Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in an interview with the Right to Know program on TV Centre

Question: Good afternoon, Mr Lavrov. The main issue today is Ukraine. Is the war over or is it a temporary respite?

Sergey Lavrov: It is a ceasefire. It is based on a document that was signed after Russian President Vladimir Putin advanced a seven-point initiative. We also expressed our readiness to work further on that document with the involvement of all sides in the conflict: the Kiev authorities and those who support them, and the Lugansk and Donetsk people's republics.

It was thanks to this initiative that a meeting was held in Minsk where the document was coordinated. It has more than seven points, because it must reflect the stands of those who are directly involved in the agreement. According to our assessment and the opinion of OSCE observers, the ceasefire has so far been effective, though not without some disruptions that have so far been insignificant, thank God. There has been some shooting, but so far the progress towards a lasting truce has not been disrupted. I don't want to be over-optimistic, because there are people who would like to derail this process and to revive the military scenario.

Question: Who are you referring to?

Sergey Lavrov: I'm primarily referring to the groups that were formed by the oligarchs who disregard Kiev's orders and who see the Ukrainian armed forces as temporary allies or companions, as well as a considerable part of the National Guard.

Question: Are you talking about the groups that are financed by Igor Kolomoisky?

Sergey Lavrov: Yes, these groups too, but not only them. There are other oligarchs who finance similar combat groups – the Donbass, Aydar, Dnepr, Azov and other battalions. There is also the National Guard, which receives financing both from the Ukrainian budget and from foreign sponsors, but it does not always act in accordance with the orders of Ukraine's supreme commander.

Question: Here's what happened next: the ceasefire was signed, but then some time later Petro Poroshenko declared that if necessary Ukraine would build something like a Mannerheim Line on its border with Russia. The Prime Minister of the Donetsk People's Republic, Alexander Zakharchenko, said that the terms of the ceasefire don't fully reflect the interests of the DPR and the LPR because they want greater autonomy, basically independence. So differences arose immediately on two points.

Sergey Lavrov: While we hear a lot of conflicting interpretations of the deal from Kiev, including demands to renounce steps toward peace and resume offensive operations using the entire arsenal of the Ukrainian armed forces, President Poroshenko – despite the statements you quoted – has repeatedly reaffirmed his commitment to the ceasefire deal. We still hope that, as the embodiment of whatever legitimacy the 25 May presidential election conferred, he will perform his duties as supreme commander-in-chief, take all necessary measures and exercise his presidential powers to make sure that the current Kiev government, which reports to the president and the parliament, does not undermine the decision he has sanctioned and approved.

Question: Is there a concern that Kiev may use the ceasefire as an opportunity to redeploy its troops? The point has been repeatedly made, including by you, that Ukrainian forces are regrouping and that heavy weaponry is being moved to the Donetsk Region.

Sergey Lavrov: Just recently, two or three days after the ceasefire was signed in Minsk, we got information, confirmed by the self-defence forces, that a strike force of artillery and tanks was being formed near Debaltsevo. We drew the attention of the Kiev leadership to these reports. We were assured that there were no such plans and that measures would be taken to clear up any confusion. Based on our information, these movements have stopped, and nothing similar has been reported.

I still have to answer your question about how the self-defence forces interpret the Minsk deal, including the status of the Lugansk and Donetsk People's Republics. You see, so far the Minsk deal is just a scheme, a framework that has to be fleshed out with more detailed agreements on practically every issue. This work is being done by the Contact Group which includes the representatives of the Ukrainian sides, Russia and the OSCE.

As for their status, there are some provisions that commit Kiev to preparing a law on interim self-rule of the Lugansk and Donetsk regions. But there is also a very brief provision titled "Continuation of inclusive national dialogue" that is hugely important. This provision is big on wishful thinking, because you can't really talk about continuing a national dialogue when no such dialogue exists. There was a half-hearted attempt to hold so-called "round tables" ahead of the presidential election and Poroshenko's inauguration. But this work was halted shortly after the inauguration despite the many promises made. And even what these "round tables" have accomplished is far from ideal. The participants did not represent the full spectrum of political forces and Ukrainian regions. And yet the participation of all the regions and political forces in a national dialogue aimed at fundamental constitutional reform is one of the obligations the Ukrainian authorities assumed under the 17 April Geneva statement signed by the foreign ministers of Russia, Ukraine, the US, and the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

That is why the reference in the Minsk agreement to an inclusive national dialogue – that is, with the participation of all stakeholders – is a matter of principle for us. All the agreements on passing a law on the interim status through the Verkhovna Rada are essentially an obligation on the Ukrainian leadership. Lugansk and Donetsk will first of all need to see how the law will be written, but that still does not completely resolve the problem. A lasting solution can only be achieved by consensus through an inclusive national dialogue.

Question: Speaking about a lasting solution to the Ukrainian crisis, President Putin and President Poroshenko have spoken over the phone frequently. A diplomatic game is on. How does Russia see the outcome of the crisis? What are we seeking? What is our position? Perhaps the recognition of Crimea?

Sergey Lavrov: Crimea is not being discussed. I assure you that this issue does not come up during discussions between our presidents. What is being discussed is the possibility of Russia using its obvious leverage in order to help Ukraine set in motion the constitutional process promised back on 21 February in the agreement signed by Viktor Yanukovych, Arseny Yatsenyuk, Vladimir Klichko and Oleg Tyagnibok, and recognised by the foreign ministers of Germany, France and Poland, and to help bring it to a successful conclusion so that Ukrainian statehood is based on a nationwide consensus reflecting the interests of all regions and political forces.

Question: Are we talking about an unaligned Ukraine?

Sergey Lavrov: This is a matter of principle to us. We are convinced that the choice reflected in Ukrainian law serves the interests of the Ukrainian people, the legitimate interests of all neighbours and partners of Ukraine, as well as the interests of European security. We have been given numerous assurances by our Western partners that they are well aware of the importance of an unaligned Ukraine for Euro-Atlantic security.

Question: Nevertheless Ukraine intends to renounce its unaligned status and even wants to put the issue to a vote in the Verkhovna Rada.

Sergey Lavrov: I wouldn't say that initiative came from Ukraine; it was just a few politicians, in particular Prime Minister Yatsenyuk, surprisingly, who proposed putting legislation before the government that would end Ukraine's unaligned status and put the country on the path to joining NATO precisely at the moment when the Minsk deal was being worked out. These actions are a direct affront to the country's president. I think he is working not in the interests of his people, but in the interests of those who want to set the Ukrainian and Russian peoples against each other and to drive a deep wedge between Russia and Europe, first and foremost, Washington. The US doesn't hide its partiality. Ukrainian radicals and extremists, including those in governing bodies, practically get carte blanche from the US, and there is no traction for arguments in favour of objectively looking at the situation and supporting a national dialogue, reconciliation and respect of the rights of minorities – all the values the West seeks to promote in any other conflict. Washington has proved repeatedly that its aim is to aggravate the crisis as much as possible in order to use Ukraine as a bargaining chip in its latest attempt to isolate and weaken Russia.

Question: A technical question. There is President Poroshenko who is the guarantor of the Ukrainian constitution and who is conducting the negotiations, while at the same time there's Prime Minister Yatsenyuk making a statement on the country's unaligned status. I could also mention the Ukrainian defence minister who wrote on Facebook that nuclear weapons should be used against Russia. Mr Lutsenko says that Europe is already supplying high-precision weapons and that the war must go on. What are the implications for the dialogue you're conducting? Who are the negotiations being held with? How can Poroshenko keep the process under his control?

Sergey Lavrov: The President of Russia has repeatedly said that he is satisfied with how direct contacts with President Poroshenko have been established. We are engaged in a dialogue with him and those who support his position, which is Ukraine's official policy. There are more than enough provocateurs. You have named some, but there are many more. Of course, we draw the attention of our Western partners to this when they speak about Europe's collective interests. We agree that these interests must be upheld, but the West is doing practically nothing to rein in the radicals.

Remember that during the last elections to the Verkhovna Rada in December 2012, under Viktor Yanukovich, Oleg Tyagnibok's Freedom party cleared the one percent barrier required to get seats in parliament. The European Union issued a strong statement calling on all the other political forces in Ukraine not to cooperate with these Neo-Nazis. Their party programme still upholds the June 1941 document which supports Hitler's aim of creating a new order in Europe and the world. On that occasion the European Union took a very strong stand, like it did in 2000 when a radical party won an election in Austria and the EU simply forced the Austrians to renounce the results of the democratic expression of the people's will and remove the party from power. But today Oleg Tyagnibok is seen as a partner in dialogue and is a member of the coalition. Nobody has voiced any protest about it.

Question: Will his party win seats in the Rada in the upcoming elections?

Sergey Lavrov: I follow the polls, but I'm not in a position to say anything definitive about the chances of the Freedom party or of many other political parties, with the exception of the association formed by Poroshenko and the party that is being led to new victories by Oleg Lyashko.

When we are told that Oleg Tyagnibok won few votes in the presidential election, we note that Oleg Lyashko did no worse and no better. He was the runner-up to Poroshenko and won considerable support form voters. I think Europe is in a very uncomfortable position. The Europeans must be aware of the threat posed by this kind of encouragement of nationalism and to some extent Neo-Nazism, but they cannot say it aloud because of their political commitments.

Question: You met Poroshenko personally. What is your impression of him?

Sergey Lavrov: I worked with him during his brief stint as Ukraine’s foreign minister. He came to Moscow; we held talks and discussed current issues in Russian-Ukrainian relations, of which there are always many. We came to terms on some of them, which allowed us to make progress.

After Poroshenko was elected president, we had a few brief meetings at international events, including the meeting in Minsk attended by the presidents of the Customs Union countries, Ukraine and high-ranking officials from the Eurasian Economic Commission and the European Union.

It seems to me Poroshenko is interested in a peace deal and needs support, primarily from the West, which was hoping Ukraine would transition from the post-Maidan situation to something more legitimate. This is why presidential elections were announced. I think the West should support Poroshenko’s desire to make a peace deal, because everyone, or almost everyone, is trying hard to frustrate his efforts.

Question: We’ll return to the issue of NATO later. For now, I’d like to ask what seems a logical question to me. Here’s a brief example. Ukrainian experts have expressed scepticism and even criticism about Ukraine not being invited to join NATO right now. We see that the West has not made good on most of the promises it has made to Poroshenko. I believe under the circumstances he should move closer to the Russian position. Why doesn’t he, or am I just missing it?

Sergey Lavrov: Recent discussions involving our presidents (the bilateral meeting in Minsk and subsequent phone conversations that produced the 5 September agreements) show that there’s still hope for progress. I mean the establishment of peace and genuine national dialogue on the future of Ukraine.

Question: We have a team of journalists in the Lugansk and Donetsk regions. They said there was a lot of confusion when the agreement was being signed and after. The situation changed, and there was an opportunity to take complete control of these regions and seize Mariupol as the agreement was being signed. Some analysts even compared the situation to the Hasavyurt accords. Why was the agreement signed at that time?

The text of the agreement is very strange. Every provision is open to a broad range of interpretations. The diplomats who worked on it could have been more specific. Was this dictated by circumstance, or is it based on some logic? Are these seven points intentionally vague?

Sergey Lavrov: Twelve.

Question: Many things in this agreement require some basic clarification.

Sergey Lavrov: Let me answer the first part of your question, to begin with. Why was this document signed now and does it reflect the interests of self-defence forces and, more broadly, the people of the Lugansk and Donetsk regions? We wanted it to be signed much earlier. The self-defence forces were also ready to sign a ceasefire deal. The deal was supported at the 2 July meeting of the Russian, German, French and Ukrainian foreign ministers in Berlin. A ceasefire was supposed to begin in three days, but Ukraine refused. It also refused when the UN Security Council demanded a ceasefire after the crash of the Malaysian airliner. More than 10 days after the resolution demanding an immediate ceasefire and safe access of international inspectors to the crash site, Ukraine refused to comply and said it would provide inspectors access to the wreckage and begin a ceasefire only after it takes control of the region.

Ukraine has repeatedly opted to use force to seize as many populated areas as possible in order to strengthen its negotiating position. This logic could also be applied to self-defence fighters (or some of them) who would also like to seize more territory and only then start the ceasefire. However, if we encourage that kind of thinking, it will never stop. One side will always want to snatch a little more territory before sitting down at the negotiating table.

We are not getting ahead of ourselves. It is unacceptable to delay an opportunity to save lives for one, two or three days. If the opportunity presents itself and the political will is there, you have to get both sides to make commitments in writing without delay. By the way, the deal was signed by Zakharchenko and Plotnitsky who represented the Donetsk and Lugansk republics. They enjoy the respect and support of the people in these regions. I’m sure they are acting out of the considerations I’m talking about – to save lives and prevent the further destruction of critical infrastructure in these regions.

As for the contents of the deal, it is a framework agreement and most of it is not supposed to be carried out right away except for the ceasefire. This is understandable, and it’s being done. We want the OSCE to increase as soon as possible the number of observers in the conflict areas and where the sides need to be separated. As for the other provisions, they should be firmed up later. Take, for one, the law on temporary self-rule in the Donetsk and Lugansk regions that was mentioned today. We don’t know what it will look like, because this is Ukraine’s responsibility. When they put their signatures under this provision, the self-defence forces made it clear that their attitude to the law would be based on what’s in it and on an understanding that this is not the end of the road but the beginning of a very complicated political process that imposes obligations on Ukraine and the self-defence forces. I’m referring to the inclusive national dialogue that will result in consequential decisions on the Ukrainian Constitution and on how the regions will fit into a larger system that I hope will allow everyone to live together in peace and respect each other’s traditions, customs, culture and values. People have very different value systems in western, central and eastern Ukraine. Today we are dealing with the mess created by the failure of the one-time opposition brought to power as a result of the coup and its Western sponsors to abide by the agreements signed on 21 February. Those agreements provided a specific sequence of events to de-escalate the situation in Ukraine after -Maidan. Most importantly, it called for a government of national unity that was supposed to draft constitutional reforms to be approved in September. Elections were supposed to take place at the end of the year on the basis of the new Constitution. The sequence was very logical and clear, but a coup took place two days after the agreement was signed. The president’s residency, the Government House and other government buildings were occupied. Speaking on Maidan Square, Yatsenyuk said: “I congratulate everyone who held out on Maidan Square. We’ve overthrown the dictator and formed a government of the victors.” This was an immediate signal to the country’s southeastern regions. It is not a national unity government that came to power, but a government of the victors, which means you’re the losers and that’s how we are going to treat you. Then constitutional reform was virtually forgotten. The Verkhovna Rada drafted a secret document that nobody has seen, which was immediately sent to the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe where it stayed for several weeks before being returned to Kiev. We know this happened, although it hasn’t been discussed much. The Venice Commission wisely declined to comment on a document with such a vague status. Its representatives told Kiev: “First agree within the country on how you want to reform the Constitution and we’ll respond accordingly.”

Question: So this was a government of the victors rather than a government of all Ukrainians?

Sergey Lavrov: Exactly. This action and the remarks about it being a government of the victors, as well as the attempt to repeal the law on national language policy, were powerful signals to the southeast. They were perceived as a declaration of war.

Question: We know what happened next. As you rightly said, if there is a chance for a truce, every effort must be made to stop the bloodshed. This is the main point. But the next question is what Russia sees as an ideal outcome.

According to one theory, Russia benefits more from maintaining the uncertain status of regions like Transnistria and Abkhazia, and that it would prefer this outcome to the southeastern region remaining part of Ukraine. On the other hand, what should Ukraine be, a federation or a confederation? What are the ideal “seven points” for Moscow? Respect, dialogue, and national, historical and cultural traditions, as you’ve mentioned, are definitely very important. But what is Moscow’s vision for an ideal administrative-territorial and political structure for the region?

Sergey Lavrov: It is in Russia’s interests to have a strong, prosperous and friendly Ukraine. As for the administrative structure, this is for Ukrainians to decide. We are guided in our actions by basic principles. Regarding our strategic interests, Russia wants to see compliance with agreements on common, indivisible and equal security in the Euro-Atlantic region. In this context, the promise made to Russia that NATO would not expand eastward is of crucial importance. Our proposal to sign a legally binding treaty based on the political pledge that no attempts would be made to strengthen one country’s security at the expense of the security of others – the pledge was made at the highest level within the OSCE and the Russia-NATO Council – was repeatedly rejected. They even ridiculed Russia for proposing some unconventional ideas. But really NATO rejected our proposal for one reason and one reason only, which they once admitted to me in the midst of a heated debate: They don’t think it’s possible to provide legal guarantees to anyone other than NATO member-countries. That’s it. This is their way of quietly bringing as many countries into NATO as possible, continuing to draw dividing lines and moving their infrastructure closer and closer to our borders. This is unacceptable.

In the broader European context, Russia wants Ukraine to be a prosperous, neutral and friendly state in which citizens of all ethnic backgrounds – though ethnic Russians occupy a special place for us – can live in safety and comfort and enjoy equal rights. This is what we want. How can this goal be achieved? It doesn’t matter if a new state is a unitary Ukraine, the Republic of Ukraine, the Federative Republic of Ukraine, or a decentralised Republic of Ukraine. The dispute about how a federation is a bad idea but decentralisation may be possible, is inconsequential. It’s just a distraction from the main goal, which is to agree on the essence of the problem, on how people will live their lives, how governors will be elected, how legislatures will be formed, and what status will be given to Russian and other minority languages (Hungarian, Romanian and Polish).

We know that the EU member-countries that have compatriots living in Ukraine refrain from clearly voicing their concerns, which they do have, because Brussels encourages them to discuss their problems behind closed doors. But information tends to leak out. For example, Ukraine is preparing for early elections. The Hungarian minority wants Kiev to establish electoral districts that give ethnic Hungarians at least one deputy in the Verkhovna Rada. They have not succeeded so far. The districts are currently carved up in a way that divides the ethnic Hungarian population, so they have no chance of electing one of their own. There are many more such examples.

We want Ukraine to become a real home for all of its citizens and to renounce the idea of a political system based on the logic of a government of the victors. But it is Ukrainians who must find a solution. We cannot do it for them. Believe me, this would be the best outcome for Russia, because we want a friendly Ukraine. We want ethnic Russians who consider Ukraine their home to continue to live there and to have a say in the government’s domestic and foreign policy and other issues, to have a voice in the country.

I heard what you said about the claims that Russia wants to create a second Transnistria in Ukraine, a buffer zone. This is nonsense. The people who make these claims apparently believe that Transnistria’s current status works for Russia, which is such a sleazy accusation that I don’t want to dignify it with a response, but I have to, because the facts are suppressed or distorted otherwise.

No one seems to remember that it 2003 it was Russia that negotiated the Kozak memorandum, which Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin and Transnistrian leaders initialled. The document was to be singed in the morning, but the night before Javier Solana called President Voronin on behalf of the European Union to convince him not to sign the document, saying that it would not be in the interests of Moldova’s cooperation with the EU. If not for that, the Transnistrian conflict would have been settled long ago. Concerns about the long deployment period for Russian peacekeepers would be moot, because the deployment period would be coming to an end now. The idea that we prevented a Transnistrian settlement and now want to do the same in Ukraine can only be the product of a fevered mind seeking to dupe the public.

Question: On 9 September the Dutch Safety Board released a preliminary report on the crash of the Malaysian airliner. The wording is quite strange, but the meaning is still clear: The airplane broke up in mid-air as a result of structural damage caused by ‘a large number of high-energy objects that penetrated the aircraft from outside.’ In everyday language, what this means is the plane crashed after something hit it. Is this the official conclusion? Is this what we have been waiting for?

Sergey Lavrov: I’m no expert in this. They certainly have their own professional jargon, which does not sound at all strange to a specialist.

Question: The day before the investigation results were released, the media and blogosphere were flooded with reports that the plane was hit by a Buk missile system from the area controlled by the self-defence forces. Its serial number and the code of the military unit it was assigned to were reported. And that was followed by an exceptionally dry investigation report.

Sergey Lavrov: They tell a lot of tales about Buk missiles. The example you cited has already been refuted. The weapon with the serial number mentioned in the reports was actually deployed in an area controlled by Kiev forces at the time of the crash. There are other supposed facts that are not merely far-fetched, they’re downright lies.

As for the report, it certainly surprised us – even our experts who are comfortable with the terminology and know how the jargon is used. The main reason we were so surprised is that despite all the clamour surrounding this tragedy, the tone of the report was remarkably subdued, and the work is proceeding at a leisurely pace. There are no demands to ensure that experts can resume work at the crash site. There were no attempts to go there to collect, as they say, the debris and see what the entire plane looked like, and nobody made any noise about it.

Question: It’s usually laid out in a hangar…

Sergey Lavrov: International experts spent three weeks in Kiev where they spoke with Ukrainian officials, but questions from Russia’s Defence Ministry and Federal Air Transport Agency in the wake of the crash went unanswered.

Our representative on the international expert panel has been trying to draw the group’s attention to these incongruities. We are working on another list of questions from Russian air transport authorities to identify issues that need to be addressed urgently. On the whole, as I’m told by experts familiar with the way such investigations are conducted, the investigators failed to do a lot of things they were supposed to. I don’t know why that happened. It’s as if the hysterical accusations against Russia and the self-defence forces triggered by the tragedy were useful to someone.

Question: The hysteria was intense.

Sergey Lavrov: It was on every front page, primetime news shows, the Internet, everywhere. But now that froth of propaganda it whipped up has served its purpose, no one wants to investigate the real cause of the crash. This is not acceptable to us. Russia is probably the only country that continues to remind the world about UN Security Council Resolution 2166. I already mentioned it earlier, specifically the demand for an immediate ceasefire around the crash site to provide access to experts, and a thorough, transparent and accountable international investigation of the incident. As for the probe being international in makeup, it seems the ICAO has formed an expert group, and the organisation is taking steps to set up international discussions. But the process is neither transparent, nor accountable. I am not saying the Security Council should investigate the crash, but its calls are commensurate with the seriousness of the tragedy and reflect the concerns of the countries whose citizens were killed and the international community, because after all we’re talking about a civilian airplane shot down there.

Question: Why weren’t Malaysian officials properly involved in the probe? It was a Malaysian plane after all. But the country’s authorities seemed to be ignored – they just handed over the flight recorders.

Sergey Lavrov: Malaysian Defence Minister Hishammuddin Hussein visited Russia. He also visited Ukraine, and I think the Netherlands as well. He plans to go to Australia.

Question: Did he visit Russia in connection with the crash?

Sergey Lavrov: Yes. They want our opinion, because they knew about the findings reported at the Defence Ministry briefing on 21 July, and about the questions released by the Federal Air Transport Agency. They want to talk with our experts. We welcome their interest. We have no reason not to answer or at least discuss the questions we have asked, which have so far gone unanswered.

Question: It has become commonplace in the last 10-15 years to blame whoever the most influential media point their fingers at, rather than the actual guilty party. Do you think we will ever know the truth about flight MH17?

Sergey Lavrov: I very much hope that we will, but that’s not up to me. Russia, its political leadership and the Foreign Ministry can only keep reminding the international community what needs to be done. This brings me back to the UN Security Council resolution that I mentioned earlier, which Russia actively supported and which is binding on all parties. The rest in up to those entrusted with the investigation.

Question: Clearly, our assessments and those of the West are almost diametrically opposed. Sometimes it seems that we live in different realities created in part by the media. Without passing judgment on either side, it is obvious that we have entered a new stage in relations with the West and that what existed prior to this year won’t be coming back. It is natural and, I think, right that we are pivoting to the rest of the world instead of focusing exclusively on Europe and America. This has been long in the making. What’s going on now is just added incentive. Even so, based on my sources and what I’ve read, I get the sense that even the countries that understand why Russia has made and will continue to make such abrupt moves and don’t blame us, are still somewhat bewildered by the pace of change and are not sure how to react. In your work, when you deal with partners outside the West, are you aware of any change in attitude towards Russia? If so, what kind of change?

Sergey Lavrov: First, you are absolutely right in saying that everything happened fast. Having said that, the underlying factors shaping the West’s attitude towards Russia – primarily the US but also the EU to some extent – have been building for a while. Long before the Ukraine crisis, there were calls to isolate and punish Russia first over the “Magnitsky case,” then for refusing to support regime change in Syria, then they took umbrage over Edward Snowden and even took steps in response, for example cancelling President Obama’s visit to Moscow on the eve of the G20 Summit in S.t Petersburg. As for the media coverage of our preparations for the Sochi Olympic Games, clearly a lot of energy went into creating an image of Russia as a failed state that is only capable of spending huge amounts of money on PR stunts. It kept building and building. To our deep regret, our constructive response to such “forays” against us has been ignored. Back in January of this year, when a full-scale Russia-EU summit was being planned, before the coup in Ukraine, the European Union downgraded it to a lunch or dinner. There was no real, comprehensive conversation between European commissioners and Russian government ministers. So, for some reason, there have been grudges for a while. While things are not completely out of control now, our Western partners are taking a very confrontational line. The reason is simple. They don’t want to acknowledge what is obvious to us: the coup was organised with the direct support, if not encouragement, of the US and Brussels. After the opposition members they actively supported came to power and formed a new government, they could get away with anything. They are absolved of everything they do. We don’t hear any attempts to rein in their unacceptable statements on the question of interethnic relations, Russia, minorities or the neo-Nazi tendencies on display in the country. This is not why Russia began expanding relations with other regions and countries. Our foreign policy concept since 2000 has stressed the need to develop relations with all regions and countries that are ready to cooperate with us on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. Portraying the Russian President’s trips in Latin America as an attempt to compensate for the failure of the G8 summit is sheer stupidity. The BRICS summit had been planned a year ago and nobody interpreted it as an alternative to Russia’s relations with the West. This is not our approach.

As for perceptions of Russian-Western relations in Latin America, Asia and Africa, I have not heard any support for the Western position from any of our partners or during high-level contacts. However, at public forums – at the UN and other multilateral venues – nobody is willing to openly voice disagreement with the totally biased and partial position taken by the West. But we also know that American as well as some European envoys are being sent to every capital of the world in order to lobby the leaders of these countries not to support Russia, to join the Western sanctions, and not to do anything that would advance relations with the Russian Federation. It’s unprecedented, in my opinion. These campaigns are an attempt to subvert Russia’s relations with its partners.

Question: Can the current situation be compared to that of the 1980s?

Sergey Lavrov: We didn’t see anything like this then.

Question: You mean the situation is worse today?

Sergey Lavrov: Perhaps the only case that was similar was when the US boycotted the Olympics in the USSR.

Question: And when the South Korean airliner was shot down?

Sergey Lavrov: I don’t remember anything comparable. At the time, I was working at the UN in New York. I remember this episode, it was also considered by the UN Security Council, but it felt completely different.

Question: Why does the EU – a powerful political and economic association – toe the American foreign policy line so readily? What leverage does the US use?

Sergey Lavrov: In this case they used appeals to universal human values. They argued that Ukraine had a president who had lost the people’s trust and had not lived up to their expectations, a president who was toppled as a result of a democratic revolution; and that European values, which he wanted to prevent Ukraine from adopting by not signing the agreement with the European Union, prevailed. That’s a very simplistic way of describing what happened.

Question: But Europe also has economic and cultural ties with us. Why are they prepared to ignore this and follow the American line?

Sergey Lavrov: I don’t know. Europe once produced thinkers who argued that economics determines politics, but now we are hearing the opposite in the EU, that is, a willingness to sacrifice economics to politics. We are seeing an extremely ideological approach. This cannot last long, and indeed reasonable voices inside the European Union have been pointing out how paradoxical it is to sign a peace deal in Minsk on the same day (5 September) that the EU instructed the Committee of Permanent Representatives in Brussels to prepare a fresh round of sanctions. It happened on the very same day that things began moving forward, thanks mainly to the initiative of Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Question: You’ve mentioned how America has invoked values to put pressure on Europe. Could it be that the EU is simply afraid of the US, and worries about economic damage and so on and so forth?

Sergey Lavrov: I’ve mentioned only what is visible on the surface. Of course, a major battle is underway. America wants to use the situation to sever Europe from Russia economically and get the best terms possible in the ongoing negotiations over the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. Negotiations have been underway for several years. Europe strongly defended its interests. Europeans believed that the US has sought to gain unfair advantage. But now these efforts have been stepped up, including an attempt to impose American liquefied natural gas on Europe at prices that cannot compete with Russian prices. There are clearly economic interests at play. But geopolitical calculations play a huge role – probably even the defining role.

Question: It looks as if we are losing Europe to the Americans.

Sergey Lavrov: I don’t think so. We see that the EU is reassessing things. The fact that some of the smaller and less powerful countries in the European Union are beginning to openly acknowledge that sanctions are leading to a dead end and are counterproductive speaks volumes.

Question: As I was preparing for this interview, I read the directives of the UN and the OSCE, and I also read up on the history of the 1989 case in which American courts indicted the president of Panama and the US carried out a special operation to take him out of the country and imprison him for life. One gets the impression that the UN and the OSCE just provided a front, and that this is simply a case of “might makes right.” Imagine a crisis in Mexico in which regions close to the US border were seeking self-determination. I am sure the US would not think twice about sending troops in. And you wouldn’t hear a peep from the rest of the world about it. We are, in fact, reverting to the times of the Roman Empire and the idea that “might makes right.” Isn’t that so?

Sergey Lavrov: This is the logic and foreign policy philosophy of the Americans, including President Obama who has made “American exceptionalism” his main slogan, to which President Putin has responded on several occasions in his speeches. I’m not going to repeat what he said. But we should remember that the idea of exceptionalism, in one form or another, has repeatedly led humanity to catastrophe. We must learn from history.

It is not only the example you mentioned that shows how little has changed since that time. One could also mention Grenada, or the events in Haiti in the last quarter of the past century when President Jean Bertrand Aristide was overthrown by a Haitian Maidan and fled the capital. The US gave him shelter, let him stay in the country for a while, bucked him up, gave him support and reinstalled him in power in Haiti. This is in response to what they say about Viktor Yanukovych – he’s the one who fled the country, so anything goes now. Ukraine is not Haiti, of course, but it needs to be treated with even more care.

Question: But the method is the same in both cases.

Sergey Lavrov: Absolutely the same. Let’s not forget that the National Security Doctrine adopted by the US in 2010, which expressly states that the US respects international law but reserves the right to take any actions to defend its interests, including the use of force without UN sanction.

Question: This year marks 100 years since Gavrilo Princip pulled the trigger on a small bridge in Sarajevo and set in motion the First World War. In the 100 years since, the Balkans have remained the “powder keg” of Europe. The horrible war in the Balkans ended twenty years ago with the signing of the Dayton peace accords in Europe. I recently visited Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was the main subject of the accords, of which Russia is a guarantor. I saw the situation there, I met with the leaders of all the communities and with the President of the Republika Srpska, Milorad Dodik. There was a sense that everyone was unhappy with Dayton and that something was brewing. Everybody wants change. I talked with our diplomats there (I think we have a strong team there). Because these are past events and are marginal in international diplomacy today, isn’t there a sense that events on the ground there might get ahead of the diplomatic community, if not tomorrow then maybe in the near future? Isn’t there anything that can be done to prevent another flare-up in the Balkans? For example, by revising the Dayton accords or introducing new functions? In spite of the bombing of Belgrade and Kosovo, we cooperated with the West there.

Sergey Lavrov: It would be very dangerous to revise Dayton agreements because it’s the reason Bosnia and Herzegovina exist as a single state. The country has a very complicated structure: three different groups make up the state (Serbs, Bosniaks and Croats) and there are two entities, as they are referred to in the agreement – Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosniaks and Croats. Neither the Croats, nor the Bosniaks have their own entity, they share one, but they are two of the three ethnic groups that make up the state alongside the Serbs. Its structure reflects the history of the region, but also the wish of the Europeans not to leave the Muslims – the Bosniaks – alone on a very narrow strip of territory. Because otherwise Republika Srpska would join Serbia (which the EU feared), and Bosnian Croats would join Croatia. This structure, which had proved workable in federal Yugoslavia, was designed to avoid this outcome. But after the collapse of Yugoslavia, largely provoked by the European Union (let’s not forget that Croatia was the first member of Yugoslavia that declared its independence), the EU agonised for a long time over whether or not to recognise it and what to do. Germany decided that there was no time to wait and recognised it unilaterally. (The European Union gradually edged closer and closer to that position).

The Dayton accords give veto power to each of the three groups. If that were to change, there would be a temptation to turn Bosnia and Herzegovina into a unitary state. There is a marked tendency toward this, including in the position of the European Union. They are unhappy that the voice of the Serbs must be heeded when making important decisions, for example on whether to join international organisations like NATO. And they do not want to infringe on the rights of Muslims out of a belief that they should be the predominant group that embodies the Bosnian state. This will not work. The current structure is very complicated: the Presidium consists of three persons – a Bosniak, a Croat and a Serb. They confer with one another, but there are many political problems. The high representative of the EU, who wields dictatorial powers, plays a very harmful role. These powers should have been revoked a long time ago. Since the EU backed the move to make Bosnia and Herzegovina a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council several years ago, it would be ridiculous to continue to have it as a virtual protectorate.

We want to see these powers revoked, and we want the Bosnians to agree among themselves and find a common denominator. We do not want them to be dragged into organisations that are unacceptable to any of the three main groups or to be forced into partnerships that suit no one. I don’t think there is any other option. If the Dayton accords are torn up, I guarantee that there will be a great temptation to redraw borders, because the Serbs in Bosnia have long been asking: “Why was Kosovo allowed to do this, while we don’t want to separate, but rather to reunite?” There is a lot of this kind of talk, but President of Republika Sprska Milorad Dodik, with whom I had worked very closely – and we continue to meet – continues to support Dayton. The threat to the peace accords comes from those who would like to create a unitary state in place of the Dayton structure.

Question: Going back to the pattern of American behaviour. You mentioned the example of Panama and Haiti, and I wanted to remind you that our history has examples like Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan. To listen to you, malicious US envoys travel all over the world and use threats and persuasion to set everyone against Russia, which is portrayed as a victim. But over the past ten years, we have been a strong, self-confident state from an economic, political and social standpoint, and consequently the mere fact of our existence could make us an example to emulate and a partner to work with. Based on what you said, it sounds like the world still recoils from us, and 25 years of post-Soviet history have not produced a cultural or political model that other countries want to emulate. Why?

Question: And let me add something. Immediately after her election as the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federika Mogerini said that the European Union no longer considers Russia a strategic partner. Are we public enemy number one again?

Sergey Lavrov: First, I did not say that everybody is against us, but that the US, which I did not describe as bad and malicious (the Americans are what they are, in thrall to their conviction that they are exceptional, and nothing can change that), but that they are sending envoys all over the world to turn everyone against us. That is true. However, they have failed to persuade anyone except the EU and some of their close allies outside NATO and the European Union.

Second, I assure you that the world is not “recoiling” from us, as demonstrated by the geographical scope of Russia’s international contacts both inside and outside Russia. And not only the geographical scope but the substance of the agreements we have been signing. We have signed numerous documents with the BRICS countries and the Gulf countries; we recently played host to the Crown Prince of Bahrain who signed an agreement with the Direct Investment Fund, and much else. So, I cannot agree that everybody is against us, that everybody is “recoiling” from us, and that we have no partners with whom to develop a constructive and sound agenda.

As for Hungary and Czechoslovakia, these are facts. Our attitude to these events, and to Afghanistan, has been expressed repeatedly. But let’s not forget that they were members of the Warsaw Treaty. In Afghanistan there was a friendly regime. That’s historical fact.

We were discussing Panama, Grenada, Haiti and Cuba not in order to suggest that if they are allowed to do it then so are we, but merely to highlight the foreign policy philosophy of the US. Their national security doctrine states that they will use force regardless of international law. That’s my point.

I wouldn’t say that we feel isolated. In fact, Western colleagues, from the EU for example, want to be in contact with us and they are; they come here, they phone us, and they extend invitations to us. Some planned meetings have been postponed, which is like an ostrich with its head in the sand, because while publicly announcing that they’ve been forced to postpone this or that meeting or visit, they ask us in the same breath not to jump to conclusions and reassure us that they are interested in continued dialogue and addressing everything that was planned, only later. So be it. We aren’t touchy.

I’m sure this will pass. Reasonable voices are starting to be heard in the EU. We don’t think for a second that this estrangement will be long-term. Russia wants to see our strategic partnership with the European Union grow stronger and develop. We reaffirm our commitment to the idea voiced repeatedly by Russian President Vladimir Putin of creating a common security, economic and humanitarian space stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific in the interests of equal, indivisible security and the full use of competitive advantages in these difficult times when it’s so important to have partners and comparative advantages on the economic front. If we were to combine the potential of Russia and the European Union, we would both gain from occupying a stronger position on world markets.

Lest anyone think that we’ve discarded this slogan and do not want to flesh it out with real substance, as a first practical step back in January this year, during a meeting over dinner in Brussels with European Council President Herman Van Rompuy and European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso, President Putin proposed initiating expert consultations on creating a free trade zone between the EU, the Customs Union and the emerging Eurasian Economic Union by 2020. That idea is still alive, and it continues to generate interest, including in the context of what is happening in the economic sphere between Ukraine and the EU and Ukraine and the CIS free-trade zone. That would answer a lot of questions.

Question: Several months ago your colleague and frequent interlocutor, US Secretary of State John Kerry, criticised Russia for behaving in the 21st century in 19th century fashion. In my opinion, the 19th century was not the worst period; it was a golden age of diplomacy that offered solutions from which we could benefit. However, much has obviously changed since then. Seeing the ongoing changes in the wider world, I am worried about diplomats. There were rules in the past; for example, diplomats did not disclose what they talked about at their meetings. Now some things seem to be leaked out by idealistic well-wishers, or one of the interlocutors makes their discussions public because they consider it necessary. I remember how you slammed a British colleague who answered you publicly because he didn’t like what you said behind closed doors. How do you feel about being a diplomat working in these conditions?

Sergey Lavrov: My British colleague did not answer me publicly. They waited about three months before leaking to the press what I had supposedly said but, in fact, had not. I was quoting another European colleague who came to Moscow from Tbilisi in August 2008 and shared his impressions of Mikheil Saakashvili. I was simply quoting his impressions. As for why they leaked this three months later, alleging it was a quote from me – that’s for them to explain.

Question: They were probably preparing a witty reply …

Sergey Lavrov: There must be some ethical norms in diplomacy, and in politics in general, and these norms do not allow disclosing confidential conversations, at least not to the general public.

The case of Jose Manuel Barroso is indicative in this sense. I cannot justify media outlets that claimed the quote was evidence of the Russian government’s intention to send troops into Ukraine to seize Kiev. It’s on their conscience. We responded immediately with an offer to publish the full text of the conversation. Trust me, we have no reason to not make even the most secret conversations public, if necessary. We have nothing to hide and nothing to be ashamed of. The reason why such conversations are kept secret is that we don’t want to scare people off from agreements. When tentative agreements become public knowledge, some people will likely want to use that to their advantage.

Question: We were talking about what happens behind closed doors. Do you intend to write about it one day? If you’re planning to write your memoirs, how many years should you wait?

Sergey Lavrov: I’ve never thought about it, but I’ll answer your question now. I will not write a memoir. Talking is much more interesting.