Interview of State Secretary, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Grigory Karasin, Granted to Interfax News Agency Following Session of Subcommission on Issues of Functioning of Black Sea Fleet and Its Stationing on Territory of Ukraine
Unofficial translation from Russian
Question: Esteemed Grigory Borisovich, on February 14 you headed the Russian delegation at the first session of the new interstate negotiation body on the issues of the Black Sea Fleet's stationing in Ukraine.
The day before, statements were heard in Kyiv about the need for a manyfold increase in rental payment for the fleet's stationing and that the Black Sea Fleet should already begin to get ready for withdrawal from Sevastopol after 2017. In general, the situation is not an easy one. With what aims and with what mandate did you go to the talks?
Answer: I will start by noting that the Subcommission on the Issues of the Functioning of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation and Its Stationing on the Territory of Ukraine is a component of the "grand" Russian-Ukrainian Interstate Commission. The Commission itself was established at the end of last year, and the Presidents of the two countries have headed it up. That is, our meeting actually started the work of the chief mechanism in Russian-Ukrainian relations.
The very fact that the first to be held was precisely the session of the Subcommission on the Black Sea Fleet evidences the importance of this problem for Russia and for the development of the entire range of Russian-Ukrainian ties.
You will recall that in 1997 Russia and Ukraine signed the so called basic agreements on the Black Sea Fleet. Based on them, a division of the Soviet Black Fleet was carried out, the conditions for the stationing of units of the Russian Federation's Black Sea Fleet on Ukrainian territory and for Russia's lease of the appropriate plots of land and facilities on them were set, and the procedure for mutual settlements was agreed upon. These agreements opened the way for signing the new general political treaty between Russia and Ukraine, which laid the foundations of relations of good-neighborliness and cooperation.
The basic agreements have stood the test of time, and to speak of their review is a hopeless and irresponsible undertaking. This holds both for the Black Sea Fleet's period of stationing on Ukrainian territory and for the size of rent.
The task of the Subcommission is to find a solution to the practical questions of the functioning of the Black Sea Fleet. The urgency of some of them gives rise to emotional outbursts which create nervosity around the stationing of our naval sailors in the Crimea.
We set ourselves the aim - guided by the basic agreements, to discuss the entire set of accumulated problems and work out a mechanism for solving them on a professional basis, without politicization and unnecessary emotions. This is important not only for the Black Sea Fleet, but also for Russian-Ukrainian relations as a whole.
We are convinced that a normal functioning of the Russian Black Sea Fleet and its interaction with the Ukrainian sailors for the purpose of ensuring security in the Black Sea region should be the connecting link between Russia and Ukraine and a factor of strengthening our good-neighborly relations.
Question: And the Russian delegation succeeded in carrying out this mandate?
Answer: It seems that we got off to a good start as regards this joint work. We've managed to shift practical matters into a legal field. We shall be trying to tackle them on a basis of mutual respect, as befits the two kindred nations.
We sensed that Kyiv is also seriously thinking of this.
Question: Please tell us in greater detail on the questions which were discussed at the talks in Kyiv.
Answer: These questions can roughly be divided into three groups: military-political, property and humanitarian.
A priority in the complex of military-political issues for Russia is the question of a technical renewal of the Black Sea Fleet - without this, the fleet is simply unable to perform its tasks. The basic agreements give Russia a right to alter the composition of the fleet within definite quantitative limits, once a year informing the Ukraine of this. In particular, the mechanism of replacement itself was discussed.
Also among priorities for Russia is reaching agreement on the parameters for actions by the Black Sea Fleet from the territory of Ukraine in crisis situations. This is particularly relevant in connection with the expanding participation of the fleet in international military cooperation, primarily in the context of counteraction against international terrorism.
In the course of the talks the Ukrainian side presented a draft of an agreement on this issue. We will study it and convey our considerations to Kyiv.
Speaking of property matters, I primarily have in mind the necessity of definitively settling what is linked to the division of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet between Russia and Ukraine. The relevant agreements were signed nine years ago, but some gaps are still present to this day. We want to remove the elements of incompleteness and uncertainty.
Alas, the problem which one would think should be the exclusive scope of professionals thoroughly familiar with it has become a subject of speculations, quite often with a political implication at that. There have turned out to be thrown into the information space a whole raft of assertions about illegal use by the Black Sea Fleet of hundreds of hectares of land in Sevastopol and about the fleet's astronomical income from subleasing.
While getting ready for the session of the Subcommission and at the session itself, we tried to find out what these assertions are based on. A check of the data presented by the Ukrainian side has shown that actually our colleagues have no exact perceptions on that point. The Russian side also has some ambiguities to clear up. For example, judging by the text of the basic agreements, Russia leases 4,591 facilities from Ukraine for the Black Sea Fleet's needs, but actually, by our estimates, the fleet is in possession of, and uses 4,512 objects. It turns out that 79 facilities for which Russia pays rent stay with Ukraine. This has to be sorted out. We asked the Ukrainian side to carry out necessary expert work and not make public statements in haste.
Question: And what about the subleasing, of which so much was said on the Ukrainian side?
Answer: We sorted out this matter too. In the first place, the Black Sea lived, of course, not by subleasing some of its premises. According to the Black Sea command, authorizations for subleasing were given in the interests of, among other things, socioeconomic development and employment in places of basing of the fleet. The matter was cleared with the government bodies of Ukraine and with local authorities. Rent was calculated on the basis of the methods approved by the Government of Ukraine. Tax payments went into local budgets. As of the end of 2005, 139 sublease agreements had been concluded, and Ukrainian courts, incidentally, have begun to confirm their legitimacy. As the practice of subleasing did not suit the Ukrainian side, however, the Black Se Fleet command initiated work on the termination of sublease agreements.
And, finally, humanitarian issues. They were also considered by us as priority ones. The fleet is not only ships and wharves, but also in the first place - living people. It is important how comfortable they feel.
In this field, indeed, quite a few problems have accumulated, for example, the problem of dual citizenship. Certain practical difficulties for the Black Sea Fleet also arise in connection with Ukrainian legislation on the rules for the stay of foreigners within Ukraine. The list of problems may be continued.
Proceeding from this, we offered the Ukrainian colleagues a comprehensive solution - to conclude a special treaty on the status of the Black Sea Fleet servicemen on Ukrainian territory. Russia has such agreements with a number of CIS countries, and these documents have acquitted themselves as an effective legal document.
We also suggested returning to work on an agreement to resolve the issues of jurisdiction and provide legal assistance in criminal matters. It appears that signing that document can help to reinforce the legal status of the Russian sailors and members of their families in Ukraine, and at the same time will eliminate some incongruous points in questions of the activity of Russian law enforcement bodies in the fleet deployed on Ukrainian territory.
We intend to be further concerned with this matter substantively, counting on a flexible and constructive approach of the Ukrainian side. For it is about people, ensuring a normal life for them, and a possibility to fully realize their civil rights.
Question: What caused the greatest difficulties in the talks?
Answer: The most acute at this point, unquestionably, is the situation with the navigation-and-hydrographic facilities of the Black Sea Fleet on Ukrainian territory. This past January around these facilities about 20 various unfriendly actions to our sailors were registered, which not only hindered the normal functioning of an important system for navigation safety, but also could provoke incidents with difficultly predictable consequences. Well, that the management of the Yalta Seaport, where a facility of the Hydrographic Service of the Black Sea Fleet - the Yalta Lighthouse - is located, does not admit to port territory the personnel of this facility is altogether a quite exceptional event.
As is known, in 1997 the question of the navigation-and-hydrographic service was solved in principle, but, unfortunately, without any final detailing. Upon the division of the Black Sea Fleet of the USSR, the bulk of the navigation system went to Ukraine. The Black Sea Fleet retained the facilities ensuring navigation on the section from Cape Tarkhunkut to Cape Ayu-Dag, that is along about 260 kilometers of Crimean coast. It was then agreed that a final division of the navigation facilities, the procedure of payments for their use, and the mechanism of ensuring navigation safety in the Black and Azov Seas could be determined in a separate agreement or several agreements.
At the time of signing the basic documents, no objections were voiced by the Ukrainian side on that point. Moreover, in 1998 the sides were close to the formalization of a relevant accord. The Ukrainian side gave consent to signing the jointly elaborated draft, but then had a change of heart and demanded that the facilities be handed over to it all at once. The talks on this basis came to a deadlock, and the Ukrainian side began to pursue a line on confiscating navigation facilities of the fleet through its own judicial system and executive bodies, and this from the international legal viewpoint is profoundly wrong.
Differences ought to be resolved by negotiations (especially as the basic agreements provide an appropriate mechanism for this purpose), and not by unilateral steps, as our Ukrainian partners are trying to do.
We indicated this in the talks with the utmost frankness, affirming readiness to again sit down at the negotiating table with a view to devising an appropriate agreement. We are certain that - given goodwill - solutions can be found which would correspond both to the interests of the Black Sea Fleet and to the international obligations of Ukraine.
Of course, we could not fail to return to the theme of the unceasing "protest actions" around the Black Sea Fleet's lighthouses, particularly since literally the day before the session of the Subcommission a new unpleasant incident had occurred in the area of the Kherson Lighthouse. Whatever the intentions of these actions' participants might be, they ought to understand that the question is one of military facilities, that is facilities of enhanced danger. Just as those ought to understand their responsibility who induce young people towards ill-considered steps.
Question: What are the practical results of the talks then?
Answer: First, in the frank discussions we sort of cleared territory for further movement forward and now understand better where we are and what is to be done.
Second, we agreed to set up five working groups which will take up elaboration of practical recommendations on individual issues: the inventory of the land plots and state property of Ukraine transferred for use to the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation; navigational and hydrographic support of navigation safety; military-political issues; ecological safety and environmental protection; and issues of jurisdiction and legal aspects of the functioning of Black Sea Fleet troop units.
It is about a significant intensification of the negotiation process on Black Sea Fleet problems. The working groups have to be formed in the coming days already so as to begin practical work in March.
The next session of the Subcommission is scheduled for April 2006, and it will be held in Moscow.
Question: With what feelings you left Kyiv? Of optimism? Of pessimism?
Answer: Generally - with faith in that this journey we together with the Ukrainian colleagues are going to cope with for sure.
Our Black Sea Fleet did not come to Sevastopol as an alien, it was born here and traveled a heroic road and so deserves worthy conditions.
We should exert all efforts towards this end.
February 17, 2006
