Russian Permanent Representative to the OSCE Alexander Lukashevich’s interview with Rossiya Segodnya, September 16, 2015

Question: Mr Lukashevich, you worked at the Russian mission to the OSCE in Vienna before. What has changed in this organisation?

Alexander Lukashevich: To tell the truth, everything has changed. The organisation has changed over the past decades, which is unfortunate. Judging by the Astana Declaration, where the OSCE summit was held in 2010, it is a representative all-embracing organisation created to hold consultations, make decisions and promote cooperation in the region. It was designed as the key element of the European security system to be complemented with the infrastructure of various other organisations. This was the philosophy it was based on. The Helsinki Final Act and other documents indicated that the OSCE, which was called the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe or CSCE then, should become the centrepiece for governing European processes jointly with other organisations. Unfortunately, that is not what has come to pass.

Question: Why?

Alexander Lukashevich: The OSCE was pushed to the margins of big European politics by the creation and strengthening of the European Union and NATO and the adoption of NATO’s military doctrine. No one was interested in the statements and principles that were coordinated by the countries that were also members of these latter organisations. Many OSCE documents say that no organisation and no security structure can consider parts of the OSCE’s geographical area as their own zones of responsibility.

The OSCE has not developed into a comprehensive regional organisation in accordance with the spirit of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. This explains the big problems with the OSCE’s institutional development. It has no charter or basic document, although this priority is stipulated in many of its decisions. Russia has been upholding this principle, because the expansion of the OSCE zone of responsibility and the forms that could be used, for example, to settle the Ukrainian conflict have been hindered by many problems rooted in its highly unstable functional structure.

Question: What prevents the formalisation of the OSCE’s official status as a regional organisation?

Alexander Lukashevich: I’m sorry to say that the main obstacle is the stance of our Western partners, who don’t want the OSCE to be formalised and to receive this status in accordance with UN Charter prerogatives. This is why it’s not referred to as a regional organisation, but as a regional arrangement as stipulated in Chapter VIII. The issue of reforms is still on the agenda, and so Russia will continue to advocate its stance regarding the basic document and the charter of the OSCE. This also concerns the operating procedure for the OSCE field activities and agencies, which are increasingly often using guerrilla tactics contrary to the decisions of the collective agencies and member states.

Question: Which agency are you referring to?

Alexander Lukashevich: The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights or ODIHR, for example. Take a recent scandal over monitoring in Azerbaijan, when the host country was surprised at the large number of observers it was required to accept. Baku considered it to be excessive and proposed its own plan that was in keeping with its national interests, considering that not only the OSCE but also other monitoring organisations can have a say in the matter. But the ODIHR took a firm stand and ultimately withdrew its observers from the Azerbaijan elections. We’ll likely have a serious discussion on the ODIHR election observation methods during the next OSCE Permanent Council meeting.

Question: Is this situation similar to the decision of the ODIHR not to monitor elections in Donbass?

Alexander Lukashevich: The situation in Donbass is more complicated. The ODIHR plays an auxiliary role here. Most importantly, the main problem of the Ukrainian peace settlement has not been resolved – the sides don’t maintain direct dialogue, as stipulated by the philosophy of the Minsk Agreements. As you remember, a mechanism for holding local elections under Ukrainian law should be streamlined through a direct dialogue between Kiev, Donetsk and Lugansk (as envisioned by the Minsk Agreements). The law on a temporary status, passed last year, has not been enacted. In effect, Ukrainian authorities have independently decided not to hold elections in Donbass on October 25, unlike elsewhere in Ukraine. And, of course, this has led to conflict, all the more so as Kiev has essentially violated its obligations under the Minsk Agreements.

I would like to mention another major drawback. I mean that all these OSCE institutions should work in close dialogue with the participating states. They should not and cannot impose their own will, if the state doesn’t want this assistance. And now it’s the other way round: the ODIHR is dictating the terms of its monitoring procedure; at the same time, no one can explain to us why the mission doesn’t visit some Western states or why it’s sending only 10-15 people there, just to confirm that these states guarantee 100 per cent democracy, that there are no problems there, although we know that no society is perfect, and that there are problems everywhere.

In late September, the participants in a Warsaw conference will specially discuss election issues; we will also take an active part and prove that our position is correct. Therefore I don’t want to say that I’m disappointed, but what I have seen, during my third visit to this organisation in Vienna, is that, of course, only internal processes function there. But the procedures for the work in Vienna and the discussions at high and top levels are absolutely different things.

Question: In what sense? Don’t the speeches of the national ambassadors to the OSCE coincide with the ministerial decisions?

Alexander Lukashevich: The thing is that the high-sounding nature of even those statements that are being passed here is dissolved in these discussions. Take Ukraine, for one, and the ministerial meeting in Berlin on Saturday. The discussion was rather difficult but constructive, there were no accusatory statements and no rhetoric. At the same time, the latest meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council is absolutely astonishing: Entire groups of countries, especially the United States and Ukraine, are resorting to such extreme terminology as ‘occupation’ and ‘the withdrawal of Russian troops,’ ‘annexation,’ etc. This has absolutely nothing to do with consensus, and this is just the opinion of these states’ representatives. But permanent representatives are talking about this here. And when all this is elevated to the ministerial level, it becomes obvious that this exceeded the boundaries of the political controversies long ago, and that this aims to attain compromises that would make it possible to promote the Minsk process. Basically, one thing is said at one level, then something absolutely different is said for domestic public consumption and to please Western sponsors.

Question: Speaking of Ukraine, you have recently criticised the work of another OSCE institution, its Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine.

Alexander Lukashevich: This is not criticism but constructive displeasure that the mission is not doing everything under its mandate, and that it can and should do more. The most difficult issues are linked with their reports. We are not completely satisfied with the way these reports reflect the real situation in the conflict zone. This concerns shellings and the overall security situation in the country. This is because the conflict in Donbass is just part of the large-scale domestic Ukrainian crisis cycle whose regulation is becoming part of the Special Monitoring Mission’s mandate. Although monitoring the situation along the demarcation line is, of course, the main task, it also concerns the human rights situation all over Ukraine.

Question: What, in your opinion, should the mission do in this case?

Alexander Lukashevich: We have put forward an initiative, and we have already said that an extremely clear, candid, analytical and thematic report is needed. This report would show the consequences of the so-called anti-terrorist operation by Ukrainian forces in the conflict zone. To be honest, this should be done on a regular basis.

Question: Should this be some new form of the report?

Alexander Lukashevich: Not quite. Theoretically, the mission has gained experience in preparing these reports, but this experience has not always been successful. I’m talking about the politically-motivated report on Crimea. Although the mission’s mandate does not encompass this territory, this is Russian territory and we have always noted this. The latest report dealing with water supply in the conflict zone was appropriate. Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov noted this while working in the Normandy Four format in Berlin. The Mission described this situation as being on the verge of a humanitarian disaster. A situation where most of the region’s population has no direct access to drinking water directly violates international humanitarian law. There was a thematic and neutral report on the human rights situation, which said that the problem exists, but overall, everything is  not bad.

Question: What do you think prevents the observers from presenting balanced reports?

Alexander Lukashevich: Pressure from Kiev and the Western countries. Observers are obviously trying to balance between the two sides in the conflict. There is Donbass on the one hand and Kiev on the other. But, for example, our journalists reveal facts that do not get included in the mission reports. This is very confusing for the public that probably would like to have a bigger picture. They see the images and facts that are not in the reports. The question is: why?

Question: Perhaps, there is a problem with access.

Alexander Lukashevich: Yes, there is a problem with access to many areas. But it’s the mission’s role to monitor the situation not for the purpose of accusing either party but in order for the global public to clearly see who is breaching the Minsk Agreements more often. It is important that the mission shows the full scale of the conflict. We’ve already raised this issue with the secretariat and the conflict prevention centre. This idea has not been rejected but, apparently, there will be internal struggles and attempts to crush the idea.

Question: Will the mandate for the Special Monitoring Mission be extended for the next year?

Alexander Lukashevich: Formally, the current mandate expires in March 2016. There are many factors involved, including the fate of the Minsk Agreements. The February agreements in Minsk are valid until the end of 2015. We don’t know what will happen then. It seems Ukraine is not ready to extend the Minsk Agreements through the next year. This could be discussed though. It all depends on the parties and how soon they can resolve their deep disagreements.

The mission is not just limited by its mandate but also by the Minsk Agreements that are basically an addition to it. The Minsk Agreements are not just the Bible for local politicians but also a roadmap for the mission itself.

Question: Security issues include more than the conflict in Ukraine. There is one more problem in Europe right now. I’m talking about the refugees. There have been reports in the media that terrorists are freely entering Europe among the thousands of people without identification.

Alexander Lukashevich: Yes, we heard about that. And these are not just independent media reports but data confirmed by official sources. It is more than a challenge. It looks like Europe is facing a large man-made disaster that will be very difficult to handle. However, the OSCE does not have a direct mandate there. This is a task for European institutions, the EU and each European country. There have been no targeted discussions of this issue here at the OSCE yet. I guess we can’t avoid them because, apparently, it concerns the organisation’s mandate indirectly. This issue is about public security, state security, and not only in the literal meaning, but it also concerns economic and social aspects. The refugee problem could easily overturn the entire European identity and make the search for further forms of European integration more difficult. Because – and this is my personal view of the matter – this is a clash of civilisations, a clash of extremist Islamism, traditional Islam and European values. This is what Europeans are legitimately afraid of as the rest of the world is.

Question: In other words, the OSCE is not addressing the refugee issue yet?

Alexander Lukashevich: I believe that this issue will be addressed. The Serbian chairmanship has indicated that it can hardly be avoided. However, we’ll see what the upshot will be. After all, financial tools and institutional resources are at work here. In any case, this will be the prerogative of states, while decisions made at the level of the EU and the European Commission regarding the distribution of quotas, are already coming into force, and this is not to everyone’s liking.

Question: All right, what is the Russian position in this situation then?

Alexander Lukashevich: In any event, our primary message was that even if we address this issue in conjunction with other institutions, we should first discuss and understand the origins of this crisis, which is now reaching catastrophic proportions for Europe. No one has discussed why the flow of refugees appeared in the first place. Everyone evades a substantive discussion about the causes of this situation and has no intention of discussing why Syrians are fleeing their country or why Libyans and Iraqis are running away. Of course, this is not a pleasant conversation.

However, in order to understand how to respond to threats, it is essential to understand their causes – why they have come about. I believe there will be a substantive conversation on how well positioned the OSCE is to get involved with this problem – in security, economic, social and humanitarian terms. We’ll see how these discussions go. At any rate, this is a serious issue which calls for a well thought-out and unhurried solution. The issue is bound to be raised at the UN General Assembly, especially since a development programme for the next decade will be adopted there. However, the OSCE cannot play a leading or crucial role here but should find a certain niche to facilitate the resolution of this problem.

Question: Incidentally, regarding plans for the future. In 2016, Germany will assume the chairmanship of the organisation. What are your plans in this context?

Alexander Lukashevich: As far as I remember, Germany once held the chairmanship but only for six months. Today, under these circumstances, especially in 2016, with the various factors weighing in, this will, of course, be a challenge to Germany’s foreign policy and its political establishment as a whole. Naturally, it is also a challenge to the organisation as a whole, because the leadership is being assumed by Europe’s biggest state, an EU leader, which, in our opinion, can find common ground amid the serious divisions that, unfortunately, were caused by the Ukrainian crisis.

Nevertheless, the Germans are preparing for their chaimanship. In July, Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier laid out German priorities that have yet to be finalised. So the OSCE ministerial meeting in Belgrade will not only be the end of the Serbian chairmanship but also a taste of the German chairmanship to come – moreover, with some indication of what Austria will be doing after Germany in 2017. We’re ready for serious and constructive work with our German partners as well as with everyone else. It is essential to reverse the trend toward politicised discussions as soon as possible and strengthen the OSCE and its tools on a collective basis, through collective decisions, no matter how difficult it might be to achieve them. The OSCE has developed such a vast array of solutions to various problems that it can easily go ahead with this one, provided there is the political will and commitment to strengthen the organisation, and not turn it into what was once called a “human rights watchdog.”

Question: What is your personal plan regarding the new line of work?

Alexander Lukashevich: There can be no personal plan, because, as they say, there is nothing personal here. I’ve come here with the intention to work hard. Naturally, we’ll follow the fundamental approaches enshrined in the foreign policy concept that are spelled out by our leadership, the foreign minister and officials on other levels. On the personal level, of course, I wish it would be possible to reverse the trend towards the confrontational division of member countries and to identify a common agenda, which we succeeded in doing previously.

Question: But what can a permanent representative do in this regard?

Alexander Lukashevich: My answer is, everything. Because the organisation’s work is built not only on dialogue and cooperation but also on consensus. Until a consensus is achieved among all 57 countries there can be no decision, so we bring in our national interests. If something is at odds with these interests we will never let it pass. Of course, this is not veto power but a serious tool to regulate what the organisation does. If our positions diverge, we’re ready to look for compromise, but if they begin to pressure us, saying, this and only this… Well, at the UN Security Council, we’ve already shown that in such cases we’ll act in line with the letter of the UN Charter, and I’d like to note that veto power is not a prerogative but great responsibility for a decision that is made. So, in response to your question, the permanent representative can do anything that a person who works at a multilateral organisation can do.

Question: In this case, do you expect a reaction?

Alexander Lukashevich: You know, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov made an interesting point at a meeting of OSCE foreign ministers in Basel in 2014 when he was asked: “Are you aware of a certain measure of isolation here, a lack of interest in talking to you amid the restrictions imposed by the West?” Here is what he said: “As a matter of fact, I can’t fight off all those willing to talk; I can’t have a cup of coffee, as there’re too many people who want to socialise with me.” Here, too, I felt that despite the differences in positions, there is huge interest in Russia’s approaches. We do have something to say, in retrospect, among other things. Russia has always played a leading role in this organisation. I’d like this trend to continue in the future. Because without Russia’s voice here or in other organisations, it is impossible to find an effective solution to various problems. I believe that we’ll continue trying to listen to and hear one another.