and Radicalisation in the OSCE Area, 2020-2022" https://civic-nation.org/pan-european-report/Report%202023%20en%20(3).pdf
[524] The situation of antisemitism in Hungary. The Anti-Defamation League, NGO.
[525] Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Hungary (sixth monitoring cycle), adopted on 6 December 2022, published on 9 March 2023. https://rm.coe.int/ecri-6th-report-on-hungary-translation-in-hungarian-/1680aa687b
[526] Jewish people’s experinces and perceptions of antisemitism. Third survey. The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. 2024. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2024-experiences-perceptions-antisemitism-survey_en.pdf
[527] Beszámoló az alapvető jogok biztosának és helyetteseinek tevékenységéről. 2021. B/18284.
https://www.ajbh.hu/documents/10180/7431400/AJBH+besz%C3%A1mol%C3%B3+2021.pdf/bf73947f-a224-3e34-ca23-32efe207423b?version=1.0&t=1667998470775
[528] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child on the sixth periodic report of Hungary. February 2020.
[529] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined eighteenth to twenty-fifth periodic reports of Hungary. June 2019.
[530] Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee on the sixth periodic report of Hungary. March 2018. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2fC%2fHUN%2fCO%2f6&Lang=ru
[531] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women on the ninth periodic report of Hungary. February 2023.
[532] Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Hungary (sixth monitoring cycle), adopted on 6 December 2022, published on 9 March 2023.
https://rm.coe.int/ecri-6th-report-on-hungary-translation-in-hungarian-/1680aa687b
[533] Fifth Opinion of the Advisory Committee of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities on Hungary. Adopted on 26 May 2020, published on 12 October 2020. https://rm.coe.int/5th-op-hungary-en/16809eb484
[534] The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report 2022.
https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2022-fundamental-rights-report-2022_en.pdf
[535] The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report 2023.
[536] Roma in 10 European Countries. Main results. Report by the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights 2022. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2022-roma-survey-2021-main-results2_en.pdf
[537] Joint report of the Center for the Study of Extremism and Radicalism at the Moscow Institute of Economics and the European Center of Democracy Development "Xenophobia, Minority Rights and Radicalisation in the OSCE Area, 2020-2022" https://civic-nation.org/pan-european-report/Report%202023%20en%20(3).pdf
[538] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child on the sixth periodic report of Hungary. February 2020. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CRC/C/HUN/CO/6&Lang=En
[539] Joint report of the Center for the Study of Extremism and Radicalism at the Moscow Institute of Economics and the European Center of Democracy Development "Xenophobia, Minority Rights and Radicalisation in the OSCE Area, 2020-2022" https://civic-nation.org/pan-european-report/Report%202023%20en%20(3).pdf
[540] In recent years, however, Budapest has come under pressure from EU bodies for its independent policies. Along with Poland, Hungary has been scrutinised for its compliance with EU law. Furthermore, in July 2021, the European Commission challenged Budapest over a law passed a month earlier banning the propaganda of homosexuality among minors, calling it discriminatory.
[541] The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report 2024.
https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2024-fundamental-rights-report-2024_en.pdf
[542] Report of the UN Human Rights Council's Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants Felipe González Morales following his visit to Hungary. A/HRC/44/42/Add.1. May 2020.
https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G20/111/59/PDF/G2011159.pdf?OpenElement
[543] Hungary: Government’s stranglehold on media poses serious risks to human rights - UN expert. OHCHR Press release. 22 November 2021.
[544] Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Hungary (sixth monitoring cycle), adopted on 6 December 2022, published on 9 March 2023.
https://rm.coe.int/ecri-6th-report-on-hungary-translation-in-hungarian-/1680aa687b
[545] The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report 2024.
https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2024-fundamental-rights-report-2024_en.pdf
[546] Joint report of the Center for the Study of Extremism and Radicalism at the Moscow Institute of Economics and the European Center of Democracy Development "Xenophobia, Minority Rights and Radicalisation in the OSCE Area, 2020-2022" https://civic-nation.org/pan-european-report/Report%202023%20en%20(3).pdf
[547] The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report 2023.
[548] The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report 2024.
https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2024-fundamental-rights-report-2024_en.pdf
[549] For instance, Hungarian Police. Information on irregular migration. 2023. (https://www.police.hu/hu/hirek-es- informaciok/hatarinfo/illegalis-migracio-alakulasa?weekly_migration_created%5Bmin%5D=2022-01- 01+00%3A00%3A00&weekly_migration_created%5Bmax%5D=2023-01-01+00%3A00%3A00) Cited in the Joint report of the Center for the Study of Extremism and Radicalism at the Moscow Institute of Economics and the European Center of Democracy Development "Xenophobia, Minority Rights and Radicalisation in the OSCE Area, 2020-2022" https://civic-nation.org/pan-european-report/Report%202023%20en%20(3).pdf
[550] Hungarian Police to Continue to Protect Borders & Prevent Illegal Entries in 2022. Schengenvisa News. 14 July 2022. https://www.schengenvisainfo.com/news/hungarian-police-to-continue-to-protect-borders-prevent-illegal-entries-in-2022/
[551] https://www.police.hu/hu/hirek-es-informaciok/hatarinfo/illegalis-migracio-alakulasa?weekly_migration_created%5Bmin%5D=2023-01-01+00%3A00%3A00&weekly_migration_created%5Bmax%5D=2024-01-01+00%3A00%3A00
[553] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women on the ninth periodic report of Hungary. February 2023.
[554] The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report 2024.
https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2024-fundamental-rights-report-2024_en.pdf
[555] Joint report of the Center for the Study of Extremism and Radicalism at the Moscow Institute of Economics and the European Center of Democracy Development "Xenophobia, Minority Rights and Radicalisation in the OSCE Area, 2020-2022" https://civic-nation.org/pan-european-report/Report%202023%20en%20(3).pdf
[556] https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements/2020/05/closure-transit-zones-hungary-important-step-forward
[557] The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report 2023.
[558] The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report 2024.
https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2024-fundamental-rights-report-2024_en.pdf
[560] EU founding values: Commission starts legal action against Hungary and Poland for violations of fundamental rights of LGBTIQ people. European Commission press release. 15 July 2021.
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_3668
[561] The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report 2023.
[562] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women on the ninth periodic report of Hungary. February 2023.
[563] https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/en/Enimerosi/Grafeio-Typou/Deltia-Typou?press=eb620db9-1bc3-4b96-8ab0-ae70011f2170
[564] https://twitter.com/atsipras/status/1512023668662190082
[565] https://www.kathimerini.gr/politics/561798445/antidraseis-gia-tin-paroysia-meloys-toy-tagmatos-toy-azof-stin-omilia-zelenski/
[566] https://ria.ru/20220319/pamyatnik-1779066642.html
[567] https://ria.ru/20220326/pamyatnik-1780239271.html
[568] https://www.facebook.com/culturegr/posts/pfbid0obQ5XgLNvFC4i3GVTRV8Je6KqHDp
JddfeGdyKmfsedVxmW8hRjcLZxNGrUnb639pl
[569] https://www.in.gr/2022/03/03/greece/sputnik-anakoinosi-eksedosan-oi-ergazomenoi-gia-mayro-sto-sait-kai-stin-ellada/
[570] https://rua.gr/news/obschestvo/48592-v-gretsii-otklyuchili-rossijskie-telekanaly.html
[571] https://ria.ru/20220403/napadenie-1781582293.html
[572] https://ria.ru/20220426/paskha-1785484413.html
[574] https://ria.ru/20220323/banki-1779646928.html
[576] Ксенофобия, радикализм и преступления на почве ненависти на пространстве ОБСЕ, 2018-2020 гг. – М.: 2021. – 188 с. (Xenophobia, Radicalism, and Hate Crimes across the OSCE: 2018-2020. Moscow, 2021. – 188 p.)
[577] https://www.in.gr/2021/11/02/greece/kalavryta-1943-orgi-apo-apogonous-tou-olokaytomatos-gia-tin-tainia-den-ypirxe-nazi-pou-mas-voithise/
[578] https://www.avgi.gr/koinonia/435149_sto-eleos-ton-fasiston-ta-ebraika-mnimeia
[579] https://www.mfa.gr/en/current-affairs/statements-speeches/statement-by-the-ministry-of-foreign-affairs-regarding-the-desecration-of-the-monument-dedicated-to-the-old-jewish-cemetery-of-thessaloniki-30122022.html
[580] http://www.holocausteducenter.gr/executive-summary/
[581] Ксенофобия, радикализм и преступления на почве ненависти на пространстве ОБСЕ, 2018-2020 гг. – М.: 2021. – 188 с. (Xenophobia, Radicalism, and Hate Crimes across the OSCE: 2018-2020. Moscow, 2021. – 188 p.)
[582] https://www.e-nomothesia.gr/kat-anthropina-dikaiomata/n-4285-2014.html
[584] https://rm.coe.int/ecri-first-report-on-greece-adopted-on-28-june-2022-published-on-22-se/1680a818bf
[585] EU Agency for Fundamental Rights Report 2023.
[586] Information from Franet desktop research; and Roma Civil Monitor (n.d.), ‘Roma Civil Monitor 2021–2025: Civil society monitoring reports on new national Roma strategies published’
[588] https://azinlikca1.net/eidiseis/item/44269-η-μειονοτητα-τησ-θρακησ-ειναι-μονον-θρ
[589]https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2fC%2fGRC%2fCO%2f20-22&Lang=ru
[590] https://www.protothema.gr/greece/article/1255976/egainiastike-to-proto-tzem-evi-stin-ellada-gia-tous-alevites/
[592] The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights Report 2024. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2020-fundamental-rights-report-2020_en.pdf
[593] https://elenaforum.org/ecthr-living-conditions-of-a-pregnant-woman-in-samos-hotspot-violated-article-3-of-the-convention/
[595] https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024 Human Rights Watch // World Report 2024
[596] https://fragdenstaat.de/dokumente/233972-olaf-final-report-on-frontex/
[597] https://www.amnesty.ie/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/202223-air-english_2023-03-22_corrx1.pdf
[598] https://reliefweb.int/report/greece/report-special-rapporteur-situation-human-rights-defenders-mary-lawlor-visit-greece-ahrc5229add1-advance-edited-version
[599] https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/greece
[600] EU Agency for Fundamental Rights Report 2023.
[602] https://www.unhcr.org/gr/en/19763-racist-violence-recording-network-annual-report-2020.html
[604] https://rsf.org/en/country/greece
[605] https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2022-fundamental-rights-report-2022_en.pdf
[606] Greece, Ellan Passe (2021), ‘10 open and ruthless questions about the assassination of the 18-year old Roma in Perama’ (‘10 ανοιχτές και αδίστακτες ερωτήσεις για τη δολοφονία του 18χρονου Ρομά στο Πέραμα’), 24 October 2021.
[607] ROM Project, ‘Intervention of the Roma Human Rights Advocacy and Defence Observatory on the death at Perama’ (‘Παρέμβαση: Παρατηρητήριο Συνηγορίας & Προάσπισης
Ανθρωπίνων Δικαιωμάτων Ρομά για την ανθρωποκτονία στο Πέραμα’).
[608] Greece (2021), ‘Takis Theodorikakos: Reforms in the Greek Police’ (‘Τάκης Θεοδωρικάκος: Μεταρρυθμίσεις στην Ελληνική Αστυνομία’), 1 November 2021.
[609] Greece, GNCHR Written Responses to the List of Issues in relation to the combined fourth to sixth periodic reports of Greece to the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, December 2021, p. 45-46, GNCHR Observations on Greece’s combined 23rd and 24th periodic report to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, September 2021, p. 28, GNCHR Contribution to the New National Strategy for the Social Inclusion of the Roma for the period 2021-2027, March 2021, p. 10.
[610] https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CRC%2FC%2FGRC%2FCO%2F4-6&Lang=en
[611] https://jyllands-posten.dk/politik/ECE16761723/hemmeligt-dokument-afsloerer-loekke-brugte-hidtil-uset-greb-for-at-frede-putins-forlaengede-arm-i-hobro-koebenhavn-og-paa-baagoe/
[612] https://jyllands-posten.dk/politik/ECE16790502/afsloering-danskrussiske-kirker-samlede-penge-ind-til-kontroversiel-praest-nu-anklages-han-for-at-levere-vaaben-til-fronten/
[613] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 20th and 21st periodic reports of Denmark. 3 December 2021. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Dowloand.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2fC%2fDNK%2fCO%2f22-24&Lang=ru.
[614] https://pet.dk/pet/nyhedsliste/ung-mand-tiltales-for-at-lade-sig-hverve-til-og-fremme-virksomheden-for-en-terrorsammenslutning/2023/01/26
[615] On 27 January 2023, Rasmus Paludan, a leader of the Stram Kurs (Hard Line) party, committed another anti-Islamic provocation with the burning of the Koran in three places in Copenhagen: at the mosque on Dorteavai Street, as well as in front of the Turkish embassy and the Russian consular division. The Danish authorities refrained from directly criticizing the actions.
[616] https://www.interfax.ru/world/912793. In Russian
[617] https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/g24/000/04/pdf/g2400004.pdf?token=OgiVv076uuI8hgyJJO&fe=true
[618] Resolution 52/38 "Combating intolerance, negative stereotyping, stigmatization, discrimination, incitement to violence and violence against persons based on religion or belief." Adopted by Human Rights Council on 4 April 2023.
[619] https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/g24/000/04/pdf/g2400004.pdf?token=OgiVv076uuI8hgyJJO&fe=true
[620] https://menneskeret.dk/nyheder/politiets-registrering-hadforbrydelser-boer-styrkes
[621] The 2022 EU Agency for Fundamental Rights Report. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2020-fundamental-rights-report-2020_en.pdf
[623] https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CERD/Shared%20Documents/DNK/INT_CERD_IFN_DNK_41240_E.pdf.
[624] The 2022 EU Agency for Fundamental Rights Report. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2022-fundamental-rights-report-2022_en.pdf.
[625] Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 2008 on combating certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law, OJ 2008 L 328.
[626] Denmark, Government, Proposal on amending the Act on prohibition against differential treatment with in the labour market (Forslag til lov om ændring af lov om ligestilling af kvinder og mænd, lov om forbud mod forskelsbehandling på arbejdsmarkedet m.v., straffeloven og forskellige andre love).
[627] https://menneskeret.dk/udgivelser/etnisk-profilering
[628] Denmark, Danish Institute for Human Rights (2022), Ethnic profiling – Main results from three studies, p. 7
[629] The 2023 EU Agency for Fundamental Rights report.
[631] https://www.ohchr.org/ru/statements-and-speeches/2024/03/turks-global-update-human-rights-council
[632] Denmark, The Board of Equal Treatment (Ligebehandlingsnævnet) (2021), Annual report 2020 (Ligebehandlingsnævnets årsberetning 2020), pp. 3, 36 and 38.
[633] The2022 EU Agency for Fundamental Rights Report. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2022-fundamental-rights-report-2022_en.pdf.
[634] Denmark, National Police (Rigspolitiet) (2021), Report on hate crimes (Hadforbrydelsser i 2020 – Rigspolitiets årsrapport vedrørende hadforbrydelser).
[635] Denmark’s Government reply to ECRI’s 2021 6th questionnaire, page 11.
[636] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women on the 9th periodic report of Denmark. March 2021. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=INT/CEDAW/COC/DNK/44503&Lang=En.
[637] European Union agency for fundamental rights. Fundamental Rights Report. 2021. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2021-fundamental-rights-report-2021_en.pdf.
[638] ECRI report on Denmark (sixth monitoring cycle). Adopted on 29 March 2022. Published on 9 June 2022.
https://rm.coe.int/6th-ecri-report-on-denmark-/1680a6d5e4
[639] Danish Institute for Human Rights (2021), Stranger in your own country? Access to citizenship for children and youth who were born and/or have grown up in Denmark (Fremmed i eget land? Adgang til statsborgerskab for børn og unge, der er født og/eller opvokset i Danmark), February 2021.
[640] The 2022 EU FRA report. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2022-fundamental-rights-report-2022_en.pdf.
[641] The 2022 EU FRA report. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2022-fundamental-rights-report-2022_en.pdf.
[642] Olsen, A. L., Kyhse-Andersen, J. H. and Moynihan D. (2020), ‘The unequal distribution of opportunity: A national audit study of bureaucratic discrimination in primary school access’, 29 December 2020.
[643] The 2022 EU FRA report. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2022-fundamental-rights-report-2022_en.pdf.
[644] European Union agency for fundamental rights. Experiences and perceptions of antisemitism — Second survey on discrimination and hate crime against Jews in the EU. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2018-experiences-and-perceptions-of-antisemitism-survey_en.pdf.
[645] ECRI report on Denmark (sixth monitoring cycle). Adopted on 29 March 2022. Published on 9 June 2022. https://rm.coe.int/6th-ecri-report-on-denmark-/1680a6d5e4.
[646] https://www.interfax.ru/world/951628. In Russian
[647] Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Belgium (sixth monitoring cycle). Adopted on 29 March 2022. Published on 9 June 2022.
[648] Data from the website of Statistics Denmark, available at Immigrants and their descendants - Statistics Denmark (dst.dk).
[649] ECRI report on Denmark (sixth monitoring cycle). Adopted on 29 March 2022. Published on 9 June 2022.
[650] https://amnesty.dk/menneskerettighedsdomstolen-syrisk-flygtning-vinder-retssag-mod-danmark-om-familiesammenfoering/
[651] https://menneskeret.dk/nyheder/brud-paa-menneskerettighederne-splitte-syriske-familier
[652] https://uim.dk/nyhedsarkiv/2022/september/danmark-og-rwanda-enige-om-faelles-erklaering/
[653] https://uim.dk/arbejdsomraader/vurdering-af-syreres-ophold-i-danmark/
[654] https://www.dr.dk/nyheder/indland/skarp-international-kritik-udlaendingecenter-er-vaerre-end-et-faengsel
[655] https://amnesty.dk/wp-content/uploads/media/6261/torturkommiteens-rapport.pdf
[656] https://www.regeringen.dk/nyheder/2022/traktat-om-leje-af-faengselspladser-i-kosovo-nu-underskrevet/
[657] https://www.coe.int/ru/web/commissioner/-/denmark-refocus-on-protection-and-integration-in-asylum-policy-and-step-up-measures-to-improve-the-situation-of-persons-with-disabilities
[658] https://m.lenta.ru/news/2023/12/23/vlasti-danii-prizvali-ukrainskih-bezhentsev-vernutsya-na-rodinu-posle-konflikta/amp. In Russian
[659] https://m.lenta.ru/news/2023/12/23/vlasti-danii-prizvali-ukrainskih-bezhentsev-vernutsya-na-rodinu-posle-konflikta/amp. In Russian
[660] https://m.lenta.ru/news/2023/12/23/vlasti-danii-prizvali-ukrainskih-bezhentsev-vernutsya-na-rodinu-posle-konflikta/amp. In Russian
[661] https://m.lenta.ru/news/2023/12/23/vlasti-danii-prizvali-ukrainskih-bezhentsev-vernutsya-na-rodinu-posle-konflikta/amp. In Russian
[662] https://um.dk/en; https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/news/2024/05/06/1035687-daniya-videlila
[663] https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=E/C.12/DNK/CO/6&Lang=En
[664] The 2022 FRA report. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2022-fundamental-rights-report-2022_en.pdf.
[665] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on combined 22nd-24th periodic reports. 3 December 2021. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Dowloand.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2fC%2fDNK%2fCO%2f22-24&Lang=ru.
[666] Report of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) following its visit to Denmark on 3-12 April 2019. Published on 7 January 2020. https://rm.coe.int/1680996859
[667] A special type of non-forensic psychiatric compulsory social isolation in places of deprivation of liberty for persons who have served a sentence for previously committed particularly serious crimes, including recidivism. Most often appointed in respect of particularly aggressive criminals. It may be imposed for life.
[668] https://m.facebook.com/leovaradkar?locale=el_GR
https://www.rte.ie/news/ireland/2024/0224/1434197-ukraine-march/
[669] https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/ireland-micheal-martin-irish-ukraine-russia-b2501882.html
[670] https://www.irishtimes.com/politics/2024/04/18/harris-confirms-government-plan-to-abandon-triple-lock-restriction-on-troops/
[671] https://tass.ru/obschestvo/20725625
[672] https://tass.ru/obschestvo/20725625
[673] website – www.inar.ie
[674] Agency for Fundamental Human Rights 2023 report
https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2023-fundamental-rights-report-2023_en_1.pdf
[675] FRA (2021), Fundamental rights report 2021, Luxembourg, Publications Office, Chapter 4.3. See also Government of Ireland, Anti-Racism Committee (2021), Interim report to the Minister for Children, Equality, Disability, Integration and Youth. The final report of the AntiRacism Committee had not been published by the end of 2022.
[676] Agency for Fundamental Human Rights 2023 report
https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2023-fundamental-rights-report-2023_en_1.pdf
[677] Kempny, M. and Michael, L. (2021), Race equality in the higher education sector: Analysis commissioned by the Higher Education Authority, Dublin, Higher Education Authority, p.33.
[678] Michael, L. (2021), Reports of racism in Ireland: Data from iReport.ie – 2020, Dublin, Irish Network Against Racism
[679] Ireland, Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission (2021), "Developing a national action plan against racism – IHREC submission to the Anti-Racism Committee", 6 September 2021.
[680] https://inar.ie/inars-2020-ireport-ie-reports-of-racism-in-ireland-published/
[681] Ireland's Fifth Report to the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities; received on 12 July 2023 г.:.https://rm.coe.int/ireland-s-fifth-periodic-report-under-the-fcnm/1680abedda
[682] https://inar.ie/2021-reports-of-racism
[683] https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD/C/IRL/CO/5-9&Lang=Ru
[684] https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD/C/IRL/CO/5-9&Lang=Ru
[685] https://www.ohchr.org/ru/statements-and-speeches/2024/03/turks-global-update-human-rights-council
[686] https://www.pragueprocess.eu/ru/countries/865-irlandia
[687] https://www.pragueprocess.eu/ru/countries/865-irlandia
[688] https://www.pragueprocess.eu/ru/countries/865-irlandia
[689] Houses of the Oireachtas (2022), "Ukrainian crisis: Discussion", Joint Committee on Children, Equality, Disability, Integration and Youth debate, 17 May 2022.
[690] Agency for Fundamental Human Rights 2023 report https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2023-fundamental-rights-report-2023_en_1.pdf
[691] https://www.pragueprocess.eu/ru/countries/865-irlandia
[692] https://www.irishtimes.com/politics/2022/10/28/irish-timesipsos-poll-strong-support-for-ukraine-but-worries-over-refugee-numbers/; https://iz.ru/1417458/2022-10-28/bolshinstvo-irlandtcev-podderzhali-ostanovku-priema-ukrainskikh-bezhentcev
[693] https://smotrim.ru/video/2802045
[694] https://smotrim.ru/video/2797823
[695] https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/21376527
[696] https://www.irishtimes.com/ireland/2024/05/27/significant-number-of-centres-housing-ukrainians-will-close-under-90-day-policy/
[697] https://ria.ru/20240527/tsentry-1948706932.html
[698] https://ria.ru/20240527/tsentry-1948706932.html
[699] https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD/C/IRL/CO/5-9&Lang=Ru
[701] ttps://rm.coe.int › fifth-report-on-ireland
[702] Report of the Commission on Human Rights and Equality, 2019
[703] Report of the Immigrant Council of Ireland, 2019
[704] ECRI Conclusions on the Implementation of the Recommendations subject to Interim Follow-up. https://rm.coe.int/ecri-conclusions-on-the-implementation-of-the-recommendations-in-respe/1680a59aec
[705] https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD/C/IRL/CO/5-9&Lang=Ru.
[707] https://rossaprimavera.ru/news/1aa1eaab
[708] https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/-/united-kingdom-commissioner-warns-against-regression-on-human-rights-calls-for-concrete-steps-to-protect-children-s-rights-and-to-tackle-human-rights-issues-in-northern-ireland
[710] https://x.com/thordiskolbrun/status/1699448143425716614?mx=2; https://www.government.is/diplomatic-missions/embassy-article/2023/11/03/Third-Committee-Explanation-of-vote-on-behalf-of-the-Nordic-Baltic-countries/.
[711] Some examples:
https://www.visir.is/g/20242529913d/sjalfstaedisbaratta-eystrasaltsthjoda-soguleg-upprifjun;
https://heimildin.is/grein/21174/nylenduveldid-russland-herferdin-til-siberiu/;
https://www.dv.is/pressan/2024/5/5/dagur-frelsunar-og-hryllings/.
[712] Some examples:
https://x.com/Bjarni_Ben/status/1714693213506707856;
https://www.althingi.is/altext/raeda/152/rad20220228T150941.html;
https://www.althingi.is/altext/raeda/154/rad20240319T192412.html.
[713] https://heimildin.is/grein/12796/#_=_;
https://www.mbl.is/frettir/innlent/2023/12/17/aftur_vart_vid_nynasistaarodur/; https://rm.coe.int/sixth-ecri-report-on-iceland/1680ac8c43.
[716] https://www.mbl.is/frettir/innlent/2024/03/13/fordomar_a_islandi_ad_koma_upp_a_yfirbordid/;
https://heimildin.is/grein/21189/nasistafana-flaggad-i-arbaenum/.
[717] https://icelandmonitor.mbl.is/news/news/2022/12/15/talked_about_becoming_members_of_a_death_squad/.
[718] https://www.mbl.is/mogginn/bladid/innskraning/?redirect=%2Fmogginn%2Fbladid%2Fgrein%2F1857444%2F%3Ft%3D903261384&page_name=grein&grein_id=1857444;
https://www.visir.is/g/20242553721d/hrydjuverkamalid-til-landsrettar.
[719] https://heimildin.is/grein/21241/kynthattahatur-og-afmennskun-i-songvakeppni/;
https://heimildin.is/grein/20623/eg-get-ekki-hent-hluta-af-menningu-minni-i-burtu/;
https://heimildin.is/grein/20610/morguninn-eftir-ummaeli-bjarna-maettu-menn-med-hotanir/;
https://www.mbl.is/frettir/innlent/2024/04/21/segir_af_ser_varathingmennsku/;
https://www.mbl.is/frettir/innlent/2024/03/13/fordomar_a_islandi_ad_koma_upp_a_yfirbordid/;
https://www.dv.is/eyjan/2024/2/5/johannes-loftsson-skrifar-stydur-island-vid-hrydjuverkastarfsemi/.
[722] https://heimildin.is/grein/20327/thrju-mal-tengd-kynthattamorkun-hja-nefnd-um-eftirlit-med-logreglu/.
[723] https://icelandmonitor.mbl.is/news/news/2021/03/06/memorial_to_rise_of_first_black_settler_in_iceland/.
[726] https://heimildin.is/grein/20710/;
https://www.ruv.is/frettir/innlent/2024-01-23-telur-bjarna-hafa-buid-sig-undir-kosningar-403136.
[727] https://www.icelandreview.com/politics/icelandic-state-pays-damages-to-pregnant-woman-who-was-deported/.
[728] https://www.icelandreview.com/news/refugee-man-and-family-previously-deported-now-back-in-iceland/.
[730] https://www.ruv.is/frettir/innlent/2024-01-30-metfjoldi-innflytjenda-i-breyttu-samfelagi-403680.
[731] https://www.ruv.is/frettir/innlent/2024-03-05-fjorir-af-hverjum-tiu-na-ekki-endum-saman-406624;
https://heimildin.is/grein/20623/eg-get-ekki-hent-hluta-af-menningu-minni-i-burtu/.
[733] https://rm.coe.int/sixth-ecri-report-on-iceland/1680ac8c43; https://rm.coe.int/fifth-report-on-iceland/16808b581c.
[737] https://island.is/samradsgatt/mal/3649;
https://www.icelandreview.com/politics/bill-on-detention-centres-for-asylum-seekers-published/.
[738] https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2023-fundamental-rights-report-2023_en_1.pdf.
[739] French Presidency of the Council of the European Union (2022), ‘First step in the gradual implementation of the European Pact on Migration and Asylum: Modus operandi of a voluntary solidarity mechanism’, 22 June 2022.
[740] https://heimildin.is/grein/20622/ord-valdhafa-um-utlendinga-geti-leitt-til-aukinnar-hatursordraedu/.
[744] https://jewish.ru/ru/stories/reviews/205821. In Russian
[747] https://jewish.ru/ru/stories/reviews/205821. In Russian
[749] https://rus.is/bulling-ili-travlya-chto-eto-takoe. In Russian
[750] https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CEDAW%2fC%2fISL%2fCO%2f7-8&Lang=ru.
[751] https://www.coe.int/en/web/anti-human-trafficking/-/iceland-should-improve-the-identification-of-victims-of-human-trafficking-step-up-investigations-and-prosecutions.
[753] https://www.coe.int/en/web/anti-human-trafficking/-/iceland-should-improve-the-identification-of-victims-of-human-trafficking-step-up-investigations-and-prosecutions.
[754] https://wp.amnesty.is/media/waking-up-to-nothing-harmful-and-unjusified-use-of-pre-trial-solitary-confinement-in-iceland.pdf.
[755] https://rikisendurskodun.is/skyrslur/nanar?id=2037;
https://heimildin.is/grein/21365/kynferdisbrot-hafa-fyrnst/.
[757] https://rus.is/ot-redakcii. In Russian
[759] https://rus.is/ot-redakcii. In Russian
[765] https://russian.rt.com/ussr/article/974510-russkie-emigranty-travlya-specoperaciya. In Russian
[766] https://www.government.is/library/01-Ministries/Prime-Ministrers-Office/Icelands%206th%20periodic%20report%20under%20the%20International%20Covenant%20on%20Civil%20and%20Political%20Rights.pdf.
[767] NGO "Movement Against Intolerance" http://www.movimientocontralaintolerancia.com/.
[768] "ABC" dated 05.03.2022.
[769] https://democ.de/en/article/neo-nazis-commemorate-spanish-wehrmacht-blue-division-azul/
[770] In particular, the participation of neo-Nazi groups in the protests is mentioned in the article "Biggest protest in Spain against Catalan amnesty law draws 170,000" by Reuters of 19 November 2023. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/biggest-protest-spain-against-catalan-amnesty-law-draws-170000-2023-11-18/
[771] As of May 2023, data for 2022 has not been published. Spanish Interior Ministry report for 2021: https://www.interior.gob.es/opencms/pdf/servicios-al-ciudadano/delitos-de-odio/estadisticas/INFORME-EVOLUCION-DELITOS-DE-ODIO-VDEF.pdf
[772] Spanish Interior Ministry report for 2022. https://www.interior.gob.es/opencms/export/sites/default/.galleries/galeria-de-prensa/documentos-y-multimedia/balances-e-informes/2022/Informe_Evolucion_delitos_odio_2022.pdf
[773] The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report 2022.
https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2022-fundamental-rights-report-2022_en.pdf.
[774] The study "Jóvenes y racismo. Estudio sobre percepciones y actitudes racistas y xenófobas entre la población joven de España" (November 2022), conducted by the Queen Sofia Centre for Adolescents and Youth: https://www.adolescenciayjuventud.org/publicacion/jovenes-y-racismo/.
[775] Interview with El País newspaper, 20.11.2022: https://elpais.com/planeta-futuro/2022-11-20/la-representante-de-la-onu-para-la-infancia-en-espana-hay-un-creciente-problema-de-xenofobia-y-racismo.html
[776] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women on the 9th periodic report of Spain. May 2023. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CEDAW%2FC%2FESP%2FCO%2F9&Lang=ru
[777] Article in the newspaper ABC of 26.09.2022: https://www.abc.es/espana/gobierno-sopesa-crear-brigada-antirracismo-vigile-medios-20220926201650-nt.html.
[778] https://ria.ru/20220810/madrid-1808614871.html
[779] European Agency for Fundamental Rights. Overview of Antisemitic Incidents Recorded in the EU in 2012-2022. http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2023-antisemitism-update-2012-2022_en.pdf
[780] Jewish people’s experinces and perceptions of antisemitism. Third survey. The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. 2024. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2024-experiences-perceptions-antisemitism-survey_en.pdf
[781] "E1 Pais" of 08.10.2022.
[782] https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/spains-jewish-community-denounces-the-biggest-increase-in-anti-semitism/
[783] The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report 2022.
https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2022-fundamental-rights-report-2022_en.pdf.
[784] IOM and UNHCR Deplore Loss of Life at Nador-Melilla Crossing. 25 June 2022.
https://www.iom.int/news/iom-and-unhcr-deplore-loss-life-nador-melilla-crossing
[785] The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report 2022.
https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2022-fundamental-rights-report-2022_en.pdf
[786] Concluding observations of the Committee against Torture on the 7th periodic report of Spain. July 2023. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CAT%2FC%2FESP%2FCO%2F7&Lang=ru
[787] Concluding observations of the Committee against Torture on the 7th periodic report of Spain. July 2023. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CAT%2FC%2FESP%2FCO%2F7&Lang=ru
[788] The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report 2024. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2024-fundamental-rights-report-2024_en.pdf
[789] https://www.interior.gob.es/opencms/export/sites/default/.galleries/galeria-de-prensa/documentos-y-multimedia/balances-e-informes/2023/24_informe_quincenal_acumulado_01-01_al_31-12-2023.pdf
[790] Assessment Report (third round) of the Council of Europe's Group of Experts on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (GRETA) on Spain. "Access to justice and effective remedies for victims of trafficking in human beings". Published on 12 June 2023. https://rm.coe.int/greta-evaluation-report-on-spain-3rd-evaluation-round-greta-2023-10-ac/1680ab8d0f
[791] The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report 2023. http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2023-fundamental-rights-report-2023_en_1.pdf
[792] The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report 2024. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2024-fundamental-rights-report-2024_en.pdf
[793] The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report 2024. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2024-fundamental-rights-report-2024_en.pdf
[794] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women on 9th periodic report of Spain. May 2023. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CEDAW%2FC%2FESP%2FCO%2F9&Lang=ru
[795] Included by the Russian Ministry of Justice in the list of undesirable organisations.
[797] Concluding observations of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on the implementation by Spain of recommendations subject to interim monitoring. Adopted on 1 December 2020. Published on 23 February 2021.https://rm.coe.int/interim-follow-up-conclusions-on-spain-5th-monitoring-cycle/1680a17dc5
[798] The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report 2022. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2022-fundamental-rights-report-2022_en.pdf
[799] The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report 2023. http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2023-fundamental-rights-report-2023_en_1.pdf
[800] Ibid.
[801] Roma in 10 Europan Countries. Main results. Report by the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights 2022. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2022-roma-survey-2021-main-results2_en.pdf
[802] This political movement, founded in 2003, owns its own publishing house, Altaforte.
[803] As a political party it was founded in 1997.
[804] For example, Lealtà Azione (Lombardy region), Skin4Skin (Milan), Hammerskin (Milan), Generazione Identitaria (Milan), Manipolo d'Avanguardia (Bergamo), Do.Ra. (Varese), Militia (Rome), Avanguardia Nazionale (Rome), Rivolta Nazionale (Rome), Fortezza Europa (Verona), Veneto Fronte Skinheads (Vicenza), etc.
[806] https://www.rainews.it/articoli/2022/10/terrorismo-internazionale-arrestato-neonazista-a-bari-propaganda-per-discriminazione-razziale--97e52bf6-b029-449f-893f-9be30db94f43.html
[807] https://www.giurisprudenzapenale.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/ssuu-saluto-romano.pdf https://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/cronaca/2024/01/18/cassazione-contro-il-saluto-romano-applicare-la-legge-scelba.-la-russa-la-sentenza-si-commenta_566fe8ad-abc4-4478-a719-57941a350b1a.html
[808] https://www.sicurezzanazionale.gov.it/sisr.nsf/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/RELAZIONE-ANNUALE-2020.pdf
[809] In the summer of 1944, Vladimir Tulisko was among the prisoners in forced labour in the Trento area. There he managed to escape. Vladimir Tulisko joined the Italian partisan division Pazubio, which operated near Verona. He died during a battle with the Nazis who were retreating from Italy to the north near Caldiero.
[810] https://milano.repubblica.it/cronaca/2023/02/19/news/svastica_parco_nord_milano_neofascisti_anpi-388555972/
[811] For more on this battalion, see the Ukraine section of this report.
[812] The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report 2023. 2023 https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2023-fundamental-rights-report-2023_en_1.pdf
[813] https://www-voxdiritti-it.translate.goog/la-nuova-mappa-dellintolleranza-6/?_x_tr_sch=http&_x_tr_sl=auto&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=de
[814] https://www.ohchr.org/ru/statements-and-speeches/2022/01/hearing-italian-senates-extraordinary-commission-against
[815] https://moked.it/international/2019/11/04/news-italian-senate-approves-committee-antisemitism-hatred/
[816] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the 21st periodic report of Italy. August 2023 https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2FC%2FITA%2FCO%2F21-22&Lang=ru
[817] Statement of the International Independent Expert Mechanism to Advance Racial Justice and Equality in Law Enforcement following its visit to Italy. 10 May 2024 https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2024/05/italy-un-experts-racial-justice-law-enforcement-warn-racial-profiling-risk
[818] https://moked.it/blog/2024/02/09/osservatorio-antisemitismo-offendere-gli-ebrei-non-e-piu-tabu/
[819] https://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/cronaca/2024/01/09/piantedosi-dal-7-ottobre-135-episodi-di-antisemitismo_3e268e64-290f-435a-ba81-17f30dfb3703.html
[820] Jewish people’s experinces and perceptions of antisemitism. Third survey. The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. 2024. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2024-experiences-perceptions-antisemitism-survey_en.pdf
[822] European Agency for Fundamental Rights. Overview of Antisemitic Incidents Recorded in the EU in 2012-2022. http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2023-antisemitism-update-2012-2022_en.pdf
[823] Ibid.
[824] European Agency for Fundamental Rights. Overview of Antisemitic Incidents Recorded in the EU in 2011-2021. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2022-antisemitism-overview-2011-2021_en.pdf
[825] http://www.voxdiritti.it/nuovi-dati-della-mappa-dellintolleranza-in-4-mesi-cresce-lantisemitismo/
[826] Opinion of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities on Italy (5th monitoring cycle). Adopted on 5 October 2022, published on 13 February 2023. https://rm.coe.int/5th-op-italy-en/1680aa21a7
[827] Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Italy (fifth monitoring cycle). Adopted on 18 March 2016, published on 17 June 2016. https://rm.coe.int/fifth-report-on-italy/16808b5837
[828] Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee on the 6th periodic report of Italy. March 2017 https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2fC%2fITA%2fCO%2f6&Lang=ru
[829] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child on the combined 5th and 6th periodic reports of Italy. February 2019 https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CRC%2fC%2fITA%2fCO%2f5-6&Lang=ru
[830] Concluding observations of the Committee against Torture on the combined 5th and 6th periodic reports of Italy. November 2017 https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CAT%2fC%2fITA%2fCO%2f5-6&Lang=ru
[831] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 19th and 20th periodic reports of Italy. December 2016 https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2fC%2fITA%2fCO%2f19-20&Lang=ru
[832] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the 21st periodic report of Italy. August 2023 https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2FC%2FITA%2FCO%2F21-22&Lang=ru
[833] Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the 5th periodic report of Italy. September 2015 https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=E%2fC.12%2fITA%2fCO%2f5&Lang=ru
[834] Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the 6th periodic report of Italy. October 2022 https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=INT%2fCESCR%2fCOC%2fITA%2f50522&Lang=en
[835] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women on the 8th periodic report of Italy. February 2024 https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CEDAW%2FC%2FITA%2FCO%2F8&Lang=en
[836] The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report 2022. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2022-fundamental-rights-report-2022_en.pdf
[837] This term refers to a situation where a person is apprehended after illegally crossing a border and is expeditiously returned to a neighbouring country without taking into account the motives for crossing the border.
[838] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the 21st periodic report of Italy. August 2023 https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2FC%2FITA%2FCO%2F21-22&Lang=ru
[839] Follow-up letter from the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on Italy's report under the follow-up procedure dated 17 May 2018. CERD/95thsession/FU/AR/ks https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CERD/Shared%20Documents/ITA/INT_CERD_FUL_ITA_31253_E.pdf
[840] The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report 2023 https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2023-fundamental-rights-report-2023_en_1.pdf
[841] https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/02/italy-proposed-new-sea-rescue-law-puts-more-lives-risk-turk
[842] https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements-and-speeches/2024/01/we-need-stand-firm-promise-human-rights-turk-tells-italian-senate
[843] The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report 2023. http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2023-fundamental-rights-report-2023_en_1.pdf
[844] https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements/2021/10/statement-end-visit-italy-united-nations-working-group-business-and-human-rights?LangID=E&NewsID=27607
[845] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the 21st periodic report of Italy. August 2023 https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2FC%2FITA%2FCO%2F21-22&Lang=ru
[846] https://www.interfax.ru/world/921194, https://ria.ru/20230916/italiya-1896649724.html https://news.ru/europe/besporyadki-i-zhertvy-sredi-detej-kadry-migracionnogo-krizisa-na-lampeduze/
[847] Roma in 10 European Countries. Main results. Report by the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights 2022. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2022-roma-survey-2021-main-results_en.pdf
[848] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women on the 8th periodic report of Italy. February 2024 https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CEDAW%2FC%2FITA%2FCO%2F8&Lang=en
[849] Roma in 10 European Countries. Main results. Report by the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights 2022. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2022-roma-survey-2021-main-results_en.pdf
[850] Ibid.
[851] Opinion of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities on Italy (5th monitoring cycle). Adopted on 5 October 2022, published on 13 February 2023. https://rm.coe.int/5th-op-italy-en/1680aa21a7
[852] The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report 2023. http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2023-fundamental-rights-report-2023_en_1.pdf
[854] On the deplorable situation in the U.S. prison system, see the relevant section of the Joint Report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation on the Human Rights Situation in Specific Countries.
[855] Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the 6th periodic report of Italy. October 2022 https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=INT%2fCESCR%2fCOC%2fITA%2f50522&Lang=en
[856] Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the 6th periodic report of Italy. October 2022 https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=INT%2fCESCR%2fCOC%2fITA%2f50522&Lang=en
[857] In previous years, Canada had mostly abstained from voting on the draft resolution.
[858] Veteran who helped bring 30,000 Ukrainian refugees to Canada to be honoured in the U.K. The Globe and Mail. 8 May 2020.
[859] The SS Division Galicia was formed in 1943 from among the Ukrainian ultranationalists of the UPA, engaged in the extermination of civilians, mainly Russian, Polish and Jewish. the division is notoriously known for its punitive actions against the partisans who fought the Nazi occupation in Ukraine.
[860] Administrative structure created by the OUN led by Stepan Bandera to administer the territories of the Ukrainian SSR occupied by Nazi Germany.
[861] Winnipeg Art Gallery dropping Nazi-linked Ferdinand Eckhardt name. CBC News. 9 January 2024. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/ferdinand-eckhardt-winnipeg-art-gallery-nazi-connection-1.7077339
[862] Canada has apologized for honoring an ex-SS "Galicia" fighter. RBC. 5 October 2023.
https://amp.rbc.ru/rbcnews/politics/05/10/2023/651e04429a7947cb7d829a92
[863] Canada has refused to extradite war criminals on political grounds. TASS. 2 February 2024. https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/19890497
[864] News declassified details from report on Nazi war criminals released by Ottawa. The Globe and Mail. 1 February 2024.
[865] Veteran who helped bring 30,000 Ukrainian refugees to Canada to be honoured in the U.K. The Globe and Mail. 8 May 2020.
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-veteran-who-helped-bring-30000-ukrainian-refugees-to-canada-to-be/
[866] Why deny the Ukrainian Nazi connection? Ottawa Citizen. 27 October 2017.
https://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/defence-watch/why-deny-the-ukrainian-nazi-connection/ ;
Nazi monuments uncomfortable Canadian truth. Winnipeg Free Press. 2 November 2017.
[867] The memorial has been transferred to the Department of Canadian Heritage.
[868] Victims of communism memorial received donations honouring fascists, Nazi collaborators, according to website. CBC News. 23 July 2021.
https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/victims-communism-memorial-fascists-1.6112809
[869] 'Victims of Communism' Monument Unveiling Postponed. The Maple. 31 October 2023.
https://www.readthemaple.com/victims-of-communism-monument-unveiling-postponed/
[870] The Daugava Hawks organization was established after World War II in a prisoner-of-war camp in Belgium by former Latvian SS legionnaires.
[871] The 'Historical Memory' foundation published statistics on 154 Latvian SS legionnaires still alive. Historical Memory Foundation. 24 March 2022.
[872] Canada will continue to train the Ukrainian military personnel until 2026. TASS. 10 June 2023.
[873] Far-Right Group Made Its Home in Ukraine's Major Western Military Training Hub. Report. September 2021.
https://www.illiberalism.org/far-right-group-made-its-home-in-ukraines-major-western-military-training-hub/ FSWC Calls for Investigation After Ukrainian Neo-Nazis Brag About Receiving Training from Canada's Military. 18 October 2021. https://www.fswc.ca/news/fswc-calls-for-investigation-after-ukrainian-neo-nazis-brag-about-receiving-training-from-canadas-military
[874] Trudeau shouted a Bandera slogan during a photo shoot at a conference on Ukraine. TASS. 16 June 2024.
[875] Russia protests to Canada over envoy's remarks about dead blogger. Reuters. 7 April 2023. https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-protests-canada-over-envoys-remarks-about-dead-blogger-2023-04-07/
[876] Report of the Special Rapporteur to the UN Human Rights Council on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and racial intolerance prepared pursuant to General Assembly resolution 73/262 in relation to reparations for racial discrimination rooted in slavery and colonialism A/74/321. August 2019.
[877] Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of Indigenous Peoples following a visit to Canada, which was conducted from 1 to 10 March 2023. Published on 24 July 2023.
https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/g23/139/14/pdf/g2313914.pdf?token=uL0mo6ufmzz5kjHrG6&fe=true
[878] Canada's apology came too late for my grandfather, stolen and abused aged eight. The Guardian. 2 February 2024.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/02/sons-of-freedom-canada-apology-violence-trauma
[879] Prime minister apologizes for anti‑Black racism experienced by No. 2 Construction Battalion. CBC News. 9 July 2022.
[880] More than 13,200 Canadians died by assisted suicide in 2022 – 30% more than previous year. The National Post. 25 October 2023. https://nationalpost.com/news/maid-assisted-suicide-in-canada
[881] Fourth annual report on Medical Assistance in Dying in Canada 2022. October 2023.
[882] It is a scary thing to live: Canada's euthanasia surges. Izvestia. 19 June 2023.
[883] The dark history of Canada's Food Guide: How experiments on Indigenous children shaped nutrition policy. CBC. 5 July 2021.
[884] Indigenous people sue over alleged Canadian secret medical experiment. The Guardian. 26 February 2024.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/26/medical-experiment-indigenous-canadians-lawsuit
[885] The Rise of Ideologically Motivated Violent Extremism in Canada. Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security. June 2022.
https://www.ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/441/SECU/Reports/RP11868343/securp06/securp06-e.pdf
[886] Far-right, anti-fascist protesters temporarily shut Quebec border crossing. CBC. 30 September 2017.
https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/far-right-antifa-clash-across-canada-1.4315053
[887] A far-right racist terrorist organization.
[888] White nationalist mayoral candidate getting Hamilton voters list is frightening, say anti-hate groups. CBC. 3 September 2022.
https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/hamilton/paul-fromm-mayor-election-candidate-1.6563269
[889] Cult Recruiter, Neo-Nazi, Personal Trainer: Meet Ottawa's Ben Mockler. Canadian Anti-Hate Network. 16 January 2023.
https://www.antihate.ca/cult_recruiter_neo_nazi_personal_trainer_meet_ottawa_ben_mockler
[890] Active Clubs: A new far-rights threat to democratic elections. Al Jazeera. 2 May 2024.
https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2024/5/2/active-clubs-a-new-far-right-threat-to-democratic-elections
[891] Canadian military not doing enough to detect, prevent extremism in the ranks: report. CBC News.
25 April 2022.
https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/military-report-racism-1.6429794#:~:text=A%20new%20report%20found%20Canada's,isn't%20part%20of%20it
[892] RCMP conduct raids in central Quebec targeting Atomwaffen Division neo-Nazi group. CBC News. 16 June 2022. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/quebec-raid-atomwaffen-division-neo-nazi-group-1.6491005
[893] Military, RCMP investigating Winnipeg neo-Nazi army reserves leader. Winnipeg Free Press. 19 August 2019.
[894] Individual associated with Atomwaffen Division charged with terrorism and hate propaganda. Royal Canadian Mounted Police. 5 July 2023.
[895] Ottawa man charged with promoting neo-Nazi terrorist group released on bail. CBC. 31 August 2023.
https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/ottawa-man-charged-promoting-neo-nazi-group-granted-bail-1.6952813
[896] 2 Ontario men accused of belonging to neo-Nazi terrorism group. Global News. 8 December 2023.
https://globalnews.ca/news/10157791/ontario-terrorism-charges/amp/
[897] Quebec judge should recognize Nazism led to Holocaust, legal expert and Jewish group say. The Globe and Mail. 13 July 2022. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/article-quebec-judge-should-recognize-nazism-led-to-holocaust-legal-expert-and/
[898] Neo-Nazi blogger Gabriel Sohier Chaput will be freed while he appeals sentence. The Gazette. 27 October 2023.
https://montrealgazette.com/news/crime/neo-nazi-blogger-gabriel-sohier-chaput-will-be-freed-while-he-appeals-sentence
[899] B'Nai Brith Canada. Annual Audit of Antisemitic Incidents 2023. Issued in 2024.
https://www.bnaibrith.ca/antisemitic-incidents/
[900] Jewish group demands resignation of Montreal anti-racism commissioner. Montreal Gazette.14 November 2023. https://montrealgazette.com/news/local-news/jewish-group-demands-resignation-of-montreal-anti-racism-commissioner
[901] Synagogue and Jewish community centre in Montreal suburb of DDO hit by Molotov cocktails. CBC News. 7 November 2023. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/jewish-synagogue-incendiary-device-1.7020910
[902] Police investigating shots fired overnight at 2 Jewish schools in Montreal. CBC News. 9 November 2023. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/jewish-schools-doors-shot-1.7023759
[903] Shots fired at Toronto Jewish girls school, police investigating. CBC News. 25 May 2024. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/police-suspects-gunfire-jewish-girls-school-1.7215118
[904] FSWC Sharply Denounces Latest Antisemitic Outrage as Two Toronto Synagogues Attacked. 1 July 2024.
[905] Danielle Kubes: Why some Jews are giving up on Canada. The National Post. 27 January 2024.
https://nationalpost.com/opinion/why-some-jews-are-giving-up-on-canada
[906] Canada's new human-rights chief denies BDS support, ant-Jewish posts. JNS. 26 June 2024. https://www.jns.org/canadas-new-human-rights-chief-denies-bds-support-anti-jewish-posts/
[907] New head of Canadian Human Rights Commission investigated over allegations of anti-Israel activity. The National Post. 25 June 2024. https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/birju-dattani-canadian-human-rights-commission
[908] Anti-Black Racism, Sexism and Systemic Discrimination in the Canadian Human Rights Commission. The Standing Senate Committee on Human Rights. December 2023. https://sencanada.ca/content/sen/committee/441/RIDR/Reports/Report_SS-1_CHRC_e.pdf
[909] Canadian Human Rights Commission faces downgrade as international body launches review. CBC. 10 June 2024. https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canadian-human-rights-commission-united-nations-1.7230631
[910] CSIS targeting of Canadian Muslims reveals the importance of addressing institutional Islamophobia. The Conversation. 22 February 2023.
[911] Islamophobia in Canada: Four mindsets indicate negativity in nationwide, most intense in Quebec. Angus Reid Institute. 13 March 2023.
[912] Combatting Hate: Islamophobia and its impact on Muslims in Canada. Standing Senate Committee On Human Rights. November 2023. https://sencanada.ca/content/sen/committee/441/RIDR/reports/Islamophobia_FINAL_e.pdf
[913] In Vancouver, Jewish and Palestinian restaurants try to find a new normal. The Globe and Mail. 23 November 2023. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/british-columbia/article-in-vancouver-jewish-and-palestinian-restaurants-try-to-find-a-new/
[914] Toronto man facing hate-related charges after alleged assaults on Muslims. The Globe and Mail. 19 November 2023. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/article-toronto-man-facing-hate-related-charges-after-alleged-assaults-on/
[915] "Notwithstanding clause", article 33 of the 1982 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
[916] Hearings on constitutionality of Quebec's secularism law underway in Court of Appeal. CBC News. 7 November 2023. https://www/cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/bill-21-appeal-begins-1.6640434
[917] Appeal Court upholds Quebec law that bars teachers, police from wearing religious symbols.
29 February 2024. https://www.cbc.ca/amp/1.7128447
[918] Concluding observations of the Committee against Torture on the 7th periodic report of Canada. November 2018. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CAT%2fC%2fCAN%2fCO%2f7&Lang=en;
[919] Racism remains an ugly reality for many in Canada: For women, it's even worse. Talent Canada. 4 March 2024.
https://www.talentcanada.ca/racism-remains-an-ugly-reality-for-many-in-canada-for-women-its-even-worse/
[920] Report of the Working Group of Experts on People of African Descent to the 74th session of the UN General Assembly. A/74/274. 2 August 2019. https://undocs.org/ru/A/74/274
[921] Ibid.
[922] Ibid.
[923] Report of the Working Group of Experts on People of African Descent on its mission to Canada. 16 August 2017. https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G17/239/62/PDF/G1723962.pdf
[924] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 21st to 23rd periodic reports of Canada. August 2017.
[925] Police-reported hate crime in Canada 2022. Statistics Canada. 2024.
https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/240313/dq240313b-eng.htm
[926] Hate crimes in Toronto up nearly 55% over last year: police. CBC News. 24 June 2024. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/toronto-hate-crime-stats-1.7245301
[927] Anti-Asian hate on the rise in Canada: survey. CTV News. 13 July 2023.
[928] A Year of Racist Attacks: Anti-Asian Racism Across Canada. One Year Into the Covid-19 Pandemic. Report. 23 March 2021.
[929] Report on anti-Asian hate an urgent call to action, say authors. CBC. 14 May 2024.
https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/anti-asian-hate-report-1.7199599
[930] Canada's Anti-Racism Strategy 2024 - 2028. https://www.canada.ca/en/canadian-heritage/services/combatting-racism-discrimination/canada-anti-racism-strategy.html
[931] Government of Canada's new strategy on racism fails to address real issues faced by federal sector workers. Public Service Alliance of Canada. 26 June 2024.
https://psacunion.ca/government-canadas-new-strategy-racism-fails
[932] In Montreal, more than 1,500 people participate in the "Immortal Regiment." TASS. 10 May 2024.
[933] The Russian Embassy in Canada honored the memory of the heroes of the Great Patriotic War. TASS. 9 May 2024. https://tass.ru/obschestvo/20756425
[934] According to the 2021 census, about 1,800,000 million people belong to Canada's indigenous peoples, which is about 5 per cent of the country's population.
[935] Under the Indian Act of 1876, Indian status was passed only through the paternal line. The Act required women who married British (or other Europeans) to live off the reservation. Children born of mixed marriages did not inherit Indian status.
The Act underwent several amendments in 1985, 2010, and 2017.
[936] Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of Indigenous Peoples following a visit to Canada, which was conducted from 1 to 10 March 2023. Published on 24 July 2023.
https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/g23/139/14/pdf/g2313914.pdf?token=uL0mo6ufmzz5kjHrG6&fe=true
[937] Ending long-term drinking water advisories. Indigenous Services Canada. January 2024.
[938] The final and more comprehensive report will be presented to the United Nations Human Rights Council in September 2024.
[939] End of Mission Statement by the Special Rapporteur on the human rights to safe drinking water and sanitation, Mr Pedro Arrojo-Agudo at the conclusion of the country visit to Canada. 19 April 2024
[940] End of Mission Statement by the Special Rapporteur on the human rights to safe drinking water and sanitation, Mr Pedro Arrojo-Agudo at the conclusion of the country visit to Canada. 19 April 2024.
[941] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child on the combined 5th and 6th periodic reports of Canada. June 2022.
[942] Indigenous rights collide with $35B Western Canada pipeline expansion. Global News. 22 November 2023. https://globalnews.ca/news/10103531/indigenous-rights-collide-with-35b-western-canada-pipeline-expansion/
[943] Federal advocate calls Inuit housing conditions a "staggering failure" of government. CBC News. 27 November 2023. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/inuit-housing-crisis-houle-report-1.7041217
[944] Federal government failing Indigenous communities on housing, policing: AG report. CBC News. 19 March 2024. https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/auditor-general-indigenous-policing-housing-trade-1.7148255
[945] First Nations leaders demand an end to short-staffing at nursing stations in remote communities. The Globe and Mail. 3 April 2023.
[946] The Scars that We Carry: Forced and Coerced Sterilization of Persons in Canada Part II. Report. Senate Committee on Human Rights. July 2022.
https://sencanada.ca/content/sen/committee/441/RIDR/reports/2022-07-14_ForcedSterilization_E.pdf
[947] Forced and Coerced Sterilization of Persons in Canada Part I. Report. Senate Committee on Human Rights. June 2021.
https://sencanada.ca/content/sen/committee/432/RIDR/reports/2021-06-03_ForcedSterilization_E.pdf
[948] At least 22 Indigenous women underwent forced sterilization in Quebec from 1980-2019: report. CBC News. 25 November 2022. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/report-uncovers-forced-sterilization-in-quebec-1.6663340
[949] She was sterilized without her consent at 14. Now she wants the practice made a crime. CBC News.
13 September 2023. https://www.cbc.ca/radio/whitecoat/she-was-sterilized-without-her-consent-at-14-now-she-wants-the-practice-made-a-crime-1.6450647
[950] S‑250. An Act to amend the Criminal Code (sterilization procedures). https://www.parl.ca/legisinfo/en/bill/44-1/s-250
[951] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women on the combined 8th and 9th periodic reports of Canada. November 2016.
[952] Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee on the 6th periodic report of Canada. July 2015.
[953] Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the 6th periodic report of Canada. February 2016.
[954] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 21st to 23rd periodic reports of Canada. September 2017.
[955] Concluding observations of the Committee against Torture on the 7th periodic report of Canada. November 2018.
[956] Report of the inquiry concerning Canada of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women under article 8 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. CEDAW/C/OP.8/CAN/1. 30 March 2015.
[957] Reclaiming power and place. National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls. Volume 1. https://www.mmiwg-ffada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Supplementary-Report_Genocide.pdf
Reclaiming power and place. National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls. Volume 2. https://www.mmiwg-ffada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Final_Report_Vol_2_Quebec_Report-1.pdf
[958] Trudeau accepts Indigenous inquiry's finding of genocide. the Globe and Mail. 4 June 2019.
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/british-columbia/article-trudeau-accepts-indigenous-inquirys-finding-of-genocide. Trudeau says deaths and disappearances of Indigenous women and girls amount to genocide. CBC News. 4 June 2019. https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/trudeau-mmiwg-genocide-1.5161681
[959] 5 years after MMIWG inquiry's final report, former commissioners still waiting for progress. CBC. 3 June 2024. https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/national-inquiry-mmiwg-final-report-fifth-anniversary-1.7221433
[960] Canada, Manitoba to develop Red Dress Alert for missing Indigenous women and girls. 6 May 2024.
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/article-canada-manitoba-to-develop-red-dress-alert-for-missing-indigenous/
[961] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child on the combined 5th and 6th periodic reports of Canada. June 2022.
[962] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 21st to 23rd periodic reports of Canada. September 2017.
[963] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 21st to 23rd periodic reports of Canada. August 2017.
[964] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child on the combined 5th and 6th periodic reports of Canada. June 2022.
[965] Quebec judge authorizes class action lawsuit alleging abuse at Indigenous day schools. The Globe and Mail. 25 December 2023.
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/article-quebec-judge-authorizes-class-action-lawsuit-alleging-abuse-at/
[966] Foster‑care system maintains brutality of residential schools, Natuashish woman tells inquiry. CBC News.
5 December 2023.
https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/newfoundland-labrador/inquiry-natuashish-1.7048340
[967] Report of the UN Human Rights Council Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Victoria Tauli‑Corpuz, in accordance with the HRC resolution 33/12. A/74/149. https://undocs.org/en/A/74/149
[968] Correctional Investigator Releases Updated Findings on the State of Indigenous Corrections in Canada: National Indigenous Organizations Issue Statements of Support. Office of the Correctional Investigator. 2 November 2023. https://oci-bec.gc.ca/en/content/correctional-investigator-releases-updated-findings-state-indigenous-corrections-canada
[969] Indigenous People in Federal Custody Surpasses 30%. Office of the Correctional Investigator. 21 January 2020. https://www.oci-bec.gc.ca/cnt/comm/press/press20200121-eng.aspx
[970] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 21st to 23rd periodic reports of Canada. September 2017.
[971] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child on the combined 5th and 6th periodic reports of Canada. June 2022.
[972] Race and food insecurity. Foodshare. November 2019. https://foodshare.net/custom/uploads/2019/11/PROOF_factsheet_press_FINAL.6.pdf
[973] A "sobering, disturbing crisis within our prisons": audit questions CSC security assessment that continues to mark Indigenous, Black inmates as higher risk. The Hill Times. 31 May 2022.
[974] Correctional Investigator Releases Updated Findings on the State of Indigenous Corrections in Canada: National Indigenous Organizations Issue Statements of Support. Office of the Correctional Investigator. 2 November 2023.
[975] Mi'kmaw harvesters say DFO officers took shoes, phones and left them stranded. APTN National News. 2 April 2024.
https://www.aptnnews.ca/national-news/mikmaw-harvesters-say-dfo-officers-took-shoes-phones-and-left-them-stranded/
[976] Left to freeze by Canada police, Darrell Night exposed their deadly 'starlight tours'. The Guardian. 25 April 2023.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/apr/25/darrell-night-who-exposed-canada-police-freezing-deaths-scandal-dies-at-56
[977] In previous years, the delegation of Cyprus abstained in the voting on that draft resolution.
[978] Apoel fans march to Ledra crossing, demand all checkpoints to be closed. Cyprus Mail. 5 March 2020.
[979] KISA. 6 January 2024.https://kisa.org.cy/kisa-offices-bombing/
Cyprus: 41 organizations call for protection of Cypriot civil society. FIDH. 13 February 2024.
[980] Migrants in Cyprus fear fresh violence after a wave of racist far-right attacks. Le Monde. 27 September 2023.
[981] Report to the Government of Cyprus on the visit to Cyprus carried out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) from 9 to 17 May 2023. Published on 17 May 2024.
[982] Report to the Government of Cyprus on the visit to Cyprus carried out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) from 9 to 17 May 2023. Published on 17 May 2023. https://rm.coe.int/1680afb22c
[983] Report to the Government of Cyprus on the visit to Cyprus carried out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) from 7 to 9 November 2022. Published on 13 July 2023. https://rm.coe.int/1680abeddb
[984] The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report. 2024.
https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2024-fundamental-rights-report-2024_en.pdf
ΦΩΤΟ: Νέα ντοκουμέντα από ταξίδια αστυνομικών και μεταναστών στον Λίβανο. Alpha News. 1 August 2023.
[985] The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report. 2022.
https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2022-fundamental-rights-report-2022_en.pdf
[986] United Nations Secretary-General's Report on the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus. 3 January 2024.
[987] Cyprus suspends asylum applications for Syrians as arrivals rise. Al Jazeera. 14 April 2024.
[988] The President of Cyprus said that the European Union would strike a deal with Lebanon to reduce the influx of refugees. TASS. 21 April 2024.
[989] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child on the combined 5th and 6th periodic reports of Cyprus. June 2022. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CRC%2fC%2fSVK%2fCO%2f3-5&Lang=en
[990] Greek Cypriots attack a mosque on Greece's national independence day. TRT World. 2021.
[991] Arson attack at Limassol mosque. Cyprus Mail. 26 August 2023.
https://cyprus-mail.com/2023/08/26/arson-attack-at-limassol-mosque/
[992] Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Cyprus (6th monitoring cycle). Adopted on 6 December 2022, published on 7 March 2023.
[993] Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee on the 5th periodic report of Cyprus. July 2023. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2FC%2FCYP%2FCO%2F5&Lang=ru
[994] Fifth Opinion of the Advisory Committee of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities on Cyprus. Adopted on 7 November 2019, published on 28 May 2020.
[995] Collective stigma and discrimination against Roma persists. Cyprus Mail. 8 April 2022.
https://cyprus-mail.com/2022/04/08/collective-stigma-and-discrimination-against-roma-persists/
[996] Cyprus agrees to extradite Russian national Petrov to the US, a source said. RIA Novosti. 25 April 2024. https://ria.ru/20240425/ekstraditsiya-1942257900.html
[997] Russian national Petrov detained in Cyprus, was extradited to the US. TASS. 9 August 2024.
[998] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/10122022-premer-latvii-rasskazal-kakie-strany-bolshe-vsekh-postradali-ot-antirossiyskikh-sanktsiy/
[999] A detailed description of the degradation of the economic situation and its influence on the rights of the Latvian residents is included in a joint report of the Foreign Ministries of Russian and Belarus on human rights situation in certain countries.
[1000] Accomplices to the Nazi crimes. Ninety-six living veterans of the SS Latvian Legion. A joint report of the Historical Memory foundation and the Foundation for support and development of the Jewish culture, traditions, education and science. Moscow, 2020. In Russian http://historyfoundation.ru/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Легионеры_4_light.pdf
[1002] Herberts Cukurs (1900 – 1965). In July 1941, he joined, as a volunteer, the Latvian Auxiliary Police and, subsequently, the punitive Arajs Kommando unit. He participated in mass murders of Latvian Jews in the Riga ghetto and in the Rumbula forest where 25,000 people were killed, including women and children. There were numerous testimonies from the witnesses stating that Herberts Cukurs shot down Soviet prisoners of war. Not long before the end of World War II, he left Latvia and, together with his family, emigrated to Brazil He was killed by the Israeli Special Services in Uruguay in 1965.
[1003] Viktors Bernhard Arajs (1910 – 1988). In 1941, before the main Nazi forces entered Riga, he established the so-called Arajs Kommando (Arajs Team) which had about 400-500 members and arrested Soviet activists and did Jewish pogroms, and since mid-July 1941 took part in mass shootings in Bikernieki and Rumbula forests, the elimination of the Riga ghetto and other acts of terror. His unit, that later became part of the Latvian Auxiliary Security Police and the SS Security Service (SD), repeatedly participated in mass executions and punitive operations, including the Nazi's Winter Magic operation in February-March 1943 on the border of Latvia and Vitebsk region, as well as in Belarus, Pskov and Kalinin regions of the Russian Soviet Republic. In 1944 he was the commander of 32nd regiment of 15th Waffen Grenadier Division of the SS on the Eastern Front. In February-March 1995 he was in command of 1st battalion of the 34th regiment of the 15th Waffen Grenadier (1st Latvian) Division of the SS. He died in prison in Kassel, FRG, where he had been serving a life sentence since 1980.
[1004] The web-site of the Saeima of the Republic of Latvia: https://www.saeima.lv/lv/aktualitates/saeimas-zinas/30326-aizliedz-georga-lensu-izmantosanu-publiskos-pasakumos
[1005] The web-site of the Saeima of the Republic of Latvia: https://www.saeima.lv/lv/aktualitates/saeimas-zinas/30860-publiskos-pasakumos-aizliedz-izmantot-militaru-agresiju-un-kara-noziegumus-identificejosa-stilistika-izmantotus-simbolus
[1006] The web-site of the Saeima of the Republic of Latvia: https://www.saeima.lv/lv/aktualitates/saeimas-zinas/30909-sogad-9-maija-latvija-piemines-krievijas-agresijas-ukraina-upurus
[1007] https://lv.sputmknews.ru/20220510/v-latvii-9-maya-byli-zaderzhany-35-chelovek-i-nachato-49-ugolovnykh-protsessov-21757072.html
[1008] https://lv.sputniknews.ru/20230317/viktoriya-matule-eto-ya-administrator-antifashistov-pribaltiki-24472740.html
[1009] https://www.saeima.lv/lv/aktualitates/saeimas-zinas/31022-saeima-aptur-latvijas-un-krievijas-divpuseja-liguma-darbibu-attieciba-uz-memorialajam-buvem-un-pieminekliem
[1011] https://mixnews.lv/latviya/2022/05/03/eto-zanoza-v-dushe-latyshey-levits-vyskazalsya-za-snos-pamyatnika-v-pardugave/
[1012] https://rus.tvnet.lv/7591608/vike-feyberga-tak-nazyvaemyy-pamyatnik-pobedy-vsegda-byl-pozornym-stolbom
[1013] https://rus.delfi.lv/news/daily/latvia/karinsh-demontazh-pamyatnika-sovetskoj-armii-zasluga-vseh-zhitelej.d?id=54676918
[1014] The account of Minister of Foreign Affairs of Latvia Edgars Rinkevics in X (former Twitter): https://twitter.com/edgarsrinkevics/status/1561758450819932162?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1561758450819932162%7Ctwgr%5Ed4ee205f51e54b8cf1869317465444b78207c4cl%7Ctwcon%5Esl_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fbb.lv%2Fstatja%2Fpolitika%2F2022%2F08%2F22%2Fsnos-pamyatnika-osvoboditelyam-glava-mid-latvii-predupredil-inostrancev
[1015] https://www.saeima.lv/lv/aktaalitates/saeimas-zinas/31190-saeima-pienem-likumu-padomju-un-nacistisko-rezimu-slavinosu-objektu-demontazai
[1016] A list of memorial sites glorifying the Soviet and Nazi regimes that are to be dismantled on the territory of the Republic of Latvia : https://likumi.lv.ta.id/334177-latvijas-republikas-teritorija-esoso-demontejamo-padomju-un-nacistisko-rezimu-slavinoso-objektu-saraksts
[1017] https://www.rubaltic.ru/article/politika-i-obshchestvo/20210316-latviya-priznala-aktom-patriotizma-oskvernenie-mogil-sovetskikh-voennykh/
[1019] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/29102022-v-latvii-razrushili-chast-memoriala-kurgan-druzhby-na-granitse-s-rossiey-i-belarusyu-video/
[1020] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/24112022-latviya-razrushila-peshekhodnyy-most-u-kurgana-druzhby-na-styke-granits-rossii-i-belarusi/
[1021] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/31102022-v-latvii-snesli-dva-pamyatnika-sovetskim-voinam-vopreki-protestam-zhiteley/
[1024] Ibid.
[1025] https://www.rubaltic.ru/article/politika-i-obshchestvo/20221125-potomki-kollaborantov-prodolzhayut-perepisyvat-istoriyu-pribaltiki/
[1026] https://pravfond.ru/press-tsentr/otstranennogo-po-politicheskim-motivam-mera-rezekne-bartashevicha-obvinyayut-v-dvukh-prestupleniyakh/?sphrase_id=4883
[1027] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/20112022-v-latvii-oskvernili-bratskoe-zakhoronenie-sovetskikh-soldat-/
[1028] https://lv.sputniknews.ru/20220511/v-poslke-tome-snesli-pamyatnik-legendarnomu-latyshskomu-razvedchiku-21766017.html
[1029] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/14112022-v-minkultury-latvii-nazvali-chislo-snesennykh-sovetskikh-pamyatnikov/
[1030] https://iz.ru/1597381/viktor-nedelin/nechestivoe-plemia-v-latvii-khotiat-raskopat-mogily-sovetskikh-soldat
[1031] https://iz.ru/1597381/viktor-nedelin/nechestivoe-plemia-v-latvii-khotiat-raskopat-mogily-sovetskikh-soldat
[1033] https://iz.ru/1597381/viktor-nedelin/nechestivoe-plemia-v-latvii-khotiat-raskopat-mogily-sovetskikh-soldat
[1034] https://iz.ru/1520664/2023-05-30/v-rige-zaiavili-o-perevozke-pamiatnika-pushkinu-iz-kronvaldskogo-parka
[1036] https://baltija.eu/2024/07/18/v-latvii-obsuzhdayut-snos-sovetskih-pamyatnikov-raspolozhennyh-na-soldatskih-mogilah/
[1037] https://lv.sputniknews.ru/20240704/vlasti-pribaltiki-doveli-russkikh-do-partizanskoy-voyny-28238329.html
[1038] https://lv.sputniknews.ru/20220511/v-poslke-tome-snesli-pamyatnik-legendarnomu-latyshskomu-razvedchiku-21766017.html
[1040] https://lv.sputniknews.ru/20220804/ne-razbirat-po-chastyam-no-i-ne-vzryvat-kak-budut-snosit-pamyatnik-osvoboditelyam-22415313.html
[1041] https://nashrezekne.lv/snos-pamyatnikov-rossiya-obyavila-v-rozysk-bolee-60-deputatov-sejma-latvii/
[1042] On recommendations to officials leaving Latvia in connection with activities initiated by the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation:https://www.mfa.gov.lv/lv/jaunums/par-rekomendacijam-amatpersonam-celosanai-arpus-latvijas-saistiba-ar-krievijas-izmeklesanas-komisijas-uzsaktajam-darbibam
[1043] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/12092023-sk-rossii-zaochno-obvinil-grazhdan-stran-baltii-i-polshi-v-oskvernenii-sovetskikh-pamyatnikov/
[1044] The General Prosecutor's Office of Belarus is to summon living veterans of the Latvian SS legion for interrogations. Historical Memory Foundation. 24 June 2021. http://historyfoundation.ru/2021/06/24/genprokuratura-belarusi-vyzovet-na-dopros-nyne-zhivyh-veteranov-latyshskogo-legiona-ss/
[1045] Accomplices to Nazi crimes. 96 veterans of the SS Latvian Legion who are still alive. The joined report of the "Historical Memory" Foundation and the Foundation for the Support and Development of Jewish Culture, Traditions, Education, and Science. Moscow, 2020. http://historyfoundation.ru/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Легионеры_4_light.pdf
[1046] Accomplices to Nazi crimes. 96 veterans of the SS Latvian Legion who are still alive. The joined report of the "Historical Memory" Foundation and the Foundation for the Support and Development of Jewish Culture, Traditions, Education, and Science. Moscow, 2020. http://historyfoundation.ru/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Легионеры_4_light.pdf
[1047] Janis Cirulis (1910-1979). As a part of "auxiliary self-defence forces" of Latvia, he participated in mass murders of civillians in 1941. In 1942, as part of a special unit of the Security Police and the Security Service, he was sent to Novgorod region (oblast) near the village of Zhestyanaya Gorka, where he continued to commit mass murders. Evidence of his guilt in these crimes was gathered in the Soviet Union in the course of a criminal investigation. In 1944, he was a company commander, then battalion commander of the 34th Regiment of the 15th Latvian Waffen-SS Division. According the CIA documents, declassified under the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act, he worked for the U.S. Intelligence.
[1050] The Saeima to establish several new Days of Remembrance: https://www.saeima.lv/lv/aktualitates/saeimas-zinas/29929-saeima-nosaka-vairakas-jaunas-atceres-dienas
[1051] https://www.saeima.lv/lv/aktualitates/saeimas-zinas/30762-inara-murniece-lestene-godinam-un-pieminam-ikvienu-latviesu-karaviru-kurs-cinijies-par-brivu-latviju
[1052] https://lv.sputniknews.ru/20240316/v-rige-sostoyalos-traditsionnoe-shestvie-v-chest-legionerov-ss-27498884.html
[1053] https://iz.ru/1666115/2024-03-16/v-posolstve-rf-zaiavili-o-snizhenii-podderzhki-marsha-ss-v-latvii
[1054] https://baltija.eu/2024/03/16/shestvie-legionerov-flagi-latvii-estonii-ykrainy-pesni-nacblok-i-zaderjaniia/
[1055] Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Latvia (fifth monitoring cycle). Adopted on 4 December 2018. Published on 5 March 2019.
[1056] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/29112022-v-latvii-gorodskuyu-novogodnyuyu-yelku-ukrasili-svastikami/
[1057] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/14122017-zhiteli-latvii-v-preddverii-prazdnikov-pozhalovalis-na-svastiki/
[1058] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/18042022-v-rige-arestovali-russkikh-moryakov-za-popytku-zakrasit-svastiku-na-flage-rf/
[1059] https://www.pravfond.ru/press-tsentr/sud-v-latvii-priovoril-k-uslovnomu-sroku-za-post-v-sotsseti-uchitelya-russkogo-yazyka-i-literatury-a/
[1062] https://baltija.eu/2023/09/14/alla-berezovskaya-proshlo-pyat-let-so-dnya-aresta-pensionera-eks-polkovnika-mvd-latvii-olega-buraka/?ysclid=lmt468e4bl916931588
[1063] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/30012023-v-minkultury-latvii-nazvali-chislo-snesennykh-sovetskikh-pamyatnikov/
[1065] https://lv.sputniknews.ru/20240402/viktoriya-matule-eto-ya-administrator-antifashistov-pribaltiki-27619496.html
[1066] https://www.rubaltic.ru/article/politika-i-obshchestvo/20230911-shag-k-spravedlivosti-litovskie-sudi-otvetyat-za-politicheskie-repressii/
[1067] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/16032024-litva-na-god-prodlila-sanktsii-protiv-rossiyan-i-belorusov/
[1068] https://tass.ru/obschestvo/18838935
[1069] https://baltija.eu/2023/05/22/podderzhavshie-putina-latyshi-osuzhdeny-i-poluchili-solidnye-shtrafy/
[1070] https://lv.sputniknews.ru/20220322/vrag-gosbezopasnosti-v-rige-arestovan-russkiy-voennyy-bloger-kirill-fedorov-21030768.html
[1071] https://pravfond.ru/press-tsentr/stati/proshu-politicheskogo-ubezhishcha-v-rossii-iz-latvii-sbezhal-eshche-odin-aktivist/
[1072] https://lv.sputniknews.ru/20220915/iz-rigi-sbezhal-russkiy-aktivist---v-latvii-ego-zhdala-tyurma-22794139.html
[1073] https://lv.sputniknews.ru/20221013/vzyal-sumku-i-uekhal-pochemu-russkiy-muzykant-sbezhal-v-rossiyu-23041993.html
[1075] https://lv.sputniknews.ru/20221229/iz-avstrii-v-belarus-pochemu-grazhdanka-latvii-sbezhala-iz-evropy-23766629.html
[1076] https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2022/06/03/byvshego-deputata-municipaliteta-rigi-zaderzhali-za-prorossiyskie-posty-v-socseti
[1077] https://lv.sputniknews.ru/20231110/v-latvii-osmelivshiesya-prodemonstrirovat-simpatiyu-rf-popadayut-v-ruki-sgb-delo-pankratova-26506309.html
[1078] https://rg.ru/2023/02/10/grazhdanku-latvii-tatianu-andriec-arestovali-za-prorossijskie-vzgliady.html
[1079] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/04082023-sud-v-rige-prodlil-srok-soderzhaniya-pod-strazhey-aktivistke-tatyane-andriets/, https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/05062023-arestovannoy-v-latvii-aktivistke-andriets-uzhestochili-obvinenie/
[1082] https://pravfond.ru/press-tsentr/obvinyaemogo-v-shpionazhe-sergeya-sidorova-vypuskayut-iz-latyshskoy-tyurmy/
[1083] https://www.pravfond.ru/press-tsentr/latviyskaya-prokuratura-predyavila-obvinenie-avtoram-telegram-kanala-antifashistam-pribaltiki/
[1084] https://baltija.eu/2023/11/09/byvshego-deputata-sejma-latvii-yanisa-adamsonsa-prigovorili-k-85-goda-lisheniya-svobody-po-obvineniyu-v-shpionazhe-v-polzu-rf/
[1085] https://lv.sputniknews.ru/20230615/v-poslke-tome-snesli-pamyatnik-legendarnomu-latyshskomu-razvedchiku-25293720.html
[1086] https://telegra.ph/Rossiya-ya-s-toboj---kak-prizyvy-k-miru-i-dobrososedstvu-obernulis-dlya-pozhiloj-latyshki-tyurmoj-Istoriya-odnoj-obychnoj-no-och-04-12
[1087] https://www.pravfond.ru/press-tsentr/rizhskiy-sud-prigovoril-antifashistku-elenu-kreyle-k-1-godu-lisheniya-svobody-uslovno/
[1090] https://pravfond.ru/press-tsentr/latyshskaya-prokuratura-trebuet-3-5-goda-realnogo-zaklyucheniya-dlya-eleny-kreyle-za-installyatsii-v/
[1092] https://lv.sputniknews.ru/20230925/admin-gruppy-v-sotssetyakh-poluchil-v-latvii-realnyy-srok-za-post-v-opravdanie-svo-na-ukraine-26091756.html
[1093] https://www.pravfond.ru/press-tsentr/sluzhba-gosbezopasnosti-latvii-nachala-ugolovnyy-protsess-protiv-byvshego-evrodeputata-andreya-mamyk/
[1094] https://baltija.eu/2024/07/06/politicheskaya-uznicza-latvii-svetlana-nikolaeva-moya-blagodarnost-ne-imeet-granicz/
[1095] https://baltija.eu/2024/04/03/byvshego-deputata-parlamenta-latvii-gloriyu-grevczovu-obyavili-v-rozysk/
[1096] https://baltija.eu/2024/04/23/eks-kandidat-v-deputaty-parlamenta-latvii-inga-tuhbatova-oficzialno-obyavlena-v-rozysk/
[1097] https://pravfond.ru/press-tsentr/kandidat-v-deputaty-parlamenta-latvii-inga-tukhbatova-predstanet-pered-sudom-za-shpionazh-v-polzu-ro/
[1098] https://baltija.eu/2024/04/10/zhitel-rigi-valerij-lazarev-osuzhden-na-2-goda-za-napadenie-na-demonstranta-naczionalista-v-2022-godu/
[1099] https://lv.sputniknews.ru/20240426/za-chto-zatknuli-rot-latviyskomu-blogeru-mataevu-27790269.html
[1101] https://pravfond.ru/press-tsentr/zhitelyu-latyshskogo-rezekne-grozit-tyurma-za-tsvety-na-meste-snesyennogo-pamyatnika-krasnoarmeytsam/
[1102] https://pravfond.ru/press-tsentr/latyshskiy-sud-prodlil-aleksandru-demidovu-srok-soderzhaniya-pod-strazhey-eshche-na-2-mesyatsa/
[1103] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/15052024-v-latvii-arestovali-mat-parnya-razvernuvshego-rossiyskiy-flag-v-rige/
[1104] https://pravfond.ru/press-tsentr/politicheskaya-uznitsa-latvii-svetlana-nikolaeva-ostavlena-pod-arestom-eshche-na-dva-mesyatsa/
[1105] https://t.me/alekseystefanov/9182, https://ont.by/special/list-data/v-latvijskoj-tyurme-pri-zagadochnyh-obstoyatelstvah-umer-politzaklyuchennyj
[1106] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/27062024-v-latvii-vozbudili-delo-na-ekskandidata-v-evrodeputaty/
[1108] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/22122022-sluzhba-gosbezopasnosti-latvii-prizvala-zhiteley-vozderzhatsya-ot-poezdok-v-rossiyu-i-belarus/
[1109] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/10122022-v-latvii-muzhchinu-zaderzhali-za-ustanovku-rossiyskikh-telekanalov/
[1111] https://titania.saeima.lv/LIVS14/saeimalivs14.nsf/webSasaiste?OpenView&restricttocategory=389/Lp14
[1112] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/17032024-posolstvo-rasskazalo-o-pogolovnoy-proverke-golosuyushchikh-rossiyan-vlastyami-latvii/
[1114] Ibid.
[1115] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/25032024-ombudsmen-otreagirovala-na-zapret-prinosit-tsvety-k-posolstvu-rf-v-latvii/
[1117] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/19092023-v-latvii-zaderzhivayut-vyplatu-rossiyskikh-pensiy/; https://www.rubaltic.ru/article/politika-i-obshchestvo/20230911-rusofoby-sdali-nazad-popytka-vydavit-grazhdan-rossii-iz-latvii-provalilas/
[1118] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/19092023-posolstvo-rossii-nablyudaet-za-situatsiey-s-deportatsiey-rossiyan-iz-latvii/
[1119] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/14092023-seym-latvii-vvel-dvukhletnyuyu-otsrochku-dlya-ne-sdavshikh-yazykovoy-ekzamen-rossiyan/
[1120] Fourth Opinion of the Advisory Committee of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities on Latvia. Adopted on 9 October 2023, published on 22 February 2024. https://rm.coe.int/4th-op-latvia-en/1680ae98f6
[1121] https://www.rubaltic.ru/article/politika-i-obshchestvo/20230911-shag-k-spravedlivosti-litovskie-sudi-otvetyat-za-politicheskie-repressii/
[1122] https://latvia.mid.ru/ru/press-centre/news/kommentariy_vremennogo_poverennogo_v_delakh_rossii_v_latvii_o_o_zykova_informatsionnomu_agentstvu_ta/
[1123] https://www.rubaltic.ru/article/politika-i-obshchestvo/20240305-potomki-kollaborantov-prodolzhayut-perepisyvat-istoriyu-pribaltiki/
[1124] https://lv.sputniknews.ru/20240315/pervye-rossiyane-kotorye-ostalis-bez-vnzh-pokinuli-latviyu-po-predpisaniyu-27490489.html
[1126] Concluding observations of the Committee against Torture on the sixth periodic report of Latvia. December 2019.
[1127] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined sixth to twelfth periodic reports of Latvia. September 2018.
[1128] Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the second periodic report of Latvia. March 2021. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=E/C.12/LVA/CO/2&Lang=en
[1129] Fourth opinion of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities on Latvia. Adopted on 9 October 2023 and published on 22 February 2024. https://rm.coe.int/4th-op-latvia-en/1680ae98f6
[1130] https://lv.sputniknews.ru/20231117/novaya-reforma---novyy-sud-v-espch-udastsya-li-otstoyat-russkiy-yazyk-v-shkolakh-latvii-26572350.html
[1131] Press release of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on the request of the Special Rapporteurs on minority issues, on the right to education, and in the field of cultural rights. 8 February 2023. https://web.dev.ohchr.un-icc.cloud/en/press-releases/2023/02/latvia-un-experts-concerned-about-severe-curtailment-minority-language
[1132] https://eng.lsm.lv/article/society/education/31.08.2023-around-220000-pupils-will-start-school-year-in-latvia.a522242/
[1133] https://www.grani.lv/latvia/138084-uchebu-v-635-shkolah-nachali-okolo-220-tysyach-uchenikov.html#:~:text=В%202023%2F2024%20учебном%20году
[1134] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/21112022-v-ministerstve-obrazovaniya-latvii-nazvali-sroki-otkaza-ot-izucheniya-russkogo-yazyka/
[1135] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/14092023-v-latvii-predlozhili-zapretit-russkiy-yazyk-v-shkolakh/
[1136] Ibid.
[1137] https://russkiymir.ru/news/317655/
[1138] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/03072024-stalo-izvestno-skolko-pedagogov-nakazali-v-latvii-za-neznanie-latyshskogo/
[1139] https://lv.sputniknews.ru/20240314/sumasshedshiy-udar-proverki-gosyazyka-lishili-shkoly-desyatkov-uchiteley-27474032.html
[1140] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/25052023-defitsit-uchiteley-postavil-pod-ugrozu-perekhod-obucheniya-na-gosyazyk-v-shkolakh-latvii/
[1141] https://lv.sputniknews.ru/20240401/pedagog-bez-vyshki-kak-v-latvii-boryutsya-s-nekhvatkoy-uchiteley-27607898.html
[1142] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/31082023-profsoyuz-latvii-prizval-dat-natsmenshinstvam-vozmozhnost-sokhranit-svoy-yazyk/
[1143] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/31082023-v-rige-prokhodit-piket-protiv-perekhoda-na-obuchenie-na-latyshskom-yazyke/
[1144] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/07082023-latviyskiy-publitsist-rekomendovala-uchitelyam-ne-vladeyushchim-gosyazykom-ukhazhivat-za-skotom/
[1145] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/13022024-v-latvii-namereny-zastavit-personal-bolnits-obshchatsya-tolko-na-gosyazyke/
[1146] https://lv.sputniknews.ru/20240704/na-pansionat-napisali-zhalobu-v-trudovuyu-inspektsiyu-iz-za-russkogo-yazyka-28236740.html
[1147] Third opinion of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities on Latvia, adopted on 25 February 2018. https://rm.coe.int/3rd-op-latvia-en/16808d891d
[1148] https://www.csb.gov.lv/en/statistics/statistics-by-theme/population/search-in-theme/2747-latvian-mother-tongue-608-population-latvia
[1149] Third opinion of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities on Latvia, adopted on 25 February 2018. https://rm.coe.int/3rd-op-latvia-en/16808d891d
[1151] Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the second periodic report of Latvia. March 2021. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=E/C.12/LVA/CO/2&Lang=En
[1152] Resolution CM/ResCMN(2021)9 on the implementation of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities by Latvia. Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 3 March 2021 at the 1397th meeting of the Ministers' Deputies. https://search.coe.int/cm/pages/result_details.aspx?objectid=0900001680a14111
[1153] Fourth opinion of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities on Latvia. Adopted on 9 October 2023, published on 22 February 2024. https://rm.coe.int/4th-op-latvia-en/1680ae98f6
[1154] https://lv.sputniknews.ru/20240112/latviya-ne-vypolnyaet-konventsiyu-se-po-zaschite-natsmenshinstv-kasatelno-ispolzovaniya-russkogo-26987008.html
[1155] https://lv.sputniknews.ru/20220715/issledovateli-sostavili-spisok-ulits-proslavlyayuschikh-sssr-22248323.html
[1158] https://lv.sputniknews.ru/20220724/kult-otmeny-izobreli-v-latvii-latviya-davno-otmenila-svoikh-russkikh-22310354.html
[1159] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/16122022-v-posolstve-rossii-v-latvii-raskritikovali-initsiativu-deputata-deportirovat-russkoyazychnykh/
[1160] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/28012024-zhiteley-latvii-prizvali-zabyt-yazyk-kolonistov-i-vygnat-grazhdan-rf/
[1161] Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Latvia (fifth monitoring cycle), adopted on 4 December 2018, published on 5 March 2019. https://rm.coe.int/fifth-report-on-latvia/1680934a9f
[1162] Ibid.
[1163] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined sixth to twelfth periodic reports of Latvia. August 2018. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2fC%2fLVA%2fCO%2f6-12&Lang=en
[1164] Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the second periodic report of Latvia. March 2021. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=E/C.12/LVA/CO/2&Lang=En
[1165] Fourth opinion of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities on Latvia. Adopted on 9 October 2023, published on 22 February 2024. https://rm.coe.int/4th-op-latvia-en/1680ae98f6
[1166] The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report 2023. http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2023-fundamental-rights-report-2023_en_1.pdf
[1167] https://antifashist.com/item/latviya-planiruet-stroit-zagrazhdeniya-na-granice-s-belorussiej-dazhe-na-bolotah.html
[1168] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/14122022-belorusskie-pogranichniki-nashli-bezhentsa-na-granitse-s-latviey/
[1169] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/25032024-izbitogo-migranta-nashli-na-granitse-belarusi-s-latviey/
[1170] Detailed estimates of deterioration of economic situation in Lithuania, its depopulation and decline of the living standards in this country are included in joint report of Russian and Belorussian MFA report on human right situation in certain countries. Published on the website: www.mid.ru
[1172] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/12022024-nuzhdayushchimsya-zhitelyam-litvy-razdadut-sotsialnye-karty/
[1173] https://www.rubaltic.ru/article/politika-i-obshchestvo/20221227-pravitelstvo-nedoveriya-v-litve-pravyashchaya-koalitsiya-stremitelno-teryaet-populyarnost/
[1174] https://lt.sputniknews.ru/20221213/seym-litvy-prinyal-zakonoproekt-o-desovetizatsii-obschestvennykh-prostranstv-25815368.html
[1175] https://antifashist.com/item/eks-kommunist-nauseda-reshil-obyavit-kompartiyu-prestupnoj-v-litve-nakazyvayut-za-foto-lenina.html
[1176] https://lt.sputniknews.ru/20220519/v-litve-zakryli-delo-ob-oskvernenii-pamyatnika-sovetskomu-soldatu-23254639.html
[1177] www.lt.sputniknews.ru/20220419/seym-litvy-zapretil-publichnoe-ispolzovania-georgievskoy-lenty-22788067.html
[1178] https://ru.respublika.lt/ru/naujienos/ru/politika/ne-miritsja-s-perezitkami-propagandi-i-razziganija-vojni-gnayseda-o-sovetskix-pamjatnikax/
[1179] https://www.lrt.lt/ru/novosti/17/1660229/evrei-litvy-osuzhdaiut-oskvernenie-memoriala-pamiati-zhertv-kholokosta#
:~:text=%D0%95%D0%B2%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%B9%
D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B0%D1%8F%20%D0%BE%D0%B1%D1
%89%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B0%20%D0%9B%D0%B
8%D1%82%D0%B2%D1%8B%20(%D0%95%D0%9E%D0%9B)%
20%D0%B2,%D0%BC%D0%B5%D1%81%D1%82%D
0%B5%20o/oD0%BC%D0%B0%D1%81%D1%81%D0%BE%D0%B
2%D1%8B%D1%85%20%D1%83%D0%B1%D0%B8%D0%B9
%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B2%20%D0%B2%20%D0%9F%D
0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B5%D1%80%D1%8F%D0%B9
[1180] https://lrkm.lrv.lt/lt/naujienos/parengtos-rekomendacijos-savivaldybems-del-sovietiniu-paminklu-nukelimo
[1181] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/26042022-v-kaunase-snesli-pamyatnik-na-zakhoronenii-sovetskikh-voinov/
[1182] https://www.1tv.ru/news/2022-07-05/432684-v_klaypede_nachalsya_snos_monumenta_sovetskim_voinam_kotorye_pogibli_osvobozhdaya_litvu_ot_fashizma
[1183] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/26042022-v-kaunase-snesli-pamyatnik-na-zakhoronenii-sovetskikh-voinov/, https://lt.sputniknews.ru/202221021/na-severe-litvy-snesli-sovetskie-pamyatniki-na-kladbische-u-sobora-24989599.html
[1184] https://www.lrt.lt/ru/novosti/17/1840837/na-antakal-nisskom-kladbishche-vil-niusa-demontirovany-skul-ptury-sovetskim-voinam
[1186] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/30112022-v-vilnyuse-nachali-demontirovat-memorial-sovetskim-voinam/
[1187] https://www.delfi.lt/ru/news/live/komitet-oon-ne-razreshil-ubrat-stely-s-antakalnisskogo-kladbischa-v-samoupravlenii-ot-planov-ne-otkazyvayutsya.d?id=91815411
[1188] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/07022024-v-litve-zavershili-snos-krupneyshego-memoriala-sovetskim-voinam/
[1189] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/22022024-posolstvo-rf-v-litve-pokazalo-kak-posle-snosa-pamyatnika-vyglyadit-kladbishche-v-vilnyuse/
[1190] https://iz.ru/1713577/viktor-nedelin/nadrugatelstvo-nad-pamiatiu-v-litve-prodolzhaiut-oskverniat-zakhoroneniia-sovetskikh-soldat
[1191] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/17022024-v-parlamente-litvy-prizvali-aktivnee-snosit-sovetskie-pamyatniki/
[1192] https://lt.sputniknews.ru/20240225/v-litve-predlozhili-uzakonit-snos-mest-zakhoroneniy-sovetskikh-soldat-32071675.html
[1193] https://iz.ru/1713577/viktor-nedelin/nadrugatelstvo-nad-pamiatiu-v-litve-prodolzhaiut-oskverniat-zakhoroneniia-sovetskikh-soldat
[1194] https://iz.ru/1713577/viktor-nedelin/nadrugatelstvo-nad-pamiatiu-v-litve-prodolzhaiut-oskverniat-zakhoroneniia-sovetskikh-soldat
[1195] https://pravfond.ru/press-tsentr/vlasti-litovskogo-shyaulyaya-namereny-perenesti-iz-tsentra-goroda-mogily-sovetskikh-voinov/
[1196] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/24022024-v-litve-oskvernili-dva-zakhoroneniya-vremen-velikoy-otechestvennoy-voyny/
[1197] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/12092023-sk-rossii-zaochno-obvinil-grazhdan-stran-baltii-i-polshi-v-oskvernenii-sovetskikh-pamyatnikov/
[1198] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/26022024-v-rossii-rassleduyut-fakt-oskverneniya-pamyatnika-sovetskim-voinam-v-litve/
[1199] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/30102023-mvd-rossii-obyavilo-v-rozysk-glavu-komissii-istoricheskoy-pamyati-v-vilnyuse/
[1201] https://www.rubaltic.ru/article/politika-i-obshchestvo/20240221-rossiya-zastavila-nervnichat-bortsov-s-sovetskimi-pamyatnikami-iz-pribaltiki/
[1203] https://iz.ru/1713577/viktor-nedelin/nadrugatelstvo-nad-pamiatiu-v-litve-prodolzhaiut-oskverniat-zakhoroneniia-sovetskikh-soldat
[1204] https://lt.sputniknews.ru/20240402/v-litve-pereimenovali-13-ulits-s-sovetskimi-nazvaniyami-32514860.html
[1205] https://lt.sputniknews.ru/20230629/v-litve-rekomendovali-snesti-pamyatniki-sovetskim-voinam-i-lesnomu-bratu-29368146.html
[1206] Salomeja Neris is the people's poet of Lithuanian SSR, laureate of the I Degree State Stalin Prize. In 1940, alongside other deputies of People's Seimas, she was a member of the delegation that called upon the USSR's Armed Forces to adopt Lithuania into the Soviet Union.
[1207] https://lt.sputniknews.ru/20240228/komissiya-po-desovetizatsii-reshila-ubrat-ulitsy-salomei-neris-po-vsey-litve-32097749.html
[1208] https://lv.sputniknews.ru/20231120/dolzhna-li-litva-izbavitsya-ot-ulitsy-slesarey-26585749.html
[1209] Ibid
[1210] https://lt.sputniknews.ru/20240406/desovetizatsiya-v-portovom-gorode-litvy-obernulas-polnym-provalom-32560318.html
[1211] https://news.rambler.ru/world/48627304-nashi-v-litve-apogey-rusofobii-borba-s-pisatelyami-i-vzvinchennye-tseny/
[1212] https://iz.ru/1137992/andrei-razumovskii/banditskii-fors-v-litve-proslavliaiut-lesnykh-bratev
[1213] https://lt.baltnews.com/freedom_of_speech/20220411/1021506655/Litovskiy-sindrom-mezhdu-geroizatsiey-natsizma-i-istoricheskoy-pravdoy.html
[1214] https://www.5-tv.ru/news/314806/vlitve-otkryli-pamatnik-izvestnomu-komandiru-lesnyh-bratev-videoreportaz/, https://iz.ru/1070683/igor-karmazin/ego-zvali-adolfas-v-litve-postavili-pamiatnik-lesnomu-komandiru
[1215] This organization is state-funded. Its objective is to study the "crimes of the Soviet occupation" and local residents' "resistance" to it, i.e. the activities of the Forest Brothers.
[1216] https://lt.baltnews.eom/vnutri_Lithuania_politika_novosti/20210520/1020805098/Litovskiy-standart-vozvyshenie-prestupnikov-stanovitsya-gosudarstvennoy-normoy.html
[1217] https://baltnews.lt/vnutri_Lithuania_politika_novosti/20210501/1020769520/Istoricheskiy-sgovor-V-Tsentre-genotsida-Litvy-novyy-obelitel-Kholokosta.html
[1218] https://lt.sputniknews.ru/politics/20200716/12640637/V-Litve-razgorelsya-skandal-vokrug-zayavleniya-glavy-EOL-o-partizane.html
[1219] https://lt.baltnews.com/vnutri_Lithuania_politika_novosti/20210906/1021036996/Agent-s-Zapada-Kak-posobnik-natsistov-zasluzhil-zvanie-geroya-Litvy.html
[1220] Detailed information on А. Impulyavičius' crimes is presented in a monography, published by "Historic Memory" Fund – See N.Selyukina's "Impulyavičius Battalion. Found Guilty" – Moscow, 2022 – page 56.
[1221] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/09062023-obshchina-evreev-litvy-prizvala-snesti-pamyatnik-posobniku-natsistov-krikshtaponisu/
[1222] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/06022024-posol-ssha-prizvala-vlasti-litvy-reshit-vopros-s-pamyatnikami-posobnikam-natsistov/
[1223] https://lt.sputniknews.ru/20240309/v-litve-khotyat-snesti-pamyatnik-sssr-a-posobniku-natsistov--sokhranit-32219779.html
[1224] N.Selyukina "Prosecution of Nazi Collaborators in 1980-2000: Examples, Problems, Results". Union State Forum: Russia and Belarus: Common History and Common Fate / Collection of Articles. – Moscow, IKAR Publishing House, 2024, p. 209.
[1225] https://www.timesofisrael.com/lithuania-passes-law-allocating-38-million-in-restitution-for-holocaust-survivors/
[1226] https://lt.sputniknews.ru/20221124/v-litve-khotyat-zakryt-vopros-s-evreyami-za-schet-simvolicheskoy-kompensatsii-25417535.html
[1227] N.Selyukina "Prosecution of Nazi Collaborators in 1980-2000: Examples, Problems, Results". Union State Forum: Russia and Belarus: Common History and Common Fate / Collection of Articles. – Moscow, IKAR Publishing House, 2024, p. 210.
[1228] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/02112017-evreyskiy-evropeyskiy-kongress-osudil-napadki-na-litovskuyu-pisatelnitsu-vanagayte/
[1229] https://lt.sputniknews.ru/20221127/presleduemaya-v-litve-pisatelnitsa-ruta-vanagayte-poselilas-v-ispanii-25475609.html
[1230] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/10012022-litva-i-latviya-otkazalis-pomogat-minsku-v-rassledovanii-dela-o-genotside-belorusov/, https://ctv.by/genprokuratura-o-novyh-faktah-genocida-masshtaby-tragedii-namnogo-bolshe-chem-ob-etom-bylo-izvestno
[1231] https://dzen.ru/a/ZAMseodeDwlhftsz
[1232] N.Selyukina "Prosecution of Nazi Collaborators in 1980-2000: Examples, Problems, Results". Union State Forum: Russia and Belarus: Common History and Common Fate / Collection of Articles. – Moscow, IKAR Publishing House, 2024, p. 215.
[1233] https://prokuratura.gov.by/ru/media/novosti/zashchita-sotsialnykh-prav-grazhdan/v-inykh-sferakh/ustanovleny-imena-na/, https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/11092023-v-minske-ustanovili-imena-litovtsev-i-latyshey-unichtozhavshikh-belorusov-v-gody-voyny/
[1234] N.Selyukina "Prosecution of Nazi Collaborators in 1980-2000: Examples, Problems, Results". Union State Forum: Russia and Belarus: Common History and Common Fate / Collection of Articles. – Moscow, IKAR Publishing House, 2024, pp. 227-228.
[1236] https://sputnik.by/20240516/selyukina-minskiy-myasnik-mozhet-byt-prichasten-k-ubiystvam-v-urochische-uruche-1086253052.html
[1237] https://prokuratura.gov.by/ru/media/novosti/zashchita-sotsialnykh-prav-grazhdan/v-inykh-sferakh/ustanovleny-imena-na/, https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/11092023-v-minske-ustanovili-imena-litovtsev-i-latyshey-unichtozhavshikh-belorusov-v-gody-voyny/
[1238] https://baltnews.lt/vnutri_Lithuania_politika_novosti/20210909/1021046743/Vandalizm-po-raspisaniyu-v-Litve-khudozhniki-izobrazili-svastiku.html
[1239] https://baltnews.lt/vnutri_Lithuania_politika_novosti/20211118/1021198979/Snova-skandal-Litva-zakhotela-krutit-pedali-na-kostyakh.html
[1240] https://lt.sputniknews.ru/20220401/v-litve-oskvernili-pamyatnik-zhertvam-kholokosta-v-paneryae-22451502.html
[1241] https://lt.sputniknews.ru/20220512/na-zapade-litvy-razorili-pamyatnik-zhertvam-kholokosta-23151466.html
[1242] https://www.lzb.lt/ru/2022/11/29/%D0%BC%D0%B5%D1%81%D1%82%D0%BE-%D0%BC%D0%B0%DI%81%D1%81%DO%B£%DO%B2%DO%BE%DO%B3%DO%BE-%D1%83%D0%B1%D0%B8%D0%B9%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B2%D0%B0-%D0%B5%D0%B2%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%B5%D0%B2-%D1%83%D0%BA%D0%BC%D0%B5/
[1243] European Agency for Fundamental Rights. Overview of Antisemitic Incidents Recorded in the EU in 2011-2021 https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2022-antisemitism-overview-2011-2021_en.pdf and in 2012-2022. http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2023-antisemitism-update-2012-2022_en.pdf
[1244] European Agency for Fundamental Rights. Overview of Antisemitic Incidents Recorded in the EU in 2012-2022. http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2023-antisemitism-update-2012-2022_en.pdf
[1245] https://lt.baltnews.com/freedom_of_speech/20210617/1020869575/Strelyali-v-zhenschin-i-detey-Litva-sluchayno-umolchala-ob-unichtozhenii-evreev.html, https://baltnews.lt/freedom_of_speech/20210617/1020869575/Strelyali-v-zhenschin-i-detey-Litva-sluchayno-umolchala-ob-unichtozhenii-evreev.html
[1247] https://iz.ru/1533429/viktor-nedelin/opravdanie-ubiitc-v-litve-vnov-podnimaet-golovu-antisemitizm
[1248] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/14022024-v-litve-vandaly-oprokinuli-pamyatnik-uznikam-evreyskogo-getto/
[1249] https://stmegi.com/posts/115678/v-nas-brosayut-kamni-evreyskaya-obshchina-litvy-zayavila-o-roste-antisemitizma/?bx_sender_conversion_id=909870
[1250] https://lt.sputniknews.ru/20240509/delo-litovskogo-deputata-antisemita-peredano-v-sud-32869001.html
[1252] https://iz.ru/1439643/2022-12-12/ssha-prizvali-vilnius-priznat-prichastnost-geroev-litvy-k-kholokostu
[1254] https://lt.sputniknews.ru/20240607/v-litve-nachalis-odni-iz-krupneyshikh-takticheskikh-ucheniy-s-uchastiem-nato-33179628.html, https://afn.today/news/i/318308
[1255] https://antifashist-com.turbopages.org, 17 June 2021.
[1256] https://www.rubaltic.ru/article/politika-i-obshchestvo/20230113-svoi-strelyali-v-svoikh-chto-stoit-za-gosudarstvennym-mifom-litvy-o-borbe-za-nezavisimost/
[1257] https://www.rubaltic.ru/article/politika-i-obshchestvo/20230906-shag-k-spravedlivosti-litovskie-sudi-otvetyat-za-politicheskie-repressii/
[1258] https://lt.baltnews.com/vnutri_Lithuania_politika_novosti/20220511/1021570079/Nesoglasnykh--v-tyurmu-Algirdasa-Paletskisa-okonchatelno-lishili-svobody.html
[1259] https://www.rubaltic.ru/article/politika-i-obshchestvo/20210728-prigovor-paletskisu-litva-prinesla-novuyu-zhertvu-istoricheskoy-lzhi/
[1260] https://www.lrt.lt/ru/novosti/17/1458028/za-shpionazh-v-pol-zu-rossii-paletskis-osuzhden-na-shest-let-lisheniia-svobody, https://lt.baltnews.com/vnutri_Lithuania_politika_novosti/20220511/1021570079/Nesoglasnyk--v-tyurmu-Algirdasa-Paletskisa-okonchatelno-lishili-svobody.html
[1261] https://lv.sputniknews.ru/20220506/sud-litvy-otlkonil-zhalobu-osuzhdennogo-za-shpionazh-v-polzu-rf-paletskisa-21726124.html
[1262] https:lt.sputniknews.ru/20220805/v-litve-protiv-foruma-paletskisa-nachato-esche-odno-rassledovanie-24098360.html
[1264] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/28122022-v-litve-nachalsya-sudebnyy-protsess-o-likvidatsii-mezhdunarodnogo-foruma-dobrososedstva/
[1265] https://www.delfi.lt/ru/news/live/delo-shvenchenene-yuraytisa-i-ivanova-peredano-v-sud-obvinyayutsya-v-deystviyah-protiv-litvy-95339675
[1267] https://lt.sputniknews.ru/20240228/v-sude-litve-proshlo-pervoe-slushanie-po-novomu-delu-protiv-paletskisa-32099544.html
[1268] https://lt.sputniknews.ru/20240629/troynye-standarty-litovskaya-aktivistka-obzhaluet-shtraf-za-foto-lenina-33402920.html
[1269] https://www.lrt.lt/ru/novosti/17/2086506/byvshemu-lideru-edinstva-prediavleny-podozreniia-v-publichnom-odobrenii-prestuplenii-sssr
[1270] https://www.lrt.lt/ru/novosti/17/2178886/byvshii-lider-edinstva-ivanov-obzhaloval-reshenie-o-ego-vysylke-iz-litvy
[1271] https://lt.sputniknews.ru/20240212/sud-v-litve-otklonil-zhalobu-istorika-ivanova-o-lishenii-ego-vnzh-31938297.html
[1272] https://lt.sputniknews.ru/20220705/litovskomu-pravozaschitniku-ostavili-prezhniy-srok-zaklyucheniya-za-shpionazh-23750586.html
[1274] https://www.delfi.lt/ru/news/live/vlasti-vilnyusa-zhdut-prinyatiya-resheniy-upomyanutaya-v-otchete-dgb-litvy-pedagog-rabotaet-v-detskom-sadu-95060739
[1275] https://www.lrt.lt/ru/novosti/17/2124700/ella-kanaite-popala-v-spisok-ugroz-natsional-noi-bezopasnosti-ukhodit-iz-shkoly
[1276] https://news.rambler.ru/world/48627304/?utm_content=news_media&utm_medium=read_more&utm_source=copylink
[1277] https://lt.sputniknews.ru/20220426/genotsid-pered-slavyanami-v-litve-rasskazali-o-sluchayakh-rusofobii-22888559.html
[1278] https://lt.sputniknews.ru/20220420/v-litve-zapretili-retranslyatsiyu-bolee-30-rossiyskikh-telekanalov-22816590.html
[1279] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/22092022-seym-litvy-zakryl-efir-dlya-rossiyskikh-i-belorusskikh-kanalov/
[1280] At the same time, according to the World Press Freedom Index, Lithuania ranked 9th in 2022.
[1281] https://www.lrt.lt/ru/novosti/l7/2l4984l/sud-postanovil-shtraf-portalu-musu-tv-za-dezinformatsiiu-v-razmere-2-2-tys-evro
[1282] www.lt.sputniknews.ru/20220419/seym-litvy-zapretil-publichnoe-ispolzovania-georgievskoy-lenty-22788067.html
[1283] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/14092022-pravitelstvo-litvy-utverdilo-kriterii-dopuska-grazhdan-rossii-v-stranu/
[1284] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/09012023-v-litve-rasskazali-ob-otkaze-vo-vezde-belorusam-posle-voprosov-ob-otnoshenii-k-ukraine/
[1285] https://www.lrt.lt/ru/novosti/17/1837373/grazhdanam-rossii-i-belarusi-pri-poluchenii-vnzh-v-litve-nuzhno-zapolnit-anketu-sprashivaiut-i-o-voine-v-ukraine
[1286] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/19092023-v-litve-rasskazali-skolko-rossiyan-ne-pustili-v-stranu-za-god/
[1287] https://e-seimas.lrs.1t/portal/legalAct/lt/TAD/lbс2сba0е9а511eda305cb3bdf2af4d8?jfwid=-1d737wmt54
[1288] https://www.delfi.lt/ru/news/live/ot-sankcij-do-litvinizma-s-kakimi-problemami-stolknulis-v-2023-godu-belorusy-v-litve-i-est-li-puti-k-resheniyu-95489993
[1289] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/12022024-litva-na-god-prodlila-sanktsii-protiv-rossiyan-i-belorusov/
[1290] This was made possible by the adoption of a new edition of the Law on Citizenship in June 2023, under which a person may be deprived of citizenship obtained by exception, if it is recognized that the person poses a threat to Lithuania's national security. Lithuania is now working on amendments that could strip citizenship obtained by origin.
[1291] https://www.lrt.lt/ru/novosti/17/2161622/v-litve-v-ianvare-ozhidaiut-resheniia-po-voprosu-lisheniia-grazhdanstva-ilze-liepy
[1292] https://lt.sputniknews.ru/20231113/prezident-litvy-primet-reshenie-o-grrazhdanstve-liepy-posle-otsenki-ekspertov-31052056/html
[1293] https://www.delfi.lt/ru/news/politics/ministr-mvd-obratilas-k-presidentu-po-povodu-lisheniya-grazhdanstva-biznesmena-kudimova-94313989
[1294] https://www.lrt.lt/ru/novosti/17/2123557/mvd-prosit-dgb-proverit-800-inostrantsev-poluchivshikh-grazhdanstvo-litvy
[1295] https://lt.sputniknews.ru/20240605/bez-very-v-luchshee-zhurnalist-rasskazal-o-goneniyakh-na-inakomyslyaschikh-v-litve-33141911.html
[1296] https://antifashist.com/item/vlasti-litvy-vyslali-zhurnalista-v-rossiyu-obviniv-ego-v-ugroze-nacbezopasnosti.html
[1298] https://spb.tsargrad.tv/news/ne-otvetila-na-dva-voprosa-kak-pozhilaja-russkaja-zhenshhina-stala-ugrozoj-nacbezopasnosti-litvy_985687
[1300] https://www.delfi.lt/ru/news/live/kultura-protiv-vojny-russkaya-intelligenciya-litvy-osudila-dejstviya-kremlya-i-podderzhala-ukrainu.d?id=89570813
[1302] https://www.delfi.lt/ru/news/live/klajpedskaya-radiostanciya-otkazyvaetsya-ot-translyacii-rossijskoj-produkcii.d?id=89559861
[1304] https://www.rubaltic.ru/article/politika-i-obshchestvo/20231006-byut-i-po-pasportu-i-po-litsu-rusofobiya-v-pribaltike-ushla-v-narod/
[1305] https://www.delfi.it/ru/news/live/diskussiya-kak-vojna-v-ukraine-izmenila-otnoshenie-k-russkim-v-litve.d?id=92372495
[1306] https://www.lrt.lt/ru/novosti/l7/1834276/glava-departamenta-natsmen-shinstv-montvidaite-tendentsii-kasatel-no-russkikh-litvy-trevozhny-i-dazhe-
[1307] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/01022024-evrodeputat-pozhalovalsya-v-prokuraturu-izza-razzhiganiya-nenavisti-k-russkim-v-litve/
[1308] https://www.lrt.lt/ru/novosti/17/1879425/shimonite-litovskoe-obshchestvo-otravleno-russkoi-kul-turoi
[1309] https://www.lrt.lt/ru/novosti/17/1879258/ministr-kul-tury-mental-nyi-karantin-rossiiskikh-proizvedenii-byl-by-polezen-no-reshenie-ostaetsia-za-uchrezhdeniiami
[1310] https://www.delfi.lt/ru/news/live/vilnyusskij-staryj-teatr-prodolzhaet-obnovlyat-svoj-repertuar.d?id:=92483767
[1312] https://news.rambler.ru/world/48627304/?utm_content=news_media&utm_medium=read_more&utm_source=copylink
[1314] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 9th and 10th periodic reports of Lithuania. June 2019.
[1315] Fourth opinion of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities on Lithuania. Adopted on 30 May 2018 https://rm.coe.int/4th-advisory-commitee-opinion-on-lithuania-english-language-version/1680906d97
[1316] https://lt.sputniknews.ru/20220829/v-litve-khotyat-otkazatsya-ot-prepodavaniya-russkogo-yazyka-v-shkolakh-24333577.html
[1317] https://iz.ru.1396081/2022-09-15/v-litve-iziali-uchebnik-russkogo-iazyka-iz-za-proslavleniia-rf
[1318] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/04012024-minobrazovaniya-litvy-rassmatrivaet-vozmozhnost-zakrytiya-russkikh-shkol-v-strane/
[1319] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/23012024-v-minobrazovaniya-litvy-raskryli-plany-po-vytesneniyu-russkogo-yazyka-iz-shkol/
[1320] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/09012024-sovetnik-prezidenta-litvy-raskritikovala-predlozhenie-o-zakrytii-russkikh-shkol-v-strane/
[1321] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/05022024-v-litve-potrebovali-chtoby-deti-immigrantov-s-ukrainy-uchilis-na-litovskom/
[1322] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/13022024-v-litve-pridumali-kak-iskorenit-russkiy-yazyk-v-vilnyuse/
[1323] Ibid.
[1325] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 9th and 10th periodic reports of Lithuania. June 2019.
[1326] Fourth opinion of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities on Lithuania. Adopted on 30 May 2018. https://rm.coe.int/4th-advisory-commitee-opinion-on-lithuania-english-language-version/1680906d97
[1327] Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee on the 4th periodic report of Lithuania. July 2018.
Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 9th and 10th periodic reports of Lithuania. June 2019.
Fourth opinion of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities on Lithuania. Adopted on 30 May 2018.
https://rm.coe.int/4th-advisory-commitee-opinion-on-lithuania-english-language-version/1680906d97
[1328] The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report. 2022.
https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2022-fundamental-rights-report-2022_en.pdf
[1329] https://www.lrt.lt/ru/novosti/17/2135498/ministr-rost-potoka-trudovykh-migrantov-neset-ugrozu-imi-prikryvaetsia-zarubezhnaia-razvedka
[1330] https://lt.sputniknews.ru/20210726/zapretili-est-dazhe-detyam-na-yuge-litvy-migranty-ustroili-besporyadki-17769975.html?dc_data=3780234_ume-technologies-russia&ui=483455fb-235b-4448-bb8f-4d161b0e54aa
[1331] https://www.lrt.lt/ru/novosti/17/1454930/nauseda-podpisal-popravki-k-zakonu-o-pravovom-polozhenii-inostrantsev
[1334] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/29082022-litva-zavershila-stroitelstvo-zagrazhdeniya-na-granitse-s-belarusyu/
[1335] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/27092023-litva-ustanovit-zagrazhdenie-na-zabolochennykh-uchastkakh-granitsy-s-rossiey-i-belarusyu/
[1336] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/30042022-v-litve-rassleduetsya-delo-ob-iznasilovanii-mestnymi-pogranichnikami-afrikanskikh-bezhenok/
[1338] Examples of such incidents can be found in the joint report of the Belarusian and Russian Foreign Ministries on the human rights situation in certain countries.
[1339] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/04072024-v-litve-priznalis-skolko-migrantov-vytesnili-s-granitsu-v-belarus-s-nachala-goda/
[1340] https://www.rubaltic.ru/article/ekonomika-i-biznes/20240617-pochemu-strany-baltii-vystupayut-protiv-migratsionnoy-politiki-bryusselya/
[1342] https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/06/lithuania-pushbacks-illegal-detention-deception-and-abuses-against-refugees-and-migrants/, www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/lithuania/report-lithuania/
[1343] https://www.delfi.lt/ru/news/live/litovskij-krasnyj-krest-vidit-problemy-v-svyazi-s-razvorotom-migrantov-na-granice.d?id=87869519
[1344] https://www.msf.org/repeated-pushbacks-cause-mental-and-physical-suffering-people-crossing-lithuanian-border; https://www.msf.org/people-repelled-lithuania-border-face-increased-suffering
[1345] https://www.delfi.lt/ru/news/live/litva-poluchit-strogie-mezhdunarodnye-rekomendacii-nikakoj-politiki-razvorota-nelegalnyh-migrantov.d?id=89056983
[1346] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2019-2024/johansson/announcements/commissioner-johanssons-speech-plenary-debate-pushbacks-eu-external-border_en
[1351] https://www.lrt.lt/naujienos/pasaulyje/6/2159613/vandens-nera-manau-kad-mirsiu-myliu-tave-aiskeja-lietuvos-morge-menesius-gulejusio-neatpazinto-migranto-istorija
[1352] lt.sputniknews.ru/20231204/sk-belorussii-vozbudil-shest-del-o-vydvorenii-migrantov-silovikami-litvy-31273869.html
[1353] The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report. 2022.
https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2022-fundamental-rights-report-2022_en.pdf
[1354] The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report. 2023.
[1355] Ibid.
[1356] Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the third periodic report of Lithuania. February 2023.
[1357] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child on the combined 5th and 6th periodic reports of Lithuania. February 2024
[1358] Fourth opinion of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities on Lithuania. Adopted on 30 May 2018.
https://rm.coe.int/4th-advisory-commitee-opinion-on-lithuania-english-language-version/1680906d97
[1359] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 9th and 10th periodic reports of Lithuania. June 2019.
[1360] https://lt.sputniknews.ru/20220802/litva-prodolzhit-taktiku-vytesneniya-migrantov-zayavili-v-mvd-24065519.html
[1361] https://lt.sputniknews.ru/20220718/v-litve-za-sutki-vytesnili-v-belorussiyu-rekordnoe-chislo-nelegalov-23899430.html
[1362] https://search.coe.int/directorate_of_communications/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectId=0900001680aeafc0
[1363] European Commission against Racism and Intolerance's conclusions on the implementation of the recommendations in respect of Lithuania subject to interim follow-up, adopted on 3 April 2019, published on 6 June 2019. https://rm.coe.int/interim-follow-up-conclusions-on-lithuania-5th-monitoring-cycle-/168094ce17
[1364] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 9th and 10th periodic reports of Lithuania. June 2019
[1365] Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the third periodic report of Lithuania. February 2023
[1366] https://m.nedelia.lt/news-lt/54527-evrobarometr-v-litve-esche-est-diskriminacija-cygan-lgbt-no-ona-snizhaetsja.html
[1367] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child on the combined 5th and 6th periodic reports of Lithuania. February 2024 https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CRC%2FC%2FLTU%2FCO%2F5-6&Lang=en
[1368] The Luxembourg general strike began in protest against the decision of the government of Nazi Germany, which occupied Luxembourg on 10 May 1940, to annex it to the German Reich, the order to impose universal conscription in Luxembourg and the mobilisation of Luxembourgers into the Nazi army. On 31 August, workers at the ARBED steelworks in Esch and the Ideal tannery in Wilz stopped working. On 1 September the strike became nationwide. The strike was led by the Communists who actively participated in the national Resistance Movement. On 8 September it was suppressed by the Nazis who used armed force. Despite this, it thwarted the plans of the Nazi invaders to carry out mobilisation, demonstrated the will of the people to fight for independence, and contributed to the further strengthening of the Resistance Movement in the country.
[1369] In previous years, Luxembourg abstained from voting on the draft resolution.
[1370] Luxembourg to finance the purchase of one CAESAR self-propelled howitzer for the Armed Forces of Ukraine. CAWAT. 31 May 2024.
https://armstrade.org/includes/periodics/news/2024/0531/114580164/detail.shtml
[1371] City exhibition on Ukraine features Nazi symbols. Luxembourg Times. 13 June 2015.
https://www.luxtimes.lu/luxembourg/city-exhibition-on-ukraine-features-nazi-symbols/1246509.html
[1372] Controversial photo removed from City exhibition. Luxembourg Times. 15 June 2015.
https://www.luxtimes.lu/luxembourg/controversial-photo-removed-from-city-exhibition/1241137.html
[1373] Une photo controversée dans une exposition sur l'Ukraine supprimée. L'essentiel. 25 October 2023.
[1374] Is Luxembourgish jihadist Steve Duarte still alive? RTL Today. 28 January 2022.
[1375] Young jihadist from Bertrange died in Syria in 2013. RTL Today. 11 December 2019.
[1376] Des residents du Luxembourg arrêtés pour « financement du terrorisme ». L'essentiel. 3 April 2023.
[1377] International Day of Commemoration in Memory of the Victims of the Holocaust marked on the anniversary of liberation of the Nazi Auschwitz-Birkenau concentration camp by the Red Army.
[1378] In Luxembourg, a memorial plaque on the grave of Soviet soldiers was restored TASS. 5 May 2024.
[1379] Detailed information on this issue is provided in the report by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation "On Violations of the Rights of Russian Citizens and Compatriots in Foreign Countries". 2024.
https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/humanitarian_cooperation/1925827/
[1380] The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report. 2023.
[1381] Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Luxembourg (5th monitoring cycle). Adopted on 6 December 2016, published on 28 February 2017.
[1382] Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Luxembourg (6th monitoring cycle). Adopted on 27 June 2023, published on 19 September 2023.
https://rm.coe.int/sixth-ecri-report-on-luxembourg/1680ac8c45
[1383] Ibid.
[1384] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 18th to 20th periodic reports of Luxembourg. May 2022.
Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee on the 4th periodic report of Luxembourg. September 2022.
Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the 4th periodic report of Luxembourg. November 2022.
[1385] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 18th to 20th periodic reports of Luxembourg. May 2022.
[1386] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women on the combined 6th and 7th periodic reports of Luxembourg. March 2018.
[1387] Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee on the 4th periodic report of Luxembourg. September 2022.
[1388] Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Luxembourg (5th monitoring cycle). Adopted on 6 December 2016, published on 28 February 2017.
[1389] War in Gaza has triggered rise in anti-Semitism, report states. Luxembourg Times. 3 June 2024.
[1390] Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Luxembourg (6th monitoring cycle). Adopted on 27 June 2023, published on 19 September 2023.
https://rm.coe.int/sixth-ecri-report-on-luxembourg/1680ac8c45
[1391] Observatoire de l’islamophobie. Rapport sur l’islamophobie pour les années 2022 et 2023.
[1392] Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Luxembourg (6th monitoring cycle). Adopted on 27 June 2023, published on 19 September 2023.
https://rm.coe.int/sixth-ecri-report-on-luxembourg/1680ac8c45
[1393] Far-right extremist Pierre Peters receives fine and prison sentence.
[1394] Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Luxembourg (6th monitoring cycle). Adopted on 27 June 2023, published on 19 September 2023.
https://rm.coe.int/sixth-ecri-report-on-luxembourg/1680ac8c45
[1395] Ibid.
[1396] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 18th to 20th periodic reports of Luxembourg. May 2022.
[1397] The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. Being Black in the EU. 25 October 2023.
https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2023-being-black_in_the_eu_en.pdf
[1398] Racism and Ethno-racial Discrimination in Luxembourg. Ministry for Family Affairs, Integration and the Greater Region, Centre for Intercultural and Social Research and Education, Institute of Socio-Economic Research. 8 March 2022.
[1399] Report on the Activities of the Centre for Equal Treatment 2022. 3 May 2023.
[1400] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 18th to 20th periodic reports of Luxembourg. May 2022.
[1401] Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Luxembourg (6th monitoring cycle). Adopted on 27 June 2023, published on 19 September 2023.
https://rm.coe.int/sixth-ecri-report-on-luxembourg/1680ac8c45
[1402] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women on the combined 6th and 7th periodic reports of Luxembourg. March 2018.
[1403] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child on the combined 5th and 6th periodic reports of Luxembourg. June 2021.
[1404] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women on the combined 6th and 7th periodic reports of Luxembourg. March 2018.
[1405] https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4030705?ln=en
[1406] https://malta.mid.ru/ru/embassy/press-centre/news/statya_posla_rossii_na_malte_a_g_lopukhova_posvyashchennaya_dnyu_pobedy/
[1407] Report submitted by Malta Pursuant to the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. Received on 3 June 2024 https://rm.coe.int/6th-sr-malta-en/1680b04938
[1408] Imperium Europa approved as political party, Norman Lowell to contest MEP elections. https://www/maltatoday.com.mt/news/national/93455/imperium_europa_approved_as_political_party_norman_lowell_to_contest_mep_elections#.YtlCaxaOHDs
[1409] EU Agency for fundamental human rights report 2024
https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2024-fundamental-rights-report-2024_en.pdf
[1410] https://www.independent.com.mt/articles/2022-02-25/local-news/5-2-of-people-in-Malta-describe-themselves-as-very-racist-6736240933
[1415] Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Malta (sixth monitoring cycle) adopted on 9 April 2024, and published on 26 June 2024. https://rm.coe.int/sixth-ecri-report-on-malta/1680b063ef
[1416] Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Malta (fifth monitoring cycle) adopted on 21 March 2018 and published on 15 May 2018.
https://rm.coe.int/fifth-report-on-malta/16808b592bhttps://rm.coe.int/government-comments-on-the-fifth-report-on-malta/16808b5931
[1417] Conclusions on the implementation of the recommendations in respect of Malta subject to interim follow-up. Published on 18 May 2021, https://rm.coe.int/ecri-conclusions-on-the-implementation-of-the-recommendations-in-respe/1680a27d87
[1418] Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Malta (sixth monitoring cycle) adopted on 9 April 2024, and published on 26 June 2024. https://rm.coe.int/sixth-ecri-report-on-malta/1680b063ef
[1419] Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Malta (sixth monitoring cycle) adopted on 9 April 2024, and published on 26 June 2024. https://rm.coe.int/sixth-ecri-report-on-malta/1680b063ef
[1420] Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Malta (sixth monitoring cycle) adopted on 9 April 2024, and published on 26 June 2024. https://rm.coe.int/sixth-ecri-report-on-malta/1680b063ef
[1421] Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Malta (sixth monitoring cycle) adopted on 9 April 2024 and published on 26 June 2024. https://rm.coe.int/sixth-ecri-report-on-malta/1680b063ef; Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Malta (fifth monitoring cycle) adopted on 21 March 2018 and published on 15 May 2018.
[1422] Fifth Opinion of the Advisory Committee of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. Adopted on 5 October 2020, published on 18 February 2021.
[1423] ECRI conclusions on the implementation of the recommendations in respect of Malta, adopted on 30 March 2021, published on 18 May 2021
https://rm.coe.int/ecri-conclusions-on-the-implementation-of-the-recommendations-in-respe/1680a27d87
[1424] ECRI conclusions on the implementation of the recommendations in respect of Malta, adopted on 30 March 2021, published on 18 May 2021
https://rm.coe.int/ecri-conclusions-on-the-implementation-of-the-recommendations-in-respe/1680a27d87
[1425] ECRI conclusions on the implementation of the recommendations in respect of Malta, adopted on 30 March 2021, published on 18 May 2021
https://rm.coe.int/ecri-conclusions-on-the-implementation-of-the-recommendations-in-respe/1680a27d87
[1426] Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Malta (sixth monitoring cycle) adopted on 9 April 2024 and published on 26 June 2024. https://rm.coe.int/sixth-ecri-report-on-malta/1680b063ef; Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Malta (fifth monitoring cycle) adopted on 21 March 2018 and published on 15 May 2018.
[1427] https://rm.coe.int/1680a1b877
[1428] https://rm.coe.int/1680a1b878
[1429] https://rm.coe.int/1680a1b877
[1430] EU Agency for fundamental human rights report 2024
https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2024-fundamental-rights-report-2024_en.pdf
[1431] Migrant woman turned away with Panadol prescription, dies in her sleep.
[1432] Report to the Government of Malta on the visit to Malta carried out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) from 17 to 22 September 2020, 10 March 2021 https://rm/coe.int/1680a1b877.
[1433]https://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/national/130164/foreign_workers_trapped_in_vicious
_cycle_of_abuse_indian_community_tells_gwu
[1434]https://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/national/130164/foreign_workers_trapped_in_vicious
_cycle_of_abuse_indian_community_tells_gwu
[1435] Malta accused of violating basic human rights because of migrants https://rossaprimavera.ru/news/a1567957.
[1436] https://news.un.org/ru/story/2020/05/1378652
[1437] https://news.un.org/ru/story/2020/05/1378652
[1438] Malta, Aditus Foundation, Jesuit Refugee Service Malta, Moviment Graffitti and SAR (Search and Rescue) Malta Network, ‘Malta complicit in unlawful pushbacks at sea’, joint press statement, 2023.
[1439] IOM, ‘Libya weekly central Mediterranean update: 7–13 January 2024’, 2024 (see box on 2023 data); Italy, Ministry of the Interior, ‘Statistical Dashboard as of 31 December 2023’ (‘Cruscotto statistico al 31 dicembre 2023’), 2023; for Malta, the information was provided by the authorities to FRA in February 2024. See also Times of Malta, ‘Maltese authorities rescued 380 migrants from Malta SAR in 2023’, 2024. Data for Tunisia are not available.
[1440] Fifth Opinion of the Advisory Committee of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. Adopted on 5 October 2020, published on 18 February 2021.
[1441] Report submitted by Malta Pursuant to the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. Received on 3 June 2024https://rm.coe.int/6th-sr-malta-en/1680b04938
[1442] Ukrainian propaganda instead of Pushkin: Moldova has set a course for total Russophobia. RuBaltic. 12 March, 2023 https://www.rubaltic.ru/article/politika-i-obshchestvo/20230312-ukrainskaya-propaganda-vmesto-pushkina-kulturnaya-politika-v-moldove-stroitsya-na-rusofobii/
[1443] "On Zelenskiy's Crooked Path." Where Maia Sandu is Leading Moldova. RuBaltic. 9 August, 2024. https://www.rubaltic.ru/article/politika-i-obshchestvo/20240809-po-krivoy-dorozhke-zelenskogo-kuda-vedet-moldovu-mayya-sandu/
[1444] Ibid.
[1446] The party was headed by Maia Sandu before her election as President in November 2020.
[1447] A monument to soldiers of the Romanian army was erected in Moldova, which caused an outrage among historians. Tsargrad. 26 October 2021. https://md.tsargrad.tv/news/v-moldove-ustanovili-pamjatnik-soldatam-rumynskoj-armii_437077?utm_referrer=https%3a%2f%2fyandex.ru%2f; "For that they spat in the direction of Russia": A monument to the Romanian occupiers-"liberators" of 1941 was unveiled in Moldova. Komsomolskaya Pravda. 26 October 2021. https://www.kp.ru/daily/28348/4495374/
[1448] "Spilled blood": Moldova honours Hitler's allies. Gazeta.RU. 9 July 2019. https://www.gazeta.ru/science/2019/07/09_a_12486949.shtml?updated; Executioners of the Moldovan people are now fighters "for peace and freedom on Romanian soil". Strategic Culture Foundation. 21 August 2021. https://www.fondsk.ru/news/2022/08/21/palachi-moldavskogo-naroda-teper-borcy-za-mir-i-svobodu-na-rumynskoj-zemle.html
[1449] Sputnik Moldova, 19 April 2024. http://t.me/rusputnikmd/74284
[1450] Lesson for Russia: Moldovan authorities and Romanian consul unveil monument to the Nazi. REGUM. 17 September 2021. https://regnum.ru/news/3372862 (saved copy
[1451] Moldova continues to erect monuments to the Nazi. News Front. 21 August 2022. https://news-front.info/2022/08/21/v-moldavii-prodolzhaetsja-vozvedenie-pamjatnikov-fashistam/, Moldova opened yet another monument to "Romanian heroes". Transnistria News. 1 August 2022. https://novostipmr.com/ru/news/22-08-01/v-moldove-otkryli-ocherednoy-pamyatnik-rumynskim-geroyam, Încă un monument în cinstea eroilor români, în raionul Rezina. TVR Moldova. 31 July 2022. https://tvrmoldova.md/article/50b99070acd499a2/inca-un-monument-in-cinstea-eroilor-romani-in-raionul-rezin.html; Executioners of the Moldovan people are now fighters "for peace and freedom on Romanian soil". Strategic Culture Foundation. 21 August 2021. https://www.fondsk.ru/news/2022/08/21/palachi-moldavskogo-naroda-teper-borcy-za-mir-i-svobodu-na-rumynskoj-zemle.html
[1452] FOTO. Ambasada României la Chișinău: "La 31 August au fost comemorați cei 59 eroi români, căzuți la datorie pentru eliberarea Basarabiei". TVR Moldova. 1 September 2022. https://tvrmoldova.md/article/9c5455e570ccb8e2/foto-ambasada-romaniei-la-chisinau-la-3 l-august-au-fost-comemorati-cei-59-eroi-romani- cazuti-la-datorie-pentru-eliberarea-basarabiei.html, FOTO | Încă un cimitir al eroilor români căzuți în luptele pentru eliberarea Basarabiei a fost reabilitat cu sprijinul României. Radio Chisinau. 1 September 2022. https://radiochisinau.md/foto-inca-un-cimitir-al-eroilor-romani-cazuti-in-lupte-a-fost-reabilitat-cu-sprijinul-romaniei---166260.html
[1453] Un monument dedicat eroilor români căzuţi la datorie a fost inaugurat la Ocniţa (VIDEO). TRM MD. 9 October 2022. https://trm.md/ro/regional/un-monument-dedicat-eroilor-romani-cazuti-la-datorie-a-fost-inaugurat-la-ocnita
[1454] Another monument to Romanian fascists unveiled in Moldova. EurAsia Daily. 28 April 2023. https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2023/04/28/v-kanun-dnya-pobedy-v-moldavii-otkryli-ocherednoy-pamyatnik-rumyno-fashistam
[1455] An oppositionist calls on the Moldovan President to dismantle the bust of Octavian Goga. RIA Novosti. 18 April 2023. https://ria.ru/20230418/kishinev-1866057283.html
[1456] Kishinev stories: Bucharest demolished the bust of Octavian Goga for his collaboration with the Nazis, while Kishinev installed one – how the Alley of Classics in Pushkin Park came to be created. Komsomolskaya Pravda. 29 December 2021. https://www.kp.md/daily/28375/4525883/
[1458] In Moldova, a monument to Nazi collaborators will be erected on the grave of Soviet soldiers. RuBaltic. 24 October, 2023. https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/24102023-v-moldove-na-mogile-sovetskikh-voinov-ustanovyat-pamyatnik-posobnikam-natsistov/
[1459] Soldier of Victory, 22 April, 2024 http://t.me/soldat_pobedi/4919
[1460] Soldier of Victory, 1 May, 2024 http://t.me/soldat_pobedi/45016
[1461] https://tass.ru/obschestvo/19412527, https://rg.ru/2023/11/29/v-moldavii-otkazalis-horonit-s-pochestiami-uchastnika-bitvy-za-stalingrad.html
[1462] A monument to Romanians who fought on the side of Nazi Germany unveiled in Moldova. Izvestia. 26 October 2021. https://iz.ru/1241365/2021-10-26/v-moldavii-otkryli-pamiatnik-voevavshim-na-storone-natcistkoi-germanii-rumynam
[1463] Vandals in Moldova painted swastikas on monuments of the memorial to Soviet soldiers. Point. 5 November 2022. https://point.md/ru/novosti/obschestvo/v-moldove-vandaly-nanesli-svastiku-na-pamiatniki-memoriala-sovetskim-voinam/
[1464] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/14082023-aktivisty-v-moldove-otchistili-ot-kraski-oskvernennyy-vandalami-pamyatnik-sovetskim-voinam/
[1465] T-34 Tank Monument Desecrated in Moldova. 11 September, 2023. https://ria-ru.turbopages.org/turbo/ria.ru/s/20230911/pamyatnik-1895614707.html
[1467] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/13092023-sk-rassleduet-obstoyatelstva-oskverneniya-tankapamyatnika-t34-v-moldove/
[1468] Vandals desecrated a monument to Soviet soldiers in Moldova. 6 October, 2023. https://ria-ru.turbopages.org/turbo/ria.ru/s/20231006/vandaly-1900991240.html
[1469] Vandals tore down a panel dedicated to Marshal Malinovsky in the city of Bălți. https://tass-ru.turbopages.org/turbo/tass.ru/s/obschestvo/19737519
[1470] Soldier of Victory, 9 February, 2024. http://t.me/soldat_pobedi/4304
[1471] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/09022024-na-severe-moldovy-demontirovali-pamyatnik-na-mogile-sovetskikh-voinov/
[1472] In northern Moldova, unknown persons desecrated a monument to Soviet heroes. 17 April, 2024. https://iz-ru.turbopages.org/turbo/iz.ru/s/1683689/2024-04-17/na-severe-moldavii-neizvestnye-oskvernili-pamiatnik-sovetskim-geroiam
[1473] Soldier of Victory, 6 May, 2024. http://t.me/soldat_pobedi/5078
[1474] "For that they spat in the direction of Russia": A monument to the Romanian occupiers-"liberators" of 1941 unveiled in Moldova. Komsomolskaya Pravda. 26 October 2021. https://www.kp.ru/daily/28348/4495374/; Primakov views extinguished Eternal Flame in Kishinev as an attempt to put pressure on Russia. Izvestia. 23 October 2021. https://iz.ru/1239794/2021-10-23/primakov-schel-potushennyi-v-kishineve-vechnyi-ogon-popytkoi-davleniia-na-rf; The bottom line about energy crisis in Moldova: where does the 700 million dollar gas debt come from and why extinguish the Eternal Flame? Komsomolskaya Pravda. 23 October 2021. https://www.kp.ru/daily/28347.5/4493983/
[1475] Moldovan President calls on special services to assess the performance of children in Soviet uniform at a concert. RuBaltic. 16 December 2022. https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/16122022-glava-moldovy-prizvala-spetssluzhby-otsenit-vystuplenie-detey-v-sovetskoy-forme-na-kontserte/
[1476] At least 37,000 people took part in events on 9 May in Moldova. Sputnik. 9 May 2022.
[1477] A car rally in support of St George's ribbon was held in Comrat. Sputnik. 16 April 2022. https://md.sputniknews.ru/20220416/komrat-proshel-avtoprobeg-v-podderzhku-georgievskoy-lenty-50189607.html
[1478] Gagauz deputies appealed in court against fines for wearing St George's ribbon. Sputnik. 29 June 2022. https://md.sputniknews.ru/20220629/gagauzskie-deputaty-obzhalovali-sude-51360420.html
[1479] Moldovan government approves initiative of the ruling party to rename Victory Day. RuBaltic. 19 June 2023. https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/19062023-pravitelstvo-moldovy-odobrilo-initsiativu-pravyashchey-partii-o-pereimenovanii-dnya-pobedy/
[1480] Party of Socialists in Moldova demands public discussion of the idea to cancel Victory Day. RuBaltic. 5 June 2023. https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/05062023-v-moldove-partiya-sotsialistov-potrebovala-publichnogo-obsuzhdeniya-idei-otmeny-dnya-pobedy/
[1481] Moldovan residents March against the law on renaming Victory Day. RuBaltic. 3 June 2023. https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/03062023-zhiteli-moldovy-vyshli-na-marsh-protiv-zakona-o-pereimenovanii-dnya-pobedy/
[1482] Moldova recognizes the Russian Imperial flag as extremist. 5 April, 2024. https://ria.ru/20240405/glag-1938068144.html?ysclid=lwkgd92gcg122682774
[1483] In Moldova, more than 50,000 people took part in memorial marches. 9 May, 2024. https://ria-ru.turbopages.org/turbo/ria.ru/s/20240509/moldavia-1945028991.html
[1484] https://noi.md/ru/obshhestvo/evreyskaya-obshhina-moldovy-obespokena-soobshheniyami-ob-antisemitskoy-vyhodke-v-odnoy-iz-stolichnyh-shkol
[1485] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/27012024-eksprezident-moldovy-schitaet-chto-zhiteley-respubliki-vse-chashche-pytayutsya-razdelit/
[1486] Fifth Opinion of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities on Moldova, adopted on 7 June 2023, published on 18 October 2023 https://rm.coe.int/5th-op-moldova-en/1680acf5c8
[1487] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 12th to 14th periodic reports of Moldova. April 2024. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2FC%2FMDA%2FCO%2F12-14&Lang=ru
[1488] Maia Sandu started destroying education in Moldova 10 years ago and continues to do it today. RuBaltic. 24 July, 2022. https://www.rubaltic.ru/cifrobalt/20220724-mayya-sandu-nachala-unichtozhat-obrazovanie-v-moldove-10-let-nazad-i-prodolzhaet-segodnya/
[1489] Maia Sandu’s regime deals a fatal blow to Moldova’s education system. RuBaltic. 26 July 2023. https://www.rubaltic.ru/article/politika-i-obshchestvo/20230726-rezhim-mayi-sandu-dobivaet-sistemu-obrazovaniya-moldovy/
[1490] Fifth Opinion of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities on Moldova, adopted on 7 June 2023, published on 18 October 2023 https://rm.coe.int/5th-op-moldova-en/1680acf5c8
[1491] Ibid.
[1492] Largest emigration wave reported in Moldova & RuBaltic. 2 July, 2024 https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/02072024-v-moldove-zayavili-o-krupneyshey-volne-emigratsii/
[1493] Major population decline reported in Moldova. RuBaltic. 7 July 2023. https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/07072023-v-moldove-zayavili-o-sushchestvennom-sokrashchenii-chislennosti-naseleniya/
[1494] Protest held demanding to stop exodus of population from Moldova. RuBaltic. 14 August, 2024. https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/14082024-v-moldove-proveli-protest-s-trebovaniem-ostanovit-iskhod-naseleniya/
[1495] Ibid.
[1496] Fifth Opinion of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities on Moldova, adopted on 7 June 2023, published on 18 October 2023. https://rm.coe.int/5th-op-moldova-en/1680acf5c8
[1497] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 12th to 14th periodic reports of Moldova. April 2024.
[1498] Fifth Opinion of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities on Moldova, adopted on 7 June 2023, published on 18 October 2023. https://rm.coe.int/5th-op-moldova-en/1680acf5c8
[1499] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 12th to 14th periodic reports of Moldova. April 2024.
[1500] Russian students are called “bastards”: 5 cases of Blatant Russophobia in Moldova. RuBaltic. 31 July 2023.
https://www.rubaltic.ru/article/politika-i-obshchestvo/20230731-russkikh-uchenikov-nazyvayut-skotami-5-vopiyushchikh-sluchaev-rusofobii-v-moldove/
[1501] https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2023/03/26/blizki-po-duhu-moldavskie-unionisty-mitinguyut-pod-flagom-ukrainskih-nacikov
[1502] https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2023/12/01/v-moldavii-unionisty-otmetili-den-rumynii-s-portretom-posobnika-gitlera
[1503] Ibid
[1504] Deputy of the ruling party proposes to impose fines on Russian speakers. RuBaltic. 23 June 2023. https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/23062023-deputat-pravyashchey-partii-v-moldove-predlozhil-shtrafovat-govoryashchikh-na-russkom-yazyke/
[1505] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 12th to 14th periodic reports of Moldova. April 2024.
[1506] Conclusions of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on the Implementation of the Recommendations in Respect of the Republic of Moldova Subject to Interim Follow-Up. Adopted on 30 March 2021. Published on 18 May 2021.
https://rm.coe.int/ecri-conclusions-on-the-implementation-of-the-recommendations-in-respe/1680a27d9c
[1507] Fifth Opinion of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities on Moldova, adopted on 7 June 2023, published on 18 October 2023. https://rm.coe.int/5th-op-moldova-en/1680acf5c8
[1508] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 12th to 14th periodic reports of Moldova. April 2024.
[1509] Concluding observations of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the third periodic report of Moldova. October 2017. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=E/C.12/MDA/CO/3&Lang=En
[1510] Conclusions of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on the Implementation of the Recommendations in Respect of the Republic of Moldova Subject to Interim Follow-Up. Adopted on 30 March 2021, published on 18 May 2021 https://rm.coe.int/ecri-conclusions-on-the-implementation-of-the-recommendations-in-respe/1680a27d9c
[1511] Centre of Sociological, Politological and Psychological Analysis and Investigations CIVIS. Ethnobarometer Moldova 2020. https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/0/7/505306_0.pdf
[1512] Opinion No. 1093/2022. OSCE/ODIHR Opinion No. ELE-MDA/444/2022. Strasbourg / Warsaw, 24 October 2022. CDL-AD(2022)025. https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2022)025
[1513] Fifth Opinion of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities on Moldova, adopted on 7 June 2023, published on 18 October 2023. https://rm.coe.int/5th-op-moldova-en/1680acf5c8
[1515] Moldova's ruling party has proposed excluding the Russian language from document circulation. RuBaltic. 10 July, 2024 https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/09072024-pravyashchaya-partiya-moldovy-predlozhila-isklyuchit-russkiy-yazyk-iz-dokumentooborota-/
[1516] Moldova's Finance Minister proposes to transfer the Russian-language schools to Romanian. RuBaltic. 13 December 2022. https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/13122022-glava-minfina-moldovy-predlozhil-perevesti-russkoyazychnye-shkoly-na-rumynskiy-yazyk/
[1517] https://www.rubaltic.ru/article/politika-i-obshchestvo/20240301-pervyy-den-vesny-prevratilsya-v-tikhiy-bunt-moldavan-protiv-rumynizatsii/
[1518] https://www.rubaltic.ru/article/politika-i-obshchestvo/20240115-glavoy-natsionalnogo-banka-moldovy-stala-grazhdanka-rumynii-anka-dragu-kotoroy-radi-etoy-dolzhnosti-/
[1519] https://www.rubaltic.ru/article/politika-i-obshchestvo/20240115-glavoy-natsionalnogo-banka-moldovy-stala-grazhdanka-rumynii-anka-dragu-kotoroy-radi-etoy-dolzhnosti-/
[1520] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/19012024-spiker-parlamenta-moldovy-obyasnil-naznachenie-inostrantsev-na-klyuchevye-posty/
[1521] Maia Sandu's regime finishes off Moldova’s education system. RuBaltic. 26 July 2023. https://www.rubaltic.ru/article/politika-i-obshchestvo/20230726-rezhim-mayi-sandu-dobivaet-sistemu-obrazovaniya-moldovy/
[1522] Moldovan authorities are forcing Moldovans to renounce their national identity. RuBaltic. 2 July, 2024. https://www.rubaltic.ru/article/politika-i-obshchestvo/20240702-vlasti-moldovy-zastavlyayut-moldavan-otkazatsya-ot-svoey-natsionalnoy-identichnosti/
[1523] Forced Romanianization of Moldovan culture is happening here and now. RuBaltic. 26 March 2023. https://www.rubaltic.ru/cifrobalt/20230326-nasilstvennaya-rumynizatsiya-moldavskoy-kultury-proiskhodit-zdes-i-seychas/
[1524] Moldova officially renames its state language. RIA Novosti. 24 March 2023. https://ria.ru/20230324/moldaviya-1860296278.html
[1525] Moldovan Wagon. 22 November, 2023. http://t.me/mv6566/21856
[1526] Romanian lessons: why does Moldova discard its language? Izvestia. 19 March 2023. https://iz.ru/1484888/igor-karmazin/uroki-rumynskogo-pochemu-moldaviia-otkazyvaetsia-ot-svoego-iazyka
[1527] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/11032024-konstitutsionnyy-sud-moldovy-priznal-zakonnym-pereimenovanie-gosyazyka-v-rumynskiy/
[1528] The Moldovan authorities intend to rename the state language to Romanian in the Constitution. RuBaltic. 17 December, 2022. https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/17122022-vlasti-moldovy-namereny-pereimenovat-gosudarstvennyy-yazyk-v-konstitutsii-v-rumynskiy/
[1529] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/16102023-premer-rumynii-otkazal-moldavskomu-yazyku-v-prave-na-sushchestvovanie/
[1530] Sandu plays West's scenario of Romania absorbing Moldova. RuBaltic. 11 December 2022. https://www.rubaltic.ru/cifrobalt/20221211-sandu-realizuet-stsenariy-zapada-po-pogloshcheniyu-moldovy-rumyniey/
[1531] Fifth Opinion of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities on Moldova, adopted on 7 June 2023, published on 18 October 2023. https://rm.coe.int/5th-op-moldova-en/1680acf5c8.
[1532] Centre of Sociological, Politological and Psychological Analysis and Investigations CIVIS. Ethnobarometer Moldova 2020. https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/0/7/505306_0.pdf
[1533] https://www.rubaltic.ru/article/politika-i-obshchestvo/20240317-rezhim-sandu-pytaetsya-sorvat-vybory-prezidenta-rossii-na-territorii-moldovy/
[1534] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/17032024-za-vorota-posolstva-rf-v-kishineve-brosili-kokteyl-molotova/
[1535] Millions for "supporting the independent media": a "correct" information space is being created in Moldova. RuBaltic. 25 February 2023. https://www.rubaltic.ru/article/politika-i-obshchestvo/20230225-milliony-na-podderzhku-nezavisimykh-smi-v-moldove-sozdayut-pravilnoe-infopole/
[1536] Ibid.
[1537] Moldovan Parliament Gives Intelligence Services Authority to Monitor Social Media. RuBaltic. 7 July, 2023. https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/07072023-parlament-moldovy-dal-spetssluzhbam-polnomochiya-dlya-kontrolya-sotsialnykh-setey/
[1538] Moldova to create center to combat propaganda. Sputnik Moldova. May 29, 2023 https://md.sputniknews.ru/20230529/v-moldove-budet-sozdan-tsentr-po-borbe-s-propagandoy-57118786.html?utm_source=yxnews&utm_medium=desktop; Moldova has decided to create a center to combat propaganda. Lenta.RU. May 29, 2023 https://lenta.ru/news/2023/05/29/no_propoganda/
[1541] https://www.rubaltic.ru/article/politika-i-obshchestvo/20230312-ukrainskaya-propaganda-vmesto-pushkina-kulturnaya-politika-v-moldove-stroitsya-na-rusofobii/
[1542] Over half of Moldovans oppose the country’s leaving the CIS. RuBaltic. 7 June 2023. https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/07062023-bolee-poloviny-zhiteley-moldovy-vystupayut-protiv-vykhoda-strany-iz-sng/
[1543] https://www.rubaltic.ru/article/politika-i-obshchestvo/20230312-ukrainskaya-propaganda-vmesto-pushkina-kulturnaya-politika-v-moldove-stroitsya-na-rusofobii/
[1544] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/14032024-posolstvo-ssha-peredalo-moldove-oborudovanie-dlya-monitoringa-smi/
[1545] https://nokta.md/s-15-maya-grazhdane-ukrainy-dolzhny-poluchit-pravovy-status-v-moldove-inache-im-pridetsya-uehat
[1546] https://radiomoldova.md/p/28930/около-23-центров-временного-размещения-украинских-беженцев-планируют-закрыть
[1547] For example, https://md.sputniknews.ru/20230920/vezd-v-moldovu-zapreschen-konferentsiya-fillologov-rusistov-v-tiraspole-nachalas-so-skandala-58466482.html
[1548] Kishinev to additionally check passengers from Moscow. RuBaltic. 4 July, 2024. https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/04072024-v-kishineve-budut-dopolnitelno-proveryat-passazhirov-iz-moskvy/
[1549] https://www.rubaltic.ru/article/politika-i-obshchestvo/20230312-ukrainskaya-propaganda-vmesto-pushkina-kulturnaya-politika-v-moldove-stroitsya-na-rusofobii/
[1550] Moldovan authorities support church schism in the country. RuBaltic. 19 August, 2024. https://www.rubaltic.ru/article/kultura-i-istoriya/19082024-vlast-moldovy-podderzhivaet-tserkovnyy-raskol-v-strane/
[1551] Moldovan authorities support church schism in the country. RuBaltic. 19 August, 2024. https://www.rubaltic.ru/article/kultura-i-istoriya/19082024-vlast-moldovy-podderzhivaet-tserkovnyy-raskol-v-strane/
[1552] Moldovan authorities support church schism in the country. RuBaltic. 19 August, 2024. https://www.rubaltic.ru/article/kultura-i-istoriya/19082024-vlast-moldovy-podderzhivaet-tserkovnyy-raskol-v-strane/
[1554] The Romanian Orthodox Church is stepping up its expansion in Moldova and Ukraine. RuBaltic. 30 July, 2024. https://www.rubaltic.ru/article/politika-i-obshchestvo/20240730-rumynskaya-pravoslavnaya-tserkov-usilivaet-ekspansiyu-v-moldove-i-na-ukraine/
[1555] Ibid.
[1556] Moldovan authorities support church schism in the country. RuBaltic. 19 August 2024. https://www.rubaltic.ru/article/kultura-i-istoriya/19082024-vlast-moldovy-podderzhivaet-tserkovnyy-raskol-v-strane/
[1558] https://radiomoldova.md/p/29234/в-2023-году-увеличилось-количество-обращений-в-еспч-из-республики-молдова-наиболее-важные-дела
[1559] Fifth Opinion of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities on Moldova, adopted on 7 June 2023, published on 18 October 2023. https://rm.coe.int/5th-op-moldova-en/1680acf5c8.
[1560] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 12th to 14th periodic reports of Moldova. April 2024.
[1561] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 12th to 14th periodic reports of Moldova. April 2024.
[1562] Russian Embassy condemns the act of vandalism on the Soviet Field of Honour in the Netherlands, TASS, 1 December 2021. https://tass.ru/obschestvo/13075611
[1563] Recognized as a terrorist organization by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation
[1564] https://nos.nl/nieuwsuur/collectie/13888/video/2422707-rusland-noemt-het-azov-bataljon-nazi-s-maar-wat-zeggen-ze-zelf
[1565] Overview of Antisemitic Incidents Recorded in the EU in 2012-2022, European Agency for Fundamental Rights. http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2023-antisemitism-update-2012-2022_en.pdf
[1568] Ibid.
[1570] https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/rapporten/2022/06/10/tk-bijlage-cijfers-in-beeld-2021
[1571] Jewish people’s experinces and perceptions of antisemitism. Third survey. The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. 2024. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2024-experiences-perceptions-antisemitism-survey_en.pdf
[1572] www.nporadio1.nl/nieuws/binnenland/47043dad-072f-4fd7-b4bf-13c54a5e0950/nationaal-coordinator-antisemitismebestrijding-onrust-in-jaren-niet-zo-groot-geweest
[1573] https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/plenaire_verslagen/kamer_in_het_kort/debat-over-antisemitisme
[1575] https://nos.nl/artikel/2514532-rutte-het-gaat-de-verkeerde-kant-op-met-antisemitisme-in-nederland
[1576] www.nu.nl/binnenland/6312700/lees-hier-terug-hoe-protesten-verliepen-bij-universiteiten-zoals-de-uva.html
[1577] www.metronieuws.nl/in-het-nieuws/binnenland/2024/05/studentenprotesten-gaza-palestina-israel-universiteite/
[1578] https://nos.nl/artikel/2520064-koninklijke-academie-van-beeldende-kunsten-blaast-samenwerking-met-israel-af
[1579] https://eenvandaag.avrotros.nl/item/gaza-protesten-op-universiteiten-leiden-tot-discussie-onder-academici-studenten-zien-het-vreselijk-zwart-wit/
[1580] https://nos.nl/artikel/2520069-aanval-op-betogers-na-pro-palestinademonstratie-amsterdam-zeven-arrestaties
[1581] 23% of young Dutch have doubts that the Holocaust happened: study. NL Times, 25 January 2023. https://nltimes.nl/2023/01/25/23-young-dutch-doubts-holocaust-happened-study
[1582] ‘White Lives Matter’ geprojecteerd op UWV-gebouw in Venlo, nog vóór die leus op de Erasmusbrug te zien was, AD, 5 January 2023. https://www.ad.nl/limburg/white-lives-matter-geprojecteerd-op-uwv-gebouw-in-venlo-nog-voor-die-leus-op-de-erasmusbrug-te-zien-was~ade83f08/
[1583] Politie onderzoekt projectie op Anne Frank Huis, NOS Nieuws, 10 February 2023. https://nos.nl/artikel/2463199-politie-onderzoekt-projectie-op-anne-frank-huis
[1584] The document defines the general approach of criminal law to racist and xenophobic speech and hate crimes.
[1585] The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report 2022.
https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2022-fundamental-rights-report-2022_en.pdf
[1586] Antwoorden Kamervragen over het niet strafbaar stellen van ontkenning Holocaust. Rijksoverheid. 13 September 2021.
[1587] National Coordinator for Combating Antisemitism presents work plan to Dutch House of Representatives. Government of the Netherlands website. 6 October 2022.
[1588] Werkplan Antisemitismebestrijding 2022-2025. Rapport. Rijksoverheid. 6 October 2022. https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/rapporten/2022/10/06/tk-bijlage-ncab-werkplan-definitieve-versie-ter-verzending-aan-tweede-kamer
[1590] An example of this interpretation by the courts of the existing legislation, in particular, is the decision of the District Court of 's-Hertogenbosch of 21 December 2004 (LJN: AR7891) and the decision of the District Court of Utrecht of 22 April 2010 (LJN: BM1987).
[1591] The corresponding decision by the Arnhem court of 8 November 2012. https://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:GHARN:2012:BY2774
[1592] The corresponding decision by the Amsterdam court of 12 January 2017. https://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2017:146 and
https://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2017:144
[1593] The corresponding decision by the Limburg court of 23 March 2020. https://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:RBLIM:2020:2349
[1594] The corresponding decision by the court of the Central Netherlands of 24 February 2021. https://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:RBMNE:2021:719
[1595] Zaak tegen bol.com om antisemitische boekenverkoop geseponeerd, NRC, 2 December 2021. https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2021/12/02/zaak-tegen-bol-com-om-antisemitische-boekenverkoop-geseponeerd-a4067682
[1596] Thierry Baudet: "Je zus met een neger?" EW Magazine, 9 February 2021. https://www.ewmagazine.nl/nederland/achtergrond/2021/02/thierry-baudet-je-zus-met-een-neger-804032/
[1597] Geschokte reacties op Neurenberg-opmerking Baudet, Trouw, 23 February 2021. https://www.trouw.nl/politiek/geschokte-reacties-op-neurenberg-opmerking-baudet~b161b71b/?utm_source=link&utm_medium=app&utm_campaign=shared%20content&utm_content=free
[1598] Peaceful multicultural societies don't exist, Dutch FM says, NL Times, 18 July 2018. https://nltimes.nl/2018/07/18/peaceful-multicultural-societies-dont-exist-dutch-fm-says
[1599] Fourth Opinion of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities on the Netherlands (fourth monitoring cycle). Adopted on 3 April 2023, published on 24 August 2023. https://rm.coe.int/4th-op-netherlands-en/1680ac509f
[1600] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child on the combined fifth and sixth periodic reports of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, February 2022.
https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G22/280/48/PDF/G2228048.pdf?OpenElement
[1601] The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report 2023. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2023-fundamental-rights-report-2023_en_1.pdf
[1602] The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report 2022.
https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2022-fundamental-rights-report-2022_en.pdf
[1603] Report of the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, E. Tendayi Achiume, following her visit to the Netherlands from 30 September to 7 October 2019. https://spinternet.ohchr.org/Download.aspx?SymbolNo=A/HRC/44/57/Add.2&Lang=en
[1604] Fourth Opinion of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities on the Netherlands (fourth monitoring cycle). Adopted on 3 April 2023, published on 24 August 2023. https://rm.coe.int/4th-op-netherlands-en/1680ac509f
[1605] Study by M. Akkermans, R.Kloosterman. "Experienced discrimination? Statistical trends" ("Gediscrimineerd gevoeld? Statistische trends"). The Hague, Statistics Netherlands, 2022. Op. cit. EU Agency for Fundamental Right, Fundamental Rights Report, 2023.
[1606] Study by J.Dagevos, M.De Voogd-Hamelink, R.Damen, "Established in the Netherlands, but it's not home. Initial findings of the Survey on Migrant Integration (sim2020)’ (Gevestigd, maar niet thuis. Eerste bevindingen uit de Survey integratie migranten (sim2020)). The Hague, The Netherlands Institute for Social Research, 2022. Op. cit. EU Agency for Fundamental Right, Fundamental Rights Report, 2023.
[1607] Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on the Netherlands (fifth monitoring cycle), adopted on 2 April 2019, published on 4 June 2019. https://rm.coe.int/fifth-report-on-the-netherlands/168094c577
[1608] The document defines the general approach of criminal law to racist and xenophobic speech and hate crimes.
[1609] The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report 2022. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2022-fundamental-rights-report-2022_en.pdf
[1610] https://rm.coe.int/ecri-conclusions-on-the-implementation-of-the-recommendations-in-respe/1680a59aee
[1611] Contributions on the Netherlands made during the fifth cycle of the Universal Periodic Review in November 2022. https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/upr/nl-index
[1612] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined twenty-second to twenty-fourth periodic reports of the Netherlands. August 2021. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2FC%2FNLD%2FCO%2F22-24&Lang=en
[1613] The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report 2023. waffenhttp://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2023-fundamental-rights-report-2023_en_1.pdf
[1615] Report of the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, E. Tendayi Achiume, following her visit to the Netherlands from 30 September to 7 October 2019. July 2020.
https://spinternet.ohchr.org/Download.aspx?SymbolNo=A%2fHRC%2f44%2f57%2fAdd.2&Lang=en
[1616] End of Mission Statement of the Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance at the Conclusion of Her Mission to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, The Hague, 7 October 2019.
[1617] Fourth Opinion of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities on the Netherlands (fourth monitoring cycle). Adopted on 3 April 2023, published on 24 August 2023. https://rm.coe.int/4th-op-netherlands-en/1680ac509f
[1618] The Netherlands is building a surveillance state for the poor, says UN rights expert. HRC special procedures press release, 16 October 2019. https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2019/10/netherlands-building-surveillance-state-poor-says-un-rights-expert
[1619] Statement by Balakrishnan Rajagopal, the Special Rapporteur of the UN Human Rights Council on the right to adequate housing, at the conclusion of the country visit to the Netherlands, 21 December 2023. https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/issues/housing/statements/20231221-eom-statement-netherlands-sr-housing.pdf
[1620] https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/opvang-vluchtelingen-uit-oekraine/cijfers-opvang-vluchtelingen-uit-oekraine-in-nederland
[1621] Report by Nils Muižnieks, Commissioner for Human Right of the Council of Europe, following his visit to the Netherlands, May 2014. https://rm.coe.int/16806db830
[1622] Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on the Netherlands (fifth monitoring cycle). Adopted on 2 April 2019, published on 4 June 2019. https://rm.coe.int/fifth-report-on-the-netherlands/168094c577
[1623] Concluding observations of the Committee against Torture on the seventh periodic report of the Netherlands, December 2018. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CAT%2fC%2fNLD%2fCO%2f7&Lang=en
[1624] Report of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, Ahmed Shaheed, following his visit to the Netherlands from 27 March to 5 April 2019. February 2020.
https://spinternet.ohchr.org/Download.aspx?SymbolNo=A/HRC/43/48/Add.1&Lang=en
[1625] Report of the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, E. Tendayi Achiume, following her visit to the Netherlands from 30 September to 7 October 2019. July 2020.
https://spinternet.ohchr.org/Download.aspx?SymbolNo=A/HRC/44/57/Add.2&Lang=en
[1626] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child on the combined fifth and sixth periodic reports of the Netherlands, February 2022.
https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G22/280/48/PDF/G2228048.pdf?OpenElement
[1627] Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee on the fifth periodic report of the Netherlands, July 2019. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR/C/NLD/CO/5&Lang=en
[1628] Ombudsmannen: de crisisopvang is ‘tragisch’ en ‘ontmenselijkend’ – met name voor kinderen, NRC, 26 June 2023.
[1630] www.parool.nl/nederland/kabinet-haalt-derde-groep-op-uit-syrie-12-is-vrouwen-en-28-kinderen~b60ea0a3/
[1631] Dutch Court allows racial profiling. Press release by a group of human rights NGOs on the website of Amnesty International the Netherlands, 22 September 2021.
[1632] Border police ethnic profiling is discriminatory, appeal court rules, Dutch News, 14 February 2023. https://www.dutchnews.nl/news/2023/02/border-police-ethnic-profiling-is-discriminatory-appeal-court-rules/
[1633] The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report 2023.
[1634] Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee on the fifth periodic report of the Netherlands, July 2019.
[1635] Third opinion of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities on the Netherlands. Adopted on 6 March 2019. https://rm.coe.int/3rd-op-netherlands-en/168096953e
[1636] Fourth Opinion of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities on the Netherlands (fourth monitoring cycle). Adopted on 3 April 2023, published on 24 August 2023. https://rm.coe.int/4th-op-netherlands-en/1680ac509f
[1637] https://www.amnesty.nl/wat-we-doen/landen/mensenrechten-nederland/vluchtelingen-en-asielzoekers/curacao
[1638] Concluding observations of the Committee on Enforced Disappearances on the additional information submitted by the Netherlands, September 2023.
[1639] New Zealand Promises More Aid to Ukraine. RIA Novosti. 22 February 2024.
https://ria.ru/20240222/ukraina-1928877026.html
[1640] Giant “offensive symbol” appears on Auckland’s Pigeon Hill. The New Zealand Herald. 14 August 2022.
https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/giant-offensive-symbol-appears-on-aucklands-pigeon-hill/O3YMCW423MFCKTRACCPM6ZQG5M/#
[1641] ‘Grossly insensitive’: Swastika sign on Waimate panelbeaters. Otago Daily Times. 14 February 2024.
https://www.odt.co.nz/regions/south-canterbury/grossly-insensitive-swastika-sign-waimate-panelbeaters
[1642] Waihi Cemetery war graves desecrated in ‘shameful act of vandalism’, families devastated.
The New Zealand Herald. 10 June 2023.
[1643] RSA Angered As Another War Memorial Senselessly Vandalized. Scoop. 14 April 2024.
https://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/AK2404/S00328/rsa-angered-as-another-war-memorial-senselessly-vandalized.htm
[1644] Lists associated with Resolution 1373. New Zealand Police.
https://www.police.govt.nz/advice/personal-community/counterterrorism/designated-entities/lists-associated-with-resolution-1373
[1645] For more details on «Action Zealandia» see:
Action Zealandia, NZ’s largest neo-Nazi group, on the hunt for new recruits. The New Zealand Herald. 9 August 2021. https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/action-zealandia-nzs-largest-neo-nazi-group-on-the-hunt-for-new-recruits/BK56VEKDR5AJE2CMBVNAX2DKRA/#
Fascism 2.0: Lessons from six months in New Zealand’s largest white supremacist group. Critic te Ārohi. 9 August 2021.
https://www.critic.co.nz/features/article/9610/fascism-20-lessons-from-six-months-in-new-zealands
[1646] Neo-Nazi group Action Zealandia “unfit, ill-disciplined”, under cover researcher found. Stuff. 6 September 2022.
[1647] For more details on “Christchurch Call to Action to Eliminate Terrorist and Violent Extremist Content on the Internet” see article on Russian International Affairs Council:
https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/analytics/borba-globalnykh-tekhnologicheskikh-kompaniy-s-terroristicheskim-kontentom-v-internete/
[1648] Ex-New Zealand Premier Jacinda takes on new role to fight terrorism, extremist content online. Anadolu Ajansi. 4 April 2023.
https://www.aa.com.tr/en/world/ex-new-zealand-premier-jacinda-takes-on-new-role-to-fight-terrorism-extremist-content-online/2863133
[1649] Imprisonment for up to 3 months or a fine of 7,000 New Zealand’s dollars.
[1650] Royal Commission’s report of Inquiry into the terrorist attack on Christchurch masjidain on 15 March 2019. November 2020. https://christchurchattack.royalcommission.nz/the-report/
[1651] National Action Plan Against Racism. Ministry of Justice of New Zealand.
https://www.justice.govt.nz/justice-sector-policy/key-initiatives/national-action-plan-against-racism/
[1652] Racism against migrants prevalent in New Zealand, report finds. Radio New Zealand. 25 March 2021.
https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/national/439123/racism-against-migrants-prevalent-in-new-zealand-report-finds
[1653] Racism disproportionately affects visibly indigenous and ethnic minorities. University of Auckland News. 30 September 2022.
https://www.auckland.ac.nz/en/news/2022/09/30/racism-disproportionally-affects-visibly-indigenous-and-ethnic-m.html
[1654] Meng Foon: Covid-19 coronavirus fear no excuse for racism. NZ Human Rights Commission. 11 May 2020. https://covid19.hrc.co.nz/meng_foon_covid_19_coronavirus_fear_no_excuse_for_racism
[1655] Antisemitic incidents on rise in New Zealand. The Jewish Chronicle. 28 December 2023.
https://www.thejc.com/news/world/antisemitic-incidents-on-rise-in-new-zealand-hj3rorir
[1656] Israel-Hamas war: Christchurch synagogue vandalised, New Zealand Jewish Council calls for politicians to tone down language on conflict. The New Zealand Herald. 22 November 2023.
https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/israel-hamas-war-christchurch-synagogue-vandalised-new-zealand-jewish-council-calls-for-politicians-to-tone-down-language-on-conflict/2VVMZPHFLFEKLFIN3SLXHBMEB4/
[1657] Survey of Antisemitism in New Zealand 2021. The New Zealand Jewish Council. March 2022.
https://nzjc.org.nz/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/AntisemitismInNewZealand2021_FullReport.pdf
[1658] 63% of NZers hold at least one antisemitic view, new study finds. TVNZ. 30 March 2022.
https://www.renews.co.nz/63-of-nzers-hold-at-least-one-antisemitic-view-new-study-finds/
[1659] Rise in antisemitic and Islamophobic online content in NZ since Oct 7. 1News. 22 November 2023.
https://www.1news.co.nz/2023/11/22/rise-in-antisemitic-and-islamophobic-online-content-in-nz-since-oct-7/
[1660] Study exposes Islamophobia discrimination against Muslims in Aotearoa New Zeland. The Massey University of New Zealand. 30 July 2024.
https://www.massey.ac.nz/about/news/study-exposes-islamophobia-and-discrimination-against-muslims-in-aotearoa-new-zealand/
[1661] Ukraine Invasion: Russians in New Zealand facing hostility, abuse and bullying at school. Newshub. 14 March 2022. https://www.newshub.co.nz/home/new-zealand/2022/03/ukraine-invasion-russians-in-new-zealand-facing-hostility-abuse-and-bullying-at-school.html
[1662] “A true witch hunt is underway”: Russian migrants on foreigners’ aggression because of special military operation in Ukraine. RT. 11 March 2022.
https://russian.rt.com/ussr/article/974510-russkie-emigranty-travlya-specoperaciya
[1663] Most Maori experience racism every day – new research. Radio New Zealand. 22 March 2021.
https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/ldr/438895/most-maori-experience-racism-every-day-new-research
[1664] Reports on racism raise challenges in election year. Newsroom. 5 February 2023.
https://www.newsroom.co.nz/reports-on-racism-raise-challenges-in-election-year
[1665] The Treaty of Waitangi, Те Tiriti о Waitangi (Maori) – a treaty concluded in 1849 between the British authorities and 539 chiefs of Maori tribes. According to this document, Maori relinquish their sovereignty to the British crown and in return they keep their lands indefeasible. The Treaty of Waitangi was not ratified by the Great Britain, however it still is one of the defining documents for New Zeaalnd’s social order. Since 1975, the specially created Waitangi Tribunal has been monitoring the respect of the spirit of this treaty as constitutional act. The Tribunal issues recommendations following the consideration of complaints submitted by Maori with relation to violations of this document’s provisions.
[1666] Thousands gather in New Zealand to protest government’s Indigenous policies. Al Jazeera. 5 December 2023.
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/5/thousands-gather-in-new-zealand-to-protest-governments-indigenous-policies
[1667] Winston Peters “not going back” on co-governance Nazi reference. RNZ. 18 March 2024.
https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/political/511997/winston-peters-not-going-back-on-co-governance-nazi-reference
[1668] Labour leader Chris Hipkins strikes back after Winston Peters’ Nazi comparison. Newshub. 17 March 2024.
https://www.newshub.co.nz/home/politics/2024/03/labour-leader-chris-hipkins-strikes-back-after-winston-peters-nazi-comparison.html
[1669] Whanaketia – Through pain and trauma, from darkness to light. The Royal Commission of Inquiry into Abuse in Care. 2024. https://www.abuseincare.org.nz/
[1670] “National disgrace”: landmark New Zealand report finds 200,000 victims of abuse in care. The Guardian. 24 July 2024. https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/jul/24/new-zealand-royal-commission-abuse-state-religious-care-report-ntwnfb
[1671] Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee on the 6th periodic report of New Zealand. March 2016.
[1672] Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the 4th periodic report of New Zealand. March 2018. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=E%2fC.12%2fNZL%2fCO%2f4&Lang=ru
[1673] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women on the 8th periodic report of New Zealand. July 2018. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CEDAW%2fC%2fNZL%2fCO%2f8&Lang=ru
[1674] Labour market statistics: December 2023 quarter. Stats NZ. 7 February 2024.
https://www.stats.govt.nz/information-releases/labour-market-statistics-december-2023-quarter/
[1675] Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee on the 6th periodic report of New Zealand.
March 2016.
[1676] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 21st and 22nd periodic reports of New Zealand. August 2017. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2fC%2fNZL%2fCO%2f21-22&Lang=ru
[1677] Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the 4th periodic report of New Zealand. March 2018.
[1678] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women on the 8th periodic report of New Zealand. July 2018. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CEDAW%2fC%2fNZL%2fCO%2f8&Lang=ru
[1679] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities on the combined 2nd and 3rd periodic reports of New Zealand. September 2022. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CRPD%2fC%2fNZL%2fCO%2f2-3&Lang=en
[1680] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 21st and 22nd periodic reports of New Zealand. August 2017. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2fC%2fNZL%2fCO%2f21-22&Lang=ru
[1681] Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the 4th periodic report of New Zealand. March 2018. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=E%2fC.12%2fNZL%2fCO%2f4&Lang=ru
[1682] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 21st and 22nd periodic reports of New Zealand. August 2017. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2fC%2fNZL%2fCO%2f21-22&Lang=ru
[1683] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child on the 6th periodic report of New Zealand. February 2023. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CRC%2FC%2FNZL%2FCO%2F6&Lang=en
[1684] Ibid.
[1685] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 21st and 22nd periodic reports of New Zealand. August 2017. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2fC%2fNZL%2fCO%2f21-22&Lang=ru
[1686] Ibid.
[1687] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child on the 6th periodic report of New Zealand. February 2023. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CRC%2FC%2FNZL%2FCO%2F6&Lang=en
[1688] Concluding observations of the Committee against Torture on the 7th periodic report of New Zealand. July 2023. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CAT%2FC%2FNZL%2FCO%2F7&Lang=en
[1689] Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee on the 6th periodic report of New Zealand.
[1690] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 21st and 22nd periodic reports of New Zealand. August 2017. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2fC%2fNZL%2fCO%2f21-22&Lang=ru
[1691] Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the 4th periodic report of New Zealand. March 2018. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=E%2fC.12%2fNZL%2fCO%2f4&Lang=ru
[1692] Headstones destroyed days before 160th anniversary of Rangiriri battle. 1News. 15 November 2023. https://www.1news.co.nz/2023/11/15/headstones-destroyed-days-before-160th-anniversary-of-rangiriri-battle/
[1693] Maori graves damaged by vandals at Waikumete Cemetery in West Auckland. The New Zealand Herald.
31 December 2023.
https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/maori-graves-damaged-by-vandals-at-waikumete-cemetery-in-west-auckland/5LY7PNNZDZAZZHY4XTQVDRMQUI/
[1694] One of the rare exclusions is the desecration of the monument in memory of Oswald anti-fascist group in Oslo (2017). The monument was covered with red paint by vandals, as most of the group's members were communists. Those responsible were not found.
[1695] On 7 October 2021, in the northern Norwegian municipality of Hasvik, in the presence of Frank Bakke-Jensen, Norwegian Minister of Defence, the grand opening of the monument took place at the site of the death of the Soviet crew of the Catalina flying boat (crashed in June 1944 on the island of Sørøya in Northern Norway during the ferry from the United States to the Soviet Union as part of the Lend-lease programme in 1944-1945).
[1696] Norway is divided into 15 counties ("fylke").
[1697] The invitation was later extended to Vladimir Zelensky.
[1698] https://russian.rt.com/science/article/1312428-norvegiya-voina-intervyu
[1699] The most up-to-date official data on neo-Nazism in Norway can be found in a report "Right-Wing Extremism in Norway: Developmental Features, Conspiracy Theories and Prevention Strategies" by the Police Academy, Centre for Research on Extremism (C-REX) and Centre for Holocaust and Religious Minority Studies, commissioned by the Norwegian Ministry of Justice, and a report "Supporters of Right-Wing Extremism in Norway, Who Are They?" by the Norwegian Police Security Service.
[1700] He has been involved in various right-wing extremist communities for 20 years and was sentenced to a year and two months in prison in 2002 for stabbing two migrants.
[1701] https://www.gazeta.ru/politics/news/2022/10/30/18913267.shtml?updated
[1702] https://www.gazeta.ru/politics/news/2022/10/30/18913267.shtml?updated
[1703] https://www.nrk.no/nyheter/30-utenlandske-borgere-pagrepet-under-nazi-demonstrasjon-i-oslo-1.16158240
[1704] https://ria.ru/20221030/norvegiya-1827838251.html
[1705] In November 2019, he was sentenced to a 30-day suspended jail sentence and fined for inciting hatred by addressing a SIAN rally in Oslo in July 2018. The court ruled that his utterances that "the more Muslims are religious, the more they are cruel", and "they should be deported to some remote region where they can worship their retarded ideology of oppression", incite hatred.
[1706] Klassekampen, 27 April 2022. Available at: https://mfa.gov.by/kcfinder/upload/files/22.07.04_report_HR_2.pdf
[1707] The PST's Report: "National Threat Assessment," February 2023. Available at:
https://politietstryggingsteneste.no/globalassets/2023/ntv/ntv_2023_eng_web.pdf.
[1709] Article on the NRK State Broadcasting Corporation's website, 29 March 2022. Available at: https://www.nrk.no/urix/azov-regimentet-i-ukraina_-hoyreekstrem-trussel-eller-vanlige-soldater_-1.15904686.
[1710] Message on the NRK State Broadcasting Corporation's website, 20 March 2022. Available at: https://www.nrk.no/trondelag/haerverk-pa-krigskirkegard-i-verdal-1.15900959; article on the Adresseavisen website, 20 March 2022. Available at: https://www.adressa.no/nyheter/i/dnePJq/minnelund-tagget-ned-a-vandalisere-dette-er-bare-trist.
[1711] Report on the "Attitudes towards Jews and Muslims in Norway 2022," November 2022. Available at: https://www.hlsenteret.no/forskning/jodisk-historie-og-antisemittisme/holdningsundersokelsene/holdningsundersokelsen-2022/attitudes-towards-jews-and-muslims-in-norway-2022.pdf.
[1712] Report on the "Attitudes towards Jews and Muslims in Norway 2022," November 2022. Available at: https://www.hlsenteret.no/forskning/jodisk-historie-og-antisemittisme/holdningsundersokelsene/holdningsundersokelsen-2022/attitudes-towards-jews-and-muslims-in-norway-2022.pdf.
[1713] Report on the "Attitudes towards Jews and Muslims in Norway 2022," November 2022. Available at: https://www.hlsenteret.no/forskning/jodisk-historie-og-antisemittisme/holdningsundersokelsene/holdningsundersokelsen-2022/attitudes-towards-jews-and-muslims-in-norway-2022.pdf.
[1714] Scientific information web-portal Forskning.no, 6 May 2024.
[1715] Aftenposten, 8 November 2023; and the NRK, 31 October 2023.
[1716] https://www.politiet.no/aktuelt-tall-og-fakta/aktuelt/nyheter/2023/12/31/midlertidig-bevapning-av-politiet-i-nyttarshelgen/; https://iz.ru/1629116/2024-01-01/v-norvegii-reshili-vremenno-vooruzhit-politceiskikh-iz-za-ugrozy-antisemitizma
[1717] Scientific information web-portal Forskning.no, 6 May 2024.
[1718] Report on the "Attitudes towards Jews and Muslims in Norway 2022," November 2022. Available at: https://www.hlsenteret.no/forskning/jodisk-historie-og-antisemittisme/holdningsundersokelsene/holdningsundersokelsen-2022/attitudes-towards-jews-and-muslims-in-norway-2022.pdf.
[1719] Report "Attitudes to immigration, integration and diversity in Norway," June 2022. Available at: imdi.no/contentassets/dc454492316546a190861bd07159bda8/integreringsbarometeret-2022.pdf.
[1720] https://islamnews.ru/2024/4/8/politsiyu-norvegii-vooruzhili-pered-uraza-bayramom; https://sarajevotimes.com/norway-to-arm-police-due-to-frequent-threats-to-muslim-community/
[1721] https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/20447919; https://www.zakon.kz/mir/6429760-organizatora-aktsiy-s-sozhzheniem-korana-deportiruyut-iz-norvegii.html; https://islamnews.ru/2024/4/5/salvan-momika-arestovan-v-norvegii; https://www.aftonbladet.se/.
[1722] See, for example: Menneskerettighetene i Norge 2019. NIMs årsmelding, Dokument 6 (2019–2020).
https://www.nhri.no/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/NIM_A%CC%8Arsmelding_2019_web.pdf; Menneske-rettighetene i Norge 2018. NIMs årsmelding, Dokument 6 (2018-2019).
https://www.nhri.no/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/NIM_Arsmelding_2018_web-1.pdf.
[1723] Report "Attitudes towards Sami and national minorities in Norway," August 2022. Available at: https://www.nhri.no/rapport/holdninger-til-samer-og-nasjonale-minoriteter-i-norge/?showall=true.
[1724] Report "Attitudes towards Sámi and national minorities in Norway," August 2022. Available at: https://www.nhri.no/rapport/holdninger-til-samer-og-nasjonale-minoriteter-i-norge/?showall=true.
[1725] Report on the "Attitudes towards Jews and Muslims in Norway 2022," November 2022. Available at: https://www.hlsenteret.no/forskning/jodisk-historie-og-antisemittisme/holdningsundersokelsene/holdningsundersokelsen-2022/attitudes-towards-jews-and-muslims-in-norway-2022.pdf.
[1726] Aftenposten newspaper, 7 December 2022.
[1727] Aftenposten newspaper, 6 March 2024.
[1728] Aftenposten newspaper, 6 March 2024.
[1729] Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report, June 2023. Available at: https://www.stortinget.no/globalassets/pdf/sannhets--og-forsoningskommisjonen/rapport-til-stortinget-fra-sannhets--og-forsoningskommisjonen.pdf
[1730] The most widespread of the Sámi languages, Northern Sámi, is now spoken by 25,000 people. Given current trends and in the absence of new incentives, this number could be reduced by 60 per cent in the coming years.
[1731] Address by Masud Gharahkhani on the occasion of presentation of the report by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 1 June 2023. Available at:
[1732] The NRK State Broadcasting Corporation's website, 20 September 2023.
[1733] Meld. St. 31 (2019–2020). Samisk språk, kultur og samfunnsliv — Digitalisering.
https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/meld.-st.-31-20192020/id2729805/?ch=1.
[1734] About 55,600 Sámi since 2011, with only about 17,000 Sámi listed in the unofficial lists of Sameting (the Sámi Parliament).
[1735] Includes six dialects: Northern Sámi, Southern Sámi, Lule Sámi, Pite Sámi, Ume Sámi, and Skolt Sámi. All of them are listed as endangered by UNESCO.
[1736] Article on the NRK State Broadcasting Corporation's website, 11 October 2022. Available at: https://www.nrk.no/trondelag/leif-arne-jama-fikk-medhold-i-hoyesterett_-ett-ar-senere-star-turbinene-fortsatt-i-fosen-fjellene-1.16132575.
[1737] https://www.domstol.no/globalassets/upload/hret/avgjorelser/2021/oktober-2021/hr-2021-1975-s.pdf.
[1738] According to Article 7 of the Energy Law, a valid license is required for energy production.
[1739] Aftenposten website. https://www.aftenposten.no/norge/politikk/abmq3d/stoere-skulle-besoeke-barnehage-maatte-snu-etter-sterke-protester-fra-foreidre?
[1740] In 2023, the Prime Minister visited the Nedre Bekkelaget school.
[1741] https://kmns.ru/blog/2024/02/06/8112/
[1742] Article 27 of the Covenant provides for the right of ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities to enjoy their own culture and language and to profess and practice their own religion.
[1743] Report submitted by Norway Pursuant to the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. Submitted on 14 September 2020. https://rm.coe.int/5th-sr-norway-en/16809f9f59
[1744] Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. Fifth Opinion on Norway. Adopted on 2 February 2022, published 19 May 2022. https://rm.coe.int/5th-op-norway-en/1680a685c5
[1745] Holdninger til diskriminering, likestilling og hatprat i Norge. 2. utgave. Guri Tyldum. Fafo-rapport 2019:26 https://www.fafo.no/zoo-publikasjoner/fafo-rapporter/item/holdninger-til-diskriminering-likestilling-og-hatprat-i-norge-2-utgave.
[1746] Aftenposten, 21 March 2024. Bufdir website, 21 March 2024.
[1747] Dagbladet, 31 August 2023.
[1748] Aftenposten, 21 March 2024.
[1749] Aftenposten, 21 March 2024. Bufdir website, 21 March 2024.
[1750] Oslo Police District report "Hate Crime in Norway - Annual Report for 2022", June 2023.
[1751] Controls without Control, October 2022.
[1752] Aftenposten, 17 August 2023.
[1753] https://apnews.com/; https://www.vesti.ru/article/4031637; https://tass.ru/proisshestviya/21280207
[1754] Dagbladet, 27 April 3 May 2023.
[1755] Dagsavisen Daily, 10 October 2023.
[1756] NRK, 24 August 2023.
[1757] Klassekampen, 11 May 2023.
[1758] Klassekampen, 18 September 2023.
[1759] NRK website, 25 January 2022. https://www.nrk.no/vestland/yasin-kan-bli-tvangsreturnert-til-talibans-afghanistan-1.15820481.
[1760] Aftenposten, 19 November 2022.
[1761] Aftenposten, 31 October 2023.
[1762] Dagbladet, 18 September 2023.
[1763] Norway 2022 Human Rights Report, 2023. https://www.nhri.no/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/NIM_A%CC%8Arsmelding_2022_web-1.pdf.
[1764] NRK website, 9 January 2024.
[1765] NRK website, 30 August 2023.
[1766] NRK website, 6 December 2022. https://www.nrk.no/vestland/432-barn-og-ungdommer-har-forsvunnet-fra-norske-asylmottak.-politiet-leter-sjelden-etter-asylsokerne-1.16184402.
[1767] NRK website, 26 January 2023. https://www.nrk.no/osloogviken/romske-barn-mister-sprak-og-kultur-i-fosterhjem_-_-bryter-barnekonvensjonen-1.16243406.
[1768] Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Norway (sixth monitoring cycle), adepted on 4 December 2020, published on 23 February 2021. https://rm.coe.int/6th-report-on-norway-/1680a17dd8
[1769] ECRI conclusions on the implementation of the recommendations in respect of Norway, adopted on 29 March 2023, published on 23 June 2023. https://rm.coe.int/interim-follow-up-conclusions-on-norway-6th-monitoring-cycle/1680ab9e2f
[1770] Professional Guide to Religion for Guardianship Authorities Fagdag om religion med barnevernet i Stavanger (in Norwegian), accessed on 01.03.2023.
https://rm.coe.int/interim-follow-up-conclusions-on-norway-6th-monitoring-cycle/1680ab9e2f
[1771] NRK website, 25 June 2024.
[1772] Aftenposten, 14 January 2023.
[1773] Aftenposten, 10 November 2023.
[1774] NRK, 24 January 2024.
[1775] Regjeringen.no, 9 June 2022.
[1777] Aftenposten, 12 May 2023.
[1778] As of February 2024, the applications of 377 Russians have been considered. Of these, 174 were positive, 16 were refused, 58 withdrew their applications, and 129 citizens were granted temporary collective asylum along with Ukrainians. The remaining applications are still being processed.
[1779] NRK, 22 March, 2022. https://www.nrk.no/norge/ matte-oppgi-drommen-om-a-fly-jagerfly-fordi-mor-er-russisk-1.15895024.
[1780] See more on this in the Report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation "On Violations of the Rights of Russian Citizens and Fellow Citizens in Foreign Countries" https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/humanitarian_cooperation/-/asset_publisher/bB3NYd16mBFC/content/id/4641517
[1781] NRK, Thursday, May 04, 2023. https://www.nrk.no/urix/har-tysk-pass-_-nektes-likevel-a-delta-i-dronning-sonja-sangkonkurranse-1.16396346.
[1782] Dagsavisen online, 28 February 2022. https://www.dagsavisen.no/ nyheter/2022/02/28/redd-barna-russiske-barn-i-norge-hetses-for-krigen-i-ukraina/.
[1783] Dagbladet online, 11 March 2022. https://dagbladet.no/nyheter/vil-ikke-ha-russere-pa-vare-hotell/75595687; cтатья на сайте гостелерадиокомпании «НРК» от 25 февраля 2022 г.: https://www.nrk.no/vestland/turistvert-seier-nei-til-alle-russiske-gjester-1.15869639.
[1784] Verdens Gang online, 30 March 2022. https://vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/i/k6O9dL/russiskfoedt-kvinne-nekted-helsehjelp-i-moss-fikk-beskjed-om-aa-se-paa-tv.
[1785] NRK, Monday, July 11, 2022. https://www.nrk.no/norge/julia-fikk-ikke-jobb-fordi-hun-er-russisk_-_-klart-tilfelle-av-diskriminering-1.16026902.
[1786] NRK, Friday, February 25, 2022. https://www.nrk.no/vestland/turistvert-seier-nei-til-alle-russiske-gjester-1.15869639.
[1787] Dagbladen online, 11 March 2022. https://dagbladet.no/nyheter/vil-ikke-ha-russere-pa-vare-hotell/75595687.
[1788] NRK, Tuesday, March 15, 2022. https://www.nrk.no/innlandet/maria-pa-12-ar-ble-overfalt-etter-a ha-snakket-pa-russisk-med-moren-i-telefon-pa-vei-hjem.-1.15893367.
[1789] NRK, Tuesday, March 15, 2022. https://www.nrk.no/innlandet/maria-pa-12-ar-ble-overfalt-etter-a-ha-snakket-pa-russisk-med-moren-i-telefon-pa-vei-hjem.-1.15893367.
[1790] Ms Kluyeva's report to the Russian Embassy.
[1791] Kivioja's report to the Russian Embassy.
[1792] E.Sazonova's report to the Russian Embassy.
[1793] Verdens Gang online, 30 March 2022. https://vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/i/k6O9dL/russiskfoedt-kvinne-nekted-helsehjelp-i-moss-fikk-beskjed-om-aa-se-paa-tv.
[1794] NRK, Thursday, May 04, 2023. https://www.nrk.no/urix/har-tysk-pass-_-nektes-likevel-a-delta-i-dronning-sonja-sangkonkurranse-1.16396346.
[1795] Oslo Police District report "Hate Crime in Norway - Annual Report for 2022", June 2023. https://www.politiet.no/globalassets/dokumenter/oslo/rapporter/anmeldt-hatkriminalitet-oslo/hatkriminalitet-i-norge-2022.pdf/
[1796] These statements are at least controversial, as they may suggest that in Norway - unlike Russia and most other countries of the world - its main organs of power (except for the king) are not formed as a result of the people's participation in free elections.
[1797] Para 19 of the Regulations of 15 August 2014 No. 1076 relating to restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty, independence and stability of Ukraine prohibits "aircraft" owned or controlled by Russian individuals/legal entities from landing/taking off in and overflying the territory of Norway.
[1798] NRK, 29 November 2022. https://www.nrk.no/tromsogfinnmark/russer-domt-til-120-dagers-fengsel-etter-a-ha-flovet-drone-i-norge-1.16199601;
NRK, 7 December 2022. https//www.nrk.no/tromsogfinnmark/dronetiltalte-andrey-yakunin-frikjent-i-tingretten-1.16211859; NRK, 2 February 2023. https//www.nrk.no/tromsogfinnmark/dronetiltalte-andrey-yakunin-frikjent-for-ulovlig-droneflyvning-1.16282160;
Dagbladet, 6 September 2023. https://www.dagbladet.no/studio/nyhetsstudio/5?post=144863?post=144863;
NRK, 23 November 2022. https://www.nrk.no/vestland/russar-domd-til-90-dagar-fengsel-for- droneflyging-i-noreg-1.16192196; NRK, 28 November 2022. https://www.nrk.no/tromsogfinnmark/russer-som-floy-med-drone-i-kirkenes-nekter-straffskyld-_-var-pa-jobbreise-for-russiske-myndigheter-1.16198402).
[1799] NRK, 14 February 2024.https://www.nrk.no/tromsogfinnmark/forretningsmannen-andrey-yakunin-er-frikjent-for-andre-gang-1.16763560
[1800] https://iz.ru/1700856/2024-05-23/norvegiia-vvela-dopolnitelnye-ogranicheniia-na-vezd-dlia-grazhdan-iz-rossii; https://norway.mid.ru/ru/consular-services/raznoe/vnimaniyu_grazhdan_rossiyskoy_
federatsii_poseshchayushchikh_norvegiyu_i_sootechestvennikov/
[1801] https://iz.ru/1700922/2024-05-23/v-kremle-nazvali-diskriminatcionnymi-ogranicheniia-norvegii-na-vezd-dlia-rossiian
[1802] The Institute of National Remembrance – Commission for the Prosecution of Crimes against the Polish Nation operates in accordance with the Act of 1998 (as amended). Its primary obligations comprise of gathering and analysing documents from state security institutions drafted between 22 July 1944 and 31 July 1990, investigating Nazi and communist criminal activity, conducting educational activities, searching for burial sites, as well as providing opinions on the presence of communist or any other totalitarian system propaganda in public spaces, buildings, objects and institutions. The last-mentioned task was assigned after the implementation of the "decommunisation law" in 2016.
[1803] https://www.prezydent.pl/aktualnosci/wypowiedzi-prezydenta-rp/wywiady/wywiad-dla-telewizji-lsm-calosc,55783
[1804] https://www.prezydent.pl/aktualnosci/wypowiedzi-prezydenta-rp/wystapienia/nowy-jork-wypowiedz-prezydenta-dla-mediow,58864; https://www.tvp.info/64019062/wlochy-prezydent-andrzej-duda-udzielil-wywiadu-telewizji-rai-we-wtorek-wieczorem
[1805] https://www.prezydent.pl/aktualnosci/wypowiedzi-prezydenta-rp/wystapienia/wystapienie-prezydenta-rp-na-monte-cassino,86063
[1806] https://www.prezydent.pl/aktualnosci/wypowiedzi-prezydenta-rp/wystapienia/wystapienie-prezydenta-rp-w-mlawie,82099
[1807] https://wiadomosci.wp.pl/ogromna-skala-pomocy-ukrainie-nawet-90-procent-z-polski-6797051920595936a
[1808] The National Armed Forces (NSZ) was one of the underground military organisations that collaborated with the Nazis. The Świętokrzyska Brigade, a part of the NSZ, fought alongside SS forces against the Red Army in 1944-1945, retreating with the Nazis into Germany in 1945.
[1809] https://ipn.gov.pl/pl/aktualnosci/148025,77-rocznica-powstania-Brygady-Swietokrzyskiej-Narodowych-Sil-Zbrojnych-Warszawa-.html
[1810] https://ipn.gov.pl/pl/aktualnosci/170669,Obchody-80-rocznicy-powstania-Narodowych-Sil-Zbrojnych-20-wrzesnia-2022.html
[1811] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/31102022-fsb-rassekretila-dokumenty-o-prestupleniyakh-polskikh-band-v-velikuyu-otechestvennuyu-voynu/
[1812] The Polish armed nationalist (anti-Soviet) underground members were responsible for killing civilians, including women and children, Orthodox Belarusians in eastern Poland (Podlasie), Jews, and Poles. One of the commanders, Romuald Rajs ("Brown"), was part of the "Cursed". All underground paramilitary organisations in the territory of Poland occupied by German troops were united in the Armia Krajowa during World War II. After Poland was liberated by the Soviets in 1944-1945, certain members of this organisation who refused to participate in the fight against the Nazis initiated an underground resistance, in collaboration with their compatriots and the Red Army soldiers.
[1813] https://www.prezydent.pl/aktualnosci/wypowiedzi-prezydenta-rp/wystapienia/art,989,wystapienie-podczas-centralnych-obchodow-narodowego-dnia-pamieci-zolnierzy-wykletych.html
[1814] https://www.prezydent.pl/aktualnosci/wypowiedzi-prezydenta-rp/listy/przeslanie-z-okazji-narodowego-dnia-pamieci-zolnierzy-wykletych,80435
[1815] https://bydgoszcz.wyborcza.pl/bydgoszcz/7,48722,29519885,ulicami-bydgoszczy-przeszedl-marsz-narodowcow-ku-czci-zolnierzy.html
[1818]Poland believes that Russian culture should disappear from the public sphere. The RBC. 4 April 2022. https://www.rbc.ru/politics/04/04/2022/624ae60d9a7947ec8b2d2561
[1819] https://kultura.gazeta.p1/kultura/7.l 14526.30617268.rosviski-pianista-zagra-w-polsce-wstvd-i-hanba-filharmonia.html
[1821] https://bip.warszawa.pl/Menu_przedmiotowe/ogloszenia/zgromadzenia_publiczne/wykaz_zgromadzen_2.htm
[1822] https://www.rmf24.pl/regiony/lublin/news-koniec-sledztwa-ws-siatki-szpiegowskiej-w-polsce-16-osob-na-,nId,7163111#crp_state=1
[1823] https://www.pap.pl/aktualnosci/14-obywateli-ukrainy-bialorusi-i-rosji-skazanych-za-szpiegostwo-na-rzecz-rosji
[1824] https://katowice.tvp.pl/70958551/szpieg-zatrzymany-maksym-s-byl-czlonkiem-pierwszoligowego-klubu
[1827] https://www.polskieradio.pl/399/7977/artykul/3328914,bialystok-rosjanin-i-bialorusin-nieprawomocnie-skazani-za-szpiegostwo
[1828] https://www.rmf24.pl/fakty/polska/news-tusk-o-rosyjskich-sabotazach-w-polsce-aresztowano-dziewiec-o,nId,7522796#crp_state=1
[1829] https://www.sport.pl/pilka/7,64946,30955707,rybus-obchodzi-dzien-zwyciestwa-z-przypietym-nacjonalistycznym.html
[1830] https://www.pap.pl/aktualnosci/news%2C1136300%2Cprezes-ipn-czas-dokonczyc-dekomunizacje-polskiej-przestrzeni-publicznej
[1832] The law came into force in September 2016. It provided for the removal from public space of names associated with persons, organisations, events and dates symbolising "the repressive, authoritarian and non-sovereign regime in Poland in 1944-1989". Initially, the law did not apply to monuments, however, in July 2017, it was amended to remove from public space any objects "symbolising communism or other totalitarian system or propagandising this system" within a year of their entry into force (the deadline for complying with these provisions of the law was subsequently shortened to 31 March 2018). In practice, the Polish authorities failed to meet the deadline. Less than 100 monuments to Soviet soldiers-liberators not connected with burials (compared to 561 in 1997) have been preserved.
[1833] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TbuzeK2TZ_k и @WyrzykowskiP
[1834] https://topwar.ru/242464-mvd-rossii-objavilo-v-rozysk-rjad-byvshih-i-nyneshnih-pribaltijskih-i-polskih-chinovnikov-za-snos-pamjatnikov-sovetskim-voinam-osvoboditeljam.html?ysclid=lwgir8zfq2556827709
[1836] Poland has called the release of Hitler's Mein Kampf in the country a "mockery". Zvezda. 23 January 2021. https://tvzvezda.ru/news/20211231822-ZDi5V.html
[1837] Poland published Hitler's "Mein Kampf", France is next. Rossiyskaya Gazeta. 20 January 2021.
https://rg.ru/2021/01/20/v-polshe-vypustili-majn-kampf-gitlera-na-ocheredi-franciia.html
[1838] Poland published Hitler's "Mein Kampf", France is next. Rossiyskaya Gazeta. 20 January 2021.
https://rg.ru/2021/01/20/v-polshe-vypustili-majn-kampf-gitlera-na-ocheredi-franciia.html
[1840] https://rzeszow.wyborcza.pl/rzeszow/7,34962,29878012,klubowe-kolory-i-czcionka-z-worda-czy-to-wystarczy-uznac-ze.html
[1842] A Polish extreme right-wing organisation (established in 1993), taking the name of the party of the same name that was active before World War II. The pre-war party was ideologically influenced by Italian fascism.
[1843] The National Movement (RN) is a Polish nationalist political party founded in 2014. It is part of the political association Confederation Liberty and Independence (KWN) along with the political parties Coalition for the Renewal of the Republic of Liberty and Hope (KORWiN) and Confederation of the Polish Crown.
RN advocates Poland's withdrawal from the EU and rejects the presence of NATO and US troops on Polish territory. Its leader is the Sejm deputy Robert Winnicki.
[1844] In particular, it is known about the participation of members of the "Stormtroopers" structure, a Polish extremist nationalist organisation. It opposes capitalism and the "dictate" of Brussels and advocates the creation of a "pure" Polish state based on traditional values. In July 2019, after the arrest of its leader, the organisation ceased to exist, moving into the format of "individual actions" of its former members.
[1846] https://bip.brpo.gov.pl/pl/content/jak-sciga-sie-propagowanie-i-pochwalanie-faszyzmu-prokuratura-krajowa-w-koncu-ujawnila-rpo
[1847] Together party is a Polish left-wing party. It was founded in 2015.
[1848] https://wiadomosci.onet.pl/olsztyn/sad-najwyzszy-zdecydowal-mozna-nazywac-onr-organizacja-faszystowska/wh2tfeh
[1849] Far-right group can be called "fascist", rules Poland's Supreme Court. Notes from Poland. 28 February 2021. https://notesfrompoland.com/2021/02/28/far-right-group-can-be-called-fascists-rules-polands-supreme-court/
[1850] https://www.nigdywiecej.org/komunikaty/komunikaty/193-rok-2021/4528-platformy-aukcyjne-kasuja-rasizm
[1851] https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/international/europe/1636821465-poland-chanting-death-to-jews-far-right-activists-burn-book-on-jewish-rights
[1852] https://bielsk.eu/hajnowka/41586-marszu-pamieci-zolnierzy-wykletych-nie-bedzie-dzis-wiecznaja-pamiat-i-uczczenie-pamieci-ofiar-oddzialu-burego
[1853] https://bielsk.eu/hajnowka/45376-organizator-marszu-srodowisk-narodowych-w-hajnowce-przed-sadem-zapadl-wyrok
[1854] https://www.gov.pl/web/rodzina/ministra-agnieszka-dziemianowicz-bak-nie-dla-gloryfikacji-jozefa-kurasia-ognia-oraz-brygady-swietokrzyskiej-nsz
[1855] It should be reminded that the National Armed Forces (NSZ) is one of the underground military organisations, which was stained by collaboration with the Nazis. A part of the NSZ called the Świętokrzyska Brigade, together with the SS troops, participated in battles against the Red Army in 1944-1945 and retreated with the Nazis in 1945 to the territory of Germany.
[1856] https://ordoiuris.pl/wolnosci-obywatelskie/murem-za-brygada-swietokrzyska-apel-w-obronie-pamieci-bohaterow
[1857] https://oko.press/marsz-ku-czci-burego-i-kontrmanifestacje-w-hajnowce-coroczny-wstyd-dla-panstwa-polskiego/
[1859] https://wydarzenia.interia.pl/raporty/raport-ukraina-rosja/aktualnosci/news-przemysl-troje-obywateli-indii-pobitych-przez-grupe-mezczyzn,nId,5863607
[1860] In 1941, a mass murder of Jews took place in Jedwabne. Until 2000, it was believed to have been carried out by the Germans, until the Polish-born American historian Jan Tomasz Gross published his book Sąsiedzi: Historia zagtady zydowskiego miasteczka (Neighbors: History of the Destruction of a Jewish Village), in which he showed that the pogrom was carried out by Polish residents of Jedwabne. Although the Polish Institute of National Remembrance generally confirmed this version in 2004, there are groups in Poland that do not agree with it.
[1863] https://wiez.pl/2023/07/12/imiona-lecace-ku-niebu-rocznica-w-jedwabnem-wsrod-protestow/
[1864] Civic Platform is a Polish liberal party founded on 19 January 2001, chaired by Donald Tusk. It is considered the main opposition party in Poland.
[1866] https://notesfrompoland.com/2022/11/10/poland-warns-of-putins-provocateurs-at-nationalist-independence-march-in-warsaw/
[1868] https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/international/europe/1636821465-poland-chanting-death-to-jews-far-right-activists-burn-book-on-jewish-rights
[1869] https://wroclaw.wyborcza.pl/wroclaw/7,35771,29133285,rosyjska-propaganda-na-marszu-narodowcow-we-wroclawiu-kim-sa.html
[1870] An Internet channel created on the YouTube platform by the Independence March organisation. In February 2023, the National Media channel, which had more than 250,000 subscribers, was blocked by Youtube. The blocking followed the publication of a report by the "Never Again" NGO, which concluded that some of National Media's videos contained xenophobic statements.
[1871] https://medianarodowe.com/2022/07/09/bakiewicz-trzeba-zawalczyc-o-prawde-nt-jedwabnego-nasz-wywiad/
[1875] https://notesfrompoland.com/2023/03/22/jewish-leaders-condemn-polish-coin-honouring-wwii-partisan-accused-of-murdering-jews/
[1879] https://wiadomosci.onet.pl/kraj/ipn-dr-tomasz-greniuch-stracil-prace-w-instytucie-pamieci-narodowej/hq7d3tg
[1880] The Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum (Auschwitz, Małopolskie Voivodeship) was opened in 1947 on the site of the former Nazi death camp.
[1882] https://bip.brpo.gov.pl/content/jak-sie-propagowanie-i-pochwakanie-faszyzmu-prokuratura-krajowa-w-koncu-ujawnila-rpo
[1883] https://www.rp.pl/przestepczosc/art39866611-spadla-liczba-grozb-i-przestepstw-z-nienawisci-tylko-zglaszanych
[1884] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined twenty-second and twenty-fourth periodic reports of Poland. August 2019 https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2fC%2fPOL%2fCO%2f22-24&Lang=ru
[1885] Letter from the Chairman of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination to the Permanent Representative of Poland to the United Nations Office at Geneva, 30 April 2021, CERD/103rdsession/FU/MK/ks https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CERD/Shared%20Documents/POL/INT_CERD_FUL_POL_44796_E.pdf
[1886] Fourth Opinion of the Advisory Committee to the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities on Poland. Adopted on 6 November 2019 https://rm.coe.int/4th-op-poland-en/1680993391
[1887] https://bip.brpo.gov.pl/pl/content/mowa-i-przestepstwa-z-nienawisci-polskie-prawo-nie-wymaga-zmian-Pelnomocnik-rzadu-RPO
[1888] Report of the European Commission against Intolerance and Racism on Poland (sixth monitoring cycle). Adopted on 27 June 2023, published on 18 September 2023 https://rm.coe.int/sixth-ecri-report-on-poland/1680ac8c62
[1889] Fifth Report of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities submitted by Poland, received on 7 March 2023 https://rm.coe.int/5th-sr-poland-en/1680aa76b1
[1890] Report of the European Commission against Intolerance and Racism on Poland (sixth monitoring cycle). Adopted on 27 June 2023, published on 18 September 2023 https://rm.coe.int/sixth-ecri-report-on-poland/1680ac8c62
[1891] https://www.rp.pl/przestepczosc/art39866611-spadla-liczba-grozb-i-przestepstw-z-nienawisci-tylko-zglaszanych
[1892] Concluding observations of the Committee against Torture on the seventh periodic report of Poland. August 2019 https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CAT/C/POL/CO/7&Lang=Ru
[1893] https://wyborcza.pl/7,75398,29281343,naciski-odbieranie-sledztw-umorzenia-jak-prokuratura-chroni.html
[1894] https://kalisz.wyborcza.pl/kalisz/7,181357,29340531,komendant-nie-wie-co-to-polin-tak-prokuratura-ziobry-legalizuje.html
[1895] https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2018/03/28/most-poles-accept-jews-as-fellow-citizens-and-neighbors-but-a-minority-do-not/
[1896] European Agency for Fundamental Rights. Overview of Antisemitic Incidents Recorded in the EU in 2012-2022. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2023-antisemitism-update-2012-2022_en.pdf
[1897] Report of the European Commission against Intolerance and Racism on Poland (sixth monitoring cycle). Adopted on 27 June 2023, published on 18 September 2023 https://rm.coe.int/sixth-ecri-report-on-poland/1680ac8c62
[1898] Experiences and perceptions of antisemitism. Second survey on discrimination and hate crime against Jews in the EU. The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. 2018. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2018-experiences-and-perceptions-of-antisemitism-survey_en.pdf
[1899] Jewish people’s experinces and perceptions of antisemitism. Third survey. The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. 2024. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2024-experiences-perceptions-antisemitism-survey_en.pdf
[1900] ADL. Poland. 2019. https://global100.adl.org/country/poland/2019
[1901] ADL. Poland. 2023. https://global100.adl.org/country/poland/2023
[1902] Judenrat was an administrative body of Jewish self-government during World War II, which, at the initiative of the German occupation authorities, was forcibly established in each ghetto to enforce Nazi orders concerning Jews.
[1904] https://www.rpo.gov.pl/sites/default/files/Odpowied%C5%BA%20KRRiT%2C10.09.2020.pdf
[1905] "Jewish property" in Poland – private property owned by Jews and taken away by the Nazis during World War II and nationalized in the post-war period – falls under this category.
[1906] https://www.polsatnews.pl/wiadomosc/2021-07-02/mlodziez-wszechpolska-wsypala-tone-gruzu-pod-ambasada-izraela-oto-wasze-mienie/
[1907] https://notesfrompoland.com/2022/04/25/polish-state-funded-nationalist-media-outlet-promotes-antisemitic-book/
[1908] https://notesfrompoland.com/2022/04/25/polish-state-funded-nationalist-media-outlet-promotes-antisemitic-book/
[1909] https://notesfrompoland.com/2021/06/30/stop-financing-fascism-polish-public-figures-tell-culture-minister-after-grants-to-far-right-groups/
[1910] Swastika, SS symbol painted on wall of Jewish cemetery near Auschwitz. The Times of Israel. 12 January 2021. https://www.timesofisrael.com/swastika-ss-symbol-painted-on-wall-of-jewish-cemetery-near-auschwitz/
[1911] https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/international/europe/1636821465-poland-chanting-death-to-jews-far-right-activists-burn-book-on-jewish-rights
[1912] https://www.timesofisrael.com/notorious-us-antisemite-arrested-in-poland-over-offensive-banner-at-auschwitz/
[1913] https://warszawa.wyborcza.pl/warszawa/7,54420,30332659,studentka-wum-z-norwegii-po-spotkaniu-z-dziekanem-prokuratura.html
[1914] https://warszawa.wyborcza.pl/warszawa/7,54420,30526786,studentka-z-norwegii-odpowiedzialna-za-antysemicki-transparent.html
[1915] The Confederation Liberty and Independence is an allience of radical nationalists and libertarians.
[1916] https://www.rmf24.pl/polityka/news-skandal-w-sejmie-grzegorz-braun-zgasil-swiece-chanukowe,nId,7205128#crp_state=1
[1917] https://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2021/К_030_21.PDF
[1918] https://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2021/К_030_21.PDF
[1919] Report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus "The Most Resonant Human Rights Violations in Certain Countries". 2022. https://mfa.gov.by/kcfinder/upload/files/22.07.04_report_HR_2.pdf
[1920] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/09112022-polskie-siloviki-izbili-bezhentsa-i-zastavili-bosikom-idti-na-territoriyu-belarusi/
[1921] The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report 2022. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2022-fundamental-rights-report-2022_en.pdf
[1922] This term refers to a situation in which a person is apprehended after crossing the border illegally and is expeditiously returned to a neighbouring country, regardless of his or her motives for crossing the border.
[1923] The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report 2023. http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2023-fundamental-rights-report-2023_en_1.pdf
[1924] The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report 2024. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2024-fundamental-rights-report-2024_en.pdf
[1925] Statement of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, Felipe González Morales, on his visit to Poland and Belarus (12 – 25 July 2022). 28 July 2022 https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/issues/migration/2022-07-27/EndofVisitStatement-Poland-Belarus26.07.2022.docx
[1926] Evaluation report (third evaluation round) of the CoE Group of Experts on Trafficking in Human Beings (GRETA) on Poland. Access to justice and effective remedies for victims of trafficking in human beings. Published on 9 June 2023 https://rm.coe.int/greta-evaluation-report-on-poland-3rd-evaluation-round-greta-2023-08-a/1680ab7039
[1928] https://notesfrompoland.com/2024/07/24/european-human-rights-commissioner-voices-concern-at-polands-response-to-belarus-border-crisis/
[1929] Report of the European Commission against Intolerance and Racism on Poland (sixth monitoring cycle). Adopted on 27 June 2023, published on 18 September 2023 https://rm.coe.int/sixth-ecri-report-on-poland/1680ac8c62
[1930] Poland: Poland: Human rights defenders face threats and intimidation at Belarus border – UN experts. 15 February 2022. https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/02/poland-human-rights-defenders-face-threats-and-intimidation-belarus-border
[1931] Ibid.
[1932] Statement by Reem Alsalem, Special Rapporteur of the UN Human Rights Council on violence against women, its causes and consequences, following her visit to Poland. 9 March 2023. 9 March 2023 https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/03/poland-upholding-full-spectrum-rights-key-ending-violence-against-women-and
[1933] https://www.nigdywiecej.org/docstation/com_docstation/64/zachowajmy_solidarnosc_z_uchodzcami._raport.pdf
[1934] https://biznes.newseria.pl/news/do-polski-z-ukrainy,p1581449955
[1935] https://www.gazetaprawna.pl/wiadomosci/kraj/artykuly/9317945,ukraincy-atakowani-nieco-czesciej-z-powodu-ich-narodowosci.html
[1936] https://walbrzych.wyborcza.pl/walbrzych/7,178336,30099918,brutalny-atak-kilkunastu-kiboli-na-dwoch-ukraincow-byli-uzbrojeni.html
[1937] The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report 2023. http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2023-fundamental-rights-report-2023_en_1.pdf
[1938] The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report 2023. http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2023-fundamental-rights-report-2023_en_1.pdf
[1939] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/24092022-v-varshave-proshla-demonstratsiya-protiv-ukrainizatsii-polshi/
[1940] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/07112022-v-polshe-ukrainskiy-restoran-smenil-nazvanie-izza-assotsiatsiy-s-upa/
[1941] Fourth Opinion of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities on Poland, adopted on 6 November 2019 https://rm.coe.int/4th-op-poland-en/1680993391
[1942] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child on the combined 5th and 6th periodic reports of Poland. September 2021 https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G21/361/07/PDF/G2136107.pdf?OpenElement
[1943] The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report 2022. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2022-fundamental-rights-report-2022_en.pdf
[1944] Report of the European Commission against Intolerance and Racism on Poland (sixth monitoring cycle). Adopted on 27 June 2023, published on 18 September 2023 https://rm.coe.int/sixth-ecri-report-on-poland/1680ac8c62
[1945] https://bip.brpo.gov.pl/pl/content/rpo-romowie-wiezienia-sw-ponowne-odpowiedz
[1946] Ukraine and Portugal sign security agreement. TASS. 28 May 2024.
[1947] Military correspondent Rozhin reported the death of the Portuguese Chavez who executed the Russian Armed Forces fighter. Rossiyskaya Gazeta.
4 July 2024.
[1948] Portuguese court allows prominent neo-Nazi to go to Ukraine. Rossiyskaya Gazeta. 21 March 2023. https://rg.ru/2022/03/21/portugalskij-sud-razreshil-izvestnomu-neonacistu-otpravitsia-na-ukrainu.html
[1949] Mário Machado sentenced to two years and 10 months in prison. País AO Minuto. 7 May 2024.
[1950] YouTube shuts Portuguese extreme-right group’s channel after NYT queries. Reuters. 13 August 2024.
[1951] Carneiro garante que não há infiltração "intencional" da extrema-direita na PSP e GNR. Público. 6 december 2022. http://www.publico.pt/2022/12/06/politica/noticia/carneiro-garante-nao-ha-infiltracao-intencional-extremadireita-psp-gnr-2030398
[1952] Report of the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights on the human rights situation in the EU Member States. 2023. http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2023-fundamental-rights-report-2023_en_1.pdf
[1953] Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Portugal (5th monitoring cycle). Adopted 19 June 2018, published 2 October 2018. https://rm.coe.int/fifth-report-on-portugal/16808de7da
[1954] Discrimination on the grounds of racial, religious or sexual intolerance.
[1955] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 18th and 19th periodic reports of Portugal. May 2023.
[1957] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 18th and 19th periodic reports of Portugal. May 2023. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2FC%2FPRT%2FCO%2F18-19&Lang=ru
[1958] Ibid.
[1959] Project Implicit. https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/takeatouchtest.html
[1961] Fourth Opinion of the Advisory Committee of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities on Portugal. Adopted 28 June 2019, published 27 January 2020.
[1962] Silêncio cúmplice com a grave situação de muitos imigrantes é racismo e xenophobia. Público. 11 february 2023.
[1963] Jornal de Noticias newspaper of 27 June 2024.
[1964] Jornal de Noticias newspaper of 14 May 2024.
[1965] ‘It’s a really big threat’: Portuguese minorities on the rise of the far right. The Guardian. 19 March 2024.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/19/portuguese-communities-on-the-rise-of-far-right-chega
[1966] Report of the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights on the human rights situation in the EU Member States. 2022. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2022-fundamental-rights-report-2022_en.pdf
[1967] As comunidades ciganas estão em protesto e querem mais nos processos de integração. Expresso. 12 April 2023. https://expresso.pt/sociedade/2023-04-11-As-comunidades-ciganas-estao-em-protesto-e-querem-mais-nos-processos-de-integracao-2f67280b
[1968] Comunidade denuncia racismo apesar da maior abertura política. Jornal de notícias. 18 January 2023.
[1969] Report of the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights on the human rights situation in the EU Member States. 2022. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2022-fundamental-rights-report-2022_en.pdf
[1970] See for example: Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the the 4th periodic report of Portugal. November 2014. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=E%2fC.12%2fPRT%2fCO%2f4&Lang=ru;
Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 15th to 17th periodic reports of Portugal. December 2016.
https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2fC%2fPRT%2fCO%2f15-17&Lang=ru;
Fourth Opinion of the Advisory Committee of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities on Portugal. Adopted 28 June 2019, published 27 January 2020.
https://rm.coe.int/4th-op-portugal-en/1680998662;
[1971] Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights upon consideration of the 4th periodic report of Portugal. November 2014.
https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=E%2fC.12%2fPRT%2fCO%2f4&Lang=ru
[1972] European Commission Report on Combating Racism and Intolerance on Portugal (fifth monitoring cycle). Adopted 19 June 2018, published 2 October 2018.
https://rm.coe.int/fifth-report-on-portugal/16808de7da
[1973] Fourth Opinion of the Advisory Committee of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities on Portugal. Adopted 28 June 2019, published 27 January 2020.
https://rm.coe.int/4th-op-portugal-en/1680998662
[1974] Ibid.
[1975] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child on the combined 5th and 6th periodic reports of Portugal. September 2019.
https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CRC%2fC%2fPRT%2fCO%2f5-6&Lang=ru
[1976] Fourth Opinion of the Advisory Committee of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities on Portugal. Adopted 28 June 2019, published 27 January 2020.
https://rm.coe.int/4th-op-portugal-en/1680998662
[1977] Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the 5th periodic report of Portugal. March 2023.
https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=E%2FC.12%2FPRT%2FCO%2F5&Lang=ru
[1978] Concluding observations of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on the implementation by Portugal of recommendations subject to interim monitoring. Adopted on 30 March 2021 Published on 18 May 2021.
https://rm.coe.int/ecri-conclusions-on-the-implementation-of-the-recommendations-in-respe/1680a27d88
[1979] Ibid.
[1980] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women on the 10th periodic report of Portugal. July 2022.
https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=E%2fC.12%2fPRT%2fCO%2f4&Lang=ru
[1981] Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the 5th periodic report of Portugal. March 2023.
https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=E%2FC.12%2FPRT%2FCO%2F5&Lang=ru
[1982] Report of the Working Group of Experts on People of African Descent during the 51st session of the UN Human Rights Council. August 2022.
A/HRC/51/54/Add.2
[1983] Ibid.
[1984] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 15th to 17th periodic reports of Portugal. December 2016.
https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2fC%2fPRT%2fCO%2f15-17&Lang=ru
[1985] European Commission Report on Combating Racism and Intolerance on Portugal (5th monitoring cycle). Adopted 19 June 2018, published 2 October 2018.
https://rm.coe.int/fifth-report-on-portugal/16808de7da
[1986] Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the 5th periodic report of Portugal. March 2023.
https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=E%2FC.12%2FPRT%2FCO%2F5&Lang=ru
[1987] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 18th and 19th periodic reports of Portugal. May 2023.
https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2FC%2FPRT%2FCO%2F18-19&Lang=ru
[1988] Portuguese President urged to pay for past mistakes. RIA Novosti. 24 April 2024.
https://ria.ru/20240424/portugaliya-1942095623.html
[1989] Portugal's government rejects paying reparations for colonial, slavery legacy. Reuters. 27 April 2024.
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/portugals-president-suggests-debt-cancellation-repair-colonial-slavery-legacy-2024-04-27/
[1990] One of the largest colonial powers refuses to pay reparations. RBC. 28 April 2024.
https://www.rbc.ru/politics/28/04/2024/662d72f59a79472dcea60a6d
[1991] Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the 5th periodic report of Portugal. March 2023.
https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=E%2FC.12%2FPRT%2FCO%2F5&Lang=ru;
Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 18th and 19th periodic reports of Portugal. May 2023.
https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2FC%2FPRT%2FCO%2F18-19&Lang=ru
[1992] Vandalism of Oporto synagogue: It is an offense, it is antisemitism. Jewish News Syndicate. 11 October 2023
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[1993] Cleansing the world of Jews: Porto housing protest turns antisemitic. The Jerusalem Post. 3 February 2024
[1994] Portugal police arrest 28 for human trafficking and exploitation following farm raids. JURIST. 21 November 2023. https://www.jurist.org/news/2023/11/portugal-police-arrest-28-on-trafficking-and-exploitation-charges-following-farm-raids/
[1995] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child on the combined 5th and 6th periodic reports of Portugal. October 2019. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CRC%2fC%2fPRT%2fCO%2f5-6&Lang=ru
[1996] Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Portugal (5th monitoring cycle). Adopted 19 June 2018, published 2 October 2018. https://rm.coe.int/fifth-report-on-portugal/16808de7da
[1997] Lisbon resident tells of Russophobic attitude towards her son at school. Izvestia. 5 April 2022.
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[1998] The coordinator of a Russian school in Portugal told about the wave of Russophobia and bullying. Russia Today. 7 April 2022. https://russian.rt.com/world/news/987147-shkola-portugaliya-rusofobiya
[1999] Tribunal manda manda julgar sete ucranianos que ameaçaram lojista russa em Braga. O Minho. 11 April 2023.
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[2000] Jornal de Noticias newspaper of 12 April 2024.
[2001] In the south of Portugal celebrated the 79th anniversary of the Victory in the Great Patriotic War. Website of the Embassy of the Russian Federation in the Portuguese Republic. 9 May 2024. https://portugal.mid.ru/ru/news/na_yuge_portugalii_otmetili_79_yu_godovshchinu_pobedy
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[2002] The Immortal Regiment marched through Lisbon. Victory of the Russian Federation. 13 May 2024.
https://pobedarf.ru/2024/05/13/bessmertnyj-polk-proshel-po-lissabonu/
[2003] Response by the official representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Maria Zakharova, to a question from the media in connection with the unveiling of a bust of Gheorghe Manoliu in Romania. Official website of the Russian Foreign Ministry. 21 June 2024.
A monument to a fascist general was unveiled in Neamţ county. Moldavskie Vedomosti. 19 June 2024.
http://www.evedomosti.md/news/v-uezde-nyamc-otkryli-pamyatnik-fashistskomu-generalu
[2004] Bucharest city council rejects plan to remove a bust of pro-Nazi minister. The Times of Israel. 4 January 2023.
[2005] Bucharest City Council rejects plan to dismantle a bust of pro-Nazi minister. Lechaim. 4 January 2023.
[2006] Case of Zăicescu and Fălticineanu v. Romania (Application no. 42917/16). https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-233212%22]}
[2007] Poeziile din închisoare (Radu Gyr) . Tribuna Magazine.
https://tribuna-magazine.com/poeziile-din-inchisoare-radu-gyr
[2008] Memorialistica fascistă este în continuare prezentă în România. Rfi.România. 7 February 2021.
https://m.rfi.ro/politica-130328-memorialistica-fascista-este-continuare-prezenta-romania
[2009] Bianca Iosef. Autografele unor personalități legionare, prezentate la Biblioteca Județeană din Prahova. 11 April 2024. https://www.presshub.ro/autografele-unor-personalitati-legionare-prezentate-la-biblioteca-judeteana-din-prahova-318043/ Concert de muzică și poezie din închisorile comuniste. 3 March 2023. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f-mKtGBJfpE
[2010] 17 ianuarie 1918. Gogu Puiu, lider al Rezistenței din Dobrogea, un destin învăluit în mister. Buciumul. 17 January 2022.
[2011] Marcel Ciolacu și-a început discursul de la sărbătoarea Unirii din Focșani cu un citat din Petre Țuțea, fost publicist antisemit și legionar/ Consilierul premierului pe antisemitism si xenofobie: "Să-și ceară scuze numaidecât"/ Reacția Institutului Elie Wiesel. G4Media.ro. 25 January 2023.
[2012] Blogger care promova mișcarea legionară şi incita la ură împotriva unor persoane pe criterii de rasă, etnie şi orientare sexuală, trimis în judecată de Parchetul de pe lângă Judecătoria Sectorului 5. 10 January 2024.
[2013] Klaus Iohannis și FDGR, succesori ai organizației naziste Grupul Etnic German. Justiţiarul. 9 February 2017. http://www.justitiarul.ro/11189-2;
[2014] Doar 12 imobile au fost retrocedate. FDGR. 8 September 2022.
[2015] Haus Iohannis, filiera retrocedărilor. Forumul Democrat al Germanilor, profitor imobiliari. Jurnalul.ro. 5 November 2014.
https://jurnalul.ro/stiri/observator/haus-iohannis-filiera-retrocedarilor-680749.html;
Cum s-a transformat Grupul Etnic German în FDGR. Trădarea lui Klaus Iohannis. Ancheteonline. 2 October 2016.
[2016] Sentința care a făcut din FDGR un succesor în drepturi de organizație fascistă. Cotidianul.ro. 10 June 2021. https://www.cotidianul.ro/sentinta-care-a-facut-din-fdgr-un-succesor-in-drepturi-de-organizatie-fascista
[2017] Falsele procese despre Grupul Etnic German. Cotidianul.ro. 14 June 2021.
https://www.cotidianul.ro/falsele-procese-despre-grupul-etnic-german/
[2018] Crimele contra umanității și regimul actual. Cotidianul.ro. 27 December 2022.
https://www.cotidianul.ro/crimele-contra-umanitatii-si-regimul-actual/
[2019] Dosarele de retrocedare din Sibiu scot la iveală adevăruri istorice dureroase. Casa cu casă... de la evrei. Gazeta de Cluj. 20 March 2019.
[2020] Sorin Lavric, Traian Brăileanu. 8 February 2023. https://senat.ro/PDFIntrebari/1569%20lavric%20s.pdf
[2021] Sorin Lavric, Gheorghe Jimboiu. 22 June 2022. https://senat.ro/PDFIntrebari/1233%20lavric%20s.pdf
[2022] Sorin Lavric, Scriitorul Constantin Gane. 27 April 2022. https://senat.ro/PDFIntrebari/1067%20lavric%20s.pdf
[2023] Sorin Lavric, Deținutul politic Nicolae Călinescu. 16 February 2022. https://senat.ro/PDFIntrebari/840%20lavric%20s.pdf
[2024] Sorin Lavric, Personalitatea lui Valeriu Gafencu. 24 February 2021. https://senat.ro/PDFIntrebari/48%20lavric%20s.pdf
[2025] Sorin Lavric, Constantin Oprișan. 10 March 2021. https://senat.ro/PDFIntrebari/92%20lavric%20s.pdf
[2026] Sorin Lavric, Deținutul politic Virgil Maxim. 24 March 2021. https://senat.ro/PDFIntrebari/143%20lavric%20s.pdf
[2027] Sorin Lavric, Savantul interbelic Mircea Vulcănescu. 3 March 2021. https://senat.ro/PDFIntrebari/64%20lavric%20s.pdf
[2028] Sorin Lavric, Partizanul basarabean Filimon Bodiu. 23 March 2022. https://senat.ro/PDFIntrebari/962%20lavric%20s.pdf
[2029] Călin Georgescu, despre Zelea Codreanu și Ion Antonescu: "Codreanu s-a luptat pentru moralitatea ființei umane. Față de martiri nu pot să am păreri/ E nevoie de schimbarea totală a sistemului"/ Despre asasinarea lui Nicolae Iorga la ordinul legionarilor: "Istoria este mistificată". G4Media.ro. 1 February 2022.
[2030] An Exhibition Dedicated to the Great Patriotic War Desecrated in Romania. RIA Novosti. 13 March 2020. https://ria.ru/20200313/1568568795.html
[2031] Maria Teodoriu, Cum e ținută-n viață extrema dreaptă din România prin preoți, tabere izolate și manipulare. Vice. 30 August 2021. https://www.vice.com/ro/article/k789pm/istoria-extremei-drepte-in-romania
[2032] Flavia Drăgan, Șocant: placa pe care scrie "Mișcarea Legionară", afișată public, nu încalcă legea, spun procurorii. Newsweek România. 3 March 2021.
[2033] Nr. Dosar unic (nr. format vechi): 21429/300/2020. https://portal.just.ro/300/SitePages/Dosar.aspx?id_dosar=30000000000569327&id_inst=300
[2034] Flavia Drăgan, Afișarea plăcuței cu Mișcarea Legionară: ilegală, dar clasată. Procurorul General a redeschis speța. Newsweek România. 23 April 2021.
[2035] Manuel Stănescu, Ucrainenii, între Wermachtul și Armata Roșie, Historia, Nr.244. pp. 30-36. May 2022.
[2036] Universitatea din București retrage titlul de Doctor Honoris Causa mareșalului Ion Antonescu. Universitatea din București. 15 February 2023.
[2037] 16 situații în care legea este încălcată: Lista străzilor cu nume de criminali de război condamnați / Unde mai sunt amplasate busturi ale acestora în România. G4Media.ro. 13 August 2021.
[2038] Nu vă atingeți de radu Gyr! USR-PLUS reia demersurile pentru schimbarea numelui străzii Radu Gyr din Cluj-Napoca. Buciumul. 1 February 2022.
[2039] VICTORIE de etapă - numele liceului Mircea Vulcănescu rămâne neschimbat, momentan. Mihai Tîrnoveanu: Acțiunea de susținere pentru păstrarea numelui Liceului Mircea Vulcănescu, în Șoseaua Vitan-Bârzesti nr. Active News. 16 February 2023.
[2040] De ce nu trebuie să aibă Mircea Vulcănescu bust? Istoric: Vulcănescu personal a coordonat măsurile de jefuire a evreilor și romilor. Rfi.România. 3 January 2023.
Pro-Nazi bust of government official stays in place in Romania. APL. 9 January 2023.
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[2041] Decizie a Consiliului General: Parcul Tolbuhin a fost redenumit. HotNews.ro. 30 June 2022. https://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-administratie_locala-25651172-decizie-consiliului-general-parcul-tolbuhin-fost-redenumit.htm
[2042] Începând cu luni, 15 noiembrie, Adevărul îți aduce timp de două săptămâni consecutive "MareșalulAntonescu în fața istoriei", vol. 1-2 – Gheorghe Buzatu. Adevarul. 18 November 2021.
[2043] Jurnalul vă oferă astăzi o carte-document: "România cu și fără Antonescu", de Gheorghe Buzatu. Jurnalul.ro. 19 April 2021.
[2044] Despre negaționiștii Holocaustuluidin România (II). Y.Obidin. 4 March 2016.
[2045] Începând din 9 noiembrie, Adevărul îți aduce săptămânal "Adevărul despre mareșalul Antonescu", vol. 1-3 – col. Gheorghe Magherescu. Adevarul. 9 November 2020.
[2046] Luni, 29 iunie, Adevărul îți prezintă "Cu mareșalul până la moarte" – generalul Constantin Pantazzi. Adevarul. 26 June 2020.
[2047] Luni, 24 august, Adevărul îți prezintă "Joc ambiguu" – Radu Lecca. Adevarul. 17 August 2020. https://adevarul.ro/cultura/carti/luni-24-august-adevarul-prezinta-joc-ambiguu-radu-lecca-1_5f3a10155163ec42710c026d/index.html
[2048] https://www.librariaonline.ro/stiinte_umaniste/estetica_eseistica/antonescu_la_hitler-manole_gica-cartea_romaneasca-p10191815
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[2051] Lavinia Ionița, Cum a fost elogiat maresalul Ion Antonescu intr-o biserica din Vaslui. Ministrul de Interne si procurorul general au fost sesizati. Ziare.Com. 4 June 2021.
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[2052] VASLUI TV. Un post local, amendat că a dat o comemorare a mareşalului Antonescu: "A fost un martir al neamului românesc". Pagina de media.ro. 26 January 2021.
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[2053] 3 preoți din Vaslui sunt cercetați penal: Au ţinut o slujbă de comemorare a mareșalului Ion Antonescu. Europa FM. 8 June 2021.
[2054] Biserica Sfintii Imparati Constantin si Elena – Vergului. CrestinOrtodox.ro.
[2055] Buserică în care apare chipul mareșalului Antonescu, plimbată pe sine. Magna News. 8 December 2022.
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[2059] Flavia Drăgan, Dosar penal, după incidentul la Memorialul Holocaustului, în prezența ambasadorului Israelului. Newsweek România. 27 January 2022.
[2060] Centrul pentru Monitorizarea și Combaterea Antisemitismului: Urmărim cu crescând discomfort negarea Holocaustului la nivelul clasei politice din România. Sesizările noastre către autorități au rămas fără răspuns. G4Media.ro. 5 January 2022.
[2061] Antisemitismul în vreme de pandemie – raport de monitorizare 2022. INSHR EW. 20 July 2022.
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[2062] "Red Line" Warnings in Romania after Nationalists Downplay Holocaust. Balkan Insight. 20 January 2022.
[2063] Romanian classrooms face hidden Holocaust history. France 24. 14 February 2024.
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[2064] Israeli envoy meets head of Romanian party accused of antisemitism, drawing rebuke. The Times of Israel. 28 August 2023. https://www.timesofisrael.com/israeli-envoy-meets-head-of-romanian-party-accused-of-antisemitism-drawing-rebuke/
[2065] Sondaj Avangarde: Evreii din România îngrijorați de antisemitism, AGERPRES, 16 October 2023. https://www.agerpres.ro/social/2023/10/16/sondaj-avangarde-evreii-din-romania-ingrijorati-de-antisemitism--1187140
[2066] An imaginary creature that scares children.
[2067] Flavia Drăgan, Unda verde pentru negaționiști, de la CAB. Vasile Zărnescu, ex-ofițerul SRI care a negat Holocaustul, scapă de închisoare. Defapt.ro. 1 April 2022.
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[2068] Vasile Zărnescu, fost colonel SRI, scapă cu un avertisment pentru negarea Holocaustului după ce judecătorii i-au admis apelul. G4Media.ro. 31 March 2022.
[2069] Youths vandalize Jewish cemetery in Romanian capital. Reuters. 25 April 2017.
[2070] Cimitirul Evreiesc din Ploiești a fost vandalizat. Trei tineri, reținuți pentru distrugerea mai multor monumente funerare. DIGI24. 7 June 2021.
[2071] Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the 6th periodic report of Romania. March 2024.
[2072] Romania's President Fined for Discriminating against the Hungarian Minority. TASS. 20 May 2020.
[2073] Traian Băsescu, amendat de Consiliul de Combatere a Discriminării după ce a spus despre maghiari că ar fi "un popor complexat". HotNews.ro. 30 August 2021.
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[2074] Report 2021. The violation of minority rights and the ethnic discrimination faced by the Hungarian community in Romania. Mikó Imre Minority Rights Legal Services Assistance. 2021, pp. 32-33.
[2075] Report 2022. The violation of minority rights and the ethnic discrimination faced by the Hungarian community in Romania. Mikó Imre Minority Rights Legal Services Assistance. 2022, p. 13.
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[2077] Derapaj verbal al unui deputat PSD, după ce UDMR a votat bugetul: "Se comportă ca niște urmași ai hunilor lui Atila, fără să le pese că lovesc în oameni". Adevarul. 3 March 2021.
[2078] Scandări xenofobe ale galeriei Farului Constanța la meciul cu Sepsi Sfântu Gheorghe. Un oficial covăsnean amenință cu retragerea echipei din competiție. G4Media.ro. 9 August 2021.
[2079] Meciul dintre "U" Cluj și Sepsi, oprit pentru scandări xenofobe! Arbitrul Colțescu e cel care a luat decizia Acest text a fost copiat de pe Ziare.com Meciul dintre "U" Cluj și Sepsi, oprit pentru scandări xenofobe! Arbitrul Colțescu e cel care a luat decizia. Ziare.Com. 22 August 2022.
[2080] Tot mai des în tribune: scandări xenofobe și rasiste. Reacții după meciul de vineri dintre Sepsi OSK și Petrolul Ploiești. Covasnamedia. 15 November 2022.
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[2082] Discrimination against the Hungarian minority in Romania. Parliamentary question. P-004554/2020. The European Parliament. 12 August 2020.
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-9-2020-004554_EN.html
[2083] Fifth opinion of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities on Romania. Adopted on 3 April 2023, published on 5 September 2023.
[2084] Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the 6th periodic report of Romania. March 2024.
[2085] Romanian Government Strategy for Roma Integration 2014-2020.
[2086] Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Romania (5th monitoring cycle). Adopted on 3 April 2019, and published on 5 June 2019.
[2087] Conclusions of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on the implementation of the recommendations by Romania subject to interim follow-up. Adopted on 7 December 2021, published on 3 March 2022.
https://rm.coe.int/ecri-conclusions-on-the-implementation-of-the-recommendations-in-respe/1680a59af0
[2088] Primarul din Târgu Mureş, amendat cu 10.000 de lei. CNCD: Afirmaţiile sale sunt extrem de rasiste. DIGI24. 22 January 2022
[2089] Report of the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights on the human rights situation in EU Member States. 2022.
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[2090] Report of the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights on the human rights situation in EU Member States. 2023.
[2091] Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the 6th periodic report of Romania. March 2024.
[2092] "Regele" Cioabă acuză Universitatea "Lucian Blaga" din Sibiu de discriminare: "Locurile pentru romi sunt aranjate". DIGI24. 4 October 2022.
[2093] George Costiță Povestea femeii care a născut pe trotuar în fața spitalului, între indiferență și discriminare 2 August 2023. https://romania.europalibera.org/a/femeia-care-a-nascut-pe-trotuar-%C3%AEn-fata-spitalului-din-urziceni/32530651.html
[2094] Rasismul de la 112. O operatoare STS înjură o femeie romă bătută: "Vorbiți ca ciorile!" "Trăzni-v-ar! Du-te dreacu!". Libertatea. 2 September 2019.
[2095] Femeia săracă bătută de un șofer de microbuz a fost condamnată la amendă sau închisoare, iar bărbatul a primit cu suspendare. Libertatea. 1 August 2022.
[2096] Concluding observations of the Committee against Torture on the 3rd periodic report of Romania. August 2023. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CAT%2FC%2FROU%2FCO%2F3&Lang=en
[2097] "Ami pare rau la domni politisti". Cazul violențelor poliției din Bolintin Vale are în spate o istorie lungă și complicată de conflicte nerezolvate și mai mulți vinovați. Ce învățăm din asta și ce facem mai departe. Republica. 30 April 2020. https://republica.ro/cazul-violentelor-politiei-din-bolintin-vale-are-in-spate-o-istorie-lunga-si-complicata-de-conflicte-nerezolvate
[2098] Reportaj. Ce au pățit niște romi săraci din Ucraina când au fost confundați în Gara de Nord cu romi de la noi. Libertatea. 9 March 2022.
[2099] "Voi nu sunteți refugiați". Reportaj CNN despre discriminarea romilor ucraineni care ajung la București și în alte orașe europene. Libertatea. 7 August 2022.
[2100] Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the 6th periodic report of Romania. March 2024.
[2101] Who is Dragos Viorel Tigau, the Romanian Recalled Racist Ambassador? Kenyan Foreign Policy. 11 June 2023. https://kenyanforeignpolicy.com/who-is-dragos-viorel-tigau-the-romanian-recalled-racist-ambassador/;
Seeing Monkey through Window, Romanian Diplomat Referred to It as "African Group" and was Recalled from Kenya. Gazeta.ru. 11 June 2023. https://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2023/06/11/17122814.shtml?updated
[2104] https://sdk.mk/index.php/dopisna-mrezha/isharan-spomenikot-na-revolutsijata-vo-tetovo-politsijata-ne-reagira-oti-nikoj-ne-prijavil/
[2105] https://www.slobodenpecat.mk/foto-spomenikot-na-revolucijata-vo-tetovo-ischkrtan-i-oblepen-so-predizborni-plakati/
[2107] https://sitel.com.mk/ukradena-i-bistata-na-nevena-gjeorgieva-dunja-borcite-baraat-seriozen-odnos-od-drzhavata
[2110] https://mia.mk/en/story/kovachevski-%E2%80%93-zelensky-north-macedonia-on-the-right-side-of-history-continues-to-support-ukraine
[2116] https://twitter.com/Bujar_O/status/1562338091158982656; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uswv1DJv40c
[2120] https://umdiaspora.org/2019/12/23/umd-inquiry-on-statues-in-macedonia-dedicated-to-nazi-collaborators/
[2121] https://vecer.mk/makedonija/akhmeti-mu-se-zakani-na-mitskoski-abb36e09-2c98-4792-96b3-1ac79ad6b508
[2122] https://inbusiness.kz/ru/last/v-severnoj-makedonii-nacionalisty-vystupayut-protiv-peresmotra-konstitucii
[2123] https://iz.ru/1698116/kseniia-loginova/nazad-v-budushchee-v-severnoi-makedonii-vernulis-k-prezhnemu-nazvaniiu-strany
[2124] https://iz.ru/1698116/kseniia-loginova/nazad-v-budushchee-v-severnoi-makedonii-vernulis-k-prezhnemu-nazvaniiu-strany
[2125] https://inbusiness.kz/ru/last/v-severnoj-makedonii-nacionalisty-vystupayut-protiv-peresmotra-konstitucii
[2126] https://aurora-israel.co.il/ru/grupos-judios-y-otros-de-macedonia-del-norte-enojados-por-el-nombre-del-club-etnico-bulgaro/
[2128] https://aurora-israel.co.il/ru/grupos-judios-y-otros-de-macedonia-del-norte-enojados-por-el-nombre-del-club-etnico-bulgaro/
[2129] https://aurora-israel.co.il/ru/grupos-judios-y-otros-de-macedonia-del-norte-enojados-por-el-nombre-del-club-etnico-bulgaro/
[2130] https://aurora-israel.co.il/ru/grupos-judios-y-otros-de-macedonia-del-norte-enojados-por-el-nombre-del-club-etnico-bulgaro/
[2131] https://www.mkd.mk/makedonija/politika/vo-bitola-protesti-protiv-otvoranjeto-na-bugarski-klub-so-imeto-na-fashistot; https://www.mkd.mk/makedonija/politika/zapochna-protestot-vo-ohrid-se-izvikuva-predavnici-fashisti-nadvor-od-makedonija
[2132] https://aurora-israel.co.il/ru/grupos-judios-y-otros-de-macedonia-del-norte-enojados-por-el-nombre-del-club-etnico-bulgaro/
[2135] https://www.mkd.mk/makedonija/sudstvo/napagjachite-na-pendikov-kje-odgovaraat-za-krivichno-delo-od-omraza
[2136] https://www.slobodenpecat.mk/en/so-raspit-na-svedoci-prodolzhi-sudenjeto-za-napadot-vrz-hristijan-pendikov/
[2137] https://www.mkd.mk/node/518305
[2138] https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2020-fundamental-rights-report-2020_en.pdf
[2139] The 2023 EU Agency for Fundamental Rights Report.
[2140] https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-221503%22]}
[2141] https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/#{%22tabview%22:[%22document%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-228661%22]}
[2142] rm.coe.int>0900001680aa1bac
[2143] https://rm.coe.int/sixth-ecri-report-on-north-macedonia/1680ac8c47
[2145] https://libertas.mk/provokativni-paroli-na-natprevarot-shkupi-vardar-e-go-ispolnime-istoriskiot-amanet-skop-e-da-bide-srceto-na-albani-a/
[2147] Shqiptar is a derogatory term used to insult Albanians.
[2150] https://apnews.com/article/mecedonia-greece-migrants-immigration-police-shooting-cde950ce1ae780fe85e8ef546b6b6fb6
[2151] https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=E%2fC.12%2fMKD%2fCO%2f2-4&Lang=en
[2153] https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=E%2fC.12%2fMKD%2fCO%2f2-4&Lang=en
[2154] https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CEDAW%2fC%2fMKD%2fCO%2f6&Lang=en
[2155] https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CEDAW%2fC%2fMKD%2fCO%2f6&Lang=en
[2156] https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2fC%2fMKD%2fCO%2f8-10&Lang=en
[2157] https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CEDAW%2fC%2fMKD%2fCO%2f6&Lang=en
[2158] https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2fC%2fMKD%2fCO%2f8-10&Lang=en
[2159] https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CEDAW%2fC%2fMKD%2fCO%2f6&Lang=en
[2161] A comment by Jaroslav Nad' for web portal aktuality.sk. URL: https://www.aktualitv.sk/clanok/ZKdzOEM/co-ie-a-co-nie-ie-ulohou-dncsnvch-protifasistickvch-boiovnikov-nazor/?ga=2.76148949.1357382788.1655705360-811075676.1607517922 (date of reference: 20.06.2022).
[2162] https://iz.ru/1637979/kseniia-loginova/brosili-vyzov-soiuznikam-slovakiia-raskritikovala-ukrainskuiu-politiku-vashingtona-i-briusselia
[2163] https://iz.ru/1637979/kseniia-loginova/brosili-vyzov-soiuznikam-slovakiia-raskritikovala-ukrainskuiu-politiku-vashingtona-i-briusselia
[2164] https://spravy.pravda.sk/domace/clanok/709279-laska-je-ako-mier-musime-o-nu-bojovat-vyhlasil-na-slavine-fico-nasledne-vypustil-holubice-mieru/
[2165] https://spravy.pravda.sk/domace/clanok/709279-laska-je-ako-mier-musime-o-nu-bojovat-vyhlasil-na-slavine-fico-nasledne-vypustil-holubice-mieru/
[2166] https://ria.ru/20240706/fitso-1957801458.html
[2167] https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/18644889
[2168] https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/18644889
[2169] https://iz.ru/1573023/igor-karmazin/zhizn-posle-smer-pochemu-v-slovakii-nametilsia-prorossiiskii-revansh;
https://www.5-tv.ru/news/448207/uzasnye-vesi-vslovakii-osudili-propagandu-ukrainskogo-neonacizma/
[2170] https://ria.ru/20230903/zapad-1893888636.html; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VZV-lN_8xGE
[2171] https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/18644889
[2172] https://ria.ru/20240602/fitso-1950061108.html
[2173] https://inosmi.ru/20230919/slovakiya-265713578.html
[2174] https://iz.ru/1693829/2024-05-08/premer-slovakii-otmetil-glavnuiu-rol-krasnoi-armii-v-osvobozhdenii-chekhoslovakii
[2175] https://iz.ru/1637979/kseniia-loginova/brosili-vyzov-soiuznikam-slovakiia-raskritikovala-ukrainskuiu-politiku-vashingtona-i-briusselia
[2176] https://iz.ru/1637979/kseniia-loginova/brosili-vyzov-soiuznikam-slovakiia-raskritikovala-ukrainskuiu-politiku-vashingtona-i-briusselia
[2177] https://dennikn.sk/3687532/siner-a-hlas-oslabiiiu-schopnosti-statu-branit-sa-ruskvm-vplvvovvin- operaciam/
[2178] https://dennikn.sk/3687532/siner-a-hlas-oslabiiiu-schopnosti-statu-branit-sa-ruskvm-vplvvovvin- operaciam/
[2179] https://ria.ru/20240602/fitso-1950061108.html
[2180] https://ria.ru/20240602/fitso-1950061108.html
[2181] https://ria.ru/20240602/fitso-1950061108.html
[2182] https://rg.ru/2024/05/15/oleg-iasinskij-pokushavshijsia-na-fico-produkt-novoj-raznovidnosti-obshchestva.html
[2183] https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/6693550
[2184] https://www.teraz.sk/slovensko/l-solak-po-strelbe-na-premiera-nar/795341-clanok.html?utm_source=teraz&utm_medium=organic&utm_campaign=click&utm_content=.%253Bw%253BwIndex
[2185] EU Agency for Fundamental Rights Report 2023. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2023-fundamental-rights-report-2023_en_1.pdf
[2186] civic-nation.org/slovakia/society/treatment_of_minorities/
[2188] https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/slovakia-slammed-for-medieval-living-conditions-of-its-roma-1.1792068
[2189] https://tvnoviny.sk/domace/clanok/871088-amnesty-intemational-aj-v-roku-2023-pokracivala-v-sr-diskriminacia- a-utlak-mensin
[2190] https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=E%2fC.12%2fSVK%2fCO%2f3&Lang=en
[2191] https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2020-fundamental-rights-report-2020_en.pdf
[2193] Coronavirus pandemic in the EU – fundamental rights implications: focus on social rights. 1 September – 31 October 2020. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. 27 November 2020 https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2020-coronavirus-pandemic-eu-bulletin-november_en.pdf
[2194] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_2249
https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2023/04/19/evrokomissiya-podaet-v-sud-na-slovakiyu
[2195] https://www.teraz.sk/regiony/najvyssi-sud-na-zs-v-starej-lubob/694190-clanok.html, https://www.tyzden.sk/rozhovory/95604/expert-na-inkluzivne-vzdelavanie-vladimir-rafael-segregacia-nepomaha-ani-romskym-ani-neromskym-ziakom/
[2196] https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=E%2fC.12%2fSVK%2fCO%2f3&Lang=en
[2197] The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights 2020 Report. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2020-fundamental-rights-report-2020_en.pdf
Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Slovakia (sixth monitoring cycle), adopted on 1 October 2020, published on 8 December 2020.
https://rm.coe.int/ecri-6th-report-on-the-slovak-republic/1680a0a088
[2198] https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2023/04/19/evrokomissiya-podaet-v-sud-na-slovakiyu; https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_2249
[2199] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_2249; European Commission (2023), ‘The European Commission decides to refer Slovakia to the Court of Justice of the European Union for not sufficiently addressing discrimination against Roma children at school’, press release, 19 April 2023.
[2200] The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights Report 2024. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2020-fundamental-rights-report-2020_en.pdf
[2201] The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights Report 2022. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2022-fundamental-rights-report-2022_en.pdf
[2202] Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Slovakia (sixth monitoring cycle), adopted on 1 October 2020, published on 8 December 2020. https://rm.coe.int/ecri-6th-report-on-the-slovak-republic/1680a0a088
[2203] Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Slovakia (sixth monitoring cycle), adopted on 1 October 2020, published on 8 December 2020. https://rm.coe.int/ecri-6th-report-on-the-slovak-republic/1680a0a088
[2204] Joint letter 2022-17/CESCR/FU dated 14 April 2022 from the CESCR Chair and Co-Rapporteurs for Slovakia to the Permanent Mission of Slovakia to the UN and other international organizations:
[2205] civic-nation.org/slovakia/society/treatment_of_minorities/
[2206] https://romea.cz/en/world/slovak-court-confirms-discrimination-cafe-refused-service-to-a-man-because-he-is-romani-now-must-apologize-and-pay-compensation
[2207] Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Slovakia (sixth monitoring cycle), adopted on 1 October 2020, published on 8 December 2020. https://rm.coe.int/ecri-6th-report-on-the-slovak-republic/1680a0a088
[2209] https://www.partnerskadohoda.gov.sk/jan-hero-na-pomoc-romskej-komunite-pojde-v-novom-programovom-obdobi-907-mil-eur/
[2210] EU Agency for Fundamental Rights Report 2023. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2023-fundamental-rights-report-2023_en_1.pdf
[2211] See Facebook post by Slovak Government Plenipotentiary for Roma Communities, 10 March 2022.
[2212] https://tvnoviny.sk/domace/clanok/871088-amnesty-international-aj-v-roku-2023-pokracivala-v-sr-diskrirninacia-a-utlak-mensin
[2213] https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2020-fundamental-rights-report-2020_en.pdf;
[2214] https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CAT%2FC%2FSVK%2FCO%2F4&Lang=en
[2215] https://slovakinfo.sk/novosti-obshhestva/torgovlya-lyudmi-naczpolicziya-slovakii-preduprezhdaet/
[2216] https://slovakinfo.sk/novosti-obshhestva/torgovlya-lyudmi-naczpolicziya-slovakii-preduprezhdaet/
[2217] https://slovakinfo.sk/novosti-obshhestva/torgovlya-lyudmi-naczpolicziya-slovakii-preduprezhdaet/
[2218] https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CEDAW%2FC%2FSVK%2FCO%2F7&Lang=en
[2220] https://standard.sk/343855/zima-lucaiova-priznala-ze-za-jej-odchodorn-z-ta3-je-stiahnutie-rozhovoru-so-sachsorn- z-webu-televizie/
[2222] civic-nation.org/slovakia/society/treatment_of_minorities/
[2224] https://regnum.ru/news/2233829
[2225] https://barikada.sk/?p=16573
[2230] https://ria.ru/20240201/aktsiya-1924909426.html
[2231] https://regnum.ru/news/2233829
[2233] https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2fC%2fSVK%2fCO%2f11-12&Lang=ru
[2234]https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CRC%2fC%2fSVK%2fCO%2f3-5&Lang=ru
[2235] https://tinternet,.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2fC%2fSVK%2Cco%2F11-12&LANG=rn
[2236] Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Slovakia (sixth monitoring cycle), adopted on 1 October 2020, published on 8 December 2020.
https://rm.coe.int/ecri-6th-report-on-the-slovak-republic/1680a0a088
[2237] https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=E%2fC.12%2fSVK%2fCO%2f3&Lang=en
[2238] Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Slovakia (sixth monitoring cycle), adopted on 1 October 2020, published on 8 December 2020. https://rm.coe.int/ecri-6th-report-on-the-slovak-republic/1680a0a088
[2239] https://aktualitv.sk/clanok/Hhk5MDI/v-novom-svetovom-rebricku-slobodv-tlace-sa-slovensko-vratilo-do-prvei-dvadsiatky /
[2240] https://euractiv.sk/section/kultura-a-media/news/slovensko-si-v-rebricku-slobody-medii-polepsilo-o-osem-priecok/
[2241] Slovenia and Ukraine signed a security agreement. TASS. 18 July 2024.
https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/21398967. In Russian
[2242] Slovenia continues to secretly supply Kiev with weapons. Balkanist. 20 July 2023.
https://balkanist.ru/sloveniya-prodolzhaet-vtiharya-snabzhat-kiev-oruzhiem. In Russian
[2244] Slovenia held an event in honour of the fallen Soviet soldiers. TASS. 23 February 2023.
Https://tass.ru/obschestvo/17122827. In Russian
[2245] Ibid.
[2246] Slovenia honoured the memory of partisans and the Soviet soldier who died during the war. TASS. 28 May 2023. https://tass.ru/obschestvo/17865703
[2247] Six former Yugoslavia countries to restore block 17 in Auschwitz-Birkenau. Jewlife. 29 January 2024.
https://jewlife.ru/shest-stran-byvshej-yugoslavii-otrestavriruyut-baraki-bloka-№17-v-osvenczime.
[2248] The memory of the victims of Nazism to be protected collectively. Pobeda RF. 10 April 2024. https://dzen.ru/a/Zhax-Cbn9RSiRsQx.
[2249] Poslanci kôncali razpravo o totalitarizmu. STA. 28 June 2022. https://sta.si/3054733/
[2250] Holocaust denial in the courts. The Times. 10 March 2022.
https://www.thetimes.com/uk/law/article/holocaust-denial-in-the-courts-kcvbwhgkx
[2251] Slovenian court voids executed Nazi collaborator’s 1946 treason conviction. The Times of Israel. 15 January
2020.
[2252] An organization recognized criminal by the Nuremberg Tribunal (composed of judges from the UK, USSR, USA and France) in 1946.
[2253] Garda Slovenske vojske v imenu Janše položila venec domobrancem. Dnevnik. 2 November 2021.
[2254] Slovenia approves a resolution recognizing the 1932-1933 famine in Ukraine as "genocide". TASS. 23 May 2023. Https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/17825515.
[2255] The Foreign Ministry explained the European Parliament's decision on the Holodomor with "illiteracy". RBC. 22 December 2022. https://www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/63a46c639a7947011c44c033
- Oskrunili spomenik v središču Ljubljane. Delo. 8 September 2021.
https://www.delo.si/novice/slovenija/oskrunili-spomenik-v-srediscu-ljubljane/ ;
- pohod od spomenika do spomenika. Delo. 8 September 2021.
- V Ljubljani oskrunili več spomenikov. MMC RTV SLO. 3 July 2019.
https://www.rtvslo.si/crna-kronika/v-ljubljani-oskrunili-vec-spomenikov/493550
[2258] The eternal flame in Ljubljana has been restored. Pobeda RF (Victory of the Russian Federation). 7 February 2021. Https://pobedarf.ru/2021/02/07/vechnyj-ogon-v-lyublyane-vosstanovlen/. In Russian
[2259] V središču Ljubljane shod pripadnikov t.i. "Slovenske obrambne straže" (dopolnjeno). STA. 7 June 2024. https://sta.si/3309815.
[2260] Koalicija vložila novelo zakona o varstvu javnega reda in miru za prepoved poveličevanja nacizma in fašizma. STA. 11 July 2024. https://sta.si/332133.
[2261] Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee on the 3rd periodic report of Slovenia. April 2016. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2FC%2FSVN%2FCO%2F3&Lang=ru
[2262] Conclusions of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on the implementation of the recommendations in respect of Slovenia subject to Interim Follow-up. Adopted on 7 December 2021, published on 3 March 2022.
https://rm.coe.int/ecri-conclusions-on-the-implementation-of-the-recommendations-in-respe/1680a59af2
[2263] Ibid.
[2264] Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Slovenia (5th monitoring cycle). Adopted on 3 April 2019, published on 5 June 2019. https://rm.coe.int/fifth-report-on-slovenia/168094cb00
[2265] Slovenia’s prime minister shared a publication insulting Muslims. Anadolu Ajansi. 24 February 2021.
[2266] Muslim Graves Desecrated with Red Fluid, Pork in Domžale. Total Slovenia News. 2 May 2021.
[2267] Letno poročilo varuha človekovih pravic Republike Slovenije za leto 2021. June 2022.
https://www.varuh-rs.si/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf/lp/LP_2021/Letno_porocilo_VCP_RS_za_leto_2021.pdf
[2268] Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Slovenia (5th monitoring cycle). Adopted on 3 April 2019, published on 5 June 2019. https://rm.coe.int/fifth-report-on-slovenia/168094cb00
[2269] World Jewish Congress delegation journeys to Slovenia to combat antisemitism - opinion. The Jerusalem Post. 2 May 2024. https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-799446
[2270] Fifth opinion on Slovenia of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for Protection of National Minorities. Adopted on 18 May 2022. https://rm.coe.int/5th-op-slovenia-en-/1680a830d8
[2271] Ibid.
[2272] Letno poročilo varuha človekovih pravic Republike Slovenije za leto 2022. May 2023. https://www.varuh-rs.si/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf/lp/LP_2022/Letno_poroc__ilo_VC__P_RS_za_leto_2022.pdf
[2273] Concluding observations of the Committee against Torture on the 4th periodic report of Slovenia. November 2023.
[2274] Fifth opinion on Slovenia of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for Protection of National Minorities. Adopted on 18 May 2022. https://rm.coe.int/5th-op-slovenia-en-/1680a830d8
[2275] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women on the 7th periodic report of Slovenia. February 2023. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CEDAW%2FC%2FSVN%2FCO%2F7&Lang=ru
[2276] Concluding observations of the Committee against Torture on the 4th periodic report of Slovenia. November 2023.
[2277] Parliament of Slovenia approves amendments to Aliens Act. TASS. 8 November 2023.
Https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/19226083.. In Russian
[2278] Concluding observations of the Committee against Torture on the 4th periodic report of Slovenia. November 2023.
[2279] Concluding observations of the Committee against Torture on the 4th periodic report of Slovenia. November 2023.
[2280] The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report. 2020.
https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2020-fundamental-rights-report-2020_en.pdf
[2281] Conclusions of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on the implementation of the recommendations in respect of Slovenia subject to Interim Follow-up. Adopted on 7 December 2021, published on 3 March 2022.
https://rm.coe.int/ecri-conclusions-on-the-implementation-of-the-recommendations-in-respe/1680a59af2
[2282] Strateški svet za preprečevanje sovražnega govora izdal 57 priporočil vladi. MMC RTV SLO. 19 July 2023.
[2284] Izbrisani–informacije in dokumenti. https://www.mirovni-institut.si/izbrisani/
[2285] Pahor izbrisanim: Opravičilo je potrebno za nazaj in kot zaveza za naprej. MMC RTV SLO. 25 February 2022.
[2286] Letno poročilo varuha človekovih pravic Republike Slovenije za leto 2022. May 2023. https://www.varuh-rs.si/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf/lp/LP_2022/Letno_poroc__ilo_VC__P_RS_za_leto_2022.pdf
[2287] https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2024/05/27/remarks-by-president-biden-at-the-156th-national-memorial-day-observance-arlington-va/
[2288] https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/01 /26/statement-from-president-joe-biden- international-holocaust-remembrance-day-statement-2024/
[2289] https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/06/10/azov-brigade-ukraine-us-weapons/; https://ria.ru/20240611/ukraina-1952087533.html
[2290] https://www.interfax.ru/world/966075
[2291] https://www.rbc.ru/politics/11/06/2024/6667a2229a794715b0b01fea
[2292] https://www.interfax.ru/world/966075
[2293] https://www.rbc.ru/politics/11/06/2024/6667a2229a794715b0b01fea
[2294] https://ria.ru/20240611/ukraina-1952087533.html
[2295] https://www.rbc.ru/politics/28/05/2023/647322719a7947b5d2f52a80
[2296] https://www.rbc.ru/politics/28/05/2023/64730eb59a79472a1e46565c?from=from_main_3
[2297] https://riafan.ru/22912317-lyudei_uvolnyayut_glava_obschestva_russkaya_molodezh_ameriki_kochin_podtverdil_usilenie_rusofobii_v_ssha
[2299] https://nypost.com/2022/03/18/nyc-man-attacked-for-pro-russian-flag-says-he-got-it-from-youtube-fan/
[2303] https://www.metmuseum.org/art/collection/search/437440
[2307] https://apnews.com/article/sports-paris-20eecf005df757d3090e23664d7f1fa4; https://iz.ru/1463873/2023-02-02/glava-olimpiiskogo-komiteta-ssha-podderzhal-zhelanie-mok-vernut-rossiian-na-turniry
[2308] https://www.sport-express.ru/obshchestvo/news/svr-soobschila-o-kampanii-ssha-po-izolyacii-rossii-v-mirovom-sporte-2240609/; https://www.sport-express.ru/obshchestvo/news/v-svr-rasskazali-o-planah-ssha-ochernit-rossiyskih-figuristok-sinhronistok-i-gimnastok-2240613/; https://m.sport-express.ru/obshchestvo/news/mariya-zaharova-kommentariy-o-novom-etape-kampanii-ssha-po-izolyacii-rossii-v-sporte-2240622/; https://ren.tv/news/politika/1247806-zakharova-prokommentirovala-gotoviashchuiusia-kampaniiu-ssha-protiv-rossiiskogo-sporta; https://ren.tv/longread/1247983-ssha-khotiat-izolirovat-rossiiu-v-sporte-raskryty-detali
[2310] https://iz.ru/1510118/2023-05-09/posol-antonov-zaiavil-o-vspleske-rusofobii-v-ssha-pered-dnem-pobedy
[2311] https://t.me/EmbUSA/3154
[2312] https://iz.ru/1507798/valentin-loginov/ne-odna-na-vsekh-kak-na-zapade-otmechaiut-den-pobedy-bez-rossii
[2313] https://www.gazeta.ru/politics/news/2024/04/25/22867910.shtml
[2316] https://www.state.gov/on-the-anniversary-of-the-massacre-at-babyn-yar-joint-statement-from-special-envoys-for-holocaust-issues-condemning-russian-actions-in-ukraine/
[2317] https://www.csce.gov/international-impact/press-and-media/press-releases/helsinki-commission-announces-hearing-alarming
[2318] The Russian Federation's ongoing aggression against Ukraine. 23.06.2022: http://osce.usmission.gov/the-russian-federations-ongoing-aggression-against-ukraine-15
[2319] Russian media drives online hate. 07.06.2022. http://axios.com/2022/06/07/russian-media-online-hate-extremists-racism
[2320] Rewriting History for the New Cold War. The American Conservative. 28 August 2021. https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/rewriting-history-for-the-new-cold-war/.
[2321] https://tass.ru/obschestvo/6789623?utm_source=google.com&utm_medium=organic&utm_campaign=google.com&utm_referrer=google.com.
[2322] It's time to confront the dark postscript to America's role in defeating the Nazis. CNN. 24 February 2021. https://edition.cnn.com/2021/02/24/opinions/dark-postscript-america-nazis-golinkin/index.html.
[2323] Joint statement by President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin and President of the United States of America Donald Trump commemorating the 75th anniversary of the meeting on the Elbe. 25 April 2020 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/63277.
[2324] The Russian Embassy in Washington urged the United States to stop distorting facts about World War II. TASS. 1 May 2020. https://tass.ru/obschestvo/8382109.
[2325] https://x.com/boweschay/status/1815343528408453175?s=46; https://lenta.ru/news/2024/07/22/v-evrope-zayavili-o-zhelanii-zapada-raschlenit-rossiyu-iz-za-straha/
[2326] https://ria.ru/20230513/vsu-1871543718.html?in=t; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6RDgxRFNVRk
[2327] On 23 June 2024, the AFU launched five ATACMS missiles at Sevastopol. One of the shells exploded over the Uchkuevka beach when many holidaymakers were there. As a result of the incident, 153 people were injured. https://lenta.ru/news/2024/06/24/gubernator-nazval-chislo-postradavshih-pri-atake-vsu-po-plyazhu-v-sevastopole/
[2328] https://lenta.ru/news/2024/06/27/eks-ofitser-armii-ssha-sobiraet-dlya-kongressa-dokazatelstva-prestupleniy-vsu/; https://lenta.ru/news/2024/06/26/v-ssha-nazvali-obstrel-plyazha-v-sevastopole-terrorizmom/
[2329] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/07/10/nato-summit-ukraine-gaza/; https://kz.kursiv.media/2024-07-10/aknv-kz-nato/
[2330] Bruce Hoffman, Jacob Ware, 'American Hatred Goes Global', Foreign Affairs, 19 September 2023.
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/american-hatred-goes-global; The China Society for Human Rights Studies' Report on Human Rights Violations in the United States in 2023. Published on 29 May 2024. https://news.cgtn.com/news/files/The-Report-On-Human-Rights-Violations-In-The-United-States-In-2023.pdf; https://epaper.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202405/30/WS6657b5a5a310df4030f51e70.html
[2331] It's time to confront the dark postscript to America's role in defeating the Nazis. CNN. 24 February 2021. https://edition.cnn.com/2021/02/24/opinions/dark-postscript-america-nazis-golinkin/index.html.
[2332] The BBC Russian service. 8 May 2019 https://www.bbc.com/russian/news-48198574 http://www.wiesenthal.com/about/news/2019_5-2-simon-wiesenthal-center-urges.html.
[2333] The China Society for Human Rights Studies' Report on Human Rights Violations in the United States in 2023, published on 29 May 2024. https://news.cgtn.com/news/files/The-Report-On-Human-Rights-Violations-In-The-United-States-In-2023.pdf; https://epaper.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202405/30/WS6657b5a5a310df4030f51e70.html
[2334] https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/un-human-rights-body-calls-out-us-failure-civil-political-rights-treaty
[2335] Report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus for 2023 on the most resonant cases of human rights violations in individual countries https://mfa.gov.by/kcfinder/upload/files/Press_Service/23.06.22_report_hr.pdf
[2336] Report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus for 2023 on the most resonant cases of human rights violations in individual countries https://mfa.gov.by/kcfinder/upload/files/Press_Service/23.06.22_report_hr.pdf
[2337] According to Dubnikov's lawyer, Arkady Bukh, the Russian citizen was detained in Mexico by the FBI agents who took him to the Netherlands as far as it was easier to extradite him from this country. https://ria.ru/20211221/ekstraditsiya-1764789386.
[2338] https://ngs24.ru/text/criminal/2022/10/20/71750876/
[2339] https://www.forbes.ru/society/480046-krasnoarskij-gubernator-otreagiroval-na-zaderzanie-syna-v-italii-po-obvineniam-ssa
[2340] https://tass.ru/politika/16110685
[2341] The prisons were allegedly closed in 2009 at the direction of Barack Obama, but there is evidence that they are still actively used.
[2342] "Southern Poverty Law Center". "The Year in Hate and Extremism" Report 2021.
[2344] NGO "Southern Poverty Law Center": https://www.splcenter.org/hate-map
[2345] NGO "Southern Poverty Law Center": https://www.splcenter.org/hate-map
[2346] Report of the NGO "Southern Poverty Law Center" – "Year of hate and extremism 2020".
[2347] https://lenta.ru/articles/2024/07/17/blm/
[2348] https://www.heinz.cmu.edu/media/2017/january/police-violence-data
[2349] https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/08/us/george-floyd-cause-of-death.html
[2350] https://nypost.com/2020/06/06/nyc-sees-another-day-of-george-floyd-protests-in-the-streets/
[2351] https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/03/us/george-floyd-protests-crowd-size.html
[2352] https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/03/us/george-floyd-protests-crowd-size.html
[2353] https://nypost.com/2022/09/03/activists-accuse-blm-leader-shalomyah-bowers-of-stealing-10m/
[2354] https://nypost.com/2022/09/03/activists-accuse-blm-leader-shalomyah-bowers-of-stealing-10m/; https://lenta.ru/news/2022/09/04/blm/
[2355] Rahman Kh. Rise and Fall of Black Lives Matter // Newsweek.14.07.2023. –
[2356] Peck E. «The backlash is real»: Behind DEI's rise and fall // Axios 02.04.2024. – https://www.axios.com.
[2357] Rothschild N. 2020's great undoing // Axios. 28.04.2024. – https://www.axios.com
[2358] Thus, in 2021, there was a split among the founders of BLM: co-founder Patrisse Khan-Cullors resigned over allegations of embezzlement of donations, with which she had allegedly bought expensive real estate.
[2359] National Security Strategy. 12.10.2022: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf
[2360] The Brown Internationale. Kai Biermann, Christian Fuchs, Astrid Geisler, Yassin Musharbash, Hogler Stark. Die Zeit. 11 February 2021. https://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2021-02/fascism-international-right-wing-extremism-neo-nazis-english/komplettansicht?utm_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2F
[2361] "Anti-Defamation League" "White supremacist terror: modernizing our approach to today's threat." April 2020 https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2191/f/White%20Supremacist%20Terror%20final.pdf Page 25., "The Soufan Center" "White Supremacy Extremism: The Transnational Rise of the Violent White Supremacist Movement», September 2019. https://thesoufancenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Report-by-The-Soufan-Center-White-Supremacy-Extremism-The-Transnational-Rise-of-The-Violent-White-Supremacist-Movement.pdf
[2362] "Oath Keepers"' Rhodes guilty of Jan.6 seditious conspiracy. 29.11.2022: https://apnews.com/article/oath-keepers-founder-guilty-of-seditious-conspiracy-42affe1614425c6820f7cbe8fd18ba96
[2363] The Year in Hate and Extremism 2020. Southern Poverty Law Center. https://www.splcenter.org/news/2021/02/01/year-hate-2020
[2364] White supremacist propaganda spikes in 2020. Anti-Defamation League. https://www.adl.org/white-supremaci st-propaganda-spikes-2020
[2365] White supremacist propaganda spikes in 2020. Anti-Defamation League. https://www.adl.org/white-supremacist-propaganda-spikes-2020
[2366] Latest violence showcases Proud Boys' toxic mix of politics and bigotry. Anti-Defamation League. 5 September 2021. https://www.adl.org/blog/latest-violence-showcases-proud-boys-toxic-mix-of-politics-and-bigotry
[2367] https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/aug/14/revealed-neo-nazi-active-club-us-military-members
[2368] https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/aug/14/revealed-neo-nazi-active-club-us-military-members
[2369] https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/aug/14/revealed-neo-nazi-active-club-us-military-members
[2370] https://rg.ru/2023/08/14/guardian-v-klube-neonacistov-kalifornii-chisliatsia-dejstvuiushchie-i-eks-voennye-ssha.html; https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/aug/14/revealed-neo-nazi-active-club-us-military-members
[2371] For more information about this problem, see the US section, latest Russian MFA Report on the situation with the glorification of Nazism, spread of neo-Nazism and other types of practices that contribute to the escalation of modern forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance.
[2372] Members of white nationalist groups not barred from US military, official says. The Times of Israel. 14 February 2020. https://www.timesofisrael.com/members-of-white-nationalist-groups-not-barred-from-us-military-official-says/
[2373] Neo-Nazi Group Membership May Not Get You Booted from Military, Officials Say. 12 February 2020. https://www.military.com/daily-news/2020/02/12/neo-nazi-group-membership-may-not-get-you-booted-military-officials-say.html
[2374] https://iz.ru/1165713/kirill-senin/iznutri-uzhasnye-v-ssha-zafiksirovali-rost-ekstremistskikh-nastroenii, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/deadly-domestic-extremism-worst-in-25-years-fbi-white-supremacists_n_60a0591ae4b03e1dd38a5b4e
[2375] https://www.ng.ru/news/783684.html
[2376] https://www.ng.ru/news/783684.html
[2377] https://ria.ru/20231114/rasizm-1909461040.html
[2378] https://news.un.org/ru/story/2023/11/1446777
[2379] https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/issues/racism/sr/statements/2023-11-14-EOM-SR-Racism-usa-en.pdf
[2380] BBC: America's race gap between black and white homeowners) // https://www.bbc.com/news/business-61845304
[2381] The Hill: Black Americans feel disproportionate pain from high interest rates)//https://thehill.com/business/3617000- black-americans-feel-disproportionate-pain-from-high-interest-rates/
[2382] The China Society for Human Rights Studies (CSHRS) Report on Human Rights Violations in the United States in 2019. March 2020. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-03/13/c_138874115.htm
[2383] http://ge.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/xwdt/202303/t20230328_11050361.htm
[2384] United States: Pandemic Impact on People in Poverty. Human Rights Watch Report. 2 March 2021. https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/03/02/united-states-pandemic-impact-people-poverty
[2385] https://www.ohchr.org/ru/statements-and-speeches/2024/03/turks-global-update-human-rights-council
[2386] The China Society for Human Rights Studies (CSHRS) Report on Human Rights Violations in the United States in 2022. Published on 28 March 2023 https://ge.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/xwdt/202303/t20230328_11050361.htm;
The China Society for Human Rights Studies (CSHRS) Report on Human Rights Violations in the United States in 2023. Published 29 May 2024 https://news.cgtn.com/news/files/The-Report-On-Human-Rights-Violations-In-The-United-States-In-2023.pdf; https://epaper.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202405/30/WS6657b5a5a310df4030f51e70.html
https://www.pnp.ru/in-world/kitay-opublikoval-doklad-o-narushenii-prav-cheloveka-v-ssha.html
[2387] http://ge.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/xwdt/202303/t20230328_11050361.htm
[2388] The China Society for Human Rights Studies (CSHRS) Report on Human Rights Violations in the United States in 2023. Published 29 May 2024 https://news.cgtn.com/news/files/The-Report-On-Human-Rights-Violations-In-The-United-States-In-2023.pdf; https://epaper.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202405/30/WS6657b5a5a310df4030f51e70.html
[2389] "CAIR 2023 Civil Rights Report: Progress in the Shadow of Prejudice", The Council on American-Islamic Relations. https://www.cair.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/progressintheshadowofprejudice-1.pdf; The China Society for Human Rights Studies (CSHRS) Report on Human Rights Violations in the United States in 2023. Published 29 May 2024 https://news.cgtn.com/news/files/The-Report-On-Human-Rights-Violations-In-The-United-States-In-2023.pdf; https://epaper.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202405/30/WS6657b5a5a310df4030f51e70.html
[2390] The China Society for Human Rights Studies (CSHRS) Report on Human Rights Violations in the United States in 2023. Published 29 May 2024 https://news.cgtn.com/news/files/The-Report-On-Human-Rights-Violations-In-The-United-States-In-2023.pdf; https://epaper.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202405/30/WS6657b5a5a310df4030f51e70.html
[2391] World Report 2022: United States / «Human Rights Watch», 01.2022. – https://www.hrw.org.
[2394] https://globalextremism.org/post/fear-and-elections/
[2395] The China Society for Human Rights Studies (CSHRS) Report on Human Rights Violations in the United States in 2022. Published on 28 March 2023 https://rm.coe.int/commdh-2022-10-report-on-the-visit-to-austria-en/1680a6679a
[2396] More George Floyd protests planned at Colorado Capitol into the weekend. The Denver Post. 29 May 2020. https://www.denverpost.com/2020/05/29/george-floyd-protests-colorado-capitol/.
[2397] $1 Billion-plus riot damage is most expensive in insurance history. AXIOS. 16 September 2020. https://www.axios.com/riots-cost-property-damage-276c9bcc-a455-4067-b06a-66f9db4cea9c.html.
[2398] https://russian.rt.com/world/article/1148285-ssha-baiden-problemy-rasizm-gosdolg
[2399] https://russian.rt.com/world/article/1148285-ssha-baiden-problemy-rasizm-gosdolg
[2401] https://iz.ru/1725333/andrei-kuzmak/pravo-na-nenavist-kakim-vidiat-rasizm-v-sovremennoi-amerike
[2402] https://iz.ru/1725333/andrei-kuzmak/pravo-na-nenavist-kakim-vidiat-rasizm-v-sovremennoi-amerike
[2403] https://iz.ru/1725333/andrei-kuzmak/pravo-na-nenavist-kakim-vidiat-rasizm-v-sovremennoi-amerike
[2404] https://iz.ru/1725333/andrei-kuzmak/pravo-na-nenavist-kakim-vidiat-rasizm-v-sovremennoi-amerike
[2405] https://iz.ru/1725333/andrei-kuzmak/pravo-na-nenavist-kakim-vidiat-rasizm-v-sovremennoi-amerike
[2406] https://iz.ru/1725333/andrei-kuzmak/pravo-na-nenavist-kakim-vidiat-rasizm-v-sovremennoi-amerike
[2407] https://iz.ru/1725333/andrei-kuzmak/pravo-na-nenavist-kakim-vidiat-rasizm-v-sovremennoi-amerike
[2408] https://iz.ru/1725333/andrei-kuzmak/pravo-na-nenavist-kakim-vidiat-rasizm-v-sovremennoi-amerike
[2409] https://iz.ru/1725333/andrei-kuzmak/pravo-na-nenavist-kakim-vidiat-rasizm-v-sovremennoi-amerike
[2410] Robertson С. Schools in One Virginia County to Reinstate Confederate Names // The New York Times. – https://www.nytimes.com.
[2411] Pennsylvania school district votes to reinstate Native American logo criticized as insensitive // Associated Press. 20.01.2024. – https://apnews.com
[2412] Rothschild N. 2020's great undoing// Axios. 28.04.2024. – https://www.axios.com.
[2413] Notably, the state where this decision was made consists of a 90% white population Robertson С. Schools in One Virginia County to Reinstate Confederate Names // The New York Times. 10.05.2024 – https://www.nytimes.com.
[2414] Daniels Ch. Confederate leaders' names will return to two Virginia schools after vote // The Hill. 10.05.2024 – https://thehill.com.
[2415] The China Society for Human Rights Studies (CSHRS) Report on Human Rights Violations in the United States in 2023. Published 29 May 2024 https://news.cgtn.com/news/files/The-Report-On-Human-Rights-Violations-In-The-United-States-In-2023.pdf; https://epaper.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202405/30/WS6657b5a5a310df4030f51e70.html
[2416] https://www.justice.gov/hatecrimes/hate-crime-statistics
[2417] https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/oct/16/hate-crimes-increasing-fbi-report; https://www.justice.gov/hatecrimes/hate-crime-statistics
[2418] https://www.npr.org/2023/01/01/1145973412/researchers-say-the-fbis-statistics-on-hate-crimes-across-the-country-are-flawed; https://time.com/6240880/fbi-hate-crime-data-gaps/
[2419] Hate crimes rise to highest level in 12 years amid increasing attacks on Black and Asian people, FBI says. The Washington Post. 30 August 2021. https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/hate-crimes-fbi-2020-asian-black/2021/08/30/28bede00-09a7-11ec-9781-07796ffb56fe_story.html Hate Crime in the United States Incident Analysis. 2020. Federal Bureau of Investigation Crime Data Explorer) https://crime-data-explorer.fr.cloud.gov/pages/home.
[2420] "Stop AAPI Crime. National Report" https://stopaapihate.org/stop-aapi-hate-national-report-2/
[2421] http://ge.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/xwdt/202303/t20230328_11050361.htm
[2422] Pew Research Center: https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2022/05/20/safety-concerns-were-top-of-mind-for-many-black-americans-before-buffalo-shooting/
[2423] "Attorney General Bonta Releases 2022 Hate Crime Report, Highlights Continued Efforts to Combat Hate", State of California Department of Justice, June 27, 2023.) https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-bonta-releases-2022-hate-crime-report-highlights-continued.
[2424] https://www.businessinsider.com/black-women-killed-by-police-database-2021-6; https://rg.ru/2024/07/20/v-ssha-s-2015-goda-policejskie-zastrelili-50-chernokozhih-zhenshchin.html; https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1828&context=facultypub
[2425] https://www.apa.org/news/press/releases/2020/07/black-women-social-justice; https://www.businessinsider.com/black-women-killed-by-police-database-2021-6
[2426] Hate crimes targeting Asian Americans spiked 150% in major US cities. Voice of America. 2 March 2021. https://www.voanews.com/usa/race-america/hate-crimes-targeting-asian-americans-spiked-150-major-us-cities
[2427] CNN: NYC woman indicted on hate crime charges accused of string of anti-Asian attacks, district attorney's office says // https://www.cnn.com/2023/Q6/01/us/new-vork-indictment-asian-attacks/index.html
[2428] Antidefamation League: Hate in the Bay State: Extremism & Antisemitism in Massachusetts, 2021-2022 // https://www.adl.org/resources/report/hate-bay-state-extremism-antisemitism-massachusetts-2021-2022
[2429] Natalie Neysa Alund and Walker Armstrong, «I'm drowning: Black teen cried for help as white teen tried to kill him, police say», USA Today, September 11, 2023. https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2023/09/11/white-teen-indicted-attempted-murder-massachusetts-racially-mativated/70821226007/.
[2430] https://www.mn.ru/smart/bezumnye-manifesty-i-svastiki-na-legal-no-kuplennom-oruzhii-chto-izvestno-o-shutinge-vo-floride
[2431] https://iz.ru/1566091/andrei-kuzmak/chernymi-po-belym-novyi-sluchai-massovoi-strelby-ozhestochil-rasovye-diskussii-v-ssha
[2432] https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/08/27/statement-from-president-joe-biden-on-the-shooting-in-jacksonville-florida/
[2433] https://iz.ru/1566091/andrei-kuzmak/chernymi-po-belym-novyi-sluchai-massovoi-strelby-ozhestochil-rasovye-diskussii-v-ssha
[2434] Deborah Barfield, Berry Terry Collins and Marc Ramirez, «Frightening, shocking: Some Black Americans fear violence after Jacksonville shooting», «USA Today», August 29, 2023.
[2435] The Washington Post, Police shootings database; https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/investigations/police-shootings-database/
[2436] "Mapping Police Violence". – https://mappingpoliceviolence.org.
[2437] "Shot at home by police: Teaching officers how to react under stress after Botham Jean, Atatiana Jefferson killings". ABC News, 19 December 2019. https://abcnews.go.com/US/shot-home-police-teaching-officers-react-stress-botham/story?id=67825639
[2438] «Shot at home by police: Teaching officers how to react under stress after Botham Jean, Atatiana Jefferson killings». ABC News, 19 December 2019. https://abcnews.go.com/US/shot-home-police-teaching-officers-react-stress-botham/story?id=67825639
[2439] The Washington Post, Police shootings database; https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/investigations/police-shootings-database/
[2440] https://www.businessinsider.com/black-women-killed-by-police-database-2021-6; https://rg.ru/2024/07/20/v-ssha-s-2015-goda-policejskie-zastrelili-50-chernokozhih-zhenshchin.html
[2441] "What We Know About the Death of George Floyd". The New York Times, 27 May 2020, and Wall Street Journal, 29 May 2020.
[2442] Notably, this is not the Committee's first use of this mechanism. On 18 August 2017 the CERD, being concerned about the scale of racist manifestations, as a part of the Early Warning and Urgent Action Procedures, called on US authorities to convict racist hate crimes on clear and unconditional basis, as well as actively assist to the promotion of tolerance and diversity of ethnic groups.
[2444] https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2024/07/18/sonya-massey-illinois-police-shooting/74460374007/; https://www.cbsnews.com/amp/news/sonya-massey-killed-sangamon-county-deputy-sean-grayson-charged-murder-illinois/; https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/local/2024/07/07/woman-shot-and-killed-by-springfield-area-deputy-during-break-in-investigation/74316549007/; https://rg.ru/2024/07/20/v-ssha-s-2015-goda-policejskie-zastrelili-50-chernokozhih-zhenshchin.html
[2446] Maryland police officer charged with murder in killing of handcuffed man. ВВС, 29 January 2020. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-51291200
[2448] https://apnews.com/article/columbus-ohio-police-shooting-girl-bd579b69e19abf5a93722986ee78c957
[2449] Black residents of Elizabeth City, N.C., thought police violence happened in other places. Then it came to their town. The Washington Post. 29 April 2021. https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-politics/elizabeth-city-police-shooting/2021/04/29/80b28b40-a8ed-11eb-8c1a-56f0cb4ff3b5_story.html.
[2450] KJ Hiramoto, 'Keenan Anderson: Cause of death revealed for LA man shocked by police Taser 6 times', FOX 5, June 3, 2023. https://www.fox5dc.com/news/keenan-anderson-autopsy-los-angeles.
[2451] https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2023/01/27/tyre-nichols-video-police-beating-live/; https://www.rbc.ru/society/28/01/2023/63d4c6059a7947e3f1378b1a
[2452] https://www.npr.org/2023/01/28/1151504967/tyre-nichols-memphis-police-body-cam-video; Marin Cogan, "Cars transformed America. They also made people more vulnerable to the police". The Vox, February 28, 2023.
https://www.vox.com/culture/23614082/sarah-seo-traffic-police-tyre-nichols
[2453] https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2023/01/27/tyre-nichols-video-police-beating-live/
[2454] https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/01/26/memphis-officers-charged-tyre-nichols/?itid=lk_inline_manual_4&itid=lk_inline_manual_5
[2455] https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/1280
[2456] https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2023/01/27/tyre-nichols-video-police-beating-live/
[2457] The China Society for Human Rights Studies (CSHRS) Report on Human Rights Violations in the United States in 2023. Published 29 May 2024 https://news.cgtn.com/news/files/The-Report-On-Human-Rights-Violations-In-The-United-States-In-2023.pdf; https://epaper.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202405/30/WS6657b5a5a310df4030f51e70.html
[2458] https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/sep/01/ohio-police-shooting-pregnant-black-woman-ta-kiya-young
[2459] Cure was convicted of the 2003 armed robbery of a pharmacy in Dania Beach, Florida, and sentenced to life in prison as he had previous convictions for robbery and other crimes. In April 2020, he was acquitted by the court and released from prison. https://iz.ru/1590889/2023-10-17/v-ssha-zamestitel-sherifa-zastrelil-otsidevshego-po-lozhnomu-prigovoru-chernokozhego
[2460] https://apnews.com/article/deputy-sheriff-shooting-traffic-stop-georgia-9ca56342974dd22b34ae330af62c555c
[2461] https://iz.ru/1590889/2023-10-17/v-ssha-zamestitel-sherifa-zastrelil-otsidevshego-po-lozhnomu-prigovoru-chernokozhego
[2462] Why Derek Chauvin's sentencing for murdering George Floyd is a rarity. ABC News. 26 June 2021. https://abcnews.go.com/US/derek-chauvins-sentencing-murdering-george-floyd-rarity/story?id=78402027.
[2463] Ex-officer was sentenced for causing sever injures to unarmed Black man while a police dog mauled him. Washington Post. 22 May 2021. https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2021/05/22/st-paul-officer-sentenced-beating-black-man/.
[2464] СNN, These are the 5 charges the jury in Kyle Rittenhouse's trial considered): https://www.cnn.com/2021/11/14/us/kyle-rittenhouse-jury-deliberations-charges/index.html
[2465] https://news.un.org/ru/story/2023/11/1446777
[2466] https://news.un.org/ru/story/2023/11/1446777
[2467] https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/issues/racism/sr/statements/2023-11-14-EOM-SR-Racism-usa-en.pdf
[2468] The UN International Independent Expert Mechanism to Advance Racial Justice and Equality in Law Enforcement was established in July 2021 by the Human Rights Council to examine the situation and make recommendations. This includes ensuring that people of African descent who have suffered police brutality have access to justice.
[2469] https://news.un.org/ru/story/2023/09/1445272
[2470] https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/ahrc54crp7-international-independent-expert-mechanism-advance-racial
[2471] https://news.un.org/ru/story/2023/09/1445272
[2472] In the Line of Fire: Human Rights and the US Gun Violence Crisis. Amnesty International.
[2473] Amnesty International 2019 report.
[2474] Shootings never stopped during pandemic: 2020 was the deadliest gun violence year in decades. The Washington Post. 24 March 2021.
[2475] https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2fC%2fUSA%2fCO%2f4&Lang=ruhttps://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2fC%2fUSA%2fCO%2f7-9&Lang=ru.
[2476] The Untold Number of People Implicated in Crimes They Didn't Commit Because of Face Recognition. American Civil Libertiys Union. 24 June 2020. https://www.aclu.org/news/privacy-technology/the-untold-number-of-people-implicated-in-crimes-they-didnt-commit-because-of-face-recognition/.
[2477] Just Security data https://www.justswecurity.org/73321/the-future-of-u-s-foreign-intelligence-surveillance/.
[2478] USA: Facial recognition technology reinforcing racist stop-and-frisk policing in New York – new research // Amnesty International. 15.02.2022. – http://www.amnesty.org.
[2479] New York City has five boroughs: the Bronx, Brooklyn, Manhattan, Queens, and Staten Island.
[2480] World Report 2022: United States / Human Rights Watch, 01.2022. – https://www.hrw.org.
[2481] The stop-and-frisk power is given to police officers in many states and allows them to detain a person outside of their home and in a public place if the officer has "reasonable suspicion" that the person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime. If "reasonable grounds" exist, the detainee can be searched "in order to find a hazardous weapon."
[2482] World Report 2022: United States / «Human Rights Watch», 01.2022. – https://www.hrw.org.
[2483] World Report 2022: United States / «Human Rights Watch», 01.2022. – https://www.hrw.org.
[2484] Facial recognition linked to a second wrongful arrest by Detroit police. Engadget. 10 July 2020. https://www.engadget.com/facial-recognition-false-match-wrongful-arrest-224053761.html.
[2485] Ban the scan: do you want your face to be used to track you? Amnesty International. https://banthescan.amnesty.org/.
[2486] Southern Poverty Law Center: https://www.splcenter.org/hate-map?ideology=anti-muslim
[2487] https://russian.rt.com/world/news/1224752-antisemitizm-rost-ssha
[2488] https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/01/26/statement-from-president-joe-biden-on-international-holocaust-remembrance-day/
[2489] https://www.kp.ru/online/news/5539059/
[2490] Anti-Defamation League «Survey on Jewish American's Experiences with Anti-Semitism». 31 March 2021. https://www.adl.org/blog/2021-survey-on-jewish-americans-experiences-with-antisemitism
[2491] https://www.adl.org/resources/press-release/us-antisemitic-incidents-skyrocketed-360-afterrnath-attack-israel-according; https://www.cnn.com/2024/01/10/us/adl-antisemitism-reports-soar-reaj/index.html; https://www.adl.org/audit-antisemitic-incidents-2021
[2492] On 6 January 2021, a crowd of protesters supporting 45th US President Donald Trump's attempts to overturn the results of the 2020 presidential election in which he was defeated, occupied the US Capitol to disrupt a joint session of Congress to count electoral votes and formalize Joe Biden's election victory. After breaking through security and causing damage, people occupied parts of the Congress building for several hours. The storming led to the evacuation and closure of the Capitol building and suspended a joint section of Congress to count electoral votes and formalize Biden's victory.
[2493] The US Capitol riot was full of hate symbols. Here's how to spot them – ABC News. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-01-12/washington-capitol-hate-symbols-race-riots-trump-antisemitism/13048516
[2494] Who's behind recent rise in US anti-Semitic attacks? BBC. 28 May 2021. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-57286341 On 26 May 2021. US Faces Outbreak of Anti-Semitic Threats and Violence. The New York Times. 26 May 2021. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/26/us/anti-semitism-attacks-violence.html.
[2495] NY Man Attacks Hasidic Jewish Couple and Baby With Knife. Jewish Journal. 1 April 2021. https://jewishjournal.com/news/334923/ny-man-attacks-hasidic-jewish-couple-and-baby-with-knife/
[2496] Holocaust survivor's car marked with swastikas; auto center tagged with anti-Semitic message. WSVN, 27 March 2021. https://wsvn.com/news/local/miami-dade/holocaust-survivors-car-marked-with-swastikas-auto-center-tagged-with-anti-semitic-message/
[2497] CBS News. 26.01.2021.
[2498] Douglas, Jack; Zapotosky, Matt; Fisher, Marc (22 January 2022). Angry outbursts and cool determination: Inside the synagogue attacker's 18-day journey to terror .THE WASHINGTON POST. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/angry-outbursts-and-cool-determination-inside-the-synagogue-attackers-18-day-journey-to-terror/2022/01/22/2015da20-7931-11ec-83e1-eaef0fe4b8c9_story.html
[2499] https://www.foxnews.com/politics/ohio-jewish-cemetery-headstones-vandalized-antisemitic-graffiti; https://lenta.ru/news/2023/11/13/v-ssha-oskvernili-evreyskoe-kladbische/
[2500] https://twitter.com/jewishcleveland
[2501] https://www.berkeleyside.org/2022/02/22/anti-semitic-flyers-berkeley-hills,
https://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Antisemitic-flyers-found-in-San-Francisco-16800705.php.
[2503] https://www.npr.org/2022/11/29/1139742844/republicans-denounce-trump-dinner-white-supremacist-nick-fuentes
[2504] https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/columnist/dan-wolken/2022/11/01/kyrie-irvings-antisemitic-film-endorsement-must-dealt-nba/10655972002/
[2505] https://stanforddaily.com/2022/10/03/freed-ukrainian-prisoners-of-war-call-for-support-against-russia/
[2506] https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/12/12/statement-from-white-house-press-secretary-karine-jean-pierre-on-inter-agency-group-to-counter-antisemitism/
[2507] https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/U.S.-National-Strategy-to-Counter-Antisemitism.pdf
[2508] https://www.state.gov/remarks-at-the-conference-of-presidents-of-major-american-jewish-organizations-antisemitism-the-interconnected-hatred/
[2509] https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/01/26/statement-from-president-joe-biden-international-holocaust-remembrance-day-statement-2024/
[2510] https://forward.com/news/462704/nazi-collaborator-monuments-in-united-states/ https://wisconsinexaminer.com/2021/03/29/ukrainian-baraboo-nazi-statues/ uhttps://www.holosameryky.com/a/azovstal-rotest/7353938.html?
[2511] withmediaplayer=1&fbclid=IwAR1skyR5C2KL1AcGM-mNwwdtFV6jHlpDR4RRlTC)9z4NhSofOUNWwW5nil4
[2514] https://truthout.org/articles/a-new-wave-of-neo-nazism-has-become-visible-in-wake-of-jacksonville-shooting/
[2516] White supremacist praise of the Taliban takeover concerns US officials. CNN. 1 September 2021. (White supremacist praise of the Taliban takeover concerns US officials. «CNN». 1 September 2021). https://edition.cnn.com/2021/09/01/politics/far-right-groups-praise-taliban-takeover/index.html; Islamic extremists celebrate success of the Taliban in Afghanistan amidst chaos, Anti-Defamation League, 26 August 2021, https://www.adl.org/blog/amid-chaos-islamist-extremists-celebrate-talibans-success-in-afghanistan.
[2517] https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2023/nov/10/israel-hamas-war-live-updates-benjamin-netanyahu-gaza-fighting-pauses-un-palestine?page=with:block-654eaada8f08c3ba45a50ece#block-654eaada8f08c3ba45a50ece
[2519] https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2023/nov/10/israel-hamas-war-live-updates-benjamin-netanyahu-gaza-fighting-pauses-un-palestine?page=with:block-654eaada8f08c3ba45a50ece#block-654eaada8f08c3ba45a50ece; https://www.kp.ru/online/news/5539059/
[2520] https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/l 1/01/statement-from-white-house-press- secretary-karine-jean-pierre-on-president-bidens-establishment-of-first-ever-national-strategy-to-counter-islamophobia/
[2521] https://islamophobia.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/2024_Fatal_The_Resurgence_of_Anti-Muslim_Hate-l.pdf
[2522] https://www.trtrussian.com/politika/epidemiya-islamofobii-na-zapade-kto-vinovat-17375903
https://www.yenisafak.com/ru/news/11593
[2523] Anti-immigrant campaign ads negatively impact Latino mental health and make them feel unwelcome in the United States.01.11.2022: ): https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2022/11/01/anti-immigrant-campaign-ads-negatively-impact-latinos-mental-health-and-make-them-feel-unwelcome-in-the-united-states/
[2524] https://rg.ru/2024/02/22/strah-i-nenavist-v-amerike-kak-bandy-migrantov-terroriziruiut-goroda.html
[2525] https://rg.ru/2024/02/22/strah-i-nenavist-v-amerike-kak-bandy-migrantov-terroriziruiut-goroda.html
[2526] https://refugeerights.org/news-resources/immigrant-rights-groups-demand-accountability-for-gross-violations-of-human-rights-at-open-air-detention-sites-at-u-s-mexico-border
[2527] The Biden administration's unfulfilled promise of humane border policies. 28.05.2022: https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(22)00741-3/fulltext
[2528] Title 42 must end. Here are five reasons why. 20.12.2022: https://www.wola.org/analysis/title-42-must-end-here-are-five-reasons-why/
[2529] Where GOP governors are transporting migrants. 23.09.2022: https://www.axios.com/2022/09/23/gop-governors-sending-migrants-democratic-cities
[2530] According to the Chinese society for the study of human rights, from 2017 to the first quarter of 2021, there were over 5,000 such incidents.
[2531] ACLU. Immigrant families still being separated at border. 2 October 2018. https://www.aclu.org/issues/family-separation
[2532] ACLU. ACLU has Filed 400 Legal Actions Against Trump Administration. 17 August 2020. https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/aclu-has-filed-400-legal-actions-against-trump-administration
[2533] Migrant boy found wandering alone in Texas had been deported and kidnapped. The Washington Post. 9 April 2021. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/04/09/migrant-boy-found-wandering-alone-texas-had-been-deported-kidnapped/
[2534] TRAC Immigration, Details on Migrant Protection Protocols (Remain in Mexico) Deportation Proceedings. Syracuse University.
[2535] Physicians for Human Rights – PHR), Forced into Danger, January 2021.
[2536] Physicians for Human Rights – PHR), Forced into Danger, January 2021.
[2537] https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/resource/us-asylum-and-border-policies-resulting-human-rights-violations
[2538] American Civil Liberties Union), Comment on Appeals Court Stay Ruling in Remain in Mexico Program, 4 March 2020.
[2539] American Civil Liberties Union), Comment on Supreme Court Stay Ruling in Remain in Mexico Program, 11 March 2020.
[2540] Data of the US Center for Disease Control and Prevention. 2020
[2541] The Century Foundation Report. 2020
[2542] Praying for Hand Soap and Masks. Health and Human Rights Violations in U.S. Immigration Detention during the COVID-19 Pandemic. Physicians for human rights website. 12 January 2021. https://phr.org/our-work/resources/praying-for-hand-soap-and-masks/.
[2543] Coalition Letter to Department of Homeland Security Secretary Mayorkas
Regarding Use of Expedited Removal Process for Asylum Seekers at the Border. "Human Rights Watch". 16 February 2021. https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/02/16/coalition-letter-department-homeland-security-secretary-mayorkas
[2544] https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/rsource/us-asylum-and-border-policies-resulting-human-rights-violations.
[2545] The US Department of Homeland Security: https://www.dhs.gov/news/2022/08/08/dhs-statement-us-district-courts-decision-regarding-mpp
[2546] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/02/us/politics/deportation-flights-mexico-immigration.html
[2547] https://riamo.ru/articles/aktsenty/chto-proishodit-v-tehase-i-mogut-li-sobytiya-na-meksikanskoj-granitse-stat-nachalom-raspada-ssha/?from=inf_cards
[2548] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-61989673; https://riamo.ru/articles/aktsenty/chto-proishodit-v-tehase-i-mogut-li-sobytiya-na-meksikanskoj-granitse-stat-nachalom-raspada-ssha/?from=inf_cards
[2549] https://nypost.com/2024/01/28/news/joe-bidens-war-with-texas-greg-abbott-threatens-a-constitutional-crisis/; https://riamo.ru/articles/aktsenty/chto-proishodit-v-tehase-i-mogut-li-sobytiya-na-meksikanskoj-granitse-stat-nachalom-raspada-ssha/?from=inf_cards
[2550] https://riamo.ru/articles/aktsenty/chto-proishodit-v-tehase-i-mogut-li-sobytiya-na-meksikanskoj-granitse-stat-nachalom-raspada-ssha/?from=inf_cards
[2551] https://riamo.ru/articles/aktsenty/chto-proishodit-v-tehase-i-mogut-li-sobytiya-na-meksikanskoj-granitse-stat-nachalom-raspada-ssha/?from=inf_cards
[2552] https://www.governing.com/now/2-years-and-4b-later-what-we-know-about-operation-lone-star
[2553] https://www.governing.com/now/2-years-and-4b-later-what-we-know-about-operation-lone-star; https://riamo.ru/articles/aktsenty/chto-proishodit-v-tehase-i-mogut-li-sobytiya-na-meksikanskoj-granitse-stat-nachalom-raspada-ssha/?from=inf_cards
[2554] https://riamo.ru/articles/aktsenty/chto-proishodit-v-tehase-i-mogut-li-sobytiya-na-meksikanskoj-granitse-stat-nachalom-raspada-ssha/?from=inf_cards
[2555] https://riamo.ru/articles/aktsenty/chto-proishodit-v-tehase-i-mogut-li-sobytiya-na-meksikanskoj-granitse-stat-nachalom-raspada-ssha/?from=inf_cards
[2556] https://riamo.ru/articles/aktsenty/chto-proishodit-v-tehase-i-mogut-li-sobytiya-na-meksikanskoj-granitse-stat-nachalom-raspada-ssha/?from=inf_cards
[2557] https://www.cbsnews.com/news/texas-blocks-federal-border-agents-processing-migrants-eagle-pass-shelby-park/; https://iz.ru/1642975/2024-01-31/izvestiia-pokazali-obstanovku-na-granitce-tekhasa-s-meksikoi; https://iz.ru/1644333/2024-02-03/nyt-soobshchila-o-vozobnovlenii-deportatcionnykh-reisov-iz-ssha-v-meksiku
[2558] https://riamo.ru/articles/aktsenty/chto-proishodit-v-tehase-i-mogut-li-sobytiya-na-meksikanskoj-granitse-stat-nachalom-raspada-ssha/?from=inf_cards
[2560] https://rg.ru/2024/01/30/tehas-shagaet-vperedi.html
[2561] https://www.cbsnews.com/news/jason-owens-border-patrol-southern-border-national-security-threat/; https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/news/2024/03/25/1027712-ssha-soobschili-zaderzhanii
[2562] https://rg.ru/2024/01/30/tehas-shagaet-vperedi.html
[2563] https://rg.ru/2024/02/22/strah-i-nenavist-v-amerike-kak-bandy-migrantov-terroriziruiut-goroda.html
[2564] https://www.foxnews.com/politics/trump-reveals-criteria-running-mate-name-drops-two-top-republicans
[2565] OHCHR: New US border enforcement actions pose risk to fundamental human rights – Turk) //https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/01/new-us-border-enforcement-actions-pose-risk-fundamental-human-rights-turk
[2566] The China Society for Human Rights Studies' Report on Violation og Human Rights in the US in 2023. Published on 29 May 2024. https://news.cgtn.com/news/files/The-Report-On-Human-Rights-Violations-In-The-United-States-In-2023.pdf; https://epaper.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202405/30/WS6657b5a5a310df4030f51e70.html
[2567] https://rg.ru/2024/06/11/bez-obiasneniia-prichin-rossijskie-migranty-popali-pod-vysylku-iz-ssha.html; https://nypost.com/
[2568] https://rg.ru/2024/06/11/bez-obiasneniia-prichin-rossijskie-migranty-popali-pod-vysylku-iz-ssha.html
[2569] https://rg.ru/2024/06/11/bez-obiasneniia-prichin-rossijskie-migranty-popali-pod-vysylku-iz-ssha.html
[2570] https://rg.ru/2024/06/04/bajden-vvodit-vremennyj-zapret-na-predostavlenie-ubezhishcha-nelegalam-iz-meksiki.html
[2571] https://rg.ru/2024/06/11/bez-obiasneniia-prichin-rossijskie-migranty-popali-pod-vysylku-iz-ssha.html
[2572] https://rg.ru/2024/06/11/bez-obiasneniia-prichin-rossijskie-migranty-popali-pod-vysylku-iz-ssha.html
[2573] https://rg.ru/2024/06/11/bez-obiasneniia-prichin-rossijskie-migranty-popali-pod-vysylku-iz-ssha.html
[2574] https://rg.ru/2024/06/11/bez-obiasneniia-prichin-rossijskie-migranty-popali-pod-vysylku-iz-ssha.html
[2575] Unchecked Growth: Private Prison Corporations and Immigration Detention, Three Years Into the Biden Administration // ACLU. 07.08.2023. – https://www.aclu.org.
[2576] Brazilian Man's Suicide Sends Shockwaves Through "Inhumane" ICE Detention Center // The Appeal. 13.10.2022. – https://theappeal.org
[2577] Resin C. An asylum-seeker died in immigration custody. His family wants answers // NBC News. 06.09.2023.) – https://www.nbcnews.com.
[2578] The Supremacy Clause is a wording in the US Constitution that provides that the Basic Law and laws of the United States, as well as international treaties entered into by the United States, are the supreme law of the country. The clause also requires state judges to be guided by the US Constitution, laws, and international treaties, even if individual state constitutions and laws conflict with federal law. State constitutions also recognize the supremacy of the federal Constitution.
[2579] Mathur S. Biden Administration Fights to Keep Private Immigration Jails Open, Despite Promises // Immigration Impact. 08.09.2023. – https://immigrationimpact.com.
[2580] Prison Policy Initiative's Report Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2020 of 24 March 2020
[2581] Human Rights Watch 2019 Report
[2582] Prison Diary / Maria Butina, Moscow: AST Publishing House 2021. – 544 pages (Portrait of an Era) – page 95, page 101, page 97.
[2583] https://iz.ru/1737632/ivan-dubrovin/ia-do-sikh-por-ne-veriu-chto-ia-v-rossii-i-chto-vse-eto-ne-son
[2584] https://iz.ru/1737632/ivan-dubrovin/ia-do-sikh-por-ne-veriu-chto-ia-v-rossii-i-chto-vse-eto-ne-son
[2585] https://iz.ru/1737632/ivan-dubrovin/ia-do-sikh-por-ne-veriu-chto-ia-v-rossii-i-chto-vse-eto-ne-son
[2586] The Washington Post: https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/01/28/my-son-was-abused-prison-proposed-virginia-legislation-still-wouldnt-give-him-second-chance/
[2587] https://news.un.org/ru/story/2023/09/1445272; https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/ahrc54crp7-international-independent-expert-mechanism-advance-racial
[2588] https://news.un.org/ru/story/2023/09/1445272; https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/ahrc54crp7-international-independent-expert-mechanism-advance-racial
[2589] https://ura.news/news/1052747757
[2590] https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/6865911; https://www.iha.com.tr/haber-mitten-buyuk-takas-operasyonu-1188066
[2591] https://72.ru/text/politics/2024/08/01/73906481/
[2592] https://72.ru/text/politics/2024/08/01/73906481/
[2594] https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/01/09/legacy-dark-side
[2595] https://www.amnesty.org.uk/guantanamo-bay-human-rights
[2596] https://www.ohchr.org/ru/special-procedures/sr-terrorism
[2597] https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/06/expert-welcomes-historic-visit-united-states-and-guantanamo-detention
[2598] https://www.icrc.org/en/document/guant%C3%A1namo-detaining-authorities-must-adapt-needs-rapidly-ageing-population
[2599] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus 2022 Report on Most High-Profile Human Rights Violations in Certain Countries of the World https://mfa.gov.by/kcfinder/upload/files/22.07.04_report_HR_2.pdf
[2600] Human Rights Watch: https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/usa/qna1006/usqna1006.htm
[2601] Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit: https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/7047939/DC-Circuit-Rao-Gitmo-Habeas-Ruling.pdf
[2602] Los Angeles Times: https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2020-01-22/ksm-waterboarding-guantanamo-testimony
[2603] «The New York Times»: https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/04/us/politics/guantanamo-torture-sentencing.html
[2604] United States of America v. Majid Shoukat Khan Ruling Defense Motion for Pretrial Punishment Credit Relief, Military Commissions Trial Judiciary, Guantanamo Bay, June 4, 2020 (United States of America v. Majid Shoukat Khan Ruling Defense Motion for Pretrial Punishment Credit Relief, Military Commissions Trial Judiciary, Guantanamo Bay, June 4, 2020)
[2605] Center for Constitutional Rights CCR: https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/attach/2019/09/Emergency%20Motion%20for%20Al%20Hajj%20S
tatus%20Conference%20August%2022%202019.pdf
[2606] Fox News: https://www.foxnews.com/world/political-poison-whats-going-on-in-gitmo
[2607] The New York Times: https://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/29/us/yemeni-detainee-at-guantanamo-died-of-overdose.html
[2608] The New York Times: https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/11/us/ibrahim-idris-dead.html
[2609] Miami Herald: https://www.miamiherald.com/opinion/op-ed/article121885083.html
[2610] Just Security: https://www.justsecurity.org/72367/toward-a-new-approach-to-national-and-human-security-close-guantanamo-and-end-indefinite-detention/
[2611] Amnesty International: https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/amr51/3474/2021/en/
[2612] "Disgraceful" Guantánamo Bay detention facility must be closed now, say UN experts. The Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council press-release. 11 January 2021. https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26649&LangID=E
[2613] The Hill: https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/549584-closing-guantanamo-is-long-overdue
[2614] The Hill: https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/557581-report-biden-hopes-to-close-guantanamo-by-the-end-of-his-first-term
[2616] Executions Scheduled for Four Federal Inmates Convicted of Murdering Children, US Department of Justice website, 15 June 2020.
[2617] Death penalty information Center
[2619] https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/
[2620] https://tass.ru/obschestvo/19822213
[2621] Death penalty information Center). Facts about death penalty, as of 20 May 2020. https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/.
[2622] Outrage greets reports of Arizona plan to use Holocaust gas in executions. «The New York Times». 2 June 2021.
[2623] Elizabeth Warren website, 22 December 2020.
[2624] https://www.cnn.com/2024/01/26/us/alabama-execution-nitrogen-what-we-know/index.html
[2625] https://www.alabamaag.gov/alabama-attorney-general-steve-marshall-statement-on-the-execution-of-murderer-kenneth-smith-by-nitrogen-hypoxia/
[2626] https://edition.cnn.com/2024/01/26/us/alabama-execution-nitrogen-what-we-know/index.html,
https://tass.ru/obschestvo/19822213
[2627] https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/01/1145947
[2628] https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/news/2024/01/26/1016974-oon-i-es-osudili-ssha
[2629] https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/01/23/alabama-intends-carry-out-first-known-us-execution-using-nitrogen-gas
[2630] Newsweek.com. US military claims responsibility for more than 23 civilian deaths in 2020
[2631] Ibid.
[2632] Amnesty International USA: https://www.amnestyusa.org/press-releases/defense-department-undercounts-civilian-casualties-in-new-reporting/
[2633] Human Rights Watch: https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/06/16/somalia-inadequate-us-airstrike-investigations
[2634] https://www.brookings.edu/articles/biden-can-reduce-civilian-casualties-during-us-drone-strikes-heres-how/
[2635] Human Rights Watch: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/somalia#
[2636] Costs of War: https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2020/Rising%20Civilian%20Death%20
Toll%20in%20Afghanistan_Costs%20of%20War_Dec%207%202020.pdf
[2637] https://www.brookings.edu/articles/biden-can-reduce-civilian-casualties-during-us-drone-strikes-heres-how/
[2638] https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2023/05/02/most-u-s-journalists-are-concerned-about-press-freedoms/
[2639] https://pressfreedomtracker.us/blog/members-of-the-press-charged-with-committing-acts-of-journalism-in-2023/
[2640] The US Press Freedom Tracker: https://pressfreedomtracker.us/all-incidents/social-media-journalist-arrested-during-san-clemente-protest-held-overnight/
[2641] The US Press Freedom Tracker: https://pressfreedomtracker.us/all-incidents/newsnation-reporter-arrested-while-covering-ohio-governor-news-conference/
[2642] The US Press Freedom Tracker: https://pressfreedomtracker.us/all-incidents/photojournalist-arrested-at-candlelight-vigil-for-man-killed-on-nyc-subway/
[2643] https://pressfreedomtracker.us/blog/members-of-the-press-charged-with-committing-acts-of-journalism-in-2023/
https://pressfreedomtracker.us/all-incidents/newspaper-ordered-to-comply-with-subpoena-for-jailhouse-interview-notes/
[2644] https://www.lugansk.kp.ru/daily/27561/4885398/
[2645] https://russian.rt.com/world/article/1270029-putin-karlson-intervyu-zapadnye-smi
[2647] https://russian.rt.com/world/article/1270029-putin-karlson-intervyu-zapadnye-smi
[2648] https://russian.rt.com/world/article/1270029-putin-karlson-intervyu-zapadnye-smi
[2650] https://russian.rt.com/world/article/1270029-putin-karlson-intervyu-zapadnye-smi
[2651] https://russian.rt.com/world/article/1270029-putin-karlson-intervyu-zapadnye-smi
[2652] YouTube press account on Twitter: https://twitter.com/YouTubeInsider/status/1502335030168899595
[2653] NGO Committee to Protect Journalists) https://cpj.org/2020/08/were-scared-shitless-out-here-four-reporters-on-covering-the-federal-response-to-portland-protests/
[2654] NGO Freedom of the Press Foundation: https://freedom.press/news/press-freedom-coalition-calls-for-end-to-assange-prosecution-after-shocking-reporting-on-cia-misconduct
[2655] NGO Democracy Now: https://www.democracynow.org/2022/6/6/headlines/spanish_court_summons_mike_pompeo_over_cia
_plot_to_kidnap_or_kill_julian_assange
[2656] https://regnum.ru/article/3898188
[2657] The Trump Administration and the Media. Committee to Protect Journalists. 16 April 2020. https://cpj.org/reports/2020/04/trump-media-attacks-credibility-leaks/
[2658] NGO Reporters without Borders. https://rsf.org/en/united-states
[2659] Website of NGO US Freedom Tracker.
[2660] The prison was going to be abolished by B. Obama, but his decree was cancelled by D. Trump.
[2661] https://www.aclu.org/news/free-speech/when-florida-officials-tried-to-silence-our-pro-palestinian-student-group-we-sued; https://www.aclu.org/news/free-speech/defending-free-speech-students-justice-palestine-florida
[2662] Report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus for 2023 on the most resonant cases of human rights violations in individual countries https://mfa.gov.by/kcfinder/upload/files/Press_Service/23.06.22_report_hr.pdf
[2663] Formed in January 2023.
[2664] The laptop that Joe Biden's son Hunter left at a repair shop in Delaware in 2019 contains thousands of emails spanning a decade. The correspondence discusses the president's son's overseas business deals. Among other things, the emails confirm Hunter's agreement with CEFC China Energy, a private conglomerate with close ties to the Chinese government, which paid nearly five million dollars to his son as well as the president's brother James. https://inosmi.ru/20220404/khanter-253672078.html
[2665] https://www.ng.ru/education/2024-03-20/8_8974_florida.html
[2666] https://www.ng.ru/education/2024-03-20/8_8974_florida.html
[2667] https://www.ng.ru/education/2024-03-20/8_8974_florida.html
[2668] https://ria.ru/20240129/doprosy-1924055439.html
[2669] https://www.epochtimes.ru/mir/severnaya-america/kitajskih-studentov-doprashivayut-i-deportiruyut-iz-ssha-za-svyazi-s-kompartiej-kitaya-196996/
[2670] There are more Chinese students in the US than from any other country. Thus, there were 289,526 Chinese students in the US at the end of academic year 2023 (the lowest since 2013‑2014 (-0.2%)). In turn, the number of American students studying in China at the end of 2023 increased to 700 after a sharp drop to 350 students in 2022 (for comparison – about 12,000 Russians are now being educated in China).
[2671] https://russian.news.cn/20240201/cc5ff0330aca438ebdc41999804223df/c.html
[2672] Tribal Nations & the United States: An introduction. National Congress of American Indians. (February 2020). https://www.ncai.org/about-tribes
[2673] Braun, S. (1 April 2022). The Indigenous World 2022: United States of America. IWGIA. https://www.iwgia.org/en/usa/4684-iw-2022-united-states-of-america.html
[2674] Tribal Nations & the United States: An introduction. National Congress of American Indians. (February 2020). https://www.ncai.org/about-tribes
[2676] NGO American Civil Liberties Union of Montana: https://www.aclumontana.org/en/news/contextualizing-federal-indian-boarding-school-initiative-report
[2677] https://ncrc.org/racial-wealth-snapshot-native-americans/
[2678] https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2022/02/09/despite-an-optimistic-jobs-report-new-data-shows-native-american-unemployment-remains-staggeringly-high/
[2679] https://www.narf.org/brnovich/
[2680] US Const. Art. I, §8, cl. 3. Commerce Clause. https://www.law.comell.edu/constitution/articlei#section8
[2684] https://www.insightintodiversitv.com/report-details-university-of-minnesotas-historical-mistreatment-of-native-americans/#:~:text=Through%20analysis%20of%20archivai%20records.lands%20and%20resources.%E2%
80%9D%20These%20actions https://mn.gov/indian-affairs/truth-project/
[2685] https://nativenewsonline.net/currents/pressure-mounts-for-release-of-political-prisoner-leonard-peltier
[2687] https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/11/readout-of-the-white-houses-first-stakeholder-convening-on-mining-reform/; https://www.doi.gov/ocI/mining-iaw-reform
[2688] Dominguez, R. (9 September 2021). Just minerals for a just transition. Earthworks, https://earthshaking/blog/just-minerals-for-a-just-transition/
[2689] Earth Island. Navajos ban uranium mining. https://www.earthisIand.org/journal/index.php/magazine/entry/navajos_ban_uranium_mining/
[2690] d. See also Galligan, T. & Reynvaan (1977). Pacific Northwest Indian Treaty Fishing Rights Vol 5:99. https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=llSO&context^sulr
[2691] https://perpetuaresources.com/proiect/
https://efiling.energy.ca.gov/GetDocument.aspx?tn=245607&DocumentContentId=79638
Healy, J., & Baker, M. (27 December 2021). As miners chase clean-energy minerals, tribes fear a repeat of the past. The New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/27/us/mining-clean-energy-antimony-tribes.html
[2692] Turkewitz, J. (8 February 2017). Army approves construction of Dakota Access Pipeline. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/07/us/army-approves-construction-of-dakota-access-pipeline.html
[2693] Romo, V. (11 September 2018). Native American tribes file lawsuit seeking to invalidate Keystone XL Pipeline Permit. NPR. https://www.npr.org/2018/09/10/646523140/native-american-tribes-file-lawsuit-seeking-to-invalidate-keystone-xl-pipeline-p
[2694] Pember, M. A. (24 February 2021). Bridget Line 3 divides indigenous lands, people. MPR News. https://www.mprnews.org/story/2021/02/24/enbridge-line-3-divides-indigenous-lands-people
[2695] Sahagun, L. (14 March 2021). A corporation wants to mine for gold near Death Valley. Native Tribes are fighting it. Los Angeles Times, https://www.latimes.com/environment/story/2021-03-14/a-corporation-wants-to-mine-for-gold-near-death-valley-native-tribes-are-fighting-it; https://k2gold.com/
[2696] Naiden, A. (1 December 2021). Environmentalists and Alaska villages continue court challenge of permits for Ambler Road Project. Anchorage Daily News. https://www.adn.com/alaska-news/rural-alaska/2021/12/10/environmentalists-and-alaska-villages-continue-court-challenge-of-permits-for-ambler-road-project/
[2698] https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/2023/07/19/alaska-ambler-road-critical-minerals-climate/ Earthworks Biden administration acknowledges legal problems with Interior's Ambler road approval (2022, Feb.20). https://earthworks.org/releases/biden-administration-acknowledges-legal-problems-with-interiors-ambler-road-approval/
[2699] Healy, J., & Baker, М. (27 December 2021). As miners chase clean-energy minerals, tribes fear a repeat of the past. The New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/27/us/mining-clean-energy-antimony-tribes.htmi
[2700] Naiden, A. (10 December 2021). Ariz. Tribes, Enviros say copper mine suit must go on. Law360. Retrieved from https://www.law360.com/articles/1491023/ariz-tribes-enviros-say-copper-mine-suit-must-go-on
[2701] EarthJustice (12 May 2022). 9th US Circuit Court of Appeals Upholds Landmark Ruling Blocking Arizona Copper Mine. https://earthjustice.org/news/press/2022/9th-u-s-circuit-court-of-appeals-upholds-landmark-ruling-blocking-arizonacopper-mine
[2702] Abbott, D. (13 June 2022). Hudbay wins latest court battle over the Rosemont Mine as heavy equipment continues to roll in the Santa Rita Mountains. Arizona Mirror. Retrieved from https://www.azmirror.com/2022/06/01/hudbay-wins-latest-court-battle-over-the-rosemont-mine-as-heavy-equipment -continues-to-roll-in-the-santa-rita-mountains/
[2703] Gilger, L. (29 August 2019). Environmentalists, tribes battle Rosemont mine in Southeastern Arizona. KJZZ. https://kjzz.org/content/960201/environmentalists-tribes-battle-rosemont-mine-southeastern-arizona
[2704] Healy, J., & Baker, M. (27 December 2021). As miners chase clean-energy minerals, tribes fear a repeat of the past. The New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/27/us/mining-clean-energy-antimony-tribes.html
[2705] Krawczyk, K. (10 June 2021). Mining for lithium, at a cost to indigenous religions. Energy News Network. https://energynews.us/2021/06/10/mining-for-lithium-at-a-cost-to-indigenous-religions/
[2706] Healy, J., & Baker, М. (27 December 2021). As miners chase clean-energy minerals, tribes fear a repeat of the past. The New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/27/us/mining-clean-energy-antimony-tribes.html
[2707] Stern, R. (22 April 2015). A copper mine near Superior and Oak Flat Campground is set to destroy a unique, sacred recreation area – for fleeting benefits. Phoenix New Times, https://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/news/a-copper-mine-near-superior-and-oak-flat-campground-is-set-to-destroy-aunique-sacred-recreation-area-for-fleeting-benefits-7287269
[2708] Kelety, J. (2 July 2022). Biden administration says Oak Flat Land Swap should proceed despite lawsuit. Phoenix New Times.
[2709] Thompson, D. (28 June 2022). US Court of Appeals denies Apache claim to Oak Flat, approves copper mine in Arizona. Native News Online, https://nativenewsonline.net/environment/u-s-court-of-appeals-denies-apache-claim-to-oak-flat-approves-copper-mine-in-arizona
[2710] Healy, J., & Baker, М. (27 December 2021). As miners chase clean-energy minerals, tribes fear a repeat of the past. The New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/27/us/mining-clean-energy-antimony-tribes.html
[2711] Human rights abuse cannot be the price paid for Essential Energy Transition. Business & Human Rights Resource Centre. (2 February 2021). https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/from-us/media-centre/liuman-rights-abuse-cannot-be-the-price-paid-for-essential-energy-transition/
[2712] Fox, L. (4 July 2019). 'Man camps' May be a threat to Yukon Indigenous women and girls, say advocates. Yukon News. https://www.yukon-news.com/news/man-camps-may-be-a-threat-to-yukon-indigenous-women-and-girls-say-advocates/
[2713] Finn, K. (30 March 2020). Recalibrating risk assessment for indigenous women. GreenMoney Journal. https://greenmoney.com/recalibrating-risk-assessment-for-indigenous-women/
[2714] A detailed description of the then events is given in the collective study "History of Ukraine: a monograph" by: Grigoriev M.S., Deinego V.N., Dyukov A.R., Zasorin S.A., Malkevich A.A., Manko S.A., Shapovalov V.L. – M.: International Relations, 2022. – 648 p. The text of the monograph is available on the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation website https://files.oprf.ru/storage/image_store/docs2022/istoriya_Ukraini_MS_Grigoriev_dr.pdf
[2715] https://raskolam.net/ru/67430-vlada-graye-z-duzhe-skladnym-yavyshhem-politolog-pro-religijnyj-konflikt/, https://antifashist.online/item/dikoe-pole-2024-zelenskij-gotovit-ukrainu-k-religioznoj-vojne.html
[2716] More detailed information on such manifestations is contained in the joint report by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation on the human rights situation in individual countries.
[2717] Human Rights Committee. Concluding observations of the on the 8th periodic report of Ukraine. November 2021 (observations published in February 2022) https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2FC%2FUKR%2FCO%2F8&Lang=ru
[2718] Report of the Independent Expert on the effects of foreign debt and other related international financial obligations of States on the full enjoyment of human rights, particularly economic, social and cultural rights, Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky, on his mission to Ukraine in May 2018. December 2018. https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G19/024/59/PDF/G1902459.pdf?OpenElement
[2719] Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Concluding observations on the sixth periodic report of Ukraine. April 2014. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=E%2fC.12%2fUKR%2fCO%2f6&Lang=en
[2720] Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women. Concluding observations on the eighth periodic report of Ukraine. February 2017. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CEDAW%2fC%2fUKR%2fCO%2f8&Lang=en
[2721] https://24tv.ua/ru/zakon-o-mobilizacii-2024-kakie-izmenenija-budut-kto-ne-podlezhit_n2533812
[2722] Human Rights Committee. Concluding observations on the eighth periodic report of Ukraine. November 2021. (observations published in February 2022) https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2FC%2FUKR%2FCO%2F8&Lang=en
[2723] https://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/ukraine-military-endangering-civilians-locating-forces-residential-areas-new
[2724] See, for example, https://amp.tsargrad.tv/articles/chjornaja-transplantologija-na-ukraine-izvestna-propiska-doktora-smert_604078, https://tsargrad.tv/investigations/koncy-v-krematorij-ukraina-platit-za-oruzhie-vnutrennimi-organami-grazhdan_523850
[2725] https://www.rubaltic.ru/article/politika-i-obshchestvo/20221027-zelenskiy-prevratil-ukrainu-v-ray-dlya-chernykh-transplantologov/
[2726] https://www.rubaltic.ru/article/politika-i-obshchestvo/20240703-chernye-transplantologi-kiev-nachinaet-priznavat-pravdivost-rossiyskoy-propagandy/
[2727] More detailed information on such confirmations is contained in the joint report by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation on the human rights situation in individual countries.
[2728] Both organisations are deemed extremist and are banned in Russia.
[2729] https://sledcom.ru/news/item/1865695/
[2730] Both organizations are deemed extremist in the Russian Federation.
[2731] Infringement of rights and freedoms in Ukraine. Manifestation of discrimination, incitement of ethnic hatred, hate crimes and extremism. Report for the OSCE human dimension implementation meeting 2019. The Institute of legal policy and social protection, the Antifascist human rights legal league. 2019.
[2732] https://strana.today/news/175167-bojtsy-upa-oun-i-unra-poluchili-v-ukraine-status-uchastnikov-boevykh-dejstvij.html (earlier https://strana.ua/news/175244-vekhovnaya-rada-predostavila-status-uchastnikov-boevykh-dejstvij-bojtsam-upa-oun-uvo-polesskaja-sech-i-unra-sut-zakona.html)
[2733] https://strana.today/news/306764-pamjatnye-daty-2021-hoda-koho-vnesli-v-postanovlenie-verkhovnoj-rady.html (earlier https://strana.ua/news/306764-pamjatnye-daty-2021-hoda-koho-vnesli-v-postanovlenie-verkhovnoj-rady.html)
[2734] https://amp.ctrana.news/news/367541-pamjatnye-daty-ukrainy-2022-2023-hoda.html
[2735] https://vp.donetsk.ua/ukraina-mir/100938-vr-prinyala-postanovlenie-o-prazdnovanii-pamyatnykh-dat-v-2022
[2736] https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/3536-20
[2737] https://strana.today/news/252473-kollaboranty-v-ukraine-khha-podderzhal-postanovlenie-o-pamjatnykh-datakh-i-jubilejakh.html (earlier https://strana.ua/news/252473-kollaboranty-v-ukraine-khha-podderzhal-postanovlenie-o-pamjatnykh-datakh-i-jubilejakh.html)
[2738] More details on topographic changes in Ukraine are provided below.
[2739] A list of such "monuments" can be found at: https://forward.com/news/462916/nazi-collaborator-monuments-in-ukraine/
[2740] Ukrainian Institute of National Memory. https://uinp.gov.ua/istorychnyy-kalendar/cherven/30/1941-progoloshennya-vidnovlennya-ukrayinskoyi-derzhavy
[2742] https://lenta.ru/news/2019/11/12/zvilen/, https://aif.ru/politics/world/fashistom_byt_pochetno_ukrainskiy-konsul-antisemit_vosstanovlen_na-rabote
[2743] The Online Environment as a Tool for Violation of Rights and Freedoms in Ukraine. Irina Berezhnaya Institute for Legal Policy and Social Protection, 2022.
[2745] https://politnavigator.news/ukrainskijj-general-poobeshhal-ubivat-russkikh-zhenshhin-i-detejj.html
[2749] https://strana.today/news/420555-v-polshe-osudili-publikatsiju-rady-ko-dnju-rozhdenija-bandery.html
[2752] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the twenty-second and twenty-third periodic reports of Ukraine. August 2016.
[2753] Hatebook. Facebook's neo-Nazi shopfronts fundingfar-right extremism. Report by Center for Countering Digital Hate. https://252f2edd-1c8b-49f5-9bb2-cb57bb47e4ba.filesusr.com/ugd/f4d9b9_55b47be4de914daf866cfa1810cc56c5.pdf
[2754] Recognized as a terrorist organization
[2755] https://remembrance.ru/2021/06/30/kiev-vozmushhen-tem-chto-evropejcy-na-ukraine-nashli-nacistov/
[2757] https://rada.gov.ua/ru/news/Novosty/Soobshchenyya/160401/html; https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2018/07/05/v-rade-ukrainy-otkryta-vystavka-vo-slavu-nahtigalya-i-evreyskih-pogromov
[2759] On 30 September 2022, the Russian Federation and the Kherson Oblast concluded the treaty of ascension of the Kherson Oblast to the Russian Federation.
[2760] https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2020/06/26/mer-hersona-pozdravil-gorozhan-s-banderovskim-aktom-i-prisyagoy-gitleru
[2761] Recognized as a terrorist organization
[2762] Recognized as a terrorist organization
[2765] https://antifashist.com/item/reabilitiruyushhij-nacizm-italyanskij-zhurnalist-popytalsya-opravdatsya-za-intervyu-s-boevikom-nacistom-vsu-v-kurskoj-oblasti.html
[2767] https://strana.today/news/309866-marsh-bandery-v-kieve-1-janvarja-2021-onlajn-transljatsija-video.html (earlier https://strana.ua/news/309866-marsh-bandery-v-kieve-1-janvarja-2021-onlajn-transljatsija-video.html)
[2769] https://nv.ua/ukr/ukraine/events/stepan-bandera-yak-v-ukrajini-vidznachatimut-den-narodzhennya-providnika-oun-v-umovah-viyni-50294650.html
[2770] https://ukrinform.ru/rubric-culture/2548034-v-ukraine-razrabotali-nastolnuu-igru-o-borbe-upa.html
[2771] https://golospravdy.eu/eduard-dolinskij-ministerstvo-obrazovaniya-rekomendovalo-lozh-falsifikacii/, https://strana.ua/opinions/212015-sredi-detej-prodvihajut-nastolnuju-ihru-s-heroicheskimi-banderoj-i-shukhevichem.html
[2772] The Day of Remembrance and Reconciliation (8 May) in Ukraine became a public holiday in 2015. Former President Poroshenko established it in order to "worthily honor the exploits of the Ukrainian people, their outstanding contribution to the victory of the anti-Hitler coalition in World War II and to express respect to all fighters against Nazism," thus attempting to unite Red Army and Banderites, many of whom served in the SS and other volunteer auxiliary units of the Nazis.
[2773] https://www.rubaltic.ru/article/politika-i-obshchestvo/08052020-ukraina-vstrechaet-den-pobedy-istoricheskoy-shizofreniey/
[2774] https://strana.today/news/332149-ukrainskij-institut-natspamjati-sozdal-metodichku-o-pravilnom-otmechanii-dnja-pobedy.html (earlier https://strana.ua/news/332149-ukrainskij-institut-natspamjati-sozdal-metodichku-o-pravilnom-otmechanii-dnja-pobedu.html)
[2775] https://uinp.gov.ua/informaciyni-materialy/vchytelyam/metodychni-rekomendaciyi/informaciyni-materialy-do-dnya-pamyati-ta-prymyrennya-8-travnya-20231
[2777] https://www.unn.com.ua/ru/news/1893299-sud-skasuvav-rishennya-oask-yakim-simvoliku-diviziyi-ss-galichina-viznavali-natsistskoyu; https://strana.today/news/291280-sud-priznal-nezakonnym-reshenie-o-priznanii-simvoliki-ss-halichina-natsistskoj.html (earlier https://strana.ua/news/291280-sud-priznal-nezakonnym-reshenie-o-priznanii-simvoliki-ss-halichina-natsistskoj.html)
[2778] https://strana.today/news/291414-kak-natsionalisty-zastavili-sud-otmenit-zapret-na-simvoliku-ss-halichiny.html (earlier https://strana.ua/news/291414-kak-natsionalisty-zastavili-sud-otmenit-zapret-na-simvoliku-ss-halichiny.html)
[2779] https://rg.ru/2022/12/06/verhovnyj-sud-ukrainy-ne-priznal-nacistskoj-simvoliku-divizii-ss-galichina.html
[2780] https://yavoriv-info.com.ua/novini/novini-lvivshhini/zi-shkilnogo-pidruchnika-priberut-naklep-na-ukrainskix-nacionalistiv
[2783] https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/385-IX; https://news-front.info/2019/12/24/detyam-ukrainy-slugi-naroda-pod-yolochku-podlozhili-plast/
[2786] https://strana.today/news/247099-natsionalisty-poluchili-ot-minkulta-pochti-polovinu-bjudzheta-na-molodezhnye-orhanizatsii.html (earlier https://strana.ua/news/247099-natsionalisty-poluchili-ot-minkulta-pochti-polovinu-bjudzheta-na-molodezhnye-orhanizatsii.html)
[2787] Online environment as a tool for violating rights and freedoms in Ukraine. Institute of Legal Policy and Social Protection named after Irina.Berezhnaya. 2022.
[2788] https://mms.gov.ua/storage/app/sites/16/Patriotychne_vyhovannia/Konkursy/richenia/2022%20%D1%80%D1%96%D0%BA/rishennya-no-1-vid-17012022.pdf
[2790] https://strana.today/news/257560-io-ministra-obrazovanija-mandzij-orhanizovyvala-vo-lvove-konkurs-v-chest-divizii-ss-halichina.html (earlier https://strana.ua/news/257560-io-ministra-obrazovanija-mandzij-orhanizovyvala-vo-lvove-konkurs-v-chest-divizii-ss-halichina.html)
[2791] https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3195711/Now-CHILDREN-taking-arms-Shocking-pictures-inside-Ukraine-s-neo-Nazi-military-camp-recruits-young-six-learn-fire-weapons-s-ceasefire.html
https://apimagesblog.com/blog/2018/11/12/training-kids-to-kill-at-ukrainian-nationalist-camp
[2793] https://galychyna.if.ua/2020/01/28/martsinkiv-poobitsyav-nazvati-vulitsyu-imenem-mihayla-mulika/
[2794] https://strana.today/news/246875-foto-kak-v-ivano-frankovske-proshchalas-s-umershim-natsistom-iz-divizii-ss.html (previously https://strana.ua/news/246875-foto-kak-v-ivano-frankovske-proshchalas-s-umershim-natsistom-iz-divizii-ss.html)
[2795] Online environment as a tool for violating rights and freedoms in Ukraine. Institute for Legal Policy and Social Protection named after E.Berezhnaya. 2022.
[2796] https://strana.today/news/262422-v-kalushe-nahradili-veterana-divizii-ss-poluchaja-nahradu-tot-zihanul.html (earlier https://strana.ua/news/262422-v-kalushe-nahradili-veterana-divizii-ss-poluchaja-nahradu-tot-zihanul.html)
[2797] This commemorative date was chosen by the OUN in 1941 Since 2014, Ukrainian nationalist organizations have held ceremonies on this date. These events are normally attended by a number of representatives from Ukrainian national and local government organizations.
[2798] Manifestations of Nazism, neo-Nazism and xenophobia in Ukraine. Overview and analysis. 2020.
[2799] https://city-adm.lviv.ua/news/society/public-sector/279791-mer-lvova-pryvitav-zviazkovu-romana-shukhevycha-zi-100-littiam
[2800] https://uinp.gov.ua/pres-centr/novyny/na-polissi-vstanovyly-pamyatnyy-hrest-general-horunzhomu-upa-ivanu-treyku
[2801] https://golossokal.com.ua/ru/novyny-kultury/y-misti-iavorovi-vidbylos-vidkrittia-memorialnoi-tablici-na-fasadi-raionnoi-centralnoi-biblioteki-imeni-uriia-lipi.html, https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2020/08/22/v-lvovskoy-Regioni-chestvuyut-vracha-evtanaziologa-iz-oun-upa
[2802] Online environment as a tool for violating rights and freedoms in Ukraine. Institute for Legal Policy and Social Protection named after E.Berezhnaya. 2022.
[2803] Online environment as a tool for violating rights and freedoms in Ukraine. Institute for Legal Policy and Social Protection named after E.Berezhnaya. 2022.
[2804] https://lviv.depo.ua/rus/lviv/yak-u-lvovi-svyatkuyut-den-zakhisnika-ukraini-fotoreportazh-202010141229260
[2805] https://zn.ua/UKRAINE/v-poltave-prokhodit-vseukrainskij-konkurs-na-luchshij-pamjatnik-simonu-petljure.html
[2806] https://m.day.kyiv.ua/ru/news/160221-lvovskiy-oblsovet-trebuet-vernut-bandere-zvanie-geroya-ukrainy-i-obyavil-2021-y-godom
[2807] https://strana.today/news/321233-ternopolskij-stadion-poluchil-imja-romana-shukhevicha.html (earlier https://strana.ua/news/321233-ternopolskij-stadion-poluchil-imja-romana-shukhevicha.html)
[2808] https://strana.today/news/323062-arena-lvov-imeni-bandery-chto-hovorjat-o-pereimenovanii-stadiona-v-chest-vozhdja-oun.html (earlier https://strana.ua/news/323062-arena-lvov-imeni-bandery-chto-hovorjat-o-pereimenovanii-stadiona-v-chest-vozhdja-oun.html)
[2810] https://aif.ru/politics/world/budni_ukrainy_veterana_ss_provodil_v_posledniy_put_prezidentskiy_polk
[2814] Polesian Sich was a military organization of Ukrainian nationalists created by Taras Borovets, which had operated on the territory of Volyn and Polesie occupied by Nazis from August 1941 till 1944.
[2815] The One Stone, One Life project was implemented by the Ukrainian Center for Holocaust Studies with the support of the Kiev city administration and the Ukrainian branch of the Goethe Institute. The project was co-sponsored by the German Embassy in Ukraine. In turn, it is part of a large-scale decentralized memorial "Stumbling Blocks" by Cologne artist Gunther Demnig, dedicated to the memory of people persecuted during the Nazi years.
[2818] http://pravua.info/v-biblioteke-pod-lvvovom-proveli-prezentacziyu-knigi-ob-ss-galichina-s-muzhchinoj-v-naczistskoj-forme/
[2820] Online environment as a tool for violating rights and freedoms in Ukraine. Institute of Legal Policy and Social Protection named after Irina Berezhnaya. 2022.
[2821] https://strana.today/news/419500-vo-lvovskoj-oblasti-v-rozhdestvenskij-vertep-ustanovili-fihury-bajdena-i-bandery-foto.html
[2822] Declared an extremist organization by Judgment of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation of 17 November 2014, its activities are banned in Russia.
[2825] https://uinp.gov.ua/pres-centr/novyny/31-bereznya-vypovnytsya-150-rokiv-ideologu-ukrayinskoyi-nezalezhnosti-mykoli-mihnovskomu-zahody
[2826] https://uinp.gov.ua/pres-centr/novyny/lokalna-pamyat-perepohovannya-uchasnykiv-drugoyi-svitovoyi-viyny-u-vinnyci-ta-inshi-novyny-z-regioniv
[2827] https://uinp.gov.ua/pres-centr/novyny/u-kyyevi-vidbuvsya-lektoriy-prysvyachenyy-yevgenu-konovalcyu
[2828] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/09/27/poland-ukrainian-nazi-veteran-canada-extradition/
[2830] https://vmiskrada.gov.ua/perelik-vulic-verhivcivskoi-miskoi-teritorialnoi-gromadi-11-03-20-20-12-2023/
[2831] https://www.rubaltic.ru/context/06032024_au-zapad-imenem-natsistskogo-prestupnika-petra-dyachenko-u-kotorogo-ruki-po-lokot-v-krovi-nazvana-ul/
[2833] https://112.ua/mnenie/nacional-radikaly-napali-na-ofis-oppozicionnoy-platformy--za-zhizn-537009/html
[2835] https://violence-marker.org.ua/blog/2022/06/03/ultrapravi-konfrontacziyi-ta-nasylstvo-u-2021-roczi/
[2836] Ibid.
[2837] https://strana.today/news/328307-v-kharkove-natsionalisty-trebujut-uvolit-prepodavatelja-akademii-nauk-za-post-v-seti.html (https://strana.ua/news/328307-v-kharkove-natsionalist-trebujut-uvolit-prepodavatelja-akademm-nauk-za-post-v-seti.html)
[2838] https://violence-marker.org.ua/blog/2022/06/03/ultrapravi-konfrontacziyi-ta-nasylstvo-u-2021-roczi/
[2839] Ibid.
[2841] https://delo.ua/society/samoprovozglasennaya-policiya-nravov-kak-pravoradikaly-voyuyut-protiv-kieva-389685/
[2844] https://violence-marker.org.ua/blog/2022/06/03/ultrapravi-konfrontacziyi-ta-nasylstvo-u-2021-roczi/
[2846] https://strana.today/news/249605-deputat-partii-poroshenko-vzjal-na-poruki-oskvernitelja-pamjatnika-vatutinu.html (earlier https://strana.ua/news/249605-deputat-partii-poroshenko-vzjal-na-poruki-oskvernitelja-pamjatnika-vatutinu.html)
[2847] https://strana.today/news/273216-sud-po-sternenko-kak-storonniki-radikala-izbivali-zhurnalistov-i-politsiju-foto-i-video.html (earlier https://strana.ua/news.273216-sud-po-sternenko-kak-storonniki-radikala-izbivali-zhurnalistov-i-politsiju-foto-i-video.html)
[2848] https://violence-marker.org.ua/blog/2022/06/03/ultrapravi-konfrontacziyi-ta-nasylstvo-u-2021-roczi/
[2850] https://strana.today/news/446715-zakhvativshie-blok-post-voennye-zajavili-chto-ikh-podrazdelenie-proverit-nelzja.html
[2851] Infringement of rights and freedoms in Ukraine. Manifestation of discrimination, incitement of ethnic hatred, hate crimes and extremism. Report for the OSCE human dimension implementation meeting 2019. The Institute of legal policy and social protection, the Antifascist human rights legal league. 2019. 2019.
[2852] https://strana.today/news/252459-pristajko-i-den-pobedy-pochemu-hlava-mid-ne-khochet-prazdnovat-9-maja.html (earlier https://strana.ua/news/252459-pristajko-i-den-pobedy-pochemu-hlava-mid-ne-khochet-prazdnovat-9-maja.html)
[2854] https://ria.ru/20200509/1571213659.html
[2855] https://tass.ru/politika/8476375
[2856] After World War I, the same name was used by right-wing volunteer units in Germany, many of whom later joined the Nazi party.
[2857] https://www.sq.com.ua/rus/news/novosti/09.05.2020/den_pobedy_natsionalisty_razvesili_po_harkovu
_bannery_foto/
[2858] https://russian.rt.com/ussr/article/860361-ukraina-9-maya-zelenskii-napadeniya
[2859] https://rg.ru/2024/05/09/kievliane-nesut-cvety-k-vechnomu-ogniu-nesmotria-na-otmenu-prazdnika.html
[2860] https://tass.ru/obschestvo/20766403
[2861] https://ria.ru/20200204/1564239120.html
[2862] https://russian.rt.com/ussr/news/721345-vandaly-oskvernili-memorial-odessa
[2863] https://russian.rt.com/ussr/news/716870-kiev-zelyonka-pamyatnik-vatutin
[2864] https://Kiev.npu.gov.ua/news/novini/u-stoliczi-speczpriznachenczi-zatrimali-molodika-za-poshkodzhennya-pam-yatnika
[2865] https://strana.ua/news/249605-deputat-partii-poroshenko-vzjal-na-poruki-oskvernitelja-pamjatnika-vatutinu.html
[2866] https://russkiymir.ru/news/272570/
[2867] https://www.interfax.ru/world/709467
[2868] https://www.gazeta.ru/social/news/2021/07/24/n_16288910.shtml
[2869] The online environment as an instrument of violations of rights and freedoms in Ukraine; Institute of Legal Policy and Social Defence named after Irina Berezhnaya. 2022.
[2871] https://tass.ru/obschestvo/14579273
[2872] https://ukrainememory.mil.ru/
[2873] https://tass.ru/obschestvo/14579273
[2875] https://www.mk.ru/social/2022/12/02/ot-pushkina-do-suvorova-skolko-pamyatnikov-uzhe-snesli-na-ukraine.html
[2877] https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2023/07/27/derusifikaciya-na-ukraine-v-poltave-snesli-pamyatniki-pushkinu-i-vatutinu
[2878] https://www.svoboda.org/a/v-dnepre-snesli-pamyatnik-aleksandru-matrosovu-raboty-vucheticha/32207478.html
[2879] https://zahid.espreso.tv/u-mostiskakh-na-lvivshchini-kladovishche-radyanskikh-soldativ-perenesut-z-tsentru-mista
[2880] https://zahid.espreso.tv/na-ternopilshchini-eksgumuyut-tila-radyanskikh-soldativ-shchob-perenesti-pamyatnik
[2881] https://sputnik.by/20230426/pamyatnik-sovetskomu-soldatu-snesli-na-zapade-ukrainy-1074853318.html
[2882]http://www.mukachevo.net/ua/news/view/5054113?fbclid=IwAR22xvNpaAgxkqk058hno22om8YS_wG5FKMoqgP_ulnGU1Fh0ewdAS_4v6s
[2884] https://iz.ru/1528472/2023-06-14/neskolko-pamiatnikov-geroiam-vov-snesli-na-zapadnoi-ukraine-za-sutki
[2885] https://iz.ru/1532770/2023-06-22/vo-lvovskoi-oblasti-za-sutki-demontirovali-tri-pamiatnika-sovetskim-soldatam
[2887] https://iz.ru/1533362/2023-06-23/na-zapade-ukrainy-snesli-shest-pamiatnikov-sovetskim-soldatam-za-sutki
[2888] https://iz.ru/1536745/2023-06-29/vo-lvovskoi-oblasti-demontirovali-eshche-dva-sovetskikh-pamiatnika
[2889] https://iz.ru/1544699/2023-07-15/vo-lvovskoi-oblasti-demontirovali-pamiatnik-sovetskomu-voinu-osvoboditeliu
[2891] https://iz.ru/1546230/2023-07-19/chetyre-pamiatnika-sovetskim-soldatam-snesli-za-sutki-vo-lvovskoi-oblasti
[2892] https://iz.ru/1545688/2023-07-18/vo-lvovskoi-oblasti-za-sutki-snesli-dva-pamiatnika-sovetskim-soldatam
[2893] https://iz.ru/1546803/2023-07-20/vo-lvovskoi-oblasti-za-sutki-demontirovali-piat-pamiatnikov-sovetskim-soldatam
[2894] https://iz.ru/1547327/2023-07-21/tri-pamiatnika-sovetskim-soldatam-demontirovali-za-sutki-vo-lvovskoi-oblasti
[2895] https://iz.ru/1547881/2023-07-22/deviat-pamiatnikov-demontirovali-za-sutki-vo-lvovskoi-oblasti
[2896] https://iz.ru/1549481/2023-07-25/vo-lvovskoi-oblasti-demontirovali-dva-pamiatnika-sovetskim-soldatam
[2899] https://iz.ru/1564574/2023-08-25/vo-lvovskoi-oblasti-snesli-piat-pamiatnikov-sovetskim-soldatam
[2900] https://iz.ru/1560197/2023-08-17/vo-lvovskoi-oblasti-demontirovali-dva-pamiatnika-sovetskim-soldatam
[2901] https://iz.ru/1554032/2023-08-03/na-zapade-ukrainy-demontirovali-eshche-tri-sovetskim-pamiatnika
[2905] https://suspilne.media/uzhhorod/608543-u-svalavi-na-zakarpatti-eksgumuvali-restki-9-ti-radanskih-soldativ-ak-vidbuvaetsa-cej-proces/
[2906] https://suspilne.media/ivano-frankivsk/617459-ne-stalo-radanskogo-soldata-u-tekucij-na-frankivsini-demontuvali-pamatnik-radanskoi-dobi/
[2908] https://suspilne.media/ivano-frankivsk/640144-u-seli-pererisl-na-frankivsini-demontuvali-7-metrovij-pamatnik-radanskim-soldatam/
[2911] https://suspilne.media/ternopil/688178-u-gromadi-na-ternopilsini-demontuut-radanskij-pamatnik/
[2912] https://volyn-news.ru/society/2024/04/12/5670.html
[2913] https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/news/2024/04/26/1034548-v-rovno-demontirovali-pamyatnik
[2914] https://ria.ru/amp/20240507/koshevoy-1944410048.html
[2915] https://suspilne.media/amp/ivano-frankivsk/742069-v-ivano-frankivsku-oblili-cervonou-farbou-radanskij-monument/
[2916] https://www.0352.ua/news/3773920/u-ternopoli-rozmaluvali-pamatnik-radanskomu-oficeru-caldaevu-foto
[2917] https://www.prikhist.com/2024/05/u-nikopoli-demontuvaly-pam-iatnyk-viktoru-usovu-dyskusii-u-sotsmerezhakh/
[2918] https://t.me/DecolonizationUkraine/13334
[2919] https://antifashist.com/item/nacistskij-revanshizm-v-harkove-v-gorode-demontirovali-memorialnye-doski-marshalam-konevu-i-malinovskomu.html
[2920] https://antifashist.com/item/nacistskij-revanshizm-v-harkove-v-gorode-demontirovali-memorialnye-doski-marshalam-konevu-i-malinovskomu.html
[2922] https://iz.ru/1502674/2023-04-22/v-zakarpatskoi-oblasti-ukrainy-otkazalis-snosit-pamiatnik-sovetskim-soldatam
[2926] https://iz.ru/1118073/igor-karmazin/proshchai-lenin-kak-na-ukraine-zakonchilas-dekommunizatciia
[2932] https://uinp.gov.ua/pres-centr/novyny/mkip-ta-uinp-pidbyly-pidsumky-za-rik-shchodo-podolannya-naslidkiv-rusyfikaciyi-y-totalitaryzmu
[2934] https://iz.ru/1450760/2023-01-05/na-ukraine-reshili-uzakonit-derusifikatciiu-radi-borby-s-pushkinym
[2935] https://www.mk.ru/politics/2023/12/23/vlasti-odnogo-goroda-dnepropetrovskoy-oblasti-ukrainy-derusificirovali-okolo-50-ulic.html
[2936] https://poltava.to/project/8222/
[2937] https://www.mk.ru/politics/2024/07/29/v-odesse-pereimenuyut-ulicy-bunina-paustovskogo-i-zhvaneckogo.html
[2938] https://ria.ru/20240802/odessa-1963588656.html
[2939]https://rg.ru/2022/06/14/mer-odessy-predlozhil-pereimenovat-vse-ulicy-sviazannye-s-rossiej.html
[2947] https://www.mk.ru/social/2022/12/02/ot-pushkina-do-suvorova-skolko-pamyatnikov-uzhe-snesli-na-ukraine.html
[2963] https://iz.ru/1445590/2022-12-23/v-ukrainskikh-chernovtcakh-snesli-poslednii-v-gorode-pamiatnik-pushkinu
[2964] https://iz.ru/1447322/2022-12-27/v-ukrainskikh-chernovtcakh-demontirovali-biust-pushkina-s-fasada-teatra
[2971] https://www.061.ua/news/3531409/v-zaporizzi-demontuvali-bust-puskinu-so-znahodivsa-na-teritorii-skoli
[2972] https://focus.ua/ukraine/549039-v-kieve-snesli-pamyatnik-sovetskomu-letchiku-chkalovu-foto-video
[2981] https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-regions/3706328-u-mikolaevi-demontuvali-pamatnik-potomkinu.html
[2982] https://iz.ru/1518156/2023-05-25/v-poltavskoi-oblasti-demontirovali-pamiatnik-bortcam-za-sovetskuiu-vlast
[2983] https://dnipro.tv/news-dnipro/u-zhovtykh-vodakh-pryvitaly-pushkina-z-dnem-narodzhennia-ta-znesly-ioho-pam-iatnyk
[2985] https://iz.ru/1530513/2023-06-17/v-zakarpatskoi-oblasti-demontirovali-biust-sovetskogo-pedagoga-makarenko
[2987] https://vesti.ua/poltava/v-poltavskoj-oblasti-demontirovali-poslednij-pamyatnik-maksimu-gorkomu
[2988] https://suspilne.media/522075-v-uzgorodi-demontuut-zobrazenna-rosijskogo-kompozitora-p-cajkovskogo-z-fasadu-uzgorodskoi-muzicnoi-skoli/
[2989] https://iz.ru/1550202/2023-07-27/v-poltave-demontirovali-pamiatniki-pushkinu-i-generalu-vatutinu
[2993] https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2023/09/11/derusifikaciya-na-ukraine-v-poltave-snesut-pamyatnik-yavlyayushchiysya-simvolom-goroda
[2995] https://iz.ru/1634015/2024-01-14/so-stancii-metro-v-kharkove-ubrali-eshche-odin-barelef-s-izobrazheniem-pushkina
[2996] https://gorod.dp.ua/news/229898
[2998] https://pokrovsk-rada.gov.ua/uk/articles/item/10044/dekolonizaciya-publichnogo-prostoru-v-pokrovskij-tg-proveli-demontazh-pamyatnika-maksimu-gorkomu
[2999] https://riafan.ru/23779823-angloyazichnuyu_versiyu_stat_i_ob_allee_angelov_v_donetske_udalili_s_vikipedii
[3000] https://russian.rt.com/ussr/article/740011-kiev-vikipediya-perepisat, https://news.rambler.ru/world/44072204/?utm_content=news_media&utm_medium=read_more&utm_source=copylink
[3001] Cases in point: A.Ripp. Ukraine's Nazi problem is real, even if Putin's "denazification" claim isn't. NBC News. 5 March 2022. www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/ukraine-has-nazi-problem-vladimir-putin-s-claim-war-ncna1290946; B.Marcetic. Whitewashing Nazis doesn't help Ukraine. Jacobin. 4 July 2022. https://jacobin.com/2022/04/ukraine-russia-putin-azov-neo-nazis-western-media; J. McCann. Protecting the Ukrainian Nazis. Standpoint Zero. 16 March 2022. https://standpointzero.com/2022/03/16/protecting-the-ukrainian-nazis/
[3002] Alarming Incidents of White Supremacy in the Military How to Stop It? U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Military Personnel (Committee on Armed Services) Hearing. 11 February 2020. Dr. Mark Pitcavage. Witness Statement. https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS02/20200211/110495/HHRG-116-AS02-Wstate-PitcavageM-20200211.pdf; https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-49803732, https://strana.ua/news/230444-azov-i-neonatsisty-ssha-pochemu-v-konhresse-khotjat-priznat-polk-terroristami.html
[3003] The Brown Internationale. Die Zeit. 10 February 2021. https://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2021-02/facism-international-right-wing-extremism-neo-nazis-english
[3004] A separate report by the Russian Foreign Ministry on the subject entitled "On the Illegal Actions of the Kiev Regime against the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, its Clergy and Parishioners", was published in July 2023.
[3005] Melnikov S.A., P.V.Lebedev, V.A.Begdash. Chronicle of the "Black Decade". Religious persecution in Ukraine 2014 – 2023. Мoscow, 2023. The monograph is available on the website of the Russian Association for the Defence of Religious Freedom: https://religsvoboda.ru/content/doklad-rars-hronika-chernogo-desyatiletiya-religioznye-goneniya-na-ukraine-2014-2023-g
[3007] https://antifashist.com/item/unichtozhenie-pravoslaviya-na-ukraine-teper-po-zakonu-chast-1.html
[3008] https://antifashist.com/item/unichtozhenie-pravoslaviya-na-ukraine-teper-po-zakonu-chast-1.html
[3010] Melnikov S.A., P.V.Lebedev, V.A.Begdash. Chronicle of the "Black Decade". Religious persecution in Ukraine 2014 – 2023. Мoscow, 2023; p. 199. The monograph is available on the website of the Russian Association for the Defence of Religious Freedom: https://religsvoboda.ru/content/doklad-rars-hronika-chernogo-desyatiletiya-religioznye-goneniya-na-ukraine-2014-2023-g
[3011] https://spzh.news/ru/mysli-vsluh/70310-vlast-vkljuchilas-v-propahandu-novostilnoho-rozhdestva
[3013] https://spzh.news/ru/news/75238-upravdelami-objasnil-pochemu-upts-ne-perekhodit-na-novyj-kalendar
[3014] Melnikov S.A., P.V.Lebedev, V.A.Begdash. Chronicle of the "Black Decade". Religious persecution in Ukraine 2014 – 2023. Мoscow, 2023; p. 199. The monograph is available on the website of the Russian Association for the Defence of Religious Freedom: https://religsvoboda.ru/content/doklad-rars-hronika-chernogo-desyatiletiya-religioznye-goneniya-na-ukraine-2014-2023-g
[3017] https://espreso.tv/skilki-gromad-uzhe-pokinulo-moskovskiy-patriarkhat-v-ukraini-karta-po-regonakh
[3018] https://rg.ru/2022/12/14/sbu-prishla-s-obyskom-v-pravoslavnye-hramy-v-deviati-oblastiah-ukrainy.html
[3019] https://rg.ru/2022/12/13/sbu-neskolko-let-vela-rabotu-protiv-ukrainskoj-pravoslavnoj-cerkvi-obnaruzheny-sekretnye-dokumenty.html
[3021] Melnikov S.A., P.V. Lebedev, V.A.Begdash. Chronicle of the "black decade". Religious persecution in Ukraine in 2014 – 2023. Moscow, 2023. p.199. The monograph is available on the website of the Russian Association for the Defence of Religious Freedom: https://religsvoboda.ru/content/doklad-rars-hronika-chernogo-desyatiletiya-religioznye-goneniya-na-ukraine-2014-2023-g
[3022] https://iz.ru/1444393/2022-12-21/na-ukraine-zavedeno-50-ugolovnykh-del-protiv-sviashchennikov-uptc
[3024] https://antifashist.com/item/unichtozhenie-pravoslaviya-na-ukraine-teper-po-zakonu-chast-1.html
[3025] https://antifashist.com/item/kapellan-mer-pensionerka-i-pevica-na-ukraine-kollaborantom-i-agentom-fsb-mozhet-stat-kazhdyj.html
[3026] https://antifashist.com/item/unichtozhenie-pravoslaviya-na-ukraine-teper-po-zakonu-chast-1.html
[3027] https://antifashist.online/item/uzniki-sovesti-ukrainskim-pravoslavnym-zhurnalistam-predyavili-novye-obvineniya.html
[3028] See already mentioned: Melnikov S.A., P.V. Lebedev, V.A.Begdash. Chronicle of the "black decade". Religious persecution in Ukraine in 2014 – 2023. Moscow, 2023. p.199. The monograph is available on the website of the Russian Association for the Defence of Religious Freedom: https://religsvoboda.ru/content/doklad-rars-hronika-chernogo-desyatiletiya-religioznye-goneniya-na-ukraine-2014-2023-g
[3029] https://spzh.live/ru/news/80576-sbu-trebuet-ot-ierarkhov-upts-vse-dannye-o-khramakh-i-imushchestve-eparkhij
[3032] https://360tv.ru/news/obschestvo/vlasti-ukrainy-lishat-monahov-dostupa-k-korpusam-kievo-pecherskoj-lavry/, https://iz.ru/1557646/elena-vasileva/opechatnoe-slovo-v-kieve-nachalsia-silovoi-zakhvat-lavry
[3033] https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-kyiv/3760404-u-niznij-lavri-pid-kontrol-zapovidnika-povernuli-vze-13-obektiv.html
[3034] https://pravfond.ru/press-tsentr/v-ministerstve-kultury-ukrainy-prigrozili-siloy-vyselit-monakhov-upts-iz-nizhney-lavry/
[3035] https://antifashist.com/item/ministerstvo-kultury-ukrainy-otobralo-u-upc-hram-zhivonosnogo-istochnika-v-kievo-pecherskoj-lavre.html
[3037] https://www.1tv.ru/news/2023-08-19/459560-vlasti_ternopolskoy_hmelnitskoy_i_rovenskoy_oblastey_zapretili_krestnyy_hod_k_pochaevskoy_lavre
[3043] https://antifashist.com/item/svyatye-po-shodnoj-cene-ukrainskoe-ministerstvo-kultury-sobiraetsya-proverit-moshhi-v-kievo-pecherskoj-lavre-na-ih-ukrainskost.html
[3044] https://antifashist.com/item/svyatye-po-shodnoj-cene-ukrainskoe-ministerstvo-kultury-sobiraetsya-proverit-moshhi-v-kievo-pecherskoj-lavre-na-ih-ukrainskost.html
[3045] https://basilica.ro/ucraina-dispusa-sa-ofere-romanilor-moastele-sfintei-teodora-la-schimb-cu-ramasitele-unor-eroi-nationali/, https://antifashist.online/item/besovshhina-prodolzhaetsya-sbu-provodit-obyski-v-pravoslavnyh-hramah-a-moshhi-svyatyh-v-kievo-pecherskoj-lavre-budut-proveryat-na-podlinnost.html
[3046] https://risu.us/ru/vosstanavlivaetsya-posle-operacii-advokat-o-sostoyanii-mitropolita-pavla-lebedya_n141809
[3047] https://spzh.live/ru/news/81727-vladyku-pavla-hospitalizirovali-prjamo-vo-vremja-zasedanija-suda-advokat
[3049] https://news.church.ua/2023/05/22/proti-mitropolita-banchenskogo-longina-yakij-usinoviv-ponad-400-ditej-ta-je-gerojem-ukrajini-policiya-vidkrila-spravu-ta-viklikaje-na-dopit-video/#2023-10-04
[3050] https://radonezh.ru/2024/02/06/na-ukraine-neizvestnye-izbili-mitropolita-banchenskogo-longina
[3051] https://informator.ua/uk/sbu-ogolosila-pro-pidozru-mitropolitu-upc-mp-yakiy-blagosloviv-priyednannya-luganska-do-rf
[3052] Report of the Humanitarian and Economic Cooperation Fund "On Persecution of Dissidents and Political Repressions in Ukraine (December 2023 – February 2024)
[3053] https://antifashist.com/item/v-cherkassah-pered-zdaniem-suda-raskolniki-pcu-ustroili-bozhij-sud-mitropolitu-upc-feodosiyu.html
[3054] https://antifashist.com/item/u-mitropolita-ukrainskoj-pravoslavnoj-cerkvi-feodosiya-serdechnyj-pristup-sudit-ego-budut-posle-vyzdorovleniya.html
[3055] https://spzh.live/ru/news/79686-k-zamhlavy-ovtss-upts-protoiereju-nikolaju-danilevichu-prishli-s-obyskom
[3056] https://antifashist.com/item/uzniki-sovesti-mitropolita-arseniya-sudyat-za-pravdu-ob-obstrelah-slavyanska.html
[3057] https://antifashist.com/item/unichtozhenie-pravoslaviya-na-ukraine-teper-po-zakonu-chast-1.html.
[3058] https://iz.ru/1690315/2024-05-01/smi-soobshchili-ob-obyskakh-sbu-u-mitropolita-uptc-zaporozhskogo-i-melitopolskogo-luki
[3059] https://rg.ru/2024/05/01/upc-mitropolita-zaporozhskogo-i-melitopolskogo-luku-obvinili-v-sviaziah-s-rpc.html
[3061] https://tass.ru/obschestvo/18462289?ysclid=lmgs853axa989219718, https://iz.ru/1557646/elena-vasileva/opechatnoe-slovo-v-kieve-nachalsia-silovoi-zakhvat-lavry
[3063] https://iz.ru/1562132/2023-08-21/khram-kanonicheskoi-uptc-pochti-polnostiu-sgorel-pod-chernigovom-posle-podzhoga
[3064] https://iz.ru/1562558/2023-08-22/storonniki-ptcu-zakhvatili-dva-khrama-uptc-v-khmelnitckoi-oblasti?ysclid=lmgpw5jitl524131723
[3065] https://www.1tv.ru/news/2023-09-04/460551-na_ukraine_politsiya_vorvalas_v_svyato_bogoyavlenskiy_zhenskiy_monastyr
[3067] https://spzh.media/ru/news/77932-v-sele-pishcha-na-volyni-storonniki-ptsu-zakhvatili-kazanskij-khram-upts
[3068] https://spzh.media/ ru/news/78517-v-kamne-kashirskom-prikhozhane-upts-otstojali-svoj-khram-ot-zakhvata-rejderami
[3071] https://spzh.live/ru/news/80820-storonniki-ptsu-zakhvatili-svjato-heorhievskij-khram-v-irpene
[3073] Melnikov S.A., P.V.Lebedev, V.A.Begdash. Chronicle of the "Black Decade". Religious Persecution in Ukraine 2014-2023. M., 2023. The monograph is available on the website of the Russian Association for the Defense of Religious Freedom: https://religsvoboda.ru/content/doklad-rars-hronika-chernogo-desyatiletiya-religioznye-goneniya-na-ukraine-2014-2023-g
[3074] Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee on the 8th periodic report of Ukraine. November 2021. (the observations were published in February 2022) https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2FC%2FUKR%2FCO%2F8&Lang=ru
[3075] https://ukraine.un.org/en/224748-report-human-rights-situation-ukraine-1-august-2022-–-31-january-2023
[3077] https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=28562
The request was sent by the Special Procedures to the Ukrainian authorities on 8 November 2023, but was made public two months later, along with the response, in accordance with the practice of the Special Procedures of the UN Human Rights Council.
[3079] https://strana.today/news/447901-zapret-dejatelnosti-ukrainskoj-pravoslavnoj-tserkvi-vsts-vystupili-protiv-zakonoproekta.html
[3080] https://www.pnp.ru/politics/kiev-sobiraetsya-zapretit-ukrainskuyu-pravoslavnuyu-cerkov-vopreki-svoey-zhe-konstitucii.html
[3081] https://spzh.news/ru/news/77895-juristy-prizvali-liderov-ssha-britanii-i-es-vmeshatsja-v-situatsiju-vokruh-upts
[3082] https://antifashist.online/item/fashistskaya-politika-i-otkrytyj-terror-agoniziruyushhij-kievskij-rezhim-otygryvaetsya-na-pravoslavnyh-svyashhennikah.html
[3084] S.A.Melnikov, P.V.Lebedev, V.A.Begdash. Chronicle of the "Black Decade". Religious Persecution in Ukraine 2014-2023. M., 2023. The monograph is available on the website of the Russian Association for the Defense of Religious Freedom: https://religsvoboda.ru/content/doklad-rars-hronika-chernogo-desyatiletiya-religioznye-goneniya-na-ukraine-2014-2023-g
[3092] https://www.ukrinform.ru/rubric-polytics/3057613-konstitucionnyj-sud-vo-vtornik-vozmetsa-za-azykovoj-zakon.html
[3093] https://vesti.ua/strana/obrashhenie-v-ksu-po-yazykovomu-zakonu-yavlyaetsya-zashhitoj-prav-russkoyazychnyh https://strana.today/articles/analysis/277345-pochemu-predstavitel-prezidenta-v-ks-zajavil-chto-ne-nuzhno-otmenjat-zakon-o-totalnoj-ukrainizatsii-.html (earlier https://strana.ua/articles/analysus/277345-pochemu-predstavitel-prezidenta-v-ks-zajavil-chto-ne-nuzhno-otmenjat-zakon-o-totalnoj-ukrainizatsii-.html)
[3095] https://strana.today/news/312768-na-zakarpate-utratili-dejstvie-mestnye-reshenija-o-rehionalnykh-jazykakh.html (earlier https://strana.ua/news/312768-na-zakarpate-utratili-dejstvie-mestnye-reshenija-o-rehionalnykh-jazykakh.html)
[3096] https://delo.ua/ru/politics/v-ukraine-prodlyat-na-god-perexod-skol-nacmensinstv-na-ukrainskii-yazyk-obuceniya-419048/
[3098] OHCHR Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine. 16 February – 31 July 2020 https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/30thReportUkraine_RU.pdf
[3100] https://kommersant-ru.turbopages..org/turbo/kommersant.ru/s/doc/6679806
[3101] https://strana.today/news/272272-zakrytie-russkikh-shkol-v-ukraine-hde-brat-uchebniki-na-move.html (earlier https://strana.ua/news/272272-zakrytie-russkikh-shkol-v-ukraine-hde-brat-uchebniki-na-move.html)
[3102] https://strana.today/news/253594-kak-vo-lvove-natsionalisty-atakujut-shkolu-s-russkim-jazykom-obuchenija-.html (earlier https://strana.ua/news/253594-kak-vo-lvove-natsionalisty-atakujut-shkolu-s-russkim-jazykom-obuchenija-.html)
[3103] https://vesti.ua/odessa/rabotaet-na-kreml-v-odesse-zatravili-izvestnogo-professora-iz-za-yazyka
[3104] https://strana.today/news/299846-jazykovoj-skandal-v-dnepre-za-chto-uvolili-professora-hromova-iz-dpi.html (earlier https://strana.ua/news/299846-jazykovoj-skandal-v-dnepre-za-chto-uvolili-professora-hromova-iz-dpi.html)
[3106] https://www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/63e1f2a79a79470c4ae86e5b
[3107] https://iz.ru/1584681/2023-10-05/v-bibliotekakh-kievskoi-oblasti-iziato-bolee-400-tys-knig-na-russkom-iazyke
[3110] https://informator.ua/uk/ce-tezh-osvitniy-proces-kremin-povidomiv-yakoyu-movoyu-mayut-spilkuvatisya-vchiteli-ta-diti-na-perervah
[3111] https://www.rubaltic.ru/amp/article/politika-i-obshchestvo/20221219-v-pogone-za-movoy-ukraina-polnostyu-khoronit-ostatki-svoey-nauki-i-kultury/
[3112] https://strana.today/news/277505-zapret-na-vvoz-knih-iz-rossii-sprovotsiroval-defitsit-na-rynke-nauchnoj-literatury-v-ukraine.html (earlier https://strana.ua/news/277505-zapret-na-vvoz-knih-iz-rossii-sprovotsiroval-defitsit-na-rynke-nauchnoj-literatury-v-ukraine.html)
[3113] https://iz.ru/1304904/2022-03-14/na-ukraine-vveli-zapret-na-vvoz-i-rasprostranenie-vsekh-knig-iz-rossii
[3118] Self-designation – "movny patrol", that is – "language patrol".
[3119] https://is.gd/TmiDr3(page of one of the associations of "movny patrol" in the social network Facebook).
[3120] https://lvov.strana.today/366447-zakon-o-jazyke-vo-lvove-izbili-ulichnykh-muzykantov-za-pesni-na-russkom.html (earlier https://lvov.strana.ua/321171-zakon-o-jazyke-dobralsja-do-muzykantov-vo-lvove-izbili-ljudej-za-russkij-jazyk.html), https://iz.ru/1262808/2021-12-10/vo-lvove-izbili-ispolniavshikh-pesni-na-russkom-muzykantov
[3121] Online environment as an instrument of violations of rights and freedoms in Ukraine. Institute of Legal Policy and Social Defence named after I. Berezhnaya. 2022.
[3122] https://focus.ua/ukraine/571602-skandal-s-pesney-coya-vo-lvove-paren-vyshel-iz-priyuta-i-rasskazal-o-planah-video
[3123] https://antifashist.com/item/umeet-orudovat-yazykom-zashhitnica-movy-podrabatyvala-v-pornoindustrii.html
[3124] https://www.rbc.ru/politics/21/10/2022/6352a7b49a7947f3b9632b73, https://iz.ru/1414045/2022-10-21/sekretar-snbo-prizval-iskorenit-russkii-iazyk-na-ukraine
[3129] https://www.kmu.gov.ua/news/prijnyato-koncepciyu-derzhavnoyi-cilovoyi-socialnoyi-programi-nacionalno-patriotichnogo-vihovannya-na-period-do-2025-r
[3130] https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1233-2020-%D1%80#Text, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1233-2020-p#Text).
[3131] Venice Commission Conclusion No. 902 / 2017 (8 – 9 December 2017)
https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2017)030-e
[3132] Venice Commission Conclusion No. 960 / 2019 (6 – 7 December 2019) https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2019)032-e
[3133] OHCHR report on the human rights situation in Ukraine. 16 February – 31 July 2020. https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/30thReportUkraine_RU.pdf
[3134] https://kanaldom.tv/esli-ty-schitaesh-chto-my-russkie-bolshaya-oshibka-ostavatsya-zhit-na-donbasse-zelenskij-video/
[3135] https://antifashist.online/item/nikakih-prav-u-vas-net-i-byt-ne-mozhet-zhitelnice-odessy-ne-pozvolyayut-perevesti-rebenka-iz-ukrainskoj-shkoly-na-domashnee-obuchenie.html
[3136] Online environment as an instrument of violations of rights and freedoms in Ukraine. Institute of Legal Policy and Social Defence named after I. Berezhnaya. 2022.
[3141] https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/ukraine/2024/report-human-rights-situation-ukraine-1-dec-2023-29-feb-2024.pdf
[3145] See, e.g., https://www.informationliberation.com/?id=62981, https://www.sott.net/article/465995-ADL-defends-Ukraines-neo-Nazis-They-dont-attack-Jews-or-Jewish-institutions?ysclid=lmgpcgkh6q921807334
[3147] Report on Anti-Semitism in Ukraine for 2020 https://jewishnews.com.ua/society/otchyot-po-antisemitizmu-v-ukraine-za-2020-god
[3148] The Online Environment as a Tool for Violating Rights and Freedoms in Ukraine. Institute of Legal Policy and Social Protection named after Irina Berezhnaya, 2022.
[3149] Antisemitism in Ukraine – 2021. Available at: https://jewishnews.com.ua/society/antisemitism2021
[3150] The Haidamak uprising in the 17th century, in which about 10,000 Jews were killed.
[3152] The Online Environment as a Tool for Violating Rights and Freedoms in Ukraine. Institute of Legal Policy and Social Protection named after Irina Berezhnaya, 2022.
[3154] https://www.unian.net/incidents/direktor-evreyskoy-obshchiny-ivano-frankovska-poluchil-tri-nozhevyh-raneniya-novosti-ukraina-amp-11767225.html
[3155] https://jewishnews.com.ua/society/vandalyi-narisovali-svastiku-na-evrejskom-obshhinnom-czentre-v-xmelniczkom
[3156] https://amp.strana.today/news/401075-eks-deputat-kievrady-mikhail-kovalchuk-zajavil-chto-evrei-ubivajut-detej.html
[3157] https://jewishnews.com.ua/society/na-okko-v%D1%96dmovlyayut-v-obslugovuvann%D1%96-xasidam-za-nacz%D1%96onalnoyu-ta-rel%D1%96g%D1%96jnoyu-oznakoyu
[3158] https://jewishnews.com.ua/society/vipadok-antisem%D1%96tskogo-vandal%D1%96zmu-v-uzhgorod%D1%96
[3159] https://jewishnews.com.ua/society/u-chern%D1%96vczyax-oblili-farboyu-pamyatnik-poeta-evrejskogo-poxodzhennya
[3160] https://jewishnews.com.ua/society/antisem%D1%96tsk%D1%96-napisi-pom%D1%96tili-v-mirgorod%D1%96
[3162] https://jewishnews.com.ua/society/v-ovruch%D1%96-oskvernyayut-stare-evrejske-kladovishhe-foto
[3163] https://jewishnews.com.ua/society/sbu-ta-gunp-vikrili-sp%D1%96lnotu-p%D1%96dl%D1%96tk%D1%96v-neonaczist%D1%96v
[3164] https://jewishnews.com.ua/society/sinagogu-v-mikolaev%D1%96-oblili-chervonoyu-farboyu
[3165] https://jewishnews.com.ua/society/u-kremenchucz%D1%96-vandal-perekinuv-xanuk%D1%96yu-pol%D1%96cz%D1%96ya-%D1%96nkrim%D1%96nue-lishe-dr%D1%96bne-xul%D1%96ganstvo
[3166] https://jewishnews.com.ua/society/u-kiev%D1%96-oskvernili-najb%D1%96lshu-xanuk%D1%96yu-evropi
[3167] https://jewishnews.com.ua/society/vandali-zrujnuvali-memor%D1%96al-zhertvam-golokostu-na-r%D1%96vnenshh%D1%96n%D1%96
[3168] https://jewishnews.com.ua/society/akt-antisem%D1%96tskogo-vandal%D1%96zmu-zd%D1%96jsneno-u-lvov%D1%96
[3169] https://jewishnews.com.ua/society/v-uman%D1%96-namalyuvali-svastiku-na-evrejsk%D1%96j-bud%D1%96vl%D1%96
[3170] https://www.rubaltic.ru/article/politika-i-obshchestvo/20231013-neudobnaya-istoriya-na-ukraine-obsuzhdayut-nenuzhnost-pamyati-o-zhertvakh-babego-yara/
[3171] https://strana.today/news/312768-na-zakarpate-utratili-dejstvie-mestnye-reshenija-o-rehionalnykh-jazykakh.html (previously at: https://strana.ua/news/312768-na-zakarpate-utratili-dejstvie-mestnye-reshenija-o-rehionalnykh-jazykakh.html)
[3172] https://strana.today/news/304131-venhry-zakarpatja-nazvali-okhotoj-na-vedm-obyski-v-venherskom-fonde-i-proverku-sbu.html
[3173] https://ukraina.ru/exclusive/20200613/1027978005.html; https://gordonua.com/amp/newspolitics/rada-vmesto-490-sozdala-v-ukraine-136-rajonov-polnyj-spisol-1509766.html
[3174] https://strana.today/news/278990-ukrainskie-rumyny-pozhalovalis-bukharestu-na-prinuditelnuju-ukrainizatsiju-i-adminreformu.html (previously at: https://strana.ua/news/278990-ukrainskie-rumyny-pozhalovalis-bukharestu-na-prinuditelnuju-ukrainizatsiju-i-adminreformu.html)
[3175] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined twenty-second and twenty-third periodic reports of Ukraine. August 2016. Available at: https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2fC%2fUKR%2fCO%2f22-23&Lang=en
[3177] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined twenty-second and twenty-third periodic reports of Ukraine. August 2016. Available at: https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2fC%2fUKR%2fCO%2f22-23&Lang=en
[3178] Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee on the eighth periodic report of Ukraine, November 2021 (observations published in February 2022). Available at: https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2FC%2FUKR%2FCO%2F8&Lang=en
[3179] Examples of such actions by the Ukrainian authorities are given in the book titled "The Online Environment as a Tool for Violating Rights and Freedoms in Ukraine." Institute of Legal Policy and Social Protection named after Irina Berezhnaya, 2022.
[3180] The Online Environment as a Tool for Violating Rights and Freedoms in Ukraine. Institute of Legal Policy and Social Protection named after Irina Berezhnaya, 2022.
[3181] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined twenty-second and twenty-third periodic reports of Ukraine. August 2016. Available at: https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2fC%2fUKR%2fCO%2f22-23&Lang=en
[3182] Monitoring of the human rights situation in Ukraine, January 2018 – April 2019. Available at: https://forbiddentoforbid.org.ua/ru/monitoring-prav-cheloveka-konets-2018-nachalo-2019/
[3183] Under the law, the National Television and Radio Broadcasting Council of Ukraine received unlimited power to put pressure on any media outlets all the way up to major fines and extra-judicial bans.
[3184] The use of the material from the Myrotvorets website in judicial practice. The Uspishna Varta human rights platform. 22 January 2019. https://uspishna-varta.com/ru/news/ispolzovaniye-materialov-sayta-mirotvorets-v-sudebnoy-praktike
[3185] List of issues in relation to the eighth periodic report of Ukraine. November 2021 (published in Februaru 2022). https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2FC%2FUKR%2FCO%2F8&Lang=ru
[3186] The report of the Humanitarian Economic Cooperation Foundation "On the persecution of the dissidents and political punitive measures in Ukraine" (December 2023-February 2024).
[3188] The report of the Humanitarian Economic Cooperation Foundation "On the persecution of the dissidents and political punitive measures in Ukraine" (December 2023-February 2024).
[3190] https://antifashist.online/item/gluhonemoj-shpion-izmenniki-rodiny-pytki-rossijskih-voennoplennyh-kak-v-sizo-dnepropetrovska-izdevayutsya-nad-lyudmi-svidetelstva-ochevidca.html
[3198] https://ren.tv/news/v-mire/1128632-ukrainskogo-deputata-rabinovicha-zaochno-arestovali-za-gosizmenu?ysclid=lmgoejpg3r636374100
[3199] https://antifashist.com/item/inzhenery-atomshhiki-pedagogi-i-informatory-s-trikolorom-sbu-prodolzhaet-shtampovat-absurdnye-ugolovnye-dela-protiv-ukraincev.html
[3200] Ibid.
[3202] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/02/jailed-as-collaborators-the-stories-of-ukrainians-who-ended-up-in-prison
[3206] https://www.politico.eu/article/racism-scandal-in-finland-economic-minister-under-fire-for-racist-slurs/
[3210] https://www.helsinkitimes.fi/finland/finland-news/domestic/24376-study-finland-is-perceived-as-one-of-the-most-racist-countries-in-eu.html
[3214] https://yle.fi/a73-l1920475; https://www.helsinkitimes.fi/finland/finland-news/domestic/19201-two-yle-reports-set-off-discussion-about-police-racism-in-finland.html
[3217] Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review on Finland. January 2023.
[3218] Concluding observations of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the 23rd periodic report of Finland. May 2017. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2FC%2FFIN%2FCO%2F23&Lang=ru
[3219] Concluding observations of the Committee against Torture on the 8th periodic report of Finland. May 2024. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CAT%2FC%2FFIN%2FCO%2F8&Lang=ru
[3220] https://rm.coe.int/letter-to-krista-mikkonen-minister-of-the-interior-of-finland-by-dunja/1680a7537d
[3221] https://poliisi.fi/en/-/large-human-trafficking-case-of-thai-berry-pickers-to-consideration-of-charges
[3222] Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee on the 7th periodic report of Finland. March 2021. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR/C/FIN/CO/7&Lang=Ru
[3223] Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the 7th periodic report of Finland. March 2021. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=E/C.12/FIN/CO/7&Lang=En
[3224] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child on the combined 5th and 6th periodic reports of Finland. May 2023. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CRC%2FC%2FFIN%2FCO%2F5-6&Lang=en
[3225] Concluding observations of the Committee against Torture on the 8th periodic report of Finland. May 2024. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CAT%2FC%2FFIN%2FCO%2F8&Lang=ru
[3226] The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report 2024. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2024-fundamental-rights-report-2024_en.pdf
[3227] Report of the Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Human Rights Council on the right to education, F. Shaheed, on her visit to Finland from 20 to 29 November 2023, submitted to the 56th session of the HRC. April 2024. https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=A%2FHRC%2F56%2F58%2FAdd.1&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False
[3228] Ibid.
[3229] Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee on the 7th periodic report of Finland. March 2021. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR/C/FIN/CO/7&Lang=Ru
[3230] Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review on Finland. January 2023. https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=A%2FHRC%2F52%2F9&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False
[3231] Views adopted by the Committee under the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a communications procedure, concerning communication No. 100/2019. 12 October 2022.
[3232] https://culturas.fi/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Cultura-sa-a-tio-sr-Suomen-vena-ja-nkieliset-2022-selvitys.pdf
[3233]https://iz.ru/1540403/2023-07-06/finliandiia-uzhestochit-vezd-abiturientam-biznesmenam-vladeltcam-nedvizhimosti-rf-s-10-iiulia
[3234] https://valtioneuvosto.fi/en/-/finland-continues-to-impose-travel-restrictions-on-russian-citizens
[3236]https://www.defmin.fi/ajankohtaista/tiedotteet_ja_uutiset/venalaisten_kiinteistonhankinnan_tayskieltoa_arvioiva_tyoryhma_aloittaa_lainsaadantovalmistelun.14141.news#9042a51a
[3237]https://www.defmin.fi/en/topical/press_releases_and_news/press_release_archive/2022/working_group_does_not_recommend_total_ban_on_russian_real_estate_ownership.13288.news#9042a51a
[3239] Concluding observations of the Committee against Torture on the 8th periodic report of Finland. May 2024. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CAT%2FC%2FFIN%2FCO%2F8&Lang=ru
[3240] The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report 2024. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2024-fundamental-rights-report-2024_en.pdf
[3241] https://yhdenvertaisuusvaltuutettu.fi/en/-/keeping-the-eastern-border-crossing-points-closed-continues-to-seriously-compromise-the-right-to-seek-asylum
[3245] Concluding observations of the Committee against Torture on the 8th periodic report of Finland. May 2024.
[3246] https://www.helsinkitimes.fi/finland/finland-news/dornestic/24610-chief-of-finnish-olympic-committee-rejects-calls-to-boycott-paris-2024.html
[3250] Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review on Finland. January 2023. https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=A%2FHRC%2F52%2F9&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False
[3251] https://www.samediggi.fi/2023/03/16/tiedote-saamelaiskarajien-vuoden-2023-vaaliluettelin-vahvistamiseen-liittyen/
[3252]https://dokumentit.solinum.fi/samediggi/download/?d=documenttipankki/kansainv%C3%A4linen_toiminta/saamelainen_parlamentaarinen_neuvosto/saamelaisen_parlamentaarisen_neuvoston_vetoomus_p%C3%A4%C3%A4ministeri_mainille.pdf
[3253] Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review on Finland. January 2023. https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=A%2FHRC%2F52%2F9&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False
[3254] https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2019/02/un-human-rights-experts-find-finland-violated-sami-political-rights-sami, https://www.euronews.com/2022/06/15/un-flnds-finland-violated-political-rights-of-indigenous-sami-people
[3255] Examples of conflicts between the Sami and private companies over the construction of wind energy facilities can be found in the "Sapmi." section of The Indigenous World, 2020, ed. by Dwayne Mamo. Стр. 526-535. IWGIA, 2020.
[3256] S. Nysten-Haarala1, T. Joona, I. Hovila. Wind energy projects and reindeer herders' rights in Finnish Lapland: A legal framework. / Elem Sci Anth (ELEMENTA Science of Anthropocene). 2021.
[3257] This issue is explored in more detail in the following document: Sandra Alexis Juutilainen. Structural racism and indigenous health. A critical reflection of Canada and Finland. (Academic dissertation). University of Oulu, Faculty of medicine. Oulu 2017.
[3258] Statement by the Special Rapporteur on the right to education, F. Shaheed, following her visit to Finland. 29 November 2023. https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/issues/education/statements/20231129-eom-statement-finland-sr-education.pdf
[3259] Report of the Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Human Rights Council on the right to education, F. Shaheed, on her visit to Finland from 20 to 29 November 2023, submitted to the 56th session of the HRC. April 2024.https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=A%2FHRC%2F56%2F58%2FAdd.1&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False
[3260] https://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/le-bloc-de-constitutionnalite/texte-integral-de-la-constitution-du-4-octobre-1958-en-vigueur
[3261] https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/loda/id/JORFTEXT000000532990
[3262] https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/loda/article_lc/LEGIARTI000043982456
[3263] https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/loda/id/JORFTEXT000000405369/
[3264] https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jorf/id/JORFTEXT000042031970/
[3265] https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/codes/article_lc/LEGIARTI000033975349
[3266] https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/codes/article_lc/LEGIARTI000022375941
[3267] https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/codes/article_lc/LEGIARTI000022375941
[3268] https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/codes/article_lc/LEGIARTI000045293962
[3269] https://www.nouvelobs.com/politique/20220729.OBS61477/le-depute-qui-a-fait-un-salut-nazi-a-l-assemblee-fait-un-don-a-une-association-de-deportes.html
[3270] https://www.francetvinfo.fr/france/val-de-marne-un-maire-fait-un-salut-nazi-durant-le-conseil-municipal-la-prefete-saisit-la-justice_6500171.html
[3271] https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/france/040523/apres-une-vague-de-dissolutions-l-ultradroite-se-regroupe
[3272] https://www.liberation.fr/politique/projets-dattaques-europol-et-la-dgsi-alertent-sur-le-terrorisme-dextreme-droite-en-france-20230710_SI7WS2PFCZFWLN4W66KWTGDVGU/
[3273] https://www.radiofrance.fr/franceinter/ultra-droite-en-france-la-nouvelle-menace-terroriste-1612243
[3274] https://www.leparisien.fr/politique/ultradroite-la-mouvance-est-en-train-de-se-reorganiser-en-petits-groupes-27-12-2022-KUCLZ2KYFFCP5LH3CREHABZSAE.php?ts=1676460171303
[3275] https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2024/04/22/anders-ravik-jupskas-politiste-la-violence-d-extreme-droite-gagne-du-terrain-en-france_6229088_3232.html
[3276] https://www.liberation.fr/societe/police-justice/extreme-droite-onze-interpellations-autour-du-groupe-survivaliste-vengeance-patriote-20220518_H6IHQFKPVBHAXD3L5PEZAG5H3I/
https://www.lemonde.fr/police-justice/article/2022/06/02/operation-contre-l-ultradroite-en-alsace-quatre-suspects-en-garde-a-vue-des-armes-lourdes-saisies_6128603_1653578.html
https://www.leparisien.fr/faits-divers/plusieurs-perquisitions-visant-la-mouvance-de-lultradroite-en-alsace-31-05-2022-47FAF54UBJABTE5LCZ2RC2TMFQ.php
https://www.bfmtv.com/police-justice/heinrich-himmler88-un-neonazi-soupconne-d-un-projet-de-tuerie-de-masse-mis-en-examen-en-france_AD-202206040182.html
https://www.leparisien.fr/faits-divers/ultradroite-un-homme-de-19-ans-mis-en-examen-pour-des-soupcons-de-projet-terroriste-13-09-2022-HBCNA6HJYRBS5JPMBNO3G3XXFU.php
[3277] https://www.rtl.fr/actu/debats-societe/les-infos-de-18h-france-maroc-les-attaques-de-l-ultradroite-etaient-elles-coordonnees-7900215855
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[3281] https://www.rue89strasbourg.com/deux-hooligans-strasbourg-offender-perquisitions-armes-mouvance-neonazie-238434; https://www.rue89strasbourg.com/deux-hooligans-strasbourg-offender-perquisitions-armes-mouvance-neonazie-238434
[3282] https://www.rue89strasbourg.com/journaliste-menaces-neonazis-248618
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[3290] https://www.20minutes.fr/justice/4017648-20230106-lyon-justice-saisie-apres-decouverte-stickers-neonazis-colles-ville
[3291] https://www.estrepublicain.fr/faits-divers-justice/2023/10/29/decouverte-d-autocollants-vandal-de-besak-colles-sur-la-facade-du-pixel-anne-vignot-compte-deposer-plainte; https://france3-regions.francetvinfo.fr/bourgogne-franche-comte/doubs/besancon/un-comite-anti-fasciste-voit-le-jour-a-besancon-pour-sauver-la-democratie-en-danger-2868506.html
[3292] https://www.streetpress.com/sujet/1693819816-nazi-militaires-neonazis-regiment-belfort-besancon-vandal
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[3294] https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/france/091223/dans-le-gard-des-tracts-neonazis-et-une-ambiance-qui-monte
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[3301] https://www.humanite.fr/politique/extreme-droite/marche-neonazie-autorisee-a-paris-rassemblements-en-soutien-a-la-palestine-interdits
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[3312] https://polk.press/ru/news/mezhdunarodnyj-bessmertnyj-polk/vo-francuzskom-lione-proshel-bessmertnyj-polk
[3313] https://www.lejdd.fr/international/du-d-day-la-conference-de-la-paix-en-suisse-les-russes-ont-disparu-146145; https://iz.ru/1710016/2024-06-09/frantcuzskaia-gazeta-ukazala-na-perepisyvanie-parizhem-istorii-vtoroi-mirovoi-voiny
[3314] https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n24/002/10/pdf/n2400210.pdf?token=tKUYNIhhdbWv8FnuvQ&fe=true
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EzIiwidCI6IjBmOWUzNWRiLTU0NGYtNGY2MC1iZGNjLTVlYTQxNmU2ZGM3MCIsImMiOjh9
[3316] http://www.senat.fr/questions/base/2021/qSEQ210623223.html
[3317] https://www.lejdd.fr/International/guerre-en-ukraine-azov-un-regiment-ultra-nationaliste-et-sulfureux-devenu-symbole-du-martyre-de-marioupol-4113630; https://www.tf1info.fr/international/guerre-en-ukraine-quel-est-ce-regiment-azov-de-l-armee-ukrainienne-accuse-d-etre-neonazi-2211759.html
[3318] https://www.slate.fr/story/247019/ukraine-symboles-nazis-neonazis-regiment-azov
[3319] https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2022/03/24/de-retour-d-ukraine-un-militant-neonazi-francais-interpelle-et-mis-en-examen_6118983_3224.html; https://www.liberation.fr/politique/extreme-droite-un-reseau-tres-politique-de-francais-partis-combattre-en-ukraine-20230602_WYNMPAW5KRCS7EYJQIQPXID6MQ/; https://www.rtl.fr/actu/international/enquete-rtl-guerre-en-ukraine-qui-sont-ces-francais-partis-combattre-aux-cotes-des-ukrainiens-7900221988
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[3321]https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/220524/l-armee-francaise-entraine-des-neonazis-ukrainiens-au-combat
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[3323]https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CEDAW%2fC%2fFRA%2fCO%2f7-8&Lang=ru
[3324] https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/g23/021/14/pdf/g2302114.pdf?token=Ayw9Suc5qadkL4ncQu&fe=true
[3325] https://www.gouvernement.fr/actualite/un-nouveau-plan-national-contre-la-haine-et-les-discriminations
[3326] https://www.ifop.com/publication/lobservatoire-meteojob-des-discriminations-a-lembauche/
[3327] https://www.ifop.com/publication/les-francais-face-a-la-lutte-contre-le-racisme-et-la-question-des-discriminations-au-travail/
[3328] https://www.inegalites.fr/Rapport-sur-les-discriminations-en-France
[3329] https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Interstats/Actualites/Info-Rapide-n-34-Les-atteintes-a-caractere-raciste-xenophobe-ou-antireligieux-en-2023
[3330] https://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/les-crimes-et-delits-racistes-xenophobes-ou-antireligieux-ont-augmente-de-32-en-2023-selon-l-interieur-20240320; https://www.interfax.ru/business/971422
[3331] https://medias.vie-publique.fr/data_storage_s3/rapport/pdf/284641.pdf
[3332] https://www.rcf.fr/articles/actualite/pres-de-1-000-actes-antichretiens-enregistres-en-2023-selon-le-ministere-de
[3333] https://www.rcf.fr/articles/actualite/pres-de-1-000-actes-antichretiens-enregistres-en-2023-selon-le-ministere-de
[3334] https://www.cncdh.fr/sites/default/files/2023-06/CNCDH%20Rapport%20racisme%202022%20web%20accessible.pdf
[3335] https://www.rcf.fr/articles/actualite/pres-de-1-000-actes-antichretiens-enregistres-en-2023-selon-le-ministere-de
[3336] https://information.tv5monde.com/info/france-attaque-au-couteau-nice-l-agresseur-interpelle-381393
[3337] https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2022/04/24/nice-un-pretre-blesse-au-couteau-dans-une-attaque-sans-caractere-terroriste-a-priori-l-assaillant-a-ete-arrete_6123459_3224.html
[3338] https://www.famillechretienne.fr/39502/article/le-bilan-impressionnant-des-attaques-contre-leglise-en-france-en-2022
[3339] https://www.vaticannews.va/fr/eglise/news/2022-01/vandalisme-eglises-france-saint-denis.html
[3340] https://www.ouest-france.fr/societe/faits-divers/a-angers-une-eglise-saccagee-au-lendemain-des-festivites-de-paques-d99544fc-d94f-11ed-a8f2-3d52644ec35b
[3341] https://www.midilibre.fr/2023/06/20/un-projet-dattentat-djihadiste-dejoue-en-france-contre-nimporte-qui-deux-jeunes-radicalises-ce-que-lon-sait-11289715.php
[3342] https://www.tf1info.fr/justice-faits-divers/dordogne-clermont-d-excideuil-profanation-d-une-eglise-et-de-plus-50-tombes-par-des-inscriptions-anti-chretiens-2289053.html
[3343] https://www.francebleu.fr/infos/faits-divers-justice/des-tags-allah-decouverts-sur-les-tombes-d-un-nouveau-cimetiere-de-dordogne-8724327
[3344] France. Population. //Big Russian Encyclopedia: http://bigenc.ru/c/frantiia-naselenie-f07cd5
[3345] https://www.crif.org/fr/content/crif-rapport-sur-les-chiffres-de-lantisemitisme-en-2023-flambee-des-actes-antisemites-en-france-a-partir-du-7-octobre
[3346] https://www.francetvinfo.fr/monde/proche-orient/israel-palestine/explosion-des-actes-antireligieux-on-vous-explique-pourquoi-il-faut-prendre-les-chiffres-de-gerald-darmanin-avec-des-pincettes_6203646.html
[3347] https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2023/10/12/dans-un-telegramme-adresse-aux-prefets-gerald-darmanin-demande-l-interdiction-de-toutes-les-manifestations-propalestiniennes_6194007_3224.html
[3348] https://www.la-croix.com/france/Darmanin-ordonne-linterdiction-manifestations-pro-palestiniennes-2023-10-12-1201286604
[3349] https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/juri/id/CETATEXT000048234644
[3350] https://www.liberation.fr/societe/police-justice/procedures-de-dissolution-les-collectifs-propalestiniens-relayant-le-hamas-dans-le-viseur-de-darmanin-20231015_SPT4EVI7GNFZHFBNJ3PXALHVZE/
[3351] La lutte contre le racisme, l'antisémitisme et la xénophobie - Année 2019. Rapport public. Commission nationale consultative des Droits de l'Homme
https://www.vie-publique.fr/rapport/274694-la-lutte-contre-le-racisme-lantisemitisme-et-la-xenophobie-2019
[3352] Oradour-sur-Glane : "Tout sera fait» pour poursuivre les auteurs des tags, assure Macron. Le Parisien. 21 августа 2020 г.
https://www.leparisien.fr/societe/oradour-sur-glane-des-tags-inscrits-sur-le-centre-de-la-memoire-du-village-martyr-21-08-2020-8371416.php
[3353] Fontainebleau : 67 tombes profanées par des croix gammées. L’express. 28 декабря 2020 г. https://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/societe/fontainebleau-67-tombes-profanees-avec-des-croix-gammees-dans-un-cimetiere_2141641.html.
[3354] https://france3-regions.francetvinfo.fr/auvergne-rhone-alpes/isere/grenoble/grenoble-une-croix-gammee-taguee-sur-une-plaque-commemorative-un-acte-intolerable-reagit-le-crif-2509789.html
[3355] https://france3-regions.francetvinfo.fr/occitanie/haute-garonne/toulouse/degradation-de-steles-chretiennes-et-juives-d-un-cimetiere-de-haute-garonne-2775858.html
[3356] https://www.rtl.fr/actu/justice-faits-divers/la-vive-emotion-des-habitants-de-ploeuc-l-hermitage-apres-la-profanation-d-un-monument-dedie-a-la-resistance-7900283952
[3357] https://france3-regions.francetvinfo.fr/grand-est/marne/chalons-en-champagne/profanation-des-croix-gammees-nazies-decouvertes-sur-une-tombe-d-un-cimetiere-de-chalons-en-champagne-2842955.html
[3358] https://www.lesechos.fr/politique-societe/gouvernement/cimetiere-juif-profane-christophe-castaner-cree-un-office-national-de-lutte-contre-la-haine-1153644
[3359] Sondage: les jeunes musulmans plus radicaux que leurs aînés. Le Figaro. 8 сентября 2020 г. https://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/sondage-les-jeunes-musulmans-plus-radicaux-que-leurs-aines-20200908
[3360] https://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2023/10/16/terrorisme-qu-est-ce-que-la-fiche-s_4741574_4355771.html
[3361] Such data was given by the head of the French Interior Ministry at a meeting with the spiritual leaders of French Muslims in April 2023.
[3362] https://www.francetvinfo.fr/culture/patrimoine/incendie-de-notre-dame-de-paris/attaque-de-la-mosquee-de-bayonne-comment-la-these-erronee-de-l-incendie-criminel-de-notre-dame-s-est-propagee_3681281.html
[3363] https://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/haut-rhin-le-carre-musulman-du-cimetiere-de-mulhouse-vandalise-20211212
[3364] https://www.aa.com.tr/fr/journal-de-lislamophobie/france-des-injures-islamophobes-et-n%C3%A9o-nazis-inscrites-sur-la-mosqu%C3%A9e-de-flers/2743433
[3365] https://france3-regions.francetvinfo.fr/hauts-de-france/nord-0/lille/les-locaux-de-l-association-al-amal-de-wattignies-vandalises-c-est-la-goutte-d-eau-qui-fait-deborder-le-vase-2735630.html
[3366] https://www.francebleu.fr/infos/faits-divers-justice/c-est-un-attentat-terroriste-la-mosquee-du-pays-de-morlaix-appelle-au-rassemblement-contre-l-islamophobie-5731724
[3367] Закон № 2021-1109 "О соблюдении республиканских принципов" (Loi n° 2021-1109 du 24 août 2021 confortant le respect des principes de la République);
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/dossierlegislatif/JORFDOLE000042635616/?detailType=EXPOSE_MOTIFS&detailId=.
[3368] https://www.ohchr.org/ru/statements-and-speeches/2024/03/turks-global-update-human-rights-council
[3369] https://www.vie-publique.fr/files/rapport/pdf/291187.pdf
[3370]https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2fC%2fFRA%2fCO%2f5&Lang=ru
[3371] https://www.bfmtv.com/police-justice/nahel-l-onu-demande-a-la-france-de-se-pencher-sur-les-serieux-problemes-de-racisme-chez-les-forces-de-l-ordre_AD-202306300390.html
[3372]https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2fC%2fFRA%2fCO%2f20-21&Lang=ru;
https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CAT%2fC%2fFRA%2fCO%2f7&Lang=ru
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[3374] https://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/guerre-en-ukraine-interdits-bancaires-des-russes-portent-plainte-20220824
[3375] See more on this: Report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation "On Violations of the Rights of Russian Citizens and Compatriots in Foreign Countries," 2024. https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/doklady/1925827/
[3376] https://www.lemonde.fr/sport/article/2024/03/30/a-kiev-anne-hidalgo-dit-aux-athletes-russes-et-bielorusses-qu-ils-ne-sont-pas-les-bienvenus-aux-jeux-de-paris-2024_6225142_3242.html
[3377] https://www.leparisien.fr/jo-paris-2024/ils-nous-traitent-comme-des-terroristes-des-volontaires-russes-et-bielorusses-ecartes-des-jo-paris-2024-03-05-2024-P4YUQUSR5ZHYVCD4NUMDD5FK3M.php
[3378] Report to the French Government on the visit to France carried out by the CPT from November 23 to 30, 2018 Published March 24, 2020. https://rm.coe.int/16809cffaf
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[3380] https://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/france
[3381] https://iz.ru/1683683/2024-04-17/politciia-frantcii-zachistila-samyi-bolshoi-skvot-migrantov-pered-olimpiadoi
[3382] https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2024/04/17/le-plus-grand-squat-de-france-a-vitry-sur-seine-en-cours-d-evacuation-a-cent-jours-des-jeux-olympiques_6228290_3224.html; https://iz.ru/1683683/2024-04-17/politciia-frantcii-zachistila-samyi-bolshoi-skvot-migrantov-pered-olimpiadoi
[3383] https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2024/04/17/le-plus-grand-squat-de-france-a-vitry-sur-seine-en-cours-d-evacuation-a-cent-jours-des-jeux-olympiques_6228290_3224.html; https://iz.ru/1683683/2024-04-17/politciia-frantcii-zachistila-samyi-bolshoi-skvot-migrantov-pered-olimpiadoi
[3384] https://www.nytimes.com/; https://tass.ru/obschestvo/21339573
[3385] https://www.nytimes.com/; https://tass.ru/obschestvo/21339573
[3386] https://www.nytimes.com/; https://tass.ru/obschestvo/21339573
[3387] https://iz.ru/1417458/2022-10-28/bolshinstvo-irlandtcev-podderzhali-ostanovku-priema-ukrainskikh-bezhentcev
[3388] https://www.politico.eu/article/why-ukraines-refugees-arent-going-to-france/?utm_source=RSS_Feed&utm_medium=RSS&utm_campaign=RSS_Syndication; https://lenta.ru/news/2024/03/25/frantsiya-otstala-ot-ostalnyh-stran-es-po-priemu-ukrainskih-bezhentsev/
[3389] https://www.politico.eu/article/why-ukraines-refugees-arent-going-to-france/?utm_source=RSS_Feed&utm_medium=RSS&utm_campaign=RSS_Syndication; https://lenta.ru/news/2024/03/25/frantsiya-otstala-ot-ostalnyh-stran-es-po-priemu-ukrainskih-bezhentsev/
[3390] https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2019-fundamental-rights-report-2019_en.pdf
[3391] https://www.ohchr.org/en/news/2023/10/committee-economic-social-and-cultural-rights-commends-france-allowing-committee
[3393] Nazisme: 2 000 personnes dans le monde touchent une pension controversée. The Times of Israel. 22 February 2019 https://fr.timesofisrael.com/nazisme-2-000-personnes-dans-le-monde-touchent-une-pension-controversee/
[3394] Nazi war criminal dies in Germany. BBC. 14 August 2007 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6946159.stm
[3395] https://www.lemonde.fr/intarnational/article/2022/12/20/une-ex-secretaire-d-un-camp-nazi-condamnee-a-deux-ans-de-prison-avec-sursis-en-allemgne_6155170_3210.html%20
[3396] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/12/20/nazi-irmgard-furchner-secretary-holocaust-stutthof/
[3397] https://stmegi.com/posts/118929/v-germanii-99-letnego-eks-okhrannika-zaksenkhauzena-ne-stali-privlekat-k-sudu-iz-za-vozrasta-i-sosto/
[3398] https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-13574971/Last-known-surviving-Nazi-concentration-camp-guard-gas-chambers-medical-experiments-unfit-trial.html
[3400] https://forward.com/news/481224/the-many-monuments-that-still-honor-fascists-nazis-and-murderers-of-jews/
[3402] See an example of such commemorative plaques in churches in Bavaria: https://t.me/germany_inessa/956
[3403] https://rg.ru/2024/02/09/bild-ded-glavy-mid-frg-berbok-podderzhival-nacistov-i-sluzhil-v-vermahte.html
[3404] https://www.bunte.de/stars/star-life/stars-privat/robert-habecks-duesteres-familiengeheimnis.html
[3406] https://lenta.ru/news/2024/08/13/zaharova-otreagirovala-na-vklyuchenie-natsistskih-ofitserov-v-spisok-primerov-dlya-voennyh/
[3408] https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/SharedDocs/publikationen/DE/verfassungsschutzberichte/2023-06-20-verfassungsschutzbericht-2022.html
[3409] https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/SharedDocs/publikationen/DE/verfassungsschutzberichte/2023-06-20-verfassungsschutzbericht-2022.html
[3410] Ibid.
[3411] Rechtsextremes Netzwerk vor Gericht. Tagesschau. 8 April 2022 https://www.tagesschau.de/investigativ/ndr-wdr/prozess-blood-honour-101.html
[3412] Atomwaffen Division und Combat 18. ZEIT. https://www.zeit.de/politik/2022-04/atomwaffen-division-und-combat-18
[3413] Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz. Reichsbürger und Selbstverwalter. Zahlen und Fakten. https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/DE/themen/reichsbuerger-und-selbstverwalter/zahlen-und-fakten_node.html
[3414] Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz. Exekutivmaßnahmen gegen Vereinigung aus „Reichsbürger"-Spektrum. https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/SharedDocs/hintergruende/DE/reichsbuerger-und-selbstverwalter/exekutivmassnahmen-gegen-reichsbuerger-spektrum.html
[3415] Xenophobia, Minority Rights and Radicalisation in the OSCE Area, 2020-2022. Report by the European Centre of Democracy Development and the Center for the Study of Extremism and Radicalism at the Moscow Institute of Economics. 2023. https://www.ru.civic-nation.org/obshcheevropeyskiy-doklad/Доклад%202023_3.pdf
[3416] Xenophobia, Minority Rights and Radicalisation in the OSCE Area, 2020-2022. Report by the European Centre of Democracy Development and the Center for the Study of Extremism and Radicalism at the Moscow Institute of Economics. 2023. https://www.ru.civic-nation.org/obshcheevropeyskiy-doklad/Доклад%202023_3.pdf
[3417] https://www.mdr.de/nachrichten/sachsen/dresden/dresden-radebeul/demo-protest-gedenken-bombardierung-neonazis-100.html
[3418] Dresden: Keine Menschenkette zum 13. Februar. Saechsische. De. https://www.saechsische.de/dresden/lokales/menschenkette-und-demos-was-in-dresden-am-13-februar-wichtig-ist-5820520-amp.html
[3419] Wie Rechtsextreme wieder gegen Flüchtlingsunterkünfte mobilmachen. Redaktions Netzwerk Deutschland, 4 February 2023. https://www.rnd.de/politik/rechtsextreme-machen-wieder-gegen-fluechtlingsunterkuenfte-mobil-MOSR4IA3CRDQRHTNLDD5KXXH3Q.html
[3421] Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz. Lagebericht „Rechtsextremisten, ,Reichsbürger' und ,Selbstverwalter' in Sicherheitsbehörden". May 2022 https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/SharedDocs/publikationen/DE/rechtsextremismus/2022-05-lagebericht-rechtsextremisten-reichsbuerger-und-selbstverwalter-in-sicherheitsbehoerden.pdf
[3422] Unterrichtung durch das Parlamentarische Kontrollgremium Öffentliche Bewertung des Parlamentarischen Kontrollgremiums gemäß § 10 Absatz 2 Satz 1 des Kontrollgremiumgesetzes zum Kontrollauftrag Erkenntnisse, Beiträge und Maßnahmen von Bundesamt für den Militärischen Abschirmdienst, Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutzund Bundesnachrichtendienst zur Aufklärung möglicherrechtsextremistischer Netzwerke mit Bezügen zur Bundeswehr. Deutscher Bundestag 19. Wahlperiode. Drucksache 19/25180. 11 December 2020 https://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/19/251/1925180.pdf
[3423] Antwortder Bundesregierungauf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Martina Renner, Nicole Gohlke,Gökay Akbulut, weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion DIE LINKE.– Drucksache 20/2366 –Lagebild Rechtsextremisten in Sicherheitsbehörden. Deutscher Bundestag. 20. Wahlperiode. 22 July 2022 https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/20/028/2002873.pdf
[3424] German soldiers dismissed over Hitler birthday song. Reuters. 16 June 2021 https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/german-soldiers-dismissed-over-hitler-birthday-song-2021-06-16/; Germany withdraws platoon from Nato mission in Lithuania. ВВС. 16 June 2021 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-57487869; Germany withdraws platoon from Nato mission in Lithuania. Gazeta.RU. 17 June 2021 https://www.gazeta.ru/army/news/2021/06/17/16115654.shtml?updated
[3425] https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/berlin-und-nrw-neue-rassistische-chatgruppen-bei-polizei-entdeckt-16981029.html
[3426] For more information on the manifestation of extremist attitudes among police officers in several German federal states, see the Ministry's previous reports on the manifestation of neo-Nazism.
[3427] https://lt.sputniknews.ru/20240607/v-litve-nachalis-odni-iz-krupneyshikh-takticheskikh-ucheniy-s-uchastiem-nato-33179628.html, https://afn.today/news/i/318308
[3428] The name of Lithuanian "Iron Wolf" exercises has caused outrage in Germany. Sputnik. Lithuania 15 November 2019 https://lt.sputniknews.ru/20191115/V-Germanii-vozmutilis-nazvaniem-ucheniy-Zheleznyy-volk-v-Litve-10675615.html
[3429] The Brown Internationale. Kai Biermann, Christian Fuchs, Astrid Geisler, Yassin Musharbash, Hogler Stark. Die Zeit. 11 February 2021. https://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2021-02/fascism-international-right-wing-extremism-neo-nazis-english/komplettansicht?utm_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2F
[3430] Antwortder Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Petra Pau, Dr. André Hahn, Doris Achelwilm, weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion DIE LINKE. – Drucksache 19/15214 – Global vernetzter Online-Rechtsextremismus – Sicherheitsarchitekturund Prävention. Deutscher Bundestag – 19. Wahlperiode. 19 February 2019http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btd/19/161/1916170.pdf
[3431] #HASS IM NETZ: DER SCHLEICHENDE ANGRIFF AUF UNSERE DEMOKRATIEEINE BUNDESWEITE REPRÄSENTATIVE UNTERSUCHUNG. Institut für Demokratie und Zivilgesellschaft. June 2019 https://www.idz-jena.de/fileadmin/user_upload/_Hass_im_Netz_-_Der_schleichende_Angriff.pdf
[3432] Xenophobia, Minority Rights and Radicalisation in the OSCE Area, 2020-2022. Report by the European Centre of Democracy Development and the Center for the Study of Extremism and Radicalism at the Moscow Institute of Economics. 2023. https://www.ru.civic-nation.org/obshcheevropeyskiy-doklad/Доклад%202023_3.pdf
[3435] https://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/rechtsextremismus-zahl-der-straftaten-im-jahr-2023-stark-angestiegen-a-fafa91b5-7321-49ab-840e-aa981e435383
[3436] The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report 2023. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2023-fundamental-rights-report-2023_en_1.pdf
[3437] Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Germany (6th monitoring cycle). Adopted on 10 December 2019. Published on 17 March 2020. https://rm.coe.int/ecri-report-on-germanv-sixth-monitoring-cycle-/16809ce4be
[3438] Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee on the 7th periodic report of Germany. November 2021. https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G21/357/48/PDF/G2135748.pdf?OpenElement
[3439] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 23rd to 26th periodic reports of Germany. December 2023. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2FC%2FDEU%2FCO%2F23-26&Lang=ru
[3440] Xenophobia, Minority Rights and Radicalisation in the OSCE Area, 2020-2022. Report by the European Centre of Democracy Development and the Center for the Study of Extremism and Radicalism at the Moscow Institute of Economics. 2023. https://www.ru.civic-nation.org/obshcheevropeyskiy-doklad/Доклад%202023_3.pdf
[3441] Ibid.
[3442] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 23rd to 26th periodic reports of Germany. December 2023. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2FC%2FDEU%2FCO%2F23-26&Lang=ru
[3443] BKA registriert Dutzende Delikte: Angriffe auf Russen und Ukrainer in Deutschland. N-TV. 19 April 2022 https://n-tv.de/politik/Angriffe-auf-Russen-und-Ukrainer-in-Deutschland-article23275758.html
[3444] Wegen Angriffskrieg gegen die Ukraine. Anfeindungen gegen Deutsche aus Russland: So bekommen Betroffene Hilfe. SWR. 09.03.2022. https://www.swr.de/swraktuell/baden- wuerttemberg/diskriminierung-deutsche-aus-russland-100.html
[3445] Blind Law: 1,600 Russians were discriminated against in the Federal Republic of Germany in course of the year. Izvestia. 4 September 2023 https://iz.ru/1567626/semen-boikov/slepoi-zakon-za-god-v-frg-podverglis-diskriminatcii-16-tys-rossiian
[3446] The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report 2024 г. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2024-fundamental-rights-report-2024_en.pdf
[3447] The volunteer said that Germans supporting the special military operation are forced to emigrate to the Russian Federation. TASS. 21 June 2024 https://tass.ru/obschestvo/21166377
[3448] The trial of Yelena Kolbasnikova, accused of war propaganda, began in Germany. Fund for the Support and Protection of the Rights of Compatriots Living Abroad. 10 March 2023 https://pravfond.ru/press-tsentr/v-germanii-nachalsya-sudebnyy-protsess-nad-rossiyankoy-elenoy-kolbasnikovoy-obvinyaemoy-v-propagande/?sphrase_id=3344; В Германии провели обыск у организатора крупных пророссийских акций. RIA Novosti, 27 March 2023 https://ria.ru/20230327/obysk-1861092501.html; A pro-Russian activist fined in Germany. Lenta.RU. 7 June 2023 https://lenta.ru/news/2023/06/07/germany/, A court in Cologne sentenced pro-Russian activist Yelena Kolbasnikova. Fund for the Support and Protection of the Rights of Compatriots Living Abroad. 7 June 2023 https://pravfond.ru/press-tsentr/sud-kyelna-vynes-prigovor-prorossiyskoy-aktivistke-elene-kolbasnikovoy/?sphrase_id=3344
[3449] ICRC and IARL adopted a Statement in connection with the criminal prosecution in Germany of Elena Kolbasnikova, a German citizen. The International Council of Russian Compatriots. 8 June 2023 https://www.msrs.ru/news-orb/item/609-2023-047
[3450] Detailed information on the above-mentioned cases of persecution can be found in the report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia on persecution of Russian citizens and compatriots abroad (www.mid.ru).
[3451] European Agency for Fundamental Rights. Overview of Antisemitic Incidents Recorded in the EU in 2012-2022. http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2023-antisemitism-update-2012-2022_en.pdf
[3452] European Agency for Fundamental Rights. Overview of Antisemitic Incidents Recorded in the EU in 2012-2022. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2022-antisemitism-overview-2011-2021_en.pdf
[3453] Ibid.
[3455] https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article251435984/Judenhass-in-Deutschland-Neue-Dimension-erreicht-Antisemitische-Straftaten-auf-Hoechststand.html
[3457] Jewish people’s experinces and perceptions of antisemitism. Third survey. The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. 2024. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2024-experiences-perceptions-antisemitism-survey_en.pdf
[3458] Bundesverband RIAS e. V. Federal Association of Departments for Research and Information on Anti-Semitism. Annual Report. Anti-Semitic incidents in Germany 2022. 27 June 2023 https://report-antisemitism.de/documents/Antisemitic_incidents_in_Germany_Annual-Report_Federal_Association_RIAS_2022.pdf
[3459] Bundesverband RIAS e. V. Federal Association of Departments for Research and Information on Anti-Semitism. V. (Bundesverband RIAS). Anti-Semitic Incidents in Germany 2023. Annual Report. 2024. https://report-antisemitism.de/en/annuals/
[3460] https://www.rbb24.de/politik/beitrag/2023/11/israel-kritik-antisemitismus-hochschulen-berlin-studenten.html
[3461] Bundesverband RIAS e. V. Federal Association of Departments for Research and Information on Anti-Semitism. V. (Bundesverband RIAS). Anti-Semitic Incidents in Germany 2023. Annual Report. 2024. https://report-antisemitism.de/en/annuals/
[3462] Fifth Opinion of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities on Germany. Adopted on 3 February 2022. Published on 14 June 2022. https://rm.coe.int/5th-op-germany-en/1680a6e008
[3463] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 23rd to 26th periodic reports of Germany. December 2023. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2FC%2FDEU%2FCO%2F23-26&Lang=ru
[3464] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 23rd to 26th periodic reports of Germany. December 2023. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2FC%2FDEU%2FCO%2F23-26&Lang=ru
[3465] Xenophobia, Minority Rights and Radicalisation in the OSCE Area, 2020-2022. Report by the European Centre of Democracy Development and the Center for the Study of Extremism and Radicalism at the Moscow Institute of Economics. 2023. https://www.ru.civic-nation.org/obshcheevropeyskiy-doklad/Доклад%202023_3.pdf
[3466] https://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Meldungen/DE/2024/240108-asylgeschaeftsstatistik-dezember-und-gesamtjahr-2023.html?nn=284830
[3467] https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/1356654/umfrage/anzahl-ukrainischer-fluechtlinge-in-den-eu-staaten/
[3469] https://www.proasyl.de/news/das-neue-rueckfuehrungsgesetz-bedient-rechten-populismus-loest-aber-keine-probleme/
[3470] Alltagsrassismus in Deutschland: Wenn der Hass krank macht. Tagesspiegel. 4 December 2019 https://www.tagesspiegel.de/wissen/alltagsrassismus-in-deutschland-wenn-der-hass-krank-macht/25295914.html
[3471] Deutsche sind besonders skeptisch gegenüber Flüchtlingen und Asyl. WELT. 26 December 2022 https://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/plus242857561/Umfrage-zu-Asyl-Deutsche-im-internationalen-Vergleich-besonders-skeptisch.html
[3472] Xenophobia, Minority Rights and Radicalisation in the OSCE Area, 2020-2022. Report by the European Centre of Democracy Development and the Center for the Study of Extremism and Radicalism at the Moscow Institute of Economics. 2023. https://www.ru.civic-nation.org/obshcheevropeyskiy-doklad/Доклад%202023_3.pdf
[3473] Xenophobia, Minority Rights and Radicalisation in the OSCE Area, 2020-2022. Report by the European Centre of Democracy Development and the Center for the Study of Extremism and Radicalism at the Moscow Institute of Economics. 2023. https://www.ru.civic-nation.org/obshcheevropeyskiy-doklad/Доклад%202023_3.pdf
[3474] Ibid.
[3475] Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee on the 7th periodic report of Germany. November 2021. https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G21/357/48/PDF/G2135748.pdf?OpenElement
[3476] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child on the combined 5th and 6th periodic reports of Germany. September 2022. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CRC%2FC%2FDEU%2FCO%2F5-6&Lang=en
[3477] Der Tag "Alarmierenden Befunde": Experten sehen dringenden Handlungsbedarf an Grundschulen. N-TV. 9 December 2022 https://www.n-tv.de/der_tag/Alarmierenden-Befunde-Experten-sehen-dringenden-Handlungsbedarf-an-Grundschulen-article23773012.html
[3478] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 23rd to 26th periodic reports of Germany. December 2023. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2FC%2FDEU%2FCO%2F23-26&Lang=ru
[3479] Studie zum Arbeitsalltag. Wie tickt die Polizei? Tagesschau. 4 April 2023 https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/studie-polizei-101.html
[3480] The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report 2023. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2023-fundamental-rights-report-2023_en_1.pdf
[3481] Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Germany (6th monitoring cycle). Adopted on 10 December 2019. Published on 17 March 2020. https://rm.coe.int/ecri-report-on-germanv-sixth-monitoring-cycle-/16809ce4be
[3482] Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee on the 7th periodic report of Germany. November 2021. https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G21/357/48/PDF/G2135748.pdf?OpenElement
[3483] Fifth Opinion of the Advisory Committee of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities on Germany. Adopted on 3 February 2022. Published on 14 June 2022. https://rm.coe.int/5th-op-germany-en/1680a6e008
[3484] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 23rd to 26th periodic reports of Germany. December 2023. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2FC%2FDEU%2FCO%2F23-26&Lang=ru
[3486] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women on the 9th periodic report of Germany. May 2023. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CEDAW%2FC%2FDEU%2FCO%2F9&Lang=ru
[3487] Thematic report on the combined visit of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, Fionnuala D. Ní Aoláin, on the visit to the Germany and North Macedonia, presented at the 55th session of the UN Human Rights Council. 8 March 2024, A/HRC/55/48/Add.2 https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/ahrc5548add2-joint-thematic-visit-germany-and-north-macedonia-report
[3488] The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report 2023. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2023-fundamental-rights-report-2023_en_1.pdf
[3489] Opinion of the Advisory Committee of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (5th monitoring cycle). Adopted on 3 February 2022. Published on 14 June 2022. https://rm.coe.int/5th-op-germany-en/1680a6e008
[3490] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 23rd to 26th periodic reports of Germany. December 2023. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2FC%2FDEU%2FCO%2F23-26&Lang=ru
[3491] Some of his statements may be found on the pages of leading Croatian periodicals and Internet portals such as www.index.hr/mobile/clanak.aspx?categorv=viiesti&id=819812, https://www.24sata.hr/tagovi/vlado-kosic-47839, https://m.vecernii.hr/viiesti/dobio-sam-tri-pretnie-lievicari-bi-ubiiali-i-nakon-7Q-godina-1194822
[3492] https://www.index.hr/mobile/vijesti/clanak/na-drzavnoj-maturi-ateizam-prozvali-nacizmom/2482454.aspx?index_ref=pretraga_ostalo_m
[3493] The Jasenovac concentration camp, the largest camp of the ISC, was located in the center of the Serbian lands, stretching from Kostajnica to Stara Gradiška and Bosanka. Its total length was 60 kilometers and its area – about 240 square kilometers. It was created in August 1941. Similar to all such camps, it served the purpose of creating a "pure Croatian nation" and was intended for mass imprisonment and systematic extermination of "undesirable elements", whom the Ustasha regime considered Serbs, Jews, Roma and some other ethnic groups, as well as anti-fascists. Jasenovac is known for horrific tortures and murders of prisoners.
[3494] www.vecernji.ht/vijesti/dacic-najavio-prosvjed-hrvatskoj-zbog-zabrane-ministru-da-posjeti-jasenovac-1761643
[3495] https://registri.uprava.hr/tf!stranka-detalii/veMBAAEAAAaa8SeAAAAAAAZgBAAAAAQEBcmVnJvalNOcmFua-UCAA
[3497] This topic is covered in more detail in the section of this report dedicated to manifestations of neo-Nazism in Ukraine.
[3498] Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Croatia (fifth monitoring cycle) adopted on March 21, 2018, published on May 15, 2018.
[3499] For example, B.Matković, R.Topić Zloćini Jugoslavenske armije i komunistička represija u Lici i gradu Gospiću 1945. godine: Dokumenti, svjedočanstva i grobišta, Hrvatska družba povjesničara Dr. Rudolf Horvat (2019), B.Matković Croatia and Slovenia at the end and after the Second World War (1944-1945), Mass crimes and human rights violations committed by the communist regime, BrownWalker Press, USA (2017), V.Geiger, S.Pilic, Partizanska i komunistička represija i zločini u Hrvatskoj, Documenti, Dalmacija, Hrvatski institut za povjest, Zagreb (2011), S.Pilić, Jasenovačka Posavina između dva svjetska rata, Tkalčić (2014), S.Pilić, B.Matković Posljeratni zarobljenički logor Jasenovac prema svjedočanstvima i novim arhivskim izvorima, Radove Zavoda za povjesne znanosti HAZU u Zadru, No. 56, str. 323- 408.
[3500] Lovac na naciste prozvao vladu zbog knjige o Jasenovcu: Zabranite to! INDEXHR. 10 January 2019.
[3501] The fifth opinion of the Advisory Committee of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities on Croatia, adopted on February 1, 2021.
[3502] Statement by Croatian Ombudswoman L. Vidović of 20 October 2018. http://ombudsman.hr/hr/dis/cld/1484
[3503] Zakon o izmjenama i dopunama Kaznenog zakona.
https://narodne-novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/2003_07_111_1496.html
[3504] Dokument dijaloga: Temeljna polazišta i preporuke o posebnom normativnom uređenju simbola, znakovlja i drugih obilježja. Vlada Republike Hrvatske. 7 March 2018.
[3505] www.novosti.hr/novosti/hrvatska/hdz-ovci-komentirali-bartulicina-4-zahtjeva-zeli-i-muzej-zrtava-komunizma/
[3506] Rušenje antifašističkih spomenika u Hrvatskoj 1990-2000, Zagreb 2002, XII
[3508] www.glasistre.hr/istra/2023/10/21/dok-se-drugdje-u-hrvatskoj-ruse-i-ostecuju-spomenici-zrtvama-drugog-svjetskog-rata-u-istri-ih-s-pon-891772
[3509] Devastiran Spomen-park Dudik. Novosti. 30 March 2020. www.portalnovosti.com/devastiran-spomen-park-dudik
[3510] Gradonačelnik Dukič uklonio posljedni spomen osloboditeljima I graditeljima grada Zadra. Antifašistički vjesnik.3 November 2020. http://www.antifasisticki-vjesnik.org/hr/komentari/4/Gradonacelnik_Dukic_uklonio_posljedni_spomen_osloboditeljima_i_graditeljima_grada_Zadra/418/
[3511] Duh vandalizma nad antifašizmom. Savez antifašističkih boraca I antifašista Republike Hrvatske.
Https://sabh.hr/duh-vandalizma-nad-antifasizmom
[3512] www.vecernji.hr/vijesti/vandalizirali-spomen-kosturnicu-na-gradskom-groblju-sprejom-iscrtali-nacisticke-simbole-1708522
[3513] Statement by Croatian Ombudswoman L. Vidović of 20 October 2018. http://ombudsman.hr/hr/dis/cld/1484
[3514] Croatian Government Pays Tribute to Fascist Ustasha Regime. Antifasisticki Vjesnhik. 27 August 2019. https://www.antifasisticki-vjesnik.org/hr/vijesti/3/Croatian_Government_Pays_Tribute_to_Fascist_Ustasha_Regime/377/
[3515] In May 1945, Yugoslav partisan troops penetrated into the Austrian territory, into Carinthia, and near Bleiburg – not far from the present-day border between Austria and Slovenia – organized a mass killing of the Croatian Ustasha and Slovenian collaborators who had fled to Austria.
[3516] An infantry unit of the Ustasha army. The name was given due to the color of the soldiers' uniform.
[3517] Odbor austrijskog parlamenta usvojio rezoluciju protiv Bleiburga. Večernji list. 9 August 2020.
[3518] Decision of the Administrative Court of Zagreb of 8 December 2015 PpJ-4877/13, Decision of the High Administrative Court of the Republic of Croatia of 27 January 2016 Jž-188/2016, Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia of 8 November 2016 U-III-2588/2016, Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia of 25 May 2016 U-III-1296/2016.
[3519] Statement by Croatian Ombudswoman L. Vidović of 20 October 2018. http://ombudsman.hr/hr/dis/cld/1484
[3520] The concerts of nationalist M. Perković Thompson are the highest-grossing concerts in Croatia. His lyrics, which contain racist, xenophobic and pro-fascist appeals and slogans, are widely quoted by nationalist youth.
[3521] In Croatia, Nazi Sympathizers Are Welcome to Join the Party. Foreign Policy. 31 July 2018. https://foreignpolicy-com.translate.goog/2018/07/31/in-croatia-nazi-sympathizers-are-welcome-to-join-the-party-thompson-ustashe-fascism/?_x_tr_sl=en&_x_tr_tl=ru&_x_tr_hl=ru&_x_tr_pto=wapp
[3522] Ibid.
[3523] Music Mobilisation: The Concerts Connecting Neo-Nazis in Croatia. Balkan Insight. 14 November 2022. https://balkaninsight.com/2022/11/14/music-mobilisation-the-concerts-connecting-neo-nazis-in-croatia/
[3524] U centru Zagreba prodaju se maske ‘Za dom spremni‘; Vlasnik: ‘Nema tu ništa protuzakonito‘. Jutarnjilist. 9 July 2020 г.
[3525] Skejo došao u Knin, njegovi HOS-ovci urlali ustaški pozdrav. INDEXHR. 5 August 2020.
[3526] Ustaški grafiti uz pravoslavnu crkvu u Zagrebu. Savez antifašističkih boraca I antifašista Republike Hrvatske.
https://sabh.hr/ustaski-grafiti-uz-pravoslavnu-crkvu-u-zagrebu
[3527] Objavljujemo nove snimke sramotnog divljanja navijača na zagrebačkoj kustošiji Susjedi zgroženi: 'Urlali su 'Ubij Srbina'. Užas! Je li to normalno?'. Jutarnjilist. 12 June 2020.
[3528] 2023 Report of the Croatian Ombudsperson, p. 206.
[3529] Napadačima prijeti pet godina zatvora, župnika štiti kanonski zakonik Sociolog: 'Biskupi peru ruke od don Josipa jer se boje etikete jugokomunista'. Jutarnjilist. 4 April 2020.
[3530] www.vecernji.hr/vijesti/u-karlovcu-zajedno-istaknute-oznake-hos-a-i-ukrajinske-pukovnije-azov-a-1595647
[3531] Odluka o ustaškom pozdravu sramota je za Visoki prekršajni sud i novi udarac pravnoj državi. Večernji list. 7 June 2020. https://www.vecernji.hr/vijesti/odluka-o-ustaskom-pozdravu-sramota-je-za-visoki-prekrsajni-sud-i-novi-udarac-pravnoj-drzavi-1407918
[3532] Zakon o prekršajima protiv javnog reda i mira NN 41/77, 55/89, 05/90, 30/90, 47/90, 29/94, 114/22, 47/23 na snazi od 11.052023. https://www.zakon.hr/z/279/Zakon-o-prekr%C5%A1ajima-protiv-javnog-reda-i-mira
[3533] Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Croatia (fifth monitoring cycle) adopted on 21 March 2018, published on 15 May 2018. https://rm.coe.int/fifth-report-on-croatia/16808b57be
[3534] Fifth Opinion of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities on Croatia, adopted on 1 February 2021. https://rm.coe.int/5th-op-croatia-en/1680a2cb49
[3535] Preliminary Observations from the Official Visit to Croatia by the UN Human Rights Council Special Rapporteur on the Promotion of Truth, Justice, Reparation and Guarantees of Non-Recurrence, Mr. Fabián Salvioli, November 26 – December 2, 2021.
[3536] Statement by T. Medved, Minister of Veterans' Affairs of the Republic of Croatia.
https://narod.hr/hrvatska/identificirano-6-osoba-stradalih-u-domovinskom-ratu-hrvatska-branjitelja
[3537] Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Croatia (fifth monitoring cycle) adopted on 21 March 2018, published on 15 May 2018. https://rm.coe.int/fifth-report-on-croatia/16808b57be
[3538] Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee on the 3rd periodic report of Croatia. April 2015.
https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G15/086/35/PDF/G1508635.pdf?OpenElement
[3539] Report of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances on its visit to Croatia. August 2015.
https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G15/183/64/PDF/G1518364.pdf?OpenElement
[3540] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined ninth to fourteenth periodic reports of Croatia. August 2023
[3541] Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Croatia (fifth monitoring cycle) adopted on 21 March 2018, published on 15 May 2018. https://rm.coe.int/fifth-report-on-croatia/16808b57be
[3542] Report of the Croatian Human Rights Ombudsperson for 2021. https://www.ombudsman.hr/hr/download/izvjesce-pucke-pravobraniteljice-za-2021-godinu/?wpdmdl=13454&refresh=6290848867cc01653638280#page=3
[3543] Centar za mirovne studije. Antidiskriminacijska politika u Hrvatskoj 2011-2016, p. 17.
[3544] T. Šimonović Einwalter has held this position since 19 March 2021.
[3545] www.vecernji.hr/vijesti/pupovac-o-vecini-bez-sdss-a-nisam-siguran-da-je-plenkovic-imao-drugog-izbora-situacija-je-ozbiljna-1767464
[3546] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child on the combined fifth and sixth periodic reports of Croatia. June 2022. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CRC%2FC%2FHRV%2FCO%2F5-6&Lang=ru
[3547] The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report 2022. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2022-fundamental-rights-report-2022_en.pdf; Ured pučke pravobraniteljice (2021) https://www.ombudsman.hr/hr/izvjesca-puckog-pravobranitelja/
[3548] The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report 2023. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2023-fundamental-rights-report-2023_en_1.pdf
[3549] Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Croatia (fifth monitoring cycle) adopted on 21 March 2018, published on 15 May 2018. https://rm.coe.int/fifth-report-on-croatia/16808b57be
[3550] Fifth Opinion of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities on Croatia, adopted on 1 February 2021. https://rm.coe.int/5th-op-croatia-en/1680a2cb49
[3551] Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee on the 3rd periodic report of Croatia. March 2015. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2fC%2fHRV%2fCO%2f3&Lang=ru
[3552] Report of the NGO Serb National Council for 2021. https://snv.hr/publikacije/snv-bulletin-22/
[3553] Report of the NGO Serb National Council for 2021. https://snv.hr/publikacije/snv-bulletin-22/
[3554] Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Croatia (fifth monitoring cycle) adopted on 21 March 2018, published on 15 May 2018. https://rm.coe.int/fifth-report-on-croatia/16808b57be
[3555] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 9th to 14th periodic reports of Croatia. August 2023.
[3556] Report of the Croatian Human Rights Ombudsperson for 2021. https://www.ombudsman.hr/hr/download/izvjesce-pucke-pravobraniteljice-za-2021-godinu/?wpdmdl=13454&refresh=6290848867cc01653638280#page=3
[3557] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 9th to14th periodic reports of Croatia. August 2023 https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2FC%2FHRV%2FCO%2F9-14&Lang=ru
[3558] Ibid.
[3559] U Vukovaru ukinuta ćirilica I zvanična upotreba srpskog jezika. N1 info. 29 December 2022.
https://n1info.rs/region/u-vukovaru-ukinuta-cirilica-i-zvanicna-upotreba-srpskog-jezika/
[3560] Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee on the 3rd periodic report of Croatia. March 2015.
[3561] Data provided by the Croatian Bureau of Statistics on the 2021 census.
https://podaci.dzs.hr/media/rqbcinx/popis_2021-stanovnistvo_po_naseljima.xlsx
[3562] Report of the Croatian Human Rights Ombudsperson for 2023. www.ombudsman.hr/hr/download/izvesce_pucke_pravobranjiteljice_za_2023_godinu/?wpdmdl=18399&refresh=6671aafc6eee1715935919
[3563] Report of the Croatian Human Rights Ombudsperson for 2023.
[3564] Report of the Croatian Human Rights Ombudsperson for 2022. https://www.ombudsman.hr/
[3565] The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report 2023. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2023-fundamental-rights-report-2023_en_1.pdf
[3566] Report of the Croatian Human Rights Ombudsperson for 2022. https://www.ombudsman.hr/
[3567]The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report 2020. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2020-fundamental-rights-report-2020_en.pdf
[3568] Roma in 10 European Countries. Main results. Report by the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights 2022.
https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2022-roma-survey-2021-main-results2_en.pdf
[3569] Report "Human Rights in Croatia. Overview of 2021" by NGO Human Rights House
https://www.kucaljudskihprava.hr/2022/04/26/ljudska-prava-u-hrvatskoj-pregled-stanja-za-2021/
[3570] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined ninth to fourteenth periodic reports of Croatia. August 2023
[3571] Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee on the 3rd periodic report of Croatia. March 2015. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2fC%2fHRV%2fCO%2f3&Lang=ru
[3572] Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Croatia (fifth monitoring cycle) adopted on 21 March 2018, published on 15 May 2018.
[3573] Roma in 10 European Countries. Main results. Report by the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights 2022. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2022-roma-survey-2021-main-results2_en.pdf
[3574] Roma in 10 European Countries. Main results. Report by the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights 2022. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2022-roma-survey-2021-main-results2_en.pdf
[3575] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child on the combined fifth and sixth periodic reports of Croatia. June 2022. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CRC%2FC%2FHRV%2FCO%2F5-6&Lang=ru
[3576] European Agency for Fundamental Rights. Overview of Antisemitic Incidents Recorded in the EU in 2012-2022. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2023-antisemitism-update-2012-2022_en.pdf
[3577] Report of the Croatian Human Rights Ombudsperson for 2023.
[3578] Report of the Croatian Human Rights Ombudsperson for 2023, p. 159.
[3579] Council of Europe anti-torture Committee publishes report on its 2020 ad hoc visit to Croatia: https://www.coe.int/en/web/cpt/-/council-of-europe-anti-torture-committee-publishes-report-on-its-2020-ad-hoc-visit-to-croatia
[3580] https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/12/human-rights-body-has-condemned-croatian-authorities-for-border-violence/
[3581] The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report 2024. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2024-fundamental-rights-report-2024_en.pdf
[3582] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 9th to 14th periodic reports of Croatia. August 2023. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2FC%2FHRV%2FCO%2F9-14&Lang=ru
[3583] The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report 2023. 2024. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2024-fundamental-rights-report-2024_en.pdf
[3584] Concluding observations of the Committee against Torture on the third periodic report of Montenegro. May 2022. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CRC%2FC%2FFIN%2FCO%2F5-6&Lang=en
[3586] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 4th to 6th periodic reports of Montenegro. August 2018. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2FC%2FMNE%2FCO%2F4-6&Lang=en
[3587] Letter of CERD Vice-Chair Marc Bossuyt following the consideration of the additional information provided by the Montenegrin authorities. 3 December 2021 CERD/105th session/2021/FU/MK/ks https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=INT%2FCERD%2FFUL%2FMNE%2F47293&Lang=en
[3588] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/montenegros-parliament-sacks-minister-over-srebrenica-genocide-denial-2021-06-18/
[3590] https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2024/07/09/blocking-montenegros-eu-accession-over-jasenovac-resolution-by-croatia-would-be-destructive/
[3592] Third Opinion of the Advisory Committee of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities on Montenegro. Adopted on 7 March 2019, published on 2 October 2019. https://rm.coe.int/3rd-op-montenegro-en/168096d737
[3593] Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Montenegro (5th monitoring cycle). Adopted on 20 June 2017. Published on 19 September 2017.
https://rm.coe.int/second-report-on-montenegro/16808b5942
[3594] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women on the 2nd periodic report of Montenegro. February 2017. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=E%2fC.12%2fEST%2fCO%2f2&Lang=en
[3595] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 4th to 6th periodic reports of Montenegro. August 2018. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2FC%2FMNE%2FCO%2F4-6&Lang=en
[3596] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women on the 2nd periodic report of Montenegro. May 2024. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CEDAW%2FC%2FMNE%2FCO%2F3&Lang=ru
[3597] Letter of CERD Vice-Chair Marc Bossuyt following the consideration of the additional information provided by the Montenegrin authorities. 3 December 2021 CERD/105th session/2021/FU/MK/ks https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=INT%2FCERD%2FFUL%2FMNE%2F47293&Lang=en
[3598] Preliminary observations on the visit to Montenegro by the UN Special Rapporteur on the sale and sexual exploitation of children, Mama Fatima Singhateh 8-16 September 2021. https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements/2021/09/preliminary-observations-visit-montenegro-un-special-rapporteur-sale-and-sexual https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements/2021/09/preliminary-observations-visit-montenegro-un-special-rapporteur-sale-and-sexual
[3601] The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report 2023. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2023-fundamental-rights-report-2023_en_1.pdf
[3602] Report of the Ministry of Interior of the Czech Republic on manifestations of extremism and hatred, I half of 2023. (Pololetní zpráva MV o extremismu)
https://www.mvcr.cz/clanek/pololetni-zprava-mv-o-extremismu-556073.aspx
[3603] Nazi collaborator monuments in the Czech Republic https://forward.com/news/481399/nazi-collaborator-monuments-in-czech-republic/
[3604] Czech court rules it is proportionate for "Tomio Okamura's Freedom and Direct Democracy" to be called fascist, verdict has taken effect.Romea.cz. 26 April 2023. https://romea.cz/en/czech-republic/czech-court-rules-it-is-proportionate-for-tomio-okamuras-freedom-and-direct-democracy-to-be-called-fascist-verdict-has-taken-effect
[3605] EU Fundamental Rights Agency Report 2024. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2024-fundamental-rights-report-2024_en.pdf
[3606] Despite the initial assurances of the Mayor’s Office to put the plaque back to its place after the restoration in 2019 the new city leadership refused to return the plaque.
[3607] Koněvova ulice by se měla přejmenovat na Hartigovu, změnu podpořili zastupitelé Prahy 3. 21 June 2022. https://ct24.ceskatelevize.cz/domaci/3510373-konevova-ulice-se-mela-prejmenovat-na-hartigovu-zmenu-podporili-zastupitele-prahy-3
[3608] Proč Hartigova? Historie Koněvovy ulice https://www.praha3.cz/hartigova/proc-hartigova
[3609] 496 monuments to Soviet soldiers were demolished in Poland and the Czech Republic. RIA Novosti Crimea. December 6, 2023. https://crimea.ria.ru/20231206/v-polshe-i-chekhii-snesli-496-pamyatnikov-sovetskim-voinam-1133319023.html
[3610] A new wave of demolition of monuments to Red Army soldiers has been predicted in the Czech Republic. February 6, 2023 TASS. https://tass.ru/obschestvo/16967785
[3611] Nazi collaborator monuments in the Czech Republic https://forward.com/news/481399/nazi-collaborator-monuments-in-czech-republic/
[3612] Přibyslav odstraní kvůli napadení Ukrajiny sochu rudoarmějce se samopalem. iDNES.cz. 4 March 2022 https://www.idnes.cz/jihlava/zpravy/valka-ukrajina-socha-pribyslav-vojak-samopal-pomnik-pamatka.A220304_653780_jihlava-zpravy_mv
[3613] Památník Rudé armády v Olomouci pomaloval sprejer hákovými kříži. Novinky .cz. 17 March 2022 https://www.novinky.cz/clanek/krimi-pamatnik-rude-armady-v-olomouci-pomaloval-sprejer-hakovymi-krizi-40390780
[3614] Sprejer pomaloval památník Rudé armády v Olomouci. Novinky .cz. 26 September 2022
https://www.novinky.cz/clanek/domaci-sprejer-pomaloval-pamatnik-rude-armady-v-olomouci-40409823
[3615] Rudoarmějce v Litoměřicích obarvili červeně a postavili na pračku Novinky.cz. 25 October 2022 https://www.novinky.cz/clanek/krimi-rudoarmejce-v-litomericich-obarvili-cervene-a-postavili-na-pracku-40412689
[3616] Náš pomník oslavuje okupaci, ne osvobození, tvrdí v Litoměřicích. Město ho neodstraní. Aktuálně.cz. 22 August 2023 https://zpravy.aktualne.cz/domaci/foto-litomerice-spor-o-rusky-pomnik/r~0a3b961a40b111eeb1f50cc47ab5f122/
[3617] Oslavy osvobození začínají. Bez Rusů. Novinky. cz. 28 April 2023
https://www.novinky.cz/clanek/domaci-oslavy-osvobozeni-zacinaji-bez-rusu-40429936
[3618] Byli jsme okupováni SSSR, bude u Anděla u nápisu Moskva – Praha. Novinky.cz. 13 мая 2024 г. https://www.novinky.cz/clanek/domaci-byli-jsme-okupovani-sssr-bude-na-andelu-u-napisu-moskva-praha-40471472
[3619] We should monitor all Russians living in the West, Czech leader says. Politico.eu. 15 June 2023 https://www.politico.eu/article/petr-pavel-russia-czech-republic-surveillance/
[3620] Ruská menšina v Česku může být nástrojem politiky Kremlu, varuje ministr zahraničí. HlídacíPes.cz. 4 July 2023
http://hlidacipes.org/ruska-mensina-v-cesku-muze-byt-nastrojem-politiky-kremlu-varuje-ministr-zahranici/
[3621] https://prazsky.denik.cz/zpravy_region/rusko-ukrajina-sankce-praha-zastupitel-dlouhy-profesor-20220224.html
[3622] Vláda souhlasila se zákazem účasti ruských sportovců na soutěžích v Česku. Novinky.cz. 28 June 2023 https://www.novinky.cz/clanek/domaci-vlada-souhlasila-se-zakazem-ucasti-ruskych-sportovcu-na-soutezich-v-cesku-40436306
[3623] Nětrebková si stěžuje na cenzuru. Novinky.cz. 17 August 2023
https://www.novinky.cz/clanek/kultura-netrebko-si-stezuje-na-cenzuru-40440983
[3624] Nejvyšší státní zastupitelství: Za schvalování ruské agrese padlo devět trestů. Česká justice.cz. 15 March 2023. https://www.ceska-justice.cz/2023/03/nejvyssi-statni-zastupitelstvi-za-schvalovani-ruske-agrese-padlo-devet-trestu/
[3625] https://www.irozhlas.cz/zpravy-domov/policie-stihani-schvalovani-invaze-rusko-ukrajina_2311110500_pik
[3626] https://www.seznamzpravy.cz/clanek/domaci-kauzy-necitim-se-vina-ucitelka-ktera-popirala-rusky-utok-prisla-k-soudu-232901
[3627] https://www.ceskenoviny.cz/zpravy/soud-opet-nepravomocne-osvobodil-ucitelku-vinenou-z-popirani-valecnych-zlocinu/2470442
[3628] "V Kyjevě se nic neděje." Soud osvobodil učitelku, která ve škole zpochybňovala invazi Ruska. Echo24. 6 мая 2024 г. https://echo24.cz/a/HVz66/zpravy-domov-kyjev-nic-nedeje-soud-osvobodil-ucitelka-zpochybnovala-rusko-invaze
[3631] "De-imperialization and de-Putinization": Free Nations of Postrussia Forum was held in Prague: Radio Prague International. https://ruski.radio.cz/deimperializaciya-i-deputinizaciya-v-prage-proshel-forum-svobodnyh-narodov-8756945
[3632] Report of the Ministry of Interior of the Czech Republic on manifestations of extremism and hatred, II half of 2023. (Projevy extremismu a předsudečné nenávisti. Souhranná situační zpráva 2. pololetí roku 2023) https://www.mvcr.cz/clanek/pololetni-zpravy-o-extremismu-odboru-bezpecnosti-politiky-mv.aspx
[3633] Report of the Ministry of Interior of the Czech Republic on manifestations of extremism and hatred, I half of 2024. (Projevy extremismu a předsudečné nenávisti. Souhranná situační zpráva 1. pololetí roku 2024) https://www.mvcr.cz/clanek/pololetni-zpravy-o-extremismu-odboru-bezpecnosti-politiky-mv.aspx
[3634] Concluding observations of the Committee against Torture on the 6th periodic report of the Czech Republic. May 2018.
[3635] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 12th and 13th periodic reports of the Czech Republic. August 2019.
[3636] Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee on the 4th periodic report of the Czech Republic. October 2019.
[3637] Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the 3rd periodic report of the Czech Republic. March 2022.
[3638] Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the 3rd periodic report of the Czech Republic. March 2022.
[3639] Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on the Czech Republic (sixth monitoring cycle). Adopted 1 October 2020, published 8 December 2020
https://rm.coe.int/ecri-6th-report-on-the-czech-republic/1680a0a086
[3640] Opinion of the Advisory Committee of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (5th cycle) on the Czech Republic. Adopted 31 May 2021, published 6 October 2021.
https://rm.coe.int/5th-op-czech-republic-en-restricted/1680a2b3d6
[3641] The highest instance of the EU Court of Justice whose decisions cannot be appealed against.
[3642] European Agency for Fundamental Rights. Overview of Antisemitic Incidents Recorded in the EU in 2012-2022. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2023-antisemitism-update-2012-2022_en.pdf
[3643] Jewish people’s experinces and perceptions of antisemitism. Third survey. The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. 2024. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2024-experiences-perceptions-antisemitism-survey_en.pdf
[3644] Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on the Czech Republic (sixth monitoring cycle). Adopted on 1 October 2020, published on 8 December 2020
https://rm.coe.int/ecri-6th-report-on-the-czech-republic/1680a0a086
[3645] Conclusions of the European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance on the Implementation of the Recommendations in Respect of the Czech Republic Subject to Interim Follow-up (sixth monitoring cycle). Adopted on 7 December 2022, published on 10 March 2023. https://rm.coe.int/ecri-conclusions-on-the-implementation-of-the-recommendation-in-respec/1680aa6865
[3646] Opinion of the Advisory Committee of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (5th cycle) on the Czech Republic. Adopted 31 May 2021, published 6 October 2021.
https://rm.coe.int/5th-op-czech-republic-en-restricted/1680a2b3d6
[3647] Concluding observations of the Committee against Torture on the 6th periodic report of the Czech Republic. May 2018
[3648] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 12th and 13th periodic reports of the Czech Republic. August 2019
[3649] Concluding Observations of the Human Rights on the 4th periodic report of the Czech Republic. October 2019.
[3650] Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the 3rd periodic report of the Czech Republic. March 2022.
[3651] The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report 2023.
[3652] Breakthrough necessary to ensure the equality and dignity of Roma people and people with disabilities in the Czech Republic. Press release of the Commissioner for Human Rights Dunja Mijatović following her five-day visit to the Czech Republic. 27 February 2023.
[3653] The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report 2023.
[3654] Ibid.
[3655] Česko na koberečku. Proč pořád diskriminujeme romské děti a co s tím. iRozhlas.cz. 15 March 2024. https://www.irozhlas.cz/zpravy-domov/cesko-na-koberecku-proc-porad-diskriminujeme-romske-deti-a-co-s-tim_2403150600_cen
[3656] Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee on the 4th periodic report of the Czech Republic. October 2019. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR/C/CZE/CO/4&Lang=Ru
[3657] Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the 3rd periodic report of the Czech Republic. March 2022.
https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=E%2fC.12%2fCZE%2fCO%2f3&Lang=ru
[3658] Concluding observations of the Committee on Enforced Disappearances on the initial report of the Czech Republic. September 2022. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CED%2FC%2FCZE%2FCO%2F1&Lang=ru
[3659] The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report 2023.
[3660] Beleaguered Swiss Bank Accused of Impeding Hunt for Accounts Linked to Nazis. The New York Times. 18 April 2023. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/18/us/credit-suisse-nazis.html
[3661] Ständerat fordert verbot von extremistischen Symbolen. The Swiss Parliament website. 20 December 2023.
https://www.parlament.ch/de/services/news/Seiten/2023/20231220100422436194158159038_bsd060.aspx
[3662] Nationalrat drängt auf rasches Hakenkreuzverbot. The Swiss Parliament website. 17 April 2024.
https://www.parlament.ch/de/services/news/Seiten/2024/20240417093227569194158159026_bsd040.aspx
[3663] Hate symbols banned by voters in Geneva. The European Jewish Congress website. 10 June 2024.
https://eurojewcong.org/news/communities-news/switzerland/hate-symbols-banned-by-voters-in-geneva/
[3664] The Swiss Federal Intelligence Service Report. 2023.
[3665] So gefährlich ist die rechtsextreme Organisation “Junge Tat”. SRF. 10 April 2024.
[3666] The Vision Remigration website. https://vision-remigration.ch/
[3667] Grenzt sich die Junge SVP zu wenig von Rechtsextremismus ab? Die SVP schweigt (nur einer nicht). NZZ.
4 April 2024.
[3668] Er wolle den Bundesrat einsperren, sagt er mit sanfter Stimme. Tages Anzeiger. 15 September 2023.
[3669] Aufrecht will nichts mehr mit Rimoldi zu tun haben – SVP liebäugelt weiter. Tages Anzeiger. 2 August 2023.
[3670] Der prominente Rechtsextremist Martin Sellner ist am Aargau von der Polizei mitgenommen worden – nun mischt sich Elon Musk ein. NZZ. 17 March 2024.
[3671] Nazi monument at Swiss cemetery sparks controversy. BBC. 2 April 2023.
[3672] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 10th to 12th periodic reports of Switzerland. December 2021. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD/C/CHE/CO/10-12&Lang=en
[3673] Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Switzerland (6th monitoring cycle). Adopted on 10 December 2019, published on 19 March 2020. https://rm.coe.int/ecri-report-on-switzerland-sixth-monitoring-cycle-/16809ce4bd
[3674] Fifth opinion of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities on Switzerland. Adopted on 13 February 2023. https://rm.coe.int/5th-op-switzerland-en/1680ab9e02
[3675] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 10th to 12th periodic reports of Switzerland. December 2021. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD/C/CHE/CO/10-12&Lang=en
[3676] Report of the OSCE/ODIHR Needs Assessment Mission to observe the Swiss parliamentary elections scheduled for 22 October 2023, p. 10.
[3677] Resultate der Erhebung “Diskriminierung und Rassismus in der Schweiz 2023”. 3 May 2024.
[3678] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 10th to 12th periodic reports of Switzerland. December 2021. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD/C/CHE/CO/10-12&Lang=en
[3679] Russia lodged a protest with Switzerland over the desecration of the monument. RBC. 14 October 2023.
https://www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/652aa07d9a7947ea2f20b053?from=article_body
[3680] “Es wäre ein politisches Konzert gewesen”. SRF. 3 May 2024.
https://www.srf.ch/news/schweiz/absage-von-anna-netrebko-es-waere-ein-politisches-konzert-gewesen
[3681] Antisemitismus-bericht. Stiftung gegen Rassismus und Antisemitismus. 2023.
https://swissjews.ch/de/downloads/berichte/antisemitismusbericht2023
[3682] Hass bei den einen, Solidarität bei den anderen. Blick. 17 November 2023.
[3683] Nach gewaltverherrlichenden Posts: Die Universität Bern entlässt einen Dozenten fristlos. NZZ. 17 October 2023.
https://www.nzz.ch/schweiz/universitaet-bern-entlaesst-dozent-nach-hamas-tweet-fristlos-ld.1761144
[3684] Keine Schlitten für Juden – jetzt ermittelt die Polizei. Tages Anzeiger. 12 February 2024.
https://www.tagesanzeiger.ch/davos-sie-vermieten-nicht-an-juden-712523122083
[3685] Davos introduced anti-Semitic rules.The Jewish.ru. 13 February 2024.
https://jewish.ru/ru/news/articles/204787/?ysclid=lslobvaeog15265235
[3686] IS-Messerattacke: Bundesrat Beat Jans besucht den beim Angriff in Zürich verletzten Juden. NZZ. 2 April 2024.
[3687] Antisemitismus-bericht. 2023.
https://swissjews.ch/de/downloads/berichte/antisemitismusbericht2023
[3688] Rassismusvorfälle aus der Beratungsarbeit. 2023.
[3689] Hass bei den einen, Solidarität bei den anderen. Blick. 17 November 2023.
[3690] Switzerland bans face coverings. RBC. 21 September 2023.
[3691] UN: Niqab ban in Switzerland will further marginalise Muslim women. UN News. 9 March 2021.
[3692] Fourth opinion of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities on Switzerland. Adopted on 31 May 2018.
https://rm.coe.int/4th-advisory-committee-opinion-on-switzerland-english-language-version/16809002ca
[3693] Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the 4th periodic report of Switzerland. October 2019. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=E%2fC.12%2fCHE%2fCO%2f4&Lang=en
[3694] Fifth opinion of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities on Switzerland. Adopted on 13 February 2023. https://rm.coe.int/5th-op-switzerland-en/1680ab9e02
[3695] Fourth opinion of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities on Switzerland. Adopted on 31 May 2018.
https://rm.coe.int/4th-advisory-committee-opinion-on-switzerland-english-language-version/16809002ca
[3696] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 10th to 12th periodic reports of Switzerland. December 2021. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD/C/CHE/CO/10-12&Lang=en
[3697] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 10th to 12th periodic reports of Switzerland. December 2021. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD/C/CHE/CO/10-12&Lang=en
[3698] Statement to the media by the UN Working Group of Experts on People of African Descent, on the conclusion of its official visit to Switzerland (17–26 January 2022).
[3699] My name is Brian: the prisoner whose treatment put Switzerland on trial. The Guardian. 19 July 2022.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jul/19/brian-keller-switzerland-prisoner-isolation-racism
[3700] Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.
[3701] Switzerland: Solitary confinement of Brian K. violates Convention against Torture, UN expert says.
[3702] Repeat offender Brian back in Swiss custody following brawl. Swissinfo.ch. 3 May 2024.
https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/democracy/brian-keller-in-police-custody-following-brawl/76878728
[3703] Swiss repeat offender Brian Keller released from custody. Swissinfo.ch. 24 July 2024.
[3704] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 10th to 12th periodic reports of Switzerland. December 2021. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD/C/CHE/CO/10-12&Lang=en
[3705] Europäischer Gerichtshof verurteilt Schweiz wegen Diskriminierung. Tages Anzeiger. 20 February 2024.
[3706] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 10th to 12th periodic reports of Switzerland. December 2021. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD/C/CHE/CO/10-12&Lang=en
[3707] Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Switzerland (6th monitoring cycle). Adopted on 10 December 2019, published on 19 March 2020. https://rm.coe.int/ecri-report-on-switzerland-sixth-monitoring-cycle-/16809ce4bd
[3708] Concluding observations of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on the implementation of the recommendations in respect of Switzerland subject to interim Follow-up. Adopted on 29 June 2022, published on 20 September 2022.
https://rm.coe.int/ecri-conclusions-on-the-implementation-of-the-recommendations-in-respe/1680a807d1
[3710] The Nordic Resistance Movement. Report. The Anti-Defamation League. 5 March 2022. https://www.adl.org/resources/report/nordic-resistance-movement
[3711] Swedish NRM neo-Nazis export bigoted antisemitism to other countries. STMEGI. 31 March 2022. https://stmegi.com/posts/97379/shvedskie-neonatsisty-iz-nrm-eksportiruyut-fanatichnyy-antisemitizm-v-drugie-strany/
[3713] The Nordic Resistance Movement. Report.The Anti-Defamation League. 5 March 2022. https://www.adl.org/resources/report/nordic-resistance-movement
[3714] Investigators find mass arsenal, preparations for terrorism, inside Swedish neo-Nazi's farmhouse. Daily COS. 1 June 2022. https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2022/5/31/2101511/-Swedish-neo-Nazi-s-farmhouse-contained-arsenal-of-weapons-preparations-just-like-Breivik-s
[3715] It is also known that contacts between extreme right-wing groups from different states have intensified, and the media have published information about the opening of a "branch" of the American far-right organization "Alt-right" in Sweden. See, for example https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/lesterfeder/how-sweden-became-the-most-alt-right-country-in-europe (archived copy available at: https://yandexwebcache.net/yandbtm?fmode=inject&tm=1723194179&tld=ru&lang=en&la=1722077440&text=sweden+alt+right&url=https%3A//www.buzzfeednews.com/article/lesterfeder/how-sweden-became-the-most-alt-right-country-in-europe&l10n=ru&mime=html&sign=a79a50ee7dbb6dbea3a447980f1026cb&keyno=0), https://www.mediamatters.org/breitbart-news/sweden-gateway-alt-right-anti-immigrant-agenda-europe
[3716] Elever åtalas för hets mot folkgrupp – hyllade Hitler. SkLT. 5 November 2019. https://www.skaraborgslanstidning.se/2019-11-05/elever-atalas-for-hets-mot-folkgrupp--hyllade-hitler
[3717] Känd nazist dömd – hyllade Adolf Hitler. Expressen. 27 November 2019. https://www.expressen.se/kvallsposten/krim/kand-nazist-domd-hyllade-adolf-hitler/
[3718] Dömd nazist fortsätter att sprida judehat. EXPO. 3 March 2020. https://expo.se/2020/03/nazist-sprida-judehat
[3719] Kvinna i 60-årsåldern hyllade Hitler. KT Kuriren. 9 April 2020. https://www.kt-kuriren.se/2020/04/09/kvinna-i-60-arsaldern-hyllade-hitler-eaadf/
[3720] Paludan får bränna koran utanför Turkiets ambassad. Aftonbladet. 20 January 2023. https://www.aftonbladet.se/nyheter/a/MoPQb5/paludan-far-branna-koran-utanfor-turkiets-ambassad
[3721] Polisen nekar tillstånd till ny koranbrännin. Dagens Nyheter. 8 February 2023. https://www.dn.se/sverige/polisen-nekar-tillstand-till-ny-koranbranning/
[3723] Hatbrottsstatistik, Brottsförebyggande rådet. https://bra.se/statistik, October 2023.
[3724] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 22nd and 23rd periodic reports of Sweden. May 2018.
[3725] Concluding observations of the Committee against Torture on the 8th periodic report of Sweden. November 2021. https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G21/381/20/PDF/G2138120.pdf?OpenElement
[3726] Concluding observations of the Committee against Torture on the 8th periodic report of Sweden. December 2021.
[3727] The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report 2019. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2019-fundamental-rights-report-2019_en.pdf
[3728] Sweden should step up efforts to fight systemic racism, UN Mechanism to Advance Racial Justice says after 5‑day visit. OHCHR website Press release. 4 November 2022. https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/11/sweden-should-step-efforts-fight-systemic-racism-un-mechanism-advance-racial
The Mechanism was established by the Human Rights Council in 2021. Its mandate under the founding Resolution 47/21 is to examine systemic racism experienced by Africans and people of African descent, the excessive use of force against them, the causes of this phenomenon, as well as to compile statistics and make recommendations to ensure further transformative change for racial justice and equality in the context of law enforcement globally.
[3729] The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report 2023. http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2023-fundamental-rights-report-2023_en_1.pdf
[3730] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination upon consideration of the combined 22nd and 23rd periodic reports of Sweden. May 2018.
[3731] Concluding observations of the Committee against Torture on the combined 6th and 7th periodic reports of Sweden. November 2014 https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CAT%2fC%2fSWE%2fCO%2f6-7&Lang=en
[3732] Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee on the 7th periodic report of Sweden. March 2016 https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2fC%2fSWE%2fCO%2f7&Lang=en
[3733] Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the 6th periodic report of Sweden. June 2016 https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=E%2fC.12%2fSWE%2fCO%2f6&Lang=en
[3734] The next decision adopted by the Human Rights Committee on 1 April 2019 CCPR/C/SR.3239 https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CCPR/Shared%20Documents/SWE/INT_CCPR_FUD_SWE_34519_E.pdf
[3735] Concluding observations of the Committee against Torture on the eighth periodic report of Sweden. November 2021 https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G21/381/20/PDF/G2138120.pdf?OpenElement
[3736] Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Sweden (fifth monitoring cycle). Adopted on 5 December 2017, published on 27 February 2018. https://rm.coe.int/fifth-report-on-sweden/16808b5c58
[3737] The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report 2022. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2022-fundamental-rights-report-2022_en.pdf
[3738] The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report 2023. http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2023-fundamental-rights-report-2023_en_1.pdf
[3739] Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the 7th periodic report of Sweden. March 2024 https://www.undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=E%2FC.12%2FSWE%2FCO%2F7&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False
[3740] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 22nd and 23rd periodic reports of Sweden. May 2018 https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2fC%2fSWE%2fCO%2f22-23&Lang=en
[3741] Report of the Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Human Rights Council on freedom of religion or belief, Nazila Ghanea, following a visit to Sweden on 11-20 October 2023, at the 55th session of the UN Human Rights Council. April 2024 https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/g24/035/63/pdf/g2403563.pdf?token=QtidEuhpTVovkD8Trt&fe=true
[3742] Neo-Nazi Nordic Resistance Movement targets Jews on Yom Kippur. The Jerusalem Post. 30 September 2020 https://www.jpost.com/diaspora/neo-nazi-nordic-resistance-movement-targets-jews-on-yom-kippur-643809
[3743] Swedish neo-Nazis disrupt exhibition of Holocaust survivors' portraits. The Times of Israel. 3 July 2019 https://www.timesofisrael.com/swedish-neo-nazis-disrupt-exhibition-of-holocaust-survivors-portraits/
[3744] Baby dolls splashed with red paint strung outside Swedish synagogue. The Times of Israel. 1 April 2021 https://www.timesofisrael.com/baby-dolls-splashed-with-red-paint-strung-outside-swedish-synagogue/
[3745] As Israel and Hamas Fight in Gaza, Antisemitism Explodes Online in Sweden. Haaretz. 20 May 2021 https://www.haaretz.com/world-news/europe/.premium-as-israel-and-hamas-fight-in-gaza-antisemitism-explodes-online-in-sweden-1.9828015
[3746] Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Sweden (fifth monitoring cycle), adopted on 5 December 2017, published on 27 February 2018 https://rm.coe.int/fifth-report-on-sweden/16808b5c58
[3747] The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report 2019. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2019-fundamental-rights-report-2019_en.pdf
[3748] Jewish people’s experinces and perceptions of antisemitism. Third survey. The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. 2024. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2024-experiences-perceptions-antisemitism-survey_en.pdf
[3749] European Agency for Fundamental Rights. Overview of Antisemitic Incidents Recorded in the EU in 2011-2021 http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2022-antisemitism-overview-2011-2021_en.pdf
[3750] Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Sweden (fifth monitoring cycle), adopted on 5 December 2017, published on 27 February 2018 https://rm.coe.int/fifth-report-on-sweden/16808b5c58
[3751] Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee on the 7th periodic report of Sweden. March 2016 https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2fC%2fSWE%2fCO%2f7&Lang=en
[3752] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 22nd and 23rd periodic reports of Sweden. May 2018 https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2fC%2fSWE%2fCO%2f22-23&Lang=en
[3753] Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the 7th periodic report of Sweden. March 2024 https://www.undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=E%2FC.12%2FSWE%2FCO%2F7&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False
[3754] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 22nd and 23rd periodic reports of Sweden. May 2018 https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2fC%2fSWE%2fCO%2f22-23&Lang=en
[3755] Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee on the 7th periodic report of Sweden. March 2016 https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2fC%2fSWE%2fCO%2f7&Lang=en
[3756] https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/10/sweden-must-strengthen-dialogue-faith-communities-combat-religious-or-belief
[3757] https://www.ohchr.org/en/media-advisories/2023/10/un-expert-freedom-religion-or-belief-visit-sweden
[3758] Report of the Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Human Rights Council on freedom of religion or belief, Nazila Ghanea, following a visit to Sweden on 11-20 October 2023, at the 55th session of the UN Human Rights Council. April 2024 https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/g24/035/63/pdf/g2403563.pdf?token=QtidEuhpTVovkD8Trt&fe=true
[3759] The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report 2021. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2021-fundamental-rights-report-2021_en.pdf
[3760] Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee on the 7th periodic report of Sweden. March 2016 https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2fC%2fSWE%2fCO%2f7&Lang=en
[3761] Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the 6th periodic report of Sweden. June 2016 https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=E%2fC.12%2fSWE%2fCO%2f6&Lang=en
[3762] Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the 7th periodic report of Sweden. March 2024 https://www.undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=E%2FC.12%2FSWE%2FCO%2F7&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False
[3763] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 22nd and 23rd periodic reports of Sweden. May 2018 https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2fC%2fSWE%2fCO%2f22-23&Lang=en
[3764] The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report 2021. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2021-fundamental-rights-report-2021_en.pdf
[3765] Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Sweden (fifth monitoring cycle), adopted on 5 December 2017, published on 27 February 2018 https://rm.coe.int/fifth-report-on-sweden/16808b5c58
[3766] The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report 2019. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2019-fundamental-rights-report-2019_en.pdf
[3767] Arbetslöshe – utrikes födda. Ekonomifakta. https://www.ekonomifakta.se/fakta/arbetsmarknad/integration/arbetsloshet-utrikes-fodda/
[3768] The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report 2023. http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2023-fundamental-rights-report-2023_en_1.pdf
[3769] The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report 2022. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2022-fundamental-rights-report-2022_en.pdf
[3770] Concluding observations of the Committee against Torture on the combined 6th and 7th periodic reports of Sweden. November 2014 https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CAT%2fC%2fSWE%2fCO%2f6-7&Lang=en
[3771] Concluding observations of the Committee against Torture on the eighth periodic report of Sweden. December 2021 https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CAT%2FC%2FSWE%2FCO%2F8&Lang=en
[3772] Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee on the 7th periodic report of Sweden. March 2016 https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2fC%2fSWE%2fCO%2f7&Lang=en
[3773] Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the 6th periodic report of Sweden. June 2016 https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=E%2fC.12%2fSWE%2fCO%2f6&Lang=en
[3774] The follow-up decision adopted by the Human Rights Committee on 1 April 2019 CCPR/C/SR.3239 https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CCPR/Shared%20Documents/SWE/INT_CCPR_FUD_SWE_34519_E.pdf
[3775] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child on the combined 6th and 7th periodic reports of Sweden. February 2023 https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CRC%2FC%2FSWE%2FCO%2F6-7&Lang=en
[3776] Larsson Taghizadeh, J. (2022), ‘Are more affluent parents treated more favourably by elementary school principals? Socioeconomic discrimination among local Swedish public officials', Local Government Studies, doi:10.1080/03003930.2021.1986391. // The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report 2023. http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2023-fundamental-rights-report-2023_en_1.pdf
[3777] Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the 7th periodic report of Sweden. March 2024 https://www.undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=E%2FC.12%2FSWE%2FCO%2F7&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False
[3778] Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the 7th periodic report of Sweden. March 2024 https://www.undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=E%2FC.12%2FSWE%2FCO%2F7&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False
[3779] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child on the combined 6th and 7th periodic reports of Sweden. February 2023 https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CRC%2FC%2FSWE%2FCO%2F6-7&Lang=en
[3780] Svenska skattebetalare finansierade Putinpropaganda – nu stoppas pengarna. Dagens Nyheter. 25 September 2023 www.dn.se
[3781] Ukrainska kvinnor tvingas sälja sex i Sverige. Aftonbladet. 12 December 2022 https://www.aftonbladet.se/nyheter/a/VPg1Rp/krig-da-koper-svenska-mannen-sex-av-ukrainskor-200-sekunder
[3782] The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report 2023. http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2023-fundamental-rights-report-2023_en_1.pdf
[3783] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child on the combined 6th and 7th periodic reports of Sweden. February 2023 https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CRC%2FC%2FSWE%2FCO%2F6-7&Lang=en
[3784] Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the 7th periodic report of Sweden. March 2024 https://www.undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=E%2FC.12%2FSWE%2FCO%2F7&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False
[3785] The gaps in legal protection of Sámi land use rights in Sweden and their vulnerability to these kinds of problems are examined using the situation around the Kallak mining projects (one of the biggest undeveloped iron ore deposits in Europe) in the province of Norrbotten in northern Sweden, where a large part of the Sámi population lives. See A. Tsiouvalas. Indigenous rights to defend land and traditional activities: a case study of the Sami in Northern Sweden // Revista de Direito da Faculdade Guanambi. 2018, Volume 5, Nº 1.
[3786] Sweden: Open pit mine will endanger indigenous lands and the environment – UN expert. HRC Special procedures' press release. 10 February 2022 https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/02/sweden-open-pit-mine-will-endanger-indigenous-lands-and-environment-un
[3787] Samiska protester mot gruvnäringen i Kiruna: "Greenwashing på elitnivå". SVT Nyheter. 13 January 2023 https://www.svt.se/nyheter/lokalt/norrbotten/sameprotest-mot-gruvnaringen-i-kiruna-sveriges-jakt-pa-grona-metaller-ar-skamlos
[3788] "The Equator Principles" are a set of voluntary principles developed and adopted in 2003 by some banks belonging to the world's largest financial market players to assess the environmental and social risks of project finance. They have subsequently been joined by others.
[3789] Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee on the 7th periodic report of Sweden. March 2016 https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2fC%2fSWE%2fCO%2f7&Lang=en
[3790] Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the 6th periodic report of Sweden. June 2016 https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=E%2fC.12%2fSWE%2fCO%2f6&Lang=en
[3791] Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the 7th periodic report of Sweden. March 2024 https://www.undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=E%2FC.12%2FSWE%2FCO%2F7&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False
[3792] Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Sweden (fifth monitoring cycle), adopted on 5 December 2017, published on 27 February 2018 https://rm.coe.int/fifth-report-on-sweden/16808b5c58
[3793] Waffen-SS is recognized as criminal by the Nuremberg Tribunal
[3794] Baltic presidents come out again with lies about Soviet deportations. Website of the "Remembrance, Research and Justice: Heritage of WWII in the 21st Century" project, 15 June 2021. https://remembrance.ru/2021/06/15/pribaltijskie-prezidenty-vnov-vystupili-s-lozhju-o-sovetskih-deportacijah/ (in Russian)
[3795] Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Estonia (sixth monitoring cycle). Adopted on 29 March 2022, published on 9 June 2022. https://rm.coe.int/6th-ecri-report-on-estonia/1680a6d5e6
[3796] https://ee.sputniknews.ru/estonian_news/20190727/17357965/pamjatj-Estonia-esesovtsy-Sinimae-pochtili-deputaty-i-voennyje.html
[3797] https://rossaprimavera.ru/news/8db1bfa4 (in Russian)
[3798] https://lt.sputniknews.ru/20230730/v-estonii-proshel-ezhegodnyy-slet-byvshikh-voennykh-ss-pishut-smi-29818035.html?ysclid=lmx4777aa3962840809 (in Russian)
[3799] https://rus.err.ee/1609408996/v-sinimjaje-pochtili-pamjat-pogibshih-v-bojah-1944-goda
[3800] https://forward.com/news/462696/nazi-collaborator-monuments-in-estonia/
[3801] "Nazi goods" market discovered at the NATO base in Estonia. Sputnik. Estonia, 29 July 2019 https://ee.sputniknews.ru/estonian_news/20190729/17393648/Na-baze-NATO-v-Estonii-raskryli-rynok-natsistskoy-produktsii.html (in Russian).
[3802] "Magnet with a Nazi's smile and beer with the smell of swastika: a dangerous path of the Baltic states" Sputnik. Latvia, 29 July 2019. https://lv.sputniknews.ru/Baltics/20190728/12144422/Magnitik-s-ulybkoy-natsista-i-pivo-s-zapakhom-svastiki-opasnyy-put-stran-Baltii.html (in Russian)
[3803] "Erna's Hiking Campaign – Estonian youth will again follow the footsteps of Hitler's saboteurs" Sputnik. Estonia 31 July 2019. https://ee.sputniknews.ru/estonian_news/20190731/17413874/pohod-Erna--estonskaja-molodjozh-projdet-sledy-diversanty-Hitler.html (in Russian)
[3805] https://forward.com/news/462696/nazi-collaborator-monuments-in-estonia/
[3806] https://regnum.ru/news/polit/3666989.html (in Russian)
[3807] Monument to the Forest Brothers is unveiled in Estonia in the presence of the former Foreign Minister Reinsalu. EurAsia Daily. 23 August 2021 https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2021/08/23/v-estonii-v-prisutstvii-eks-glavy-mida-reynsalu-otkryli-pamyatnik-lesnym-bratyam (in Russian)
[3808] https://regnum.ru/news/polit/3666989.html (in Russian)
[3809] https://topwar.ru/146030-v-es-fashizma-net-no-v-jestonii-vosstanavlivajut-pamjatniki-nacistam.html (in Russian)
[3811] https://rus.postimees.ee/7667704/galereya-na-kladbishche-koze-s-pochestyami-perezahoronili-treh-lesnyh-bratev (in Russian)
[3812] https://rus.postimees.ee/7673538/kolonka-zhurnalista-rasistskiy-vypad-deputata-riygikogu-portit-druzhbu-estonii-s-franciey-i-ugodil-v-mirovoy-kontekst (in Russian)
[3813] https://limon.postimees.ee/7705482/on-opyat-za-svoe-mestnyy-adolf-gitler-zamechennyy-na-fakelnom-shestvii-vozbudil-narod (in Russian)
[3814] https://rus.delfi.ee/statja/120138966/s-ruzhem-napereves-na-toompea-predvybornaya-kampaniya-reformista-eerika-niylesa-krossa-vyzvala-negodovanie (in Russian)
[3815] Russian diplomats were outraged by the Russophobic lampoon of the Estonian media in the lead-up to 9 May. Sputnik Meedia. 8 May 2021. https://sputnik-meedia.ee/Estonian_news/20210508/421738/diplomaty-rf-vozmutilis-rusofobskij-paskvil-estonskoje-izdaniye-kanun-9-may.html (in Russian)
[3816] The bottom has dropped out: the Russian Embassy commented on the Postimees' publication Sputnik Meedia. 12 May 2021. https://sputnik-meedia.ee/Estonian_news/20210512/445352/Pochva-ushla-iz-pod-nog-Posolstvo-RF-prokommentirovalo-publikatsiyu-Postimees.html (in Russian)
[3817] https://regnum.ru/news/polit/3666989.html (in Russian)
[3818] European Agency for Fundamental Rights. Overview of Antisemitic Incidents Recorded in the EU in 2011-2021. http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2022-antisemitism-overview-2011-2021_en.pdf
[3819] European Agency for Fundamental Rights. Overview of Antisemitic Incidents Recorded in the EU in 2012 – 2022. http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2023-antisemitism-update-2012-2022_en.pdf
[3820] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/02032021-posolstvo-rf-v-estonii-potrebovalo-nayti-vandalov-oskvernivshikh-tankpamyatnik-pod-narvoy/ (in Russian)
[3821] Monument to the victims of the Nazis in Tallinn was smeared with chicken eggs. RuBaltic. 10 April 2021. https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/10042021-pamyatnik-zhertvam-fashistov-v-talline-izmazali-kurinymi-yaytsami/ (in Russian).
[3822] https://www.ritmeurasia.org/news--2021-10-22--sovetskie-pamjatniki-v-estonii-nenavistny-vandalam-gosudarstvennym-i-chastnym-56993 (in Russian)
[3823] https://iz.ru/1432352/viktor-nedelin/vandaly-v-zakone-estoniia-obiavila-voinu-sovetskim-pamiatnikam
[3824] In the spring of 2023, the country's President Alar Karis rejected the law to dismantle the Soviet monuments, noting that the ban is formulated "vaguely", and the first article of the law is "legally unclear" and contradicts the country's Constitution. On 27 September 2023, the Estonian Parliament refused to adopt the law for the second time.
[3825] https://ren.tv/news/v-mire/1003115-v-estonii-do-kontsa-goda-snesut-vse-pamiatniki-sovetskim-voinam (in Russian)
[3826] https://rus.postimees.ee/7579463/pamyatnik-istoriya-propaganda-i-element-landshafta (in Russian)
[3829] https://rus.err.ee/1608792445/komissija-goskanceljarii-78-iz-322-sovetskih-monumentov-mogut-byt-sohraneny-na-nyneshnem-meste
[3835] https://iz.ru/1432352/viktor-nedelin/vandaly-v-zakone-estoniia-obiavila-voinu-sovetskim-pamiatnikam
[3836] Ibid.
[3837] https://rus.postimees.ee/7713483/riygikogu-prinyal-zakonoproekt-o-snose-sovetskih-pamyatnikov
[3838] https://www.gazeta.ru/politics/news/2023/09/27/21378877.shtml?ysclid=ln6gox9oij124568211&updated (in Russian)
[3839] https://www.rubaltic.ru/article/politika-i-obshchestvo/20230803-korichneveyut-na-glazakh-vlasti-estonii-perestali-skryvat-svoi-politicheskie-predpochteniya/ (in Russian)
[3840] https://rus.err.ee/1608600292/v-volosti-ljajeneranna-s-kladbiwa-propal-pamjatnik-sovetskim-voinam
[3841] https://novayagazeta.ee/articles/2022/06/29/mertvye-dolzhny-byt-na-kladbishche-tolko-gde-oni-eti-mertvye (in Russian)
[3842] https://baltija.eu/2022/06/30/v-estonii-unichtozhen-pamyatnik-general-majoru-potapovu-kotoryj-spas-gorod-elva-video/
[3843] The monument dismantlement was reported to the Embassy by veterans' organization representatives
[3846] https://rus.postimees.ee/7585385/ne-tolko-tank-kakie-eshche-sovetskie-pamyatniki-segodnya-snesli
[3847] https://rus.postimees.ee/7585385/ne-tolko-tank-kakie-eshche-sovetskie-pamyatniki-segodnya-snesli
[3848] https://rus.postimees.ee/7585385/ne-tolko-tank-kakie-eshche-sovetskie-pamyatniki-segodnya-snesli
[3849] https://rus.postimees.ee/7585385/ne-tolko-tank-kakie-eshche-sovetskie-pamyatniki-segodnya-snesli
[3850] https://rus.postimees.ee/7585385/ne-tolko-tank-kakie-eshche-sovetskie-pamyatniki-segodnya-snesli
[3851] https://rus.postimees.ee/7585501/galereya-v-narve-snyali-pyatikonechnuyu-zvezdu-i-pamyatnuyu-dosku-s-ocherednogo-sovetskogo-monumenta
[3852] This case was reported to the Embassy by veterans' organization representatives
[3858] https://rus.postimees.ee/7614331/sovetskiy-pamyatnik-v-karksi-nuyya-ischez-zagadochnym-obrazom
[3863] https://baltija.eu/2022/07/13/v-rakvere-nachalis-raskopki-na-meste-bratskoj-mogiloj-krasnoarmejczev/
[3864] https://rus.postimees.ee/7564580/pamyatnik-i-mogilu-v-vyzu-likvidirovali-tak-zhe-bystro-kak-nakanune-v-rakvere
[3865] https://rus.postimees.ee/7573031/galereya-ocherednaya-bratskaya-mogila-sovetskogo-vremeni-ischezla-tiho-i-nezametno
[3867] https://rus.postimees.ee/7640312/iz-bratskih-mogil-izvlekli-ostanki-polusotni-pavshih-sovetskih-soldat
[3868] https://rus.err.ee/1608710476/na-hijumaa-poka-perenesli-tolko-odin-sovetskij-voennyj-pamjatnik
[3869] https://rus.err.ee/1608749356/ostanki-soldat-i-grazhdanskih-lic-iz-mogily-v-raadi-perezahoronili-v-raznyh-koncah-kladbiwa
[3870] https://rus.err.ee/1608749356/ostanki-soldat-i-grazhdanskih-lic-iz-mogily-v-raadi-perezahoronili-v-raznyh-koncah-kladbiwa
[3871] https://rus.postimees.ee/7648140/galereya-ostanki-iz-sovetskoy-bratskoy-mogily-perezahoronili-v-kolga-yaani
[3872] https://rus.postimees.ee/7648140/galereya-ostanki-iz-sovetskoy-bratskoy-mogily-perezahoronili-v-kolga-yaani
[3873] https://rus.postimees.ee/7640312/iz-bratskih-mogil-izvlekli-ostanki-polusotni-pavshih-sovetskih-soldat
[3874] https://rus.postimees.ee/7640312/iz-bratskih-mogil-izvlekli-ostanki-polusotni-pavshih-sovetskih-soldat
[3876] https://rus.err.ee/1608782674/v-jelva-pristupili-k-raskopkam-voinskogo-zahoronenija-rjadom-so-shkoloj
[3877] https://rus.postimees.ee/7660229/sovetskie-pamyatniki-ischezli-iz-tapa-i-tamsalu
[3878] https://baltija.eu/2022/03/06/vandaly-oskvernili-zahoronenie-sovetskih-soldat-v-estonskom-rakvere/
[3879] https://rus.postimees.ee/7558063/fotofakt-kto-raskolol-v-rakvere-klumby-na-mogile-sovetskih-soldat
[3881] The second case of desecration was reported to the Embassy by representatives of a veterans' organisation.
[3882] https://rus.err.ee/1608561364/v-otepja-pamjatnik-vtoroj-mirovoj-vojny-razukrasili-v-cveta-ukrainskogo-flaga
[3883] https://rus.postimees.ee/7514398/chelovek-spilivshiy-orden-s-bronzovogo-soldata-mne-bolno-videt-v-gorode-russkogo-soldata
[3884] The second incident of desecration was reported by Embassy diplomats during an inspection of the Cemetery.
[3885] This incident was reported by Embassy diplomats during an inspection of the cemetery.
[3887] Three other cases of desecration were reported to the Embassy by representatives of a veterans' organisation.
[3888] This case was reported to the Embassy by representatives of a veterans' organisation.
[3889] This case was reported to the Embassy by representatives of a veterans' organisation.
[3890] https://rus.delfi.ee/statja/96597931/vandal-oskvernivshiy-memorial-pavshim-vo-vtoroy-mirovoy-voyne-v-tartu-dobrovolno-sdalsya-vlastyam
[3891] The second case of desecration was reported to the Embassy by representatives of a veterans' organisation
[3894] https://rus.postimees.ee/7541828/foto-akt-vandalizma-sovetskiy-voennyy-pamyatnik-okrasili-v-cveta-ukrainskogo-flaga
[3895] https://rus.err.ee/1608687016/na-kladbiwe-v-tjuri-pamjatnik-na-mogile-pavshih-krasnoarmejcev-raskrasili-v-sine-zheltye-cveta
[3896] https://rus.postimees.ee/7580721/vandala-oskvernivshego-pamyatnik-krasnoarmeycam-zhdet-ugolovnoe-nakazanie
[3897] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/080822-pravyashchaya-koalitsiya-v-narve-prinyala-reshenie-o-perenose-sovetskogo-pamyatnikatanka/
[3898] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/11082022-izvestny-rezultaty-oprosa-zhiteley-narvy-o-dalneyshey-sudbe-sovetskogo-pamyatnikatanka/
[3901]https://www.rubaltic.ru/article/politika-i-obshchestvo/20230803-korichneveyut-na-glazakh-vlasti-estonii-perestali-skryvat-svoi-politicheskie-predpochteniya/
[3905] Ibid.
[3906] https://rus.delfi.ee/statja/120140868/video-perehod-na-estonskiy-yazyk-rossiyskaya-propaganda-sovetskie-pamyatniki-pravitelstvo-rasskazalo-o-svoih-novyh-resheniyah
[3907] https://rus.err.ee/1608878522/ministerstvo-oborony-prosit-vydelit-1-42-mln-evro-na-demontazh-sovetskih-pamjatnikov
[3908] https://rus.err.ee/1608906860/prezident-ne-provozglasil-tak-nazyvaemyj-zakon-o-sovetskih-pamjatnikah
[3909] https://estonia.mid.ru/ru/press-centre/news/kommentariy_posolstva_v_svyazi_s_planami_po_oskverneniyu_zakhoroneniy_krasnoarmeytsev_na_tallinskom_/
[3910] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/01022024-sledkom-rossii-otreagiroval-na-plany-tallina-oskvernit-mogily-sovetskikh-voinov/
[3911] https://baltija.eu/2024/05/09/v-estonii-v-publichnom-prostranstve-ostalos-vsego-24-pamyatnika-voinam-osvoboditelyam/
[3913] https://ren.tv/news/v-mire/1236102-demontazh-nadgrobii-sovetskikh-soldat-nachali-na-ostrove-saaremaa
[3914] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/02072024-rossiya-vyrazila-protest-estonii-izza-perenosa-zakhoroneniy-sovetskikh-voinov/
[3917] https://rus.postimees.ee/7953504/rassledovanie-kapo-zakaz-na-oskvernenie-pamyatnikov-v-sinimyae-mog-postupit-iz-rossii
[3918] Alfons Rebane was in the service of the Nazis in various SS units since 1941. By the end of the war he had the rank of Standartenführer (Colonel), was commander of the 20th SS Division and had a Knight's Cross with oak leaves. Alfons Rebane was the only Estonian to receive oak leaves to the Knight's Cross. After the war, the SS serviceman found asylum in Great Britain, and from 1961 he lived in the Federal Republic of Germany. He died in March 1976. In June 1999, with the direct participation of the Estonian Foreign Ministry and the financial support of the Estonian government, the ashes of the Nazi criminal were transported from Germany and reburied in the Tallinn cemetery with all military honours. The ceremony was attended by the then Minister of Defence Andrus Öövel, Lieutenant General Johannes Kertcommander of the Estonian Defence Forces, many officers, members of parliament and veterans of the Union of Estonian Freedom Fighters. A black granite monument was unveiled on the grave with the inscription: "To the holder of the Knight's Cross with Oak Leaves." (http://old.redstar.ru/2004/05/28_05/7_15.html)
[3920] https://rus.postimees.ee/7770755/vandalizm-v-ida-virumaa-oskverneny-pamyatniki-estonskim-soldatam
[3921] https://rus.postimees.ee/7950975/zloumyshlenniki-snova-oskvernili-memorial-pavshim-v-voyne-v-sinimyae
[3922] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/12092023-sk-rossii-zaochno-obvinil-grazhdan-stran-baltii-i-polshi-v-oskvernenii-sovetskikh-pamyatnikov/
[3924] Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Estonia (sixth monitoring cycle). Adopted on 29 March 2022, published on 9 June 2022. https://rm.coe.int/6th-ecri-report-on-estonia/1680a6d5e6
[3925] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 10th and 11th periodic reports of Estonia. August 2014 https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2fC%2fEST%2fCO%2f10-11&Lang=ru
[3926] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined 12th and 13th reports of Estonia. April 2022 https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2FC%2FEST%2FCO%2F12-13&Lang=ru
[3927] Concluding observations of the Committee for Human Rights on the fourth periodic report of Estonia. March 2019. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2fC%2fEST%2fCO%2f4&Lang=ru
[3928] https://news.err.ee/1153405/european-commission-launches-infringement-proceedings-against-estonia
[3929] The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights Report 2021. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2021-fundamental-rights-report-2021_en.pdf
[3930] Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Estonia (sixth monitoring cycle). Adopted on 29 March 2022, published on 9 June 2022. https://rm.coe.int/6th-ecri-report-on-estonia/1680a6d5e6
[3931] "Non-citizens" in Estonia are officially referred to as "persons of undetermined citizenship." A non-citizen passport is referred to as an "alien's passport."
[3932] This name was given by the colour of the passport cover.
[3933] As of 1 July 2015, individuals who have passed the Estonian language proficiency test successfully will be reimbursed for the course of language learning.
[3934] Article 8 of the Federal Law on Citizenship of the Russian Federation states as follows: "Child's citizenship of the Russian Federation shall not be terminated if such termination results in his/her statelessness." This norm thus constitutes a legal safeguard aimed at preventing statelessness.
[3935] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child on the combined second to fourth periodic reports of Estonia. January 2017 https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CRC%2fC%2fEST%2fCO%2f2-4&Lang=ru
[3936] https://rm.coe.int/report-of-the-council-of-europe-commissioner-for-human-rights-dunja-mi/16808d77f4
[3937] Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the third periodic report of Estonia. February 2019 https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=E%2fC.12%2fEST%2fCO%2f3&Lang=ru
[3938] Concluding observations of the Committee for Human Rights on the fourth periodic report of Estonia. March 2019 https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2fC%2fEST%2fCO%2f4&Lang=ru
[3939] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined tenth and eleventh periodic reports of Estonia. August 2024 https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2fC%2fEST%2fCO%2f10-11&Lang=ru
[3940] The Preamble of the 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Estonia stipulates that "the state... must guarantee the preservation of the Estonian people, the Estonian language and the Estonian culture through the ages".
[3942] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/28122022-premer-estonii-dlya-bezopasnosti-strany-nuzhno-otkazatsya-ot-russkoyazychnogo-obrazovaniya/
[3943] Adopted by the Estonian Parliament on 12 December 2022.
[3944] Essentially a repressive institution that until 1 August 2020 was called the language inspectorate. After it was renamed it received expanded functionality, including language policy-making authority.
[3945] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/17122022-ministr-obrazovaniya-estonii-utverdil-plan-perevoda-russkikh-shkol-na-estonskiy-yazyk/
[3946] https://iz.ru/1443747/khariton-galitckii/iz-uchitelei-v-kassiry-kak-estoniia-likvidiruet-russkie-shkoly
[3947] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/22122022-zakharova-vlasti-estonii-obyavili-voynu-vsemu-russkomu/
[3949] Human rights in Estonia. Russian schools. REGNUM. 10 August 2021 https://regnum.ru/news/polit/3338792.html
[3950] The attitude towards Russians is outrageous: school director about reform in Estonia's Ida-Virumaa. Sputnik Meedia. 3 March 2021, https://sputnik-meedia.ee/society/20210303/120400/Vozmuschaet-otnoshenie-russkij-direktor-shkola-reforma-estonski-Ida-Virumaa.html (in Russian).
[3951] Human rights in Estonia. Russian schools. REGNUM. 10 August 2021 https://regnum.ru/news/polit/3338792.html; https://dokole.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/29.10volikoguprotokoll.pdf
[3954] Human rights in Estonia. Russian schools. REGNUM. 10 August 2021 https://regnum.ru/news/polit/3338792.html; https://dokole.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/29.10volikoguprotokoll.pdf
[3955] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/10112023-v-estonii-nachalas-zabastovka-uchiteley-shkol-i-vospitateley-detsadov/
[3957] https://iz.ru/1443747/khariton-galitckii/iz-uchitelei-v-kassiry-kak-estoniia-likvidiruet-russkie-shkoly
[3958] https://baltija.eu/2022/08/11/russkaya-shkola-estonii-protiv-planov-pravitelstva-po-uskorennoj-estonizaczii-russkih-shkol-i-detskih-sadov/
[3959] https://baltija.eu/2022/10/04/alisa-blinczova-nko-russkaya-shkola-estonii-dobrym-slovom-i-800-000-evro/
[3960] https://baltija.eu/2022/11/11/nko-russkaya-shkola-estonii-obsudila-s-verhovnym-komissarom-obse-situacziyu-v-estonii/
[3961] https://baltija.eu/2022/12/15/otkrytoe-obrashhenie-nko-russkaya-shkola-estonii-k-mestnym-samoupravleniyam-estonii/
[3962] https://baltija.eu/2023/03/02/russkaya-shkola-estonii-soobshhila-obse-o-diskriminaczii-russkih/
[3963] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined tenth and eleventh periodic reports of Estonia. August 2014 https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2fC%2fEST%2fCO%2f10-11&Lang=ru
[3964] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined twelfth and thirteenth reports of Estonia. April 2022. https://docstore.ohchr.org/SelfServices/FilesHandler.ashx?enc=6QkG1d%2fPPRiCAqhKb7yhsq90DTob4ikPW5%2fsylCWY%2bsTv4D7bkEbOqgPC2IgX%2bZhrsC0LVGMdazwZw%2bHIR%2fVTCJQSvj7Oir%2bNS5aIn%2fwOjl1b8cVSIHQNH4Mj4oNamJOXsczsRWStBIDLusa5FiBnA%3d%3d
[3965] Fifth opinion of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Estonia. Adopted on 16 June 2015, published on 13 October 2015 https://rm.coe.int/fifth-report-on-estonia/16808b56f1
[3966] Report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Estonia (sixth monitoring cycle). Adopted on 29 March 2022, published on 9 June 2022. https://rm.coe.int/6th-ecri-report-on-estonia/1680a6d5e6
[3967] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child on the combined second to fourth periodic reports of Estonia. January 2017.
[3968] Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the third periodic report of Estonia. February 2019 https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=E%2fC.12%2fEST%2fCO%2f3&Lang=ru
[3969] Concluding observations of the Committee for Human Rights on the fourth periodic report of Estonia. March 2019 https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2fC%2fEST%2fCO%2f4&Lang=ru
[3970] Fourth Opinion of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities on Estonia. Adopted on 19 March 2015. Published on 21 October 2015.
https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=090000168047d0e5
[3971] Fifth Opinion of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities on Estonia. Adopted on 3 February 2022. Published on 9 June 2022. https://rm.coe.int/5th-op-estonia-en/1680a6cc9e. It should be noted that the analysis of the situation as well as the Committee's visit took place before the Estonian authorities eliminated all the possibilities to receive education in the Russian language. Such a formal approach essentially made it possible for the Committee to avoid giving its assessment of the recent Tallinn's measures aimed at eliminating all education in Russian and to limit itself to point out that the on-going reform of the school education should be accompanied by the dialogue between the authorities and national minorities, as well as assured possibilities for national minorities to use their native language in education without compromising the quality of their education.
[3972] Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the third periodic report of Estonia. February 2019. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=E%2fC.12%2fEST%2fCO%2f3&Lang=en
[3973] https://infosila.ee/main/3516-eduard-odinec-zakonoproekt-ekre-o-zaprete-russkogo-yazyka-eto-uzhe-verh-absurda.html
[3974] https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2022/11/19/estonskiy-parlament-otverg-zakonoproekt-o-polnom-zaprete-russkogo-yazyka
[3975] Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the third periodic report of Estonia. February 2019.
[3976] ECRI Report on Estonia (sixth monitoring cycle). Adopted on 29 March 2022, published on 9 June 2022.
[3977] The Fifth Opinion on Estonia of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. Adopted on 3 February 2022, published on 9 June 2022. https://rm.coe.int/5th-op-estonia-en/1680a6cc9e
[3978] https://baltija.eu/2024/08/06/v-russkoyazychnom-regione-na-severo-vostoke-estonii-uroven-bezraboticzy-dostig-13/
[3979] Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the combined twelfth and thirteenth reports of Estonia. April 2022. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2FC%2FEST%2FCO%2F12-13&Lang=ru
[3980] https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/08/estonia-new-law-banning-mother-tongue-education-minorities-may-violate-human
[3981] https://baltija.eu/2024/07/10/vlasti-tallina-planiruyut-pereimenovat-moskovskij-bulvar-v-lasnamyae/
[3982] https://lv.sputniknews.ru/world/20210330/15422485/estonia-arestovan-russkoyazychnyy-pravozaschitnik.html
[3984] https://sputnik-meedia.ee/Estonian_news/20210421/334498/V-Talline-proshel-uzhe-vtoroy-piket-Svobodu-pravozaschitniku-Sergeyu-Seredenko.html
[3985] https://lv.sputniknews.ru/Latvia/20210408/15467802/Latviya-ugrozhaet-a-Estoniya-uzhe-sazhaet-v-Rige-trebuyut-osvobodit-pravozaschitnika-Seredenko.html
[3986] https://sputnik-meedia.ee/Estonian_news/20210409/278143/Evrodeputat-Yana-Toom-prizvala-vnesti-yasnost-po-delu-Sergeya-Seredenko.html
[3987] https://lv.sputniknews.ru/Latvia/20210408/15467802/Latviya-ugrozhaet-a-Estoniya-uzhe-sazhaet-v-Rige-trebuyut-osvobodit-pravozaschitnika-Seredenko.html
[3988] https://sputnik-meedia.ee/Estonian_news/20210409/278143/Evrodeputat-Yana-Toom-prizvala-vnesti-yasnost-po-delu-Sergeya-Seredenko.html
[3989] https://m.sputnik-meedia.ee/Estonian_news/20210426/360171/Russkaya-shkola-Estonii-prizvala-PASE-dat-otsenku-arestu-Sergeyu-Seredenko.html?mobile_return=no
[3991] https://www.rubaltic.ru/article/politika-i-obshchestvo/20221024-zhertva-rusofobskogo-rezhima-pravozashchitnika-posadili-za-pravdu-ob-unizhenii-russkikh-v-estonii/, https://rus.err.ee/1608724240/sergej-seredenko-poluchil-5-5-let-tjurmy-po-obvineniju-v-antigosudarstvennoj-dejatelnosti
[3992] https://baltija.eu/2024/01/17/estonskomu-politicheskomu-uzniku-sergeyu-seredenko-otkazano-v-perevode-na-beksonvojnyj-rezhim/
[3993] https://pravfond.ru/press-tsentr/politicheskiy-uznik-pravozashchitnik-i-antifashist-sergey-seredenko-tri-goda-v-estonskoy-tyurme/
[3994] https://rus.delfi.ee/statja/120062948/foto-mihaila-stalnuhina-isklyuchili-iz-centristskoy-partii
[3995] https://baltija.eu/2023/01/30/dimitrij-klenskij-kak-menya-isklyuchali-iz-soyuza-zhurnalistov-estonii/
[3996] The Sputnik Meedia portal was created by former employees of the Sputnik Estonia news agency , which was closed down two years ago due to strong pressure from the Estonian police.
[3997] https://rodina.ee/item/1208-pochemu-komsomol-skuyu-pravdu-v-severnoj-evrope-obyavili-bankrotom
[3998] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/05042023-v-estonii-zablokirovali-sayty-s-dostupom-k-rossiyskim-telekanalam/
[3999] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/12022024-v-estonii-sobralis-shtrafovat-doma-prestarelykh-za-translyatsiyu-rossiyskikh-kanalov/
[4000] https://pravfond.ru/press-tsentr/stati/shveytsarskaya-pravozashchitnaya-organizatsiya-podala-zhalobu-v-oon-po-povodu-narusheniy-prav-chelov/
[4001] https://baltija.eu/2024/03/27/v-estonii-arestovana-russkoyazychnaya-zhurnalistka-svetlana-burczeva/
[4002] https://rus.err.ee/1609085963/igravshij-v-rossii-jestonskij-kerlingist-mihail-vlasov-diskvalificirovan-do-konca-sezona
[4003] https://rus.postimees.ee/7870542/ne-ponyala-suti-problemy-uchitelnica-russkogo-yazyka-prinyavshaya-uchastie-v-konkurse-rusistov-v-moskve-lishilas-raboty
[4005] https://rus.postimees.ee/7889140/vzyalis-za-propagandu-prorossiyskomu-portalu-prikazano-udalit-materialy-ugrozhayushchie-bezopasnosti-estonii
[4006] https://narvanews.com/p/estonia/estonianews/zhurnalist_allan_khantsom_prigovoren_k_tjurme_na_6_5_let_v_ehstonii/6-1-0-1222, https://pravfond.ru/press-tsentr/zhurnalist-allan-khantsom-priznan-vinovnym-v-razvedyvatelnoy-deyatelnosti-protiv-estonii/
[4007] https://rus.err.ее/1609223 588/professora-tu-vjacheslava-morozova-zaderzhali-po-podozreniju-v-rabote-na-rossijskie-specsluzhby
[4008] https://rtvi.com/news/v-estonii-rossijskogo-politologa-morozova-prigovorili-k-shesti-godam-tyurmy/
[4009] https://pravfond.ru/press-tsentr/byvshiy-professor-tartuskogo-universiteta-vyacheslav-morozov-prigovoren-k-6-3-godam-za-shpionazh/
[4010] https://rus.postimees.ee/7944631/ugroza-gosbezopasnosti-zhitelya-estonii-lishili-vnzh-i-vyslali-v-rossiyu
[4011] According to Andry Josu himself, he has only a Russian visa, and was deported to Russia on his own request, as he had left his car there.
[4013] https://pravfond.ru/press-tsentr/vlasti-estonii-deportirovali-v-rossiyu-antifashista-andreya-tredersona/
[4014] https://baltija.eu/2023/07/21/poet-i-muzykant-yuri-kivit-schital-sebya-estonczem-poka-ne-uvidel-kak-gosudarstvo-oboshlos-s-russkimi/, https://pravfond.ru/press-tsentr/muzykant-yuri-kivit-zaplatit-krupnyy-shtraf-za-oskorblenie-gosudarstvennogo-gimna-estonii/
[4015] Vadim Konoshchenok returned to his motherland as a result of prisoner exchange between Russia and a number of Western countries.
[4016] https://rus.err.ee/1608909434/gossud-shtraf-za-publikaciju-v-»Facebook»-fotografii-rossijskih-desantnikov-byl-obosnovan
[4017] https://rus.err.ee/1608941975/noshenie-futbolki-s-nadpisju-sssr-oboshlos-narvitjaninu-v-444-evro
[4018] https://rus.postimees.ee/7850034/zalomali-dedushku-za-lentochku-zhiteli-estonii-sporyat-s-policiey-iz-za-zaderzhaniya-voditelya-v-kohtla-yarve
[4019] https://rus.err.ee/1609097381/v-narve-voditelju-avtomobilja-prishlos-zaplatit-za-georgievskuju-lentochku-400-evro
[4020] https://rus.err.ee/1609103672/na-granice-v-narve-za-georgievskuju-lentochku-oshtrafovali-grazhdanina-polshi
[4021] https://rus.err.ee/1609117379/policija-oshtrafovala-na-500-evro-iniciatora-ispolzovanija-naklejki-ja-russkij
[4022] https://rus.delfi.ee/statja/120237622/video-publichnoe-i-gromkoe-ispolnenie-gimna-rf-povleklo-dlya-dvuh-muzhchin-vozbuzhdenie-policiey-dela
[4023] https://rus.postimees.ee/7876986/grazhdanina-rossii-nakazali-za-georgievskuyu-lentochku-nemalym-shtrafom
[4024] https://rus.postimees.ee/7881964/priezd-v-estoniyu-v-shapke-s-gerbom-sovetskogo-soyuza-oboshelsya-v-400-evro
[4025] https://rus.postimees.ee/7775283/mid-rossii-podderzhal-napadenie-na-aktivista-s-ukrainskim-flagom-v-narve
[4026] https://rus.err.ee/1608571405/rijgikogu-v-preddverii-9-maja-prinjal-zakon-o-zaprete-vrazhdebnoj-simvoliki
[4027] https://www.riigikogu.ee/ru/press-relizy/pravovaya-komissiya-ru/rijgikogu-prinyal-popravki-k-zakonu-ob-oruzhii/
[4028] https://rus.err.ee/1609147967/gosudarstvo-otobralo-razreshenie-na-oruzhie-u-zawitnikov-sovetskogo-tanka-pamjatnika-v-narve
[4029] https://rus.err.ee/1608525092/tartuskij-universitet-s-oseni-ogranichit-priem-grazhdan-rossii-i-belarusi
[4030] https://rus.err.ee/1608543355/jestonskaja-akademija-muzyki-i-teatra-priostanavlivaet-priem-grazhdan-rf-i-respubliki-belarusi
[4031] https://rus.postimees.ee/7493048/tallinnskiy-universitet-bolee-ne-primet-na-obuchenie-rossiyskih-i-belorusskih-studentov
[4032] https://rus.err.ee/1608540403/kapo-ogranichenija-na-priem-rossijskih-studentov-ne-nakazanie-a-preventivnaja-mera
[4035] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/26012024-tamozhni-pribaltiki-dogovorilis-edinoobrazno-primenyat-sanktsii-protiv-rf/
[4036] https://www.rubaltic.ru/article/politika-i-obshchestvo/20231123-patalogicheskaya-rusofobka-bez-printsipov-kto-vozzhelal-stat-gensekom-nato/
[4037] https://rus.err.ee/1609224843/kaja-kallas-lishenie-vseh-grazhdan-rossii-izbiratelnogo-prava-trebuet-vremeni
[4038] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/14022024-pogransluzhba-estonii-zayavila-o-vozmozhnom-zakrytii-granitsy-s-rossiey/
[4039] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/18012024-pravitelstvo-estonii-odobrilo-denonsatsiyu-dogovora-s-rf-o-pravovoy-pomoshchi/
[4040] https://severnojepoberezhje.postimees.ee/7887032/v-narve-uvolili-desyateryh-policeyskih-iz-za-yazykovogo-nesootvetstviya
[4041] https://rus.delfi.ee/statja/120257027/yazykovoy-skandal-v-ratushnoy-apteke-detsadovcam-zapretili-pet-novogodnie-pesni-na-russkom.
[4042] https://www.rubaltic.ru/news/06022024-glava-estonskoy-pravoslavnoy-tserkvi-pokidaet-estoniyu/
[4043] https://rus.err.ee/1609225491/jestonija-ne-stala-prodlevat-vnzh-mitropolita-evgenija-6-fevralja-on-dolzhen-pokinut-stranu.
[4044] https://baltija.eu/2024/04/23/igumeniya-filareta-predlozhila-pravitelstvu-estonii-obratitsya-k-patriarhu-kirillu-s-predlozheniem-smeny-statusa-pyuhticzkoj-obiteli/
[4045] https://baltija.eu/2024/04/23/igumeniya-filareta-predlozhila-pravitelstvu-estonii-obratitsya-k-patriarhu-kirillu-s-predlozheniem-smeny-statusa-pyuhticzkoj-obiteli/
[4046] https://www.puhtitsa.ee/index.php?view=article&id=378&catid=18&fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTAAAR3ytrgNJZB0sSfWYaOgi2vdAB-aKbyGT6Dm9MOxlmdLkdnbjO-V6-flr0g_aem_AXxs-3n0mveXI-2RVzsXdgaCE04qqZibQkGW7aGyGs974iax7Hpr6EBVFQWcg4xCrzIrPfG2fFoZFCT_XTFJzfqr
[4047] https://baltnews.com/v-ehstonii/20240426/1026278607/Raskol-pravoslavnoy-semi-Kak-vlast-vmeshivaetsya-v-dela-tserkvi.html
[4050] https://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/html/20240423/k10014430371000.html
[4051] https://www.jpost.com/opinion/commemorating-visas-for-life-on-holocaust-remembrance-day-656802
[4052] https://ria.ru/20230207/kurily-1850203487.html
[4053] https://ria.ru/20220413/yaponiya-1783381205.html
[4054] https://ria.ru/20230806/khirosima-1888417889.html
[4055] https://mainichi.jp/articles/20220520/k00/00m/010/411000c
[4056] https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2022/04/20/national/yoshimasa-hayashi-russian-discriminatiion-concenrs/
[4057] https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G18/287/65/PDF/G1828765.pdf?OpenElement
[4058] https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2fC%2fJPN%2fCO%2f10-11&Lang=ru
[4059] https://www.asahi.com/sp/ajw/articles/14367406
[4060] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2021-10-17/koreans-in-japan-hate-speech-case-highlights-workplace-racism
[4061] https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/14783372
[4062] https://www.japantimes/co/jp/news/2021/05/01/national/media-national/hate-speech-in-japan/
[4063] https://rg.ru/2023/03/29/iuzhnaia-koreia-vyrazila-glubokoe-sozhalenie-iaponii-iz-za-uchebnikov-istorii.html
[4064] https://www3.nhk.or.jp/lnews/maebashi/20240328/1060016658.html
[4065] https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2fC%2fJPN%2fCO%2f10-11&Lang=ru
[4066] https://www.npa.go.jp/policies/evaluation/04jigo-hyouka/jisseki_hyouka/r4_jizen_bunseki.pdf
[4067] https://twitter.com/ACSTokyo/status/1467629914857816065
[4068] https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20221217/p2a/00m/0na/010000c
[4069] https://www.trtrussian.com/amp/novosti-mir/isk-protiv-rasizma-v-yaponii-16801553
[4070] https://www.trtrussian.com/amp/novosti-mir/isk-protiv-rasizma-v-yaponii-16801553
[4071] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-68078061
[4072] https://iz.ru/1639093/2024-01-24/iapontcy-vozmutilis-novoi-miss-iaponiia-ukrainskogo-proiskhozhdeniia
[4073] https://iz.ru/1639093/2024-01-24/iapontcy-vozmutilis-novoi-miss-iaponiia-ukrainskogo-proiskhozhdeniia
[4074] https://iz.ru/1645319/2024-02-05/pobedivshaia-na-miss-iaponiia-2024-ukrainka-otkazalas-ot-titula
[4075] Human Rights Watch Japan Events of 2021 - [Official website] URL: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/japan
[4076] The U.S. Department of State 2022 Trafficking in Persons Report - [Official website] URL: https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/20221020-2022-TIP-Report.pdf; The U.S. Department of State 2023 Trafficking in Persons Report - [Official website] URL: https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Trafficking-in-Persons-Report-2023_Introduction-V3e.pdf
[4077] Since NATO's aggression against Yugoslavia in 1999, the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija has been de facto beyond Belgrade's control. All the while, UNSC Resolution 1244 confirms Serbia's sovereignty and territorial integrity with regards to Kosovo.
[4078] Milica Čubrilo-Filipović. Living with defeated expectations. Serbian weekly magazine Vreme, No.1675-76. 9 February 2023. p.10.
[4079] UNDP and EU suspend renovation of Nazi collaborator's house in Kosovo. Euractiv. 10 February 2022. https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/short_news/undp-and-eu-suspend-renovation-of-nazi-collaborators-house-in-kosovo/
[4080] "Politika" newspaper. No. 39192. 5 January 2023. P.7.
[4081] "Kurir" newspaper. No. 3205. 22 January 2023. P.5.
[4082] "Politika" newspaper. No. 39214. 28 January 2023. P.7.
[4083] Nazi collaborator monuments in Kosovo. Forward. 27 April 2022.
https://forward.com/news/500730/nazi-collaborator-monuments-kosovo/
[4084] Nazi collaborator monuments in Kosovo. Forward. 27 April 2022.
https://forward.com/news/500730/nazi-collaborator-monuments-kosovo/
[4085] Напад на Петра Костића 500. етнички мотивисан инцидент од доласка Альбина Куртиjа на власт. Канцеляриjа за Косово и Метохиjу Влада Республике Србиjе. 23 April 2024.
[4086] Resolution CM/ResCMN(2019)11 on the implementation of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities in Kosovo. Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 3 July 2019.
https://search.coe.int/cm/pages/result_details.aspx?objectid=090000168095da70
[4087] Fifth opinion of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities on Kosovo. Adopted on 16 February 2023, published on 26 May 2023.
[4088] Српска листа против изласка на референдум за смену градоначелника. RT Balkan. 7 April 2024.
https://rt.rs/srbija-i-balkan/84271-srpska-lista-kosmet-referendum-gradonacelnici/
[4089] “Leksija” za novo tiho iseljavanje Srba sa KiM: Šta se dešava sa kompleksom Rajska banja? Danas.rs. 21 December 2023. https://www.danas.rs/vesti/drustvo/rajska-banja-srbi-kim/
[4090] "Evening News" newspaper. 12 January 2024, p. 3.
[4091] "Politika" newspaper. 24 January 2024, p. 1.
[4092] "Evening News" newspaper. 13 April 2023, p. 2.
[4093] "Politika" newspaper. 19 June 2023, p. 6.
[4094] "Evening News" newspaper. 11 December 2023, p. 7.
[4095] Vucic: Dacemo sve od sebe da ne dode do sukoba, ali ne po cenu pogrom Srba. Kosovo Online. 2 July 2023.
[4096] European Commission's Report on Kosovo. 8 November 2023.
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/2023/SWD_2023_692%20Kosovo%20report_0.pdf
[4097] "Politika" newspaper. 15 September 2023, p. 4.
[4098] Protection of Cultural Heritage in Kosovo. OSCE Mission in Kosovo. July 2022.
[4099] The Serbian Patriarch has been banned from entering Kosovo. RIA Novosti. 15 May 2024.
[4100] The foundations of the monastery of the Church of the Mother of God in Hvosno replowed; Locals: the latest blow to Serbian returnees. Kosovo Online. 20 January 2024.
[4101] "Politika" newspaper. 23 January 2024, p.7.
[4102] Caring for our sanctuaries is not an act of hatred but a civilizational duty and a matter of religious freedom. Statement of the Serbian Orthodox Diocese of Raska-Prizren and Kosovo-Metohija. 8 March 2024.
[4103] "Politika" newspaper. 29 December 2023, p. 5.
[4104] Kisha e Shёn Premtёs nё Prizren, trashёgimi kulturore universal e Kosovёs. KOHA. 7 January 2024.
https://www.koha.net/shtojca-kulture/404933/kisha-e-shen-premtes-ne-prizren-trashegimi-kulturore-universale-e-kosoves/
[4105] Оскрнављена Српска Православна Црква код Пећи. Српска Православна Црква – Епархиjа Рашко-Призренска. 14 May 2024.
[4106] Земља Манастира Високи Дечани Уписана у Косовски Катастар. Српска Православна Црква – Епархиjа Рашко-Призренска. 20 March 2024.
[4107] A road has been excavated through the old Serbian cemetery in North Mitrovica. Kosovo Online. 24 October 2023.
[4108] OSCE, Serbian Church Criticise Damage to Serb Cemetery in Kosovo. Balkan Insight. 26 October 2023.
[4109] Who is bothered by the graves of the Serbs in Kosovo? Kosovo Online. 6 November 2023.
https://www.kosovo-online.com/en/news/kontext/who-bothered-graves-serbs-kosovo-6-11-2023
[4110] "Politika" newspaper. 15, 16, and 17 April 2023, p.8.
[4111] Statement by Permanent Representative Vassily Nebenzia at UN Security Council meeting on the situation in Kosovo. Official website of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations. 22 April 2024. https://russiaun.ru/ru/news/220424
[4112] Резолюция 217 A (III).
[4113] См. резолюцию 2200 A (XXI), приложение.
[4114] United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 660, No. 9464.
[4115] См. Официальные отчеты Экономического и Социального Совета, 2004 год, Дополнение № 3 (E/2004/23), гл. II, разд. A.
[4116] Там же, 2005 год, Дополнение № 3 (E/2005/23), гл. II, разд. A.
[4117] См. Официальные отчеты Генеральной Ассамблеи, шестьдесят третья сессия, Дополнение № 53 (A/63/53), гл. II.
[4118] Там же, шестьдесят шестая сессия, Дополнение № 53A и исправление (A/66/53/Add.l и A/66/53/Add. 1/Corr.l), гл. II.
[4119] Там же, шестьдесят седьмая сессия, Дополнение № 53A (A/67/53/Add. 1), гл. II.
[4120] См. A/CONF.189/12 и A/CONF.189/12/Corr.1, гл. I.
[4121] См. A/CONF.211/8, гл. I.
[4122] A/78/302.
[4124] United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1125, No. 17512.
[4125] A/73/305 и A/73/305/Corr.l, п. 56.
[4127] A/HRC/38/53, п. 15.
[4129] A/HRC/38/53, п. 16.
[4131] A/HRC/38/53, п. 35 c).
[4132] A/69/334, п. 81.
[4133] A/64/295, п. 104.
[4134] Resolution 217 A (III).
[4135] See resolution 2200 A (XXI), annex.
[4136] United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 660, No. 9464.
[4137] See Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, 2004, Supplement No. 3 (E/2004/23), chap. II, sect. A.
[4138] Ibid., 2005, Supplement No. 3 and corrigenda (E/2005/23, E/2005/23/Corr.1 and E/2005/23/Corr.2), chap. II, sect. A.
[4139] See Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-third Session, Supplement No. 53 (A/63/53), chap. II.
[4140] Ibid., Sixty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 53A and corrigendum (A/66/53/Add.1 and A/66/53/Add.1/ Corr.1), chap. II.
[4141] Ibid., Sixty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 53A (A/67/53/Add.1), chap. II.
[4142] See A/CONF. 189/12 and A/CONF.189/12/Corr.1, chap. I.
[4143] See A/CONF.211/8, chap. I.
[4144] A/77/512.
[4146] United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1125, No. 17512.
[4147] A/73/305 and A/73/305/Corr.1, para. 56.
[4149] A/HRC/38/53, para. 15.
[4151] A/HRC/38/53, para. 16.
[4153] A/HRC/38/53, para. 35 (c).
[4154] A/69/334, para. 81.
[4155] A/64/295, para. 104.
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