1. Restoring the central and coordinating role of the Universal Organization in global affairs, which has been compromised as a result of Washington and its satellites' policies aimed at making the United Nations suit their agenda, is the main priority of the 79th session of the UN General Assembly. This task is enshrined in the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation.

The activities of the United Nations should primarily aim to shape a more just, democratic and sustainable multipolar world order building on the principles of the UN Charter in their entirety and interrelation, first of all the principle of sovereign equality of states.

2. Attempts by Westerners to promote their notorious concept of the "rules-based world order," which involves a revision of the decades-old international legal architecture, discreditation or arbitrary interpretation of the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and creation of alternative narrow decision-making formats bypassing the Universal Organization, must be strongly opposed.

3. We should resolutely combat the flawed neocolonial practices employed by the collective West to slow down the objective historical process of the emergence of a genuinely multipolar world order, and retain its fading dominance and continue to prey on the countries of the world majority.

This includes illegal unilateral sanctions, unfair trade agreements, restricting access to new technologies, plundering the resources of sovereign states, and even direct military interventions. Such actions harm the most vulnerable communities in affected countries and further delay the prospect of implementing the Sustainable Development Goals.

Against this backdrop, the Group of Friends in Defense of the Charter of the United Nations prepared a draft UN General Assembly resolution on "Eradication of colonialism in all its forms and manifestations." The main objectives of the document include declaring 14 December the Day of Struggle against Colonialism in all its forms and manifestations (to commemorate the date of the adoption of the UNGA Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples of 1960) as well as putting the relevant item on the General Assembly's agenda.

The initiative was approved by the General Assembly Special Committee on Decolonization (C‑24) in June 2024. We call on all constructively minded partners to support it in the UNGA Fourth Committee, which will take place in autumn 2024.

4. Russia will continue the special military operation carried out in line with Article 51 of the UN Charter until all its objectives are achieved.

Financial, technical and military assistance provided to Kiev by Western countries, including expanded arms supplies, is only protracting the Ukraine crisis and leading to its escalation. This policy makes the collective West an accomplice to the crimes of the neo‑Nazi regime.

The Armed Forces of Ukraine, failing to reverse the dire situation on the battlefield, are retaliating by hitting civilians and civilian infrastructure in Russian border areas. All war crimes as well as terrorist attacks committed by the Kiev regime are carefully registered, and the perpetrators will be brought to judgement.

Moscow is open to dialogue on the political and diplomatic settlement of the crisis. On 14 June 2024, the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin outlined the conditions for the start the negotiations process: withdrawal of Ukrainian armed formations from the Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics, Zaporozhye Region and Kherson Region; neutral nuclear-free status for Ukraine, its demilitarization and denazification; ensuring the rights, freedoms and interests of the Russian-speaking population; legal recognition of new territorial realities (status of Crimea, Sevastopol, DPR, LPR, Kherson and Zaporozhye Regions as entities of the Russian Federation), as well as Kiev's renunciation of its claims to NATO membership and the removal of all sanctions against Russia.

However, at present, the Ukrainian authorities and their Western mentors seem unwilling to negotiate. Instead, they are trying to enforce Zelensky's "peace formula," which makes a comprehensive, sustainable and just settlement even more difficult to achieve. The Westerners are trying to lure the countries of the world majority into supporting this initiative, inviting them to participate in all sorts of so‑called peace conventions. We urge all sensible members of the international community not to fall for these provocations.

We take note of the engagement of the UN Secretariat's leadership in these counterproductive endeavours in violation of Article 100 of the UN Charter, which requires UN officials to maintain an equidistant position. By doing so, the Secretariat denies itself the opportunity to act as an honest mediator.

5. The Ukraine crisis marks the extreme point of the Euro-Atlantic security system degradation. In this context, the initiative to shape a new security architecture in Eurasia put forth by President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin on 14 June 2024 builds on the principle of equal and indivisible security and rejection of "zero sum games." Countries and associations of countries should not regard any part of the world as their exclusive sphere of influence or seek to ensure their own security at the expense of that of others.

In future, the new Eurasian system could be used as a model by other regions of the world with a view to stabilizing the global military and political situation. We invite all interested countries of the continent – both from its Asian and European parts – to join the discussion on the matter.

6. Primary responsibility for preventing conflicts and addressing their consequences rests with the states involved. International assistance under the UN auspices must not substitute for national efforts and can only be provided with the consent of the authorities and in line with the UN Charter. Mediation and good offices, as well as preventive diplomacy should be based on the principles of impartiality and unconditional respect for the sovereignty of states.

7. The aim of reforming the UN Security Council is to bring this body in tune with modern geopolitical realities by increasing the representation of states of the Global South and East in its membership. At the same time, the transformations should not affect the efficiency and responsiveness of the UNSC, meaning that the number of its members should be kept within the low twenties.

Special attention should be paid to redressing the historical injustice done to the African continent based on modalities developed by Africans themselves. We support Brazil and India as candidates for permanent "seats" on the reformed Security Council. An increase in the number of Westerners in any membership category, given their overrepresentation and their non-constructive agenda, is inadmissible.

No matter which path the reform takes, the resulting transformation model should be supported by the vast majority of Member States and, ideally, endorsed by consensus. There seems to be no agreement so far. The relevant discussions should be pursued with patience in the form of Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN) without imposing artificial deadlines. Switching to text-based discussions before agreeing on the basic reform parameters would be counterproductive.

The prerogatives of UNSC permanent members, including their veto power, are not subject to revision. Veto is not a privilege, but a crucial SC mechanism that guarantees the adoption of truly balanced and measured decisions that take into account the entire range of views. This is particularly relevant given the apparent unwillingness of the Western members to pay heed to their colleagues in the Council.

8. Russia is actively engaged in preparations for the "Summit of the Future" (New York, 22‑23 September 2024) and the agreement of its outcome documents: the Pact for the Future as well as the Global Digital Compact and Declaration on Future Generations as its annexes.

Any endeavours to improve UN work should aim to enhance the efficiency and credibility of the Organization. Its intergovernmental nature and division of powers between the main bodies need to be maintained. UN Member States have the final say on initiatives to reshape the United Nations Organisation, and it is up to them to decide which proposals deserve to be implemented.

Attempts to raise the "profile" of non-governmental organizations and other non-state actors in the work of the Universal Organization create the risk of undermining its foundations. We cannot agree to initiatives on establishing new structures that would duplicate the functions of existing UN bodies, especially with regard to international peace and security. Nor do we support the idea to strengthen the human rights component of the UN activities. We regard as detrimental any steps to link security and climate issues in a universal manner, since it paves the way for interference in the internal affairs of states and blurring of the UNSC mandate.

9. We support realistic initiatives to optimize the work of the UN General Assembly within the Ad Hoc Working Group on its revitalization. In our view, it is of paramount importance to fine-tune the UNGA working methods, streamline its overloaded agenda and strengthen multilingualism. Any innovation should be reasonable and meet current needs. Attempts to redistribute the UNSC powers in favour of the General Assembly are unacceptable.

10. We support developing and strengthening cooperation between the UN and regional and sub-regional associations in conformity with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. The UN should increase constructive collaboration with the CSTO, SCO, CIS, BRICS and EAEU, which have a better understanding of the specificities of their respective areas of responsibility and can therefore synergize with the UN efforts to respond to current regional challenges and threats.

11. We underline the imperative of applying a comprehensive approach to conflict resolution in the Middle East and North Africa on the universally recognized international legal basis, without external interference. There is also a need for joint international efforts and initiatives to facilitate the creation of a region-wide security architecture.

12. We stand for a peaceful settlement in Syria based on the commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the country through a Syrian-led and Syrian-owned political process with the UN assistance, as provided for in UNSC resolution 2254. The relevant tasks are directly specified in the mandate of UN Special Envoy for the Syrian Arab Republic Geir O. Pedersen, who in effect is trying to replace it with obscure step‑by‑step plans that have no added value.

It is essential to continue fighting against terrorist groups, which remain present in the territories beyond Damascus control, first of all in Idlib and Transeuphratia. We regard the presence of the US and its allies as well as Turkey in the north, north-east Syria and Al Tanf zone as illegal and undermining Syria's territorial integrity. Arbitrary Israeli attacks as well as decisions concerning the occupied Syrian Golan Heights in breach of international law further destabilize the situation.

The aggravation of the humanitarian situation remains the main challenge for the Syrians. The international community's response, including through the UN, remains inadequate due to the policies pursued by Western countries. They fail to comply with their donor obligations, reject urgent early recovery projects, while plundering the natural resources of the Syrian Arab Republic and tightening illegal unilateral sanctions; besides, they block the facilitation of the voluntary return of refugees and IDPs, despite the overwhelming burden of Syrians' protracted stay in refugee-hosting countries.

13. The unprecedented escalation of violence in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict zone, alongside the growing threats of destabilization and spillover of tensions into the wider region, cannot but cause concern. We oppose terrorism in all its manifestations, oppose attacks targeting civilians, no matter the location or country they occur in, including the attack in Israel on 7 October 2023. Yet the said attack cannot be used as a pretext for the collective punishment of millions of Palestinians as well as attacking neighbouring Lebanon and Syria.

It is therefore necessary to ensure a permanent ceasefire everywhere; release all hostages and arbitrarily detained persons; provide a safe and unhampered humanitarian access to all victims and those in need; resume peace talks based on the universally recognized legal framework, with an emphasis on launching an irreversible process to establish an independent and sovereign Palestinian state within the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital.

14. We are concerned about the impasse in the political process in Libya. Holding nation-wide elections and forming consolidated authorities with a fair representation of all regions of the country could be a solution. Such steps should be implemented without excessive external pressure. We encourage the Libyans to seek compromises and restore consolidated state institutions as soon as possible. We are convinced that there is no alternative to an inclusive dialogue with due regard for the concerns of all Libyan sides and assisted by the UN.

15. Normalization in Yemen is hindered by the escalation in the region, including the aggravation in the zone of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and militarization of the adjacent waters. However, the negotiation process needs to be energized, involving all Yemeni protagonists, including Ansar Allah, and leading regional players, with impartial UN mediation. Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General for Yemen Hans Grundberg should further engage with the sides to operationalize the existing roadmap.

The UNSC sanctions against Yemen have lost their relevance and, due to their unbalanced nature, only add to the continued turbulence in the region. We are concerned that certain states are using the UNSC sanctions decisions for unfair purposes. We condemn the illegal transfer to third countries of military hardware seized during ship searches.

16. We welcome Iraq's steady progress towards strengthening its national sovereignty. We are convinced that the Iraqi authorities and people are ready to assume full responsibility for the political future of their country. We supported the unanimously adopted UNSC resolution 2732 on termination of the activities of the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq by the end of 2025.

We consistently support efforts of the Iraqi government to improve the socio-economic situation in the country as well as address the terrorist threat. We acknowledge progress made in the work to reconcile the differences between various ethnic and faith-based groups of the Iraqi society through a nation-wide dialogue. We emphasize that turning Iraq into an arena for regional confrontation in inaccessible. We think it is important for Baghdad to resolve all problems with neighbouring countries.

17. We consistently pursue the policy to facilitate national reconciliation, enhance stability in Afghanistan and turn it into a state free from terrorism and drugs.

ISIL's growing influence and the threat of terrorist activities spilling over into Central Asia and beyond cause serious concern. We promote the imperative of the international community's pragmatic interaction with the Taliban de facto authorities without using pressure or ultimatums. We attach paramount importance to regional support for the settlement, first of all within the framework of the Moscow consultations mechanism as well as through regional organizations, such as the SCO and CSTO.

We support the activities of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), first and foremost in terms of scaling up humanitarian assistance to the local population, providing conditions for an early Afghan asset unfreeze and mobilizing donor funds to revitalize the national economy. Any modification to the UNAMA mandate, as well as the creation of new posts, including the Secretary-General's Special Envoy, is subject to consent of the de facto authorities.

We are convinced that the main burden of post-conflict reconstruction should be borne by the US and its NATO allies responsible for the devastating aftermath of their 20‑year presence on Afghan soil.

18. The escalation of military and political tensions around the Korean peninsula has been entirely caused by the US and its allies' reckless military build‑up in North-East Asia, triggering a fair response on the part of the PRC. Full responsibility for the present deplorable state of the Korean settlement process rests with Washington.

UNSC sanctions against the DPRK did not help stabilize the situation in the region, but caused the humanitarian deterioration in the country as a side effect, aggravated by the aftermath of illegal unilateral coercive measures of individual countries and associations of countries.

We insist that the UNSC sanctions pressure applied in the Korean matter be dramatically eased, which would allow for political measures towards a detente around the peninsula. In a broader sense, we should consider building a resilient security system in North-East Asia taking into account the interests of all states in the region, including the DPRK. The elimination of the Panel of Experts of the UNSC 1718 Sanctions Committee is a measure that is long overdue and cannot be avoided. This panel, in defiance of the principles of objectivity and impartiality, served the interests of Pyongyang's opponents. Any alternative monitoring mechanisms outside the UNSC framework would lack international legitimacy.

19. On the Iranian nuclear issue, we believe that there is no alternative to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). We warn the US, which withdrew from the Plan in 2018, as well as Western parties to the nuclear deal, against further breaches of the provisions of the JCPOA and UNSC resolution 2231. We underline the inadmissibility of destructive steps against the Plan within the UNSC, in particular, the possible ungrounded use by Western countries of a sanctions snapback against Iran in violation of the procedures provided for in the JCPOA. We reject attempts to retrospectively accuse Iran of "violating" the missile-related provisions (paragraphs 3 and 4) of Annex B to UNSC resolution 2231, which were terminated in October 2023. We call on Washington and its allies to resume negotiations for an early and full restoration of the JCPOA implementation.

20. In the context of the Cyprus issue, we need to search for a fair and sustainable settlement model that would build on relevant UNSC resolutions and incorporate just interests of both communities. Imposing arbitrary timeframes is unacceptable. We welcome the Secretary-General's efforts under his good offices mission. The stabilizing role played by UN troops in Cyprus remains relevant. We do not think that the European Union needs boost its 'political' role on this track.

21. The key to ensuring the sustainable functioning of Bosnia and Herzegovina's institutions is respect for the equality of the two entities and the three state constituent peoples, in full compliance with the 1995 Dayton Accords. Bosnians deserve the right to independently decide on the destiny of their country. We believe that the Office of the High Representative should be abolished as soon as possible. The post of the High Representative remains vacant, because Christian Schmidt's candidature was not approved by the UNSC.

Relations between the three ethnic groups were undermined by UNGA resolution 78/282 (adopted on 23 May 2024) promoted by the Bosniaks in violation of the country's constitution and the Dayton Accords and supported by Westerners, designating 11 July as the International Day of Remembrance of the Srebrenica "Genocide." The document is politicized and anti‑Serb in nature. The total number of Member States that did not support the resolution significantly exceeded those that voted in its favour. We are worried that this reckless move will enhance centrifugal tendencies in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

22. The situation in Kosovo is of particular concern, since its leadership is increasingly drifting away from the letter and spirit of UNSC resolution 1244, disregarding its obligations and pursuing a segregation policy against the Serbian population. The problem can only be solved if Belgrade and Pristina reach an agreement without externally imposed ready-made solutions. The situation reflects the relevance of the United Nations presence in Kosovo. We oppose any steps to reduce the human and financial capacities of the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo. UNSC meetings on Kosovo should remain open‑ended and regular.

23. The peace-building process in Columbia should be based on the Final Peace Agreement approved by the UNSC. We welcome the Columbian parties' commitment to its comprehensive implementation. However we have to point out the slow pace of the practical realization of the agreements and lack of proper security guarantees for ex-combatants involved in the peace process as well as the affected civilian population. We are looking forward to practical outcomes from the efforts to establish a dialogue between the authorities and armed groups, including the National Liberation Army.

24. The continuous degradation of the situation in Haiti was caused by years of interference in the country's affairs and attempts to "design" its political landscape from the outside. The deployment of a foreign military contingent to the island should be time-limited and focused on rebuilding law enforcement agencies' capacity and assisting them in restoring law and order. A viable solution to the crisis is only achievable through a broad-based intra-Haitian political dialogue.

25. We stand for a balanced depoliticized approach when considering the developments in Myanmar, including on searching for ways to improve the humanitarian situation in the Rakhine State. It is through bilateral dialogue between Myanmar and Bangladesh that a sustainable solution can be found to the issue of Rohingya refugees. It is unacceptable to use the Security Council to put pressure on the authorities in Nay Pyi Taw by dragging into the Council unrelated human rights issues using unverified information from unreliable sources.

26. Russia has always consistently advocated normalization of relations between India and Pakistan. We hope that the sides involved will prevent the situation in the region from deteriorating again. We believe that the Kashmir issue should be settled through bilateral talks between New Delhi and Islamabad.

27. A leading role in crisis prevention and conflict resolution in Africa should be played by Africans themselves with support from the international community, as appropriate. We stand for paced and progressive strengthening of the UN's cooperation with the African Union and the continent's sub-regional organizations. We attach great importance to UNSC resolution 2719 adopted in December 2023 on ensuring access to UN assessed contributions for African Union‑led peace support operations. The implementation of this document will help further strengthen the strategic partnership between the UN and the pan-African organization.

We intend to further actively contribute to the political settlement of crises in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan, Somalia, Mali and the Sahara-Sahel region as a whole, as well as in other hotspots in Africa. We consistently support the continent's commitment to finally shedding its colonial legacy and neo-colonial manifestations thereof. We actively resist attempts to discredit Russia's cooperation with African countries.

UNSC sanctions regimes against a number of African countries should be regularly revised for possible softening, particularly with regard to arms embargoes. Far from contributing to conflict resolution, outdated and ineffective restrictions hamper governments' efforts to combat illegal armed groups.

28. We continue to closely watch the developments in West Africa and Sahel. We welcome enhanced engagement between Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger with a view to collectively ensuring security in the region. We commend the efforts by the Mali government to stabilize the situation in the country, address the terrorist threat, drug trafficking, and cross-border movement of small arms and light weapons (SALW) as well as fighters. International assistance to Bamako through the UN should be provided in line with the state's priorities without external interference.

29. As a permanent member of the UNSC and bilateral partner, we continue promoting a long-lasting and sustainable solution to the protracted internal conflict in the CAR. We are open to collaboration with all stakeholders on the ground, as well as international and bilateral partners of the CAR government. We underline Russia's key contribution to stabilizing the situation in the country and securing government control of 85% of the national territory. We oppose attempts to defame the activities of Russian instructors on political grounds.

30. We point out the serious aggravation of the security situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which most adversely affects the humanitarian situation in the country. We believe that the withdrawal of the UN Stabilization Mission in the DRC should be carried out on a step-by-step basis. Creating voids of insecurity in the regions left behind by peace keepers, first of all in the east of the country, is inadmissible.

31. We support efforts to settle the armed conflict in Sudan, which has continued since April 2023. We regard the country's Supreme (Sovereign) Council as the highest legitimate authority. We advocate for preserving the unity, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the state as well as sustainable and comprehensive Sudanese-led resolution of the crisis through a national dialogue without external interference.

Once the violent phase of the conflict is over, practical steps should be taken to resume the inter-Sudanese dialogue. We consider it essential to engage all local influential political forces and ethnic and faith-based groups, as well as high-profile regional leaders.

We welcome the efforts of Personal Envoy of the UN Secretary-General for Sudan Ramtane Lamamra to bring stability and peace to the country. We hope that he will manage to restore confidence in the UN in the eyes of the local population in order to remedy the damage done by the unscrupulous and biased former leadership of the now terminated UN Transition Support Mission in Sudan.

The current situation in the country should not be used as a pretext for further increasing the UNSC sanctions pressure on Darfur. Restoring national unity through a Sudanese-led political process remains the key to normalizing the situation.

32. We consider it of paramount importance to complete the decolonization process as soon as possible in line with fundamental UN General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) approving the 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. The issue remains relevant, with 17 non-self-governing territories still on the agenda of the UNGA Special Committee on Decolonization (C‑24). Russia will continue its active participation in the C‑24.

33. We stand for the strict adherence to the basic principles of UN peacekeeping: consent of the parties, impartiality and non-use of force except for self-defence and defence of the mandate. Peacekeeping efforts are aimed, above all, at facilitating political settlement of armed conflicts. We are concerned about the trend towards overloading mandates with minor tasks, including those of human rights, climate, or gender-related nature. Given the limited financial and human resources, this only prevents the blue helmets from effectively performing their main duties.

Success of missions is largely determined by the ability and willingness of their heads to build constructive relations with states of residence. It is only possible to use new technologies on condition of strict respect for the sovereignty of the receiving country. It is unacceptable to utilize the fight against disinformation to muffle fair criticism against peacekeepers. Intelligence in peacekeeping should solely be used to ensure the safety of peacekeepers and protection of civilians. Expanding mandates of operations by including greater powers to use force is only possible pursuant to a UNSC decision, with the strict consideration of the specificities of each particular situation.

We believe that the UNGA Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C‑34) has a leading role to play in defining the main areas for the development of UN peacekeeping. The C‑34's consensus decisions reflect the collective will of all players involved on this topic. Attempts to bypass this platform are unacceptable.

We believe that the CSTO has good prospects for engaging in the UN peacekeeping activities. The changes to the 2007 Agreement on CSTO Peacekeeping Activities, which are in force, allow the Organization to participate in UN peace support operations under the aegis of a so‑called coordinating state.

34. International support for peacebuilding and peacekeeping should only be provided at the request of the host government, in line with the state' priorities and with a view to building its own capacities. There is a need for greater transparency and detail in the reporting on the expenditures of the UN Secretary-General's Peacebuilding Fund.

35. Sanctions are an auxiliary tool for the UNSC to suppress activities that pose a threat to peace and security. We oppose using them as a means of punishment or for the purposes of unfair competition, exerting pressure on regimes that have fallen out of favour and their economic strangulation.

Restrictions should be carefully calibrated and imposed for a predetermined period of time, with flexibility for their timely modification depending on the situation on the ground. The whole complex of their political, socio-economic, humanitarian, and human rights consequences should be taken into account and kept under constant control. We reject the malpractice of parallel introduction of unlawful unilateral coercive measures against countries that are already under UNSC sanctions and insist that such actions be recognized as inadmissible in relevant UNSC resolutions.

We suggest expanding the mandate of the Ombudsperson to the Security Council's 1267/1989/2253 ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee to cover all those on the United Nations' sanctions list. In this regard, clarifying the functions of the Focal Point for De-listing is not enough for the UNSC sanctions arsenal to become a truly targeted, effective and fair tool of conflict resolution.

36. We call on the international community to join its efforts in the fight against terrorism, with the United Nations' playing a central coordinating role, without any double standards or hidden agendas, and based on the UN Charter, relevant universal conventions and protocols, Security Council's resolutions, as well as the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. It is important to make active use of the array of tools offered by the Council's subsidiary counter-terrorism bodies, particularly of the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), the ISIL and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, and the Taliban Sanctions Committee.

We support the activities of the UN Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT). We advocate for increasing the share of the UN regular budget allocated to the UNOCT. Initiatives focused on building the national counter-terrorism capacities of the recipient countries should remain at the core of the UNOCT programme and project activities.

We believe that states and their competent authorities should play a central role in the fight against terrorism. It is inadmissible to replace interstate counter-terrorism collaboration mechanisms with some kind of "flexible international partnerships" involving a limited number of countries and non-state actors.

There is a need for intensified efforts to cut off ideological and material support, financial and manpower supply to terrorists, as well as closer cooperation between countries in suppressing foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) and bringing them to justice on the basis of "extradite or prosecute" principle.

We oppose the endeavours of the West to erode the international legal counter-terrorism framework, the attempts to universalize unilateral standards in countering terrorism and extremism by manipulating the human rights and gender agendas, as well as the controversial concepts of "preventing violent extremism" and fight against "racially and ethnically motivated violent extremism/terrorism."

As an alternative to Western anti-extremism initiatives, we promote within the United Nations the relevant SCO Convention on Combating Extremism (2017) as a model international treaty on interstate cooperation in the fight against extremist manifestations of all kinds.

We draw the attention of the international community to the dangerous rise in right-wing extremist threats, especially aggressive nationalism and neo-Nazism. We work to expose the terrorist nature of the Kiev regime; highlight the mendacity and double standards of the collective West, which, while making groundless accusations of "aggression" against Russia, is turning a blind eye to the fact that the neo-Nazi regime in Kiev openly renders state support to terrorism. We call on the United States and its allies to refrain from assisting the Ukrainian authorities in political sponsorship of and supplying arms to local neo-Nazi formations, which actively resort to terrorist methods and build ties with transnational organized criminal and terrorist groups in the matters of movement of FTFs and arms trafficking. This process leads to an escalation of counter-terrorism security risks in Europe and the rest of the world.

We advocate for developing international cooperation in the fight against the spread of terrorist and extremist ideologies in the information space by establishing a single and fair international framework for interaction between states in this area, as well as universal rules of responsible online behaviour.

We call for the effective and good-faith implementation of UNSC resolutions on combatting the financing of terrorism (2199, 2253, 2462) and preservation of the professional and depoliticized nature of the leading anti-money laundering formats. We are convinced that any attempts to exclude Russia from specialized international cooperation are contrary to the technical mandate of the global system for combating money laundering and terrorist financing.

37. The global drug problem poses a serious threat to public health and security. We devote equal attention to its three interrelated components: reducing drug demand, reducing drug supply, and strengthening international anti-drug cooperation based on the common and shared responsibility of states. We defend the principle of zero tolerance to illicit drug production and trafficking.

Strict compliance with the three relevant UN conventions of 1961, 1971 and 1988 by all states is essential for the effective functioning of the global drug control system. We consider attempts to destabilize it, including the legalization of drugs for recreational use in the United States, Canada and a number of EU countries, to be a grave violation of these treaties and a threat to the national security of our country. The principle of limiting the use of drugs to medical and scientific purposes only, as enshrined in the conventions, is the best way to implement the human rights to life and health.

Our ultimate goal is to build a drug-free society by promoting healthy lifestyles among children and youth.

We consider it inadmissible to politicize anti-drug cooperation, to break off police contacts with out-of-favour states – just the way the United States and EU countries have done – and to impose such questionable concepts as "harm reduction," which involves drug addiction treatment methods prohibited under Russian legislation.

38. We support the consolidation of international efforts to combat criminal challenges and threats with the UN's central coordinating role and on the basis of good-faith, mutually respectful and equal interstate cooperation.

We believe that attempts to politicize the work of the UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice and the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC), as well as its review mechanism, are destructive. These forums are designed for holding professional discussions on issues of combatting crime, sharing experiences and best practices among law enforcement and judicial experts, identifying new areas and strengthening the legal framework for international anti-crime cooperation.

We emphasize the primary role and responsibility of states and their competent authorities in countering crime. We note the importance of strengthening the legal framework for international cooperation in combating crime through the development of new relevant universal instruments.

We oppose the flooding of anti-crime platforms with irrelevant or secondary issues, which prevents states from fully focusing on finding joint solutions to the most pressing problems in this area.

39. We support international anti-corruption cooperation with the United Nations' playing a central and coordinating role and on the basis of the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC). We reaffirm our commitment to the principles of the Mechanism for the Review of Implementation of the UNCAC and preserving its intergovernmental and technical nature. We attach great importance to the implementation of the political declaration of the 2021 UNGA Special session against Corruption, particularly in terms of filling gaps in international law governing the return of assets. It is essential to ensure that states implement the resolutions of the Conference of the Parties to the UNCAC, including the provisions on the need to preserve the technical nature of cooperation among competent authorities and to refrain from imposing and applying unilateral sanctions.

40. We advocate for maintaining the central role of the UN, particularly of its Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on international information security (IIS). It is important to ensure the implementation of the agreement reached at the eighth session of the OEWG (New York, 8‑12 July 2024) to establish within the UN (following the conclusion of work by the current OEWG in 2025) a single universal consensus-based mechanism on information security with a mandate to develop legally binding norms in the digital sphere. The First Committee of the 79th UNGA session needs to adopt a decision (under agenda item "Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security") that would formalize the results of the July OEWG meeting and provide for agreeing upon the remaining modalities of the new body (participation of non-governmental stakeholders and the functions of the thematic subgroups) exclusively within the OEWG during its final negotiation cycle (December 2024 – July 2025). It is necessary to keep vigilant for and thwart possible attempts by the US and its allies to impose on the world community a non-transparent Programme of Action under their control – in violation of the consensus agreement reached within the OEWG – by introducing in the First Committee a relevant draft General Assembly resolution.

In the area of combating information crime, it is important to pave the way for the adoption by the 79th session of the UN General Assembly of a comprehensive convention on countering the use of information and communications technologies (ICTs) for criminal purposes, which is being developed within the relevant Ad Hoc Committee.

The role of the UN system in the field of ICTs for sustainable development needs to be further strengthened. To this end, relevant efforts need to be intensified within the specialized organizations and mechanisms – the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), and the Internet Governance Forum (IGF). Russia is ready to make a contribution by hosting the IGF in 2025.

In application of the WSIS outcomes, we oppose the introduction of unilateral restrictions and the assertion by individual countries of exclusive rights to Internet governance. We believe it crucial to reflect these provisions in the Global Digital Compact (GDC). We note the inadmissibility of attempts made by the West to include tendentious human rights tropes in the GDC, to fill the text with harmful ideas on the equality of states and non-governmental entities in regulating ICTs, including artificial intelligence (AI).

We advocate the establishment of fair international technical standards and requirements in respect of AI. We consider the ITU to be the most appropriate platform for addressing this task.

41. We emphasize that nuclear disarmament – one of the NPT's pillars – should be viewed as an integral part of a comprehensive process of general and complete disarmament in full accordance with Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in its entirety. The disarmament process should take into account the current geopolitical realities, the indivisible security principle and the importance of progressive steps towards strengthening strategic stability and reducing tensions on a global and regional scale.

42. Despite having withdrawn its ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), Russia remains a State signatory to the Treaty, with all the rights and obligations arising therefrom. The United States remains the biggest obstacle to the CTBT's entry into force as it has sabotaged the process for many years. President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin has sent a clear message in his statements: Russia will not be the first to resume nuclear tests; we will only do this if the United States acts in this way.

43. We oppose attempts to politicize the review process of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which is a cornerstone of global security. We emphasize that nuclear disarmament – one of the NPT's pillars – should be viewed in the context of a comprehensive universal disarmament process, which should take into account the current geopolitical realities, the indivisible security principle and the importance of progressive steps towards strengthening strategic stability and reducing tensions on a global and regional scale.

44. We consistently support the right of states to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. We underscore that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) plays a key role in the exercise of this right. It is unacceptable to politicize the Agency's work or expand its mandate beyond the scope of its Statute. In its work, the Agency should ensure a balance between all the statutory areas of the organization's activities.

We support the IAEA's efforts aimed at the global recognition of an atom as a climate-neutral source of energy. We advocate for preserving the objective, depoliticized, and technically sound nature of the Agency's verification mechanism – the safeguards system, which should be based on agreements concluded between states and the IAEA. We will continue to regularly update the international community on the real situation at the Russian nuclear facility of the Zaporozhye NPP (ZNPP) in the face of intensified attempts by Ukraine to jeopardize nuclear safety and security.

45. We note further degradation and politicization in the work of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which is vividly demonstrated by the activities of the OPCW Technical Secretariat in the context of the Syrian "chemical weapons file." We reject attempts by Western countries to defend the findings of illegitimate entities operating under the auspices of the Technical Secretariat, as well as to promote "punitive" decisions concerning "out-of-favour" countries at the Conference of the States Parties and within the OPCW Executive Council in violation of the norms and requirements of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

46. We will continue to work on strengthening the regime of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) given the United States' active military and biological activities in third countries and the fact that Washington blocks the development of a legally binding protocol to the Convention with an effective verification mechanism.

We advocate for updating the principles and procedures of the Secretary-General's Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons with a view to further strengthening its capacity. We have put forward a number of specific proposals in this regard and look forward to launching this process as soon as possible.

47. We highly appreciate the role of the UNSC 1540 Committee as a subsidiary body of the Security Council aimed at preventing non-State actors from obtaining WMD. We believe it important to step up efforts in this area in the spirit of cooperation, as stipulated in UNSC resolution 1540.

48. We consistently support efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) at the regional level. We consider the work of the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction to be an important process in this area. We are convinced that the elaboration of a relevant legally binding agreement would help strengthen regional stability. We continue to participate in the Conference as an observer. We regret that the US – the only of the five nuclear states – continues to disregard it.

49. We count on the support for the Russian initiatives on the development of multilateral arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation agreements, as well as draft resolutions concerning no first placement of weapons in outer space, transparency and confidence-building measures in space activities and further practical steps on prevention of an arms race in outer space that we traditionally submit for consideration by the First Committee.

50. In the context of the situation in Ukraine, we remain concerned that Western countries seek to undermine global efforts to combat the proliferation of weapons and sabotage international arms control arrangements. The unrestrained "pumping" of the Kiev regime with weapons by NATO Member States, which themselves admit the lack of capabilities to trace their further movement, increases the risks that these weapons will fall into the hands of terrorist groups and criminal organizations, spreading uncontrollably all over the world.

51. As regards international cooperation in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes, we are guided by the intrinsic character of the central and coordinating role of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. We oppose the resolution of issues falling within its competence in other international platforms and non-specialized international organizations. We emphasize the need for development and adoption of national regulations to ensure the fulfilment of obligations under international law concerning space activities. We express concern about the emerging trend towards the use of unilateral approaches in individual states' policies (outside the United Nations and its Committee on Outer Space) regarding the establishment of a regime for the study, exploration and use of space resources, which poses serious risks to international cooperation, including in the outer space dimension.

We continue to advocate for legal certainty in the matters of delimitation of outer space and airspace in the context of establishing the spatial limits to states' sovereignty over their territory and ensuring their national security, as well as for creating the enabling environment for long-term sustainability of space activities and aviation safety. We call for the creation of an efficient space traffic management system based on regulation and monitoring, with a legally binding code of conduct to be developed by the international community.

52. As regards the law of the sea, we consider it essential to preserve the integrity of the regulatory framework established by the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and other fundamental documents in this area. New processes, including the Agreement on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas beyond National Jurisdiction adopted in June 2023 and its system of global bodies, should be without prejudice to the provisions of existing universal and regional treaties, as well as mandates of competent intergovernmental organizations.

We are interested in ensuring the effective functioning of the bodies established under the 1982 Convention, i.e. the International Seabed Authority, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. We believe that the said bodies should act strictly within their mandates under the Convention, avoiding any broad interpretation of their powers or politicized decisions.

53. Russia hopes that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) will be effective and impartial in performing the functions vested in it by the UN Charter, including in proceedings involving Russia. These hopes have not been vain: despite the unprecedented political pressure exerted by the West, our opponents are suffering one defeat after another.

Earlier this year, the ICJ passed two landmark judgments in favour of Russia. First of all, it is the final judgment on the merits of the case Ukraine v. Russian Federation concerning Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (ICSFT) and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD). The International Court of Justice recognized the absence of the policy towards discrimination of Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians in Crimea. The Court's decision in relation to the ICSFT delegitimized Ukraine's "anti-terrorist operation" in Donbass, confirming that there had been no terrorists and that Kiev had fought against civilians who had not recognized the authorities that came to power after the "Maidan." Thus, Ukraine was completely denied any compensation under these claims.

Shortly after that, the ICJ passed another remarkable judgment in favour of Russia – in the case concerning the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, having rejected Ukraine's allegations of invoking the Convention in bad faith in order to justify the recognition of the DPR and LPR and start of the special military operation. It was established that the DPR and LPR had been recognized on the basis of the right to self-determination, and the special military operation had been commenced based on the right to self-defence. These rights are enshrined in the UN Charter, and the Convention has nothing to do with them. As a result, the only issue that has been left for the Court's consideration is the one concerning the genocide in Donbass at the hands of Kiev. Thus, Ukraine has turned from a complainant into a respondent. Even the 32 Western countries that intervened in this case – allegedly as "third parties," but in fact to support Ukraine – did not help Kiev.

We expect the Court to continue making the right choices in favour of justice in the face of such unprecedented pressure, as doing otherwise would jeopardize the entire system of international justice. Pursuant to the relevant 2022 UNGA resolution, the Court issued a second advisory opinion on the legal consequences of Israeli policies in the Occupied Palestinian Territory focusing on illegal settlement construction. Furthermore, in the context of the Israeli military operation in the Gaza Strip, the ICJ opened hearings and passed three decisions on "provisional measures" in the case concerning violations of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide filed by South Africa with a number of countries that intervened.

We will actively use these decisions.

54. Last year, the International Criminal Court (ICC) fully confirmed its subservient essence by continuing to execute the political order of the West for chasing the officials of regimes that are out of favour.

We regard the "trick" pulled off by ICC Prosecutor Karim Khan, who has requested arrest warrants for Israeli leaders as the same sort of behaviour. The Court's decision on this matter will depend on instructions from Washington, which is known for double-crossing its allies every once in a while. The activities of the ICC, which bears no relation to the UN, have long made it impossible to refer to this body as an international criminal justice institution. We expect that states, when considering cooperation with the ICC, will fully comply with the generally recognized norms of international law regarding the immunity of state officials.

55. We stress the provisional nature and strictly limited mandate of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (IRMCT), as well as the need for its speedy closure. The IRMCT has inherited the worst practices of its predecessors, especially the ICTY, consistently demonstrating an anti-Serbian bias.

We still consider it unacceptable for international organizations' bodies to be granted the power to investigate alleged internationally wrongful acts and "attribute" responsibility to the states that did not explicitly consent to that, or otherwise act outside the scope of their competence.

The "International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011" established by the UNGA in excess of its powers is illegitimate, and its "decisions" are legally null and void.

The UN General Assembly's increasingly going beyond its competence has led to a series of confrontational anti-Russian resolutions adopted since 24 February 2022 in connection with the situation in Ukraine in violation of Article 12, paragraph 1, of the UN Charter. By seeking to qualify the special military operation as an "aggression," calling for its cessation, reparation of damage, etc., in its non-consensus documents, the UNGA goes far beyond its mandate and appropriates the functions of the UNSC.

56. We closely monitor the work of the UN International Law Commission (ILC), which has traditionally made a significant contribution to the codification and progressive development of international law. Within the Sixth Committee of the UN General Assembly, we promote Russian doctrinal approaches to international law in support of the development of universal conventions on issues ripe for codification, such as the responsibility of international organizations.

57. The issue of "the rule of law" should be considered with an emphasis on its international dimension. Attempts to use the concept of the "rule of law" to interfere in national legal systems must be opposed. We assume that the extraterritorial application of national legislation to the detriment of the sovereignty of other states is a negative factor in international relations.

58. As for the concept of the "responsibility to protect," we will continue to draw attention to its non-consensus nature, opposing its institutionalization within the UN Secretariat.

59. Attempts to distort history and revise the outcomes of World War II are categorically unacceptable, which is especially important in the light of the fact that the 79th session of the UNGA is held in the year that marks the 80th anniversary of the Victory in that war. In this context, the resolution "Combating glorification of Nazism, neo-Nazism and other practices that contribute to fuelling contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance," which has been regularly submitted for consideration by the UN General Assembly since 2005, is one of the key Russian initiatives in the United Nations.

The resolution condemns the glorification of the Nazis and their accomplices, as well as the Nazi movement in general and the whitewashing of former SS members, including the Waffen‑SS. The document expresses concern about the war waged against the monuments in honour of those who fought with the Nazism, about the demonstrations held to glorify Nazism and the renaming of schools and streets after those who fought side by side with the Nazis or collaborated with them.

This document is as relevant as ever in the light of the tragic consequences of the promotion of the Nazi ideology in Ukraine, as well as of the relevant manifestations in the Western countries. Yet the resolution does not mention any countries, being aimed at solving the problem, rather than condemning any specific state or a group of states.

60. The primary responsibility for the protection and promotion of human rights rests with states, while the executive bodies of the UN play an auxiliary role. Equal cooperation of states based on compliance with international legal obligations and respect for sovereignty should be the core principle of the UN's efforts to promote and protect human rights. Integration of human rights agenda into various areas of the Universal Organization's activities should not lead to the duplication of work of its bodies or displacement of their core activities under their mandates. We support neither the idea of linking the activities of the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) with the Security Council, nor upgrading the status of the HRC to a UN statutory body.

We strongly condemn the use of the human rights agenda as a pretext for interference in internal affairs of states and subversion of the basic principles of international law. The Universal Periodic Review (UPR) under the auspices of the HRC is the main UN tool for assessing a state's human rights record. The drafting and promotion of country resolutions by individual states and groups of states to advance their political priorities is one example of politicization of the human rights work and interference in internal affairs.

It is through this lens that we view the resolution on the human rights situation in the so-called occupied territories of Ukraine, including Crimea, submitted by the Ukrainian delegation. The document is designed to undermine Russia's territorial integrity and has nothing in common with the real situation in the regions of the Russian Federation.

Georgia's initiative on the status of internally displaced persons and refugees from Abkhazia and South Ossetia, introduced in the United Nations immediately after the Saakashvili regime attacked South Ossetia, is also of hostile nature. This initiative is aimed at shifting attention from the real instigator of the conflict. Such moves risk complicating the situation in the region and stalling the Geneva discussions, which remain the only dialogue format involving representatives of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Georgia.

The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights increasingly demonstrates in its work a politically biased approach to assessing the human rights situation in various countries. The Office's transparency and accountability to UN Member States needs to be strengthened.

61. We strongly condemn discrimination in any forms or manifestations. The ban on discrimination enshrined in international human rights treaties is universal and applies to all people without exception. We see no point in singling out new vulnerable groups (e.g. members of the LGBT community, Internet bloggers) that allegedly require special legal protection or creating new categories of rights. Such steps serve to implement the neoliberal political agenda, which increases politicization and confrontation within UN human rights mechanisms.

We advocate promoting and strengthening the role of the family and protecting traditional values as the moral foundation of society.

62. Active engagement in the work for social development is Russia's national priority and builds on the outcomes of the World Summit for Social Development and the 24th Special Session of the General Assembly.

We oppose attempts to abolish the UN Commission for Social Development, which is the main coordinating body within the UN system for developing concerted action on common social development issues, ensuring equal opportunities for persons with disabilities, supporting the elderly, improving the situation of youth and strengthening the role of the traditional family.

63. The UN Commission on the Status of Women remains the main intergovernmental body for discussions on a wide range of issues pertaining to gender equality and the advancement of women. We see no reason for changing the status of or reforming this body. It is important to avoid politicization of women-related issues and inclusion of this topic by default in non-core UN documents.

UN-Women activities on the ground should only be carried out upon request and with authorization of the states concerned.

64. We are in favour of further strengthening international cooperation in the promotion and protection of children's rights on the basis of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the outcome document of the 27th UNGA Special Session entitled "A World Fit for Children." Attempts to involve minors in political activities are unacceptable.

We are paying close attention to issues related to children in armed conflict. We support the mandate of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict and continue to engage with her on the sections of the respective thematic report we consider relevant.

65. We welcome the UNGA discussion on the problems of interfaith and intercultural interaction and the development of intercivilizational dialogue, particularly within the framework of the Alliance of Civilizations. We consider building a culture of peace as an essential prerequisite for peaceful coexistence and facilitation of global cooperation for the sake of peace and development.

66. We advocate for the development of international humanitarian cooperation on an equal and mutually respectful basis. We are concerned about the extreme politicization of the cultural and humanitarian area and attempts to discriminate against and defame cultural figures. We condemn the practices of introducing politically motivated unilateral sanctions in this area, systemic dismantling of monuments related with cultural heritage, and obstructing the organization of exhibitions, concerts and tours.

67. We are concerned about the extreme politicization of UNESCO and the total "Ukrainization" of its work. The Western countries' efforts to impose the issues of territorial integrity and sovereignty, which are outside its mandate, and promote non-inclusive initiatives in the spirit of the notorious "rule-based order" on UNESCO, undermines its international credibility and is detrimental to its efficiency. We insist on the need for a greater budgetary discipline and strict compliance by the Secretariat and Member States with UNESCO's statutory provisions.

68. We are ready to cooperate with all constructively-minded relevant non-governmental organizations on issues on the UN agenda. At the same time, we oppose the erosion of the Organization's interstate nature.

We are working to promote the adequate representation of Russia's non-governmental community in the work of UN bodies and entities.

69. We support the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, which underpins comprehensive long-term cooperation aimed at establishing legal migration channels and countering irregular flows. The Global Compact is not legally binding and does not impose new obligations on states. We welcome the UN's enhanced activities on the migration track with the coordinating role of the International Organization for Migration. We share the main objectives of the Progress Declaration of the Global Compact adopted at the First International Migration Review Forum in May 2022.

70. The Russian Federation significantly contributes to strengthening the international refugee protection regime and resolving migration problems, which is reflected in its large-scale humanitarian activities in many countries and regions across the world, as well as in political efforts to prevent and address crises. Since February 2022, safe Russian regions have provided emergency shelter to more than five million residents of the DPR, LPR, the Kherson and Zaporozhye Regions, as well as Ukraine. Russia is making every effort to receive and further accommodate them. We welcome efforts by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). We believe it necessary for the UNHCR to pay increased attention to stateless persons, including in Europe. We are convinced of the need for Russia's initiative on the voluntary repatriation of Syrian refugees, which calls for international support.

71. Sport is meant to bring peoples together and unite them; it is a unique tool for promoting and strengthening social relationships and developing interstate dialogue. We support cooperation in sport on an equal footing with all interested countries, in full compliance with the Olympic spirit and principles.

Politicization of sport and discrimination against athletes, including Paralympic athletes, in the form of collective punishment is unacceptable. We advocate establishing a universal system of international sports cooperation based on the principles of independence and autonomy of sport.

We consider it unacceptable that certain Western countries misuse sport for their self-serving purposes. Persistent attempts to put pressure on line multilateral organizations and sow discord in the international sport movement run counter to the Olympic goals and ideals and the principle of cooperation.

We are concerned about the rapid degradation of the International Olympic Committee leadership, which condones Western countries' policy aimed at "cancelling" Russian sport. We believe it necessary to hold fair and just competitions and ensure that all countries have equal access to participation in the Olympic and Paralympic movements.

72. In the socio-economic field, we regret to note the continuing attempts by the Western countries to shift onto Russia the responsibility for the multiplying economic challenges.

Illegal sanctions and other methods of neo-colonial coercion, reducing donor assistance to poor countries while providing generous support to Ukraine have led to the increasingly visible dissatisfaction of the World Majority, which effectively confirms its readiness to cooperate with Russia to restore value chains, ensure energy and food security, and build a more sustainable and equitable system of global economic relations.

The de-dollarization and de-globalization process in the world economy as well as the expansion of regional economic cooperation organizations free from Western domination, including BRICS and the SCO, are an objective trend, which is only reinforced by Western countries' aggressive information and economic campaign against the new centres of power. We are convinced that these very associations established on an equal footing will eventually become pillars of a new multipolar order.

73. We reaffirm our commitment to implement the agreements reached at the second meeting of the High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development (HLPF) held in September 2023 under the UNGA auspices and the mid-term review of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (2030 Agenda), as well as the Addis Ababa Action Agenda on Financing for Development as an integral part of the 2030 Agenda.

These intergovernmental agreements remain relevant in their entirety and guide national planning and targeted efforts made by the UN development system, especially in the context of the upcoming "Summit of the Future". We oppose the selective and unbalanced revision of certain provisions of the 2030 Agenda, without taking into account its comprehensive nature, to serve the narrow interests of certain groups to the detriment of other Agenda issues. Insistent demands to move quickly to elaborating the "beyond 2030 Agenda" pose a risk of overshadowing donor's pledges to fulfil their 2015 financial obligations.

We continue to view poverty eradication as the central goal of UN social and economic activities. We support further elaboration of practical steps in this area, including social, economic and technological transformations that accompany industrial development, especially in the least developed countries, in the framework of the Third UN Decade for the Eradication of Poverty (2018‑2027).

The gender and human rights aspects of the 2030 Agenda and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda on Financing for Development, which the Western countries seek to present as aspirations of the developing countries, are in fact the result of a "deal": The World Majority accepted them in exchange for pledges of assistance to economic development. Now that it is clear that the Sustainable Development Goals will not be met by 2030, the financing gap continues to widen, reaching USD four trillion per year. At the same time, funding has been massively diverted to Ukraine. In this context, the balance between the socio-economic and ideological components in the sustainable development concept should be revised in favour of the former, which, in fact, is the true interest of developing countries.

74. We advocate maintaining the key role of the three Rome-based agencies – the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, the United Nations World Food Program and the International Fund for Agricultural Development – in combining and coordinating international efforts to strengthen global food security, eliminate hunger, improve nutrition, and ensure sustainable agriculture and rural development. The inevitable transformation of food systems should take into account national priorities and the specific features of states' development.

We oppose the persistent attempts by Western countries to shift the responsibility for the global food crisis onto our country. In this context, we continue efforts to inform our friendly countries using the platforms of international organizations of the true reasons of current developments, as well as the consequences and impact of the illegal restrictive measures introduces against us on the situation with access to food worldwide.

We oppose politicizing multilateral cooperation in the agriculture and food sector and manipulating the issues related to combating hunger to suit commercial, economic and geopolitical interests of the Western countries. We pay particular attention to ensuring the smooth functioning of supply chains and correcting distortions in the fertilizer market in order to strengthen the food sovereignty of developing countries.

75. Removing all unilateral coercive measures (UCMs), which run counter to the UN Charter and therefore international law, would be a decisive contribution to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and addressing the crisis. UCMs have a serious humanitarian impact, obstructing assistance to those in need and basic goods supplies such as food, fertilizers, fuel, lubricants, and medicines, and hampering the economic recovery, which requires international investment sources. The UN development system, its organizations and entities, including UNCTAD, and country teams led by resident coordinators should actively and systematically monitor such impacts and report to member countries.

Official development assistance provided by Western countries has no significant influence on the social and economic development of the Global South. Nor does it cope with its intended function as a "catalyst". Own-income generation by developing countries should become the main means to address social and economic underdevelopment. This requires stepping up efforts to implement at least three tasks: ensuring fair and full participation of the World Majority in international trade through removal by the West of its protectionist measures imposed under the guise of the green agenda; establishing a fair and inclusive international taxation system; and providing developing countries with access to loans on fair terms.

76. We welcome a more diversified relationship between the UN and the G20. As the main platform for international economic and financial cooperation, the G20 contributes to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals under the 2030 Agenda, reforming the system of global economic governance in the interest of developing countries, and building a just multipolar world order.

We support the priorities of the Brazilian G20 Presidency aimed at eradicating all inequalities and strengthening the role of the World Majority in international affairs and multilateral institutions. We are ready for a productive and frank dialogue within the framework of the G20 Foreign Ministers' Meeting open to a broad participation of interested states, which will take place on 25 September 2024 in New York on the sidelines of the High-Level Week of the 79th Session of the UN General Assembly.

77. We highly appreciate the activities of the UN Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), which significantly contributes to the harmonization of laws governing relations in various areas of international trade.

Russia actively participates in the development of the Commission's tools to ensure stable economic development for both developed and developing states. We are making a significant contribution to the activities of the Commission and its working groups. We are ready to further actively promote its policy to address pressing legal issues of international trade and economic relations. Russia has put forward its candidacy for re-election as a member of UNCITRAL in the upcoming elections during the 79th UNGA Session and is looking forward to support from the Member States.

78. Together with like-minded states, we will continue to take decisive steps to revise the global financial architecture, in particular in the context of the Summit of the Future (September 2024). It is necessary to ensure equitable participation of developing states in value chains and non-discriminatory access to concessional financing in the framework of multilateral financial institutions as well as to financial markets. Improving inclusiveness and effectiveness of international scientific and technological cooperation through, inter alia, technology transfer, remains a crucial element of financing for development.

Illicit financial flows from developing countries are de facto used by Western economies as a source of financing; the relevant funds should be returned to countries of origin, primarily by establishing a relevant multilateral instrument, e.g. a protocol on asset recovery to the Convention against Corruption.

We believe that there is a need for a more inclusive and fair international tax system that would take full account of the interests of the Global South. The OECD, which serves the interests of developed states, fails to perform this task. Therefore, we support the process to develop a UN framework convention on international tax cooperation and its protocols launched at the initiative of the group of African States.

79. We are in favour of enhancing the effectiveness of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat) in implementing the SDGs. We emphasize the need to counter the course pursued by a number of Western countries to politicize these operational programmes and dilute their technical mandates by expanding the scope of their activities.

The outcomes of the sixth session of the United Nations Environment Assembly (UNEA-6) reaffirmed its role as the leading intergovernmental platform in the UN system for interstate cooperation in the environmental area. It is inadmissible to focus efforts on the environmental dimension of sustainable development to the detriment of its economic and social aspects. We are against discussing peace and security, human rights and humanitarian operations within the UNEP framework. It is necessary to work to ensure equitable geographical representation in the professional composition of the Secretariat in accordance with resolution 5/13 adopted at the fifth UNEA session.

We emphasize the role of UN-Habitat in achieving the SDGs in urban and settlement development. As for the work carried out under the Programme of Assistance to States Affected by Armed Conflicts and Natural Disasters, we consider it inadmissible to prioritize some countries and disregard others under the pretext of lack of funding.

80. We attach great importance to international cooperation in addressing climate change. We regard the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its Paris Agreement as the main international legal mechanisms for climate action.

It is important to strictly adhere to the provisions of the Paris Agreement in terms of keeping the average global temperature increase within the range of 2–1.5 °C and achieving carbon neutrality in the second half of the century rather than by 2050. We oppose the "blurring" of the UNFCCC mandate and the establishment of a system of contractual obligations duplicating it. The division of labour between environmental mechanisms should be respected while avoiding the creation of artificial overlaps which make it harder to pursue common goals and interests.

We are convinced that climate action should build on non-discriminatory international cooperation with due regard for economic realities and aspirations of all countries concerned.

We oppose linking climate and security agendas and vesting peacekeeping missions with climate-monitoring functions that do not fall within their competence. By doing so, major donor states are seeking to shrug off the responsibility for economic problems faced by least developed countries.

81. Artificial linking of security and water issues is counterproductive. We believe that water disputes should be resolved the bilateral basis. We do not support the establishment of new multilateral structures and processes to discuss water management issues due to their sensitivity. Any policy and strategic document on water developed within the UN should be discussed with member countries.

82. We recognize the important role of the UN development system (UNSD) in implementing the 2030 Agenda and achieving its core goal of poverty eradication. In the context of the upcoming intergovernmental negotiations on the quadrennial comprehensive policy review of operational activities for development of the United Nations system (autumn 2024), it is important to insist on the need to step up efforts to complete the UNSD reform, strengthen the mechanisms of the UNSD organizations and structures' accountability to the Member States and, above all, its resident coordinators, consider the national priorities of beneficiary countries, and reinforce regional cooperation platforms, with a focus on the role of regional economic commissions.

83. We note the potential of regional economic commissions (RECs) designed to help address pressing regional social and economic issues through enhanced sectoral cooperation and coordinated implementation of the 2030 Agenda on the basis of the priorities defined by the Member States. It is important to raise the RECs' profile within the UN system and to ensure that they deliver practical results at the country level by providing their support with resources and expertise.

84. We attach great importance to the use of information and communications (including digital) technologies, including artificial intelligence systems, in order to develop and promote inclusive and fair economic growth.

In this context, we are committed to implementing the principles of the Geneva Declaration of the World Summit on the Information Society and creating a more equitable competitive environment to distribute profits in favour of companies from developing countries. We insist on respecting the mandates of the relevant intergovernmental processes and preventing the establishment of alternative platforms duplicating their functions in the area of security in the use of ICTs and countering crime in the information space. We intend to take into account the outcome of the intergovernmental negotiations on the elaboration of the Global Digital Compact if they do not contradict our interests in the field (expected to be adopted in September 2024).

85. As for the protection of public health, we are in favour of measures agreed upon within the UNGA and WHO to achieve universal health coverage while preparing for the upcoming UNGA High Level Meeting (HLM) on antimicrobial resistance to be held in September 2024. We are interested in actively engaging in multilateral efforts to curb the risks related to the spread of antimicrobial resistance. We will further contribute to the international partnership to fight against HIV/AIDS in strict compliance with Russia's interests.

Today, preparedness for, prevention of, and appropriate response to outbreaks of communicable diseases are becoming a key element of cooperation in the area of public health. The bulk of the professional work in this field should be managed by the relevant WHO bodies with due consideration for the positions of Member States and unconditional respect for their national sovereignty.

We believe that the WHO has a leading role to play as a coordinator of international cooperation in the area of health. We advocate building the WHO's capacity and improving its performance. We are in favour of enhancing the accountability of the Organization to Member States and against attempts to politicize its work.

86. We emphasize the importance of strengthening the coordinating role of the UN and improving interstate cooperation in disaster risk reduction in the context of the implementation of the Sendai Framework 2015-2030. We believe that the efforts to integrate early warning and forecasting systems for natural disasters into disaster risk management are well grounded.

87. We support the strengthening of the international humanitarian response mechanism on the basis of the universally recognized Guiding Principles enshrined in UNGA Resolution 46/182 that are not subject to revision. We will further resist attempts to smuggle provisions unacceptable for us into UN intergovernmental documents. We are concerned about the increasing politicization of humanitarian assistance and the spread of the flawed practice of applying double standards in this field.

88. We consistently support restraining the growth of the UN regular and peacekeeping budgets and financial estimates for the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals. We insist that the requested amounts be reasonably reduced. We welcome the proper implementation by the UN Secretariat of the recommendations given by oversight bodies. We demand greater accountability, transparency and internal controls in the Secretariat's activities. Within the framework of the UNGA Fifth Committee (Administrative and Budgetary matters), we attach great importance to Member States' maintaining effective control of the UN financial activities and human resources.

89. Maintaining the parity among the six UN official languages in conference services and information and communication activities remains our priority while engaging with the UN Secretariat. The principle of multilingualism should be of central importance in the planning and implementation of all UN projects in the media and social networks.

90. Special attention needs be paid to countering misinformation and maintaining an objective and balanced approach in the work of the UN media resources. In their activities, UN news services should take an equidistant and neutral approach, rely solely on verified data and use information from Russian official sources.

Other important priorities include comprehensive assistance in expanding contacts and establishing partnerships between the Department of Global Communications, the Information Centre in Moscow and other UN organizations with Russian media.