Speech by Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov at the XV Assembly of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy

Unofficial translation from Russian

Dear colleagues and friends,

The theme of the present Assembly appears very important and timely. The world is no longer what it was several years ago. Many things have cleared up. And the chief thing that has cleared up is: a unipolar world has not materialized, nor could it have materialized by virtue of the insufficiency of military-political, financial-economic and other resources for imperial building in the conditions of globalization. Really, the "unipolar world" mythology determined for a while the orientation of minds and the behavior of a considerable part of states. They believed this myth and took it up politically.

The "reduction" of the United States' hypertrophied role in world affairs and the clarification of the true significance of the Russian factor in global politics, including the experience of the last 15 years, serve as a sufficient ground for serious analysis of the development of international relations at this stage.

I have carefully read the summary of the CFDP report and consider that this is a serious attempt to interpret the new international realities, and on this basis, construct recommendations for the foreign policy of the country. There are, however, things with which I cannot agree, particularly the alarmism and pessimism.

I think that the very course of events, our diplomacy of recent years, the statements of President Vladimir Putin on foreign policy issues and above all his Munich speech leave no doubt that the political leadership of the country has a well-thought-out and practice-tested strategy in international affairs. The Foreign Policy Survey, carried out by the Foreign Ministry on the President's instruction, is testimony to this, among other things.

The main conclusion: the choice made in 2000 in favor of pragmatism, multivectorness and our firm, but unconfrontational upholding of national interests in foreign affairs has acquitted itself. I assume that it may have seemed to someone at the time that Russia had made a choice in favor of moderate policy and multilateral diplomacy from a position of weakness. But Russia now stronger and confident does not give up these fundamental principles of its foreign policy either.

At the base of our then vision of the world lay common sense and a sober, down to earth assessment of the tendencies determining contemporary world development. History, if a period of 6-7 years may be called history, has justified us. By the way, short histories of the start of the 21st century are already being written. Thus, Thomas Friedman in his book has drawn the conclusion that the world has become "flat," that is globalization, having gone beyond the framework of Western civilization, leaves no room for all kinds of hierarchical constructions. It is horizontal ties, determining the essence of contemporary international relations, that lead us up to the need for network diplomacy.

I shall also cite the famous phrase of Richard Haas that "while the United States does not need the world's permission to act, it does need the world's support to succeed." And if so, then it is necessary to agree on what and how to do. Munich has opened many people's eyes. Thus, The Boston Globe, analyzing the speech of President Putin, wrote: "Moscow, ahead of Washington, has come to comprehend a key fact: The world is becoming a polyarchy - an international system run by numerous and diverse actors with a shifting kaleidoscope of associations and dependencies."

And here I can in no way agree with the thesis that a real alternative to the "unipolar world" is the "chaotization" of international relations as the result of a "vacuum" of governability and security. I think that the talk is rather about a vacuum in the consciousness of the elites of some or other states. Because, as convincingly attested to by what we've seen more than once, it has been unilateral response, particularly the one based on the use of force, that has led to the growth of conflict proneness in world politics and the accretion of new on old problems, which, strictly speaking, is the mechanism for the expansion of the conflict space in world politics.

I can understand that those on the other side of the Atlantic still can't overstep themselves and utter the world "multipolar." I do not understand why one should regard multipolarity as being set for confrontation. Yes, new power centers are appearing. They compete, particularly for access to natural resources. It was always so, and there is nothing fatal about this.

I think that the emerging informal collective leadership of major states of the world offers precisely the way to solving the issue of governability in the world today. It's another matter that ruled out in this case are anyone's individual leadership and claims to truth, be it by the US, the European Union or Russia.

I think that the paradigm of contemporary international relations is determined precisely by competition in the broadest meaning of the notion, particularly when value guidelines and development models become its object. All this is not tantamount to confrontation. The novelty of the situation consists in that the West is losing its monopoly on globalization processes. Evidently hence the attempts to present what is happening as a threat to the West, its values and way of life.

Russia is against attempts at a civilizational split of the world into so called "civilized humanity" and all the rest. This is the way to global catastrophe which only intellectual inertia and the prejudices of the Cold War era can suggest. That is why the question of overcoming the intellectual, psychological and other legacy of the Cold War is acute in today's world politics. We shall not allow ourselves to be put at loggerheads with the Islamic world. I believe that the choice of Russia and other leading states, including such civilization-forming ones as India and China, in favor of a unifying policy will be the main factor ensuring that a split of the world on civilizational grounds will not occur.

Globalization raises before humanity truly existential questions. It is already obvious that natural resources are limited, which makes it simply impossible to provide consumption for all at the level of industrially developed countries. I shall refer to the authority of Pope Benedict XVI, who in his address at the Catholic Academy of Bavaria in January 2004 spoke of the necessity of self-limitation. He was also critical of the manifestation of "Western conceit," meaning the claims to universality of "both great Western cultures - the culture of Christian faith and the culture of secular rationalism." Under today's conditions it is difficult not to agree with another assertion of the present head of the Vatican, "that today the concept of man's rights should be supplemented with a teaching about man's duties and about man's possibilities." I am convinced that it would be possible to restore the common moral denominator of the main world religions along these lines. The harmonious development of all humanity is impossible without this.

I have to say that the summary of the CFDP report presents in a hypertrophied fashion the terrorist menace, particularly in our country. This question is being treated quite contradictorily. On the one hand, the possibilities of the formation of a consolidated Islamic factor in world politics are being exaggerated, and on the other - it speaks of the deep contradictions among Islamic states. But I see the chief mistake in that this question is being viewed in total isolation from the necessity of solving the real problems, above all in the Middle East, that hinder the realization of the existing potential in the Arab-Muslim world to meet the challenges of modernization. On the whole, it underestimates the possibilities of politics in the real settlement of the crises which are the breeding ground for this evil. They are the renunciation of power politics, and the adoption of measures which would help solve the problem of poverty on a global scale.

The experience of the last six years convincingly shows that any attempts to get around the reality of the multipolar world turn into failure. Whichever examples we may take: Iraq, Lebanon, it is hard to say how it will all end in Somalia - the conclusion is but one: contemporary problems have no force-based solutions. Attempts to solve them by the use of force only exacerbate and stalemate the situation. The sense of a shortage of security is also caused by stagnation in the disarmament sphere, which exacerbates the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

I think that the imposition on the world of a hypertrophied significance of the factor of force is a temporary phenomenon. Objectively the role of the force component in world politics is on decline. Here one can draw a parallel with the 1992 presidential elections in the US, when not all grasped the importance of the economic factor: "It's the economy, stupid." Now, on the global scale, questions come to the fore that are about ensuring the sustainable economic development of states, including the satisfaction of energy requirements. It is the increased economic interdependence that serves as an important factor of maintaining international stability. Its significance, by the way, also did not find proper reflection in the summary. Neither the use of force, nor occupation, nor a military presence abroad can solve these tasks.

We regard staking on force as the fundamental drawback of the policy of our partners. And this is done to the detriment of the factors of "soft power," whose significance, on the contrary, is on the rise. The phrase ascribed to Stalin, "How many divisions has the Pope?" determined this mentality in the past. Now, when we are discussing Iraq, we often hear in reply: "Is Russia ready to send its troops to Iraq?" This approach weighs heavily upon the foreign policy strategy of Washington.

What's needed is giving up attempts at re-ideologization and remilitarization of international relations and strengthening collective and legal principles in them.

One of the fundamental elements of today's reality is that the world must be free, and that all states should be able to decide matters for themselves, in line with their own understanding of their national interests in the new conditions. Neither bloc nor ideological discipline works automatically anymore, although we're witnessing attempts to replace it with the solidarity of one civilization against all the rest.

It is also intellectual freedom - the "freedom of speech," of which we speak with reference to the internal development of each country. Any clamping down on dissent and sweeping the existing disagreements under the carpet bring adverse consequences for the international community as a whole. It is also freedom to pursue irrational policy. But in the present day conditions everybody has to pay the bill.

Uncertainty over a future world pattern was largely due to the weakening of Russia during the period after the disintegration of the USSR. One got the impression that Russia was simply written off as material for a new territorial-political redivision of the world - a prospect with which our country had already been confronted, for example, at the start of the 18th century. Then the problem was solved on lines of accelerated modernization of the country, which formed the main content of the reforms of Peter the Great. We also meet the present challenge on lines of radical political and economic reforms, which, as then, proceed in the mainstream of a European choice, but with the preservation of the centuries-old traditions of Russia. As a result, Russia has restored its foreign policy independence.

It is thanks largely to this that for the first time in the last decade and a half a real competitive environment has formed on the market for ideas of a world pattern adequate to the contemporary stage of world development. The rise of new global centers of influence and growth, and the more even distribution of development resources and control over natural wealth lay the material foundation for a multipolar world order.

The totality of these and other factors has determined the incipient transition to a new stage of world development. Counteraction against the challenges and threats of our time remains the objective basis for broad international cooperation. Multilateral diplomacy is gaining recognition - as an effective tool for regulation of international relations at the global and regional levels. There grows the role of the United Nations, possessing unique legitimacy. So that I cannot agree with the underestimation of the significance of this world body in the CFDP summary. Life itself induces everyone, including even those who are by no means ready to do justice to the UN, to work in the Organization and act through its mechanisms.

Of course, an object of close analysis is our increased role in energy geopolitics. Firstly, no one has proved any "energy blackmail" on our part. Secondly, there are hidden reefs in this regard. As though using reverse psychology they are trying to impose on us the dubious status of an "energy superpower," which would only help to fix Russia firmly in the energy raw materials niche of the international division of labor. It's another matter that the possibilities provided by earnings from the sale of energy resources and the strengthening of the positions of our raw materials companies in transnational business should be used to build on the dynamics of our integration into the global economy, and shift our own onto the innovative path of development.

It would seem that the well-known disagreements with Ukraine, Belarus and other CIS states should have convinced the West that we have no imperial designs, but are building normal relations with our neighbors based on market principles. It was the politicization of economic mutual relations that could serve as a ground for suspicions regarding Russia. Now this is no longer there, but the suspicions linger on, from which one can conclude that geopolitical "games" are being played in the CIS space with the use of such an instrument as the "democratizing" endeavor. Let us be frank, the chief criterion of the level of evolution of democracy actually remains preparedness to tow behind other people's foreign policy.

In the CIS space in bilateral and diverse multilateral formats we cultivate elements of objective commonality and interdependence - economic, cultural-civilizational and other - between our countries. No more than this, but also no less. Among other things, this must be conveyed to the consciousness of our Western partners that it is futile to try and keep Russia in a regional "shell." In our development we have long since come out of it. Let us hope that all this will facilitate building here unpoliticized relations with external factors with a view to stabilizing this region and giving up the tactic of "harassing actions" towards Russia.

We are ready to participate in carrying through to a positive conclusion the projects that have unilaterally been started. First of all I mean Iraq, where the situation can still be saved. It is hard to argue with the thesis of Henry Kissinger that sooner or later "Iraq has to be restored to the international community, and "other countries must be prepared to share responsibilities for regional peace." But sharing responsibility presupposes a joint search for optimal solutions.

We are being told that the situation in Iraq is now our "common misfortune." I fully agree with this. Malignancy, a striving to take advantage of other people's misfortune, has always been alien to us. But in this regard there is no way to dispense with the need for our American partners to cardinally alter their Iraq strategy by bringing it into conformity with the prevalent analysis both at home and in other capitals. In this vein, we must see the multilateral conference held in Baghdad a few days ago. This process needs to be used to work out a new, collective strategy in Iraq.

A realistic correction of the coalition's course in Iraq would help realized in practice the objective commonality of the interests of Washington and Teheran, staking on one and the same government in that country. There is no doubt that a real political process exists in Iran. To realize the potential of the moderate political forces of Iran and influence the behavior of that country in a required spirit is possible only through involvement.

For all the importance of continued multilateral efforts to find an exit from the present situation around the nuclear program of Iran it is necessary to realize that a significant part of the problem, as in the case of the Korean Peninsula nuclear problem, stems from the unwillingness of the US to normalize its bilateral relations with Teheran on the basis of generally accepted principles. The US displayed flexibility and pragmatism in approach to North Korean affairs - and the result came soon. The same is required in the Iran matter as well. There's no need to think up anything: peaceful coexistence tackled such problems in the recent past. So why not live and let live?

At the same time consistency and logic on the part of our partners are important. If under the pretext of an "Iranian threat" elements of the US national missile defense system are being deployed near our western borders, and sanctions are being imposed against Russian companies, then why make unnecessary fuss in the Security Council of the United Nations? I hope that the American partners will ponder this. Especially as they are exhorting us to combat a theoretical threat while at the same time creating a real threat to our security.

We profess a comprehensive approach to solving the problems of the Euro-Atlantic region. It could be about broad interaction across the entire spectrum of themes of concern in a trilateral format - between Russia, the European Union and the US. Such cooperation already exists in practice, be it in the UN Security Council, in the framework of the G8, the Middle East Quartet of international mediators or within the Six on the nuclear program of Iran. What's particularly important is that this format should remove unnecessary mutual suspicions regarding what is happening between any two participants of this "triangle." Russia is not going to "drive a wedge" in transatlantic relations. It is simply impossible to inflict greater harm than the Iraq disagreements upon them. What we would not like is that the transatlantic link would be strengthened at our expense.

As applied to Russian-American relations, the present landmark stage in shaping a global security architecture leads us up to the chief problem. Its essence is the determination of the modalities of our cooperation in international affairs; this is the very same modus operandi without which, it is now obvious, we will not succeed in making any movement forward. Herein lies the significance of the discussion for which President Putin invited all our partners in Munich.

Russia lays no claims to any special rights in international relations. We simply have no reason to act in the role of being led. Full equality, particularly in threat analysis and decision making, is an indispensable minimum.

A feature of Russian foreign policy is also that perhaps for the first time in our history we are beginning to uphold our national interests in full, using all our competitive advantages.

Political scientists in Russia and the US are speaking of an inevitable "pause" in the development of our bilateral relations in view of the electoral cycles in the two countries. I think that this would be a bad choice. I would like to see the US not retreating into itself in the face of the Iraq catastrophe, but participating in a renewal of the partnership with Russia on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. Then, hopefully, the shift to a "more unified and rational policy" will occur fairly soon.

Good opportunities for the positive evolution of Russian-American relations are opening up in the framework of the joint work on the implementation of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and the initiatives of the Russian and US presidents for the safe development of peaceful nuclear energy and access by all interested states to its boons with the observance by them of their nonproliferation commitments. One more proof of our capacity for compromises is the signing of the bilateral protocol with the US on Russia's accession to the WTO. In the center of our intensive dialogue are the struggle against terrorism, the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the settlement of regional conflicts and, of course, strategic stability. Where to arrive at mutually acceptable solutions proves impossible, not a bad option is "nominal consent." We do not deny the US a right to decide for itself, but this means acting at one's own risk and at one's own expense.

Speaking in Munich, Vladimir Putin did not say the notorious "nyet." A negativist approach is basically alien to our foreign policy. We have promoted and will continue to promote a positive agenda of international relations and constructive alternatives in dealing with existing problems. Herein is the main spirit of what the President said. I fully agree with Sergey Karaganov that "in Munich Putin voiced the bitter truth about the present and recent past." But we go beyond this statement of facts, offering realistic ways out of the prevailing situation, a joint solution to problems.

In our relations with the US there is no confrontational predeterminedness. And so there is no question of a new "cold war," for which there are no objective reasons.

Unfortunately, the criticism of US foreign policy in the CFDP summary borders on fatalism, the predeterminedness of Messianism in America. At the same time it underestimates the pragmatism of the Americans, which in history has led them up to strategies of a different kind in foreign policy. And here I would like to refer to the line of Franklin D. Roosevelt in the framework of the anti-Hitler coalition. That is, the Americans can also heed the circumstances when those dictate a choice in favor of a moderate policy and mode of action in agreement with other leading states of the world.

As regards anti-Americanism. Yes, it is dangerous and intellectually detrimental. But the problem has to be tackled "at source," I mean first of all the present mode of action of the US in international affairs. Globalization leaves no possibility for self-isolation if only given the dependence of the US economy on external financial injections (approximately 1 trillion dollars a year) and external sources of energy resources. In our attitude to the US there must prevail a broad, objective view of things. That the administration has listened to a group of neocons should not determine our fundamental attitude to America.

We are against the "strategic games" in Europe aiming literally in an empty place to create a confrontational potential and build a European policy on the "ours-theirs" principle. The realization of the US plans to deploy elements of the NMD in Europe really leads to this. We can only regard this as a provocation on the scale of European and global politics. Especially as to this unilateral project there are collective alternatives in the form of a TMD system in Europe involving NATO and Russia. The collective approach would remove this problem. An American MD in Europe is unacceptable - that's the question. And it will directly affect our relations with NATO. If the alliance is untenable as a collective security organization and turns into a smokescreen for unilateral measures detrimental to our security, then what's the point of our relations with it? Where's the added value of the RNC then? Anyway, the new missiles in Europe is deja vu with quite predictable consequences of the early 80s type.

We, however, see the difficulties NATO is experiencing. We are ready to help, for example, in Afghanistan, where the Alliance is also undergoing a test for viability. We are placing high bets on the success of the multilateral effort in that country, for it is about ensuring our security interests in a critically important region. We have made serious input to this operation at its various stages, and taken not easy decisions for ourselves. We are therefore entitled to count on a positive result. And if the international military presence presides over a situation where the Taliban may return to power, this will also have the most serious consequences for our relations with the Alliance.

In principle what makes us cautious is that the entities and instruments inherited by us from the past - NATO, the OSCE, the CFE Treaty and others - in real life are turning into means of reproducing bloc policy in the present day conditions. Essentially, there is bloc work against Russia going on within their framework. Who needs it? I am certain this can't long continue. There exists the real danger that the situation with a European security architecture reform not carried through might acquire a life of its own, predetermining a real split of Europe for decades in advance. Here runs the boundary line of the present stage of European politics.

Our foreign policy is fully consistent with the present stage of our internal development. The broad consensus in society on key foreign policy issues points to this. The recently created Inter-Party Meeting on Foreign Policy will undoubtedly contribute to its preservation and strengthening. For the world we wish the same thing as for ourselves - evolutionary development without upheavals.

It has become fashionable to make excessive and unilateral requirements to Russia and its foreign policy. We are hearing accusations of lack of ideology, of which our foreign policy pragmatism is supposedly evidence. But we proceed from life and do not rule out that some ideology will grow out of the requirements and practice of real life. So far the ideology of common sense suits us completely. It serves as a sound doctrinal basis of our moderate and unconfrontational foreign policy strategy, which finds understanding in the overwhelming majority of our international partners. Frankly speaking, they want us to give up an independent role in international affairs. Such attempts will continue.

In conclusion I would like to say that, indeed, Russia has found itself in a favorable international position. But it, as we all well know, is never guaranteed in an evolving international situation. We can only preserve and increase the positive results achieved through active and vigorous involvement in international affairs.

We entertain no illusions about difficulties lying ahead. But we are convinced that a crystallization of many things has already taken place in global politics. In terms of foreign policy our country is well prepared for further changes.

March 17, 2007